



People leave carnations following terror attacks in Istanbul and Berlin. **From left:** Flowers at the place of terror attack, Vodafone Stadium in Istanbul, Turkey, 12 December 2016, which killed 45 people. Photo by Orlok/Shutterstock. Man putting candle and flowers at the Christmas Market in Berlin on 20 December 2016, the day after the terrorists attacked with a truck, leaving 12 people dead. Photo by Hanohiki/Shutterstock.

■ TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: Why We Should Rethink All We Know

by PROFESSOR CRISTINA ARCHETTI
 Political Communication and Journalism
 Department of Media and Communication
 University of Oslo

The most effective tools against extremism are a greater will to engage with the human aspects of radicalization rather than technology.

ERRORISM AND THE EFFECTIVE COUNTERING of it go hand in hand with communication. It has long been known that terrorism, like political mobilization of any nature, is fundamentally about communication – sharing ideas and visions for the future with others, persuading them to support a cause.¹ Since 9/11 much has been said about the role of global communication networks in sustaining transnational extremism, the spread of its ideology, and recruiting activities.² The Internet and social media, as shown by the current debate about Islamist foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq to fight along the ISIS' ranks, tend to be singled out as a convenient tool exploited by extremists to groom and engage often very young audiences.³ In this respect, digital communication is largely taken to be crucial to the so called "lone-wolves" phenomenon and to radicalization processes more broadly.⁴





Broken pencil, a symbol of the terrorist attack against the French magazine Charlie Hebdo, which killed 12 people and injured 11 others. Photo by Ekaterina Pokrovsky/Shutterstock.

There is a widespread assumption that, since communication and media are crucial to the strategy of extremism, they should be used to counter it, too, to the point that "strategic communication," "narratives," "counter-narratives" and "counter-messaging" have become buzzwords in official circles, think tanks and academia.⁵ CVE (Countering Violent Extremism), an approach that privileges the use of persuasion and communication over military and coercive means, has also been gaining ground, as demonstrated by the establishment of the CVE-dedicated Hedayah centre in Abu Dhabi by the Global Counterterrorism Forum in 2012⁶ and the explicit adoption of this non-coercive approach more recently by the UK government and U.S. State Department.⁷ Within CVE, engagement between authorities and local communities, the amplifying of credible voices and "counter-narratives" against extremism are regarded as key in addressing the threat of homegrown radicalization. Despite the centrality of communication, however, there has been very little effort to actually understand what the relational and informational

dynamics that underpin both the emergence of extremism and its prevention actually consist of and, most importantly, how they work.

This article is part of a broader research agenda that aims to bring communication at the centre of our approach to contemporary extremism.⁸ Within its self-contained scope, it shows that a greater understanding of communication in the 21st Century can be the basis for a more realistic explanation of radicaliza-

**Terrorism,
like political
mobilization of
any nature, is
fundamentally
about
communication.**

tion than current suggestions of contagion-like processes based on the spread of a radical ideology. To do so, the article first outlines three crucial misunderstandings that characterize current communication approaches to countering terrorism. Second, it provides an alternative communication-based explanation for the phenomenon of radicalization. This is the basis, in the third part of the article, to dispel some myths about the role of communication technologies and the media in radicalization. Further practical lessons that can be applied to counterterrorism are drawn in the last concluding section.

The Problems with Current Approaches

The first main shortcoming of strategic communication approaches to countering terrorism lies in assuming that the information space in the digital age is far simpler and linear than it actually is. To start with, from reports on how to counter "online radicalization"⁹ to governments' calls for taking 'extremist material off the Internet,'¹⁰ there is a strong focus on "messaging." Whether this means fighting the terrorists with the "right" counter-message or removing "their" extremist message, this approach reflects a woefully outdated model of public-media interactions.

