



THE MAGAZINE OF THE JOINT WARFARE CENTRE

THE THREE SWORDS

STAVANGER – NORWAY

EXCLUSIVE LOOK INTO
TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 OPPOSING FORCE



NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY STAVANGER 2015 & VISIT TO JWC

SECRETARY GENERAL

highlights NATO's long-term adaptation to new security challenges

LEADING TRANSFORMATION



Interview with General Denis Mercier, SACT

JWC OPTIMIZATION TRIAL



TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2015



GENDER PERSPECTIVE

in an evolving age & within Allied Command Operations





COVER

Clockwise: NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg shaking hands with Major General Reinhard Wolski, 12 October 2015. General Denis Mercier, SACT, at JWC. Photos by Vincent Micheletti, French Navy, JWC PAO. JWC Jättå Camp, photo by JWC PAO. TRJE15 mass paratroop by Canadian and Portuguese Army paratroopers, photo by NATO. A Norwegian female soldier participating in officer candidate school training. Photo by Torbjørn Kjosvold/Forsvaret.

BACK COVER

Clockwise: TRJE15 press conference in Troia, 5 November 2015 (from left to right: General Hans-Lothar Domröse, General Denis Mercier, General Petr Pavel and General Adrian Bradshaw). Photo by WO Artigues, HQ MARCOM. Canadian Ship Winnipeg in the Eastern Atlantic Ocean during TRJE15, photo by Ogle Henry. Portuguese Marines disembark an Osprey of U.S. Marines in Pinheiro da Cruz to take part in a heli assault, photo by Horta Pereira, NATO. A German Lynx conducting deck landing training on HMS OCEAN during TRJE15, photo by Des Wade, NATO. General Domröse during a CPX simulated press conference in Zaragoza, photo by JWC PAO.



NATO and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: The year 2015 marks the fifteenth anniversary of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, which recognizes that there can be no sustainable peace without equal inclusion of women and men alike. Articles in these pages explore the gender perspective and provide valuable insights into gender issues, including the implementation of a gender perspective within NATO's entire structure, notably in the fields of Crisis Management, Cooperative Security and Collective Defence.



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WELCOME



DEAR READER,

This is our first edition of The Three Swords Magazine since the implementation of JWC's trial organization in August 2015, which will ensure a more mission-focused Peacetime Establishment (PE) for the Centre. It will also make us better placed to respond to NATO's demands for more training and exercises. On the following pages you will learn more about JWC's new trial organization, its background, highlights and challenges.

As is the case every year, JWC has had a busy fall with exercises and key visitors and events, such as NATO Parliamentary Assembly's 61st Annual Session, which took place in Stavanger this year. Some of the key visits were that of Mr Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO Secretary General; General Petr Pavel, the Chairman of the Military Committee and General Denis Mercier, the new Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT).

If I had to sum up these last three months using just two words it would be TRIDENT JUNCTURE; the high-visibility NATO exercise in which JWC has been heavily involved since June 2013, and for which JWC has led the two-week Command Post Exercise. TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 saw the certification of NATO's Joint Force Command Brunssum for its standby command role for NATO Response Force (NRF) 16. The overall aim was increased readiness and preparedness of our forces to meeting all the security challenges that our Alliance faces.

One of the main themes of this issue is gender perspective in NATO, and how NATO fulfils its commitment to implement the UN Resolution on Women, Peace and Security. This is due to the fact that gender in operations has become an important Training Objective in NATO exercises and the nature of today's conflicts reminds us of the need for whole populations to work together for successful outcomes in peace talks and capacity building.

I hope that you will enjoy this edition and that the articles will contribute to knowledge sharing in our many specialist areas. My special thanks to all our contributors who made it possible to produce this edition of The Three Swords.

Finally, on behalf of the Public Affairs Office, I would like to take this opportunity to wish all of my fellow colleagues at the JWC, our contributors, and all of our readers a very happy and successful year 2016!

Lieutenant Colonel Stefan Kuehling
German Army
Chief Public Affairs Officer
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Special Thanks: Major Hubert de Quievrecourt, SACT Public Affairs Advisor; Eszter Skrinjar, SHAPE SAG; Colonel William Jones; Mr Peter Hutson; Mr Adrian Williamson; CPO Paul Thistlewaite.



THE THREE SWORDS MAGAZINE

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THE THREE SWORDS is the Joint Warfare Centre's authorised magazine published two times a year by the Public Affairs Office. It presents a compilation of articles, editorials, opinions, news and general information related to the JWC as well as a variety of key defence and security issues. Opinions expressed in this magazine are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the policies and points of view of NATO. The editor reserves the right to edit or shorten submissions.

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Major General Reinhard Wolski German Army Commander, Joint Warfare Centre

THE MOST FAMOUS MOTTO of the French Revolution was *liberté, égalité, fraternité*. More recently, the increase of terrorism around the world reminds us of the triad of values which has become our guiding light, with which we embrace a universal solidarity against those who oppose to it and try to undermine our way of life, freedom and democracy. We once again ponder and cherish our Alliance's common values, which have never been as important as now. It is with these values that we have defeated violence once, and it is with these values we will ensure the well-being and security of our present and future generations.

I would like to echo NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in that: "We stand strong and united in the fight against terrorism. Terrorism will never defeat democracy."

Forecasting the unpredictable will be our biggest challenge in the years to come.

Coming closer to home, with the execution of TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 (TRJE15), NATO's largest exercise in over a decade, we have just put behind us some busy months here at JWC. TRJE15 addressed some of the most important international security challenges and concepts of our time, from hybrid and conventional warfare, terrorism and cyber threats on one hand to Strategic Communications, theatre ballistic missile defence, complex maritime, air and Special Forces operations, Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance as well as conflict-related humanitarian emergencies on the other.

The successful Command Post Exercise was versatile and ambitious, providing our Training Audience with many operational dilemmas and strategic challenges. The Sorotan exercise scenario which was developed by JWC helped prepare the future NATO Response Force (NRF) for a quicker response to any conflict.

During TRJE15, JWC was honoured by the visits of Mr Jens Stoltenberg, General Petr Pavel, the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, and General Denis Mercier, NATO's new Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT). The SACT has an exclusive interview in this edition, which I strongly recommend you to read closely.



In August of this year, upon approval by NATO's Military Committee, we started the implementation phase of JWC's trial restructuring. With the transition of operations in Afghanistan in autumn 2014, JWC's responsibilities and missions have become more dynamic while retaining the same number of posts in our Peacetime Establishment. Therefore, this trial organization is very important for our future and for how we will handle the growing demands for our deliveries. We can now take the next step in developing it even further in areas where it is deemed necessary.

As the Warsaw Summit 2016 is quickly approaching, NATO's responsiveness and readiness can be observed to be increasing by the day, and it is the training and exercise scheme which is one of the main drivers for

this. NATO's unity is our most important capability, and conducting exercises also plays a part in achieving this unity. In this area, JWC is at the front and centre.

I hope you will find this eclectic collection of articles both interesting and inspiring. As an example, gender perspective, being one of the Alliance's new capabilities, makes for a cover story in this edition. To me gender in NATO is closely linked to common values, inclusiveness, comprehensive approach, equality and human rights.

I highly recommend each and every one of these articles for a good reading and learning experience.

It is a great pleasure to be leading this team of experts here in JWC. Together we add to our record of providing the best possible training for NATO's forces, and this is a precious mission. It has been an honour to provide training and exercises for the headquarters of the NATO Command and the NATO Force Structures. Indeed, by mid-December, the Centre will have conducted seven TRIDENT Series of Exercises in the past 14 months.

Before 2016 starts with ongoing operations, TRIDENT Series of Exercises and exercise planning events and scripting conferences, enjoy a blessed, peaceful and rewarding holiday season with your families.

I sincerely wish you all a healthy and happy New Year!

Reinhard Wolski

EXCLUSIVE

THE NEW ARCHITECT OF TRANSFORMATION

GENERAL DENIS MERCIER



General Denis Mercier, SACT.
Photo by NATO.

French Air Force General Denis Mercier currently leads the Transformation of NATO. He was appointed Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) during a change of command ceremony held on 30 September in Norfolk, Virginia, the United States. Being one of the two NATO Strategic Commands and the only permanent NATO headquarters in North America, Allied Command Transformation plays an essential role in maintaining and strengthening the vital transatlantic link between Europe and North America and leading the transformation of NATO's military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine. Previous to this assignment, General Mercier served as the French Air Force Chief of Staff, leading French airmen and airwomen on many fronts, including North Africa and the Middle East, as well during the air policing mission over the Baltic States. The following interview took place on 9 November 2015, during SACT's first official visit to the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC).

Interview by Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO. Photographs by CPO Vincent Micheletti, French Navy.

Sir, first we would like to thank you for giving us this exclusive interview for *The Three Swords Magazine*. What were your thoughts when you learned that you had been designated as NATO's new SACT?

— It is a Commander's duty and my pleasure to answer questions from all ACT members and organizations. Thank you for giving me this opportunity to address the JWC and to reach out to your readers. Upon my appointment, I felt a strong sense of pride and motivation to

lead the Allied Command Transformation, but I was also humbled by the faith and trust placed in me. The very uncertain world we live in makes leading the Transformation a challenging mission; and also ensuring that we will enable our Alliance to continue to fulfil its three core tasks, namely Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security, today and in the future. All in all, I remain confident in our ability to keep this Transformation moving forward.





SACT's ALL HANDS ADDRESS TO ACT

During his first All Hands address to the leaders and staff of Allied Command Transformation on 13 October 2015, General Denis Mercier advocated a full capacity-based approach to Transformation. General Mercier said: "I want this Command to be resolutely oriented towards the development of NATO's future capacity, while concurrently and coherently addressing short-term adaptation requirements, such as the Readiness Action Plan and other important preparatory works for Warsaw."

According to General Mercier, the foundation stones for NATO's future capacity were built upon the following:

1. C4ISTAR (Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target, Acquisition and Reconnaissance): General Mercier said that C4ISTAR would "increasingly become the heart of modern warfare." He added: "In a nutshell, we have to think 'system'. And the backbone of our system will be C4ISTAR."

2. Projection, mobility and sustainability: General Mercier said that this was a key area for NATO's fighting capacity as it would "continue to enable our forces to deploy and to sustain their operations."

3. Training and Partnerships: Exercises and training benefit everyone involved and give NATO greater flexibility in long-range planning as well as increased readiness and interoperability. The very nature of present conflicts indicates that military leaders and their civilian counterparts will work in even closer coordination than ever before. "At the end, exercises will send an underlying message of the credibility of our Alliance's capacity and posture, and finally bolster the deterrence," said General Mercier.

4. Manpower: The General's focus was on enriching education and individual training by introducing new ways of delivery and also by leveraging new information technologies. "NATO's fighting capacity will rely on the quality and on the competencies of the people who will be part of it," General Mercier underlined.

5. Capabilities: "Building NATO's fighting capacity means providing the Alliance with the required capabilities to meet its level of ambition with each capability being developed along the DOTMLPFI (Doctrine,

Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Information/ Interoperability) framework," the General said, citing the Readiness Action Plan as a great example of NATO's capacity.

General Mercier then highlighted the five strategic military focus areas in his speech. He said: "I believe that all the solutions and proposals that this headquarters will provide to NATO and the Nations to enhance or adapt part of the capacity must be cross-checked against their ability to increase: NATO's operational agility, strategic awareness, security networking, shared resilience and/or Strategic Communications—the five strategic military perspectives addressed in the Framework for Future Alliance Operations."

General Mercier listed his core values as Respect, Service and Excellence. In conclusion, he said that each and all of the Transformation family played a role in strengthening NATO's capacity. General Mercier concluded: "There may be some of you who think that their work, as good as it may be, has no impact on today's and tomorrow's changing world. Let me assure you, it is not true. As economist Peter Drucker said: The best way to predict the future is to create it. The Future starts here, with you, with all of us as **one team**."

What does Transformation mean to you?

— The question could equally have been: What do we do in ACT? My concern here is what do we transform. We all need to understand the results and the objectives of our Transformation. We are not transforming for the sake of transforming. And, as to what we transform, it is best described as NATO's posture, which enables and will continue to enable our Alliance to fulfil its three core tasks. Our output is, therefore, operational. We transform our posture, so that when SACEUR uses it, be it today, tomorrow, or in the future, he has at his disposal the right forces and the overall posture required to deliver the right effects. And it is very important that we all understand this. Because we need to bear in mind that all the processes in ACT, such as Smart Defence, Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) and most of our projects are intended to provide the Alliance with a strong posture, which is the operational ability

to face any challenge. And this is what I want this command to concentrate on.

What will be your main focus areas in the near future and which areas, in your view, require further attention?

— This is a great question, as it allows me to highlight the areas we will be working on. The posture is composed of forces (conventional, nuclear, missile defence) at an appropriate level of readiness. But, to make this posture relevant and credible at the military level, we must ensure that it develops on a robust foundation based on six focus areas:

- Command and Control,
- Logistics and Sustainment,
- Collective Training,
- Partnership,
- Manpower,
- Capabilities.

Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine have changed the security environment in Europe. NATO's Secretary General said that NATO is now implementing its biggest reinforcement of Collective Defence since the end of Cold War; how do you define NATO's new challenges? What concerns you most?

— I believe there is, in fact, one vital challenge, which is to develop the appropriate posture to fulfil our three core tasks and to confront all the threats we face, irrespective of where they originate from. This posture must take into account ongoing threats as well as potential strategic surprises, which we must be able to face with the appropriate level of readiness. Our main challenge is therefore to define this posture and adapt it to current and future situations. However, we must not forget that this posture must face challenges from 360 degrees, and that we are not only focused on threats from the east.





"BE AMBITIOUS AND AIM HIGH"

Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, General Denis Mercier, during a Joint Press Conference following TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2015 live demonstration at San Gregorio training area, Spain. NATO photo by Edouard Bocquet.

JWC is NATO's premier organization for joint operational level training and warfare. What are your expectations from the Centre?

— NATO's posture requires a high level of training in all kinds of environments and development of future concepts and doctrine. It is JWC's role to take into account new and emerging threats, such as cyber threats, hybrid warfare, ballistic missiles, etc. Let me share something with you: when I went to the three consecutive Distinguished Visitor (DV) days of exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 (TRJE15), I had one concern, which was "were we being too ambitious?" But the feedback I got from the various levels involved was overwhelmingly positive, participating headquarters came away delighted and felt that the experience that this exercise had given them had changed them. To me this indicated that the more ambitious we are with our exercises, the better they become. So, I would encourage you to always aim high, be more ambitious in your scenarios and in preparing the exercises you are entrusted with.

How effective are exercises in achieving NATO's effectiveness and efficiency?

— In these exercises we can train all the different

levels of the Chain of Command, from the tactical units up to the Strategic Commands. This full range of effectiveness, from a clear demonstration of the credibility of our posture at the strategic level down to the proof of our interoperability at the tactical level, is the guarantee of the effectiveness of the exercises. They are built around realistic scenarios, which can cover all the range of the threats that the Alliance must face. What I saw during TRJE15 has completely fulfilled those requirements, and the lessons learned during the exercise will help us to further strengthen the efficiency of our Alliance.

What are your observations from TRJE15?

— I am very satisfied with exercise TRJE15 and with what I witnessed during the DV days in Italy, Spain and Portugal. This large-scale and very ambitious exercise has achieved its objectives and will help the Alliance develop the right posture. It also pleases me to see that TRJE15 allowed us to experiment with new concepts and train on new threats, such as hybrid warfare and cyber-attacks. Further, the exercise involved many Partners and international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as industry ob-

servers. However, the aim was not to train together, but to test our interoperability and coordination efforts in all kinds of environments, which we also achieved.

Do you have people that you look to for guidance and inspiration?

— You, the JWC, first of all. You and the other ACT Centres, the JALLC in Monsanto, Portugal, and the JFTC in Bydgoszcz, Poland. In the ACT organization as a whole, we have a wide spectrum of capabilities and we need to exploit them all. I would like to stress that you are not working *for* me; you are working *with* me, in order to enable the NATO Alliance to face any future challenge.

To conclude, what is your message to NATO's Transformation community?

— I have been impressed with the professionalism and the unique skills that I've seen during my visits to the various Centres. We will continue to rely on you for the preparation of Allied forces, and we will be asking more and more of you, in order to reach the highest level of readiness for our Alliance. In other words: we must strive to become even more ambitious! ✦



According to SACT, Transformation is about "finding the right tuning, the right measure, while continuously fostering innovation, and whenever possible exploiting this innovation to explore new directions." During his visit to the Joint Warfare Centre on 9 November, SACT received comprehensive briefings about JWC's simulation media and CAX (Computer Assisted Exercise) capabilities. Clockwise: SACT with Major General Reinhard Wolski and as he signs the JWC Guest Book on arrival; SACT shaking hands with Mr Bartek Jedra and visiting the simulation TV Studio; Mr Nils Skarland, JWC's Financial Controller; Major General Wolski during a meeting with SACT; the main entrance of the JWC Training Facility; SACT with the simulation TV producer, Ms Laura Loflin DuBois and attending a presentation on JWC's CAX capabilities by CAX Specialist Mr Phil Draper.



GENDER PERSPECTIVE

IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY: NATO and its partners are taking action to promote the role of women in peace and security. This demonstrates their commitment to support the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and related Resolutions (1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122 and 2422). These Resolutions recognize the disproportionate impact that war and conflict has on women and children and highlight the fact that historically women have been left out of peace processes and stabilization efforts. They call for full and equal participation of women at all levels ranging from conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction, peace and security. They call for the prevention of sexual violence and accountability to end impunity for incidents of sexual violence in conflict. Together, these resolutions frame NATO's Women, Peace and Security agenda.¹

(1) Women, Peace and Security (NATO, UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions) last updated: 29 October 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91091.htm.



Clockwise: Kosovar Albanians at a refugee camp, 1999. Northfoto, Shutterstock.com. A female Force Protection soldier in Afghanistan. Photo by Kim Gulbrandsen, Forsvaret. A dentist in a PRT camp outside Meymaneh, Afghanistan. Photo by Torbjørn Kjosvold, Forsvaret. A little boy holds hands with a member of a Female Engagement Team in Helmand, Afghanistan. Photo by Cpl Katherine Keleher.



The military instrument does play a central role in putting an end to Conflict-related Sexual and Gender-based violence. And, everyone under my Command has clear direction and guidance in the way we analyze, plan and conduct NATO operations and missions. NATO will integrate a gender perspective to the regular tasks of training, advising and assisting local forces. The importance of military personnel as role models and positive agents for change in this regard should not be underestimated, especially in mentoring and training.

**GENERAL PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE**

The confluence of crises that characterize this moment in history—from rising violent extremism to levels of civilian displacement not seen since the Second World War—cannot divert our commitment to the cause of human rights. Rather, the urgency of combating the threats posed right now to women's lives and livelihoods must capture the world's attention anew. Women's rights don't end when wars begin.

**ZAINAB HAWA BANGURA
THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT**

UNSCR 1325 is the landmark "No Women, No Peace" resolution, which recognizes that there can be no sustainable peace without equal inclusion of women and men alike.

**AMBASSADOR MARRIËT SCHUURMAN
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE FOR WOMEN, PEACE
AND SECURITY**

For me [gender equality] is a matter of principle. Ensuring gender equality has always been central to who I am. We simply cannot achieve lasting peace and security without engaging half the world's population. Too often, we overlook the critical and rightful role women have to play in resolving crises and in rebuilding societies after conflict. Gender equality isn't optional. It is fundamental. It allows us to respond better and smarter to the many complex security challenges we face today.

**JENS STOLTENBERG
THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL**

The nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically in recent times. Whereas war traditionally could be described as being a fight over territory between two countries through the instruments of well-trained, disciplined armies facing each other on the battlefield, modern warfare is predominantly intrastate or domestic, waged by non-state actors and triggered by issues of identity, ethnicity, religion and competition for land or resources, particularly oil and mineral wealth. The changing nature of armed conflict has also led to a transformation in terms of who is mostly affected by the hostilities. In contemporary low-intensity wars, rebel groups—and government forces—often kill civilians and defy international law. It has been said that most civilians tend to die from war rather than in battle. And women have ended up on the front-line; not as soldiers, but as victims.

**MARGOT WALLSTRÖM, SWEDEN'S
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

**ALL OPPRESSION
CREATES A STATE
OF WAR.**

**SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR
WRITER, PHILOSOPHER**

We live in a world where our security environment is ever-changing; where new threats emerge and where we have to constantly adapt to protect our values and our freedom. We manage to do so thanks to the service men and women who play an essential role in protecting NATO's security and defending its values in missions and operations. It is by standing together and recruiting from the whole talent pool that NATO remains strong, ready, and able to counter any threat.

**GENERAL PETR PAVEL
THE CHAIRMAN OF NATO
MILITARY COMMITTEE**

**IT IS MORE DANGEROUS
TO BE A WOMAN IN A
CONFLICT ZONE THAN IT
IS TO BE A SOLDIER.**

**AMBASSADOR ALEXANDER VERSHBOW
NATO DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL**

Gender Perspective and its Place within ACO Now and In the Future

BY CHARLOTTE ISAKSSON
Gender Advisor to SACEUR/ACO
SHAPE HQ

This article describes gender perspective at NATO's Allied Command Operations (ACO) while addressing key achievements and challenges in the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) and related resolutions and concludes with a consideration of future developments.

1325

* Fifteen years ago, in October 2000, the United Nations Security Council adopted the historic resolution 1325.

* UNSCR 1325 addresses the significant and disproportionate impact that armed conflict has on women and girls as well as recognizes the under-valued and under-utilized contributions women make to conflict prevention, peace-keeping, conflict resolution and peace-building.

RECOMMENDED READING

Special Report: Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace www.un-women.org

IN OCTOBER 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). This was the first time women's experiences of conflict were linked to the international peace and security agenda, which recognized the disproportionate impact that armed conflicts have on women. It also acknowledged the fact that women continue to be excluded from participation in peace processes and as such, stressed the importance of women as active agents in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. In 2007, through the adoption of the first policy on UNSCR 1325, NATO took the first step on its path of implementing 1325 and has since been developing its own capacities to understand the role that

gender plays within conflict. This commitment was reinforced through new versions of policies, the latest from the summer of 2004, and then again in March 2015, with General Philip M. Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) stating that "gender equality and women's empowerment are critical to the security and success of the Alliance and its Partners."

MEN, WOMEN, BOYS AND GIRLS all suffer from war and conflict. Such suffering comes in many shapes, not only death and injury, but also displacement, trauma, abuse, and loss of control over and access to essential resources for life. The different impact that these changes has on different social groups results in exacerbation of gender inequalities during periods



Photo by Jon Ingemundsen.
Stavanger Aftenblad.

1325: Greater participation of women in conflict resolution, more respect for women's rights in conflicts and more women's perspectives in peacekeeping.

DID YOU KNOW?

In 2006, seven award-winning playwrights joined together and created a documentary theatre piece; seven monologues that illuminated seven extraordinary women and their inspiring journeys. Then, they worked together to weave these monologues into the acclaimed documentary play, "Seven". After its tour around the globe in 2013, "Seven" achieved its military premiere at HQ SHAPE on 11 March 2014, during which seven high-ranking military personnel gave their voices to seven women's rights activists.

In May 2015, the ACO Gender Advisor Office, together with SHAPE WoMen, arranged the reading of the documentary play for the second time. Over 150 people came to see this second performance on 7 May at 7 p.m. In addition to the SHAPE community, the audience also included members from NATO HQ, showing that "Seven by SHAPE" was truly an event that was supported by all elements of SHAPE as well as the broader NATO community. Mrs. Cindy Breedlove, an active supporter of SHAPE WoMen, in her welcom-

ing remarks, linked the powerful stories of "Seven by SHAPE" and the work by NATO to support women as actors in peace building in conflict situations.

"Since the reading at SHAPE last year, 'Seven on Tour' has worked in Latvia, Montenegro, Ukraine, Sweden, Kosovo, Norway, the United States and in Bangladesh and has started activities in Belarus and Egypt," said Hedda Krausz Sjögren, the producer of the play. She added proudly: "In all of these countries, the reading by SHAPE Generals has received great attention. Many positive voices have been raised about the fact that a military organization and its top leadership acknowledge women's rights and gender equality in their internal as well as external processes."

In summary, by taking on the task of playing the parts of women militating against gender-based discrimination, the high-ranking military personnel showed their absolute dedication for women's rights and equality during this 70-minute play.



of armed conflict. Unless addressed, this situation can continue during post-conflict reconstruction, undermining the fabric of a society already overwhelmed by the immediate impact of the violence. Women's participation in conflict resolution is essential and thus differing gender dimensions need to be considered during the analysis, planning, conducting and evaluation of operations. Combined with the essential need to protect civilians, this requires NATO personnel and planners at all levels to ensure that they develop a comprehensive understanding of the military operating environment and the wider civilian setting.

Within NATO, gender perspective is a cross-cutting theme where responsibility lies with the Commander. Gender advisory personnel within ACO have a critical role to play in ensuring that there is an active promotion of women's empowerment and gender equality in NATO's military contribution to long-term security and stability.

The work within the NATO Strategic Commands is focused on the institutionalization of an integrated gender perspective into NATO operations, missions, training and exercises. According to the NATO definition, the integration of gender perspective is a way of assessing the gender-based differences of

women and men that are reflected in their social roles and interactions in the distribution of power and the access to resources.

Key achievements and challenges

A critical step forward for NATO's military component was the development of the practical proposals and guidelines for implementing UNSCR 1325 in the form of the Bi-SC Directive 40-1, which is a comprehensive directive providing adequate and relevant guidance for all levels of the military structure, including national military forces of Member Nations and its Partners.

"WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION IS ESSENTIAL AND THUS DIFFERING GENDER DIMENSIONS NEED TO BE CONSIDERED DURING THE ANALYSIS, PLANNING, CONDUCTING AND EVALUATION OF OPERATIONS."

With every policy comes the need for a supporting structure to ensure its implementation. A successful implementation of the UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming within NATO is therefore only achieved through the establishment of gender advisory positions throughout the organization. At the NATO Strategic Command level, both ACO and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) have Gender Advisors who report directly to the Commander as well as to the Joint Force Commands at the operational level. This has then been mirrored by the creation of gender advisory positions at the theatre/tactical level. These advisors are situated so that they report directly to the Commander to achieve maximum effect.

The main challenge for the advisor structure is the dilemma posed by vacant positions. If positions at the various levels remain vacant, it creates a situation that will interfere with the chain of command, which in turn will have a decisive effect on implementation of the directives and orders related to UNSCR 1325 and Bi-SC Directive 40-1. In addition to the appointment of full-time and part-time Gender Advisors, there will also be a need for our individual commands to appoint Gender Focal Points, with gender as a secondary role, across their organizations. Appointing Gender Focal Points is an





Left: NATO Generals and key leaders rehearse their lines prior to the start of this year's play (from left): SHAPE Chief of Staff, General Werner Freers; ACO Command Senior Enlisted Leader, Chief Master Sergeant Richard Small; Military Representative of Sweden to the Military Committees of EU and NATO, Rear Admiral Odd Werin; Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Intelligence Directorate, Major General Gordon B. "Skip" Davis, Jr.; Deputy Chief of Staff, Resources Directorate, Major General Fernando Alejandro; Deputy Commander of Joint Force Command Brunssum, Air Marshal Graham Stacey; and SHAPE Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans Directorate, Major General Jerzy Biziewski. Photo by Staff Sergeant Andrew Davis, U.S. Air Force, HQ SHAPE. **Above:** The premiere of "Seven" at HQ SHAPE on 11 March 2014. Photo by SHAPE PAO.

effective approach to supporting full integration where the objective is for each and every part of the structure to work with an integrated gender perspective. These functions should be seen in the light of the Special Representative to the NATO Secretary General on Women, Peace and Security, first appointed in 2012.

Even though a robust policy platform has been formalized, the challenge still lies in successfully putting the policies into practice throughout our organization. Starting a new initiative where one struggles to understand the why and how of it, constitutes a challenge. This is why the integration of gender perspective into daily activities such as analysis, planning, conducting and evaluation of operations and exercises has proven to be very helpful in making it understandable for colleagues. Indeed, suddenly a light bulb goes off and they often say: "this isn't how I thought it was." Integrating gender perspective into exercises has been very important and effective in terms of transforming the views of colleagues to where they can genuinely see how gender, as a cross-cutting theme, relates to day-to-day business and operations at a military HQ.

