



# THE THREE SWORDS

STAVANGER - NORWAY

The Magazine of the Joint Warfare Centre

20 April 2007 - Issue No: 8

## ENABLER '07

First-ever JWC Stand-Alone Experiment

- **NATO and Terrorism**
- **Training EBAO and Humanitarian Considerations**
- **PEACEGAMING: Wargaming for PSOs**
- **HQ ACT's 2006 Military Member of the Year**

**EXCLUSIVE!**  
**Henrik Syse**  
ON ETHICS OF WAR  
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Cover \_ 21 entities from NATO and other agencies participated the first-ever JWC stand-alone experiment, ENABLER 07. A composite DJTF HQ came together in JWC's Ulsnes Training Facility, ready for an intense week of experimentation and training. Photo by SMsg Eise, JWC PIO.



## Editorial

Welcome to the eight issue of "The Three Swords", which is also the first edition in 2007, and the most extensive so far. Our cover story is Enabler 07, where unlike our previous exercises, experimentation was the main focus of event. But, the bulk part of this issue takes a closer, maybe a little unusual, look at the challenges, we, as officers and NATO as a political and military organization are confronted with while undertaking peace related operations, and how we plan, prepare and train for them.

We start with an article on how JWC trainers contribute to the preparation pace of an operational headquarters before going in-theatre. Then, we continue with a report from the last ISAF training event in February. In the "ISAF Civil-Military Relationship" interview, we are focusing on our relationship with IO/NGOs, and clarifying the role each one of us plays in peace operations. The article "NATO and Terrorism" takes a broader look at the challenges NATO is facing in the battle of regaining peace and preventing terrorism. How does NATO improve and learn from its current operations in Afghanistan? Read the next article, "JALLC in ISAF", and hopefully you will find the answer.

I would like to draw special attention to the following two articles: "Training EBAO and Humanitarian Considerations in Operations" and "The Ethics of War". These two will hopefully provide food for thought on the legal, ethical and humanitarian side of our profession, and how we can prepare for the challenges we are currently facing with in ongoing operations. In addition, you will also read educational articles on Information Operations and Peacegaming. We also have a presentation of our Supply Branch and some interesting community news.




I would like to take this opportunity to invite you all to provide us with good, illustrative and entertaining photos. Thank you all for your positive attitude and contributions in making this magazine; we cannot do it without you. I wish all of my fellow colleagues at the Joint Warfare Centre and our readers a challenging, rewarding and joyful Spring.

CDR (Sg) Helene W. Langeland, NOR Navy  
Chief, Public Information Office  
Joint Warfare Centre

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**PUBLISH AN ARTICLE IN THE THREE SWORDS!**  
We are always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you have got something to say, send it to us. We will be happy to consider it for publication. Email your articles, as well as your comments and feedback to JWC CG PIO Common (CRONOS) or inci.kucukaksoy@jwc.nato.int.



## The Three Swords

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## Air Marshal Peter B. Walker CB CBE BA Royal Air Force Director, Joint Warfare Centre

**O**UTSIDE my office window, I see, every day, physical evidence of progress at the JWC. It is of course a large crater punctuated by loud explosions to dislodge the rock and the papers on my desk. For those of you who work below ground, it must be worse, but the good news is that it is coming to an end, and we should see the end of destruction and the start of construction very soon.

The new building is testament to the confidence Nations have in the output of the JWC, and the work of all of you here, but we will need to turn our thoughts to the business of occupation. 2009 is not very far away, and we must ensure that we have a clear understanding of what needs to be done to have a building fit for purpose, and to plan for a successful transition. Accordingly, I have tasked the Chief of Staff with leading the Division Chiefs to identify and track all the parallel lines of operation needed to support our future move. You will have your own ideas and requirements, and the earlier these are articulated through the Chain of Command the more successful you will be, because at some stage everything will be frozen and your aspirations are very important. Bid early-bid often!

I know that the uncertainty of the exercise calendar has been unsettling for some of you, and we have the added pressure of the forthcoming PE Review. I believe we are now fixing the scheduling problems that have been such a challenge, and SHAPE has agreed that we should not have to arbitrate between the different requirements of the Joint Force Commands and Joint Commands (JFC/JCs). This year has been complicated by the challenges of supporting the composite headquarters' staffs for ISAF, but I view this as a learning process. We have to endure it, and as long as we learn the lessons and apply them, I am confident that next year will be better structured.



As to the PE review, I am as relaxed as I can be. I do not expect major changes at the Joint Warfare Centre, because we have developed a lean structure to support our output in the face of 15 percent undermanning. Next year there will be an increase in our output, as we train each of the Operational Commands annually, and I do not see scope for major surgery. It follows that the military and the civilian staffs can be confident that they will still have a job at the JWC, and any changes that are demanded will be managed sensitively, taking the interests of NATO and the individual into account.

We are now approaching our busiest three months so far this year, with ISAF, NRF and Iraqi Key Leader training all upon us, seemingly at once. These exercises are built on months of detailed preparation and attention to detail, and it is this care and nurturing that is the key to success. Good plans prevent poor performance, and even weak plans are better than none at all. The routine work of the Headquarters outside of the exercises is all about this preparation, and no matter where you sit on the staff of the JWC, your contribution is of value and is valued. No one here at the JWC achieves much by himself; we are not islands of competence, we are all part of a greater team in which everyone has to play their part to the best of their ability. I remain very impressed by the way everyone here works together, and believe that it is the whole effort that makes the JWC effective; remove one piece of the jigsaw and it will always look half done, without all your collective efforts, the JWC would look very ordinary.

Finally, as with all planning, I hope you have looked ahead to the Summer and made your Holiday arrangements. Your partners and families deserve their slice of your life, and as the days get rapidly longer, they will be thinking about the Summer vacations even if you have not.



# Brigadier General Philip M. Ruhlman

## U.S. Air Force

### Chief of Staff, Joint Warfare Centre

**N**OW that our Norwegian Winter has come to an end, I am happy to see the days getting longer and Spring time about ready to burst in with its seasonal change. In many ways, the JWC is experiencing the same type of rapid growth and transition, but in our case the change is not seasonal, but rather transformational.

Construction is on track for the new JWC building addition, with visible signs, and daily sounds (explosions, rather) reminding us of what the future will hold. We have stood up a JWC Transition Steering Group to guide our move into the new building, which I am sure you will agree will be no easy feat. Once the structure is up, and all the internal furnishings, computers, and systems are installed, there will remain the very critical step of testing the entire set-up to see if it works. This “shake-down” of the systems will allow us to insure the new facility will be ready for the first inaugural exercise sometime in late 2009 or early 2010.

Another transformational change in the JWC has been its completion of the first-ever JWC stand-alone experiment, ENABLER 07, fully coordinated and executed by our Capability Development Division (CDD). During the first few weeks of March, representatives from SHAPE, the Joint Force Commands, their Components, and Allied Command Transformation gathered at Ulsnes to conduct a stand-alone experiment using several new capabilities and techniques involving Joint Common Operational Picture (JCOP), Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), and Time-Sensitive Targeting (TST). An incredible amount of learning took place, which will be flowed into future exercise execution in STEADFAST JACKPOT and eventually, real-world operations. CDD also has been very busy producing three new handbooks, which have been released for staffing and coordination: Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (CIED), Joint Personnel and Recovery, and EBAO. Our intent is to get this information into ACT and SHAPE hands for review and comment, with the hope that this important information will be refined and soon available for use in the field.



A major transformational change for the JWC has been the formalization of the SHAPE Training Integrated Product Team (IPT) recommendations into a formal exercise schedule for 2008 and beyond. Essentially, the new annual tempo for the JWC will include three major NRF certification exercises per year, one for each Joint Force Command. Additionally, the JWC will conduct two major ISAF Composite Headquarters Mission Rehearsal Exercises. All said, there will be five major exercises at the JWC each year, above and beyond the already existing levels of other exercise support and training operations, such as Iraqi Key Leader Training (IKLT). That means these exercises must be carefully deconflicted to ensure mission success for the participating Joint Force Commands, as there is only one

JWC that must be shared amongst key users in ISAF and SHAPE. With the help of the SHAPE J7 and the MTEP, 2008 appears to be well scheduled and deconflicted, albeit still a schedule that is very busy and intense.

One final major element of the JWC transformation is the SACEUR vision for Director JWC to conduct a 2007 trial as Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE). This significant change, fully supported by SACT, will allow the JWC to more efficiently and successfully direct operational exercise training objectives for the STEADFAST series of exercises. Now, there are many details that must still be worked out, as this **new** OCE role is not the traditional OCE role of old. For example, operational commanders will still retain their responsibilities for real-life support and CIS. Nevertheless, this new OCE role for the JWC is a significant transformational change that will benefit all. Subsequent to the trial, it is expected the Director JWC will assume these new STEADFAST OCE duties in 2008 and beyond.

So, here comes Spring; time to get buckled in and ready for the fast paced ride to Summer--- IKLT, STEADFAST JACKPOT, ISAF MRT, and the myriad of other events vital to the Joint Warfare Centre's mission. Between now and then, its going to be a great ride.

## First-ever JWC stand-alone experiment

# ENABLER 07: an initial assessment

Contributors' names are listed at the end of the article.

**I**N March 2007, 213 staff came together from organisations across NATO in JWC's Ulsnes Training Facility for an intense week of experimentation and training in Enabler 07. ACO, ACT, JFC Brunssum, JFC Naples, JC Lisbon, JWC, JFTC, LCC Heidelberg, MCC Naples, MCC Northwood, ACC Ramstein, ACC Izmir, CIMIC COE, COE DAT, CJOS COE, CIMIC GN, NC3A, NCSA and NOBLE were all represented.

Superficially, Enabler 07 may have seemed similar to the well established Steadfast series of Exercises hosted by the JWC. It had training and execution phases; it had experimentation and training objectives; it was supported by a sophisticated simulation system (the Joint Theatre Level Simulation, JTLS) and it was managed by a "control structure" through use of a suitable scenario and MEL/MIL, which was tailored to stimulate desired responses. All this was centred around a Deployable Joint Task Force Headquarters (DJTF HQ).

Scratch below the surface, however, and it can readily be seen that Enabler 07 was fundamentally different in character to these events. Firstly, the experimentation was the main, rather than subsidiary, focus of the event. This gave the experimenters much more latitude to design the event to meet experimental needs. Consider the above mentioned tailoring of MEL/MIL: for example, in Enabler 07 it was to meet experimentation objectives, while in a Steadfast event that tailoring is to meet training objectives. The training objectives of Enabler 07 were defined to enable the training audience to use new capabilities, which were experimented upon.

Secondly the Audience was scaled to meet experimentation needs, balancing



the need to be an accurate simulation of a "real" DJTF, with the desire to keep the manpower bill low, and thus minimise the intrusion into the J(F)C's busy schedules. The SAECON (Stand Alone Event Control: the equivalent of EXCON) structure was then similarly scaled. The Audience was also a "composite"; formed from the 3 J(F)Cs, augmented from Component Commands and JWC. This was driven both by the Enabler aim to expose developing capabilities across ACO and, again, by the desire to minimise the manning bill for any one J(F)C. The training phase (12 & 13 March) again ostensibly similar to, though shorter than, those in Steadfast events, had substantially different objectives: to expose **new** capabilities and to enable the Audience to be sufficiently skilled in these new capabilities to use them realistically enough to support the experimentation.

In fact, this links to one of the most important "unique" characteristics of Enabler 07: that the performance of the Audience was of no interest other than for what it might imply about the capabilities under test.

There were four capability areas for experimentation in Enabler 07: Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), Joint Situational Awareness/Joint Common Operational Picture (JSA/JCOP), Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Joint Time Sensitive Targeting (JTST). Additionally, current thinking on two capability areas was "exposed" to the Audience: Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) and Intelligence Reach Back (IRB). Highlights from these experiments are included at the end of this article.

Enabler 07 should be viewed as one part of a wider experimentation cam-




## Stand-alone Experiment

paign, including Steadfast Jackpot 07 and Steadfast Jaw 07 and, potentially, other JWC venues. Objectives for all six capability areas in Enabler 07 were developed both specifically for the event, and with reference to the entire campaign. Both C-IED and IRB are scheduled for experimentation in Steadfast Jackpot 07, for example. As can be seen from the panels, valuable output was recorded in all four experiments. C-IED & IRB were successfully briefed. Additionally, data were gathered to provide understanding on the execution of the event itself.

This is important for two reasons. Firstly, it is necessary to understand the context and applicability of the experimentation results. The design of Enabler 07 was based on the synthesis of many complex factors and requirements, resulting in trade-offs being made, the most significant of which were times allocated to training and to execution, and the size and composite nature of the DJTF HQ. It was thus important to determine whether these impinged upon experimental outcomes and, if so, to

what extent. The second reason was, of course, to help JWC refine – or, indeed, if necessary, fundamentally redesign – stand-alone experimentation constructs for future Enablers. One aspect of this was to pull through lessons into the maturing design of the NATO Joint Battle Lab, which is scheduled for implementation in the JWC in 2009, and, meanwhile, into the interim capability at the Ulsnes Facility.

The analysis of all these data is currently underway. However, even at this early stage, it is clear that Enabler 07 has proven extremely valuable. The **event construct** ensured that the *information sought* was that of most immediate use to those intended to exploit it. The **detailed design**, and, in particular, the crafting of the MEL/MIL to stimulate desired activities in each experiment, its de-confliction to reduce the risk that stimulation for one experiment undermined another, and its harmonisation to allow single story lines to support multiple experiments, ensured the experimental *data available* were what was



...Enabler 07 has been a valuable preparation for Steadfast Jackpot 07

needed. The efforts and thoughtfulness with which those from across NATO provided their assessments through discussion with experimenters, through feedback, questionnaire responses and reviews, ensured that the *data gathered* had met its purpose. It is anticipated that this initial impression will be fully realised as the analysis continues and, indeed, it appears from an experimentation perspective that Enabler 07 is likely to be the most valuable event yet undertaken by JWC, whilst also delivering a more immediate tangible benefit for ACO staff through exposure to new capabilities.

### JOINT SA/JCOP:

**Background:** Enabler 07 was set as a milestone in the Joint Common Operational Picture (JCOP) (increment 0) implementation process and in its integration with the Joint Situational Awareness (JSA) concept. Experimentation required installation and configuration of a complex capability based on combined elements re-using existing NATO systems such as ICC, MCCIS, LC2IS, iGEOsit, NIRIS and TIDE/BRITE components.

