The chosen process starts a high level direction for doctrine to be developed or by someone finding a void in the doctrine and propose that a project of writing a new publication or amending an existing one be initiated; from here it goes to an assessment of the proposal, which either recommends the call off of the project for not corroborating the proposal or leads to a directive for the project to be carried out; the last being the case the publication is supposed to be ready in an 18 months time period, plus 6 months for each additional draft that may be required (of course, time periods are approximate). The 18 months are the time necessary for a study draft to be written, sent to the nations and NATO bodies for comments, the comments be incorporated in what becomes the ratification draft, the ratification draft sent to the NSA, from there to the nations for approval, and back to the NSA for ratification and distribution. In face of the above, the first issue that should deserve some attention is how the concept of fighting power stated in AJP-01 is common perception within NATO: What percentage of NATO personnel, namely NATO leaders, NATO commanders of all levels and staff officers at the different NATO structures, do perceive fighting power as a function of the stated factors or components? In case the percentage of personnel who has indeed got AJP-01’s view of fighting power is well below 100%, what is wrong? It could maybe be interesting to have an analysis of how has NATO been managing its fighting power, in all its components, over the times and in particular recently, calls for retreat from Afghanistan to the perception about the Afghan peoples, societies and drivers, from the means employed to the doctrine followed over the time. We will try to present just a superficial, very brief look at the binding factor of the fighting power, doctrine, our field of work in JWC. We will go from a very ruff picture of the existing NATO doctrine for military operations to the processes the Alliance has in place to produce doctrine and, finally, some analysis and discussion.

The tier approach was complex, but provided training realism and interaction that could not be accomplished through the use of response cells. Co-location of HQ ISAF and IJC training audiences was also important to develop relationships between counterparts at the two headquarters and enhance the team building process before deployment. Common training themes and storylines across all tiers of TA HQs were created as possible. Transition was the overarching theme for the exercise. The example below is a view of how a single event has impact across all echelons of command. Combined tier training events and exercises should be conducted when doing so offers mutually beneficial solutions for achieving the common aims of the stakeholders. Such aims to be considered like teambuilding for personnel from all entities or the benefits of sharing and pooling of resources. Apart from the aforementioned aspects training members were able to facilitate a more realistic environment and enhance better training. The benefits of the combined events can only be reached through face-to-face talk between the parties. Different organizations might have different training policies and methods for the delivery of training. These differences must be understood in order to properly unite the planning and hence execution of a training event. The conduct of an overarching ISAF PDT exercise with multi-tier participation including ISAF HQ, IJC, RC’s and BDE level has proven to provide great benefits by creating opportunity for the commanders and staffs to meet, to interact
and to share view and perspectives. It offers economy of effort by having one planning and preparation effort and delivering training through the whole chain of command. More importantly it sets up a unique venue to foster interoperability between NATO allies and to give the training audience the same realistic and high quality training through use of theatre data and ISAF common staff processes, with 100 percent results in good training. Summing all this, planning for combined TE/UE events is a very complex process. The cooperation and coordination between the NATO/US training partners has improved, but there are a number of planning issues which must be resolved before the next potential combined training event in the second semester of 2013. From a long term perspective there is a need for guidelines on possible NATO-led training to support the post 2014 Afghanistan NATO Training, advisory and assistance work. It was not without reason that the Joint Warfare Centre was conceived to include the then Capability Development Division, meanwhile shrunk and renamed Join Capability Integration Division. This division of JWC was conceived to encompass the areas of doctrine, lessons learned, and concept development and experimentation. In fact, these – concept experimentation, in particular – are what consubstantiates a warfare center versus an exercise center. Concept experimentation what for?