Such a model – often referred to among communication scholars as the "hypodermic needle" model of communication – was developed in the aftermath of World War I, nearly a century ago, at a time when the winners of the conflict believed they had triumphed thanks to the persuasive powers of propaganda.¹¹ The model was elaborated in the attempt to explain how propaganda messages had affected enemy soldiers. It assumes that the public is passive and that different members of an audience tend to change attitudes and behaviour in a similar way upon reception – or injection/inoculation, continuing with the hypodermic needle metaphor – of the same media message. The reality of communication, however, could not be more different. The fact that the model is simplistic and naïve at best is not only proved by the fact that, as we can all realize in the immediacy of our everyday lives, we do not buy every commodity advertising messages tell us to buy. As a range of subsequent communication theories have pointed out,¹² audiences are





"The phenomenon of **violent extremism** takes place in a **social world** that is constituted by overlapping networks of relationships."

active both in the selection of the information they pay attention to – they do not consume all the information that is "out there" – and in the interpretation of media texts. This means that the *availability* of a message – for instance a jihadi video being online – does not necessarily equate *reach*, that is such message actually being accessed and consumed (the jihadi video, among the 'hundreds of millions of hours' of footage watched on *YouTube* alone every single day, actually being watched).¹³ This, in turn, does not at all mean *impact* – the message having the desired effect (*i.e.* getting any viewer radicalised, or terrorized, depending on the audience being targeted by a terrorist).

As a further demonstration of these points, most readers of this article will have been exposed to some form of radical message from extremists, yet not turned into radicals. In fact, watching a jihadi video might even increase a counterterrorist's resolve against extremism – an opposite effect than originally

intended by the producer of that message.

A second limitation in the way strategic communication approaches counterterrorism is the tendency to unnecessarily demonize the Internet and social media. For some, the Internet is the very reason al-Qaeda – when the average lifespan of 90 per cent of terrorist groups is shorter than a year – has managed to survive for decades.¹⁴ For others, the possibility new media offer to extremists to lurk in the dark alleys of cyberspace is even regarded as the main cause of radicalisation.¹⁵ Indeed, the Internet and social media are widely blamed for ISIS recruitment among Western audiences.¹⁶ These views are simplistic in their *technological determinism* – the belief that a technology, out of its mere existence, must produce certain effects. They overlook the fact that it is always humans (citizens, governments, and extremists among them) who use technology as a tool to advance their own goals and that audiences, as already seen, actively select and

embrace – rather than merely absorb – messages they are interested in. In reality, although the phenomenon of Western fighters joining ISIS is described as 'unprecedented'¹⁷ we need only to look back at history to find that this is not the case.

The Spanish civil war (1936–39), for instance, attracted volunteer foreign fighters in much higher numbers: on the Franco nationalist side alone there were 8,000 Portuguese, 700 Irish, 250 French, 78,000 Moroccans, just to name some of the nationalities involved.¹⁸ On the Republican side, the biggest national contingent of the International Brigades was French with 8,500 combatants, but involved many more volunteers from as far away as Brazil, and China.¹⁹ Among them was also British George Orwell. We can further think of the over 210,000 Irish volunteers who fought with the British in WWI.²⁰

While recruitment propaganda²¹ was a contributing factor to the enlisting of volunteers



"Sending a 'narrative' into the information environment without there being a network to convey it and re-convey it could be compared to sending a message into outer space. What should then be remembered is that narratives are not made by words, but by social action."

in past conflicts – showing that the Internet is really no more effective than the old-fashioned poster – we do not tend to dismiss those volunteers' motivations²² for joining foreign conflicts as the mere effect of "brainwashing".²³ Negative assessments of the role of the Internet and social media are also based on a lack of historical perspective. What we might see as an unprecedented "communication revolution" is barely the latest manifestation of those profound changes that the introduction of any communication technology, from the invention of parchment, to the printing press and the telegraph, has always contributed to across the centuries.

The first instantaneous and global communication technology – the telegraph (not the Internet!) – for example, supported the establishment of colonial empires by enabling the effective and timely administration of distant lands. The telegraph, like the Internet of today, was associated in Victorian times with growing social ills, particularly with offering

novel opportunities to criminals for fraud and deception.²⁴ The alarmed attitudes towards the "dangers" of Internet and social media – emerging platforms whose effects some appear not entirely to comprehend – is thus not new when we look at the reactions by those who witnessed advances in communications in the past.