**Results:** The set-up phase, the first integration of the two capabilities, was successful. The intense two-day training period and execution phase exposed the capability to the J(F)Cs and tested and contributed to its validation in a DJTF en-



...the experimentation was the main, rather than subsidiary, focus of the event



vironment. Both ACO and NC3A learned lessons, exploitable in the continuing development of this capability.

## EBAO:

**Background:** EBAO experimentation examined the use of the Effects Based Suite of Tools (EB SAT, EB TOPFAS and EB CAT, respectively for systems analysis, planning and assessment) within the DJTF environment, to both test and, if necessary, adapt them. The DJTF Headquarters Operations Effect Cell used the tools to modify an Effects Based plan and conduct limited assessment. The EBAO Handbook was exposed to the participants, for comment and feedback to facilitate its ongoing development. Wider discussion of the emerging EBAO concept and terminology were also stimulated.

**Results:** The event provided a valuable vehicle for exposing developing tools and emerging concepts, and produced valuable “user” feedback to both tool developers and the EBAO Bi-SC Working Group.

## CIMIC:

**Background:** Enabler 07 included two distinct CIMIC experiments as preliminaries to Steadfast Jackpot 07 (SFJT 07). One investigated elements that would help a Recognized CIMIC Picture enhance the DJTF Commander’s and his Staff’s Situational Awareness. The second examined Information Exchange from the military side to the civilian side in order to understand why specific types of information are, or are not to be shared. This was preparatory to experimentation at Steadfast Jackpot 07, where a prototype CIMIC Fusion Centre/Civil-Military Overview is to be assessed.

**Results:** Initial indications are that Enabler 07 has been a valuable preparation for Steadfast Jackpot 07.



## JTST:

**Background:** NATO concerned to handle time sensitive targets more effectively, especially with respect to accuracy and speed. Norwegian Battle Lab, NOBLE, has conducted JTST experiments, leading to a generic JTST concept. Enabler 07 experiment to explore JTST technology and human factors approaches in co-located and distributed JTST-cell organisation using the Generic JTST concept and JCHAT/FAST tools.

**Results:** Most objectives met. An NRF education package for JTST was successfully introduced. Situational Awareness and performance were measured and compared for differing configurations, and a new solution (combining JCHAT/FAST and human factors approach) to be further experimented during SFJT 07.

## IRB:

**Background:** This ACT “NATO Intelligence Reach Back (IRB)” concept proposes a distributed and collaborative network of intelligence support to deployed NATO forces, and outlines potentially new innovative organizational relationships (including with national intelligence, and ACO’s Intelligence Fusion Center), and a collaborative methodology as a means of capitalizing on the vast resources that exist across the Alliance.

**Results:** The IRB aim for Enabler 07 was limited to exposure of the concept to the event participants, and this was successfully completed. This concept will be experimented within Steadfast Jackpot 07, addressing intelligence capabilities’ deficiencies of the NRF or other deployable forces and their staffs.

## COUNTER-IED

**Background:** C-IED concept is NATO’s response to the high priority IED threat and gives guidance how to deal with it.

**Results:** At Enabler 07, the C-IED Concept was exposed to the Audience, and a significant MEL/MIL storyline on IED was injected to force the Headquarters to think through options to deal with this difficult problem. It integrated well with the other experimented capabilities, in particular with Joint SA/JCOP and EBAO. Enabler 07 increased ACO staff familiarization with C-IED, and was a good preparation for the Headquarters, which has to handle the subject in future operations. ✦

## Contributors:

Col Schneider, DEU A; CDR Gonzalez-Aller, ESP N; Mr Williamson; Mr Oliveira; Wg CDR Sharp, GBR F; CDR Pierre, FRA N; LTC Jensen, NOR A; LTC Wege, DEU A; Mr Hutson and Maj Nuhoglu, TUR A.  
JWC Capability Development Division.

Upcoming  
Events

# NATO LEGAL CONFERENCE

By Lone Kjelgaard,  
JWC Legal Advisor

**F**OLLOWING last year's successful NATO Legal Conference at the Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland, this year the Joint Warfare Centre is providing the venue for the NATO Legal Conference from the 23<sup>rd</sup> to the 26<sup>th</sup> April 2007. More than 60 Legal Advisers, Assisting Legal Advisers and Legal Assistants are expected to spend three days of valuable discussions and exchange of experiences in Stavanger. The audience will be representing all NATO Headquarters, including those in theatre as well as all the Agencies.

A diverse agenda focusing on how the legal community can contribute in a coordinated fashion to the current operational and transformational efforts upon which our respective commands and agencies are embarked will facilitate the daily dis-

cussions. Special focus will be given to the status and further development of the findings and actions from last year's conference.

That is;

- ◆ *To improve communication and information-sharing mechanisms throughout the Legal community and provide mutual support*
- ◆ *To be forward looking, e.g., to establish links with national authorities responsible for the training and assignment of legal advisors to NATO*
- ◆ *To move beyond ad-hoc solutions by developing and promulgating relevant documents, standards and guidance*
- ◆ *To address operational risk management factors when providing legal support and increase capacity to delegate tasks/authority*

Furthermore, this year's conference will press on with the issues identified for action last year, presenting a number of deliverables for community review and approval, assessing the progress made on others, and also identifying new topics that require a coordinated community response.

The agenda has been compiled based on inputs from all the Commands and Agencies. The Conference will take place at the JWC Ulsnes Training Facility, and it will be opened by Air Marshal Walker, Director JWC and Mr. De Vidts, NATO Headquarters Legal Adviser.

The Conference will also receive key-note addresses by Arne Willy Dahl, General Judge Advocate, Norwegian Forces; and Judge Hanne Sofie Greve, Human Rights expert. ✦

▼  
Lone Kjelgaard and Col Jody M. Prescott, USA A, provide outstanding legal coverage for the NATO Response Force and ISAF exercises, which adds significantly to the quality of JWC training.



“We’re from JWC, and we’re here to help...”

# JWC TRAINERS

*Committed to Training Audience Success*

By Lt Cdr Katherine M. Vigneau, CAN A,  
with input from Col Paul Morillon, FRA A  
Chief Training Improvement Branch, Joint Training Development Division, JWC

**T**HIS article is written for the larger NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) community in order to clarify the role of the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) Training Team (TT) in the conduct of NATO Response Force (NRF) and real world training exercises. Most members of the NATO and PfP communities are aware that the JWC exists, and that we have a certain training mandate. Questions arise, however, as to:

- What is the role of the Training Team?
- What skills and capabilities do Training Team members possess?
- What will Training Team ‘trainers’ do, and not do?

By addressing these questions it is hoped that we can foster a better understanding of Training Team roles and responsibilities, and ultimately maximize their utility in support of you – *our customers*.

The JWC plays a focal role in NATO as it *promotes and conducts NATO’s joint and combined experimentation, analysis, and doctrine development processes to maximize transformational synergy and to improve NATO’s capabilities and interoperability*.

One of JWC’s core tasks is to train the operational level headquarters (Brunssum, Lisbon and Naples, plus ISAF HQ). The JWC is assisted in this role by the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), which concentrates on Component Command level headquarters (i.e. Heidelberg, and including Regional Command Kabul or Regional Command South in ISAF) as NATO’s focal point for tactical level combined and joint training and transformation. Both organizations have Training Branches from which Training Teams are formed to drive the Training Audiences (TA) through a number of challenges during JWC-led exercises.

Table I. TT Composition NRF





Table II. TT Composition ISAF

The Training Team is comprised of the following people:

- JWC TT consisting of Observer/Trainers (OTs) and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)
- Augmentees consisting of OTs and SMEs
- Senior Mentors (retired General officers, selected for their wide operational experience)
- JWC Analysis personnel

The focus of this article is the role of the Experts (OTs/SMEs) who interact with the Training Audience. SMEs provide staff level mentoring to the Training Audience in functional and process areas. Functional trainers may provide expert advice in logistics, communications, force protection, intelligence, etc., while process trainers may be experts in various aspects of the planning process, such as operational design, wargaming, Course of Action development, etc. Trainers usually act in two roles simultaneously - as observers who monitor the performance and operational practices of the Training Audience; and as trainers who coach and mentor the Training Audience in the execution of their duties. Hence, they are commonly known as Observer/Trainers. The OTs work closely with the Senior Mentors to advise the Commander and the Exercise Director on the progress of the Training Audience. Whether employed as trainers to assist in a specific functional area, or



in a more general OT role, these trainers are “experts” whose primary function is to assist Training Audiences in learning and performing their roles for NRF deployments and real world operations.

## Skills and capabilities of Trainers

In order to fill their assigned role, trainers must have a wide variety of knowledge, skills, and experience. First, they must be knowledgeable in their functional area (Intelligence production, analysis and assessment for instance). Second, they must be adept in all aspects of the Operational Planning Process (OPP). Third, they must be conversant with NATO doctrine including NRF/CJTF composition. Fourth, they must have operational experience in staff planning for real world operations. Finally, they must be skilled instructors and facilitators.

JWC’s trainers have been selected by their nations for employment in this role due to their training and experience. Augmentee Trainers are likewise selected for their skills. In addition, JWC offers frequent training opportunities to improve the skills of trainers, whether through courses at the NATO school in Oberammergau, or through regular “in-house” training. What does this mean for the Training Audience? You can expect a high level of training experience and challenge from the trainers, and trust that they will be able to advise you on a wide variety of subjects as required.

## Trainer Wills and Won’ts

All participants in an exercise should fully understand the role of trainers. The Training Audience can expect these trainers to observe (and sometimes say nothing), train, provide feedback, help find solutions, and identify lessons, good and bad. The balance between obser-


### Will do

- Observe
- Train and coach
- Provide feedback
- Assist in finding solutions
- Identify lessons


### Won’t do

- Test
- Examine
- Evaluate
- Compare Training Audiences
- Be negative

JWC trainers will NOT fight with the Training Audience.



JWC trainers will cooperate with the training audience to contribute to their success.



vation and training will depend on the experience of the Training Audience, the stage of the exercise, and the policy direction given by the Director JWC. Often, more training is required in the early stages of an exercise, and with Training Audiences who have recently experienced high personnel rotations, or who have not yet exercised as a formed Headquarters. The trainers will immerse themselves in the Training Audience, not to do the actual planning work, but to fully understand the process and to be in the best position to offer feedback and advice. Experienced Trainers will often remain silent as Operational Planning Process (OPP) is initiated while they orient themselves to the Training Audience and their level of skill and experience.


The Training Team/Target Audience relationship is best understood by looking at some examples of trainer involvement and interaction with the Training Audience in recent exercises.

- During Phase II, a TA lacks sufficient experience in wargaming

We bring knowledge, skills and less



JWC trainers will NOT test or evaluate.



JWC cartoons by Martin Labak, Czech Republic

and requests assistance from the TT. Trainers, in conjunction with the Senior Mentor, provide a wargaming tutorial to key staff as well as a detailed critique of the actual wargaming session.

■During Phase III, a TA struggles with the delineation of responsibilities between the CJ4 and the Joint Logistics Support Group. The TT functional expert is able to provide the NATO doctrine and professional knowledge to clarify the situation.

■The TT develops and delivers a Phase I academic package consisting of a series of linked lectures on diverse topics from Force Protection to Legal Geometry to Decision Making. Morning lectures are followed by syndicate discussion facilitated by TT experts.

■During an ISAF exercise, the TA struggles with the morning Commanders' update. The Senior Mentor, Chief TT and the JOC Trainer explain the purpose and how to sort out the details of this briefing with an example. The Commander is then able to gain perspective and

just as important to understand what they will not do. It is not within the mandate of trainers to test, evaluate, compare Training Audiences, or to be negative. We are a resource to be used by the Training Audience, and we will adjust to their requirements.


**Conclusion**

You, the larger NATO and PfP communities, are our customers. The JWC seeks to provide world class training for joint and component staffs in preparation for NRF tasks and real world operations. Our trainers are key to accomplishing this goal. It is important that you understand their role in order to garner maximum benefit from their participation in training events.

JWC Director, Air Marshal Peter Walker describes JWC's final step in achieving world class excellence as packaging capabilities *in an aggressive training and exercise programme that provides NATO with the required tools to efficiently and effectively command and control the soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen who may be placed in harm's way in order to build a secure future.*

Trainers assist in this goal through the activities highlighted in this article. We bring knowledge, skills, and lessons identified to NATO exercises; all to be used as a resource by the Training Audience. Ultimately, the success of each Training Audience on every exercise is tied to the accomplishment of NATO's mission. Therefore, trainers are *committed to your Tangible Operational Improvement.* ✦

JWC trainers will coach and mentor.



Lessons identified to NATO exercises...



**JWC Training Team**  
11 April 2007

# STANDARDISATION OF THE NATO JOINT HEADQUARTERS

JOINT WARFARE CENTRE



## BACKGROUND

8 September 2006 saw the ACT Action Plan for the implementation of the “ACO Training Integrated Implementation Team Final Report” issued. This report detailed the Bi-SC support required to meet ACO’s training requirements.

One requirement of the ACT Action Plan was for the development of standardised Joint Headquarters SOPs and layouts. The requirement to review Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) had already been roughly captured in three internal JWC taskers, but these initiatives were effectively superseded by clear direction to support ACT’s Action Plan. JWC Capabilities Development Division (CDD) was designated as the JWC action body, and work immediately began in scoping the task of developing standardised SOPs.

The potential output from the ongoing NATO Command Structure review may make this work even more relevant as it recommends that Joint Command Lisbon “grow” into the third Joint Force Command, which will benefit from standard, interoperable

SOPs. In addition, it is envisaged that a benefit will be gained from a standardised approach when, in 2008, the JWC begins training all three J(F)Cs in the same year, in accordance with the Integrated Project Team Plan.

## THE CHALLENGE

There are currently three Joint Commands within NATO: JFC Naples, JFC Brunssum and JC Lisbon. Each of the Joint Commands is an independent command and organised to fulfil specific functions. JC Lisbon is currently not a Joint Force Command and is primarily organised to provide a sea-based Deployable Joint Task Force/Combined Joint Task Force (DJTF/CJTF) Headquarters, with half the staff of the JFCs. Therefore, the current situation is that:

- SOPs have developed along different lines with differing approaches to how the Joint Commands conduct operations. For instance, JFC Naples is approaching the Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) more aggressively than Brunssum or Lisbon
- Development of SOPs has occurred at differing rates
- SOP formatting differs between each organisation
- Emphasis has been placed on different SOPs, so each Headquarters has a range of SOP quality/content
- The Command direction of each Headquarters has driven the direction and detail contained in each SOP.