Outside of exercises, the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan has embodied a key step forward in this regard.

"UNSCR 1325 and Gender Equality" is one of the Military Strategic Objectives for the RSM. Its planning process showed that integrating a gender perspective is no longer an afterthought, but part of the entire planning cycle, from political decision-making, to development of the Operational Plan (OPLAN) and generation of

forces. RSM was also the first mission where Allies and Partner Nations made the required gender expertise available at all levels from the very beginning of the mission.

NATO, as well as other deployed military forces, is integrating a gender perspective in the regular tasks of training, advising and assisting



Exercise NOBLE JUMP 2015. Photo by NATO.





Above: Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 (TRJE15) simulated press conference conducted by Joint Warfare Centre's media team with General Hans-Lothar Domröse, Commander Joint Force Command Brunssum. TRJE15 exercised gender perspective fully into the analysis, planning, conduct and evaluation processes. Both General Philip M. Breedlove, SACEUR (right) and General Domröse are strong advocates of implementing gender perspectives within NATO. Photo (above) by Emily Langer, (right) by NATO.

local forces. The importance of military personnel as role models and positive agents for change in this regard must not be underestimated, especially in mentoring and training. This is particularly true in the context of Security Sector Reform and Security Force Assistance, as well as other capacity building exercises for local security forces, which aim to increase local ability to address and handle issues of Conflict-related Sexual and Gender-based Violence (CR SGBV), and to provide equal security to men, women, girls and boys in their societies.

From policy to practice: Working through organizational change

Dealing with the theory of change has been instrumental for ACO's transformation and implementation. In short, it deals with the concept of leadership commitment and active involvement, local ownership, and responsibility of first and foremost the Commander, but also that of everyone else (top-down and bottom-up). For ACO, this meant a need to find and define our own internal stakeholders and actors who would assume responsibility for the change process as well as for reaching our desired goal.

Individuals with already perceived strong platforms and high status participated in the first echelon. The agents for change have been, by purpose, individuals with substantial understanding and knowledge of the organization, or key personnel who could easily communicate and relate to both the people as well as the tasks. As is well understood, *change from within* is more likely to be accepted, sustained and implemented, and this has been evident in the case of ACO's implementation of gender perspective.

Based on prior experience with organizational change, it is clear that one of the most common reasons for failure is a neglect of the organization's culture. In a military organization, it is imperative to understand the military culture and its potential impact on a change process. It is also vital to accept that there may be resistance to change at the organizational as well as individual levels. Such resistance occurs for various reasons. For many, a change process can be perceived as a threat to their rank, or the proposed change might challenge existing values and culture. Most importantly, if the reasons behind a change process are not fully understood by those in the institution, resistance is much more likely to occur. To ensure success, ACO has expended great ef-

fort in anchoring the change processes with a focus on bringing on board key leaders, both formal and informal, throughout the organization. But, changing the mindset of an entire organization takes time. Creating and fostering change is not only about building competence on gender and women's perspectives; it requires skills in sociology and change management too. It must be understood that the integration of gender perspective will be made mainly on the organization's own terms, and taking ownership of these issues in the organization is a must.

GENDER EQUALITY and women's empowerment are critical to the security and success of the Alliance and its Partners. Unfortunately, the overall picture for women in many parts of the world remains dark and grim—Conflict-related Sexual and Gender-based Violence





A more diverse military; a stronger and more capable armed forces. Picture shows a member of the Female Engagement Team talking to a group of children after securing their compound during a foot patrol in Afghanistan. Photo by NATO (ISAF, 2012).

remains a significant and widely overlooked problem. In countries where NATO conducts ongoing missions we must utilize all our capabilities to make sure that Conflict-related Sexual and Gender-based Violence makes it onto the security agenda. NATO can demonstrate best practice, and act as a role model, especially when it comes to capacity building and providing training for local security forces—a key element in establishing upstream security. NATO must help national security forces take the lead in addressing the gender perspectives by regularly liaising and mentoring of their forces, and by encouraging their training development with "Train the Trainer" programmes for their security institutions. Additionally, within and together with the host nations, we must work to synchronize our efforts with other organizations that are operating in the same environment as part of NATO efforts. Finally, NATO must ensure a continued focus on the incorporation of the gender perspective based on the core principles of UNSCR 1325: participation, protection and prevention.

What lies ahead of us?

Achieving gender equality requires both gender balance and gender mainstreaming. Conflict-related Sexual and Gender-based Violence is a

symptom of inequality—gender inequality—and while almost everyone agrees that gender equality is critical, there has been a slow progress on the broader underlying gender equality front in most nations, including the NATO Alliance and its Partners.

This year's NATO Committee on Gender Perspective Conference featured the topic of the recruitment and retention of women in our armed forces. Many of the NATO Nations' militaries still struggle with full integration of women into their military forces where women are still mainly present within the lower ranks and in supportive roles. These internal weaknesses constitute challenges for the Alliance when it implements the agenda of Women, Peace and Security, and addresses Conflict-related Sexual and Gender-based Violence.

This begs the question: how can NATO, with its own internal gender-related challenges, credibly respond to security problems and participation of women in its external operations? The short answer: NATO will struggle, but ambitions are high, the policy framework in place and Nations' commitment outspoken and strong. However, this will still call for challenges not in the least when it comes to maintaining our own organizational credibility as we look to ensure equal participation and protection of men and women in a crisis.

One positive change is that the pervasive "boys will be boys" attitude within military institutions, including peacekeeping operations, is slowly changing. In many nations, military culture is coming under increasing scrutiny, and the armed forces are trying to better understand, prevent and respond to cases of sexual harassment, assault, abuse, discrimination and sexualized treatment of female, as well as male personnel. They are also trying to eradicate often widespread cultures that blame, encourage silence, and act with hostility toward victims.

Sexual harassment, discrimination, sexual abuse, and sexual assault in our own institutions cannot be left out unmentioned. A victim of Sexual and Gender-based Violence perpetrated by a fellow soldier, officer, or other official within an organization, where trust is fundamental for unit cohesion, is indeed troubling. The internal aspects matter in relation to the execution of operations and missions—if there is no respect and protection within a unit, the ability to foster and develop respect and protection for the local populations has to be questioned. We must continue to invest in explaining, training and educating, and what is more: we must continue to practice what we preach. ✦



Charlotte Isaksson, the Gender Advisor to the SACEUR and Allied Command Operations.

An exclusive interview with Ms Isaksson can be viewed at www.youtube.com/watch?v=QseZ9AqiAx0



Left: Ambassador Schuurman is a career diplomat who has served in many different countries and regions and in a variety of priority policy areas of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prior to her nomination as Special Representative, Ambassador Schuurman was the representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹. Ambassador Marriët Schuurman was appointed the NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security in October 2014. The Ambassador speaks English, French, German and Russian.

(1) Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

INTERVIEW

By Franziska Hofmann, NATO School PAO

Ambassador Marriët Schuurman NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security

The recruitment and retention of women has been steadily increasing over the past few decades. What potential do you see with the increasing percentage of women in Allied armed forces?

— The percentage of women in the Allied forces of NATO has been increasing, but it has been increasing very slowly. In the past fifteen years we went up from 7% to 10%. If we want to continue to increase that percentage, we must recognize that having a gender balance improves performance and that it is of critical importance to have women in the armed forces. We need to tap into all the potential our society has to offer in order to be more effective in our response to the new security challenges that we face today. NATO is an Alliance of democracies and is built to defend equal rights and opportunities and fundamental freedom. As a matter of credibility we have to lead by example, but it is also a matter of capability. We need to be more inclusive in order to find better answers to security challenges.

With the implementation of UNSCR 1325, NATO and its Partners are committed to removing barriers for women's participation in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building. They are

also committed to reducing the risk of conflict-related and gender-based violence. Can you give us an example on how NATO aims to implement these goals?

— The Action Plan is to start in our own house. That means to integrate gender perspectives as our day-to-day work ethic and in the procedures on how we look at security, analyze, and find answers to security threats along with planning, education and training. We have to ask ourselves what we can do to ensure that in our institutions we have a better balance in gender. This will lead to recruitment and the retention of women in our own armed forces, but also in other security institutions that we have within NATO and our Partner states. NATO is implementing military guidelines on the prevention and response to sexual violence in conflicts. Applying these guidelines to our planning measures, education and training of our troops and the reporting procedures will prevent sexual violence in the area of operations more effectively.

The United Nations Secretary General stated "Forming gender equality is not optional; it is fundamental." What more needs to be done to better integrate women in security?

— NATO has done a lot in terms of integrat-

ing gender perspectives and gender equality when it comes to planning and executing peace operations. The goal is to integrate gender perspectives in our daily tasks of NATO, which are not only peace operations and crisis management but also security cooperation and Collective Defence. It is not only on how we perceive security worldwide, but also on how we perceive our own peace and security internally. This is the real challenge because it changes the mindset on how we perceive our own peace and security in a more comprehensive and inclusive manner. That is the leadership challenge that we face today to make sure that the UNSCR 1325 is also relevant when it comes to defending our own peace and security. This can only be achieved with strong committed political leadership. ✚

This interview was conducted on 13 July 2015.

RECOMMENDED READING

* NATO and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Time to Bring It Home.

Written by Marriët Schuurman and published in Connections: The Quarterly Journal (Vol XIV, Nr 3, Summer 2015) this article can be found at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_124032.htm?selectedLocale=en



Remarks by NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow at the United Nations Security Council Open Debate on the High-Level Review of UNSCR 1325

13 October 2015

IT IS MORE DANGEROUS to be a woman in a conflict zone than it is to be a soldier. That brutal fact led the United Nations to pass Resolution 1325 fifteen years ago. Its aim? To inspire a new approach to international security, where the views and actions of women are every bit as important as those of men, and where their inclusion is guaranteed.

For too long, the needs and interests of women have been ignored, both during times of conflict and when making and keeping the peace. If peace is to be sustainable, then it must include the voices of women. You cannot ignore half of the population.

NATO is proud of its record of implementing 1325. Within our operations in Afghanistan and in the Balkans, we have made a tangible difference to the lives of women in conflict and post-conflict countries. The root of our success to date comes from embedding a gender perspective deep within our organization, and from keeping things as practical as possible.

- We are incorporating gender perspectives within NATO's analysis, planning, execution and evaluation of all our operations and missions,
- NATO's Strategic Commands are implementing new guidelines on the prevention and response to Conflict-related Sexual and Gender-based Violence,
- We have a wide network of Gender Advisors,
- We are placing gender perspectives at the centre of defence planning and reporting by our Member Nations,
- Gender is a key principle of our "Defence Capacity Building Initiative" with our Partners around the world,
- We are implementing the first Trust Fund with Jordan on gender training for their armed forces,
- And, in May, we appointed our first-ever female NATO Commander, Brigadier General Giselle Wilz of the U.S. Army, at NATO's Headquarters in Sarajevo.

NATO is doing a lot. But, we need to do more, especially when it comes to promoting equal participation within

NATO itself. We need to increase active and meaningful participation of women. To this end, we pledge:

- To share best practices and valuable lessons learned among our Allies and Partners on increasing female participation at decision-making levels in our own structures,
- To accelerate the advancement of women in our own headquarters by establishing a Women's Professional Network and Mentoring Programme,
- To actively encourage Allies to submit female candidates for our most senior decision-making positions,
- To strengthen our partnership for gender equality with other international organizations, including the UN, OSCE, European Union and the African Union,
- To finance gender-sensitive research aimed at identifying drivers of radicalization and violent extremism, and to develop targeted and evidence-based responses, including the empowerment of women to safeguard communities,
- We also welcome the broad participation of civil society in the development, execution and monitoring of our NATO/EAPC Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security and as a next step, we pledge to establish a civil society advisory panel to institutionalize that positive engagement.

The world is changing rapidly. We face a rising tide of violent extremism and terrorism. And it will be women, once again, who are most at risk. It is therefore essential that women be involved at every stage, and every level, of our operations and missions.

Improving gender equality within NATO not only improves our credibility; it is essential to our ability to do our job right. Gender equality enhances our ability to respond and to deal with crises. Diversity gives us strength. Being inclusive will allow us to achieve our common goal: lasting peace and security.

NORDIC CENTRE FOR GENDER IN MILITARY OPERATIONS



BY CDR JAN DUNMURRAY
Commander, NCGM



Photo: Johan Lunddahl

THE NATURE OF MODERN CONFLICTS is changing rapidly and our security forces face considerable challenges trying to assist in building secure and democratic states founded on sustainable peace. To meet these challenges the need to understand the conflict environment, its inhabitants and driving forces is extremely important. To have the gender perspective means to be able to discern when men, women, boys and girls are affected differently in any given situation or operation because of their gender. Integrating the gender perspective in operations increases the military forces' effect on strengthening the overall security situation, the human rights as well as the entire populations' ability to take full and equal part in the peacebuilding process.

Further, a well incorporated gender perspective also leads to increased participation by women in peace processes and highlights women's roles as actors both during and after a conflict. Collected information and intelligence must represent the civil society as a whole and include sex-disaggregated data to be used in performing a complete and proper analysis.

The gender perspective is applicable in both peacetime establishments and in crisis establishments and echoes NATO's three core tasks, namely Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security. Moreover, gender perspective is also about equality and gender balance within NATO's own forces. Only when men and women are represented on all levels and in all positions will we "practice what we preach".

NCGM

The Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) is a world leading hub of knowledge and a platform for training and education. The establishment of the centre in 2012 was a joint venture by the Nordic countries' armed forces and their commitment to integrate the UN Security Council's Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325) and its related resolutions into military operations. Since February 2013, NCGM serves as the NATO Department Head on matters of gender. In this capacity, NCGM translates NATO's strategic and operational requirements into an education and training programme and offers support to NATO Nations and Partners with subject matter expertise.

Military personnel on all levels receive mandatory training in how to integrate the gender perspective and UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions into planning and operations.

NCGM supplements this education and training with instructors, participation in exercises, instruction materials and other products. The newly released "National Training Package on Gender" has been developed to support all NATO Allies and Partners in knowing how to integrate gender perspective in all armed forces. The package is available at no charge and can be downloaded at www.act.nato.int

To conclude, applying the gender perspective to national and collective defence, crisis management operations and peace support operations will improve operational effectiveness and strengthen our military capabilities. Together, we can all contribute to more effective and successful outcomes of military operations, and in the long run, to a world where everyone can take full and equal part in building long-lasting peace. ✦

NCGM COURSES AND SEMINARS

<p>Gender Field Advisor (GFA) Course (NATO Selected)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 28 participants • Pre-deployment for GFA, GENAD • Focus on the advisory role and gender perspective in operational planning processes 	<p>Gender Commanding Officers Seminar</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 20 participants • Commanders — OF4-OF6 • Focus on COs' role in integrating gender perspective into military operations • Operational and tactical level
<p>Gender Training of Trainers (GTOT) course (NATO Selected)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 25 participants • Trainers — OF1-OF4 or OR5-OR9 • Focus on training troops, units and officers in gender perspective in military operations (methodology) 	<p>Gender Key Leader Seminar (NATO Selected)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15 participants • Flag Officers — OF6-OF9 and Ambassadors • How gender perspective contributes to achieving political, military, strategic and operational objectives

For more information, visit www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/swedint/nordic-centre-for-gender-in-military-operations/

INTERVIEW

By Inci Kucukaksoy and
Sonia Bjerke Abdelmaguid

Colonel Stéphane Bellamy

Former Chief of JWC's Joint Capability
Integration Division and GENAD



As JWC's first Gender Advisor (GENAD), can you explain some of your main focus areas?

— First and foremost, my focus was on making the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) compliant with the Bi-SC 40-1 on Implementing Gender into NATO Operations for Increasing Operational Effectiveness. With the abovementioned policy and the NATO/EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) Action Plan on implementing the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) as the foundation, I developed an Action Plan specifically for JWC. It soon became clear to me that in order for this Action Plan to be properly implemented in all JWC activities, I had to involve more staff members. This resulted in the recruitment of dual-hatted Gender Focal Points (GFPs) in each key area to provide support to the GENAD and help spread awareness as to what gender perspective really means to NATO exercises. The idea was to have a GFP in each key area, e.g. Scenario, Operational Planning, Training Development, Public Affairs, Mission Support, etc. What is important to know is that gender was a relatively new discipline in JWC exercises. Consequently, I had to focus my ef-

forts in making JWC's implementation of gender known to the larger NATO gender community and Training Audiences (TAs). Thanks to the NATO gender community's excellent work; we are now starting to see gender perspective as an evaluation criteria and also as a Training Objective in exercise planning documents.

Why is there a need for more trained personnel in the gender field?

— In conflicts, men, women, boys and girls all have different gender roles which need to be analyzed. In other words, gender is about doing the right things, and doing it right. As often happens in wars, women, young men and children are deliberately targeted by terrorists, warlords and militias because of their gender. The increased situational awareness we achieve by analyzing gender through every step of our training, be it intelligence, human terrain reports, media, psychological operations etc., will help prepare us for the tough challenges ahead. What we learned in Afghanistan was that when we started to see things from a gender perspective it brought added value to our operation, e.g. a CIMIC project with a gender perspective may help us achieve the desired effect much faster.

"UNDERSTANDING HOW TO APPROACH GENDER MATTERS IS MISSION-CRITICAL IN ANY SCENARIO, REGARDLESS OF THEATRE."

Gender has been an integral part of the JWC-led TRIDENT Series of Exercises this year. They all had strong commitments on gender-related issues and topics. Can you elaborate a bit on how gender training needs were identified and incorporated into these exercises?

— Current operations are becoming increasingly complex and are ever-changing, and each exercise brings its own unique gender analysis with the varied geographical locations. The NATO out-of-area exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 offered a complex human environment in the fictional Cerasia region with challenges such as movement of populations, inter-ethnic clashes, human trafficking and sexual violence, whereas exercise TRIDENT JAGUAR 15, which was set in Europe, required a completely different approach to gender, which focused more on the human rights part of it. Understanding how to approach gender matters is mission-critical in any scenario, regardless of theatre.

Given the increased awareness of implementing gender perspective into all NATO activities, how do you envision this will impact operational level training in the future?

— The complicated reality demands increasingly complex scenarios that implicate entire populations, including children, both as victims and actors, and women, in capacity building and peace talks. Moreover, integrating gender will help us cooperate better with international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the ground, which is an important part of our operations. Finally, with increased gender awareness our forces will be more balanced when carrying out negotiations and they will have a more complete view on planning reconstruction and DDR—Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration.

What advice can you give to the JWC's gender community?

— In an effort to spread awareness, the best way to learn is from examples, both good and bad. Examples help people at all levels—military or civilian—to relate to what you are saying. Another advice would be to maintain contact with Gender Advisors, Gender Field Advisors (GFAs) and Gender Focal Points across the NATO commands to communicate JWC's continued commitment to this discipline. Keep up the good work! You've already showed me that you can do it! ✦



WOMEN IN COMBAT

BY PROFESSOR ANTHONY KING B.A., M.A., PH.D
University of Exeter, United Kingdom

Introduction

On 20 August 2015, the media announced that two U.S. Army officers, Captain Kristen Griest and First Lieutenant Shaye Haver had become the first two women to pass the notorious U.S. Army Rangers' course. Their achievement sets a precedent for the full integration of women into the ground combat arms instituted by Leon Panetta, the former Defense Secretary, in January 2013. In fact, Griest and Haver will not be allowed to serve in the 75th Ranger Regiment or in any other infantry unit at this time, but their achievement marks an important step. By 2016, when Panetta's policy has to be implemented, there will certainly be women in the U.S. infantry and armoured units. Indeed, female candidates have already been allowed to enter the United States Marine Corps Infantry Officers' Course, although, as yet, none have passed out.

The accession of women in American combat units is the culmination of a long process, which goes back to the Second World War. However, it is more specifically a recognition of recent operational realities. Across NATO, female personnel performed the important du-

ties on the frontline in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many women are full combat veterans; some have engaged and killed enemy fighters at close quarters. By any standards, these women have served in combat and have, in effect, acted as combat soldiers.

The accession of women in the U.S. Army and Marine Corps means that only one NATO member, the United Kingdom, still formally excludes women from the combat arms. However, under Alliance pressure and precisely because a significant number of British female service personnel served with combat units in Iraq and Afghanistan, it seems certain that this policy will be changed next year when it is up for formal reconsideration. Indeed, the British Army is currently engaging in an intense process of research and consultation on the presumption that women will be allowed to serve in the combat arms from next year.

This is a radical transformation. Until after 2000, Canada was the only NATO Nation, which accepted women into the combat arms and even there the process of accession was deeply compromised. NATO countries be-

gan to change their policies only after 2000 and it is only in the last decade that a new gender norm has become established in the Alliance. The question which confronts NATO member states and NATO itself is how to institutionalize the accession of women into the combat arms successfully in order to the benefit not only of female service personnel but also of western armies. Since female integration has been opposed on two basic grounds—the physical capability of women and the problem of sexual relations between male and female service personnel that may result with unacceptable behaviours of sexual nature—it is necessary to address these two crucial issues.

— Physical standards

It is very easy to underestimate the special rigours of military operations. In their understandable alacrity to promote general equality, some feminist scholars have consistently questioned the physical standards, which are enforced for those serving in the combat arms and especially in the infantry and which im-





This page: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Whitney Houston. **Opposite:** The first photo by Peder Torp Mathisen/Forsvaret; the second photo by ISAF PAO; the third photo by Torgeir Haugaard/Forsvaret.



The Norwegian winter exercise COLD RESPONSE.
Photo by Torbjørn Kjosvold/Forsvaret



LIVEX, TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15.
Photo by NATO

pede women's entry into these units. Other scholars and commentators have suggested that as a result of digital technology, war is becoming less physical than the past.

Some of this analysis is well-taken but it cannot detract from a basic reality. No matter how sophisticated western technology becomes, combat operations are uniquely demanding; physically, emotionally and mentally. War remains a brutal struggle of wills, as the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Ukraine demonstrate. No matter how good their equipment, the combat effectiveness of NATO ground forces will finally rely on the fortitude and raw physical endurance of its troops. Successful female integration cannot compromise that combat effectiveness. Accordingly, in order to maintain combat effectiveness, while the validity of certain selection tests should certainly be reviewed periodically, it is imperative that physical standards are sustained as an entry requirement into the combat arms.

Indeed, successful female integration is actually predicated on the maintenance of these standards. In a professionalized military, soldiers trust each other and form themselves into cohesive units on the basis of proven competence; individuals are accepted on the basis of their ability to perform their roles. Unit cohesion is no longer based so much on general

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appeals to masculinity, nationalism or racial or ethnic homogeneity as it was in the twentieth century, but the more impersonal standard of professionalism. Soldiers are accepted into the armed forces on the basis of their competence. Like ethnic minorities or gay service personnel before them, women can be accepted fully as comrades so long as they have proven their competence. In Iraq and Afghanistan, as long as a woman could perform her role in the frontline, she was accepted as an equal. It was very noticeable that Griest and Haver were explicitly accepted by their fellow students at Ranger School, once they had shown that they



Photo by Sgt. Veronica Arsenault,
Canadian Army Public Affairs



Captain Kristen Griest and U.S. Army Ranger School Class 08-15 render a salute during their graduation at Fort Benning, Ga., 21 August 2015. Griest and class member 1st Lieutenant Shaye Haver became the first female graduates of the school. Photo by Staff Sergeant Steve Cortez.

were physically capable. Precisely because performance has been the unifying factor in socially diverse professional units, it is imperative that entry standards, a symbolic marker of proven competence and ability, have to be maintained for women. To demand the lowering of physical standards to allow for the accession of women is to destroy the very basis by which any genuine integration could take place.

The maintenance of physical standards presents a potential obstacle to the integration of women into the combat arms. In general, women tend to be smaller than men, with less bone and muscle density. Although an advantage in some physical activities, female morphology is a disadvantage for soldiering which primarily involves carrying and lifting heavy weights. Indeed, with the introduction of body armour, the average weight which infantry soldiers now has to carry in combat significantly exceeds that of the twentieth century: 40-50 kilograms is normal. As a result of the physical demands of combat—and therefore the standards which armies must enforce on their infantries—it is inevitable that the number of women who will be physically capable of serving in the combat arms will be small. Canada is one of the most integrated of all western militaries, but only 18 percent of its force is women, and approximately 1 percent of its in-

fantry is female. Similarly, in a test conducted by the UK's Ministry of Defence, it was assessed that only 1 percent of currently serving females could pass the mandatory tests for serving in the infantry. In terms of planning for the female integration, it is important to recognize this point.

As Captain Griest and First Lieutenant Haver demonstrate, a small number of women are eminently capable of meeting the physical standards required. Indeed, some of these women will be physically superior to many male soldiers. In a press conference following their successful graduation from the Ranger School, a male colleague of Griest and Haver noted that these women together beat significant numbers of men on a 12-mile route march. Yet, the fact remains that only a small number of women will be capable of serving in the combat arms and especially in the infantry. But, their small number in no way detracts from their right to serve or from the fact that armies would want to assign female talent to the infantry. This is an important reality when developing policy.

— Unacceptable behaviours of sexual nature in the military

As described earlier, sexuality, ethnicity and race have become less relevant with the rise of professionalism. It is a fact that a very small

minority of women is physically capable of serving in combat units and they might be integrated into the infantry if they are judged on their performance, not their gender. However, a second objection has been frequently raised by the opponents: the issue of sexual relations, which may lead to humiliation, sexual harassment and unwanted sexist behaviour. A number of conservative commentators have highlighted the point. Thus, in his wonderfully subtitled book, *Deadly Consequences: How Cowards Are Pushing Women into Combat*, Robert Maginnis highlights the issue of sex. He notes that sexual fraternization was endemic at Kandahar Airfield, saying that "as if consensual affairs weren't bad enough, our armed forces also face an epidemic of sexual assaults." (Page 71).

As a Christian and a political conservative, Robert Maginnis is perhaps extreme. Yet, in fact, a number of scholars have adopted a similar position. On the basis of her research on the Special Forces, Anna Simons claims that the inevitable sexual relations between men and women in these units will make cohesion impossible: "More than a decade ago, I described the critical ethos on teams and in squads or platoons as 'one for all and all for one.' Introduce something over which members are bound to compete [i.e. women], that the winner won't





Photo by Torbjørn Kjosvold/Forsvaret

In order to mitigate and reduce the possibility of corrosive and de-professionalizing sexual relations, an organizational reformation is required.

Conclusion

Opponents to female accession to the combat arms fear that it will undermine combat effectiveness. They fear that the units will be physically weaker and their cohesion will be undermined by sexual relations among their members. These are serious concerns but, in fact, female accession may advance the professionalism of western forces. In particular, rather than excluding individuals on the basis of what they are, every candidate must be subjected to the same rigorous tests, which assess what they can do. Gender integration demands that western militaries assess individuals and units on purely professional and performative basis. In this way, successful female accession may be able to enhance the effectiveness of the combat arms. If standards are the genuine criteria for inclusion then they must be applied universally and rigorously.

Men, who in the past might have been allowed to bypass these standards because of various arbitrary factors, must now be failed too. Other tests might be identified as irrelevant. Every single member of the combat arms must be assessed equally against an ideal of professionalism. Moreover, because we still live in a gendered culture, the presence of women in combat units seems to increase the motivation of men, who do not want to be beaten by a female. Female integration therefore, potentially improves combat performance and motivation. Against critics, if it is implemented properly, the accession of women to the combat arms is likely to enhance their combat effectiveness, rather than undermine it. †

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share, and you inject a dangerous dynamic. Worse, introduce the possibility of exclusivity between two individuals and you will have automatically killed cohesion." (Simons 2014).