Besides, the Internet might be "new" to security experts, but its effects on politics and society have been studied and debated for over twenty years in the fields of Political Communication, International Communication, and Communication Studies. It is perhaps a matter for counter-terrorism practitioners to look a bit further into multidisciplinary territory for advice. The not unjustified, but certainly disproportionate, focus on the Internet prevents us from seeing the wider social – and never online-only – space in which extremism is rooted. In this respect, rather than focusing on the technology alone, it is more helpful to look at the convergence of different platforms, both "new" and "old" media, and at how they are used by political actors (terrorists, citizens, NGOs, governments, etc.) for their own agendas.

A third and last limitation of current strategic communication against extremism relates to the understanding of narratives as simple "messages" or "stories." The idea here is that, if Western governments craft the "right" narrative and this is received by extremists, they will stop committing acts of terrorism. Narratives, however, are much more than rhetorical devices. Far from being "just stories," they have deep roots: they are *socially*

constructed.²⁵ In other words, narratives arise from a specific constellation of relationships – a social network.²⁶ It is possible, in fact, to say that where there is a narrative there must be a network. The reason is that a narrative does not exist in a void. If it exists it is because the story it embodies is told and continuously re-told by the people who belong to that network. Understanding this is important: sending a "narrative" into the information environment (as some current approaches in fact aim to do) without there being a network to convey it and re-convey it could be compared to sending a message into outer space. What should then be remembered is that narratives are not made by words, but by *social action*. The next section, in this respect, examines the social construction of narratives, particularly how the connection between social networks, communication and extremism can be explained.

A Different Explanation of Extremism

As I have argued elsewhere in greater detail, the phenomenon of violent extremism takes place in a social world that is constituted by overlapping networks of relationships.²⁷ In examining narratives a distinction should be made between *individual narratives* and *collective narratives*. An individual narrative consists of a person's understanding of the world and one's role in it. As illustrated in Figure 1 (*next page*), more specifically, an individual's identity (who we are) is shaped by the network of relationships one is enmeshed in at any given time. Communication technologies have a role in extending such relationships beyond the realm of face-to-face interactions.


Craig Calhoun, in this respect, argues that the proliferation of 'indirect relationships' is a feature that fundamentally characterizes modernity.²⁸ Beyond direct interpersonal relations, Calhoun envisages indirect personal connections that can exist, for instance, with political representatives, TV personalities, but also through tradition.²⁹ Communication technologies, in this respect, can further extend our social reach in forming both direct relationships (through emails, for example, or by having a chat over the phone) and in building indirect relationships. For instance, an activist can develop an indirect relationship with an admired political figure (a terrorist leader, for

**The
disproportionate,
focus on the
Internet prevents
us from seeing
the wider social
space in which
extremism is
rooted.**



COUNTERING TERRORISM

Figure 1 The social construction of the individual narrative



example) one comes to know through speeches available online. In this sense relationships can be *imagined*. 'Imagined communities,' to borrow the term used by Benedict Anderson,³⁰ are based on the 'politics of identification.'³¹ As Calhoun explains: 'People without direct interpersonal relations with each other are led [...] to imagine themselves as members of communities defined by common ascriptive characteristics, personal tastes, habits, concerns.'³² In this respect, there can be imagined communities of interest like those constituted by environmental activists, gay marriage campaigners, or radical Muslims who aspire to live in a society regulated by Sharia law.

Face-to-face communication and communication technologies, together with media coverage, however, occupy another place in the social map ('incoming information,' in the upper part of Figure 1). They allow the acquisition of new information (through conversation, surfing on the Internet, reading the newspaper, watching TV...), which will be interpreted through the relational perspective occupied by the individual at any specific time. It is at this point that an individual can come into contact with other narratives. They might be other actors' individual narratives (belonging to our friends and acquaintances,

for instance), but also collective narratives (related to the sense of belonging of a democratic society, for example, or sustained by the traditions of an ethnic minority, the rituals of a religious group). The collective narratives might be promoted, as in the case of political movements (as also terrorist organisations), for specific mobilization purposes. I will come back to this in a moment in discussing collective narratives.

Any incoming information, including

other actors' narratives, will never be absorbed as it is but filtered and *interpreted* through the prism of the individual narrative. This might, over time, lead to a transformation in the vision of the world of the individual, reflected in his/her changing patterns of social relationships, development of a revised identity, individual narrative, behaviour, and so forth in a continuous cycle. Partly as a result of our action, partly as the outcome of the simultaneous action by all the actors within our networks, the relationships' maps are constantly changing. This leads to our identity being continuously evolving, together with the way we interpret the world around us and the way we act. This is reflected in a continuously and progressively changing individual narrative. Figure 2 shows the way in which different networks lead to different identities, interpretations of the world, and consequent behaviour.