Colonel David “Bubba” Royal, USA F



One concern in pursuing this effort is that the ACT idea of standardised SOPs may not match the desire of the three Joint Commands. Indeed, as the JWC is outside the ACO command structure, it is not certain that we will be able to influence the Joint Commands to adopt a new, standardised SOP format, or content. This will largely depend on support and influence from ACO and the affected Joint Commanders.

## THE APPROACH

In December 2006, the CDD Project Team led by Lt Col (now Col) David Royal and supported by Maj Phil Ashcroft (CDD Doctrine Support), met with an Operational Preparation Directorate (OPD) team. During this meeting it was agreed that the CDD team would take on the SOP Standardisation task, focusing the requirement on a DJTF Headquarters for the NATO Response Force (NRF).



The requirement can be summarised as follows:

- a. Approach all Joint Commands for their initial agreement
- b. Focus the standardisation to the most critical SOPs
- c. Gather relevant SOPs in electronic format
- d. Analyse the various sets of SOPs for content/best practice
- e. Develop a set of "standardised" SOPs reflecting the best practice from each Joint Command
- f. Ensure Standardised SOPs are sufficiently generic to allow for command flexibility
- g. Distribute final draft versions of each SOP to SMEs outside the JWC, and the J(F)Cs who have recent operational experience for validation
- h. Organise a meeting with representatives from each command to agree the content and format of the standardised SOPs
- i. Forward our recommendations for standardised SOPs to SACT for Bi-SC coordination and promulgation by October 2007.

Although the standardised DJTF SOPs will not be directive, our aim is that they will receive Bi-SC endorsement as a standard frame of reference as JWC conducts training and OPD conducts evaluations. Ultimately, having this clearly defined frame of reference should make it easier for Joint Commands to focus their own training, and increase interoperability within the limited pool of shared augmentees available to support NATO Joint

Command operations.

**Best Practice** will be identified through the merging of current SOPs from each of the commands against a backdrop of the relevant Doctrine, the identification of outstanding Lessons Learned, and the input of SMEs during the drafting stage. The SOPs will then be living documents which will be updated when new Best Practices, or Lessons Learned, are identified.

## CURRENT SITUATION

The JWC has gathered all relevant SOPs and is in the process of analysing the content. Meetings have been completed with JC Lisbon and JFC Naples, and meetings are planned with JFC Brunssum and SHAPE in April. All commands have given their initial support to the project and are part way to agreeing a standard Joint Command SOP format, which will be incorporated into the JWC output. The JWC will use all available resources, when required, to complete the analysis and compilation of the standardised SOPs to facilitate their delivery on-time.

## CONCLUSION

The identification of Best Practice across the Joint Commands and the development of a standardised set of SOPs at DJTF level will be a first in the NATO forum. Not only will all three Joint Commands benefit from the combined use of Best Practice, but in establishing this "benchmark" both JWC and OPD will have a standard reference for training and evaluation at the DJTF HQ level.

From our perspective, these standard SOPs should be viewed as a foundation for DJTF HQ operations and not a ceiling that limits transformation or development. This approach leaves the way open for command flexibility based on generic SOPs. There will always be better ways of doing the job which evolve, are recognised, and adopted, as a new Best Practice. So, standardised SOPs should not limit progress, but rather provide a common point of departure that is refined and improved over time.



A benefit will be gained from a standardised approach when, in 2008, JWC begins training all three J(F)Cs in the same year.



Major Phil S. Ashcroft, GBR A

# ISAF TRAINING,

## February 2007

By Inci Kucukaksoy,  
JWC PIO

...a generic operation requires less agility than an operation like ISAF



**J**OINT Warfare Centre conducted a modified ISAF training for Composite Headquarters at its Ulsnes Training Facility between 5<sup>th</sup> to 14<sup>th</sup> of February. This ISAF training event aimed to train augmentee staff assigned to Headquarters ISAF for the successful conduct of their real-world operations. This implied; promoting continuity and common standards, establishing mission and functional area awareness, and facilitating and rehearsing staff action and interactions.

"Our focus here is to ensure that the training audience understands how they can assist the Commander in his decision-making process while also providing his intent to the staff. JWC provides the best opportunity for the staff to train. Our biggest challenge is to ensure that our training is realistic and timely with what is going on in Afghanistan. A generic operation requires less agility than an operation like ISAF. Things are changing rapidly there everyday, so we need to make sure we are engaged with the actual staff that are over there, in order to understand the new dynamics of the environment. Before each exercise, we send

a team to Afghanistan to ensure we are completely synchronized and that we can replicate, or, make the 'game' properly simulate the way things are in Afghanistan. When our training audience leaves here, they are better prepared for what it is going to be like when they arrive in Kabul," Col Harrigan, USA F, JWC's Chief Joint Exercise Division said.

ISAF Composite Headquarters consists of three main entities: Command Group, a nominated NATO Headquarters as Standing Headquarters, and augmentees from NATO Nations.



JWC's February 2007 ISAF training event was different from previous events due to the implementation of the Composite Headquarters model, however, the Mission Rehearsal Training was based on the pre-deployment training model used for previous ISAF Headquarters, and was aimed at developing ISAF operational battle and staff processes. It was a vignette-based "Operational Seminar" conducted by Subject Matter Experts, Senior Mentors and Observer/Trainers. The aim of the Operational Seminar was to familiarize the Training Audience with some of the principal corporate activities and processes of ISAF Headquarters, such as, joint planning, joint coordination, re-construction and development, campaign assessment as well as functional area specific challenges. Joint Warfare Centre was responsible for the conduct of the Operational Seminar, including the development of vignette play and hot wash-up.

"The training team has done a terrific job, and especially the Syndicate Leaders who have not done training like this before performed in an excellent manner and showed that they are real Subject Matter Experts. A huge portion of the success is actually based on Colonel Morillon and his team's performance," Major von Norman, DEU A, said. All participants received training on Mission Specific Training, to include training on Functional Area Systems and Functional Area Training.

Joint Warfare Centre executed this training event in support of the ISAF mission to further NATO's goal to support the Government of Afghanistan in providing and maintaining a secure environment in order to facilitate the re-building of Afghanistan. ISAF has a force of approximately 35,000 soldiers from 37 Nations. Joint Warfare Centre's mission is pivotally important in order to adequately prepare the ISAF battle staff for real world operations.

"One of the main challenges working outside Europe is cultural awareness. It is very difficult for us to judge exactly what the level of understanding and application will be in-theatre. But, we do send our staff periodically to get some feed back, so that our training remains as relevant as possible. Getting that real life taste of sand, wind and cold of Afghanistan is quite important. Also, the training we provide is very much part of their force-protection. I believe passionately that, our duty is to provide for the men and women of our Nations that go in harm's way, the best prepared and trained Command and Control organisation that we possibly can," Air Marshal Walker said, adding, "37 Nations in ISAF demonstrates to me how important NATO is, in terms of having a common standard of interoperability and standardized operating procedures that allow each Nation to work together." ✦

*Left top, clockwise, Functional Area Training, Ulsnes Training Facility; Maj Von Norman making an interview with the Polish TV crew; Air Marshal Walker, Director JWC; U.S. Department of Defence photo by Sgt Graham showing soldiers in the Kabisa province of Afghanistan; Right, top, clockwise, Col Harrigian, Chief JWC Joint Exercise Division; Col Morillon, Chief JWC Training Improvement Branch; media training during ISAF training.*



“ It is very difficult for us to judge exactly what the level of **understanding and application** will be in-theatre. But, we do send our staff periodically to get some feed back so that **our training remains as relevant as possible**. Getting that real life taste of sand, wind and cold of Afghanistan is quite important. ”



# The ISAF Civil-Military Relationship

*“The Three Swords” interview with Gary Littlechild  
(outgoing United Nations representative to NATO)*

**TS** What is your view of the current situation in Afghanistan?

**GL** I think that the current situation in Afghanistan remains very challenging. Security difficulties are far from being solved. Continued public debate over force generation and military burden sharing among the NATO Members and Partners cause some doubt of robustness of the Alliance’s commitment in the eyes of the Afghan population and the wider international community. In turn, such doubt provides some comfort to those internal and external actors who seek to undermine the effectiveness of the ISAF effort and the long term stability of Afghanistan and the wider region.

There are major development issues, both physical and political to be resolved. These have enormous implications for the imbalances in the distribution of wealth and political influence within the Afghan population. In addition to these, are the continuous threats posed by Nature to the security of the basic life-needs of the population, such as food, shelter, employment, and so on. Despite these difficulties, I tend to see the Afghan glass as half full, rather than half empty. There have been great steps forward in

terms of Afghan political development. There is an elected Government, albeit fragile in capacity and in need of support. The international community, of which NATO/ISAF is a part, has made and continues to make enormous political and resource investments to Afghanistan. I cannot see that investment being allowed to go to waste to the benefit of those disruptive elements mentioned earlier.

Political pressure throughout the region and on the wider world stage is moving in the right direction, albeit that it is very slow and remains vulnerable to other political agendas. Above all, I think that the Afghan people themselves, at the grass roots level, are ready to embrace stability, providing their quality of life and security fears are allayed. The political challenge for NATO is to dispel those national and international doubts about Alliance’s collective commit-

ment. The operational challenge for ISAF within this context is to help to provide the safe and secure environment in which other actors can deliver the political and economic stability. Tactically, a consistent military approach and finesse by all ISAF contingents coupled with a sensitivity on how their actions are and will be felt by the national population in particular, are also part and parcel of the overall ISAF campaign effort.

**TS** What is your opinion of the NATO/ISAF relationship with the IO/NGO Community?

**GL** Having spent a large part of my military career interacting with the civil community, my various commercial appointments and my eight years as the United



Nations Liaison Representative to NATO, I can safely say that the civil-military relationship is in a state of continuous change. Tensions between both communities always ebb and flow. Military operations such as the invasions of Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, by NATO Member States, clearly serve to increase the tension. NATO/ISAF military response to less controversial events, such as the Pakistan Earthquake, improve the civil-military interaction and move it from the simple "co-existence" end of the spectrum towards the full "collaboration" end. From my experience of many wars and natural disasters, I have seen the same lessons to be learnt over and over again:


1. The need for Joint Civil-Military Planning. Not civilians conducting military operational planning nor the military conducting civil planning, but more the *understanding* of the implications of their activities on each other.
2. The need to exchange of Liaison Officers early. Organisations do not do business with other organisations. An individual in one, does business with an individual in another. Therefore, manage the personal relationships!
3. The need to follow the principles

of international guidelines. Such as the Oslo Guidelines (for natural disasters) or the MCDA Guidelines (for Complex Emergencies, like wars).


4. The need for Joint Training. Even in war, practice and rehearsal of joint activities is essential.
5. The need for improved information gathering and sharing. It is too easy for the military to hide behind security classifications as a reason not to share knowledge. Sometimes civilians need to know about forthcoming operations in order to plan for the resulting effects.

**TS How can military and civilian organisations go hand in hand in reconstruction efforts? What role can the PRTs play?**

**GL** The strength of ISAF does not lie in its ability to reconstruct Afghanistan, particularly in the form of so-called "CIMIC Projects". This is the responsibility of the Government of Afghanistan, supported where necessary and requested by the international civil community. To bring the greatest return on its investment, the ISAF role in the "Dis-



aster Cycle" is very specific and is time limited. It is to assist in providing a safe and secure environment in which the other actors can play to their strengths and roles. This is too frequently forgotten, particularly at the PRT level, where NATO Member States follow their own national agendas for reasons other than those of the local Afghan situational requirements. ✦



United Nations Mission in Afghanistan

**Resume**

Gary Littlechild started his working life as an accountant with Ford Motor Company. After a short spell as a sports teacher, he served for 20 years as a British Army officer. This included a tour on the NATO Staff, when he wrote the first feasibility study into the use of NATO military resources on UN operations. Following his early retirement from the Army, he returned to business school and commercial life as a director and non-executive director with several companies, including Group Sales and Marketing Director of the Norwegian company, Kvaerner. Throughout, the UN kept in contact with him. In 1999, he was asked to open the UN office to NATO, focussing mainly on civil-military relations. He has participated in all of the ISAF and NRF Mission Readiness Exercises and certifications and is a frequent guest speaker at the NATO School, NATO Member States' Staff Colleges and Academies. His service has taken him to 14 wars and numerous natural disasters in some 68 countries.

In December 2006, he left the UN to return to the commercial world in various director and non-executive director appointments. He maintains his interest and involvement in civil-military activities on an occasional, part-time consultancy basis, primarily as a mentor, guest lecturer and exercise control staff member.

He can be contacted by:

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By Lt Col Paolo Vinciguerra, ITA A,  
JALLC, ISAF Project Manager

# JALLC IN ISAF: LESSONS for NATO TRANSFORMATION

**Kabul, Afghanistan\_** On 5 October 2006, General David Richards GBR A, the Commander of ISAF, completed the Transfer of Authority (TOA) for Stage Four of ISAF's mission expansion with the transfer of Regional Command (RC) East to ISAF Command. This important milestone was the culminating event of ISAF's assumption of authority for NATO's military and reconstruction operations throughout Afghanistan. Directly related to this challenge, lessons learned from ISAF are crucial to shaping the future of NATO success, both in this theatre and in future operations. For the first time in NATO history, ISAF has confronted the shape of the future battlefield. Now, NATO has the opportunity to use the experience of combat in Afghanistan to tailor NATO's transformational strategies to ensure that the Alliance becomes more relevant and vital.

The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) was in Afghanistan several times to gather first hand data during various phases of the ISAF expansion. Stage One and Two Transitions saw large JALLC teams deployed in almost all locations of Regions North and West; Masar-el-Sharif, Pol-e-Komri, Farah and Herat. In September 2006, an eight-man JALLC team was in Kabul, Kandahar and Baghram to collect data on ISAF lessons learned during TOAs for Stages Three and Four. The team quickly integrated their efforts with the ISAF J7 staff and set out in Canadian C-130Js for a flight to the front line in Kandahar province. While in RC South, the team also travelled by helicopter to the Dutch PRT at Tarin Kowt in Oruzgan.

To carry out this challenging mission, the preparation of JALLC team started in January 2006, when ACT assigned JALLC the task of analysing ISAF OPLANs for their consistency with current NATO doctrine. The resultant JALLC ISAF report (Part One) was issued on 30 June 2006.