As Maginnis and Simon emphasise, such unwanted gender-related behaviours are unavoidable in the army as they are in the civilian organizations. However, because the army consists of a uniquely disproportionate number of unmarried young men between 18 and 25, the possibility of inappropriate sexual relations is particularly pronounced. It is impossible to ignore the fact that incidents of discrimination, sexism, harassment and abuse, including rape, continue and that sex is a problem for unit cohesion. However, some presumptions about the nefarious effect of women have to be challenged. It is particularly important to avoid any blaming individual women or female accession in general for fraternization. In many, perhaps, most cases, these relations are not initiated by females but by male soldiers, often exploiting the advantages of rank. In other cases, women have been unjustly accused of precipitating these sexual relations or, often, false sexual rumours are circulated in order to undermine a particular female soldier. A pernicious double standard is at work here. Female soldiers have repeatedly noted that if a female had any sexual relations with her comrades it instantly undermined her professional credibility. Although men are minimally equally responsible for any breach of discipline when they have sexual relations with a female comrade and they are not held to

account for it. In order to eliminate this double standard, both parties in any sexual relation should be held equally accountable for their unprofessional conduct. Both need to be formally disciplined.

And, leadership is the key to this kind of cultural change. For the very reason that the armed forces are, and will remain, overwhelmingly male organizations for the foreseeable future, soldiers overwhelmingly continue to understand themselves in masculine terms. Thus, some collective education aimed at revising the organizational culture of the armed forces might be valuable. Currently, the default position of combat units is a conventional masculinity in which women are not always constructed as potential professional equals. As a result, unthinking everyday discrimination is routine in combat units, while actual sexual harassment and even assault are sadly not uncommon. The armed forces need to change their organizational cultures, which legitimate the presumptions of many of their male soldiers about women and their attitudes towards them. To this end, it may be useful to define female soldiers not primarily as women but, on the contrary, in the first instance simply as fellow professionals.

After Kristen Griest and Shaye Haver graduated from the Ranger School, a widely circulated tweet asked: "What do you call a female Ranger? A Ranger."

Precisely.



Left: Five of Europe's six female defence ministers: Albania's Mimi Kodheli, the Netherlands' Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, Germany's Ursula von der Leyen, Norway's Ine Marie Eriksen Soreide and Italy's Roberta Pinotti. Photo by NATO Council Canada. **Below:** NATO Gender Perspectives Annual Conference 2015. The conference in Belgium focused on the recruitment and retention of women in the military. Photo by NATO.



UNSCR 1325 Reload

http://www.nato.int/issues/nogp/meeting-records/2015/UNSCR1325-Reload_Report.pdf



Right: United States Army Brigadier General Giselle Wilz, Commander NATO HQ Sarajevo, is NATO's first-ever female NATO Commander.



The definitions below are extracted from the NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1: "Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure"

Gender refers to the social attributes associated with being male and female learned through socialization and determines a person's position and value in a given context. This means also the relationships between women and men and girls and boys as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. Notably, gender does not equate to woman.

Gender mainstreaming is defined as a strategy to achieve gender equality by assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies and programmes in all areas and at all levels, in order to assure that the concerns and experiences of women and men are taken into account in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres. This will lead to women and men benefitting equally and inequality is not perpetuated. Gender mainstreaming in this context represents the process to recognize and incorporate the role gender plays in relation to NATO's various

operational missions. Gender mainstreaming does not focus solely on women, but the benefits of mainstreaming practices recognize their disadvantaged position in various communities.

Integration of gender perspective is a way of assessing gender-based differences of women and men as reflected in their social roles and interactions, in the distribution of power and the access to resources. In ACO and ACT activities, it is used synonymously with implementing the requests of UNSCR 1325, related resolutions as well as directives emanating from NATO.

Gender analysis is defined as the systematic gathering and examination of information on gender differences and social relations in order to identify and understand inequities based on gender. It could also be understood as "methods used to understand the relationship between men and women in the context of society. For example, military planning activities should assess the different security concerns of women and men, girls and boys in the area of operation or take account of power relations in the community to ensure women and men have equal access to assistance where the military is en-

gaged in supporting humanitarian assistance."¹

Gender equality refers to the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for women and men, and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same, but that women's and men's rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born female or male.

Sexual violence is "when the perpetrator commits an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or cause such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person's or persons' incapacity to give genuine consent."²

(1) See UN "Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence—An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice" Page 5 for guidance.
 (2) Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court.

Sitting at the table



BY NAOMI ADAMS
Coordinator,
Strategic Management Team
HQ SHAPE

valuable contribution to the outcomes of my organization. The experience has been largely positive for me, as I find that the vast majority of my work brothers are educated and supportive. I also have no doubt that significant progress has been made by my foremothers and the Gender Advisors in enhancing levels of awareness, but there is still work to do.

In short, just when you don't expect it, a throwback comment or action catapults gender equality way back into the last century and, at best, leaves you scratching your head in bewilderment. Prejudices or thoughtlessness can cause untold harm to a woman's professional image and it can be surprising just where those sometimes unintentional, yet damaging, behaviours originate.

DID YOU KNOW?

Since 1961, female senior women officers in NATO have organized conferences on an ad hoc basis to discuss the status, organization, conditions of employment and career possibilities for women in the armed forces of the Alliance. In 1976, the Military Committee officially recognized the "Committee on Women in the NATO Forces" or CWINF. In May 2009, the CWINF's mandate was extended to support the integration of gender perspective into NATO's military operations, specifically to support the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 1820 as well as related resolutions. Additionally, the Committee was renamed "NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives". Photo below is taken on 2 June 2009, during the re-naming of the CWINF.

HAVING BEEN A SHAPE NATO civilian at middle management level for more than a decade, I have experienced what it is to be the minority gender in a rather gender-lopsided environment. In my current role, I am the only female member of a division of 20 military and civilian staff. I try to "sit at the table", both figuratively and literally, in my attempt to deliver a



GENDER BALANCE IN THE WORKFORCE IS NOT ABOUT ACHIEVING COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS OR BEING SEEN TO BE AN EQUAL EMPLOYER. IT IS ABOUT ACHIEVING EXCELLENCE.

Improving the gender balance will go some way towards fostering a positive gender environment. The truth is that the progress made by the nations in encouraging females into the military may not be fully experienced by NATO (at least not at the strategic level) for several years. This is because, from my observations, many military men at SHAPE are more experienced and, well, older. A higher proportion of military women are on their way to SHAPE, but they haven't arrived yet.

As many NATO civilian posts are filled by retiring military staff, SHAPE currently has a predominantly male civilian workforce. While women are integrating our establishments as military members, most female civilians remain pooled in administrative, Human Resources or finance-related functions, with managers in core functions being men. There are hard-fought exceptions and on a positive note, we are seeing an improvement in gender balance. From my perspective, gender balance in the workforce is not about achieving compliance with standards or being seen to be an equal employer. It is about achieving excellence. We should not underestimate the negative impacts of gender imbalance on our collective performance.

I believe that maintaining a gender skewed environment may impact on the quality of our products. Gender imbalance is one of the components that puts organizations at risk of "groupthink". This psychological phenomenon, identified by Irving Janis from Yale University in the 1970's, occurs within a group of people seeking to desire harmony or conformity in results without critical evaluation of alternative viewpoints, by actively suppressing dissenting viewpoints and by isolating themselves from outside influences. Antecedents to groupthink include faulty group structure.

The concepts of Red Teaming or Alternative Analysis are central to achieving high quality military advice. In turn, they absolutely rely on bringing individuals with different frames of reference together to examine all possible alternatives. Any organization seeking to achieve excellence needs to challenge any antecedents to groupthink. In the context of a hybrid environment, NATO's adoption of a Comprehen-

sive Approach requires knowledge of factors covering populations across SACEUR's Area of Responsibility. More than 50 percent of these populations, and arguably the most vulnerable, are women. Comprehensive thinking requires comprehensive thinkers. We will increase the quality of NATO's products, give NATO a competitive edge in the face of its adversaries, and be more responsive to the demands of our populations by encouraging more females into the work environment at NATO.

However, there are serious obstacles that women have to overcome in order to get through the door, sit at the table and be heard. Some are societal, some are policy-related and some are due to sheer ignorance and prejudice.

From a societal perspective, there are subliminal preconceptions causing a negative impact on women in the workplace. According to a study entitled "*Why Are Women Penalised for Success at Male Tasks?*" published in the Journal of Applied Psychology, likeability and ambition are positively correlated for men (ambitious men are liked) and negatively correlated for women. Women cannot behave in an ambitious way if they want to be liked. This starts at the job interview and affects a woman throughout her career. Sheryl Sandberg's book "*Lean In*" discusses the social penalty that females incur when displaying aggressive and hard-charging behaviour for which men are continually applauded. In the workplace, taking risks and advocating for oneself are traits that lead to career development—but they are traits that girls, as they are growing up, are discouraged from exhibiting. This is why women in the workplace often do not speak up or sit at the table, choosing to take a back seat in meetings, literally.

Accepting that women must form part of NATO's collective thinking and that they are at a societal, not academic, disadvantage when it comes to playing their valuable role in the workplace, I would offer the following messages to four groups:

— **To men:** Support women in getting to the table. If you are in a position of authority, use it to establish a positive working environment.

Question your judgements and reactions, your own frame of reference. Think about what you say and what you mean and how it might reflect the behaviours of others. Think about who is sitting around the table, encourage women to be confident because they might just have the best contribution to make to your discussion, but don't feel comfortable enough to provide it.

— **To policy makers:** Make it easier for both genders to share the load at home, so that women can pursue their careers and sons will see their fathers taking an active role at home and respect their working mothers, becoming even better men. Make gender balance a priority that permeates through recruitment and development and into the culture.

— **To women scrambling through the jungle gym of a career:** Try to sit at the table. Question why you didn't raise that point or why you sat at the back of the room. Support each other. Don't sacrifice your likeability for success or your success in order to be liked. Find trailblazers and seek help if you need it. Take behaviours and comments at face value and don't overreact, but don't ignore bad behaviour either. Talk to trusted people in your headquarters.

— **And finally, to women who made it to the table:** Stay at the table and be the trailblazers and mentors for those behind you so that the path is cleared for them. This is not about positive discrimination; it is about making sure that the environment is a healthy, balanced place for both genders to make their contribution to our collective success. ✦

Naomi Adams is responsible for coordinating the development and implementation of Strategic Management Plans across Allied Command Operations (ACO). Having worked in the European Institutions in the area of Corporate Responsibility, she developed an interest in workplace issues. She has been involved in several organizational design areas including the development of the Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC) and in the review of the NATO Command Structure as part of the Readiness Action Plan.



Gender Perspective during TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 CPX

Appointed last year, JWC's Gender Focal Points had the opportunity to apply their learning during exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15, and they have already left an imprint.

Sarah Denieul and Sonia Bjerke Abdelmaguid explain how.

Interview by Inci Kucukaksoy
JWC Public Affairs Office

Apart from your primary jobs in Exercise and Training Administration and Linguistic Service respectively, you both took part in TRIDENT JUNCTURE (TRJE15) as acting Gender Advisors. Can you explain your role?

— During the execution of TRJE15, we held a gender advisory role in the Situation Centre (SITCEN) within the Exercise Control (EXCON). Prior to learning of our possible involvement in the execution phase, we both had participated in the Main Events List/Main Incidents List (MEL/MIL) workshops. Foreseeing a rapidly approaching involvement for the gender community, we quickly decided upon an initial and two-fold course of action: (1) reinforce our hitherto lean grasp of an exercise cycle and of the Sorotan scenario, whilst (2) deepening our knowledge and exploring the scope of gender perspective within an exercise setting. With no prior involvement in exercises, it was indispensable to interact with representatives from the international organizations and non-governmental organizations (IOs/NGOs) and shadow the Brunssum Gender Advisor (GENAD) who contributed signif-

icantly during both the incident development phase and inject scripting. More specifically, in the execution of TRJE15, our task was to go through stand-alone or integrated gender-related injects to be played and ensure compliance with the Training Audience's Training Objectives. In the absence of a trainer/mentor GENAD within the Training Team in Zaragoza, it became vital to have GENAD representation at least in the SITCEN in Stavanger. Our role, with valuable support from three colleagues from our gender community, was to monitor the injects related directly or indirectly to gender and to act as a reach back element for the White Cell and for the EXCON Response Cells.

Why was it important for the JWC to have a GENAD represented in TRJE15? In your view, is it equally important to incorporate gender into future exercises too?

— For this high-visibility exercise to comply with the NATO Bi-SC Directive 40-1 and the NATO/EAPC Action Plan, as well as to enable the Training Audience to take full advantage of the complex setting that the Sorotan sce-

nario provided, there was no other way to go; a GENAD had to be represented in EXCON, and ideally both in SITCEN and in the trainer/mentor team. Moreover, 15 years have passed since NATO first recognized UNSCR 1325, and eight years have passed since NATO adopted an Action Plan on implementing these resolutions into all its activities, including exercises and operations. In 2016, NATO's commitment to UNSCR 1325 will undergo scrutiny in the form of an audit. In other words, it was high time to roll up our sleeves and get to work. For TRJE15, we were perfectly aware that nested inside both the Operations Plan (OPLAN) and Exercise Plan (EXPLAN) were specific gender Training Objectives, and that within the Training Audience from the Joint Task Force HQ and the Canadian Multinational Task Force were GENADs who were expecting a scenario with challenging gender content.

How do you ensure that gender is integrated into an operational level exercise?

— If we understand an operational level exercise as an exercise in which the Joint Force





Above (from left): Sonia B. Abdelmaguid at SITCEN during the exercise. JWC's dual-hatted GENAD U.S. Army Major Adrian Sullivan. Sarah Denieul and Sonia B. Abdelmaguid during a JWC Gender Focal Point meeting prior to the exercise. Photos by JWC PAO.

Command's processes rather than results are tested, then integrating gender perspective into an exercise of this scale is not as simple as injecting an individual occurrence of rape within a conflict zone! With thousands of scripted injects, some injects never make it to execution. In order to make sure that a gender story makes the cut, it needs to fit nicely into the overall dilemma, not just as an "add-on". It is also important to clearly define expected and desired outcomes and coordinate across events. In compliance with the NATO Directive 40-1 and the NATO/EAPC Action Plan, it was important to approach the task through the UNSCR 1325 principles of prevention, protection, and participation.

For TRJE15, the Training Audience requested that gender be divided into the eight Gender Lines of Support (GLoS) outlined in the JFCBS EXPLAN: Security Forces Assistance, Security and Protection of Women and Vulnerable Groups, Gender and Rule of Law, Women's Access to Public Services, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Gender in Humanitarian Assistance, Women's Participation in Decision-Making, Political and Peace Processes and Human Trafficking.

We had also observed that when a gender perspective is applied to humanitarian disaster settings, the spotlight is almost exclusively on protection. This does not, however, reflect reality. While one of the main gender focuses in exercise TRJE15 was indeed

on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) with women and children being highlighted, applying a gender perspective or lens goes way beyond "just" protecting women and children. The social gender, as opposed to the biological gender, should be analyzed for all areas of operation, regardless of the geographical setting for the scenario, and the stories created should depict not only the vulnerabilities of local populations, but also their strengths.

In any operation you would collect sex-disaggregated data and analyze what identifies men's and women's patterns of mobility, divisions of labour, political standing, access to resources, participation in the conflict and risks of being targeted by violence. These analyses form the creation of challenging and varied gender-related content. The story needs to be monitored as it unfolds, and the right questions need to be asked: How do we convert an inject where there has been a rumour of an abduction case with the perpetrator allegedly being a member of the NATO forces into a story that will really trigger well-oiled processes of monitoring and reporting, coordination with civilian IOs and NGOs, investigation and thorough knowledge of reference documents and policies? Who are most often the victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war? How will the CIMIC unit react when they walk into a local hospital and find only male patients? Will the Commander accept an invitation to a conference hosted by

the largest regional women's organization even though the warfighting situation is tense and priorities might clash? Could a NATO Strategic Communications campaign solve the issue of disgruntled populations, so that hearts and minds remain with the Alliance? How do the typical local gender stereotypes change during the armed conflict and what are the roles and activities assumed by girls in fighting forces (e.g. combat soldiers, looting, suicide bombers, mine sweepers, spies, messengers etc.)? How will the NATO Maritime Component Command report when they find a ship with victims of human trafficking; will they hand over minors to Save the Children and will they have a mixed engagement team in place? What challenges will NATO troops face when training women and men in local armed forces? How will the CIMIC unit report when they find hundreds of commuting children sleeping in the basement of a main hospital? Have NATO troops ensured that men, women and children prisoners of war are kept in separate detention facilities? Will the Commander divert more assets than normal to rescue a female pilot who has crashed in the opposing forces' waters? These are indeed very important questions with gender perspective, but not all of them apply to TRJE15.

What have been some of the highlights during the execution phase?

— One highlight was when Deputy Commander of the Joint Task Force, during one



"UNTIL BASIC GENDER PERSPECTIVE TRAINING BECOMES MANDATORY FOR ALL NATO PERSONNEL, THERE WILL BE A CONTINUOUS NEED TO REFRAME THIS MUCH MISUNDERSTOOD AND MISINTERPRETED CAPABILITY."



Above, left: The 15th Anniversary of Security Council Resolution 1325—Adopted on 31 October 2000, 1325 is the first United Nations Security Council Resolution to address the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women. Photo by UN/Devra Berkowitz. Right: Mother and child in a community clinic in rural Bangladesh. Photo by UN/Mark Garten.

of the daily Situational Awareness Briefings, underlined that the responsibility for integrating gender perspective should be moved away from one individual, the GENAD, and rather be streamlined into all processes. Reading between the lines, gender perspective is a cross-cutting enabler that should become organic to a force rather than remaining the object of a dedicated programme. Another highlight was our conversation with Major General (Ret.) Roger Lane, TRJE15's Senior Advisor, whose ability to contextualize gender issues in conflict zones has been very valuable. A desired and conceivably attained outcome, rather than a highlight, was to see how the stories we had created came to life and appeared throughout the execution, such as the fictitious NAWOL (National Association of Women's Organizations in Lakuta, inspired by similar real life organizations) and the story of the hundreds of night commuters who were discovered by our CIMIC unit in the basement of the city's main hospital. Last but not least, an important desired and achieved outcome would be that a visible presence and contribution within EX-

CON has helped to put gender perspective on the JWC exercise map, so to speak.

Did you face any challenges?

— Our foremost challenge was due to a small hiccup prior to STARTEX, which left us only two days to prepare for execution. Obviously this resulted in the absence of a two-way direction and guidance in relation to our SITCEN role. However, through a last-minute and quasi-heroic effort on the part of one of the Event Managers and the SITCEN Officer of Primary Responsibility (OPR), two unplanned seats were found for us in Stavanger. It is important to understand that this was the first time that a GENAD placard (or two!) had ever graced the monitors of the SITCEN! By regularly searching through the Training Audience's products, closely monitoring human terrain-related injects and an appreciable measure of willingness from colleagues in SITCEN, White Cell and Response Cells, we were gradually able to obtain and give a more comprehensive picture of how our gender-related injects were being addressed by the Training Audience.

What is the way ahead for the gender community at the JWC?

— Until basic gender perspective training becomes mandatory for all NATO personnel, there will be a continuous need to reframe this much misunderstood and misinterpreted capability. Our endeavor will be to streamline gender into all processes, liaise with the wider ACO and ACT gender community and represent JWC at workshops and seminars, where possible. NATO's Bi-SC Directive 40-1 (Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure) is in the process of being updated and JWC will follow the ensuing direction and guidance. The JWC Action Plan on Gender will similarly undergo adjustments and indicators relating to goals will be closely monitored. Finally, we are also working on how to better divide exercise participation while maintaining continuity, because TRJE15 will certainly not be our last challenge! Hopefully, our contribution, while definitely needing refinement and optimization, has helped to legitimize this capability in the JWC exercise arena. †



NATO FORCES 2020

TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15

16 locations
4 Multinational Brigades
140 aircraft, 60 ships, 7 submarines

LIVEX

37 Nations
36,000 troops



ON THE COVER



JWC's Optimization Trial

JOINT WARFARE CENTRE'S (JWC) primary mission is the planning and execution of operational level collective training and exercises, which in turn support its wider warfare remit, including integration of new concepts and doctrine into NATO's overall training programme. It is a mission that has evolved significantly from the inception of JWC in 2003 to this day—the focus today is on readiness, training and exercises rather than large scale operations. The Vision of the Commander is: *"JWC to sustain and enhance its role as the premier provider in NATO for exercises and innovation at the joint-operational level of warfare, for the headquarters of the NATO Command and the NATO Force Structures, and, when ordered, to any other headquarters of the Alliance."* Thus, the new trial organization, which was implemented on 6 August 2015, aims to better align and optimize JWC's role within NATO.

"I think the hardest challenge we faced was trying to figure out how to properly resource each part of the organization in order to meet the increased workload, given that we had a manpower cap of only 250 people," said Lieutenant Colonel Frank Andrews, JWC's

Training Team Branch Head and key contributor to the optimization, adding: "We looked at what JWC was expected to deliver to NATO in the future and the three main drivers of change that were occurring nearly simultaneously. These were implementing the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), the Alliance's shift of focus in Afghanistan, and, finally, the re-balancing of operational level responsibilities between the NATO Command Structure and the NATO Force Structure."

The initiating study and the five phases of the optimization process that followed reflected JWC's desire to respond to this new dynamic training environment and its broader warfare context:

— **Phase I:** This six-month phase was led by the Chief of the former Joint Capability Integration Division. It identified Courses of Action for potential organizational structures. Phase I was finalized in February 2014.

— **Phase II:** Initiated in March 2014, Phase II was led by the former Director of Management and Chief Exercise and Base Services Division who were tasked to produce a detailed analysis and a greater refinement of the selected struc-

ture. The outcome of Phase II was a proposed new organizational structure for JWC, a structure designed to improve agility and efficiency in the delivery of all core JWC outputs.

— **Phase III:** This phase translated the concept into action through a controlled process of development, validation and command authorization. To enact it, an Organizational Development Planning Team (ODPT) was appointed, comprising four core staff members and representatives from the extant divisions and offices.

— **Phase IV:** Phase IV, which took place in June 2015, involved the physical move of personnel and supporting equipment, including the Computer and Information Systems (CIS) as well as amendments to e-mail addresses, the Document Handling System (DHS), file permissions and the telephone directory setup.

From August 2014, and with support from both JWC and the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) Squadron Stavanger (NCST), the ODPT has:

- a. Developed a project plan that allowed for an authorized and agreed transition to the optimized trial organization and ensured





Above, clockwise: General Paloméros, former SACT, signing the Visitor's Book during a visit to the JWC. Photograph by CPO Vincent Micheletti, French Navy. Major General Reinhard Wolski, Commander JWC. A presentation during the wargame. Photos by JWC PAO.

that key milestones and decision points were achieved with a "Risk and Issue Management Process" in place,

- b. Identified all internal and external stakeholders who were then kept apprised of the progress at every stage,
- c. Produced the required list of functions, statements of work, statements of functions, all 250 job descriptions, a "people-to-posts" (P2P) list, a "function to facility" (F2F) overview and a detailed floor plan, including a "people-to-seats" overview,
- d. Planned and delivered a wargame, which served to validate the results thus far and improve the shared understanding of the new work processes and procedures. In addition, the purpose was to assess whether the trial would put the delivery of the JWC 2015-2016 Programme of Work (PoW) at risk,
- e. Produced reports to support the Commander JWC, Major General Wolski, in his dialogue with Allied Command Transformation, NATO Defence Manpower Audit Authority and the Military Committee.

During these last two phases, the ODPT made a deliberate effort to keep JWC staff members fully informed and engaged as and when the changes and decisions were made. The paramount importance of establishing good internal communication about the work in progress was obvious from the outset and consistent with JWC's "One Team" ethos. ODPT meetings were held every two weeks and all ODPT issues and actions were recorded and minutes distributed. Moreover, all JWC staff were invited to attend monthly ODPT Q&A sessions.

— **Phase V:** The JWC optimization project entered into the Implementation Phase in August 2015. This trial phase aims to verify the effectiveness of the trial organization to deliver JWC's output and result in a final report being submitted to HQ SACT in May 2016.

"So, what comes next? I would say an honest assessment based on criteria that should have been identified and very well defined before commencing the trial. Furthermore,

it is absolutely paramount to analyze the new requirements for training and exercises, which resulted from NATO's Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and, particularly, NATO's new approach to operations planning, *i.e.* Graduated Response Planning (GRP). Our trial results must be amalgamated with our internal analysis of RAP and GRP, and only the combined findings should serve as the basis for JWC's future structure," said Lieutenant Colonel (GS) Dr. Thomas Henschke, JWC's former Head of Information and Knowledge Management Branch.

In the new organizational structure, under a more compact Command Group and Staff Advisory Group, the bulk of the JWC staff was re-brigaded under three directorates:

The Exercise, Training and Innovation Directorate (ET&I): Comprising approximately 70% of the JWC Peacetime Establishment (PE), the ET&I was configured as a cross-functional "Programmes and Projects" organization, consolidating JWC capabilities oriented primarily





Above (from left): Preparations for the final exercise in 2015, TRIDENT JET, with NATO's Allied Air Command (AIRCOM) as the Training Audience. General Petr Pavel with JWC's Deputy Commander, Brigadier General Roger Watkins, during exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 in Stavanger. Photos by JWC PAO.

on production to meet deliverables based on external requirements. The ET&I structure maximized personnel committed to production, de-emphasizing traditional hierarchal management, and instead adopting "Programme and Project Management" principles appropriate to a matrix-based and flexible approach.

The Plans and Programmes Directorate (P&P): The P&P is a small Directorate dedicated to supporting the Commander JWC in planning, coordinating, and controlling the Centre across its full mission, including the strategic functions. The Directorate undertakes the initial engagements on future exercises, scoping the work sufficiently to enable an exercise OPR when appointed to take up and manage the exercise project.

The Mission Support and Sustainment Directorate (MS&S): The MS&S was developed to lead and produce all mission support and sustainment activities, both within and outside the Jättå Camp Facility for day-to-day running as well as during exercise support planning and delivery.

The JWC is now in Phase V of the optimization, which is the "Assessment and Verification" stage. During an "All Hands" address to staff, Major General Reinhard Wolski said: "We are now three months deep into our trial. JWC is re-organized to operate more effectively and efficiently to meet current and perceived war-

fare requirements. The assessment tools have been developed, and we are looking for the right date for the surveys and the interviews. We have to pull all these experiences together, assess them, and start developing a comprehensive picture of the performance of our matrix system. As NATO's premier CPX provider with a wider warfare remit, JWC's desired end state is to provide the highest quality training, analysis and doctrine support to NATO in order to enhance and sustain its forces' military preparedness and interoperability. The optimized structure will help us to achieve this."

Mr Hargreaves, the project leader, agrees and says: "We now need to assess and verify the operation of the designs that evolved from the earlier conceptual work. In other words, we need to be able to verify that we are as lean as

the Nations demand, yet assess that we remain as focused and capable as those that rely on our deliverables need us to be."

The ODPT has now become the Organizational Development Team (ODT), which is made up of three core members and a number of representatives from the new directorates. Phase V will allow the JWC staff to give their feedback in the form of surveys, interviews and focus groups and will allow the ODT to gather and analyze the information to measure the success of optimization at JWC. "As we trial the optimized structure, we are obliged to put our organization under the spotlight in order to achieve a structure that better supports the JWC's mission; ensuring that NATO forces are trained and ready for the challenges of today and tomorrow," Mr. Hargreaves added. ✦

*"JWC plays an **important role** within the Alliance. It is currently training elements of our NATO Response Force (NRF) which allows the NRF to remain ready, relevant and responsive. The JWC also contributes to the efforts to **enhance the interoperability and full integration of our forces**. They are doing an outstanding job, ensuring that the NRF is ready—whenever, wherever, to keep the Alliance safe."*

*~ General Petr Pavel, Czech Republic Army
Chairman of the NATO Military Committee
11 October 2015, CPX TRJE15, Stavanger*

The former and current members of JWC's Organizational Development (Planning) Team (from left): Mr Andrew Eden, Col (Ret.) Kurt Arne Gimre, Mr Garry Hargreaves, Lieutenant Colonel Julie Freedman, Ms Dodi Cullen, CPO Paul Thistlewaite. Photo by Major Stephen Olsen, JWC PAO.



INTERVIEW

By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

Mr Garry Hargreaves Chief of JWC's Organizational Development Team

Can you tell us a bit about the JWC optimization process in general? When did the work start and what have been the highlights?