As identities exist at both individual and collective level, so do narratives. In this perspective, according to Alberto Melucci, social movements (as also terrorist groups) 'offer individuals the collective possibility of affirming themselves as actors and of finding an equilibrium between self-recognition and hetero-recognition.'³³ Whether an individual will join an extremist group depends on the compatibility between the individual's own narrative and the group's. In Figure 3, for example, individuals 1 and 3, as a result of their specific and unique constellation of relationships at that given time, can see themselves as belonging to, having a role in, an extremist group. They might be individuals living in completely different parts

Figure 2 Evolution of the individual narrative over time





Figure 3 Changing membership of a group over time: compatibility/dissonance of individual narratives with a collective narrative



of the world. One might live in the Middle East and have a network of like-minded individuals he or she meets every day. The other might be a British citizen who, mainly through the Internet, has developed contacts and imagined relationships with individuals he or she might have never met. In this sense it is interesting to note that this individual, normally referred to as "lone wolf," is not alone at all in his/her mind. Individual 2 (perhaps one of the readers of this piece), due to his/her different network of relationships, cannot envisage a role within an extremist group. These configurations, however, given that networks of relationships continuously evolve, might change over time. Perhaps, as a result of a shift in his/her network of relationships, Individual 1 will leave the extremist group at a later stage.

Dismantling the Myths

Once violent extremism is understood through such relationship-based framework it is easy to counter some widely-held beliefs in counterterrorism circles. Among them are: the idea that terrorism can be "predicted;" that there are technologies (such as the Internet) that might be responsible for radicalization; that we should worry about "online radical-

ization"; and that there is a need to counter extremist messages. As I am now going to explain, these notions are wrong because radicalization is a temporal- and context-specific outcome: *it depends on an individual's unique position within a configuration of relationships at any given time*.

To begin with, there are no individual characteristics that define the profile of the terrorist³⁴ and there are no given structural conditions in which terrorism will arise – which helps explaining the failure of terrorism research in finding a definite set of "causes" for terrorism. As it has been noted, individuals who turn to terrorism might be the unemployed, excluded, alienated and vulnerable, but they could equally well be the educated, middle class, and even well-off.³⁵ Extremism can develop in closed societies,³⁶ in democratic ones,³⁷ or in both.³⁸ Young people join extremist groups for the most varied reasons, which range from ideological motives to attempting to find a sense of belonging to a group, expressing anger for having experienced discrimination, seeking adventure.³⁹ What matters is that terrorist action is the outcome of the constitution of an identity and a corresponding narrative that legitimises violent action. Where and when the constellation of relationships

– both real and imagined – that will support the formation of that violence-based identity will materialize simply cannot be anticipated with mathematical certainty without reference to the specific milieu in which they develop.

The role of the Internet should not be dismissed: of course it has changed our society, the way politics work, and the dynamics of social mobilization.⁴⁰ This technology offers the opportunity to reach out to potential supporters internationally and to fundraise more effectively, as social movements (Greenpeace, Amnesty International or Occupy, for instance), activists (like Anonymous), and charities (as Oxfam) know very well. However, the role of the Internet in the extremism phenomenon – as in any political mobilization – is relative: in the mountains of Afghanistan – where there is no electricity and most of the population is illiterate – the terrorists' narrative is not conveyed through the Internet but rather *shabnamah* (night letters) and leaflets affixed to walls and often handwritten.⁴¹

It is often argued that multimedia material available online is more "radicalising" than text. For instance, Anthony Lemieux and Robert Nill have underlined the role of music in jihadi propaganda, particularly in leading individuals exposed to the lyrics to 'engage in deeper processing and consideration.'⁴² But no message is either 'convincing' or able to connect at a deeper emotional level with an individual in and for itself. Whichever information and messages one receives, will be filtered through the lenses of an individual's identity and point of view from a specific "corner" of the social world. The very fact of being "convincing" or "moving" is relative and depending on the relationship between the message and the individual narrative.