JALLC deployment to Regions Capital, South and East supported the follow-on Part Two report that further examined the issues raised in the Part One report - specifically C2, Force Generation, Detainee Ops, CIS and Common Funding, as well as an analysis of TOA handover procedures during Stages Three and Four.

LTC Paolo Vinciguerra (ITA A) coordinated the JALLC ISAF Report, acting not only as project manager, but also providing CIS expertise. His experience with analysis of the ISAF mission goes back over two years, and through several previous projects. While the data collection team deployed to theatre, he remained in Lisbon to provide Reach Back, project oversight and quality control to the data gathering effort. The deployed team consisted of Team Leader LTC Frederic Deputy, French Army, INTEL SME; four other NATO Officers - including representatives from Joint Warfare Centre and the CIMIC Centre of Excellence, two NATO Legal Advisor Officers and one civilian contractor with US combat experience.

The JALLC team arrived just as major combat operations were winding up, proving to be an opportune time to gather data. The team was able to gather key data by interviewing soldiers and officers involved in current operations in Kabul, RC South Headquarters in Kandahar, RC East Headquarters in Baghram and at PRT Tarin Kowt. After three weeks in theatre, the team returned to JALLC to begin analysis and report writing. After arduous drafting and review process, a final report was released to ACT in late January. Data gathered from interviews by the JALLC deployment team served as

a key source for transformation analysis, because ISAF is where NATO meets its future relevance. This research from the field provides especially vital information at this stage in NATO's history and our analysis confirms that the key challenges ISAF faces in Afghanistan are often the same challenges NATO faces in its transformation mission. For example, issues that have been a challenge for ISAF reflect many NATO transformation issues, such as Common Funding, Detainee Operations, National Caveats, CIS, CIMIC Ops, Contractors on the battle field, and Force Generation, just to name a few.

ISAF assumption of full operational authority in Afghanistan comes at a crucial time as NATO is transforming its key concepts for a more relevant and efficient Alliance. JALLC continues to play a crucial role in NATO transformation development since it is positioned within ACT, while its principal customers are within ACO. The synchronicity of capturing lessons from Operations under the mandate of the Transformation Command allows JALLC to ensure that operational relevance is retained within the transformation process.

On 6 December 2006, JALLC celebrated its fourth birthday, marking our continued growth as a vital tool for NATO's transformation, ensuring relevance and efficiency in the face of rapidly changing and dynamic battle space. ✦

*Members of the Analysis Team at HQ ISAF in Kabul. Left to right: CDR Holdt, USA N, JALLC Staff Officer Legal; CDR Michael Gatke, DEU N, CIMIC COE; LCDR Geoff Everts, CAN N, JALLC Staff Officer Joint Ops; Mr Mark Rendina, JALLC Contractor; Col Frode Berntsen, NOR A, former JWC Legal Advisor, and our host Maj James Scott, GBR A, ARRC/ISAF C.J7.*



# InfoOps – PSYOPS

OOOOOOOOOOOPS WHAT?

Pictures and Article by Maj Joerg Fischer, DEU A  
SME Psychological Operations, JTDD, JWC

**B**EFORE I start, I would first like to introduce myself. I am Major Joerg-Dieter Fischer, German Armed Forces. My professional career started in 1986, as an army aviator. Following different appointments that included German Army Personnel Command and GARFCOM PIO, I finally changed my career in 2000, into the field of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Now, you can find me at JWC's Joint Training Development/Subject Matter Experts Branch (JTDD).

During missions in Afghanistan as Chief Target Audience Analysis/SO, and in Kosovo as Chief PSYOPS/Information Operations (InfoOps) MNB (SW), I personally discovered not only the value of PSYOPS and InfoOps, but something more: Battlefields have *really* changed, and scientists are telling the truth about this. Who knows this fact

better than us, soldiers, nowadays! We are facing new challenges almost on each and every step of our missions. In addition to that, we are under close surveillance, not by the known or unknown enemy; no. We are under close surveillance from the whole world! Media, TV, Internet – today's communication possibilities are seemingly unlimited.

But, besides having been watched and reported about, these possibilities can be especially helpful during our deployments abroad. Modern means of mass communication make it possible for us to inform the parties to a conflict of our intentions and activities openly and purposely, and get a step ahead in the battle about information superiority and in the battle to win the hearts and minds of the population.

During this issue of the "The Three Swords" magazine, I would like to introduce you to the

▲  
Face to Face communication with Afghan Police Forces on a road checkpoint on the way to Pakistan; a worthwhile activity to gather inside information to be used either for PSYOPS or InfoOps.



▶  
Handing out the newspaper "Sada-e-Azadi" and getting direct results and comments on it! Don't be too shy to get in contact with the local population – it's the only way to get first hand information!

broad field of Information Operations and Psychological Operations. During the Summer issue of our magazine, I will give you some more details on InfoOps, current developments, documents in use for Armed Forces, and especially, our, Joint Warfare Centre's role in training InfoOps personnel on exercises. In addition, the Autumn issue will deal with Psychological Operations and all aspects of winning "hearts and minds".

Let's start with an overview.

Best place to start is the overarching "new" military "umbrella" of the former C2W, the broad field of Information Operations (InfoOps). It is nothing new or miraculous – even if it might be seen miraculous by most non-InfoOp'pers. InfoOps are coordinated actions to influence decision-making of adversaries in support of the Alliance's overall objectives by affecting their information, information-based processes and systems while exploiting and protecting one's own (MC422/1, NATO *Military Policy on InfoOps*).

Brought back to basics: InfoOps is a coordinating staff function inside J/A3 Branch, and the InfoOps Officer is the "Spider in the Web", responsible for everything inside his field of responsibility and, that is a huge one!

Information Operations covers everything that is useful to influence the enemy in most imaginable ways. InfoOps means are spreading from non-lethal ones like "the media", key leader engagement and others, up to the lethal side, like e.g. bombs or direct action against targets.

You have to be aware of the following fact: Every action is always causing a reaction, no matter of what means are used. Being aware of this fact will

▼  
Information can be found also at places you normally are not aware of – This Afghan citizen is building up a mine-awareness facility to teach Afghan scholars about the risks of UXO's and mines – and besides he was able to support us with good informations!



give you the chance to try to steer the respective action in such a way that you might reach your desired output! This output can be everything from a "hard kill" to an article on the local newspaper, and it is supposed to be in your favour! It shapes the common mind - Let's hope for good!

That is the real artwork of InfoOps: to steer actions in a way that the outcome will be your desired output! The main forum for InfoOps in each and every operation is the Information Operations Coordination Board (IOCB). This is where the "real" work happens. Participants from PI, EW, J4-J6, LEGAD, POLAD, CIMIC, Intel, Targeting and Component Reps (LCC/ACC/MCC/JSFOCC/POCC) will sit together, discuss and exchange opinions on all Info related topics and finally will produce FRAGO's and the InfoOps Action Plan and contribute to the Joint Coordination Order.

During that board, they also agree on, or, adjust the Information Operations Matrix wherein everyone should be able to find his specific tasks or possibilities to contribute to the overall mission success. The main partners for InfoOps are PI, CIMIC and PSYOPS Forces. The latter ones are the true specialists on the information battlefield.

PSYOPS Forces might have different names in different countries or services, but their job is the same all around the world. Their mission is to **communicate**.

Mass communication media can decisively influence the course and outcome of conflicts. Anyone who has these means will use them to his advantage and to the disadvantage of his adversary. Propaganda and disinformation to manipulate opinions can be part of the opponent's conduct of operations. Especially, in a climate of general insecurity where information is biased; political, ethnical, religious and other types of ideologisation may reach a point where people are prepared to resort to violence.

In order to avert this risk, it is necessary to be able to explain the mission of Allied and Coali-





tion forces in the area of deployment. This serves mostly to the safety of our own soldiers.

To this end PSYOPS forces have a military mission on which their military routine as well as their training and continuation training programmes are based. The soldiers are provided with the latest equipment so that they can fulfill their mission. This task centers on the soldier and his products, which serve as means of communication.

It has long been said that “the pen is mightier than the sword”. That is because, if used properly, words can be an inspiration to motivate others.

Now, for psychological operations to be effective, you must make sure that you know the most possible about your enemy and that you are targeting his beliefs, and not using your own.

To this purpose, modern PSYOPS Forces have psychological, ethnological and sociological specialists at hand. Some of them are in uniform and some of them provide their civilian expertise. They prepare the ground for all psychological operations by preparing, e.g. country studies and giving the troops on the ground valuable information on the society they will meet in the specific mission.

They are called **TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS TEAMS**. How do they get to know the oppos-

ing forces? The answer is, via intelligence reports, country studies, in-country research, local people’s help, and even the enemy Prisoners of War all are sources of information.

## THINKING LONG-TERM

The overall PSYOPS goal is to change attitudes and behaviour in the long term. We aim to gain trust and support for our mission, and to keep the path open to reconciliation later on by communicating with the enemy despite ongoing combat action.

The PSYOPS forces are the “mouthpiece” of the force commander on the ground. It is with their help and equipment that he can pass on information and his message directly to “his” target audience, and it is important to say this – we are *not* competing with Public Information!

For any further questions, or to discuss PSYOPS products, feel free to contact me in JTDD’s SME Branch! ✨

Major Joerg Fischer, Joint Warfare Centre  
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Email: joerg-dieter.fischer@jwc.nato.int

▲  
Networking is everything  
inside the Information Field.  
Yesterday’s enemy is today’s  
friend – be aware of  
that fact!



By Tanja Geiss, ADL Coordination Office  
NATO School, Oberammergau, Germany

# NATO AND



SINCE 11 September 2001 and after invoking Article 5 for the very first time in NATO's history, just 24 hours after the attacks on New York and Washington DC<sup>1</sup>, NATO had to face terrorism as a mutual threat for its Allies and Partners. When NATO was established in 1949, the Alliance was designed to react against threats from other states, or another alliance. Today's challenge for NATO is that the Alliance is now confronted with threats from individuals or groups. NATO's challenge will be facing several threat scenarios, but the combat of some of these threats, especially terrorism, is traditionally seen as an inner state responsibility; but it is nowadays regarded as a problem for the international community.<sup>2</sup> Despite these problems, combating terrorism became a topic on NATO's agenda, and will remain on it, inter alia due to NATO's missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, NATO Member and Partner nations have to face the problem of combating so-called unconventional threats, such as terrorism, with their traditional tools of statecraft. For NATO what that means is, they can just operate within the international legal framework<sup>4</sup> and their tools, which are diplomatic and military ones.

Regardless of the already existing NATO missions to condemn and limit terrorism, like **NATO Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism**<sup>5</sup> and **The Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism**<sup>6</sup>, NATO has very limited possibilities to take measures against terrorism. The reason for that is quite simple. First of all, the quality of the threat varies very much from those at the beginnings of NATO.



Second, the terrorists are individuals who are challenging states and the Alliance. This emerges a further problem for NATO, since the Alliance was designed to deal with inter state problems. In addition to that, there is not yet one generally accepted definition available, and one must recognize that "there has not been a single form of terrorism but many, often with few traits in common"<sup>7</sup>. This makes it difficult for NATO and the nations to find suitable ways to address the terrorist threat. Finally, NATO's structure is another limiting factor. Since NATO is both a political and military Alliance, the resources to encounter terrorists are strictly limited to political and military tools. Does that mean that NATO is not capable to oppose terrorism in an adequate manner? This article aims to illustrate not

only the difficulties NATO has in addressing the new problems in a correct manner, but it will also try to show which measures NATO has already been taken in limiting the vulnerability of its Member and Partner nations towards terrorist attacks. Starting with the quality of the threats and the problematic challenges of the new actors, this article will also discuss the difficulties of finding a working definition of terrorism<sup>8</sup>, in order to analyse NATO's possible reactions towards terrorism and terrorist threats. This article aims to address the problem in a plain theoretical manner. Therefore, it tries to outline the challenges to NATO through the threat of terrorism as an example how unconventional threats can be addressed with traditional tools of statecraft.



# TERRORISM



## QUALITY OF THREATS:

As mentioned in the introduction, terrorism is challenging the Alliance in many ways. One is the changed perception of threats, and how the terrorists work. For NATO, as well as for their Members and Partners, this threat mainly occurs in the nature of terrorist attacks, which are very unpredictable. Normally, the behaviour of states within international politics follow a quite simple pattern, which means that states want to survive and some tend to maximise their power<sup>9</sup>. Terrorists, on the contrary, do not follow that pattern. Their actions do not harmonize with the classical logic of international politics; they choose their targets in order to gain maximum attention from the nations.

Terrorists try to create a feeling of insecurity

among the target nation and its partners. This feeling of insecurity is based on rational and irrational anxiety.<sup>10</sup> The rational fear occurs from terrorist attacks and the likelihood that another attack will happen. This fear affects mainly the security offices of the nations and NATO. The irrational anxiety is based on the assumptions of theoretical threats; it is mainly a product of the imagination of each individual and their personal fear of being caught in a terrorist attack. After each terrorist attack, the rational fear as well as the irrational fear increase, not only in the target nation, but also in Partner and Allied nations. For NATO, this kind of threat is hard to address, since terrorists are in the advantage of being at least one step ahead. Of course national intelligence services try to get information about planned attacks, and in

doing this, they were recently very successful, but to combat terrorism remains also a reaction on happened attacks. However, when speaking about combating or fighting terrorism, one must bear in mind the quality of threat. Strong security measures have to be seen more like prevention and protection, than addressing the problem itself. Furthermore, it is quite hard to predict when another attack will occur. Even if NATO and its Member and Partner states know that there might be a new attack planned, it is quite hard to figure out where and when it will happen. This leads to the next problem for NATO and states, since they have to face the problem that terrorists are individuals, but the tools of statecraft in international politics and NATO were designed for addressing other states.

## DIFFICULTY OF THE DIFFERENT ACTORS:

Besides the problem of defining terrorism<sup>12</sup>, states and NATO have the problem of who to address as terrorists. Terrorists are individuals. The international community has very limited measures to sanction them, since the sanctioning of individuals is traditionally seen as an inner state problem. For NATO this means that nations have to solve problems on the international level, which originally belongs to national responsibility. Nevertheless, terrorism is today seen as a major problem for international politics and is addressed within means of NATO as well. Trying to sanction individuals on the international level is always difficult, especially when being so tight on limited tools. Furthermore, terrorists are operating in respect to their terrorist group's interest, but not (officially) on any states' interests.<sup>13</sup> According to the level of involvement in terrorism, states can be classified as, "states supporting terrorism", "states operating terrorism" and "states perpetrating terrorism".<sup>14</sup> In these cases, it is of course possible to take political and/or military measures against these states, and in the last instance, against terrorists. Regardless to that, the problem remains how to address a group, which is well known, but operating secretly.