— I think I would say it started just as the last NATO Peacetime Establishment (PE) review was finalized and when the former JWC Commander Major General Jean-Fred Berger stated that we were not fully prepared to meet the post-2014 era. That was in 2012. That perception was picked up and refined by Major General Erhard Buehler who initiated and championed the design, which was then further developed under the leadership of Major General Reinhard Wolski. In that time, there have been many highlights. One important highlight for me has been the way that people, for the most part, have gathered and formed around the new vision and willingly engaged with change; even those who would never be here to see the fruits of their labour. Their effort and commitment was selfless. Another significant highlight was the support we received from HQ SACT and the national channels all the way up to the NATO Defence Manpower Committee (NDMC). One senior Human Resources representative stated

prior to the meeting that this could either be an "intergalactic catastrophe or it would be fine." Thankfully it went fine, which was both a major relief and a highlight.

Looking back, what have been the areas that you wrestled with?

— In any organizational change process, you will have those who might be seen as catalysts, drivers, and protagonists, and for these people, change is vital. They provide the much needed energy and impetus. There are also those who are the more ambivalent; perhaps they are not yet convinced about the concept, but they are willing to "give it a try". Finally, you might have those who are skeptical or downright resistant to change, for whatever reason, and need a little more time and effort to be convinced or to become tolerant of the initiative. As the process evolved, and it became better communicated, more transparent and inclusive, those who were initially struggling to accept change started climbing on board and I think we reached a tipping point. Reaching this point was a real highlight for me and my small team. Along the way,

we also had to wrestle with a dynamic Programme of Work (PoW) and other real-world challenges. An organizational development and change programme is not easy to de-conflict with a dynamic PoW, so the optimization had to continue through times when the organization was totally absorbed with delivery. In practical terms, this meant that our small team had to disconnect and step outside the here and now in order to think about a changing training and educational environment as well as our evolving mission.

Why was there a need for reorganizing the Joint Warfare Centre?

— With the transition of the ISAF mission to Resolute Support, training and exercises become the venue for connecting forces, reinforcing interoperability, introducing new capabilities and demonstrating solidarity. JWC is now aligned around a perceived delivery of up to four operational level multi-HQ exercises per year. The ISAF training event was much less dependent upon the creation of settings, scenarios and simulations. These changes were



the key drivers behind the decision to reorganize into a trial organization. Other evident reasons are of course our changing operational context; the new and more complex training requirements, the NATO agency consolidation from 2012, the strategic shifts in education and training responsibilities between SACEUR and SACT, and last but not least, the analysis of our own lessons learned from training nearly 50,000 personnel.

What makes this review different from those preceding it?

— I think what makes it very different from previous PE reviews is that this is the first time we have really taken a long, hard look at our mission and truly understood the role JWC has to play. Initially, our PE was created based on other national training centre models, and we did not possess the home-grown expertise in the training sphere to really challenge the models being employed. The reviews following that initial position have focused on manning reductions rather than taking a fundamental look at our mission. So in 2012, when we were reduced from 256 to 250 staff, there was no fundamental stock take of what we do, no large scale organizational realignment despite the significant ad hoc resourcing of key functions such as OPRs and MEL/MIL. Therein lies an important lesson from my perspective; waiting for NATO to impose a PE review before optimizing is unrealistic, especially in an area as volatile as training and exercises. I think organizational refinement should be continuous, and NATO has tools to enable such. By constantly assessing the evolving environment and aligning the organization to match, you will avoid the organizational shock experienced when a full blown PE review does take place, and you will be far better situated when the inevitable review does arrive.

What is the purpose of the trial organization?

— During the second phase of the optimization, an academic piece of work was transformed into an organizational chart and in Phases III and IV that chart become our current trial organization. The purpose of the trial is to organize around our key outputs and then assess whether those early designs are valid and if not to refine them. We should not forget the driving concept, from its inception, was to put as much power as possible in the so called "engine



room" whilst retaining critical support functions. There is an inevitable trade off to occur here; the current "answer" is 250, the trial will assess whether we got the balance right within that manpower ceiling.

The restructuring is designed to enhance performance, agility and collaboration in the organization. How does this work in practice?

— The new organization is designed, for the most part, around the key functions that have to exist in JWC to deliver our output. These functions are what define our uniqueness as an entity. When they are able to be dynamically resourced and configured properly, they will be able to provide the agility required, so we do not have to populate a team for worst case scenarios, instead we flex, through pooling and sharing. Our eight key functions, from scenario development to Real Life Support could have resources bolted onto them and so they are much more scalable. That does drive the need for increasing levels of collaboration for leaders throughout the organization. They need to empathize with other areas and come to their aid, knowing that when they are against the wall, help will be close at hand. Performance will also be improved by focusing on our core outputs, adjusting our capabilities within the reorganization so that we can prioritize our key deliverables above all else. We should be able to work on our *blue chips*—our highest value tasks—much more coherently and transparently. Programme Directors must drive the activities of the organization, so that divisional chiefs are able to deploy talent where it is needed and in the right quantities and qualities.

Can you describe the trial organization chart that you have developed?

— Well, first and foremost, we feel we cannot take the credit for developing this chart. It was actually the teams associated with the second phase of optimization who developed it, led by Colonel (Ret.) Kurt Gimre and Colonel Peter Baierl. They did the hard work, what we did

was to use that design and work it through to Military Committee approval. Upon approval, we transformed the design into a physical reorganization, that is, our current trial organization. What is important now is that we are ready to assess and verify that the new organization is able to deliver effectively and efficiently, and if not, we need to come up with recommendations to refine it further, and there is no shortage of "good ideas" already out there.

What does leadership look like in a cross functional planning team such as the ODPT?

— Thick skinned for a start and highly selective in terms of which areas are worth fighting for and which are best left alone. Leadership also needs to be highly responsive to inputs and also to have a feel for when good enough is enough.

Let's talk about JWC "One Team" culture. How much does having a strong corporate culture help during major organizational shifts?

— Significantly, but it's not about having a strong culture at all; it's about having the right culture. History is littered with lessons from the after-effects of strong cultures. Having the right culture, that is, an appropriately aligned culture, is critical. Interestingly, our second lowest score in two full-staff surveys was willingness to change. In spite of the fact that we are a transformational entity and change should be our norm. There is an interesting dichotomy at play here.

Are there things you have learned through this reorganization process?

— A danger of leading a wholesale organizational review like this is that you shine lights into different areas that you would have not seen before. Some of what you see is inspiring; keen, energized people doing everything they can to help to deliver; some of what you see is not so inspiring. I learned that optimization also means compromise. The way NATO functions means that optimization is never really an end state; there will be politics, power plays, caveats, and people posted into roles that are not ideal, yet somehow it all works. So, while optimization may be an impossible goal, it is a very worthy cause. Optimization isn't about the destination so much as the journey, and I hope the journey continues. The people coming here to train, potentially deploying into harm's way soon after, deserve nothing less. ✦



Organizational Review: Phases 0 and I

BY ADRIAN WILLIAMSON

Operational Analyst
Joint Warfare Centre

ON RETURN from summer leave 2013, I was called in to support what can now be considered as Phase 0 of the organizational review. Lieutenant (then Major) General Erhard Buehler had taken command of JWC early in the summer and was already concerned, as his predecessor Major General Jean-Fred Berger had been, at the pressure to undertake more exercises of increasing complexity as well as the need for modernization and the requirement to manage all this within a smaller Peacetime Establishment (PE) than had originally been allocated to JWC for fewer and less complex exercises. It was determined that an external review by an expert in Management Science was essential to make a clear assessment of the fundamental problems confronting the Centre. As JWC's Operational Analyst¹, I was tasked to help define technical aspects of the contract; to help the contractor to access information about JWC business and also to act as technical reviewer on the output.

The first report, delivered on 4 September 2013, was a survey of the changing environment in which JWC operates relating to our current assignment. It included significant errors, but also hit on several strong points. It would have been possible to dismiss the report due to the errors. However, my assessment was that, for an external analyst coming somewhat

cold to an analysis of systems as complex as NATO and JWC, and delivering such an assessment in so short a time, errors were to be expected and, indeed, probably to a greater extent than occurred. Looking back now at the main observations, most appear prescient. The Panel on Page 40 presents a good comparison between what was observed then, compared to what is happening today.

The study had three parts, but, following this paper, Lieutenant General Buehler initiated what is now termed Phase I of the organizational review. It had two parallel streams, internal and external. The external was a continuation of the Phase 0 external contract; the internal was directed by Colonel Stéphane Bellamy, JWC's former Chief Joint Capability Integration Division and executed by Major Fabrice Beauriois; I was tasked to support both, primarily in a technical analysis/review role. These two streams—one more traditionally military in approach, the other a management science "soft systems" approach—continued in parallel, sometimes harmoniously, sometimes with considerable friction, but ultimately complementary, such that in January 2014, Lieutenant General Buehler, was able to present a clear assessment of the situation to General Jean-Paul Paloméros, the former Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), and

in February 2014, he had enough information and analysis available to choose a preferred Course of Action for Phase II. The selected model was called "project organization", according to which there would be two Deputy Chiefs of Staff: one for Support (Blue Box) and one for Delivery (Green Box).

These "Blue" and "Green" boxes became well known to the JWC staff, almost as totems of the organizational review. So, as Phase I drew to a conclusion, the fundamentals that we are now implementing can be seen to be in place, setting the scene for Phase II, where I was also closely involved.

The further development in Phase III and implementation in Phase IV built and expanded on these foundations under the lead of Commander JWC, Major General Reinhard Wolski, who took command of JWC in September 2014. Major General Wolski developed, and where necessary, re-shaped the earlier work as required to deliver an organization that will enable us to exploit modern business practices to increase efficiency and enhance both our training and warfare delivery. †

(1) Operational Analysis and Management Science are closely related disciplines often employing the same techniques and methodologies and can be used essentially synonymously.





FROM PHASE 0 TO EXERCISE TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15

Observation (2013)

From a Capability Development perspective, the end of ISAF will reduce the "real" information (including operational Lessons Identified) available to concept and capability developers, who will then need to seek other information sources. This may force greater exploitation of exercises as a "next most realistic" data source.

NATO may increasingly have to deal with less well-understood threats. JWC should consider tracking projects such as Multiple Futures and Hybrid Threat, and their successors, to inform our exercises.

For Pooling and Sharing to be more than isolated "one offs", greater synchronization of DOTMLPFI (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Information/Interoperability) aspects will be required, with "D" and "T" potentially benefiting from strong JWC contributions.

As Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) moves forward, JWC will need to assess how nations wish to train in an austere* environment.

* "Austere" here refers to nations' current economic constraints rather than to an operational environment with limited infrastructure.

JWC may find itself under increased pressure to deliver warfare as well as training outputs. This may also provide JWC with opportunities to have greater influence across the Alliance.

Assessment (2015)

Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 (TRJE15) had the largest number of Capability Development activities in the form of "Capability Integrations" in the Command Post Exercise Part (five in Phase III; with an additional one in Phases I and II) and in the LIVEX Part (two). SACEUR's Annual Guidance on Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation (The Sage) also directs improvements in exercise provision; in areas undergoing Capability Development.

Hybrid Threat, while more conceptual at the time of the study, has come to the forefront of NATO's thinking following Russia's masterful use of a hybrid approach in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. JWC is now regularly tasked to brief Hybrid Warfare in Phase I Academics and to incorporate it in its exercise designs.

Pooling and Sharing is still discussed within NATO, though it has not yet had significant impact on JWC. Notwithstanding this, however, JWC does have the capacity to contribute to this through DOTMLPFI assessments on key capabilities. In TRJE15, a DOTMLPFI "stock-take" on cyber has been undertaken. Available to HQ SACT, this could be used to inform synchronization with and between nations. The last two years has also witnessed a drive to re-invigorate Doctrine in NATO. This has included an increased focus on Doctrine within JWC exercises.

In TRJE15, both NATO Response Force (NRF) and the Canadian HQ were trained. Whilst the main driver for the Canadian involvement was not directly cost-saving in terms of the exercise cost, it was indicative that most NATO Nations would generally expect to operate as part of a coalition. This is partly driven by the nature of modern operations, but also most NATO Nations have reduced organic capabilities and will generally wish to benefit from working with Nations whose capabilities are complementary.

Of the three highest profile Capability Integrations in TRJE15, two—Operations Logistic Chain Management (OLCM) and Strategic Communications (StratCom)—involved joint HQ SACT/JWC teams, with the third, Cyber, being a JWC team. All of these Capability Integrations provide outputs that inform capability developers on how to further shape and improve their efforts; with the latter two also focused on improved exercise provision in these areas.

INTERVIEW

By Inci Kucukaksoy and
Sonia Bjerke Abdelmaguid

Commodore Hans Christian Helseth Royal Norwegian Navy Special Advisor to Commander JWC



Commodore Helseth in Zaragoza, Spain, during TRJE15. Photo by JWC PAO.

Sir, thank you for giving us the time for this interview. Before being assigned to JWC in September 2015 as the Special Advisor to the Commander, you had various key assignments with the Navy, on the ground in the Balkans and Afghanistan and with the International Military Staff at NATO HQ; what was the most important thing that these assignments taught you?

— This is both an easy and a difficult question for me. The experience I gained from having spent fifteen or so years at sea, in submarines and on frigates has shaped me. I have mainly been in operational command-and-control positions, so maybe "joint warfare" can sum it up. You see, the Norwegian Navy gave us command responsibilities at a relatively young age, and in a lifestyle where the only certainty is change, I would say you learn to bloom where you are planted.

How do you feel about your assignment to JWC so far? And to expand on this point, what are your priorities?

— Some of my dear colleagues from earlier assignments, who were very familiar with the work of the Joint Warfare Centre, immediately told me upon my nomination that this was indeed the perfect post for me. And I must say that the more I get to know the Centre, the more I tend to think that they were right. I know that my experience from NATO HQ and other NATO assignments as well as my operational background in general are appreciated here, for which I am grateful. As for priorities, in my position as Special Advisor, I reside outside the Chain of Command and thus I am

not in a position to introduce any changes as such. My task is to support the Commander and other levels of the organization, where my expertise is needed.

You joined JWC just before the execution phase of TRJE15. What are your observations from this exercise?

— I would say that the foremost observation was the enormous effort that the team had put into preparing and conducting the Command Post Exercise (CPX). It got me off to a flying start being able to observe a JWC-designed exercise of this scale, and I also got to see with my own eyes the professionalism and flexibility of JWC as a whole and of the TRJE15 team in particular. Exercise Control (EXCON) was manned by 800 experts, including the Higher Control (HICON), Response Cells (RCs), the Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX) and the Opposing Force (OPFOR). Some of the things that made an impression on me were the 2,800 Main Events List/ Main Incidents List (MEL/ MIL) injects and the CAX and OPFOR capabilities, all of them unique to JWC. Similarly, the effort of the deployed White Cell, consisting of role players from real-world international and non-governmental organizations was also quite impressive. It is my understanding that TRJE15 had the largest ever Response Cells, which gave the exercise yet another layer of realism. Last but not least, JWC's Media Section also made a great effort in depicting the fictitious conflict. I could go on and on with: the industry members observing the exercise, the massive task of our professional Real Life Support team, the support of Spain as our host etc. Having seen a

large number of exercises and operations, I can confidently say "well done, JWC".

In your view, what role do you feel that JWC plays for NATO and our Host Nation Norway?

— It did not take me many days to realize that JWC is the jewel in NATO's crown. I am impressed by the fact that JWC has trained close to 50,000 personnel from NATO and Partner Nations for operations, for the NRF stand-by and for other purposes. This simply could not have happened without the JWC. Our Host Nation has provided accommodation, maintenance, security, transport and much more, and I have been told that all the services are provided in a professional manner. Both SACT and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee have been very happy with the service they have received while here. And they were not referring to the beautiful nature, the fjords and the splendid view from our building, which of course come in addition and at no additional cost! For Norway, NATO's presence here is a symbol of the country's commitment to NATO, and vice versa.

And to conclude, why did you choose the Navy?

— Very easy to answer! I applied for admission for about ten different military colleges—including the Army and the Air Force—but the Naval Academy was the first to do their acceptance tests. So, you could say that the Navy chose me! And reflecting upon the camaraderie, the ethos, the friendships, the challenges, the rewards, I would have done it all over again. Thanks for the opportunity to pay my tribute to The Three Swords Magazine. ✦



(www.nato-pa.int) At the conclusion of the Assembly meeting in Stavanger, the Alliance parliamentarians urged NATO Nations to boost defence spending in the face of an "increasingly unpredictable Russia, growing instability in the Middle East and a developing array of security threats." Photo by NATO.



Russia, the Arctic and the ever-changing security environment



THIS YEAR, the Parliament of Norway (The Storting) hosted the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's 61st Annual Session. The event took place on 9-12 October 2015 in Stavanger, the host city of the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). Behind the four-day session lies months of endeavour, and, looking forward, the reports and policy recommendations formalized here will resonate with next year's NATO Summit in Warsaw. The policy recommendations adopted at the 61st Annual Session currently include "Addressing the Evolving Threat of Terrorism" (Resolution 420), "Countering Russia's Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns" (Resolution 421), "Solidarity with Ukraine" (Resolution 422), "Economic Sanctions Against Russia" (Resolution 424) and "An Urgent Comprehensive and Unified Response to Crises in the Middle East and North Africa" (Resolution 425), amongst others.

Engaging Allies and Partners

The event, which coincidentally also marked the successful culmination of the Assembly's 60th anniversary commemorations, brought together more than 240 parliamentarians, delegates, observers and interagency partners to discuss actual threats to international security. Its main aim was the prioritization of common security interests, including the commitment to boost the national defence budgets, as set out in the Wales Summit Declaration, and to keep up with the adaptation measures, which are the key steps to enhance NATO's military posture and readiness levels. These include the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (the "Spearhead Force") and the newly established six headquarters in Eastern Europe (Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania and Poland)—the NATO Force Integration Units.

During the event, meetings were held by the different committees, including the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security, the Defence and Security Committee, the Economics and Security Committee, the Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group, the Political Committee and the

Science and Technology Committee. Cooperation through common understanding was highlighted throughout the discussions, which mainly focused on Russia and its aggression against Ukraine as well as on the growing spread of ISIS across the Middle East and the ongoing heated conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya and South Sudan. "We now live in an age of unpredictability and dynamic instability," General Petr Pavel, NATO's Chairman of the Military Committee, said in his remarks on 11 October, adding: "We are all well aware that NATO now faces two distinct security challenges, the East and the South, where Russia is a common denominator in both."

The Plenary Session on 12 October brought together Ms Erna Solberg, the Prime Minister of Norway and Mr Jens Stoltenberg, NATO's Secretary General. In his keynote speech, Mr Stoltenberg highlighted the fact that the Readiness Action Plan was NATO's biggest reinforcement of its Collective Defence since the end of the Cold War. "For over the last couple of years we have seen dramatic changes. From the annexation of Crimea to the collapse of the Arab Spring, our world has become less predictable and more dangerous," the Secretary General said, adding: "This instability which surrounds us is our new strategic reality, and it will be with us for the long-term."

He then outlined his three priorities: modernizing NATO's deterrence, relations with Russia, and the challenges in the South and the importance of developing a comprehensive security strategy in order to face this challenge. Referring to deterrence, he said: "We have strong forces not because we want to fight a war, but because we want to prevent war."

Not coincidentally, the High North, which continues to see increased Russian military presence, was another matter of concern during the meeting. Indeed, an article in Washington Post published on 20 April 2015 quoted a top Moscow official referring to the Arctic as "the Russian Mecca". On the following pages, we are pleased to present the keynote speech delivered by Lieutenant General Kjell Grandhagen, Chief of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, at the 61st Annual Session. The article is highly relevant, as it covers topics such as Russia, the Arctic and the changing security environment.

~Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

Lieutenant General KJELL GRANDHAGEN

Director, Norwegian Intelligence Service

Lieutenant General Kjell Grandhagen, Director of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, addressing the Political Committee about Russia, the Arctic and the changing security environment on 10 October 2015.
Photo by Stortinget.



RUSSIAN actions in Ukraine have deteriorated the security policy climate in Europe considerably. The introduction of sanctions and countermeasures appears to have had a limited impact, and today—more than 18 months after the annexation of Crimea—the relationship between Russia and the West remains tense. Meanwhile, Russia has become a more unpredictable foreign policy actor. The Ukraine conflict demonstrated the Putin regime's willingness and ability to use all means available to the state in order to achieve regime aims, even at the expense of a struggling economy.

In Syria, Russia has proved itself willing to take on military involvement beyond its near abroad. Russia appears increasingly threat-oriented, and the Ukraine conflict is symptomatic of its threat perception, which is characterised by fear of so-called colour revolutions and of Western interference in the affairs of other states. This is also reflected in the Syria conflict. However, Russia's role in Syria serves multiple purposes, supporting as it does the Putin regime's aim of a multi-polar world order whereby Russia balances the position held by the United States and plays a more prominent role on the world stage.

In sharp contrast to reactions outside Russia, the Putin regime saw its popularity ratings soar at home in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. However, the conflict is becoming drawn-out and pressure is mounting on the re-

gime, especially given the conflict's economic ramifications. From an intelligence perspective, the Ukraine crisis has nonetheless provided much valuable insight into Russian courses of action and objectives. I would therefore like to start by highlighting what we consider the key operational lessons learned from Ukraine, before I go on to share some more general assessments of developments in Russian politics and military power.

BY WAY OF PUTTING Russia's actions in Ukraine into perspective, it might be useful to start by taking a quick backward glance at the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008. Despite Russia's victory, the war exposed some serious weaknesses in Russian military capabilities. In order to address these weaknesses, a major military reform was initiated that



In the revised edition of the Russian military doctrine, published on 26 December 2014, NATO remains Russia's number one security policy risk.

same year. By transforming the Russian armed forces into a considerably leaner and more mobile military organisation, the reform laid the groundwork for what Russia has been able to achieve in Ukraine. The government wants to continue investing in the modernisation of the military, despite the strained budgets.

For the outside world, three particular lessons have emerged in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. All three are directly linked to the results of the Russian military reform.

The first lesson is that the Russian armed forces have improved their responsiveness considerably. Russia demonstrated an impressive ability to swiftly concentrate military force from across the country in order to conduct an efficient, coordinated and challenging operation.

The second lesson is linked closely to the aspect of time, and concerns the so-called reinforcement concept. The Russian military reform entailed a transition from a "mobilisation concept" to a "reinforcement concept", based on standing reaction forces and rapid deployments. The Ukraine crisis has shown us that the Russian reinforcement concept works.

The final lesson I would like to draw your attention to is Russia's use of instruments of state power. During the Ukraine crisis, Russia employed a range of instruments of state power, on a scale and with a degree of coordination not seen before, and applied them in the form of what is often referred to as hybrid warfare, *i.e.* the combination of classic military power and unconventional and civilian measures. Although none of this is novel in terms of military theory, what is new is the finesse with which it was executed. The Norwegian Intelligence Service was able to observe the combination of various Russian instruments on an hour-by-hour, week-by-week basis. The approach has involved classic military power in the form of dozens of battalion level task forces, artillery, air defence, command and control and logistics. It has also involved the supply

of hundreds of tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery to the separatists in eastern Ukraine. We have seen large units composed of what the Russians term "Russian volunteers" fighting inside eastern Ukraine; in reality, these fighters have been contracted Russian mercenaries recruited from regular Russian military units. They have included Russian Special Forces in unmarked uniforms posing as separatists, referred to by the media as "little green men". The approach has involved Russian-operated and -controlled air defence systems and other regular Russian units on Ukrainian soil, as well as sophisticated and coordinated information operations in Ukraine, in the West and in Russia. And it has also involved cyber operations.

The conflict showed how extremely important non-military means have become within the Russian toolbox. The Kremlin has placed considerable importance on influencing through the media and in the information sphere. Although the degree of coordination of and impact from Russian information operations should not be overstated, it is important to note that these means are used extensively—even in peacetime. The Russian threat perception involves conflict viewed as something, which is constantly ongoing between irreconcilable civil systems. This is why Russia constantly seeks to convey its narratives through all available channels. In sum, this creates a "new normal" where the distinctions between civilian and military and peace and conflict become blurred.

THESE ARE SOME PURELY operational lessons from Ukraine. In today's situation, it is equally important to identify the regime's overarching foreign policy vision. In practice, Russia has two main foreign policy objectives, which both remain unchanged. The first is regional dominance in the CIS [*Editorial: Commonwealth of Independent States*] area, the so-called "near abroad". The other is to reinforce Russia's

status as an equal and respected world power. These objectives are very closely interlinked.

One of the key drivers behind Russia's eagerness to dominate the CIS area is the Kremlin's desire to maintain a security policy buffer zone between Russia and the outside world, especially the West. In a Russian context, the term "security policy" is applied broadly. The Putin regime's decision to use a variety of wide-ranging measures in Ukraine is largely a reflection of Moscow's expansive and complex enemy perception. For instance, the regime views political and economic integration between Western countries and CIS countries as a security challenge, regardless of whether this integration takes the form of EU membership or an association agreement. The regime considers such integration a possible first step toward NATO expansion into the CIS area, a clear "red line" to Russia.

However, the Putin regime likely considers it equally threatening that closer political and economic integration with the West could move the CIS countries' social systems and values in a more liberal and democratic direction. Moscow fears that such developments could spill over into Russia and may come to pose a threat to the regime itself. In other words, Russia's foreign policy priorities reflect both the conviction that the West poses a classic security threat and the regime's own fear of losing power. Taken together, these aspects explain many of Russia's actions in Ukraine and the CIS area at large. We expect Russia's strategic objectives in the CIS area to remain unchanged in the years ahead.

When it comes to Russia's desire to attain the status of a great power, this is a search for respect in the sense that the Russians believe they deserve to exert just as much influence as the United States and the EU on major international issues. Referring to Russia's current foreign policy line as "revanchist" is correct in the sense that Russia wants to see the





NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, 22 September 2015. Photo by NATO.

end of the unipolar, U.S.-dominated world order which has prevailed since the end of the Cold War.

However, the Russian elite does not envision a return to the Soviet era, when Russia was a superpower in a bipolar world. Rather, Russia seeks a multi-polar world order, expressed most clearly in its steadily evolving bilateral relationship with China. The conflict in Syria is yet another example, where the Kremlin is trying to show itself to be an independent power broker, by assuming the leadership in the global fight against terrorism. However, Russia's actions in Syria have shown that Moscow's main goal is to support the regime of president Bashar al-Assad. The support for Assad is based on a desire to counter American influence in the Middle East, which Moscow hopes will serve to limit Washington's freedom of action more broadly.

Russia is, as mentioned, strongly critical towards what it perceives as American unilateralism, be that in Iraq, Libya or—indirectly—in Ukraine. The Russians fear that this

perceived American policy of regime change will ultimately threaten the Putin regime itself, through a so-called "colour revolution". In other words, the roots of Russia's actions in Syria can be traced back to Russian domestic politics, and the difficult economic situation the Putin regime now finds itself in. The Syria campaign is therefore actively exploited by the Kremlin in its domestic propaganda, which depicts Putin as the only guarantor for stability in Syria and the world at large—but more than anything at home in Russia. But this is not a show of strength. In reality we are witnessing a Putin under tremendous pressure. Moreover, it is not obvious that Russia has a clear end-game in Syria, where the situation could rapidly take a turn for the worse—not least considering that Russia itself has become a target for Islamist terror.

Still, in the years ahead, we can expect tough Russian rhetoric on key international issues. The country will continue to make active use of its UN Security Council veto, and the Kremlin will also continue to actively approach non-Western countries politically.

Well-developed economic links to the outside world have long constituted another of Russia's key foreign policy objectives. From a Russian perspective, these links serve a number of purposes, the most crucial of which is that over half of Russia's government revenue stems from petroleum exports. Given the current oil price, it is essential for Russia to maintain its relationships with individual Western countries, its main energy customers in particular. Despite Russian rhetoric stating the opposite, it would be impossible for Russia to replace Europe with China as its key trading partner in the foreseeable future. This largely explains why Russia continues to strive to increase its political influence in Europe, particularly by establishing links to individual countries and Russian-friendly political forces, and by attempting to sow dissent between European states.

AFTER PUTIN'S RETURN to the presidency, we have witnessed a systematic transfer of power from the government to the Presidential



Administration. Throughout the Ukraine crisis, this development has been reinforced by Putin's preference—more so than in the past—to base his decisions on the advice of a very small circle of advisers with intelligence, security and defence backgrounds. This means there is little room for alternative views to the current conservative and authoritarian line, and therefore little chance of any real policy change.