Individuals who have become extremists do not necessarily need to be exposed to extremist material to reinforce their conviction and perhaps take violent action. They can just watch the news and find confirmation of their interpretation of what happens in the world around them. For example Nizar Trabelsi, accused of plotting to bomb a military base in Belgium in the name of al-Qaeda, stated during his trial that he had decided to carry out the attack after seeing pictures of a Palestinian baby girl who was killed in the Gaza Strip in 2001.⁴³ It is not clear where Trabelsi exactly saw those pictures. Yet, it is very likely





Clockwise: Silence and unmistakable sadness at the Christmas Market in Berlin, the day after the terrorist attack. Photo by Hanohiki/Shutterstock. Flowers and candles outside Oslo Cathedral after the bombing in Oslo and the massacre at Utøya, which claimed a total of 77 lives. Photo by Torbjørn Kjosvold, Forsvaret. Terrorist attack in Istanbul on 10 December 2016 killed 45 people, of which 38 were police officers killed in the line of duty, like this little girl's police officer father. Photo by Hurriyet Daily Newspaper/AA.

that many more people (perhaps even tens of thousands in case they had been broadcast over the daily news) must have been exposed to the same images and did not become "radicalised" by them.

Further to this, despite the regular appearance of the term both in research and in policy documents, there is no such phenomenon as "online radicalization" as a process that takes place separately from the "offline world" and obeying to its own logics. As explained, the strengthening of radical views, even if this indeed happened as a result of an individual's consultation of online material or interaction over the Internet, is never only limited to the online dimension. The reason why an individual turned to the Internet in the first place would still have its roots in the individual's social network of relationships and world view that this network supports. These are shaped by sets of experiences that, in our mediated society, span a single social space where the online and offline domains cannot be told apart.

Counterintuitively, it is not necessary to be exposed to radical ideas to become a radi-

cal. The Norwegian Anders Breivik, for example, developed his extremist manifesto *2083: A European Declaration of Independence*⁴⁴ on the basis of harmless sociology books that are available in any library. Ed Husain, a former British extremist, as he recalls in his memoir *The Islamist*, became interested in political Islam by reading a religion textbook in school.⁴⁵ These are good examples of the creativity of audiences in actively interpreting messages: both Breivik and Husain independently drew their own extremist conclusions from non-radical material countless other individuals, who did not turn into radicals, had been exposed to.

Because any individual interprets incoming information according to a personal narrative that is rooted in one's network of relationships at any given time, targeting extremists with the "right" message is, to put it bluntly, a waste of time. I am not arguing that communicating with extremist is not useful or has no impact: receiving information (*if* one is listening, that is) always leads to some form of effect. Just do not expect to de-radicalise

extremists by "messaging" them. As political campaigners know, there is no point in trying to convince people who are very interested in politics about who to vote for: these individuals have already decided. The same applies to extremists: they have already decided, too. That is why messages, if at all used, should target not the extremists, but who is *around* them – the extremists' non-radical network of relationships. In other words: if you change an extremist's network (and the narrative that is embedded in it), then you change the extremist's identity – to a point perhaps in which the person is no longer an extremist.

Ultimately, although communication is crucial, it is important to understand that the message is not all. "We" can communicate as effectively as we like, but the consistency between words and deeds is paramount. Just to illustrate this with a couple of examples, could extraordinary rendition and the killing of civilians resulting from the increasing use of drones be undermining "our" own narrative? How credible, in the light of what is happening in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan, is



There is no such phenomenon as "online radicalization" as a process that takes place separately from the "offline world."

the claim that Western countries are democracies that value individual freedoms and human rights? Reality cannot be concealed behind rhetorical makeovers.

What Can We Learn for More Effectively Countering Terrorism?

In conclusion, communication is key to countering extremism, but it is not a silver bullet that will neutralize radical messages or 'inoculate' audiences against extremism, to mention a metaphor often used by those who operate within the "messaging" and "counter-narratives" approach. The analysis raises questions that governments and counterterrorism practitioners should urgently consider: Is the substantial use of resources dedicated to tackling "online radicalization" – a phenomenon whose existence is questionable, as the discussion here has demonstrated – justified? Should we really try and counter extremist messages when the great majority of our publics, in the information ocean we all swim in every day, do not even know about their existence and when those who do pay attention, the actual extremists, cannot realistically be swayed in their beliefs?