The example of Afghanistan illustrates the difficulties in addressing a state, which supported and operated terrorism. Despite the fact that an elected government is in power, and some of the terrorist hiding places are traced; the terrorist threat is not yet banned.<sup>15</sup> That leads to another problem NATO and na-



tions have to face: the global network of terrorism and the well hidden command cell of a terrorist group. Different from organised crime groups, it is very hard to get linked with the “inner circle”, the decision making group of a terrorist cell. But like the mythological “Hydra”, it is impossible to destroy a terrorist group without eliminating the heads/leaders of the group. In addition to that, the problem of suicide bombing introduces us to another dilemma.<sup>16</sup> That is, how to sanction individuals who are willing to “sacrifice” themselves. For the western societies, this phenomenon is very hard to understand why these terrorists are willing to kill themselves for the mission. But the fact that within terrorist groups there are persons who are willing to die for a so called “higher aim”, makes the difficulties in combating terrorism quite obvious. Even if states succeed to fight against terrorism by attacking terrorist groups, they might win a fight, but will not gain the final battle as long as there is the leadership still existing somewhere, in some cases, even as long as there are still supporters to the group left. This leads to the next problem, which is NATO’s structure, as well as the challenge for states that can just operate with tools of statecraft, while terrorists are using unconventional instruments.

## NATO’S STRUCTURE<sup>17</sup>

When NATO was established in 1949, its focus was on addressing state actors. Despite the fact that NATO has transformed itself through its history, it still remains a political and military Alliance to address “traditional” threats and problems. As mentioned in the text earlier, the terrorist threat has a different quality; first of all it addresses both rational fears and irrational anxieties<sup>18</sup>, secondly, the threat originators are individuals. For those two difficulties, NATO cannot work towards irrational anxieties, and NATO has limited resources in dealing with individual actors. The irrational anxiety is a personal feeling, and of course, by showing military presence, the feeling of security can be increased and the rational fear can be minimized, but the irrational anxiety might remain. As mentioned already, NATO is not capable to address the misconduct of individuals for that is an inner state issue. Of course, NATO can force the nations to enforce new laws against terrorism, but the practical measures are limited. As well as states, NATO’s tools in addressing any threat towards the Alliance are strictly limited to the traditional tools of statecraft, which means they remain within the framework of

the North Atlantic Treaty<sup>19</sup> and the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>20</sup> Of course traditional tools of statecraft are intentionally created to respond to conventional threats, with states as the main actors, therefore possible reactions towards unconventional threats are challenging for NATO and nations.

Nevertheless, the set of international framework for measures in a conflict situation is, on the one hand, limiting the nations and NATO, on the other hand, this agreed international handling of crisis ensures a certain level of security for the international community.<sup>21</sup> NATO Structure ensures first of all that both the political and the military sides are heard, and the decisions are made in accordance with each other. Furthermore, the consent policy helps to reflect each single nations’ interest, despite the fact that it also makes the decision making process sometimes more difficult.<sup>22</sup> It can be said that the NATO’s Structure and the limitation of available tools, as well as the possibility to address the originators of the threat<sup>23</sup> has some effect on the possibility to address unconventional threats. But one must not forget that there are a bunch of measures taken to address the threat.

## CONCLUSION

Taken into account the quality of threat, the new actors involved in international politics, and the available tools of statecraft to address the problem, it has to be said that the measure taken by NATO and its Member and Partner nations are helping to contain the problem. Of course, terrorist attacks are still threatening NATO and its Member and Partner nations, but within the international framework, NATO is trying its best to respond towards the terrorist threat. NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism<sup>24</sup>, the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism<sup>25</sup>, and the Riga Summit Declaration<sup>26</sup> are just few examples for NATO’s efforts against the terrorist threat.

Coming back to the picture of mythological hydra, of course NATO is facing a similar problem with fighting terrorism, but as we know, there was a chance to defeat the hydra. Through the continuous fight against terrorism, not only with military and civilian measures and stronger controls on critical places<sup>27</sup>, but also by trying to limit the effects of terrorism to our irrational anxiety, there is a chance to limit the opportunities for terrorist attacks.

The best way to address the terrorist threat is not only by focusing on limiting the outcomes of terrorism, but also by looking on the factors that might drive terrorism. Even if terrorism

can be never fought with traditional tools of statecraft, there is a way to address that problem by discussing root causes, which might be the agars for new terrorists. As NATO Secretary General Jaap Hoop de Scheffer said, “(...) *Protecting and promoting democracy remains the best answer to terror. (...) The most effective way is to have a combination of all the things in our inventory, and that goes from nation-building to intelligence to diplomacy, political talks, and if necessary, military power.*”<sup>28</sup> NATO and its Member and Partner Nations must not forget that combating terrorism is not only a military effort. The factors that are pushing terrorism and delivering the necessary manpower for the terrorist groups must also be addressed. ✨

<sup>1</sup> NATO Handbook, p.167.

<sup>2</sup> International Politics is seen as the domain of states, whereas individuals are traditionally seen as inner state problem. (Waltz, Keohane, Nye, et al.)

<sup>3</sup> An Islamist group called on Germany and Austria on 10 March 2007 to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan to prevent attacks against the two countries.

<sup>4</sup> The international binding document on self-defence is the UN Charter Article 51 (individual or collective self-defence) and the North Atlantic Treaty.

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicctxt/b021122e.htm>

<sup>7</sup> Laqueur Walter, *The New Terrorism*, NY, Oxford, 1999.

<sup>8</sup> The author will use NATO’s official definition of terrorism.

<sup>9</sup> See Waltz, Keohane and Nye.

<sup>10</sup> Ganor; Boaz: *Israel’s Counter-Terrorism Policy: 1983-1999-Efficacy Versus Liberal Democratic Values* (<http://www.ict.org.il>)

<sup>11</sup> I refer to the prevented attacks in London Heathrow last August and in Germany.

<sup>12</sup> I will use the official NATO definition of terrorism for further reference: “The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objective (AAP-6).” NATO’s military concept for defence against terrorism, Annex A, Definitions.

<sup>13</sup> Laqueur, 1999, p.156ff.

<sup>14</sup> Please see for further information about the problem in Ganor: “Defining Terrorism: ‘Is one man’s terrorist another man’s Freedom Fighter’”, where he defines states’ involvement in terrorism (<http://www.ict.org.il>)

<sup>15</sup> For further information on ISAF <http://www.nato.int/isaf/>

<sup>16</sup> Laqueur, 1999, p.140ff.

<sup>17</sup> Speaking about NATO’s structure, it refers in that case not only to the political and military arms of the Alliance, but also to the general problems states and therefore also NATO have in dealing with unconventional threats.

<sup>18</sup> See “Quality of Threats”.

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicctxt/treaty.htm>

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter>

<sup>21</sup> Rules and norms in international politics are set to give states the chance to evaluate the measures according to the threat.

<sup>22</sup> See North Atlantic Treaty.

<sup>23</sup> It has to be taken into consideration that any sanctions under the UN Charter have in general limited effect to terrorist, since they are addressed against countries and might not effect the terrorists.

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>.

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicctxt/b021122e.htm>

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm#terrorism>

<sup>27</sup> Airports and train stations, as well as public buildings.

<sup>28</sup> 10 March 2004, Madrid.

# Training **EBAO** and **Humanitarian Considerations** in Operations: Blue Force Looks Within

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## I. INTRODUCTION

**G**IVEN the high tempo of current military operations, humanitarian considerations regarding the use of lethal force and the detention of individuals, and the moral and legal implications inherent in these actions by individual soldiers and units, are of great interest to our political and military leaders, and to the public.<sup>i</sup>

This concern and a growing recognition of the need for greater cooperation with civilian and international actors in operations<sup>ii</sup> are in part responsible for the increasing emphasis within the Alliance on developing Effects Based Approaches to Operations (EBAO). EBAO seek to enhance traditional military planning and the execution of operations by creating a more holistic picture of the operational environment. Within this broader view, these sorts of methodologies seek to focus commanders and staffs on the effects needed to meet the operational, and in some cases strategic, objectives their political leaders believe must be achieved in order to accomplish the mission. EBAO, therefore, look not just at “red,” or opposing forces, but also at “green” elements (civilian and international actors and relationships) within the operational environment. What

many EBAO do not do well, however, is look at how “blue,” or friendly forces’ actions create undesired or unintended effects upon themselves across the spectrum of Alliance instruments of power, within the operational environment.<sup>iii</sup>

Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the crucial nature of creating the “effect” of rule of law in war-torn societies as a component of successful operations.<sup>iv</sup> This is not a traditional military task, nor are military forces ordinarily trained and equipped to specifically accomplish it.<sup>v</sup> This article suggests that certain existing operational headquarters’ staff processes and products associated with “use of force” and “detention” standard operating procedures (SOPs) can serve as important tools in reinforcing appropriate decision making by our military personnel in these challenging situations.

This article further suggests that consistent staff coordination that includes staff elements such as political advisors (POLADs), legal advisors (LEGADs), CJ-9, and Special Operations Component Commands (SOCCs)<sup>vi</sup> could enhance the effectiveness of these processes and products. This could provide an effective means to link operational “blue on blue” effects with the operational effects

sought in the “red” and “green” components of the operational environment, particularly with effects that may be difficult to achieve or even to measure, like establishing the rule of law.

## II. EVOLUTION OF HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS IN OPERATIONS

Before discussing how rules of engagement (ROE) and detention SOPs could be useful in helping to ensure the observance of humanitarian considerations during military operations, it is important to first identify, in general terms, the conditions under which they are applicable, and how these conditions came about.

Historically, the humanitarian considerations relevant to military operations were found in the customary law of war. Beginning with the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1868, which proscribed the use of certain calibres of explosive munitions, the customary, or non-treaty, law of war has been complemented, and perhaps surpassed in certain respects, by the international agreements that make up the bulk of what has become known as the law of armed conflict. The law of armed conflict is also known as “international humanitarian law.”



Today, there is a high degree of consensus among the nations of the world as to the substance of the law of armed conflict, as shown by the great number of nations who are party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, for example, and the use of this body of law by the UN in its operations.<sup>vii</sup>

A separate branch of law, human rights law, first really developed after World War II. Important examples of human rights law include the Genocide Convention of 1948 and the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950. In contrast to the law of armed conflict, human rights law traditionally governed a nation's treatment of its own citizens within its own borders.<sup>viii</sup> As human rights law has developed, however, it has begun to overlap with the law of armed conflict in certain areas. This blending has been promoted not just by policy decisions of governments whose forces are involved in international operations, but by national court decisions as well. For example, a court in the United Kingdom has held that the European Convention on Human Rights is applicable outside the United Kingdom in areas of operations where its military forces exercise a certain degree of control and jurisdiction.<sup>ix</sup> Further, a case has been recently argued before the European Court of Human Rights in which a Kosovar challenged the legality of his prior detention by KFOR.<sup>x</sup> The applicant, Mr. Saramati, had been arrested by order of the KFOR commander, and ordered detained because his involvement with armed groups constituted a threat to KFOR troops and the local population. Although the case has not yet been decided, it shows the increasing role played by human rights law in military operations, and the importance of seeking ways to ensure that humanitarian considerations are proactively addressed in the planning, execution, and assessment of operations.

### III. ROE SOPs

For many, the ROE document is the one most familiar to them when dealing with the use of force. Less familiar, however, may be the processes used to generate the ROE, and the processes and prod-

ucts, which implement and modify the ROE. One such staff product is an ROE SOP. An ROE SOP can list and describe other staff processes and products that are related to the use of ROE, and therefore can serve as both a checklist and a reference for a staff to ensure that it has included these things in its ordinary course of business, or "battle rhythm."

An example of one of these processes is an ROE board or cell. An ROE board is a multidisciplinary working group that includes representatives from different staff sections like CJ3 and CJ5, special staff like POLADs and LEGADs, and perhaps even from different functional groups like Joint Fires Working Groups or Joint Effects Boards. The board determines whether the current ROE are appropriate, and recommends any necessary changes in the ROE to the command. An important factor to consider in the conduct of the board is the kind of information that it considers in making its recommendations. For example, it may not be sufficient to rely solely on written reports submitted through the chain of command. To understand more fully how the ROE are actually understood and implemented at the soldier level, it may be better to also interview chains of command and soldiers who were actually involved in ROE events (to the extent that their national command chains are comfortable with this process). Such interviews might not result in changes to the ROE, but might instead result in recommendations to the CJ7 with regard to training ROE.

Headquarters may conduct many different boards that are involved in the execution of missions according to the ROE, such as targeting boards or working groups. Depending upon the actual staff processes used, however, these important groups may not specifically focus on whether the current ROE are appropriate, or whether they are appropriately understood throughout the command. Instead, they may focus only on whether the existing ROE are being properly applied during the targeting process.

In an EBAO, kinetic and non-kinetic targeting processes may be embodied in the work of a "Joint Effects Cell," which

helps the CJ3 plan and coordinate targeting actions between military and non-military actors.<sup>xi</sup> As noted above, the holism of this approach is no guarantee that these targeting bodies are actually assessing the effectiveness and appropriateness of the current ROE. This is likewise true of "Assessment Working Groups" or cells. These are emerging mechanisms that utilize "Measures of Effectiveness" ("Are we doing the right things?") and "Measures of Performance" ("Are we doing things right?") to gauge the effectiveness and appropriateness of blue force actions. Assessment working groups provide the crucial feedback required to make an EBAO work in an operation, but they are more focused on blue actions on red and green actors and relationships rather than blue on blue.

Training personnel effectively on ROE can be challenging and resource intensive before a deployment commences. It can become even more challenging to train personnel once an operation begins, particularly if operational conditions restrict mobility, impact security, or do not allow the development of a robust training infrastructure.