So how sustainable is the current foreign policy line at home?

First, I would like to make it clear that we do not expect regime change in Russia in the short term. Russian popular opinion appears to remain extremely receptive to nationalist patriotic rhetoric, and as mentioned earlier the Putin regime saw its popularity ratings rise after the annexation of Crimea. Alternative voices in the elite and opposition have become further marginalised in recent years, helped by the regime's high degree of control of the Russian media landscape. As anti-Western propaganda has flourished in Russia over the past 18 months, the liberal opposition has increasingly become referred to as "fifth columnists" and traitors whose aim is to undermine Russia in favour of the West. The assassination of the Russian opposition politician Boris Nemtsov on 27 February this year was typical of the current political climate in Russia, which allows little scope for alternative and oppositional voices.

However, the current economic crisis in Russia has exposed a number of long-standing vulnerabilities in the Russian political system. The IMF currently expects the Russian oil-dependent economy to shrink by 3.8 per cent this year, whereas the Russian central bank's own estimate is even more pessimistic. Last year, by comparison, saw a slight increase of 0.6 per cent, and it is not long since Russia had annual growth rates of 7–8 per cent several years in a row. The oil price fall combined with Western sanctions has shaved nearly half the value off the rouble in a year and resulted in high inflation and negative real wage growth after years

of robust increases. The Russian government has nevertheless chosen to continue giving priority to the military buildup even as budget cuts have begun to bite. The state still holds financial reserves, but a low oil price, negative economic growth and high Russian ambitions mean that these will have to be drained within the next few years.

In parallel, long-term demographic developments will give rise to an ageing population and demand a sharp productivity increase among those of working age. Despite, this, the current political leadership is adamant in retaining the current economic model, with strong state control and a large proportion of actors closely linked to the Kremlin. The lack of necessary structural reform is conspicuous and helps preserve nepotism, an unreliable legal system and Russia's dependency on oil. As the country's economic development slows down, the government will find it increasingly difficult to provide the level of welfare the Russian people have come to expect.

Most Russia analysts nonetheless agree that it is neither the oil price nor the sanctions, which poses the biggest threat to the Russian economy in the longer term. The country has failed to take the necessary structural mea-


asures to diversify and legislate, and to combat corruption, and with the current sanctions and low oil price this could come to have an extremely detrimental long-term effect.

Why have the Russian authorities not done more to address the economy's structural weaknesses? The answer is simple. Some people benefit from the exclusion of others and from the ease with which large sums of money can be squirreled away. In Russia, these individuals can be found in close proximity to the power elite.

Due to the economic situation, the regime's fear of domestic popular opposition has become stronger, which in turn has prompted further tightening of Russia's already extremely authoritarian political line toward civil society. We expect this development to continue, especially given next year's Duma elections and the presidential election in 2018.

In the longer term it is possible to imagine more friction within the Kremlin, within the elite at large and within the population. Because the conflict in Ukraine has proved lengthy, popular support for it could be waning. Moreover, the economic crisis may spark associations to the chaotic 1990s, which Putin has based his political career on being the antidote to. Although massive popular uprisings seem unlikely in the short term, experiences from elsewhere, such as the Middle East, suggest that popular unrest can arise quickly and be difficult to predict. Within the political elite, the crisis could potentially challenge Putin's superior role as the top political intermediary between various groups.

Nevertheless, I would like to emphasise that even if the current situation triggers regime change in the longer term, this will not necessarily result in a more cooperative, democratic or predictable Russia. The lack of renewal among the regime's power brokers over the past decade, combined with a traditionally strong central authority, makes it difficult to imagine a situation whereby Putin is forced to leave the presidency in favour of a



Vladimir Putin during a press conference. Photo by Shutterstock.

Moreover, it is not obvious that Russia has a clear end-game in Syria, where the situation could rapidly take a turn for the worse—not least considering that Russia itself has become a target for Islamist terror.



A military cyber command has been in development since 2012, and will, in the coming years, boost Russia's ability to attack an opponent's military capabilities, including command and control.

more liberal, democratically-oriented successor. It is more likely that a future new regime is recruited from the same circles which are currently in power, perhaps with an even more nationalistic profile. It is also worth noting that even the parts of the regime which support a more liberal political line and are more conciliatory toward the West share the fundamental desire for Russian regional dominance in the CIS area and great power status.

All indicators point to a continued modernisation of the Russian military as a top priority. This is linked in part to the continuity seen in the Russian threat perception. In the revised edition of the Russian military doctrine, published on 26 December 2014, NATO remains Russia's number one security policy risk. The Russian world view includes potential security challenges in other parts of Russia as well, from volatile regimes and extreme Islamism in the south to a growing China in the east—which despite the closer bilateral relationship is likely viewed with some trepidation by the Kremlin.

The 2008 defence reform will continue to guide the military capability development and force structure in the years ahead. The modernisation of the Russian military will continue through the state armament programme GPV-2020. However, the struggling economy has forced the authorities to repeatedly revise their budgetary plans.

Military spending therefore looks set to decrease somewhat over the next few years. Several acquisitions will have to be put off until the next planning period, stretching toward 2025. However, there is much to suggest that military budget allocations will remain top priority. It looks as though the budget item "national defence" will total 4.2 per cent of GDP in 2015, compared to 3.5 per cent last year. Often, defence-related allocations come in addition to this, and these are calculated into other budget items. The Ukraine crisis has contributed to the continued prioritisation

of the armed forces because they have shown themselves to the authorities to be an accessible means to achieve foreign policy goals. The result of this is that NATO will be faced with an increasingly capable Russian military going forward, with access to a broad range of assets.

Nuclear weapons will continue to form the basis of Russian deterrence. This capability will be preserved through modernisation and replacement of both nuclear weapons and attendant means of delivery. Over the coming decade, most of the Soviet-era systems will be replaced. Another move of equal importance to NATO is Russia's prioritisation of the development and acquisition of long-range conventional precision-strike weapons, which supplement or even serve as an alternative to the global and regional roles played by nuclear weapons. These weapons are capable of striking an opponent's key capabilities early on in a conflict, without escalating to nuclear weapons. The recent use of cruise missiles in Syria is an example of this.

The Russian authorities have for years used computer network operations to acquire information about other countries' political decisions and military and economic affairs. There are currently well-established Russian institutions, first of all their intelligence agencies, running this type of operations, and these institutions have amassed considerable experience and skills. Together with China, Russia currently is the most active originator of network-based intelligence operations against Norway. A military cyber command has been in development since 2012, and will in the coming years boost Russia's ability to attack an opponent's military capabilities, including command and control.

Offensive cyber capabilities could come to play a strategic role. Actors such as China and Russia appear to be developing capacities in order to strike infrastructure and critical systems. Elsewhere, there have been instances of information operations making use of hacking.

I WILL NOW MOVE on from more general developments to what this means for the High North and the Arctic. Russia has referred to the Arctic as its key strategic resource base in future, and like the other littoral Arctic states Russia therefore has a strong interest in keeping the High North and the Arctic a low-tension zone, and handle transnational challenges collectively. In recent years, this has become evident through Russia's efforts to portray itself as a responsible actor adhering to the law of the sea in the Arctic.

On the other hand, the change seen in the security climate has led to an erosion of trust between Russia and the West. This affects the cooperation climate in the Arctic negatively as well. As we have seen first in Ukraine and now in Syria, Russia is willing to use force when it considers it necessary to defend Russian interests. The situation in the Arctic is obviously quite different. Nevertheless, to Russia, the significance of the northern strategic direction has increased due to concern for NATO's and especially the United States' ability to project military power in the Arctic. This could prompt the Russians to view Arctic actors not just as individual countries with which Moscow seeks a good bilateral partnership, but also increasingly as members of a Western interest and defence alliance with strongly diverging interests to Russia. The likelihood of Russia pursuing an even more challenging foreign policy in the Arctic has therefore increased, especially on matters where Russia sees its vital interests at stake. These developments also mean that Russia could potentially employ a wider range of measures to influence and shape developments in the area.

A few years back, Russian Arctic rhetoric was characterised by terms such as "peaceful development", "low tension" and "low military activity". Now, Russian leaders such as Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu are increasingly referring to the need for ramping up military activity in the High North. Rhetoric is one thing,



however action is what counts. It is a fact that Russia recently established a new joint command in charge of much of the Russian Arctic, new airbases and coastal and air defence installations all along the northern Russian coastline and on the polar archipelagos, as well as a new army brigade at Alakurtti. Plans also exist for another brigade on the Yamal Peninsula, and new and modernised weapons systems are being supplied to all the services as we speak.

We are currently facing a new security policy landscape, where the continuous monitoring of Russian military developments in the High North is crucial. Although the forces in the High North primarily serve a global strategic role, they are also a regional instrument to ensure Russian control there. The Northern Fleet's strategic submarines are central to Russia's nuclear deterrent. We assess that the Kola Peninsula will remain Russia's key strategic nuclear base in future. Through the addition of new weapons and new technology, Russia is in the process of boosting its ability to use nuclear weapons and to protect its strategic capabilities and core areas. The range of these weapons enables them to cover much of European land, air and sea territory.

To some of you, this description sounds familiar, and the truth is that Russia's basic military concept remains relatively unchanged since the Cold War. The country continues to believe that great power status and survivability depends on a credible and redundant nuclear first- and second-strike capability, as well as the ability to defend this capability whatever the cost. To Norway, the fact remains that this capability is located only a few kilometres from our north-eastern border.

Russia also continues to conduct its much debated strategic sorties with medium and heavy bombers close to Norwegian borders. A key purpose behind these sorties is the opportunity to demonstrate Russian ability to conduct operations with airborne strategic weapons. However, these sorties are also used for political posturing vis-à-vis western European countries. Generally speaking, air activity increased slightly in 2014, while air activity on the Kola Peninsula and adjacent areas and along the Norwegian coast remained largely unchanged from previous years.

FINALLY, I would like to emphasise that despite the considerable military and foreign

policy changes we have seen, the Norwegian Intelligence Service's assessment that Russia currently poses no direct military threat to Norway or NATO remains firm. A threat is a combination of capability and intent, and although Russia's capability is increasing, it is currently hard to see a rationale for Russian military aggression against Norway or NATO in the short or medium term. The Ukraine crisis has played out in what Russia considers its privileged sphere of interest, meaning that it, politically speaking, has limited application elsewhere. On the other hand, intent is fluent, and Russia's actions in Ukraine, its mounting economic crisis and increasingly unpredictable domestic policy situation makes it paramount to track political developments in the country closely in the time ahead.

There is a long term risk related to the combination of an over-ambitious authoritarian regime, an economic crisis and the brewing of potential internal unrest. Simply put; it has become increasingly difficult to predict Russian stability and possible courses of action in a 5-20 year perspective.


On the operational side, I initially highlighted three lessons learned from the Ukraine crisis. The Russian armed forces' substantially improved responsiveness and the transition from a mobilisation to a reinforcement con-

cept has reduced the warning time for Russian military preparations and force buildup, in reality from months to days or weeks. Russia has also demonstrated an ability to integrate information and cyber operations, diplomacy and economic instruments with classic military power in comprehensive campaigns. From a military perspective, this means shorter warning time and a more complex potential opponent, against which a classic approach to military conflict would not suffice. It is especially important to note the importance Russia places on covert and deniable subversion. As its relationship with the West has cooled, we can expect an increase in such activities against our own spheres of interest, even in peacetime. To the alliance, this means that we cannot allow ourselves to be inflexible in our methods and our approach. In order to give our decision-makers as relevant and current threat perception as possible, we will have to continually update our methods and technology.


This week, the Norwegian government proposed to increase the budget of the Norwegian Intelligence Service by more than 25 per cent. This proposal reflects the need to continuously monitor regional and global developments in order to provide timely situational awareness and early warning in case of changes to the threat against Norway. ✦

The Arctic—Photo by Lars Magne Hovtun.





"Most academic and national defence research concludes that it is a matter of when, not if, the military will be required to operate in an urban environment."



*"The future character of conflict has been described by the **5Cs**. They may not be applicable for all environments, but they absolutely resonate with the future urban battlespace: it will be more **congested**, more **cluttered**, more **contested**, more **connected**, and more **constrained**. (...) It is critical for NATO to think in this space, and remain adaptable and resilient enough to operate in the most challenging physical and human environment. It is not if we have to, but when we have to... and we need to get it as right as possible, when we do."*

**~ Brigadier Ian Rigden, British Army
Head of Land & Research Development,
Concepts and Doctrine Centre**

NEW CONCEPTS

JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS AND THE NATO URBANISATION PROJECT

BY WG CDR GORDON PENDLETON

Royal Air Force
Concept Development Branch
NATO Allied Command Transformation

Introduction

The Military Committee (MC) tasked Headquarters Allied Command Transformation (HQ SACT) to deliver a Bi-Strategic Command Concept "NATO Conceptual Study on Urbanisation" by 31 March 2016 that examines the impact of the urbanisation trend on NATO military operations between now and 2035. The NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA)¹ had identified that urbanisation was a future strategic trend of concern and should be monitored closely. The NATO Framework for Future Alliance Operations (FFAO)² went further and identified three urbanisation related "instability situations" that could impact future NATO operations significantly:


- Natural disaster,
- Mass migration, and,
- Megacity turmoil.

The MC tasking also added the requirement to consider hybrid warfare and high-intensity conflict within the inner city turmoil instability situation.

The Urbanisation Project was initiated through Concept Development and Experiment (CD&E) Engagement with NATO Nations in late 2013. In 2014, a number of workshops were held to gather together urbanisation experts, strategic foresight experts and national defence planners to distil their knowl-

edge. At the start of the project, a number of gaps in existing urbanisation literature were identified and HQ SACT commissioned eight academic research papers to assist in answering the "so what" on urbanisation for NATO. Additionally, a Limited Objective Experiment was executed at the Rome-based Modelling and Simulation Centre of Excellence (M&S COE) in September 2015. The experiment explored future urban scenarios in order to gain additional insights and identify gaps in future capability and capacity requirements associated with the three FFAO instability situations mentioned above. To date, 17 NATO Nations (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Esto-





nia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States), the United Nations, the City of San Francisco, NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO), 17 NATO Centres of Excellence, universities in Italy, United Kingdom and the United States have all contributed to the Urbanisation Conceptual Study and Experiment. A detailed breakdown of the project timeline—the milestones and key deliverables—is provided in the diagram above.

The urbanisation challenge

Urbanisation can be defined³ as the increase of the share of the urban residents amongst the total population. It is driven by two processes:

- Net internal migration, from rural to urban areas, and net international migration into urban areas,
- The natural population growth of urban areas (e.g. the excess of births over deaths in the cities).

According to a recent United Nations report⁴ more people live in urban areas today than in rural areas—with 54% of the world's population residing in urban areas. In 1950, 30% of the world's population was urban, and by 2050, 66% of the world's population is projected to be urban. The western world is already urbanised, with 78% of people living in urban areas. Developing countries are experiencing a rapid rate of urbanisation, and this, combined with large population growth, means that the urban


population in the developing world will jump from 2.9 billion in 2015 to 4.3 billion in 2035.

Moreover, the urban environment is also changing rapidly. Technology is already affecting how people live and work in urban environments; for example the use of social networks for everything from organising large-scale gatherings to reporting news events instantly; to buying goods and possibly having them delivered by unmanned drones. NATO will have to adapt to this changing environment of rapidly increasing population.


The future cities will be hard to navigate—the streets will be narrow and congested, as will the airspace; and the rise of slums will also increase the likelihood of no-go areas for parts of the population. The paucity of major highways and other routes running through city centres will mean that military movements could become entirely predictable. Cities will have a vertical as well as a horizontal dimension, and the subterranean space underneath a city will also have to be considered as part of the future operating environment.

This future operating environment can best be summed up as the "9 or 10 Domain Challenge" (the diagram on the next page) and NATO planners of the future will need to con-





"Now and in the future, NATO faces unprecedented Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) challenges in the urban environment..."




RECOMMENDED READING:
A future perspective of warfare, read more at <http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2013/09/25/out-of-the-mountains-the-coming-age-of-the-urban-guerrilla/>


sider all aspects of this challenge when developing a fully comprehensive operational plan. Now and in the future, NATO faces unprecedented Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) challenges in the urban environment and littoral approaches. A2AD aggression threatens not only power projection, but also Collective Defence in the Alliance's border regions. Both state and non-state competitors continuously challenge NATO's security via cyber intrusions, multi-dimensional surveillance, support of proxy militias, and psychological operations aimed at provoking anti-Western sentiments. Hybrid threat tactics, empowered non-state actors, and the proliferation of advanced weapons systems pose a future threat dilemma that is as unpredictable as it is dangerous. Competitors will exploit the vulnerabilities, resources, and sanctuary of strategically situated cities to deny NATO access to key points of entry and limit freedom of action within the mission space. They will persuade or terrorize civilians into participating—willingly or otherwise—in a comprehensive A2AD strategy that employs physical, virtual, and psychological components to pose dangerous obstacles to both military forces and vulnerable civilian populations.⁵ History shows that military opera-

tions tend to be where the population resides, whether it is assistance in the event of a natural disaster or crisis response during a period of unrest. NATO countries have relatively little recent experience of operating in large urban areas, with the focus over the last decade being on Afghanistan. Furthermore, most academic and national defence research concludes that it is a matter of when, not if, the military will be

required to operate in an urban environment, however training and capabilities for such an environment are lacking at this time, and NATO has yet to adapt to the changing landscape of cities.

The 9 or 10 Domain Urban Environment
Dr David Kilcullen, 2014





TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 Urban Warfare Training.
Photo by Eriks Kukutis, NATO.

"NATO expeditionary forces are likely to operate in urban, often littoral, environments in the developing world on multiple occasions between now and 2035."

The "so what" for NATO

Urbanisation will be one of the most significant dynamics affecting the future, presenting both opportunities and risks.⁶ This will be accompanied by increased demand for natural resources—particularly water, energy, and food—creating stresses as vital municipal services and systems come under increasing pressure. As more people live in urban areas,⁷ which become ever more central to the way people live, armed forces will need to develop ways of delivering military effect in this environment. Failed and failing cities, in both developed and developing countries, could pose major security challenges.

Taking the large-scale trends together, a clear pattern emerges.⁸ Rapid urban growth in coastal, underdeveloped areas is overloading economic, social and governance systems, straining city infrastructure, and overburdening the carrying capacity of cities designed for much smaller populations. This is likely to make the most vulnerable cities less and less able to meet the challenges of population growth, coastal urbanisation, and connectedness. The implications for future conflict are profound, with more people competing for scarcer resources in crowded, under-serviced and under-governed urban areas. Rapid urbanisation and inadequate socio-economic infrastructure are likely to increase the number

and scale of densely populated slums. Such areas are likely to be more prone to social unrest. Urbanisation concentrates populations, potentially making them more vulnerable to the effects of natural disasters, disease and deliberate acts of violence. With most urban areas likely to be in coastal regions, cities will be particularly vulnerable to the effects of rising sea levels. Megacities⁹ may also offer safe haven for threat groups who wish to strike NATO while simultaneously megacities' links to national interest only grow stronger over time. This dichotomy of threat conjoined with growing criticality will produce a complex security environment, which will challenge policy makers and military planners.

Therefore, NATO¹⁰ expeditionary forces are likely to operate in urban, often littoral, environments in the developing world on multiple occasions between now and 2035, as the global population increasingly urbanises, especially in developing countries, and as urban centres continue to cluster on coastlines. (This is not to suggest that operations in remote environments, including the global commons, will not still occur—they will, and capabilities for these kinds of operations will remain critical. It is just that, with an increasing proportion of the world's population and economy clustered in urban littoral areas, operations in the urban littoral will become an increasingly large proportion of the whole).

The military implications

NATO must view urbanisation as both a challenge and an opportunity. We must exploit our superior professionalism, fleeting technological edge, and compelling ideological narrative to produce our own asymmetric advantages and overmatch substantial competitor investments in A2AD systems across all domains.

As highlighted in the NATO Smart Defence principle, future capability contributions must be affordable, feasible, and relevant. Our operational concepts specify the requirement for enhanced situational awareness, redundant capabilities, enhanced partnerships, and joint solutions for combined arms entry operations. Future technologies including autonomous systems, directed energy, and robust deployable networks will reduce the costs to generate a lighter, lethal and agile force, but will likewise provide new options for adversaries if our research is not jealously safeguarded.

Equipment programmes must focus more on the requirement for NATO to be able to operate in complex, and, in particular, urban terrain in the future. Most important for success is the ability for all elements, whether mounted, dismounted, in the air or in the littoral, to be able to communicate without congesting nets to a point where they become unworkable. NATO will need a number of new technologies to deal with the threat posed by



the urban environment, all of which will need to be considered from both an offensive as well as a defensive standpoint—that is, how NATO forces can field and employ such technologies to their own advantage as well as protecting against possible use by an adversary.¹¹

The following principal categories of technology development will have the greatest impact on future urban environments: Food and water technologies, travel and transportation, mass surveillance, energy production, storage and distribution, communications, unmanned (autonomous) systems, human performance enhancements, data management and processing, and advances in architecture, open source design and advanced manufacturing technologies including additive manufacturing.

Training and exercises


So, how can the recommendations of the study be applied to NATO training, integrating all aspects of operational level planning and execution—the Joint Warfare Centre's domain?

To meet the urban and urban littoral challenge out to 2035, NATO needs to prepare for these eventualities explained above. If the Alliance wants to be successful in future urban conflicts, adaptation and continual training is not an option; it is a must.

Furthermore, adapting the mindset of leaders, and as a result the organisational culture, and particularly those leadership elements responsible for achieving information dominance are absolutely necessary to successfully operate within the urban environment.

Current NATO urban training areas are small in scale, designed to train Army units tactically and are built inland. NATO must consider the construction of a specialist Urban and Urban Littoral Training Area. The training area must be large with appropriate live and simulated training facilities and replicate the intellectual, physical, psychological and emotional challenges posed by Urban Operations.

Additionally, it must be built on the coast with port and airport facilities, buildings higher than 10 stories, complex subterranean structures, a riverine area, an industrial complex— Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) simulation—and cluttered airspace to allow Urban and Urban Littoral Operations to be exercised at the Joint and Comprehensive level. To meet the challenges



For these related stories, visit www.act.nato.int/urbanisation

— Why is the Urbanisation Study and Experiment important?

In 2008, the world as a whole passed the 50% threshold of individuals living in cities as opposed to the countryside. The western world is already urbanised, with 78% of people living in urban areas. Developing countries are experiencing a rapid rate of urbanisation, and this combined with large population growth means that the urban population in the developing world will jump from 2.9 billion in 2015 to 4.3 billion in 2035. History has shown that military

operations tend to be where the population resides, whether it is assistance in the event of a natural disaster or crisis response during a period of unrest. Academic and National Defence research share the same conclusion that it is a matter of when, not if, the military will be required to operate in urban environments. Therefore, the Alliance needs to identify possible gaps in training, requirements and capabilities, adapting to the changing landscape of cities in order to successfully tackle potential security challenges in urbanised systems.

posed by operating in the urban environment, urban tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) should become mandatory for all arms during collective training. To achieve this suitable training, resources will need to be made available throughout the training progression. This training must be either a Command Post Exercise (CPX) or amongst the population, and include the full range of planning and tactical actions from offensive and defensive to enabling and stabilising actions. The latter will require training alongside the full range of civilian agencies to provide a fully Comprehensive/Whole-of-Government Approach. Investments in education and training will round out NATO's professional edge, emphasizing mission awareness, agile and empowered leadership, and professional restraint down to the lowest tactical levels.¹² In sum, it is highly recommended to include and plan an Urban, Urban Littoral and Megacity LIVEX/CPX in the NATO 2017-2018 Military Training and Exercise Programme (MTEP) to further develop the recommendations and capabilities outlined in the NATO Urbanisation Conceptual Study which will help provide valuable lessons learned into Capability Development. ✦

END NOTES:

- (1) HQ SACT-Strategic Foresight Analysis Paper dated 11 September 2013.
- (2) NATO Framework for Future Alliance Operations, dated 9 April 2014.
- (3) HQ SACT Urbanisation Literature Review, dated 1 November 2014.
- (4) UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Urbanisation Prospects, dated 2014.
- (5) HQ SACT Research Paper-Future A2AD Challenges Posed by Urban Centre to 2035.
- (6) Royal Dutch Shell-New Lenses on Future Cities, dated 2014.
- (7) United Kingdom-Global Strategic Trends, dated 12 February 2014.
- (8) HQ SACT Research Paper-Climate and Geographical Implications for Future Urban Operations, dated 5 January 2015.
- (9) United States Chief of the Army Strategic Studies Group-Megacities and the United States Army, dated June 2014.
- (10) HQ SACT Research Paper, Technology and its Implications for a Future Urban Environment, dated 18 December 2014.
- (11) HQ SACT Research Paper-Technology and its Implications for a Future Urban Environment, dated 18 December 2014.
- (12) HQ SACT Research Paper-Future A2AD Challenges Posed by Urban Centre to 2035.

Defining Duty

Editor's Note: This interview first appeared in the JFQ magazine, 2nd Quarter 2015, and is reprinted with permission of the Editor.



**BY GENERAL (RET.) MARTIN E. DEMPSEY
UNITED STATES ARMY
FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

THROUGHOUT OVER 40 years of service, I have maintained a list of principles to judge my actions against. Chief among these principles is duty. I have reflected and written on this topic throughout my career, and I strongly believe the concept of duty is central to the Profession of Arms. Indeed, it seems to me to be *the* cornerstone of the uncommon life to which we have dedicated ourselves. Entrusted by society to apply violence on behalf of the Nation, we have a moral imperative to understand and uphold our solemnly sworn duty to "support and defend the Constitution". It is worth a conversation about what that duty entails.

Our duty as Service members resides in two primary responsibilities. First, we keep the Nation free from coercion. Second, we support our elected leaders as they perform their constitutional duties. To fulfill these responsibilities requires continued and life-long development of three important traits: expertise, humility and courage.

Expertise

Military leaders have a duty to understand the use—and limitations—of the military instrument of power. We must be unrivaled experts in the application of force on behalf of the Nation.

At the tactical level, our teams and units require highly skilled leaders who accomplish their assigned missions with the great-

est chance of success and minimal risk to the force. In this, we should always overmatch our adversary. To this end we must remain persistent students of the art and science of war, continually honing our skills as individuals, small teams, and units.

At the strategic level, civilian leaders depend on our advice and expertise to assist in the development of national strategies consistent without long-term national objectives. Our role is to offer options in discussions regarding the best use of military forces. We provide the "how we" and "can we" for any given situation, but we are not ultimately responsible for the "should we". That is, and always will be, a decision rightfully belonging to our elected leaders. Our duty as military members is to accurately assess risks and present our best military advice with clarity and candor—whether planning a small unit-level attack or testifying about military posture before Congress. To fulfill these responsibilities, we must be trusted, and professional expertise is the necessary foundation of this trust.

Humility

Humility is the constant companion of expertise. Lifelong learning requires acknowledging gaps in our expertise, examining our successes *and* failures, and admitting both our strengths and weaknesses. This can be particularly challenging in a culture that prizes success and values immediately providing answers. Humility allows us to step back, set our ego aside, and embrace new ideas.

It takes humility to acknowledge that our civilian leaders do not have to accept our advice wholesale. Military leaders must have the humility to recognize that our senior leaders balance multiple competing demands. I can say with confidence that civilian leaders want to hear our advice. They know they owe it to the American people to consider all information and to weigh the risks before deciding on a particular course of action—and they take that obligation seriously.

For our part, we must recognize that the military is only one instrument in an array of national power. Frankly, it is often not the most important or appropriate instrument. In developing plans, policies, or budgets, there are always legitimate and competing considerations,

and our civilian leaders are responsible to weigh and integrate these competing considerations. We must remember national security is but one aspect of a much larger set of choices.

Courage

Duty performed well requires courage. Certainly, our line of work requires the physical courage to act in the face of grave bodily danger. Yet, doing our duty also demands moral courage—that is, resolve in the face of ambiguity. We intuitively understand acts of physical courage—honoring and rewarding those who display such acts. In praising these physical acts, we reinforce their importance to our concept of duty. It is not clear that we do the same to reinforce and cultivate moral courage. Duty may require us to advocate an unpopular position. It may require us to risk our personal ambitions. Duty may require the courage to act decisively or to show restraint.