While the focus on technology and the production of messages/narratives might appeal because it leads to easily measurable outcomes (counts of clicks, "likes," followers...) – and these are increasingly required to prove "effectiveness" in bureaucratic and target-oriented organizational cultures – are these the most appropriate measures to address the

causes of extremism? Is not this approach, in fact, entirely failing to tackle the motives that lead individuals to join extremist groups?

When it comes to addressing the real roots of the extremism problem, the analysis has also pointed out that it is not possible to predict terrorism: there is no fixed formula that can tell when and where terrorism will arise or which kind of grievances might lead an individual to embrace violence.

Although there are no messages, however perfectly crafted, that can, alone, neutralise violent extremism, in each single local context, through community-based approaches and long-term engagement it is possible to gain an insight into the local motives for violence, the local narratives and the networks such narratives arise from: What is the identity of the local community? How can they be addressed? How do its members see themselves? Who are the "relevant others"? What are the problems of this community? Are there any sources of (real or perceived) injustice? The establishment over time of radical identities through ideas and discourses *can* be detected. By being part of a community, it is also possible to engage with the non-radical networks that are around an extremist core. The most effective tools against extremism, in the end, are a greater will to engage with the human aspects of radicalization rather than technology, and a more focused attention on the consistency between our narrative (words) and our policies (deeds). ♦

This article was submitted on November 10, 2016

CRISTINA ARCHETTI is Professor in "Political Communication and Journalism" at the University of Oslo, Norway. She is the author of three books: *Explaining News: National Politics and Journalistic Cultures in Global Context* (Palgrave, 2010); *Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communication Approach* (Palgrave, 2012); *Politicians, Personal Image and the Construction of Political Identity: A Comparative Study of the UK and Italy* (Palgrave, 2014). She won, among other international prizes, the 2008 Denis McQuail Award for Innovating Communication Theory.


Her research interests cover the intersection between communication, politics and security. More specifically, she has written on:

- The relationship between politicians and journalists;
- The role the media in radicalization, extremism and counter-extremism;
- The impact of new media on diplomatic practice and diplomacy 2.0;

- The effects of digital technologies on international journalism and foreign correspondence;

Archetti has over thirteen years experience teaching in Higher Education. She serves on the editorial board of the journal *Critical Studies on Terrorism* and was Chair of the International Communication section of the International Studies Association in 2013-2014.

Beyond academia, among her most recent engagements, she taught about the role of communication in Counteracting Violent Extremism (CVE) on courses provided to officials and community stakeholders by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Hedayah Center (Abu Dhabi); she has lectured for the NATO Centre of Excellence—Defense Against Terrorism in Ankara (Turkey) and NATO Centre of Excellence—Strategic Communication in Riga (Latvia).



END NOTES:

¹ Schmid, A. & de Graaf, J. (1982) *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media*. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage); Crelinsten, R. (1987) "Power and Meaning: Terrorism as a Communication Structure," in P. Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (Eds), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism* (Aberdeen: The Univ. Press), pp. 419-450; Schmid, A. P. (1989) "Terrorism and the Media: The Ethics of Publicity," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1(4): 539-65.

² Nacos, B. L. (2007) *Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield).

³ NATO StratCom (2016) "Daesh Information Campaign and Its Influence" (NATO: Riga).

⁴ Weimann, G. (2012) "Lone Wolves in Cyberspace," *Journal of Terrorism Research* 3(2): 75-90; von Behr, Ines, Anaïs Reding, Charlie Edwards, Luke Gribbon (2013) *Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism* (Brussels: RAND); Carter, J.A., S.