For example, many units will go through a mission rehearsal exercise in the field before a deployment. Today, situational training exercises in which personnel are confronted by role-players in various scenarios are commonly used to provide realistic training and thereby develop soldiers' judgement and problem-solving skills.<sup>xii</sup> In an austere or dangerous operational environment it may not be possible to replicate this kind of training to familiarize soldiers with changes in the ROE. A well-planned program of instruction at the operational headquarters level that takes these factors into account, and is also flexible enough to take national caveats concerning the use of force into account, could promote the observance of humanitarian considerations in an operation. Current NATO doctrine recognizes the value of such training.<sup>xiii</sup>

Part of a program of instruction for training soldiers on ROE changes could include the creation, production, and distribution of so-called "soldier's cards." These pocket cards are often used to



synthesize the important ROE and other instructions by commanders.<sup>xiv</sup> If personnel used them to train on ROE prior to deployment, there may be a benefit in using them for in-theatre refresher training as well. Importantly, personnel may have saved the cards they used in training, and consult them during the deployment. It may be necessary, therefore, to physically replace the old cards with new cards reflecting ROE changes. Finally, such cards and other training aids should be the result of a coordinated effort across staff sections to ensure that they are accurate, user-friendly, nested within an overall training program, and able to be tailored to address each nation's use of force caveats, if any.

#### IV. DETENTION SOPs

Detention operations confront soldiers with situations involving the potential use of force as well as issues concerning the deprivation of liberty. It is therefore important when training a staff and when reviewing staff processes and products to be mindful of the linkages between ROE and detention. As with ROE, a detention SOP can promote the observance of the applicable humanitarian considerations in an operation<sup>xv</sup>, and serve as a link to an EBAO focused on red and green actors and relationships. In the current operational environment, the opposing forces of non-state actors are often difficult to distinguish from civilians, and questions of status, proper treatment, and processing of detainees may be complex. A detention SOP, perhaps buttressed by a detention SOP working group, is likely to be useful regardless of what kind of conflict within which the detention is occurring.

The first important feature of a detention SOP to consider is whether it sets out guidelines and timelines within which the detaining authority's decision to detain an individual is reviewed by a higher authority.<sup>xvi</sup> This helps ensure that a person is not being improperly held, and provides clear planning and milestone times that can be tracked by a staff as a detainee's case proceeds.

The current ISAF Headquarters' detention SOP, for example, requires that



▲ *US Army Sgt Kelley, one of the medical personnel helping with the medical treatment of a prisoner at the Detention Facility Hospital at Abu Ghraib prison, Iraq, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, 5 April 2004. (Photo by SFC Johan von Boers, US A, [www.dod.mil](http://www.dod.mil))*

a higher level commander approve any request to detain an individual for more than 96 hours.<sup>xvii</sup> There are external bodies interested in visibility over detention operations as well. A detention SOP may need to specifically describe the role and duties of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Under interna-

tional law and practice, the ICRC visits detainees across the world to review the conditions of their detention and assist detaining authorities in complying with the applicable legal standards through confidential assessments provided to those authorities.<sup>xviii</sup> ISAF, for example, has entered into an exchange of letters





► *How best can a training team, particularly one working with commanders and staff elements of a headquarters using EBAO, incorporate these features into a training program?*

with the ICRC that sets out the procedures for ICRC visits to detainees in ISAF detention facilities.<sup>xix</sup>

The abuses of the detainees at Abu Ghraib showed the necessity for the next feature to be considered in working with a detention SOP – whether there is a clear and responsible chain of command.<sup>xx</sup> Uncertainty as to who is responsible for the treatment of detainees, and therefore who is responsible for the conditions of detention, potentially puts soldiers conducting detention operations in a very difficult spot.<sup>xxi</sup> Further, this sort of confusion is not likely to benefit the detainees. The ISAF Headquarters' detention SOP sets out clear provisions delineating who in the chain of command is responsible for what and to whom. These provisions, coupled with timelines and reporting requirements, promote staff awareness of detainee issues within the area of operations.<sup>xxii</sup>

The minimum standards governing the actual detention of individuals should also be set out in a detention SOP. In a multinational operation with detention operations conducted by different nations, these standards should be linked to the detailed national procedures covering the day-to-day routine of detention. These standards should address both the administrative routine of a detention operation or facility as well as the expected life support standards for detainees. Routine in any detention

facility is very important because routine promotes safety and control<sup>xxiii</sup>, and accountability through registration of individuals and documentation of their time in detention.<sup>xxiv</sup> Life support standards help clarify the resources required for support of detention operations, such as medical care<sup>xxv</sup> and ablution facilities, and can also provide a systemic way to ensure that cultural and religious sensitivities of detainees are being properly taken into account.<sup>xxvi</sup>

Training requirements for those taking and guarding detainees can also be an important feature of detention SOPs, especially since available doctrine may only discuss procedures for accomplishing these tasks, but not necessarily go deeper into the level of training required to comply with the procedures.<sup>xxvii</sup>

A degree of command and staff visibility over this kind of training would likely ensure that only properly trained personnel conduct detention operations, and that the headquarters understands the resource requirements generated by the need for this training. As Abu Ghraib showed, just having soldiers with an appropriate military background may not be sufficient -- retraining may be necessary to increase their technical proficiency and understanding of the applicable standards.<sup>xxviii</sup> Further, this training could help identify national caveats that could impact these sorts of operations.

For example, the French Gendarmerie

is well trained for law enforcement operations in France and abroad, and has been involved prominently in a large number of multinational operations. Under French law, however, gendarmes are not allowed to conduct prisoner of war detention operations.<sup>xxix</sup>

Observer/Trainers should also look to see whether a headquarters' detention SOP sets out interrogation responsibilities and standards. One of the problems at Abu Ghraib appears to be that sometimes unidentified interrogators were given unsupervised and unregulated access to detainees for questioning,<sup>xxx</sup> which worked in part to undermine the authority of the chain of command. Further, guards were sometimes enlisted into assisting in interrogations.<sup>xxxi</sup> Blurring the roles of jailor and interrogator may change the relationship between the guard and the detainee in a very negative way by making the guards less objective in their treatment of those in their custody. Further, this sort of activity might be beyond the scope of the ordinary training of a military policeman.

## V. CONCLUSION

Given the often limited time available in which to conduct staff training for multinational exercises and operations, it may be very difficult for a training team to portray and exercise a battle rhythm that includes meetings like a ROE board, or a detention SOP working group. How best can a training team, particularly one working with commanders and staff elements of a headquarters using EBAO, incorporate these features into a training program? Any solution to this question will of course need to be modelled to fit each training exercise and training audience, but there are general steps that a training team can take in each situation.

First, the training team must assess whether the headquarters to be trained is using EBAO, and if so, pursuant to what kind of doctrine (national or multinational). The training team should also review any internal EBAO SOPs belonging to the training audience in order to gain an understanding of how the training audience plans to implement EBAO.



The training team should link their presentations to the training audience's EBAO processes during the academic or functional area preparations for the training event. If the training audience's EBAO does not include tracking "blue on blue" effects, the training team should make it a point to highlight the value of linking existing staff processes and products like ROE boards and detention SOPs to EBAO.

Second, in the operational planning phase of the exercise, if there is one, the training team could prepare nominal higher headquarters' ROE and detention SOPs, and provide them to the training audience as higher headquarter guidance. The training team then can observe whether the guidance is understood and used by the training audience in their planning, and what effect this has on the development of the operations plan. The training team can also observe to what degree the training audience achieves a multidisciplinary approach to this aspect of planning through inclusion of staff elements like the POLAD, the LEGAD, CJ-9, and the SOCC. In a mission readiness exercise, there may not be an operational planning phase, so actual SOPs may in fact be more appropriate for use.

Third, in the actual exercise itself, the training audience can be presented with ROE or detention themed events in either computer assisted virtual scenarios or vignette and syndicate discussion scenarios. The training team can then observe how well the training audience understands their own processes and products in this regard, as well as those of either a nominal or actual higher headquarters. Again, the degree to which the training audience utilizes a multidisciplinary approach in reacting to events or in discussions in syndicates can also be observed and recorded. If the training audience is using EBAO, the training team's observations should link with that methodology in the after action review. This would allow the training audience to better assess for itself whether processes and products like ROE boards and detention SOPs have value as things to be linked to its EBAO.

Determining clearly the humanitarian considerations applicable in con-

temporary military operations requires some effort, as does ensuring that they are properly implemented. Actions that could violate human rights protected by international law should be tracked, mitigated, and avoided because of the undesired and unintended effects they can create in the areas of domestic and international public opinion, media relations, and civil affairs operations – effects that could potentially cause mission failure for the Alliance. Establishing EBAO linkages between actions and effects, making tools available to commanders and staffs for tracking, mitigating, and avoiding actions that create undesired and unintended effects, and using existing tools such as ROE boards and detention SOPs, may off-set the potential requirement to create new and most likely very complicated EBAO law-oriented elements with are difficult to generate and to measure effectively. ✦

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

- i See "UK must Investigate Iraqi Civilian's Death," Guardian Unlimited, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1373400.00html> (downloaded 5 January 2007); and Paul von Zielbauer, "Army Says Improper Orders by Colonel Led to 4 Deaths," NYTimes.com, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/21/world/middleeast/21abuse.html> (downloaded 26 January 2007).
- ii NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, "Lessons Learned from NATO's Current Operations" 167 DSC 06 E, paragraph 99 (2006 Annual Session)
- iii See, e.g., Joint Warfighting Centre, U.S. Joint Forces Command, "COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK FOR AN EFFECTS BASED APPROACH TO JOINT OPERATIONS," pages III-9-10; IV-11-18 (24 February 2006) (hereinafter "COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK").
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# ETHICS OF WAR

with Henrik SYSE

By Inci Kucukaksoy,  
JWC PIO

*We continue to recommend good books for our interested readers. The book we selected is called “The Ethics of War” and it was published by Blackwell Publishing in 2006. Three authors expertly edited Ethics of War: Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse and Endre Begby. Our aim is to suggest a comprehensive overview of an important area in military culture that NATO as an organization does not ordinarily deal within training.*

*The Ethics of War, starts with a succinct preface, which sets the tone for the rest of the book and raises questions in the reader’s mind. The first paragraph reads as follows: “No doubt, some wars have been fought for the sake of justice and peace. But, regardless of idealistic aims and even occasional just outcomes, wars always cause fear, suffering, and destruction. War is that human activity which, in the words of Augustine, brings the most sorrow to our minds and makes us confess that we are indeed miserable creatures. Augustine simultaneously insisted, however, that adherence to sound moral norms – on the part of rulers as well as ordinary soldiers – can do much to lessen the worst ills of war.” According to Dr. Carl Ficarotta, Professor of Philosophy at the United States Air Force Academy, “the book is a unique collection of essays culled from every period of Western philosophy, some of which were previously unavailable in English. It should be read and re-read by any serious student of the perennial ethical problems of warfare.”*

*We had the opportunity to interview one of the co-authors of the book, Dr Henrik Syse, who is currently the Head of Corporate Governance at Norges Bank Investment Management. He is, alongside his work at Norges Bank, a Senior Researcher associated with the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO). Henrik Syse is also the author of Natural Law, Religion, and Rights (2007). As for the other two editors of the book, Dr. Gregory M. Reichberg heads PRIO’s Program on Ethics, Norms and Identities, while Endre Begby is a Fulbright Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh.*

**TS This is possibly the first book to collect seminal texts on the ethics of war in a single volume. What was your intention in assembling “The Ethics of War”?**

**HS** Both Gregory Reichberg and I have been teaching the ethics of war for several years at the University of Oslo and elsewhere. There is a rich body of literature dealing with this theme, but much of it is hard to find, and it is very scattered. So, we simply said, let’s try to make the book we need.

**TS In your view, what is just war?**

**HS** Many would say that “just war” is not a good phrase at all. A

war is always a tragic thing. Wars result in fatalities, destruction of property, splitting of families and in the spending of major resources that could be used other ways. So, can you put a positive adjective in front of the word “war”? I see that challenge; we still use it though. It is an old expression that goes back to the Roman thinkers who talked about certain wars being better or more justified than the others. Morally speaking, the term just war reminds you that using armed force should always be about rectifying wrongs, and that as such, it can be necessary and morally right. If wars are about something else, such as territorial ambitions, or pure revenge and display of power, then you are not rectifying wrongs that can be righted in no other way. That is why you need to have these criteria that the just war tradition provides. So, there are two reasons behind the strong influence of the just war tradition: The first reason is historical. The second reason is the fact that it does address in a very useful way moral problems of war that are still very much with us.

**TS How important is military ethics?**

**HS** I think it is extremely important, because the use of armed force without ethical restrictions can be so dangerous. One of my favorite passages in the book is by Augustine, a Christian theologian and philosopher who lived in the late 4<sup>th</sup> and early 5<sup>th</sup> Century. Here, he asks, “What are the evils of war?” And, you expect to hear about bloodshed, suffering and so on...But, instead, he lists vices as opposed to virtues - those things that *happen* to us. He talks about lust for domination, brutality, and how we start to lust after wrongs that can destroy human society. I think this is an important insight that goes right through the just war tradition. Armed force needs to be restricted, because otherwise we can destroy ourselves. There need to be rules. I find those thoughts as early as in Thucydides and Plato. Plato describes this perfect fictional City, which we find in the dialogue called the “Republic”. Here, he talks about how a perfect city would look. One of the most important steps in building this perfect City is to train the soldiers properly. If you do not train the soldiers correctly, if they do not realize what their moral boundaries and loyalties are, and how they should treat others, then the City will fall apart. If armed force is not directed to the common good, it can be the most destructive force of all. So, yes; military ethics is very important. In addition to that, military ethics adds to the reputation factor as well. If one’s armed forces have a reputation elsewhere in the world for being brutal and insincere, that is very destructive of their ability to be respected and to set an example.



**TS Does the idea of just war have applicability in today's operational environment?**

**HS** Obviously, not everything in the tradition is directly applicable today. Many of the key texts were written centuries ago. However, although we have to take the distance in time seriously, I still believe that they have a lot of relevance for us. I think this has been proven by the fact that since the Vietnam War, the just war perspective has come back and played a crucial role in the debate about the use of armed force. It is important to read these texts also, because they are free of some of those issues that are more typical of the modern era. If you look at the problems we are addressing today in war, they have little to do with nation states or territorial entities. Instead, they have to do with terrorist organizations, insurgents, guerillas, and so on. And, most of the just war framework was not dependent on the nation states either. The just war tradition actually goes back to an era prior to the nation states. Many of the writers, philosophers and theologians covered in *Ethics of War* lived in a time when nation states were not important or did not exist in our sense of the term. These thinkers are closer to us than we actually think they are.