In today's environment of ubiquitous communication, there is an inexorable pull to blog, tweet and comment, and post. Such media can host laudable professional expression, but some may be seduced by reading their name in print or receiving recognition online. Tempting as it may be to enter the limelight, we should consider that courage may require us to remain quiet professionals. In policy development, disagreement is not disloyalty. Debate is healthy when conducted with professionalism and in the proper forums. But it is inappropriate to become a salesman for policy or to circumvent proper channels for discussion. In the end, courage demands that we remain objective, unemotional, and apolitical.

An uncommon life

Clearly, a life devoted to duty—and the foundational traits of expertise, humility, and courage—is an uncommon life. Yet, as Saint Augustine reminds us, "In doing what we ought we deserve no praise, because it is our duty."

Our commitment to a life of duty should give us no sense of superiority or entitlement but rather a deep sense of responsibility. Our duty as members of the military profession is an act of service best accomplished with a servant's soul. We must remember our military does not exist for its own sake. It exists for the Nation it serves. ✦



Major General Reinhard Wolski,
Commander JWC and
TRJE15 Exercise Director



Personnel from the 21st Spanish Signal Regiment in front of the two ATOH tactical terminals, the deployable communications modules



Land Response Cell



CPX closing
speech by
JWC Deputy
Commander
Brigadier
General Roger
Watkins



Air Response Cell

"It was important to try to ensure the exercising troops didn't feel they were on exercise, but that they felt they were on a real operation..."



Maritime Response Cell

#TJ15

CPX





ZARAGOZA/STAVANGER



WITH THE BACKDROP of today's strategic security environment—the proliferation of threats, ever-changing challenges and new technology—NATO concludes its largest and most ambitious exercise in over a decade, TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 (TRJE15). The exercise was conducted in two parts of 14 and 21 days each. The first part, which involved more than 4,000 military and civilian personnel was an operational-level Computer Assisted/Command Post Exercise (CAX/CPX) directed by German Army Major General Reinhard Wolski, Commander of the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). This was followed by a Live Exercise (LIVEX), featuring more than 36,000 service personnel from 28 Member Nations and nine Partner Nations. The high numbers of service personnel and the many exercise locations, namely Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, Canada, Norway, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands are indeed impressive and mirror the complex-

ity of the exercise and the many challenges that the participants were exposed to.

On 5 November, at the Distinguished Visitor's Day in Troia in Portugal, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, said: "This exercise is a tremendous demonstration of our capabilities, and of our ability to work together among Allies and also with Partner Nations and international organizations from around the world. (...) Our security environment has changed and is more challenging than at any time since the end of the Cold War. And, in an unpredictable world, NATO remains an anchor of stability."

TRJE15 was a long-term planned exercise designed to ensure that NATO is ready to respond rapidly to any threats, emerging from any direction. Its aim was to test the Command and Control elements of the NATO Response Force (NRF)—NATO's rapid deployment multinational task force. In summary, the exercise has:

- tested and certified Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCBS) to take command of the NRF in 2016,
- tested the new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF); the spearhead brigade-sized element of the NRF, currently led by Spain, that will be able to deploy in a matter of days,
- practiced Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR), utilizing cutting-edge technology from multiple nations,
- exercised Special Operations Forces and complex maritime operations.

For JWC, the exercise planning and the scenario development began in 2013. First used in TRJE15, the 4,500-page Sorotan scenario

Photos above by JWC PAO: (clockwise): CPX After Action Review; the Air Response Cell; daily update meeting with Chief MEL/MIL; media training in Zaragoza; a CAX-focused discussion with the members of the Industry Involvement Initiative (I3X); the OPFOR Cell; Brigadier General Watkins; a Training Team meeting in Zaragoza.





was developed by the Centre to test NATO's ability to respond to today's security threats.

"As NATO's premier operational level training provider, JWC's aim is to achieve the best possible readiness for NATO forces," said Major General Reinhard Wolski, adding: "TRJE15 required a different mindset and an innovative approach. There has been a lot of effort put into the exercise planning and execution to make sure that it meets the military objectives of JFCBS and its components. We have delivered a CPX in accordance with the Exercise Specification document; but, often, we have undertaken and delivered much more than that. This was a unique exercise with a very complex scenario involving both direct and elusive threats, such as hybrid warfare. Another training topic was Strategic Communications, especially in this era of all-pervasive social media. Our training was very effective and I am very proud of the JWC team who showed such exceptional competence and commit-

ment. Readiness and Responsiveness, Capabilities, Adaptation, Visible Assurance, Connected Forces Initiative and Comprehensive Approach were all key themes of this unique exercise."

Brigadier General Roger Watkins, JWC's Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, agreed and said: "TRJE15 was a very challenging exercise that combined a very dynamic Comprehensive Approach with a military adversary with near-peer capabilities for the NRF. The use of the new Sorotan scenario proved to be highly effective in meeting these rigorous requirements. In the end, I believe the overall success of the exercise can be measured in the fact that the primary Training Audience, JFCBS, achieved all of the exercise and training objectives as well as receiving recommendation for certification by SHAPE J7; as did all the component HQs, like Spanish Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC Spain); Italian Joint Force Air Component (JFAC) and the United Kingdom Maritime Forces (UKMARFOR)."

Incidentally, exercises such as TRJE15, does not only increase the readiness and preparedness of NATO forces, but they also operationalize the Connected Forces Initiative or CFI, which strengthens interoperability and collaboration with international partners. CFI is actively pursued by NATO since the 2012 Chicago Summit. Referring to the initiative, Brigadier General Watkins said: "During the CPX, the participation of the Canadian Joint Operations Command (in Ottawa) truly validated the CFI within the exercise construct."

CPX throws the spotlight on hybrid warfare, ethnic conflict, maritime disputes

During the operational level CPX, the Stavanger-based Exercise Centre (EXCEN) organization tested the ability of the Training Audience to respond to a wide range of security threats from hybrid warfare to maritime and air com-





Colonel Williamson with General Petr Pavel, the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. Photo by JWC PAO.

a significant challenge to receive, in-process, brief and integrate those staff in the space of just five days total," he said. Colonel Williamson continued: "And so, on Day Six, the CPX begins... As the Chief EXCEN, it was my role, on behalf of my Commander and Chief of Staff, to ensure those personnel in Stavanger understood the overall exercise framework and their role in it; the scenario, and the tools we use to ensure the exercise runs as planned. It was important to try to ensure the exercising troops didn't feel they were on exercise, but that they felt they were on a real operation, with real forces under command, a real NATO hierarchy above them, and a near-peer enemy opposing them."

In the world of shadows and computers: OPFOR and CAX

An important element of TRJE15 was the role of the simulated Opposing Force (OPFOR) Cell. Acting as the "enemy", OPFOR simulated all actual threats, including cyber, electronic warfare, proxies, conventional warfare and threats from the Information domain during the CPX. Under the leadership of JWC, the strong OPFOR team was made up of an eclectic mix of marines, sailors, soldiers and civilian personnel from STRIKFORNATO, the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices Centre of Excellence (C-IED CoE), the Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) and the NATO

bat by "pushing" nearly 3,000 injects requiring an action. This was done through Sorotan, which enabled an out-of-area, non-Article V Crisis Response Operation against a near-peer opponent in the fictitious region of "Cerasia". That peer opponent is the dictatorship "Kamon" who invades its democratic neighbour "Lakuta", before moving on to expand its military aggression to the entire region—a region which is torn by internal strife and ethnic conflict amidst a multifaceted water crisis that impacts maritime navigation and energy security. In response to Kamon's aggression, the United Nations Security Council authorizes NATO to lead an international assistance force, ECISAM, to help protect the threatened states and safeguard freedom of navigation at sea.

Referring to the scenario, CDR Mike Angelopoulos, JWC's Chief MEL/MIL for

TRJE15, said: "We wanted to challenge the traditional military way of thinking and ensure that the Training Audiences were well positioned to respond to any emerging crisis, be it a Crisis Response Operation or highly complex humanitarian emergencies."

According to Colonel Steve Williamson, JWC's Deputy Chief of Staff Exercises, Training and Innovation Branch, TRJE15 was quite remarkable in terms of both "make-believe" and "real-world" scenarios:

"This was my ninth exercise since arriving at the JWC, and it was, by some margin, the largest, longest and the most complex exercise I have been involved in. EXCON was over 830 personnel, spread over eight locations from Canada, and throughout Europe, with over 560 personnel in the EXCEN here in Stavanger. Of the 830, only 160 were JWC staff, so there was

Below: Brigadier General Roger Watkins, JWC's Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, with TRJE15 Response Cell Chiefs and OPRs. Photo by JWC PAO.



Visit of Mr Jens Stoltenberg, NATO's Secretary General, to the JWC SITCEN.
Photo by JWC PAO.



As it happens in every exercise, the OPFOR "gracefully loses the battle."

Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom CoE).

"This was the first time we, at the JWC, have given the task of developing the OPFOR plan to an external HQ," said Colonel Williamson. "Whilst the overall lead of this group during the exercise was retained by the JWC staff, STRIKFORNATO, very ably supported by a number of personnel but in particular JAPCC, developed a superb product. This was a highly professional, experienced team and it was great to work with them," he added.

JWC's another unique capability is the Computer Assisted Exercise element (CAX). JWC's CAX specialist, Phil Draper, said: "Every training event is different and the continuously evolving and emerging training requirements demand that we adopt an agile approach to the training architecture, including the Live, Virtual and Constructive (LVC) balance within simulation. Finding the ideal blend is challenging and depends on the Training Objectives that are defined for each exercise event. JWC focuses primarily on the training of headquarters responsible for joint operational missions conducted across the full spectrum of warfare, rather than, for instance, single service tactical training. Therefore, our exercises are typically CAX/CPX and we use live simulation in almost every CAX."

"From a CAX perspective, TRJE15 is

one of the most challenging and complex exercises ever planned and played in the last eight years," CAX specialist Ivan Vianello underlined, adding: "This is based on the size of the forces represented in the simulation database, and also due to the fact that the number of actions planned to be simulated were six times more than in a usual NRF exercise. Additionally, from a setup perspective, CAX was deployed overseas, with connections to exercise sites in Europe and Canada. The key for JWC is to have a realistic, but not over-sophisticated toolset. Such architecture allows the CAX team to have the necessary flexibility to support any training requirements."

Colonel Williamson noted that the CPX trained NRF with a fictitious, but a very realistic scenario that had real-world implications including everything from conventional to more subtle hybrid warfare techniques and propaganda to protection of women and children during a crisis. He added: "Thanks to some excellent work by the JWC team who developed this exercise and the tremendous external support, the Response Cell manning was the best I have seen in my time in the JWC. The JWC team working for me in the EXCEN and running the exercise day-to-day was, by some margin, the most experienced, competent and dynamic as a group that I have had the privilege to work with."

Overall, TRJE15 was the culmination of the NRF training cycle in 2015, bringing together, during the LIVEX, the world's most modern land, sea and air forces. It was also a test-bed exercise for the VJTF—a key part of NATO's strategic and operational adaptation.

"At the core of NATO's defence strategy lies the NRF," Royal Air Force Squadron Leader Colin Macpherson, a former JWC Training Team staff officer wrote in a cover story for JWC's The Three Swords Magazine in November 2014, adding: "To shape the components of NRF into one cohesive force requires a collective and structured training framework on which to build a comprehensive understanding of the emerging operational environment."

And, altogether, JWC strives to ensure exactly this, and to make NATO stronger. ✦

~ Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

NRF 16 national components under the lead of JFCBS are:

- United Kingdom Maritime Forces (UKMARFOR)
- Italian Joint Force Air Component (JFAC)
- NATO Rapid Deployable Corps, Spain (NRDC Spain)
- United States Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR)
- Polish Combined Joint, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Task Force (CJ-CBRN-TF).



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ON THE COVER

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visits Joint Warfare Centre

THE NATO SECRETARY GENERAL Mr Jens Stoltenberg paid a visit to the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) on 12 October 2015.

Mr Stoltenberg was in Stavanger on the occasion of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's 61st Annual Session where he addressed the parliamentarians arriving from 28 NATO Member countries as well as delegates from the Partner countries.

"During the last year, we have doubled the size of the NRF, making it more ready and more capable, and established a high readiness Joint Task Force, able to move within a matter of days. We have increased our presence in the east, with more planes in the air, more ships at sea and more boots on the ground. We have established six new headquarters in our eastern Allies, with two more on the way. And we will soon deploy new advanced surveillance drones in Sicily. We have improved our decision making. And, increased our exercises three-fold," Mr Stoltenberg said.¹

NATO Secretary General pointed out that the current instability surrounding us "is our new strategic reality and it will be with us for the long-term." "So our Alliance must also adapt to the long-term," he added. To this effect, Mr Stoltenberg illustrated three priorities: modernized deterrence, relations with Russia, and the southern dimension. "First, we must modernize our deterrence, with better intelligence and early warning, a better integration of our land, sea and air forces, and significantly better cyber defence," he said. "Second, as we approach our Warsaw Summit, we will assess the long-term implications of the current crisis on our relations with Russia; engagement is not the same as accepting a new status quo, or giving Russia a free hand," he added. Third, in-



The Secretary General arrives at JWC. Photo by JWC PAO.

stability "from Afghanistan, through the Middle East and across North Africa" is "a challenge that demands a comprehensive response, from the countries in the region and the entire international community," the Secretary General pointed out. "NATO has a role to play," Mr Stoltenberg added. "NATO must be ready and able to deploy forces when needed," he said. "But we also have to get better at projecting stability without necessarily deploying large combat forces; call it Resolute Support, Defence Capacity Building or Partnership what matters is that from Afghanistan to Morocco, and many places in between, NATO is helping other countries to defend themselves; and to stabilise their own neighbourhoods; for if they are more stable, we are more secure; by building up the capacity of countries like Tunisia, Jordan or Mauritania; helping others, like Iraq and—at some point—Libya to strengthen their security," he highlighted.²

THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S visit to the JWC also coincided with the Command Post Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 (TRJE15), which gave him the opportunity to observe first-hand the Stavanger-based Exercise Centre (EXCEN). Upon arrival, Mr Stoltenberg was welcomed by German Army Major General Reinhard Wolski, Commander JWC, and U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Roger Watkins, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff. Following a bilateral meeting with Major General Wolski, Mr Stoltenberg attended a special screening of the TRJE15 "Road to Crisis" video, produced by the Joint Warfare Centre's Media Section. The Secretary General then received a mission briefing by Major General Wolski, which outlined JWC's Programme of Work as well as NATO's collective training framework in which the Centre plays a key role.

As NATO's footprint in Norway, the Centre is responsible for planning, developing





and delivering operational level training and exercises that challenge the Joint Force and Component Command HQs, while simultaneously supporting NATO's doctrine, concept development and experimentation efforts. In doing so, JWC's ultimate goal is to achieve high preparedness and successful interoperability of NATO forces.

During his tour of the facilities, the Secretary General received an exercise forces' map briefing by Colonel Stephen Williamson, JWC's Deputy Chief of Staff Exercise, Train-

Photos above, clockwise: The Secretary General in SITCEN; during various briefings; addressing the Parliamentary Assembly (photo by Stortinget); interview with Laura L. DuBois for the "Three Swords News", which can be viewed at youtube.com/watch?v=ZVu0Gme_Xn4; with Nina Janson and during a TRJE15 update in the War Room. All photos by CPO Vincent Michelletti, French Navy, JWC PAO.

ing and Innovation Branch and U.S. Navy CDR Mike Angelopoulos, JWC's Chief Main Events List/Main Incidents List (MEL/MIL) for TRJE15. The Secretary General also visited the SITCEN, which is the "nerve centre" of TRJE15. Here, he met with the key exercise personnel, including Chief Scenario, Chief Opposing Force (OPFOR), Response Cell (RC) coordinators, CAX representatives and the Officer of Primary Responsibility (OPR) as well as the Trusted Agent and the OPR representing the Joint Force Command Brunssum, TRJE15's Primary Training Audience.

The Secretary General thanked all SITCEN staff and noted that what they accomplished jointly was extremely complex and of great importance for the high readiness of NATO's forces as well as for the Readiness Action Plan, which was one of the centerpieces of the Wales Summit. At the end of the visit, JWC's TV News Producer, Ms Laura Loflin DuBois,

conducted an interview with Mr Stoltenberg for the "Three Swords News". When asked what kind of NATO the world should see as they watched exercise TRJE15, the Secretary General underlined: "They should see a NATO which is agile, ready and prepared; an Alliance which is responding to the new and changing security environment."

Mr Stoltenberg's arrival marks the first-ever visit to the JWC by a NATO Secretary General. Mr Jens Stoltenberg was born in Oslo on 16 March 1959 and has served as Prime Minister of Norway from 2005 to 2013. ✦

~ Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

END NOTES:

(1) The text here is extracted from NATO's internet website article titled: "Secretary General highlights NATO's long-term adaptation to new security challenges" at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_123764.htm

(2) Ibid.

61st Annual Session of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Stavanger



Clockwise: Prime Minister of Norway Erna Solberg interviewed by the press. Photo by Morten Brakestad/Stortinget. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at a press conference. Photo by Morten Brakestad/Stortinget. Norwegian Defense Minister, Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide, and Chief of Defense of Norway, Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hanssen. Photo by Stortinget/Jørgen Benkholt. The parliamentarians and observers. Photo by NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Petr Pavel, addressing the Defence and Security Committee regarding the road to Warsaw and beyond. Photo by Stortinget/Morten Brakestad.

IN MEMORIAM



AIR MARSHAL PETER WALKER CB CBE FRAeS
29th September 1949 — 6th September 2015

Since the last edition of *The Three Swords Magazine*, Royal Air Force Air Marshal (Ret.) Peter Walker, JWC's third Director, has sadly passed away. Major General Reinhard Wolski, Commander JWC, issued the following statement on the loss of Air Marshal Walker: "On behalf of NATO's Joint Warfare Centre, I convey my deepest condolences to the family of Air Marshal Peter Walker, who served as Director Joint Warfare Centre from February 2005 to July 2007. The death of Air Marshal Walker is a loss to us all. He leaves a legacy as a truly exceptional leader who played a key role in building the well-known reputation within the Alliance that the Joint Warfare Centre enjoys today."

In his first Foreword to the first edition of this magazine, which was published on 4 June 2005, Air Marshal Walker wrote: "The Joint Warfare Centre is often described as the Jewel in the Crown of Allied Command Transformation, and rightly so; we are the interface between the requirements of the operational commands, and the brave new world of change. We are also about delivery. Delivery of quality training that is impartial, transparent, standardised, and professional. This is a big responsibility, because it is our destiny to make NATO staff perform more effectively on operations, and therefore play a major part in creating the conditions for mission success."

Air Marshal Walker was particularly proud of the JWC and his statement above remains our wise guidance to this day. He deserves our admiration for his supreme intelligence, inspiring leadership and great sense of humour. Air Marshal Walker is survived by his wife Lynda and their daughter and two sons. As befits the sad passing of a hugely well-respected and loved Director, we will miss him very much and the world will be a duller place without him. Rest in Peace, Air Marshal Walker.



BY CMDR. ERICK A. PETERSON
United States Navy
SOCC Chief of Staff



United States takes lead for NATO Response Force Special Operations Component Command 2016



Commandos fast-rope from a CV-22 Osprey during TRJE15. Photo by 1st Lieutenant Chris Sullivan, U.S. Air Force.

HIGH DEMAND, LOW DENSITY — that is the catch phrase for NATO's Special Operations Forces, commonly known as SOF. In the past decade there has been an extremely high demand for NATO's relatively small Special Operations Forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, throughout Africa and at home within Europe. Therefore, it was understandably difficult for anyone within the Alliance to take the lead on 2016's NATO Response Force (NRF) Special Operations Component Command (SOCC). With short notice, and with numerous other missions ongoing, the United States Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) accepted, on behalf of the United States, responsibility to be the component command for the upcoming NRF.

Based out of Stuttgart, Germany, SOCEUR transitioned roughly 80 personnel to be the SOCC framework, with 60 Allies and Partner Nation personnel from 15 Nations, contributing to create a very experienced headquarters staff. This capable and exceptionally talented staff was able to successfully execute the large scale computer-based TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 (TRJE15) Command Post Exercise led by





TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15. Photos by NATO.



NATO's Joint Warfare Centre in Norway and obtain NATO certification as a Component Command. This same staff then seamlessly transitioned into the even larger scale Live Exercise (LIVEX), commanding and controlling 1,000 SOF in Spain and Portugal. The Special Operations Task Groups (SOTG) included forces from the United States, Portugal, Spain, Finland, Poland, The Netherlands, Belgium, Czech Republic, Canada and Slovakia.

For other fighting forces pulling together such a diverse force may have proved a tremendous challenge. For NATO SOF, however, this was a familiar assemblage. Such a massive gathering of varied nationalities is only possible with the familiarity that has been built over long standing professional relations and normal training engagement.

In the words of the SOCC's Commanding General, U.S. Air Force Major General Gregory Lengyel, "This was business as usual for SOF. Our long history of partnership allows

us to quickly pull together an unparalleled team of professionals."

Taking their lead from Joint Force Command Brunssum's Commanding General, General Hans-Lothar Domröse, the SOCC has made cross-component communication, liaison officer sharing, and force interoperability a priority and major training objective during exercise TRJE15.

The way ahead—looking to a secure Europe in 2016

Currently, Poland's Special Operations Forces Command (POLSOF) has the SOCC responsibility for 2015. With the turn of the New Year, the U.S. SOCC will accept stand-by responsibility from the POLSOF to be the NRF SOCC for 2016. In this capacity, the SOCC will remain based out of Stuttgart, Germany, and will have command-and-control over two Special Operations Maritime Task Groups,

five Special Operations Land Task Groups, and one Special Operations Air Component, positioned throughout Western, Northern, Eastern and Southern Europe. This diversity of forces and diversity of locations ensures any emerging crisis will be met quickly and effectively by NATO's quick response SOF. Apart from the habitual military exercises, the forces under the SOCC will also participate in the two NATO Very High Readiness Task Force (VJTF) exercises planned in April and May/June. These exercises will test the VJTF's, and SOCC's, ability to quickly alert and prepare their forces (BRILLIANT JUMP Part I) as well as quickly and effectively deploy their forces to a crisis location and begin conducting missions (BRILLIANT JUMP Part II).

In summary, with the highly successful completion of TRJE15, the 2016 NRF SOCC stands ready, and proven capable, to confront any new, or old, threats that emerge within or without Europe. ✦

TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15

OPPOSING FORCE AND THE EXERCISE DESIGN



The methods of the JWC-led simulated enemy

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARKUS SCHILCHER

Austrian Army

Joint Plans Subject Matter Expert, TRJE15 Chief OPFOR

Joint Warfare Centre

TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 (TRJE15) was, without any doubt, the most ambitious exercise that the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) has ever conducted. Not only was the 14-day exercise record-long, but it also featured 24/7 operations, three levels of Training Audiences (TAs), a record-high participation of real-life international organizations and non-governmental organizations (IOs/NGOs) and a cooperation with the Canadian exercise JOINTEX 15 in the framework of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). All of the above made the exercise an important milestone within the exercise delivery and training efforts of JWC. Nevertheless, as we say here: "After the exercise is before the exercise." On the horizon there are already new and challenging clouds emerging, which will require a similar effort. It is therefore time to revisit the overall exercise design process from an Opposing Force (OPFOR) perspective and to identify areas for further improvement in the delivery of major NATO exercises.

Building the OPFOR model at the Joint Warfare Centre

In the light of NATO's Strategic Concept of 2010, it became obvious that the JWC needed to shift its focus for the exercises that it delivered. Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security, in this order, are all listed as the core tasks of the Alliance: "The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack," as set out in Article V of the Washington Treaty.¹

In the same context, referencing exercises and training, Members commit to "(...) carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate Visible Assurance and reinforcement for all Allies."²

Indeed, the Alliance's shift of focus had

immediate implications for the way that JWC planned, designed and executed its exercises. In order to include high-intensity warfighting in JWC-led exercises within or outside of Article V scenario settings, it was necessary to replicate the enemy or, in NATO terms, the Opposing Force.

The first time that JWC played out the concept of OPFOR all the way was in the exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 2012 (SFJE12). The creator of JWC's OPFOR capability was Squadron Leader Colin Macpherson, a former member of the Joint Plans, Execution and Coordination Section (JPEC) in the Joint Training Division. He also developed the short definition of OPFOR, which in the absence of a formalized definition within NATO doctrine, still serves as the only existing definition of the OPFOR Mission Statement: "OPFOR is the intellectual application of coherent military and political activity designed to create a realistic, dynamic and challenging Opposing Force to



The OPFOR War Room. At the background is Italian Rear Admiral Francesco Covella, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, STRIKFORNATO, visiting JWC. Photo by JWC PAO.



enable the NATO Force Commander to meet his agreed Training Objectives in order to demonstrate competence and confidence to undertake the role of NATO Command Structure/NATO Force Structure (NCS/NFS) deployed operational headquarters. OPFOR is a key element of the Comprehensive Approach to training and is also an integral part of scenario development."³

In mid-2013, Hungarian Army Lieutenant Colonel Csaba Elekes joined the JPEC Section and quickly found himself supporting the OPFOR in JWC. These two staff officers soon became the face of JWC's OPFOR. Having been deployed with the Training Team (TT) in 2013 and early 2014, I joined the OPFOR team for the first time during the execution phase of exercise TRIDENT JAGUAR 2014 (TRJR14). This enlarged team soon became known as the "Axis of Evil" within the JWC.

Thanks to Colin's and Csaba's dedication and hard work, JWC OPFOR has evolved from a mere MEL/MIL "add-on" to a core part of exercise execution. In mid-2014, looking ahead at the busiest schedule in JWC's history, it became clear that the Centre needed additional manpower to further develop the JWC OPFOR concept. Luckily, Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO) had volunteered to act as the framework headquarters for OPFOR in TRJE15. Additionally, we were also assisted by NATO's Joint

Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC), who once again willingly shared their air expertise. At this point, the only post missing was a staff member from the inside, who would assume the responsibility as the "Chief OPFOR" on behalf of the Officer Directing the Exercise (ODE), or Commander JWC, Major General Reinhard Wolski. Eventually, I was assigned to this position and found myself in the midst of OPFOR's world of shadows with fictional but quite daring network of modern-day villains and their range of dark arts. The assignment offered the chance to further increase and improve the role of OPFOR.

I am well aware of the ongoing discussions on the importance of OPFOR, but I still intend to describe, and thereby demonstrate, that OPFOR plays an important role in all exercise phases, including: Concept and Specification, Planning and Product Development, Operational Conduct and Exercise Analysis and Reporting. Indeed, the freedom to implement new ideas in TRJE15 derived from a number of factors: (1) JWC had never conducted an exercise with the full commitment of an external HQ throughout the exercise phases; (2) consequently, no Standard Operating Procedure/Standard Operating Instructions (SOP/SOI) existed that described how to effectively integrate that HQ into the OPFOR; (3) the newly developed Sorotan scenario required an early OPFOR contribution.

Early involvement

In the newly developed exercise scenario Sorotan, the OPFOR is the fictitious state of "Kamon"—an aggressive dictatorship equipped with fourth and fifth generation military equipment, located in the fictitious geography of "Cerasia".

The Exercise Specification (EXSPEC) for TRJE15 clearly outlined the primary Training Audience's (TA) expectations for the exercise. As such, NATO's Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCBS)—the primary TA—requested to be challenged in the full spectrum of security challenges of a contemporary crisis, including hybrid warfare. Logically, this meant that we had to study the topic carefully, including the so called "Gerasimov Doctrine", in order to transform the parameters of the exercise specifications into Kamon's strategic framework and lay the foundation for STRIKFORNATO and JAPCC OPFOR operational level plan.