- Maher and P. R. Neumann (2014) "#Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks" (London: ICSR).
- ⁵ For example: Casebeer, W. D. and J. A. Russell (2005) "Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive 'Counter-Narrative Strategy,'" *Strategic Insights* 4(3), http://0-www.ciaonet.org.wam.leeds.ac.uk/olj/si/si_4_3/si_4_3_caw01.pdf; Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and the University of Virginia Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG) (2007). NETworked Radicalization: A Counter-Strategy, <http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/NETworkedRadicalization.pdf>; National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (Ed.) (2010) Counterering Violent Extremist Narratives (The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism); Home Office (2011) Prevent Strategy (London: The Cabinet Office); Council of the European Union (2014) Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment, Brussels 19 May 2014.
- ⁶ Hedayah (n.d) "Our History," <http://www.hedayah.ae/about-hedayah/history/>
- ⁷ Home Office (2015) "Counter-Extremism Strategy" (London: The Cabinet Office), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf; US State Department (2016) "Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on Counterering Violent Extremism" (Washington, D.C.: State Department).
- ⁸ Archetti, C. (2012) Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communication Approach (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
- ⁹ Stevens, T. and P. R. Neumann (2009) "Counterering Online Radicalization: A Strategy for Action" (London: ICSR/Community Security Trust); Neumann, Peter R. (2013) "Options and Strategies for Counterering Online Radicalization in the United States," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 36(6): 431-459; Helmus, T. C., E. York, and P. Chalk (2013) Promoting Online Voices for Counterering Violent Extremism (Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR130/RAND_RR130.pdf.
- ¹⁰ David Cameron cited in Ackerman, S. and N. Watt (2014) "Obama urges action to halt Isis 'cancer' as UK steps up fight against jihadists," *The Guardian*, 21 August, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/20/obama-urges-action-halt-isis-cancer-uk-steps-up-fight-jihadis>.
- ¹¹ Brooker, W. and D. Jermyn (2003) *The Audience Studies Reader* (London: Routledge), pp. 5-6.
- ¹² Lazarsfeld, P.F., B. Berelson and H. Gaudet (1944) *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign* (New York: Columbia University Press); Blumler, J. G. and E. Katz (1974) *The Uses of Mass Communication* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage).
- ¹³ YouTube (2016) "Statistics," available from: <https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/en-GB/statistics.html>
- ¹⁴ Rapoport, David C. (1992) "Terrorism," in Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (eds.) *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Government and Politics, Volume II* (London: Routledge), p. 1067.
- ¹⁵ For example, a US Presidential Task Force report states that 'The United States should devote far more resources to counterering radical extremist messages on the internet, where the self-radicalization process is spreading and accelerating' (Presidential Task Force (2009) Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counter-radicalization (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p. 17)).
- ¹⁶ For one example, see Brooking, E. (2014) "The ISIS Propaganda Machine Is Horrifying and Effective. How Does It Work?" Council on Foreign Relations Blog, 21 August, <http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/08/21/the-isis-propaganda-machine-is-horrifying-and-effective-how-does-it-work/>.
- Kerchove in BBC News (2014) "Islamic State crisis: '3,000 European jihadists join fight," 26 September, available from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29372494>.
- Othen, C. (2013) *Franco's International Brigades: Adventurers, Fascists, and Christian Crusaders in the Spanish Civil War* (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 4.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., p. 262.
- ²⁰ Jeffery, K. (2011) "Ireland and World War One," BBC History, available from: www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/wwone/ireland_wwone_01.shtml.
- ²¹ McGreevy, R. (2014) "New figures show almost 20,000 Irishmen fought for Canada in WW1," *The Irish Times*, 1 August, available from: <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/new-figures-show-almost-20-000-irishmen-fought-for-canada-in-ww1-1.1885044>.
- ²² Byrne, E. (2014) "The forgotten Irish soldiers who fought for Britain in the first world war," *The Guardian*, 5 April, available from: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/05/irish-soldiers-who-fought-for-britain>.
- ²³ Taylor, M. (2014) "Isis militant's mother pleads for return of 'brainwashed' son," *The Guardian*, 22 June, available from: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/isis-mother-reyaad-khad-video-plea-return>.