**TS How does just war fit into the use of force under the United Nations Charter?**

**HS** Broadly speaking, I think there is an overlap between what the UN Charter says and what the just war tradition says, but there are also some differences. One of the things that the UN Charter presumes, in its Article 51, is that self-defence is the main reason going to war. I think the just war tradition sees justified use of armed force somewhat more broadly than the UN Charter does. It also, for example, justifies the use of armed force to help a third party. In this case, although you have not been attacked, you can still be right when you are defending a third party. Having said that, especially in the 1990s, we have seen the UN increasingly moving to accept humanitarian interventions, thereby, moving the UN system closer to the just war tradition. There is also an opening in Article 42 for military operations mandated by the Security Council. But this is not restricted, at least not in theory, and it is hence quite broad. It says that the Security Council may take action to maintain or restore international peace and security. Here, the just war tradition is very useful to specify that and narrow it down.

**TS You raise the question whether "blunt military force is a suitable tool in service of humanitarian ideals" (page 685). Does the concept of humanitarian intervention compete with or complement international peace and security?**

**HS** It is a huge question whether or not military force is a suitable tool for achieving peaceful goals, basically because one is doing harm as one performs the action. Take the Kosovo War as the archetypal example of that, where we basically said, "We have come to restore peace and to safeguard human rights". However, what people on the ground often saw was destruction through the air bombardments. So, the question is, can blunt military force be a suitable tool for peace? I think in some cases, we have no choice. If you actually have the power to intervene, and you can do so in a way that will most likely result in a basic



**Henrik Syse**  
Head of Corporate Governance at  
Norges Bank Investment Management

safeguarding of human values and human lives, and creation of a more peaceful situation afterwards, then we should do so. I think the concept of humanitarian intervention complements the idea of international peace and security. In some cases, we do have a duty to intervene, but we must always be aware of the fact that it is extremely difficult to achieve the results that we should achieve. And, it is hard to guarantee success. I think, in January 1994, we should have been willing to enter Rwanda to defend the Tutsis, at the cost lives to us, and at the cost of engaging in a military battle. I also think that the idea behind the Somalia intervention in December 1992 was right, although it has been judged in posterity not to have gone well.

**TS Who has the moral responsibility to protect people at risk with massive humanitarian disasters?**

**HS** The national governments have the main responsibility to do their best to protect their citizens and those who live within their borders. But, in some cases, this does not work. We talk about "failed states", because you do not really have any monopoly of power in such countries. In such cases, responsibility evolves in two directions: First, it evolves within the local community, so each local community or family, or each Church or Mosque that the local community looks to, will have to attempt to stand up not to participate in the violence and to end it. The other direction comes from the international community, of which NATO is a part. We have not seen the last of Rwanda or Congo, I am afraid, but, hopefully, we will see less often that the international community just sits and watches.

**TS Should NATO take the lead in formulating a doctrine on humanitarian intervention?**

**HS** I think NATO is already taking part in that. It did so in 1999, with its Strategic Concept during the Kosovo War. So, the answer is yes; NATO should take an important part in formulating a dynamic doctrine in humanitarian intervention.

**TS What is your opinion about NATO's role in the Balkans after completion of the status talks on Kosovo?**

**HS** Obviously, there are still a lot of questions to be resolved.



NATO has played an important and constructive role, and much of the progress that has been made in the Balkans would not have been possible without NATO. I think, in the long run, the European Union will be the main integrator of this region into the European political sphere, where many of the local tensions will eventually have to be resolved. Until now, the situation has been to a large extent a military situation albeit with significant civilian infrastructure building. But gradually and hopefully, the military portion decreases in importance. We must, however, still be prepared to take action to defend civilians in the Balkans, because there are still tense situations that have not been resolved.

**TS As you said, NATO was fundamental in restoring peace and security in the Balkans, and it is now making a major contribution to the fight against international terrorism, following the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, and later in Indonesia, Madrid and London. In your book, American philosopher Michael Walzer (b.1935) describes terror as the totalitarian form of war and politics, which shatters the war convention and the political code. What is the moral response to terrorism?**

**HS** We need to take a moral stand against terrorism, but I do not think that just saying “we have to fight evil” will get us much further in formulating a moral response. I think the moral response must be two tiered. It is, first, pointing out what sort of evil we are fighting against, but, secondly, it is about building that fragile thing called a coalition. That is part of the moral response to terrorism. Having said that, in some cases, the moral response to terrorism consists in the use of military force. The military attacks on Afghan territory in the fall of 2001 seem to me quite justified.

**TS What are your expectations of NATO?**

**HS** At the end of the Cold War, a lot of people asked whether we needed NATO anymore, because NATO was very much built up as a response to Soviet Communism. But I think NATO has proven itself to be durable, and it still has a role to play, not least in crisis management, as a coordinator of armed force. NATO is also making sure that the armed forces of different countries are united for a common purpose, which is an important thing. And, I think if NATO manages to continue its work with Partnership for Peace countries in general, and Russia in particular, that will be an important part, also. But, does NATO have the same role as it did during the Cold War? The answer is, no. NATO today is a different sort of organization. When it comes to the ethics of war, my hope for NATO is that, it will be a driving force to integrate high morale ideals into all its standing forces and in its overall policies, and it will insist on moral legitimacy in its structures and policies.

**TS What main challenges lie ahead for NATO?**

**HS** Afghanistan is the main challenge right now. But it is obviously linked with Iraq. And, even though Iraq is a different military operation, without full NATO involvement, it influences on NATO, not least since there are deep divisions within the organization over Iraq. Finding a way of co-operating meaningfully towards a stable future for this whole region, including Afghanistan and Iraq, is a huge task that NATO must contribute to. I also think crisis capability is a challenge. Take Rwanda as an

example. Everyone now agrees that we should have intervened in Rwanda. Let us assume that NATO had intervened, and a thousand NATO soldiers were killed in battle. Maybe, they would have managed to stop the genocide, but, not before 100,000 Tutsis were killed as well. Do you think everyone would say that NATO stopped the genocide? Probably not. Because, we would not have known that this was actually a success! Maybe some political scientists would have pointed out that this was a success, because NATO had stopped something that could get much worse. I mean, if you look at Somalia, it was considered to be a failure. And, that was believed to be so after approximately 18 soldiers were killed in the battle. Of course, it was a tragedy what happened there, and it developed into a terribly difficult situation, tactically and strategically. But, would we have had the tenacity to carry the other mission through? It seems easy on paper to save civilians, preserve humanitarian ideals, human dignity, and so on, but it is not easy in practice. That is also one of the main challenges for NATO: To make sure that the soldiers of the Alliance are so well trained, the moral fiber of the whole organization is so good, and the military planning is so well thought through that it can actually manage to carry out its missions. But of course this is a challenge for the political leadership of the NATO countries, just as much as for NATO as such.

**TS General Henault, Chairman of NATO Military Committee, said that, “Ethical decision-making keeps an organization strong and healthy. For our soldiers, sailors and air personnel, ethical responsibility is not a choice, it is an obligation.” How do you think ethics should be implemented in military training?**

**HS** I absolutely agree with what he says. You need to have consistent attention to ethical training. And ethical training in military organizations overlaps with legal training. Secondly, this training has to be realistic; it has to be close to life. I think our military forces need to develop further a kind of training that is realistic as regards what will happen when the soldiers are in-theatre. Preparation is crucial. Major Bård Mæland, former Chaplain and Instructor of the Norwegian Military Academy, and Chief Editor of Journal of Military Ethics, has done interesting work on this. He has written about how soldiers who go in-theatre with high ideals can get a shock when they end up in the chaotic and strange world of the actual operations. Much of the time it may be boring, and when they try to help people, they may feel that, the people whom they are trying to help are not that grateful after all. For some, things then seem to fall apart. Soldiers cannot speak the local language; locals steal from the soldiers; and then after a few months, soldiers can get cynical, and negativity starts to creep in. Also, there are the tragedies of war: rape, arson, looting - all sorts of crimes, injuries and death. Suddenly, these tragedies become a real, tangible thing. Alcohol sometimes has a huge part in it, as well. But, you can prepare your soldiers. It is possible to be more alert. Military organizations must not be afraid of talking on these things. Not until we learn to speak about these problems can we be the soldiers and officers we want to be. All of those with leadership responsibilities must realize that this is what defines us, not only as soldiers or officers, but also as human beings. ✨

# "PEACEGAMING"

## WARGAMING FOR PEACE

## SUPPORT OPERATIONS

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**Author's Note:** This is the second in a series of two articles. It should be read in conjunction with the first article, "Wargaming: Evolution and Application", which appeared in the 11 December 2006 edition of The Three Swords.

### INTRODUCTION

The 11 December 2006 issue of The Three Swords contained an article entitled "Wargaming: Evolution and Application." That article was later the subject of a presentation given in Naples during Steadfast Jackpot, Phase I. Inevitably, one person asked how non-military dimensions (political, social, and economic) could be incorporated into traditional wargaming. This can and is being achieved to a limited extent through a process that will be referred to as peacegaming.

NATO's traditional focus on war-fighting has expanded to include responses to a wide range of Peace Support Operations (PSOs). Some of the crisis response operations that may warrant NATO intervention include natural disasters, non-combatant

evacuation (NEO) and humanitarian operations. NATO intervention may be necessary along the spectrum of peace support operations from conflict prevention through peace enforcement to peace building.

*In fact, the greatest and most visible change in NATO's activities since the end of the Cold War is its involvement in ending conflict, restoring peace and building stability in crisis regions. Indeed, the Alliance is currently involved in a variety of capacities in complex, peace-support operations on three continents: in the former Yugoslavia in Europe; in Afghanistan and Iraq in Asia; and in Darfur, Sudan, in Africa.*<sup>1</sup>

With new challenges comes the need to review current operational planning processes. This article will examine the similarities and differences between wargaming and peacegaming.

It will offer new terminology, concepts and tools in order to adapt traditional wargaming processes to the spectrum of peacekeeping operations.

### TERMINOLOGY

Peacekeeping is not an approved NATO term, nor is it widely used to describe wargaming for PSOs. It is, however, a succinct

term to distinguish between traditional wargames and those for PSOs. The Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution has adopted and defined the term as follows:

*Peacegaming – a program designed to help civilian and military actors determine appropriate actions to foster peace and stability in pre-conflict, conflict, or transitional environments.*<sup>2</sup>

Whatever terminology is employed, operational planners need to fully understand the specific requirements of planning and wargaming for PSOs.


### SIMILARITIES

Many aspects of traditional wargaming do apply in PSOs. For example, formal peacegaming should take place at the same times in the operational planning process – prior to Course of Action (COA) selection and again following COA selection to permit further COA refinement. As well, the basic conduct of the peacegame follows the action, reaction, counter-action cycle of a traditional wargame. Finally, the same room layout, level of preparation and supporting documents and maps are needed. A peacegame, then, is simply a

Figure I. Potential NATO PSOs



## NATO Peace Support Operations Spectrum



traditional wargame whose focus is broadened to consider the additional demands of a PSO environment.

### DIFFERENCES

The PSO environment places additional demands on operational planning staffs to consider non-kinetic factors in the context of a comprehensive approach to planning. The consequences for the peacegame are changes to the complexity, the participants, and the results. Peacegames are inherently more complex than wargames as they consider far more than military, kinetic effects. A peacegame must consider all dimensions of a comprehensive approach including political, economic and social concerns. For example, a complete political assessment of the operation must be developed in the planning process and referred to as the peacegame develops. Such an assessment was provided during a recent NRF exercise where the POLAD provided the following evaluation to the Commander:

**The need for a Comprehensive Approach:** *The scenario teems with requirements to consult broadly. A UN Special Representative of the Secretary General is on the ground, and will be in charge of the civil and political engagement between the UN and the affected states. NATO will need to incorporate the existence and role of the UNSRSG into its planning, and work to achieve a reasonable division of labour between political negotiations and military diplomacy. The UNSCR directs that the UNSG establish mechanisms for coordination between UN Forces and NATO. It is thus likely that these will be decided on by the UNSRSG in theatre. In addition, expect the International Committee of the Red Cross, NGOs, UNHCR, etc to be on the ground and desiring to engage*

*with the NRF leadership. The Deployable Joint Task Force POLAD will have a very important role, as will those of the Component Commands, in developing an effective Diplomatic Campaign Plan.*<sup>3</sup>

This excellent analysis is one example of the level of detailed assessment needed from the non-kinetic players who will be participating in a peacegame. In planning their exit strategy from Haiti in 1996, United States Forces in Haiti (USFORHAITI) correctly identified the need to consider 'other' factors. Without qualified experts available, however, "the need to identify and seek political information requirements, severely taxed all those working in the [planning] cell." Planners realized that *although the final evaluation criteria were sound, we could have developed them more quickly and efficiently had we had information on how to define, request, recognize, and respond to relevant political information, not merely as we developed the plans to support the exit strategy, but throughout the operation.*<sup>4</sup>

Such is the nature of PSOs – their complexity demands a broader focus and in-

Peacegaming is not revolutionary; it is the extension of traditional wargaming techniques to the complex environment of Peace Support Operations

clusion of political, economic and social factors.

In terms of peacegame participants, blue team composition is increased and more importance is placed on contributors such as legal, political, and civil-military advisers. These individuals must be integrated in the planning process and be deeply involved in Mission Analysis and COA development. In addition, the red and blue teams are joined by non-military actors such as representatives from International Organizations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and local governments. These additional participants are incorporated in the planning process and attend the peacegame. At the end of each turn, the coordinator should allow time for these representatives to offer their evaluation of the impact of that turn on their area of responsibility.

### Similarities and Differences




Figure III. Comparison of Peacegame vs Wargame



For example, in wargaming an NRF Initial Entry Operation into a theatre experiencing a humanitarian crisis, the blue team might explain the entry operation and the red team might respond with an increase in violence in refugee camps. At the end of the turn, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) representative might explain the impact of these actions on the camps and agencies operating in the area. Potential outcomes include increased mortality in the camps or pull-out of targeted IOs/NGOs. This information is considered by the coordinator and referee in the final evaluation of the turn as described below.

the Commander is trying to achieve and must be measurable in some way. They may be Decisive Points, effects, criteria for success, or any other criteria selected by the Commander as being of importance to the mission. They should incorporate military, political, economic and social domains. Arrows can be used to illustrate whether the action-reaction-counteraction at each turn has resulted in an improvement or degradation in each area of measurement.

In the example shown, the humanitarian situation is an important consideration. Although initially neutral, the situation worsens when blue forces arrive in theatre. It is not until Turn 4 that there is a recognized

instrumental in capturing usable information and contributing to the Commander's decision-making process.