The ambition to create challenges at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, in line with the Training Objectives of the TA, created the requirement to think and develop a comprehensive OPFOR plan on all levels. JWC's scenario creators had an appropriate doctrine for Kamon that facilitated to conduct a broad range of activities, including conventional and asymmetrical military operations as well as political and economic processes, while si-



multaneously conducting effective operations in a contemporary Information environment. Indeed, as reflected in the Gerasimov Doctrine: "The Information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy... It is necessary to perfect activities in the Information space, including the defence of our own objects."⁴

Kamon's operational level plan was developed during a two-week planning event comparable to the Crisis Response Planning (CRP) conducted by the TA. The event took place in the beginning of October 2014 in Lisbon, and it was the first time that the OPFOR team got together. During this meeting, JWC, STRIKFORNATO, JAPCC and representatives from the Canadian Simulation Center (which would eventually conduct JOINTEX 15) developed an operational level OPFOR Concept of Operations (CONOPS). STRIKFORNATO also used this opportunity to get their new-

comers on board and up-to-speed on NATO's overall exercise planning processes. However, in this case, the true challenge was to plan from an aggressor state perspective, which is clearly outside of the mindset of NATO exercise planners in real life!

To facilitate the finalization of the scenario, and incorporate the findings of the OPFOR team, JWC's Scenario Section organized a Sorotan Wargaming Session at the end of October 2014. Senior representatives from the civilian environment, such as the former UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Ambassador José Victor da Silva Angelo, were also there to provide valuable insight for the scenario team. The event was important for setting the scenario details and should therefore be considered as a JWC best practice.

During the final preparations of the scenario package for the CRP, the development of the details for the Intel community in the

Crisis Intelligence Package (CRIP) and the regularly distributed Crisis Situation Updates (CSUs), along with the development of the Road to STARTEX and the detailed STARTEX positions highlighted the limitations of using an external HQ as the framework for OPFOR. The drafting of these essential documents provided the TA with situational awareness and required permanent consultation and collaboration between JWC's Scenario Section and the OPFOR Team. Simply put, it's basically not possible for an external HQ to stay abreast of the latest developments, and consequently, it cannot contribute effectively to the product development—VTCs, emails and phone calls are not enough to replace face-to-face consultation and an in-depth cooperation. That means that also in the future whenever JWC chooses to follow the TRJE 15 OPFOR model, the core element has to be permanently manned from JWC staff. Only through that, unity of effort between Sce-



Sqn Ldr Colin Macpherson, the creator of JWC's OPFOR capability, briefing to SACEUR. Photo by JWC PAO.



OPFOR daily update by the author during TRJE15. Photo by JWC PAO.



TRJE15 OPFOR Cell. Photo by JWC PAO.



General Domröse speaking with Major General Milner during a visit to the Canadian troops in Santa-Margarida, Portugal. Photo by Sgt Sebastien Fréchette.





Major General Wolski with NATO Secretary General in the SITCEN. Photo by JWC PAO.



"The OPFOR plan served as the framework for the MEL/MIL Incident Development Workshop. This procedure proved effective, and should therefore be incorporated as best practice in future JWC exercise planning and delivery processes."

nario, MEL/MIL and OPFOR can be achieved and maintained throughout the exercise.

Prior to the MEL/MIL scripting, JWC received another key document that helped develop the storyline for the exercise. The Training Audiences' Joint Coordination Order (JCO) 06 described the adjustments made on the Exercise Campaign Plan and its impact on "ECISAM", the so-called NATO mission in the scenario, which occurred in a timeframe that

would start slightly before the exercise and end after the ENDEX. It was based on a qualitative assessment of the drafted Road to STARTEX, which was forwarded to the TA prior to the JCO. As such, the JCO served as the last cross-check in the validation of the exercise narrative. On Day Three of the MEL/MIL scripting, after having gone through the final details with JFCBS's Trusted Agents, the exercise narrative was then shared with the scripters in a Wargaming format, which focused on TA's joint actions and OPFOR's counter-actions for each envisaged phase of JCO 06. During this time, JWC's Chief Analyst described the joint actions of the JCO, whilst the OPFOR actions were explained by the Chief OPFOR. The positive response of the TA led to numerous repetitions of this format during the update briefings as well. Eventually, JWC's Media Section produced a video of this narrative for the Exercise Control (EXCON) training of more than 500 participants. I would say that it is very important to have this common focus while developing the exercise MEL/MIL. This is because only this kind of in-depth collaboration allows people to understand the detailed and complex construct of the exercise and serves as an exercise framework for both the scripters and the Response Cells (RCs) during the MEL/MIL scripting and execution phase, respectively.

OPFOR's contribution to MEL/MIL development and the execution phase

JWC's ultimate focus when delivering operational level joint exercises needs to properly identify possible operational dilemmas. In the absence of a clear definition, these could be described as the "operational challenges", which require a comprehensive review and should be identified within the Campaign Synchronization process, more specifically through Operations Assessment at the operational and tactical levels. Preferably, those dilemmas should have occurred as part of Campaign Synchronization in order to avoid the Joint Task Force getting dragged solely into the "current fight", and thereby, abandon the ultimate focus areas within operational management. These are described as Monitoring Campaign Progress, Managing Lines of Operation, and Campaign Rhythm, in AJP 3: "Campaign Synchronization is the coordination and prioritization of all efforts of a Joint Force in order to maximize the efficiency and synergy of all activities in time and space in accordance with the Operational Plan (OPLAN)"¹⁵ (AD 80-70).

For exercise designers, it is important to understand that the overall joint process of Campaign Synchronization relies heavily on the quality of the output of two boards: the Assess-



TRJE15 "Day One" VTC.
Photo by JWC PAO.



OPFOR Situational Update with Italian Rear Admiral Francesco Covella and Brigadier General Watkins.
Photo by JWC PAO.



ment Board and the Joint Coordination Board. Especially, in order to train the HQ in a capability both in terms of organization and internal processes, it will be desirable to impose that critical decisions must be made on short notice, for example within a Crisis Action Team (CAT). In order to give the HQ the best training value during TRJE15, JWC needed an adjustment of its processes. More specifically, JWC required a different approach when analyzing the joint level CONOPS and OPLAN while designing the execution phase of the exercise. Previously, this analysis was mainly performed as a consistency check by the JWC Training Team in order to provide feedback to the TA. This consistency check added limited value to the development of the MEL/MIL, and the remarks were often ignored by the TA after this having absorbed immense time and manpower.

In TRJE 15, the core team of Chief Analyst, Chief MEL/MIL and Chief OPFOR followed a new approach. The CONOPS was checked for consistency and used by the team to validate the operational dilemmas as identified during the MEL/MIL Strategy Workshop. The next step was to compare the TA CONOPS against the OPFOR CONOPS, which would form the basis for the detailed development of the main OPFOR joint actions and operations planned for the execution phase. In principle, the team's approach was very similar

to the standard NATO process of Campaign Synchronization where the common understanding of the state of an operation and the recommendations to Commander Joint Force Command feed the development of a possible solution presented to the Commander at the Joint Coordination Board for decision. Further, the comparison of the CONOPS helped develop an "estimated assessment", which formed the basic framework during the exercise. Although this assessment was not based on quantitative and qualitative data analyzed for the medium term review of the campaign, it was helpful for ensuring a realistic approach to OPFOR.

In March 2014, the OPFOR team met at STRIKFORNATO headquarters in Lisbon. Here, we first developed the major OPFOR joint actions/operations for TRJE15 and then shared them in a briefing to the Deputy Commander of STRIKFORNATO. To ensure full transparency, both JFCBS Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander JWC were briefed on the current status of development. Upon approval, the OPFOR plan served as the framework for the MEL/MIL Incident Development Workshop. This procedure proved effective, and should therefore be incorporated as best practice in future JWC exercise planning and delivery processes.

Another necessary change in TRJE15 was the organization of the MEL/MIL. Both the complexity of the exercise and the need to

challenge the TA at the strategic, operational and tactical levels tested the existing OPFOR structure by having to act as both the state of Kamon and Kamon's Armed Forces.

I always found the analogy of MEL/MIL Event Managers combined with Norse mythology quite interesting and appropriate: *The Norns spin the threads of fate at the foot of Yggdrasil, the tree of the world.*⁶ In our case, the Event Managers are effectively the mythological Norns spinning the threads of the exercise story. Each of those threads is the story of one actor's group. The task for the Event Managers and the Chief MEL/MIL is to ensure the consistency of these threads within the overall story. Ideally, using this approach, every exercise would be constructed like an interactive play and could be described as a story.

In the past, MEL/MIL was organized as events dealing with "Stakeholders", "Threats" and "Sustainment". It is questionable whether Event Managers in this construct would be able to handle the complexities of an exercise like TRJE15. In the end, it was decided to try a geographical solution, whereby each Event Manager would control all the actors within his own state, and represent all aspects of the state themselves. The only exception to this was the "Regional Security" event, which was created to manage all international and non-governmental incidents. This geographical-based approach



created a need for close coordination with the deployed White Cell during execution, as White Cell representatives would not only be responsible for role-playing the state actors, but they were also asked to represent both the Lakutan and Tytan Armed Forces, the two other fictitious countries of Cerasia. This coordination was quite challenging because the White Cell was located in Zaragoza, Spain, and the MEL/MIL was run from Stavanger, Norway.

Execution phase and OPFOR

From an OPFOR perspective, the geographical Event Manager solution worked reasonably well. During the execution, the internal OPFOR organization was divided into strategic and military cells to replicate the whole state of Kamon. The military cell was further divided into a small Joint Operations Centre (JOC) with the components located in close proximity. By design, the biggest improvement was the introduction of the JOC, which was actually based on a STRIKFORNATO initiative. Every day, the JOC also released the OPFOR Fragmentation Order (FRAGO), which provided detailed information on the planned OPFOR actions for the next 72 hours. In the evening, an OPFOR Situational Awareness Briefing (SAB) was held with the participation of OPFOR component representatives, summarizing

the day. Aside from the update, the platform provided the ideal forum for the Chief OPFOR to issue continuous guidance based on the direction from the Exercise Director and an opportunity for key personnel to respond to contingency plans or reactions from the TA. OPFOR conducted the operation almost like a NATO Force Structure HQ by using the "integrated model" while replicating both the operational and tactical level within one organization. The other key component for conducting a successful and well-coordinated execution phase was the close and excellent cooperation between the Chief OPFOR and the Chief MEL/MIL (CDR Mike Angelopoulos). Indeed, this close collaboration with Chief MEL/MIL was essential in developing the exercise storyline and it paid off during execution phase when we were able to quickly overcome challenges and complete all necessary amendments (for example, the introduction of the TA's LAST-LAST-LAST CHANCE (L3C)) in no time. It proved that in an exercise within the scale of TRJE15, close cooperation between both Chiefs was an absolute necessity!

The way ahead

In summary, several changes were introduced to the exercise planning process and the design of TRJE15. This should not come as a surprise

to anyone, as JWC must continue to be seen as NATO's "Center of Excellence" in organizing and executing operational level exercises. Nevertheless, it must be clear that not all changes will prove equally useful for all types of JWC exercises. The effort to use an external OPFOR HQ during the development of the whole range of OPFOR products, such as the CONOPS and JCO, will most likely not be needed for an exercise in the TRIDENT JAGUAR series. That's mainly because, for NATO Force Structure HQs being certified to conduct small-scale joint operations, both scenario and scope of ambition (as outlined in the Allied Directive 80-98) do not require a complex scenario or a fully manned OPFOR similar to those of the TRIDENT JUNCTURE exercises. From past experience, the key challenge for these HQs will remain their ability to plan and execute the campaign on two-levels simultaneously (tactical and operational), especially when they have decided to follow the Integrated Model.

Overall, there are still areas that need improvement. The aim of JWC exercises is to train and to improve the capabilities of the TA. We have past the point when TAs need an introduction to the process of planning NATO operations. Consequently, the next step should be to focus on improving the output of the planning process. This is only achievable if the Training Teams have a complete understand-



Major General Wolski, Commander JWC and Exercise Director, during a presentation in Zaragoza. Photo by JFCBS PAO.





IN MEMORIAM

This article is dedicated to Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth (Kenny) Rogers from STRIKFORNATO who passed away shortly after the end of the execution of TRJE15.

He was a valuable OPFOR member who provided indispensable expertise to the team. His death has left us shocked and deeply saddened, but it has also reminded us all of how strong our emotional ties have become as a team that embraces our differences—each of us being as unique as our fingerprints. What unifies us is the ambition to provide a challenging environment for the Training Audience to help them achieve their Training Objectives.

Kenny, we will always remember you.

Markus Schilcher

ing of the scenario and possible solutions for all functional areas when they meet the TA. The functional interaction within and outside the HQ, through all stages of the planning process, needs to improve. Additionally, improved communications will increase the coherence of the plan and ensure a better overall outcome of the Crisis Response Planning.

Another area for improvement is a better understanding of joint synchronization and campaign management. As outlined above, there are boards and working groups, which are essential for successfully mastering the joint operational level. One such board is the Assessment Board; without the proper assessment and recommendations from the Assessment Board, the operational dilemmas that JWC attempt to create will not be identified by the Joint Task Force. The quality of this assessment depends on the data gathered in the Data Collection Plan (Annex OO, OPLAN). This plan should therefore serve as a key document for the preparation of the execution phase.

In the past, the Road to STARTEX was merely aimed at providing qualitative data, while in reality the quantitative data is at least equally important. Data analysis and cross-checking against other functional areas (especially those of the Intel and Operations communities) is crucial for the assessment community to achieve full training value from JWC exercises. If JWC is able to focus on relevant data

delivery within the execution phase through both MEL/MIL and Response Cells in line with the data collection requirements, we will be capable of increasing the chance of the operational dilemmas being understood by the TA.

We also need to improve our personnel's understanding of joint synchronization and campaign management. As execution phases normally have a rather high tempo, we might reconsider our engagement in the Battle Staff Training (BST) events. Training BST Trainers could be beneficial, but it will require additional and regular training of our staff across the functional areas. Once achieved, a BST-centric training approach would allow us to shift focus during exercise execution to the quality of the outcome of boards and working groups. This approach will help to differentiate JWC Training Team from Evaluators (who are process-oriented) while providing added value for EXCON. The additional benefit would be to free up some personnel resources towards better analysis of Training Objectives progression.

Interestingly, the assessment community is measuring the progress towards decisive conditions and ultimately towards operational objectives. Following this logic, it should be possible to apply the same approach and methods when measuring the exercise progress towards the Training Objectives. The only required change would be to use effects as specifications of the Training Objectives. This is not

a contradiction as effects are described as the change of the behaviour or the physical state of an actor. Data collection and interpretation would require more effort in the preparation and during execution, but instead of "best guessing" at progress, quantitative data could support our arguments and provide a more factual assessment of the TA.

In a nutshell, I would say that, for both the JWC and the TA, TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 proved to be a very interesting and challenging exercise. Although there is room for improvement in some areas as I explained above, the overall response was quite satisfactory. But, keep it in mind: the world is not getting any safer and there are challenging times ahead! It is our duty to learn and adapt. ✦

END NOTES:

- (1) NATO Strategic Concept 2010, p.14, Retrieved October 27, 2015, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm
- (2) NATO Strategic Concept 2010, p.15, Retrieved October 27, 2015, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm
- (3) Macpherson, Colin; 2013
- (4) Military-Industrial Kurier, (2013, February 27). Gerasimov Doctrine [translated by Coalson, R.]. Retrieved October 30, 2015, from <https://inmoscowshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/>
- (5) NATO. Allied Directive 80-70. Campaign Synchronization and Targeting.
- (6) Norms. Retrieved October 30, 2015, from <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norms>.

The April Public Affairs Course for International Students had nine students representing eight countries: Bulgaria, Turkey, Kuwait, Moldova, Philippines, Ukraine, Macedonia and Taiwan. Photos by DINFOS.



International Military Students at DINFOS

BY RIVERS JOHNSON

Chief, International Military Student Office, DINFOS

THE DEFENSE INFORMATION SCHOOL at Fort Meade is known around the world for its excellence in public affairs training and visual information. The school has played a critical role in the education and training of U.S. military members and civilians since its doors opened more than 50 years ago. Those DINFOS-trained service members and civilians have gone on to help commanders and organizations tell their stories and highlight the unique missions of the U.S. military and its international partners.

DINFOS also supports U.S. security cooperation programs by training international students—both military and civilian—in a variety of public affairs courses. Since 1949, DINFOS has contributed to the security cooperation efforts by training more than 1,000 international students from more than 80 countries.

Security cooperation is simply those activities designed to "encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. Security Cooperation is an important tool of national security and foreign policy," according to a Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5132.03.

DINFOS trains approximately 30 international military students each year as part of the various security cooperation programs, which fall under the U.S. Department of State and is executed by the DoD through its respective service components. Like other security cooperation efforts, DINFOS' training of international students is designed to enhance interoperability and capabilities for joint

operations and establishes a rapport between the U.S. military and the respective country's military to build alliances for the future. The international military student office at DINFOS manages the day-to-day operations of the international military students.

"Our goal is to prepare our graduates to be more effective public affairs advisers and leaders in their respective countries," said U.S. Army Colonel Martin Downie, DINFOS commandant, who served as Chief Public Affairs Officer at SHAPE before his current assignment. "We want to ensure DINFOS is recognized as a world class public affairs training institution for our international partners," he added.

The majority of the international students attending DINFOS are trained in five key areas: communication skills, media relations, public affairs in international operations, public affairs planning and social media. Courses for international students average from two weeks to 24. Major Stefan Zemanovic, an Air Force officer from the Slovak Republic, was a recent honor graduate from the Public Affairs Qualification Course. Zemanovic said DINFOS provided him with realistic training he can apply in his home country. "I knew the value of DINFOS as many of my colleagues were graduates," said Zemanovic. "I considered the public affairs training mandatory for me if I was going to compete on an international scale."

International students attending DINFOS must have a good command of the English language. Some students spend several months at the Defense Language Institute in San Antonio, honing their English language

skills prior to coming to DINFOS. Many international officers who graduated from DINFOS return to their countries and become influential in their countries' military. One such case was retired Lieutenant General Sukumal Thanyasiri Weswongsatip of the Royal Thai Army. Weswongsatip, who graduated from the "Public Affairs Qualification Course" in 1993, was selected in 2006 to join Thailand's first cadre of female general officers.

"My early success as a military broadcaster and later managing or giving interviews as I went up the ranks is largely due to the great training I received at DINFOS," says Weswongsatip. Weswongsatip recently visited DINFOS to see how the school has grown since she was a student here.

DINFOS also offers a five-week course designed specifically for international students where the focus is more NATO and United Nations-centric. The Public Affairs Course for International Students provides basic public affairs training and is designed to support DoD's goal of building the public affairs capacity for its partner nations.

Security cooperation is key for mission success on the international playing field, and the Defense Information School is doing its part to build, foster and maintain those key international relationships so critical to operating in the current global environment.

International officers who want to attend public affairs training at the Defense Information School should use their Ministry of Defense channels. U.S. military organizations can use their training program managers. ✦



WHAT RUSSIANS REALLY THINK ABOUT THE WEST?

In the age of the Internet and free travel, why do Russians continue to support their authoritarian president, who has destroyed democracy and overseen an explosion of corruption and is again isolating his country from the world?

BY GREGORY FEIFER



Russian President Vladimir Putin. Copyright Timofeev Sergey.



1 March 2015—Russians during a mourning march in memory of Boris Nemtsov, the Russian opposition leader who was assassinated on 27 February 2015. Photo by Kozyrev Oleg/Shutterstock.

Editorial: The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily represent official opinion or policy of member governments, or of NATO.

IT'S EASY TO FORGET just how little the free world knew about what was really going on inside the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Back then, Gore Vidal¹ used to say he would believe strident warnings about the military threat only when the Russians would be able to manufacture proper vodka bottle tops. As anyone who visited the USSR would remember, they used to be made of foil. They peeled open and couldn't be resealed—perhaps because very few people were ever known to return an opened bottle to the shelf. Vidal was a famous critic of almost everything, of course. But although he was wise to suspect the capabilities of a military with stunning deficits of discipline and efficiency, as it turned out, he was less right about the bottle tops. Today, although Russians export ultra-premium vodka around the world in very fancy bottles, their military still faces many of the same problems.

So, how much of a threat does it actually pose? A quarter-century after the collapse of Communism prompted hope Russia would become an integrated member of the Western order, or at least a constructive ally, Vladimir

Putin has launched a new Cold War, with nuclear threats and air force planes testing NATO members' responses almost daily. Although American military leaders are again calling Moscow their country's greatest existential threat, we still know too little about Moscow's motivations. What does Russia really want in Ukraine? What is the real threat to NATO members? Indeed, how do Russians really see the West?

Approaching those questions requires examining even larger ones about Russian politics and society. The fact is that although post-Communist Russia remains far more open to the West than ever before in the country's history, many Western observers remain stumped by Moscow's fundamental motivations and the predilections of most Russians. In the age of the Internet and free travel, why do they continue to support their authoritarian president, who has destroyed democracy and overseen an explosion of corruption and is again isolating his country from the world? Does that mean they have learned nothing from their very painful past? Clues to some of the answers lie in Russians' daily behavior: their family life,

their work and social habits. But also in influences that have shaped the national character over centuries: the country's forbidding geography, its terrible climate and its bitter history.

In my eight years' of reporting in Russia, I've found that what emerges is a pattern in behavior that's understandable because there are practical reasons to explain it. What's clear is that although Russians' way of doing things may seem chaotic to outsiders, it is very successful in achieving its own aims, informed by decidedly unWestern values and motives. Before discussing them, however, it's worth mentioning some of the characteristics that make their country unique.

Shaky colossus

Russia is a place of huge contrasts and paradoxes; the world's largest country, a crossroads of cultures stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Far East. Much of the land consists of uninhabitable tundra and taiga forest and the winter is legendary. Anton Chekhov once said the cold makes you "go into a stupor, turn more malicious than the cold itself."





A country of major contrasts. **Left:** Broadcaster Russia Today (RT), a pro-Kremlin, global media powerhouse, with a 2015 budget of \$275 million. **Right:** An old man in a village in Russia. Photos by Shutterstock.



A hundred years later, during the Cold War, one of the few American journalists who reported about Soviet life as opposed to politics—my father George Feifer, as it happens—wrote that the way to understand Russian life is through the ordeal of a Russian winter. "It is not a season of the year like other seasons," he wrote in the 1980s, "not merely a longer, darker, crueller span of time than that which annually slows the countries of northern Europe and America. It is a life sentence to hardship that prowls near the center of the Russian consciousness, whatever the time of year."²

Surviving under such conditions has helped shape a culture with a distinctive view of itself and the world. Part of it comes from the idea that in order to survive, people must live in groups because individuals acting alone are weak. Overcoming hardship is most likely under a strong leader who can force the group to adapt. That has reinforced a kind of fatalism—the sense that since there is little one can do to change things by oneself, trying is futile even in matters of health. Perhaps that helps explain why Russians drink almost twice the internationally recommended limit, and that every fifth male death is attributable to the effects of alcohol.

But if drinking to dull suffering may sound reasonable, what about the Russian ac-

ceptance of, say, the huge gap between the very few rich and the vast numbers of very poor? It's well known that Russia has some of the world's largest reserves of oil and natural gas, which have helped generate vast numbers of luxury cars and fancy restaurants in Moscow. But outside the capital, thousands of villages are dying out. And it isn't necessary to go all the way to Siberia to see them. An hour outside Moscow, many villages are home to only one or two elderly people living along isolated muddy tracks surrounded by abandoned wooden houses. A third of Russia's 153,000 villages—and nearly two-thirds in some regions—house fewer than ten people. With growing poverty, AIDS and other diseases, in many ways Russia is heading toward crisis.

Why do Russians put up with that state of affairs? When I spoke to a bright young journalist from one such declining region, Tver, northwest of Moscow, I asked whether she condemned Putin for taking away her right to vote her governor out of office when he abolished regional elections in favor of Kremlin appointments in 2005. The reporter—who risked her career if not her life to report on the massive corruption and mismanagement that had contributed to the collapse of local industry and agriculture—responded by looking at me as if I were crazy. Elections only allow

wealthy criminals to take power with fraud and deceptive advertising, she told me. That's something I heard from many people who buy the government line that democracy is a threat and that however bad it is, the state knows better.

Corruption rules

That is taking place in a country where the president's inner circle sees the state economy as the source of its own personal revenue. Of the record \$50 billion spent on the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games, companies connected to one man alone earned more than \$7 billion, around the entire budget for the 2010 Vancouver Olympics. That man happens to have been Putin's childhood friend and former judo partner, the tycoon Arkady Rotenberg. The pattern he sets evokes a popular joke in which a newspaper publishes Putin's latest reform program. The plan's main goal, the newspaper reports, is to make people rich and happy. Following the reform program, a note in small type says: "See the list of people below."

The leaders enjoy impunity partly because their behavior reflects how the rest of society works, through an informal system where agreements on paper are rarely the important ones. Until very recently, the conventional wisdom about Putin was that he ruled according to



Demonstrators blockaded the Independence Square during Ukrainian revolution on December 14, 2013 in Kiev, Ukraine—a Christmas tree was hung with Ukrainian flags as the protesters called for the resignation of the former president, Viktor Yanukovich, who decided to back away from an EU integration pact in favour of the Kremlin-led Eurasian Economic Union. Clashes between protesters and police left near 130 people dead and many wounded. In late February 2014, Yanukovich and many other high government officials fled the country. Photo by snig/Shutterstock.com.



an unwritten social contract: Russians countenanced the Kremlin's mounting authoritarianism as long as their living standards continued rising thanks to the country's energy wealth. That was only part of the explanation.

In fact, corruption provides the real lubrication for Putin's system of governance. Bribery is integral to daily life. Drivers inevitably stopped by the traffic police pay bribes to keep their licenses. (A fellow Western reporter recently stopped for a minor infraction insisted on following the rules. After many hours spent in line at various offices during the course of many weeks, she gave up in distress.) The owners of virtually every shop must pay building inspectors, health inspectors and fire safety inspectors. Bribery coerces people because it enables the authorities to prosecute almost anyone. But it also co-opts them by giving them a feeling they have a stake in the system because they are getting something in return. A grocery store owner who pays the police to ensure no bricks break his windows at night may feel he has a leg up on his competition a couple blocks away. It is no surprise, therefore, that despite a brief rise of protests against the authorities in late 2011, a recent poll reported that the vast majority, more than 70% of respondents, said they would refuse to protest against falling living standards or in support of their rights.

Primacy of facades

Still, Russia is far from the world's sole kleptocracy, and its corruption only partly explains how Putin is able to maintain the 80-plus % popular approval ratings that are integral to his authority even as his policies push the country toward recession. The fuller explanation lies in one of the most central and successful traits of the Russian way of conducting affairs: obscuring what is really going on.

Many in the West see Putin as a caricature of an aging dictator, jailing rivals with impunity and threatening to turn the United States into "radioactive dust"—as a state television presenter recently described Russia's nuclear capabilities. But such crude bluster is actually evidence of the president's role as a master of appearances.

Putin came to power by resurrecting a centuries-old Russian practice of hiding what goes on in secret behind the Kremlin's walls with bluffing and facades. Russian leaders have often done that by adopting foreign influences that resulted in what turned out to be clearly more traditionally Russian. The laws of Catherine the Great left out much of the Enlightenment thought she said they reflected. The tone and practice of Soviet Communism would surely have dumbfounded Marx. One of the clearest recent examples was the presidency of Putin's protégé Dmitri Medvedev. After he

took office when Putin's two consecutive term limit expired in 2008, Western observers spent the entire four years of his tenure guessing when he would assume real power. In fact, his reforming Western-looking image served to conceal the maneuverings of Putin, the real ruler, who soon returned to his old job, as everyone now knows. So, while Putin may seem crude to foreigners, he's a brilliant student of the traditional Russian—and Soviet—political culture. Western politicians' mistake is to take Russian institutions and rhetoric that are meant to deceive outsiders at face value.

The real threat

Under a system in which power is synonymous with owning property, Putin makes decisions that are in his interest as opposed to the country's—risking Russia's economy by precipitating Western sanctions, for example. One American scholar has characterized such actions as privatizing the country's profit and nationalizing the risk. It belies a common argument by those Western observers who oppose sanctions against Russia over its actions in Ukraine: that the West is partly to blame by expanding NATO when Russia was weak. In fact, far from boosting his country's influence now, Putin is acting against its long-term interests, undermining stability and prosperity by consolidating a power structure that serves the





Launching a new Cold War with the West has played well among many Russians, thanks to state propaganda that exploits nostalgia for the Soviet Union. The Buk (SA-11 Gadfly), Russian self-propelled, medium-range, surface-to-air missile system.

elites. That project was threatened by Ukraine's popular revolution in 2013. "Who remembers that today?" one Russian reporter told me. "Now, Ukraine is at war."