- ²⁴ Standage, T. (1998) *The Victorian Internet: The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph and Nineteenth Century's Online Pioneers* (New York: Walker Publishing).
- ²⁵ Somers, M. R. and G. D. Gibson (1994) "Reclaiming the Epistemological Other: Narrative and the Social Constitution of Identity," in C. Calhoun (ed.) *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell), 37-99; Lawler, S. (2002) "Narrative in Social Research," in T. May (ed.) *Qualitative Research in Action* (London: Sage), pp. 245-246.
- ²⁶ White, H. C. (2008) *Identity and Control: How Social Formations Emerge* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), Chapter 6.
- ²⁷ The argument develops on the basis of a theoretical framework that combines Relational Sociology, Actor Network Theory, and social movement theory. It is part of a broader multidisciplinary research programme which uses the insights offered by the study of communication to develop a greater understanding of extremism in the age of global interconnectedness (Archetti, C. (2012) *Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communication Approach* (Basingstoke: Palgrave), especially Chapter 3).
- ²⁸ Calhoun, C. (1991) "Indirect Relationships and Imagined Communities: Large Scale Social Integration and the Transformation of Everyday Life," in P. Bourdieu and J. S. Coleman (eds) *Social Theory for a Changing Society* (Oxford: Westview Press), pp. 95-121.
- ²⁹ Ibid., pp. 96-105.
- ³⁰ Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: New Left Books).
- ³¹ Calhoun, C. (1991) "Indirect Relationships and Imagined Communities: Large Scale Social Integration and the Transformation of Everyday Life," in P. Bourdieu and J. S. Coleman (eds) *Social Theory for a Changing Society* (Oxford: Westview Press), p. 108.
- ³² Ibid.
- ³³ Melucci cited in Schlesinger, P. (1991) *Media, State, and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities* (London: Sage Publications), p. 154.
- ³⁴ Gartstein-Ross, D. and L. Grossman (2009) *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and the U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process* (Washington, DC: Foundation for the Defense of Democracy's Center for Terrorism Research), pp. 56-57.
- ³⁵ Bjørgo, T. (2005) "Conclusions," in T. Bjørgo (ed.) *The Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward* (London: Routledge), p. 256; Sageman, M. (2008) *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), pp. 48-50; Presidential Task Force (2009) *Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counter-radicalization* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), p. 4; Beski-Chafiq, C., J. Birmant, H. Benmerzoug, A. Taibi and A. Goignard (2010b) *Youth and Islamist Radicalisation*: Lille, France. English Summary (Aarhus: Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation), available from: http://ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/SummaryFINAL_Eng_rapport5_.pdf, p. 12.
- ³⁶ Bonanate, L. (1979) "Some Unanticipated Consequences of Terrorism," *Journal of Peace Research* 16(3): 197-211.
- ³⁷ Eubank, W. L. and L. Weinberg (1994) "Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 6(4): 417-435; Weinberg, L. and W. L. Eubank (1998) "Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10(1): 108-118.
- ³⁸ Eyerman, J. (1998) "Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems," *International Interactions* 24(2): 151-170; Bjørgo, T. (2005) "Conclusions," in T. Bjørgo (ed.) *The Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward* (London: Routledge), p. 257.
- ³⁹ T. Bjørgo (2016) *Preventing Crime: A Holistic Approach* (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 203-204.
- ⁴⁰ Chadwick, A. and P. N. Howard (eds) (2009) *Internet Politics: States, Citizens, and New Communication Technologies* (Oxon: Routledge); Coleman, S. and J. G. Blumler (2009) *The Internet and Democratic Citizenship: Theory, Practice and Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- ⁴¹ Johnson, T. H. (2007) "The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters)," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 18(3): 317-344.
- ⁴² Lemieux, A. and R. Nill (2011) "The Role and Impact of Music in Promoting (and Counterering) Violent Extremism," in L. Fenstermacher and T. Leventhal (eds) *Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies* (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: AF Research Laboratory), p. 144.
- ⁴³ BBC News (2003) "Al-Qaeda Suspect Tells of Bomb Plot," 27 May, available from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2941702.stm>
- ⁴⁴ Breivik, Anders (2011) "2083: A European Declaration of Independence," available from: <http://www.slideshare.net/darkandgreen/2083-a-european-declaration-of-independence-by-andrew-breivik>
- ⁴⁵ Husain, E. (2007) *The Islamist* (London: Penguin Books).

RECOMMENDED READING

* Examining The Military Role in Counter-Terrorism: the United Kingdom as Case Study

Written by Major Kathleen McKendrick and published in The Three Swords Magazine: (Issue. No 30, July 2016) this article can be found at <http://www.jwc.nato.int/media/selected-articles-from-the-three-swords-may-2014-issue>