In other words, the Kremlin successfully dealt with any Russian envy for Ukrainian openness. Seizing Crimea and fomenting civil war in eastern Ukraine has provided a brilliant distraction. For the vast majority of Russians, more than 80%, the rallying cry of "Crimea is ours," *Krym nash*, is more compelling than the fact that the conflict has eroded their savings and isolated their country.

To maintain the Kremlin's narrative, Putin requires an ongoing, low-intensity conflict that he can ratchet up as needed to destabilize Ukraine. He does not want to become enmeshed in the war, or stuck supporting ruined eastern Ukraine. He wants to maintain a winking deniability about his involvement in case the war becomes unpopular so he can pull out at a moment's notice. Putin needs a simmering conflict rather than a decisive victory in Ukraine for another reason. When it comes to foreign policy, Putin, like his Soviet models, believes that to be feared and loathed means to be respected. That is the best way to ensure his picture is broadcast on CNN together with Barack Obama's; a logic of equivalence that calls for a periodic heating up of tension to compete

with Islamic State, Yemen and any other stories dominating headlines.

Testing NATO defenses is part of the effort. Putin does not really want to provoke a war with NATO member countries, even the Baltic former Soviet republics—long part of the Russian Empire before they were re-occupied by the USSR. Those countries are very worried about another invasion by Moscow. For now, however, Putin doesn't want traditional war with the Baltics as much as to keep them off balance by stoking a sense of insecurity. He also wants to see how much he can threaten an alliance he believes is based on a weak Western consensus in which individual self-interest often trumps collective security. Invading Ukraine and breaking with the West has enabled Putin to play on the sympathies of those who believe Moscow's arguments must be heeded—by projecting himself as a historic leader who is America's main rival. That is to say that although Russia's nuclear capabilities indeed make it the greatest physical threat to the United States on paper, for now Putin is using them mainly for bluster.

In Syria, too, the main purpose behind the Russian bombing of opposition groups is to complicate the situation on the ground in order to take international center stage. Propping up Bashar al-Assad, Moscow's sole Middle East ally, is aimed at boosting Putin's public approval ratings by frustrating Washington and its allies, which is what counts for restoring Moscow's Cold War power.

Putin has been very consistent in that. Since he launched a second war in Chechnya at the start of his rule fifteen years ago, war has served to establish his image as Russia's undisputed strongman. His overriding aim is to shore up power, not restore the Russian empire's traditional territory, much as he has tried to make it seem that way.



What does that mean for the future?

In the long term, I certainly do not believe Russia is fated to continue opposing the West. Despite the deep continuities of Russian life and the isolation Putin is forcing on his country, the Kremlin's actions ultimately stem not from fate, but practical considerations, as I have tried to show. Although Western countries must treat Moscow's rhetoric seriously, responding properly requires understanding that despite his huge power, the personal system of control Putin has built is inherently brittle and unstable.

Still, even though Putin's actions are not ultimately sustainable politically or economically, Russia's plight will deepen before its policies change. Even then, reforming the country will take more than just new leadership. It will require a fundamental change in the behavior that makes it seem mystifying to so many today. Until then, Moscow will continue to confound the West with ideas and designs very different from its own for as long as anyone can reasonably foresee. ✦

END NOTES:

- (1) Gore Vidal was an American writer and a public intellectual. He died in 2012. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gore_Vidal
- (2) George Feifer, "Russian Winter", Harper's Magazine (February 1982).



GREGORY FEIFER is a journalist and author who reported about Russia's resurgence under Vladimir Putin as NPR bureau chief in Moscow. His book *Russians* (2014) concerns the social behavior behind the country's political culture. His other books include *The Great Gamble* (2009), a history of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. His work appears in various publications, including *Politico*, *The Washington Post* and *Foreign Affairs*. An associate of Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian Studies, he is working on a book about anti-Americanism.



LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERT P. OTTO
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR ISR

Lieutenant General Robert P. "Bob" Otto is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Headquarters U.S. Air Force. He is responsible to the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force for policy formulation, planning, evaluation, oversight and leadership of Air Force ISR capabilities. As the U.S. Air Force's senior intelligence officer, he is directly responsible to the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. He leads five Directorates and supports a 30,000-person enterprise with a portfolio valued at \$55 billion across the U.S. Air Force.

You've mentioned in other venues the need to revolutionize analytics. What does that entail, and how will it affect the ISR enterprise as a whole?

— We had a robust discussion about the fact that we know we need to do work in analytics. But, does it amount to a revolution? We started off with a survey of our people, especially commanders, and what we came to realize was that there is a real gap between the skill sets that we think we will need to be successful in future wars, especially high-end wars, and what we are actually training and executing today. If you take the fact that 75% of our ISR airmen

Q&A

ANALYTIC REVOLUTIONARY: Transforming ISR Through Big Data and the Cloud

enlisted after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, you will understand that they have predominately dealt with counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. The skill sets that are needed to succeed in those areas can be very different from those needed to succeed in high-end fights and Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) situations. The second factor is how technology is proliferating, and how much data are potentially available. Everyone talks about the era of big data, but what we are really saying is that there is a great deal of potential information out there, but historically, we have tended to focus on a very small percentage of it. Could we get some game-changers if we could access more information and use it in different ways? When you harness that with the gravitation to cloud environments, we start to see big data, cloud environments and high-end computing having the ability to really change the way we do business. Some of the efforts that we are pursuing include open architecture, widely shared tools and multi-domain analysis. We are putting all of that together and thinking through the direction the intelligence community is going, including the IC Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE), as well as bringing in information for the Air Force from the three primary domains of space, air and cyberspace. You can also throw into that all publicly available information, which we call the terrestrial domain, and then think about

multi-INT [*Editorial: multi-Intelligence*] approaches, looking not just at geospatial, but also at geospatial informed by signals intelligence, along with social media, open source and human intelligence. All of that together, we believe, represents a revolution in analytics.

How much of a challenge will the changes in training be, or will it be something that a new generation of airmen will adapt to easily from having grown up with the technology?

— I think the airmen will adapt very easily. The challenges will be in the bureaucracy and getting permissions or in our training development that might lag. The quality of the airmen we assess today, and their familiarity and comfort with technology, blows me away. When I watch airmen monitoring 16 to 20 chat screens in real time in a fight, with the ability to figure out critical information and set up their own screening mechanisms for the data, I am extremely impressed. I don't think the limit will be the airmen. But, I do think we need to come up with training that can match their abilities and have technology and permissions that will allow them to access all the data they need.

What's the strategy to bring more automated tools to speed storage, fusion and retrieval of collected geospatial data?

— We are progressing along several battle lines. First, we are pursuing an open architecture for



our Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS), which provides globally networked, regionally focused immediate warfighter support. When that system becomes an open architecture, and we are more agnostic as to the hardware we apply to it and the sensors we need to integrate—because we can do that in days or weeks rather than years—it really starts to open up some possibilities while also providing an opportunity to bend the cost curve. There is also data storage. We're looking at how we can use cloudlike structures for data storage. We have to think of that more as a commodity, and therefore invest fewer people in it, and it can become an opportunity for industry to meet a need. We need to combine with the efforts in the IC so that we don't both spend resources developing a common tool. Why not take a tool developed for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, for example, and possibly modify it by 5-10% for our use, or take it as it is? If you have an open architecture, you can do those kinds of modifications because you know the standard for which you need to build to fit into the architecture. Finally, we need to reach into the multi-domain. So, we have an ongoing effort to discern the direction that commercial entities are going in space, where a lot of EO/IR sensors are being deployed and how we could bring that data into our ground stations. The same thing is true with cyber, which presents some more sensitive subjects in terms of database access. The point is that there are several lines of effort that will all come together to enable this revolution in analytics.

What sort of partnering activities would you like to see between the intelligence community and industry to enable geospatial analysts in their mission? Also, do you think the open architecture systems that you are looking for will be affordable in the future?

— I think we can do open architecture within the current budget we are spending on DCGS, and the savings that will result from it are so significant. It will be the gift that keeps on giving. In terms of reaching out to industry, we established a foothold in Silicon Valley, and we were planning to do that even before Secretary of Defense Carter gave his address to Stanford University and talked about partnering. We believe that there is a lot we can learn from industry in certain areas, such as what I call "new

space"—there are the commercial entities that have access to space now that cheaper launch and microsattellites have come about. Another area is cyberspace, where many big companies have found tremendous advantages in mining data, grappling with big data and discerning what was important for their business. Private enterprise is really a leader in this space, and there is a lot we can learn from them. Finally, we are partnering and emphasizing Air Force participation in IC ITE and the Department of Defense's Joint Information Environment. It will take good coordination between the various pieces to bring this all together. That's a lot easier for me to say than it is to execute, however, so it definitely will be challenging.

What's the plan to prepare airmen for this revolution in analytics?

— We have a formal process through which we change our training approaches. There are some long lead times, however. For everything done on a large scale, we need to train the trainers and have an approved curriculum before we can run the airmen through that. However, we have already started the effort to make training more agile. At Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas, where we do our foundational intelligence training, they have proved remarkably agile in integrating lessons learned from ongoing efforts in Afghanistan, and Iraq before that, so they can integrate some modest changes into a curriculum from one class to the next. We're much more agile than we used to be.

And where does advancing technological initiatives for geospatial intelligence fall in your priorities?

— We have five priorities: to rebalance and optimize our integrated ISR capabilities; normalize cyber ISR, space ISR and HUMINT; strengthen integration, collaboration and partnerships with other services, nations and ourselves; revolutionize analysis and exploitation; and deliver and care for our team of ISR airmen. We have a number of technological initiatives that fall under those five priorities, but we don't have a priority to advance technology, because technology should support broader priorities. We are moving toward IC ITE and working on a new ground station for the MQ-9 [Editorial: *The MQ-9 Reaper is a medium-to-high altitude, long endurance remotely*

piloted aircraft system]. We are advancing the capabilities in the Global Hawk to enable it to be the backbone of our high-altitude ISR. We are transforming our approach to JWICS, the top-secret communications infrastructure, upon which intelligence resides. As I have mentioned, we are attempting to access efforts from commercial entities in the space domain, and working on an open-architecture DCGS.

How does full motion video (FMV) fit into geospatial intelligence?

— It almost controls our day-to-day efforts. The Air Force provides 61 CAPs of FMV today, and it will be 60 in October. It has proven to be one of those things for which there is just insatiable demand, and there is also the issue of data storage. We often use FMV that has been stored, especially from Gorgon Stare, as we conduct a forensic examination after an explosion. FMV is very much integral to the GEOINT that we work on. The piece that we haven't grappled with is the notion of whether we are effective with it. Unfortunately, despite 14 years of war, we mostly track hours and sorties, and have not adopted robust measures of merit. We need to focus more on effectiveness.

How is the Air Force adapting geospatial collections for contested environments against near-peer adversaries?

— First of all, I believe that we need a new platform. When we talk about my first priority, which is to rebalance and optimize integrated ISR capabilities, it is really about whether, as a nation state, we are over-invested in permissive ISR and under-invested in the kind of ISR that allows us to address these near-peer, A2AD environments. We clearly need to be working toward a new platform that can operate in that environment. Secondly, we have low numbers of highly exquisite national satellites, which I believe could be lucrative targets in a conflict with a near-peer adversary—both the satellites and ground stations. Diversifying our access to information from space seems like a prudent course of action, and one we are looking very closely at doing. We also need to think not only about the collection side in an A2AD environment, but also about decision making. We start to bring together command and control and ISR, because ISR is foundational to a commander trying to make decisions. What we need to do is to tighten the Observe, Ori-



Airmen from the 380th Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Squadron tow an RQ-4 Global Hawk to a hangar after a sortie 18 September 2015. Global Hawk delivers intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to warfighters. Photo by Technical Sergeant Christopher Boitz, U.S. Air Force.



ent, Decide and Act (OODA) loop. If we can create a tighter OODA loop and turn that into intelligence with the timing and tempo that the commander requires, we stand our best chances in those environments. My vision for a new platform is something that can penetrate very complex integrated air defense systems—systems that are pushing platforms further and further out. What we need to be able to do is to characterize those systems and gather both signals and geospatial intelligence. Some of that you can do from space, but when space is threatened as well, you need the ability to get in closer. Essentially, that means we're going to have to figure out how to do that from a stealth perspective.

With the pending decision to divest the U-2 DRAGONLADY, how will airborne geospatial intelligence collection be affected?

— The plan is to begin to retire the U-2 in Fiscal Year (FY) 2019. The FY 2012 defense authorization law says we need equal or greater capability in the Global Hawk, looked at holistically, before the U-2 is retired. The Air Force wants to invest in Global Hawk to make the sensors better, and we are looking specifically at advanced spectral sensors. We also looking at the optical bar camera that currently flies on the U-2, and discussing how to replace that capability on the U-2 on the Global Hawk or another platform. What we need to do is achieve sensor parity by FY 2019. If we're successful in doing that, and can convince Congress that it is the right thing to do holistically, then we'll

transition to the Global Hawk as our platform.

The thirst for ISR seems to have no end; every combat commander wants a freshly collected geospatial product before a mission. How does the Air Force plan to meet the demand, and what are the challenges to doing so?

— First of all, what we've proven is that constant surge cannot work. We practically broke our medium-altitude RPA [*Editorial: Remotely Piloted Aircraft*] enterprise by constant surge. So we're in a reset period that will take a couple of years to fix. We need to learn from that. We believe we're going to be in these kinds of operations for a sustained period of time, and you just can't treat people as if there's an existential threat that requires a surge all the time. Eventually they get tired and want their own lives, and leave the service. We believe we have a plan now that would expect the Air Force to provide 60 CAPS of medium altitude FMV, look to the Army to eventually provide 16 CAPS. Then our surge force becomes these government-owned, and contractor-operated CAPS of up to 10 CAPS. That's 86 CAPS of capability just of drones. If you add the numerous manned platforms that the Air Force and Army have, that is a lot of capability. That is an approach, and then we have the National Guard and Reserves for short period surges. But in order for that to work, we have to have a discussion about CAP effectiveness. I believe that there is a point of diminishing returns, and if there is some scrutiny on how we are using these CAPs and the best way to use them

to achieve the combatant commander's desired effects, then we can make progress without adding additional CAPs. What we need to do is to think through the analytics and get at effectiveness, rather than just saying we need more FMV.

Is there anything else you would like to add?

— We will succeed or fail based on the efforts and ingenuity of our airmen. So, we cannot ignore the airmen in the equation. We have to continue to develop them and care for them, and let them know that this is something they can do over the long term. I am concerned at how hard we have been pushing our airmen. I have enlisted 1N0s (operations intelligence specialists), 1N1s (geospatial intelligence analysts), 1N4s (network intelligence analysts) and 14N intelligence officers who are all below the secretary of defense's one-to-one deployment dwell red line. My 1N2s (signals intelligence analysts) and 1N3s (cryptologic language analysts) are at the secretary's red line. I don't believe we can expect them to continue to do this without some reset. What concerns me is that three things are coming together—an improved economy, high-op tempo and sequestration environment that continues to put pressure and demands on our airmen to do more with less. We're at the point where we need the support of the American people and Congress and to recognize that we have taken all the fat out of the system. If we're going to continue to maintain these end-states, we need to be mindful of our airmen. †



"CAX provides an important framework for validating doctrine, preparing units for missions and training commanders and staffs on how to steer and lead our complex, joint military operations."



INTERVIEW

Lt. Col. John M. Ferrell Deputy Director, NATO Modelling and Simulation Centre of Excellence

The NATO Modelling and Simulation Centre of Excellence (M&S CoE) hosted the 10th edition of the NATO Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX) Forum in Vicenza, Italy from 29 September through 1 October 2015. As the nature of warfare becomes more complex due to globalization and the pace of change and proliferation of technology outpaces that of policy and doctrine, the need to develop and manage adaptive training models becomes more critical, says United States Army Lieutenant Colonel John M. Ferrell, the Deputy Director of the M&S CoE. **Interview by Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO.**

Sir, thank you for giving us the time for this interview. Can you tell us about your job at NATO M&S CoE?

— NATO M&S CoE is a NATO-accredited international military organization established to support NATO and the Nations in all aspects of M&S by providing military subject matter expertise and technical capabilities through M&S applications. The M&S CoE, like most NATO CoEs, is organized to support four key areas: education and training within the M&S domain, Concept Development and Experimentation, Doctrine and standards, and analysis and lessons learned. The CoE operates with an annually approved Programme of Work (PoW)

in coordination with NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and in partnership with several stakeholders from the military, industry and academia. Interoperability underpins all that we do, and the CoE is a great conduit for Nations to integrate better in NATO through M&S. As the Centre's Deputy Director, I support the Director in planning and executing the PoW, conducting international outreach to develop partnerships and build the broader NATO M&S community of interest and providing supervision and leadership to the CoE staff in executing the various activities.

Recently, the M&S CoE hosted the 10th

NATO Computer Assisted Exercise Forum in Italy. Could you explain the overall purpose of this important event?

— NATO Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX) Forum is the largest event of its kind within NATO and the CoE assumed leadership of the planning and executing of this event five years ago. The purpose of this event is to bring together military, industry and academic experts and practitioners of CAX into a focused three-day seminar to share ideas, promote best practices and demonstrate new technologies that continually improve capabilities to train our warfighters more effectively and more efficiently to meet collective training requirements.





The forum invites speakers and technical experts in order to provide a basis for discussing new developments and exploring new ideas in a strategic context. Additionally, directors and representatives from national simulation and training centres are invited to share information on their national capabilities. This helps build and strengthen the international community of interest and thus creates more opportunities for nations to develop national and multinational exercises within a NATO context.

What was the overarching theme at this year's forum, and why this theme?

— There was more than one overarching theme at this year's forum; the emerging challenge of hybrid warfare, cyber and wargaming were all equally emphasized. The themes are determined through close discussions with ACT, JWC and JFTC, the most influential stakeholders of the CAX capability in NATO. While the CoE maintains the overall planning and execution responsibility, we rely on our Partners to share their ideas about the most important trends and issues in the CAX field.

Can you elaborate a bit more on the key areas of discussion during the event?

— The topics are discussed through briefings, panel discussions, demonstrations and tutorials. In addition to the general themes mentioned above, we also see that participants discuss traditional topics such as interoperability,

M&S training and education and NATO's strategic guidance, such as the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). Then we have NATO Modelling and Simulation Group (NMSG) and Science and Technology (S&T) organization's activities to improve CAX capabilities and processes as well as efforts at the national-level offered to NATO and fellow Members and Partners of the Alliance. When it comes to hybrid warfare and the increased interest in integrating cyber into exercises, the discussions focused on understanding both the challenges and opportunities that these concepts present and how M&S can better support their integration into our collective training for higher levels of fidelity and even more realistic scenarios. Clearly, the social setting of the CAX Forum provides ample opportunities for participants to engage in small groups and to build and strengthen our network.

What role does CAX play in NATO's readiness?

— CAX provides an important framework for validating doctrine, preparing units for missions and training commanders and staffs on how to steer and lead our complex, joint military operations. M&S helps trainers create artificial yet realistic environments and scenarios to support everything from individual training to strategic leadership decision-making processes. Within the context of collective training, CAX provides commanders with an opportunity to train their staffs by identifying lessons learned

in both individual skills and collective staff processes. This helps mitigate risks as units prepare for operations and deployment.

How challenging is it to connect real-world systems to a synthetic world and ensure that NATO trains as it fights?

— The technology that supports CAX is designed specifically to stimulate current command-and-control (C2) systems. However, not all the nations and their militaries are consistent in their use of this technology. Even within national systems, C2 architectures are not fully interoperable. Additionally, while simulation is designed to stimulate C2 systems with realistic data, the simulations themselves require C2 systems to push accurate data back through the simulation in a synthetic environment. What constitutes a challenge for CAX practitioners is designing technical architectures that support C2 systems, while, at the same time, trying to "mirror" the complex C2 architectures that the headquarters will need in theatres. The Afghan Mission Network brought with it the current Federated Mission Network, a network designed to support the complex C2 simulation systems and architectures, which are constantly being adapted.

Photos above by M&S COE: (From left): Brigadier General Christopher Cavoli, Commander of the U.S. Army Europe's Joint Multi-National Training Command; CAX Forum 2015 participants.





What are the current challenges for the simulation providers when it comes to achieving increased interoperability? Are they technical challenges or are they multi-dimensional?

— More than 10 years ago, technologists were working hard towards achieving technical interoperability, but as technology was developed to support specific needs of nations and military services, it did not always align with other stovepipes. Moreover, the pace of change of technology made it difficult for some acquisition systems to keep up with emerging capabilities. The development and advent of open system architectures, international standards for input/output messaging and more international cooperative development activities have made technological interoperability less of an issue today. In this regard, technology has surpassed policy in terms of interoperability, especially within network security.

Perhaps the larger challenge is the cultural, procedural and personal levels of interoperability. CAX is just a tool, but the exercises are planned, coordinated and executed by individuals. Each individual involved, from the planner or technician to the warfighter Training Audience, brings its own personality, cultural background and organizational pro-

cesses into the exercises, which are not always compatible with each other. Recently, NATO expressed the need and desire to increase the number of NATO and multinational exercises to help overcome some of these barriers. The CAX Forum is an excellent complementary venue to help transcend some of these issues by sharing best practices, participating in cultural visits and breaking down personal barriers to achieve efficient multinational cooperation. Through shared cultural understanding, we achieve better interoperability on the individual level and it also promotes and enforces more effective technical standards.

How do you ensure that the Centre of Excellence is up-to-date on potentialities of warfare and proliferation of technology?

— That is exactly why industry and academia play a big role in the CAX Forum. Industrial and academic researchers and developers have the opportunity to share and demonstrate emerging capabilities, while the CAX practitioners and warfighters discuss their challenges in the changing operating environment and CAX execution. Additionally, the CAX community is part of the larger M&S community. There are numerous international conferences, seminars and technology expositions such as I/ITSEC in Orlando and ITEC in Europe that provide the CAX community with a look at current and emerging capabilities in this domain. NATO recognizes the importance

of M&S as evidenced by the establishment of the NATO Modelling and Simulation Group under the Science and Technology Organization. This group, in which the M&S CoE is a member, is composed of M&S professionals from almost every nation in the Alliance and provides a venue for discussing military requirements, sharing national S&T activities in the M&S domain and allows for collaborative multinational teams to collectively study the requirements and develop solutions.

Is there anything else you would like to add?

— The M&S CoE is an important partner to the M&S and CAX community, and works closely with the JWC and JFTC in many areas of CAX support. By providing Subject Matter Experts to support the exercises, exploring CAX-related challenges and working within the S&T community to develop solutions, the CoE has become an integral member to the larger NATO CAX team. Additionally, the CoE hosts education and training opportunities for NATO, Nations and Partners. Our "CAX Specialist Certification Course" gives students an overview of CAX in NATO and specific training on the various and most commonly used CAX simulation systems in the Alliance. To conclude, our "Modelling and Simulation Basic Course" provides attendees with the fundamentals of M&S and how it supports military applications. For more information on the NATO M&S CoE, please visit us at <http://mscoe.org>

Photos above (From left): Mr. Björn Löfstrand, Pitch Technologies Service and Training Manager with Lieutenant Colonel (CZE) Jan Hodicky, M&S CoE Doctrine, Education and Training Branch Chief.

CULTURAL CONCEPTS:

BY PAUL SEWELL
Lessons Learned Analyst,
Lead Facilitator for
JWC Culture Programme



Change

"If at first the idea is not absurd, then there is no hope for it."

~Albert Einstein

THE HUMBLE POST-IT note. Chances are you are within range of at least one of these ubiquitous little yellow squares right now. They do everything from remind us to buy milk, mark territory in the office fridge, and even help plan out major operations. And yet, they almost didn't exist.

In 1968, Spencer Silver was a chemist working for 3M, a large American industrial company. He was tasked to create glue, strong enough to be used with aircraft parts. However, despite his best efforts, the glue he created was barely strong enough to hold together two pieces of paper. When he presented his results, the automatic response from the management was to scrap the project, calling it a failure. However, he believed that it had value and so persisted. Instead of calling it a failure, he re-

framed it, and called it "a solution without a problem", believing that it had some value in another context.

Four years later, Art Silver, another 3M employee found the "problem". He was looking for a way to hold the bookmarks in his hymn book at church and found this glue to be strong enough to hold a piece of paper in place without tearing it. Pleased with this discovery, he continued to develop the product, which ended up becoming the common (and extremely profitable) post-it note, which endures today.

What lessons can we take from this little yellow square? This small post-it note is a tangible reminder that something we may first struggle to understand may actually have real value. However, finding value is not a passive task—we cannot simply sit and wait for it to reveal itself. Instead, we must always play an

active role. This is directly analogous to the current JWC's organizational trial structure.

Remembering back to the JWC "One Team" concepts, there are two perspectives we can often take when it comes to change.

The first is the *Observer/Critic/Judge* or OCJ. This style focuses on purely what is wrong or what won't work. This is by far the easiest and most common perspective when we face change. This is mostly because it is easier to criticize something rather than actively looking for value. Typical responses are "this idea wouldn't work because..." or "we tried this before and it didn't work." This approach is common everywhere from the boardroom to the sidelines of an under-8's football match. In fact, it is so common that we often don't see it ourselves, particularly when we criticize or judge our own ideas internally.

JWC's Branch Head Offsite, June 2015. Photo by JWC PAO.





Clockwise: Syndicate work at the Branch Head Offsite; the author, Mr Paul Sewell; Mr Gordon Ramsay briefing the team on their results; a team exploring behavioural working styles at a JWC One Team Programme; Lieutenant Colonel Frank Andrews facilitating at one of JWC cultural programmes. Photos by JWC PAO.

You may argue that this is our natural tendency reaching back to earlier times in our history when it was critical that we be able to quickly identify real-life threats. However, this approach does not come without a cost. If we continually default to this OCJ mindset, it becomes harder and harder to recognize value and new ideas are often swiftly killed off by the OCJ mindset. This is detrimental because in most cases a new idea has to be given the chance to mature before it becomes truly valuable. Further, by continually overusing this mindset in our lives, we are also limiting ourselves. Value becomes harder for us to see through this filter, which restricts how we see the world and therefore how we operate in it.

The second and more useful approach is that of the *Participant/Supporter/Coach* or PSC. This involves resisting the urge to immediately pick holes in an idea, and instead take a more engaged and collaborative approach to seek out reasons why it is worth trying. This involves actively finding ways to make it work, by looking for possibilities and help bring out the real value hidden within the idea, much like the glue originally designed for aircraft in the story of the post-it note. Once again, this perspective not only helps us expand and de-

velop ideas, but gives us a broader, richer outlook on possibility in our own lives and those we interact with.

Although both perspectives yield results there is nevertheless a critical difference. The OBJ perspective, while easier to use, produces very little, as most ideas are blocked before they can develop. To contrast, the PSC perspective is generative and helps us move from what might initially appear to be a poor idea to a newer, greater idea. The key point here is that when we realize we have a conscious choice of which perspective to use, the more flexibility we have in contributing to the best possible results. Remember Spencer Silver's change of perspective from "failure" to a "solution without a problem" in the original story of the post-it note. This simple mindset change made it easier for the other scientist to take on and use his original idea. This highlights how important attitude is in any organizational change.

Now the JWC is in the middle of its trial organization structure what attitude do we need to take forward when evaluating it? Do we take the almost automatic, mindless perspective of the OCJ or do we engage with the more value-generating perspective of the PSC? As the staff we play a crucial role in this trial and

it could be argued that the "result" depends less on the proposed structure itself and more on the attitude of the staff to make it work, something the JWC is well known for. So the final question is: in the upcoming trial will you see the next great "post-it note" idea or just defective glue? Luckily the choice is ours. ✦



All organizations have cultures. The only choice we have is whether we shape them or we let them shape us. Culture plays one of the biggest roles of success or failure in an organization. Since 2013, the Joint Warfare Centre has embarked on a journey of intentionally shaping a healthier, high-performing culture to become even more effective in serving NATO. We call it the "One Team" culture.

Joint Warfare Centre provides NATO's training focal point for full spectrum joint operational level warfare.



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