**CONCLUSION**

Peacegaming is not revolutionary; it is the extension of traditional wargaming techniques to the complex environment of PSOs. As such it requires some adaptation of participants and techniques. Including legal, political and civil-military actors in all aspects of the planning process is certainly the first step. Next, inviting non-military actors from the political, economic and social domains to participate is essential. All of these representatives must be given the opportunity to provide input to Mission Analysis and COA development and attend and actively contribute to the peacegame. Finally, planners must be creative in developing mechanisms to capture and use the results of a peacegame. It is essential that evaluation tools consider more than the military implications of a COA. Political, economic and social impacts must also be measured as these factors may be equally or more important than military factors in planning for PSOs. These important changes to traditional wargaming practices will result in better and more relevant results for PSOs. ✨

### Evaluation Matrix

	up to Gday Start	G to G+30 Turn 1	G+30to60 Turn 2	G+60-65 Turn 3	G+66to90 Turn 4
Secure HA situation	→	↘	↓	→	↑
Embargo success	↓	→	→	↗	↑
Police operate independantly	↓	↓	→	→	↑
Triangle stable	→	↓	↘	→	↑
Borders secure	→	↓	↓	→	↑
Terrorist incidents controlled	→	↓	↘	→	→

↑ Positive

→ Neutral or no change

↓ Negative

Figure IV. Evaluating a Peacegame

One of the biggest challenges of peace-gaming is capturing and evaluating the results. In a standard wargame, Operation Analysis may be able to provide concrete measures of success (i.e. distances moved, casualty rates, objectives achieved). In peacegaming, it is often difficult to understand who is winning or losing, so it may be necessary for the peacegame participants to develop measures of success on their own, relying on the expertise of military and non-military participants. The matrix shown above is an example of a tool that can be used to capture and evaluate the results of a peacegame.

The criteria in green must be carefully selected. They should reflect the objectives

improvement in the situation.

This matrix is **NOT** a scorecard to justify COA selection during the initial peacegame. It is simply a way of maintaining situational awareness on how blue forces are progressing towards attainment of their mission in a complex environment. The information gathered and recorded in the matrix should be used after the initial peacegame to refine COAs, and later to compare COAs during the Decision Brief. This does not replace the requirement for a Synchronization Matrix which will be specifically designed to include sections for non-military actors. Evaluation is a significant challenge during a peacegame but tools such as these matrices can be in-

<sup>1</sup> NATO Briefing: Building peace and stability in crisis regions, September 2005.

<sup>2</sup>Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Internet: www.guidestar.org

<sup>3</sup>Professor James H. Bergeron, Political Advisor, Striking Force NATO, email 14 March 2007.

<sup>4</sup>Kevin C.M. Benson and Christopher B. Thrash, "Declaring Victory: Exit Strategies for Peace Operations," Parameters, Autumn 1996, p.73.

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Major Jørgen Ellingsen



Johannes Egeland

# THE FORGOTTEN BEES IN SOMA

Supply Branch is responsible for the acquisition, property accountability, management and disposal of supplies for the Joint Warfare Centre

By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PIO

TUCKED away in a hidden area, which is surrounded by the hilly landscape, family-owned farms and old pine trees that are all frozen in winter, is a compound of buildings that form the Soma Camp. In a number of different buildings, Soma Camp houses JWC's Transportation Branch and Supply Branch, as well as five warehouses and a special depot for the storage of NCSA's CIS equipment. Also, Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization (NDLO) has its own Transportation unit and a maintenance workshop.

"When I came out here for the first time, I found it quite isolated," Major Ellingsen, Chief Supply Branch says. "In my mind came the saying about 'the place that God forgot, the devil abandoned, and NATO settled'. Well, it is a joke of course, because Soma Camp is not that remote and there are also some advantages with this location. The

landscape and surroundings are beautiful and there are no ongoing blasting operations for instance. Also, we are seeking ways to make it more appealing for the people working here and have together with Transportation Branch and NDLO recently started the work to look at opportunities to reestablish the former pump and circumstance of Soma Camp."

Supply Branch is responsible for the overall management, administration and control of all property within the JWC. The Branch

also provides the policy and guidance relating to internal logistics.


"In addition to making sure household expenses are in order, Supply Branch receives, accounts for, distributes, orders and issues all equipment and supplies for the Joint Warfare Centre. My staff are the busy bees that makes this happen and they work in three different Sections: Property Accounting, Stock Management and Warehouse. As a team we stand by to support any tasks we might be assigned to, including support for exercises and events," Major Ellingsen says. Soma Camp is also the turn-in point for all unserviceable items that can be repaired at the depot and then returned into the supply pipeline.

### Challenges

Major Ellingsen gives us a sincere glimpse into Supply Branch and the dedication and professionalism of the staff that run it.

**DID YOU KNOW?**  
**In 2006**  
Total value of items accountable exceeded **135 Million NOK**





CW2 James Maina


Currently, he is responsible for managing 11 employees within five different categories of personnel. These include three NATO military staff, one NATO civilian, three Local Wage Rate Norwegian civilians, three Voluntary National Contribution Norwegian civilians and one conscript.

“I am impressed with the work done by my staff. With tough work schedules, we have worked hard to make up for vital positions that for quite some time have been unmanned. To get these seats filled has been my main challenge until now,” he states, adding, “Our job is challenging and requires competent staff for effective execution. There are for example, new concepts being introduced, such as International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) that will have a significant impact on how we operate. These standards will hopefully improve financial management and accountability, which will again contribute to better decision-making. We need to keep abreast with such developments; therefore, I clearly see the need to prioritize the continued education and training of my staff. It is particularly important to get our new staff up to speed so we can become fully operational and functional in our support to JWC operations.”

Supply Branch directly supports JWC’s Ulsnes Training Facility during exercises by operating a stationary store on demand and by acquiring critical supplies throughout the events. The key to success from a logistics perspective is planning ahead. The Supply team needs advanced notification in order to offer good solutions for the customer.

So, if they are in such high demand, why do they feel they are “forgotten”?


Major Ellingsen smiles and says: “Our work most of the time is invisible, we work behind the scenes, especially during the exercises and training events. It is also evident that bad



Bjørn Kolberg

support is much more visible than good support. When things move smoothly, nobody will complain. So, when we are forgotten that is actually an indication that we are performing well. Supply or die! This motto may sound childish, but to me it is really the essence for Supply Branch - if we are not able to supply and support then, there is no need for us.”

The low speed connectivity on the computer networks between Soma and Jättå, are one of the difficulties that sometimes make work a challenge. This problem also directly affects the flow of information to personnel at Soma. “We need to fix computer problems here. We need to improve the ease of use and speed of NATO networks; especially the secret network, which is unreliable and often



Camilla Grønås

unstable when the weather changes. The connection at times is so bad that there are instances where two people cannot use their computers at the same time,” he adds.

### Achievements

One major accomplishment of the Supply Branch in 2007 was the closing of Norwegian Property Accounts and transfer of all Norwegian Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) items to NDLO for accounting. This process required extensive coordination with NJHQ, NDLO, NATO CIS Services Agency (NCSA) and SMC4 Division, and was finalized on 17 January 2007, when Major General Sundseth, Chief of Staff, NJHQ, signed the papers to agree responsibility for the items previously



Gert Poulsen (left) and Henrikus Hopmans

accounted by NATO. About 11,000 items with a value of more than 65 Million NOK were transferred which required more than 56,000 transactions to be processed. The Property Accounting Section and the NDSS system administrator really demonstrated excellent coordination and teamwork in this process.

Supply's Warehouse Section recently demonstrated both great effectiveness and efficiency when they cleared an old warehouse and transferred equipment to the new warehouse, which is closer to Supply's main building. This move has freed up indoor parking spaces for Transportation Branch's vehicles and at the same time made work a lot safer and comfortable for the staff as the new warehouse is in a better condition for storage and maintenance.

Another accomplishment is a dream come true for Major Ellingsen. On 21 February 2007, the first sports facility at Soma Camp was opened with a well-attended ribbon cutting ceremony, presided over by Air Marshal Walker, Director JWC, as well as the landlord from NDLO. Particularly the conscript drivers at Soma welcomed the sports room with praise, for them this is a good opportunity to do something else than watching TV when they are not driving.

"I am very excited about new sports opportunities at Soma Camp," Major Ellingsen says. "The new sports room was inaccessible before, filled with unserviceable items. When we cleaned it up, we saw that it was twice the size of the sports room at Jättå. Thanks to Marita Ims, the sports officer in Jättå, we were provided with all redundant sports equipment from Officers Mess at Sola as well as Ulsnes gym. Also, Engineering and Maintenance Branch provided us with a brand new linoleum flooring and promised to assist with more improvements to the room. The sports

room is also the result of great teamwork with NDLO and Norwegian Defence Estate Agency and I thank all who supported us to make this happen."

Former Iraqi Key Leader coordinator Major Ellingsen has served at the Joint Warfare Centre since the start, and has been working for NATO in Stavanger for more than four years. "This assignment is quite different from my previous assignment in Joint Training Development Division. I enjoy what I do right now and I am motivated by the new challenges as well as the interaction with the very professional staff I have to support me." Father of a four-month-old son and two daughters, Major Ellingsen says one of the positive sides with his new job is the ability to spend more time with his family. ✦

### ★ OPENING OF SOMA CAMP SPORTS ROOM



"The room is 100 square meter, about twice the size of Jättå. Even if some of the equipment is not brand new; most of it works and will certainly improve individual fitness and maintain the good team spirit at Soma Camp," Major Ellingsen says.

**SUPPLY OR DIE!**






## HINTS ON ENGLISH PRONUNCIATION

I take it you already know  
 Of tough and bough and cough and dough,  
 Other may stumble, but not you,  
 On hiccough, thorough, laugh and through,  
 Well done, and now you wish, perhaps,  
 to learn of less familiar traps?  
 Beware of heard, a dreadful word  
 That looks like beard and sounds like bird,  
 And dead: it's said like bed not bead  
 for goodness sake don't call it 'deed'!  
 Watch out for meat and great and threat  
 (They rhyme with suite and straight and debt.)  
 A moth is not a moth in mother.  
 Nor both in bother, broth in brother,  
 And here is not a match for there  
 Not dear and fear for bear and pear.  
 And then there's dose and rose and lose –  
 Just look them up – and goose and choose,  
 And cork and work and card and ward,  
 And font and front, and word and sword,

And do and go, and thwart and cart –  
 Come, come, I've hardly made a start.  
 A dreadful language? Man alive,  
 I'd mastered it when I was five!  
 I will teach you in my verse  
 Words like corps, corks, horse and worse.  
 For this phonetic labyrinth  
 Gives monkey, donkey; ninth and plinth;  
 Wounded, grounded, grieve and sieve;  
 Friend and fiend, alive and live.  
 Query does not rhyme with very.  
 Nor does fury sounds like bury.  
 Dies and diet; Lord and word;  
 Evil, devil; tomb, bomb and comb;  
 Doll, roll; dull, bull; some and home.  
 Finally – for I've surely said enough –  
 Through, though, thorough, plough, cough,  
 though,  
 While hiccough has the sound of cup.  
 My advice is : GIVE IT UP!

London Sunday Times  
 3 January 1965

Contribution : WO Katy Birge-Wilson, FRA A



Marita Ims

# CAPEX 07



CAX Planners Exercise (CAPEX 07) was conducted in Ulsnes between 15-19 January 2007 with 81 participants. Among these, 22 were from the JWC, five from the JFTC, 15 from the NC3A and 38 from the other NATO organizations and Nations. On the first day of CAPEX, briefings about CAX processes and CAX tools were given. After syndicate work on the second day, a two-day mini-CAX was conducted. During the mini-CAX, participants rotated among JEC, PTA, Response Cells and SitFor Cells, and gained insight about the overall CAX structure. CAPEX 07 was concluded with the briefings about the future capabilities in Allied Command Transformation. (Text by Dr Erdal Cayirci, CAX Chief; Photos by Lt Col Dieter Stoll, SMC4, JWC)



# The 2006 Military Member of the Year Ceremony

## Recognising ACT's Top Junior Enlisted

By Chief Petty Officer Derek Evangelista, USA N,  
JALLC InfoSec Manager

**T**HE Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre had the honour of hosting the 2006 Allied Command Transformation (ACT) Military Member of the Year (MMOY) Ceremony from 12-16 February 2007 at our home in Lisbon, Portugal. This ceremony is an annual opportunity for senior enlisted members to recognize one of their junior NCOs for their hard work and dedication to duty in support of their command.

This year's ceremony had representatives from six different ACT commands: SACT Norfolk, SACT Staff Element Europe at SHAPE, NATO School Oberammergau, JALLC, JWC and JFTC. Each command's selectee was accompanied by their Senior Non-Commissioned Officer or Senior Enlisted Advisor. Together, these Senior Enlisted Advisors made up the selection board that was to judge each candidate and determine the winner. While only one candidate would be chosen as the MMOY, simply being selected is just as high an honour. The candidates were selected by the senior NCOs (OR-7 and above) of their home command based upon their personal and professional achievements, command and community involvement, leadership skills, off-duty involvement, professional appearance and physical readiness. Each command had to find the most well-rounded soldier, sailor or airman to represent them in the ceremony.

This year's Candidates were: Joint Force Training Center, Staff Sergeant Dariusz Sikorski (Polish Army); NATO School, Staff Sergeant Marko Pogorevc (Slovenian Army); Joint Warfare Centre, Petty Officer Amanda Tremble (Royal Navy); Joint Anal-



Candidates and Senior Advisors assembled at JALLC

ysis Lessons Learned Center, First Sergeant José Oliveria (Portuguese Army); SACT SEE, Petty Officer Terry Cerami (United States Navy) and ACT Petty Officer Aishia Williams (United States Navy).

The MMOY Ceremony lasted for four days. It kicked off on Monday with an evening social at the hotel once everyone had gotten settled in after their flights Lisbon. This was the first time all the Senior Enlisted and candidates got to meet one another. After some opening words from Sergeant Major Eduardo Marques PRT F, the host and Senior Enlisted Advisor at JALLC, followed by refreshments and a light supper, it was time for everyone to get down to business. A long day of travel and final preparations for the next day meant everyone turned in pretty early.

Next morning, everyone met at the

JALLC auditorium, candidates and seniors dressed in their national military service dress uniform, and awaited the official commencement of the 2006 MMOY Ceremony. The Director of JALLC, Brigadier General Mehmet Çetin TUR A, began by greeting each candidate individually, then proceeded to give them some words of wisdom. After the Director's introduction, it was time for the candidates to begin the first task in the competition: their presentations. Each candidate was tasked to give a fifteen-minute presentation on their individual command, how their command fits into ACT and to describe its role in current events within NATO. Most of the candidates would agree that was the toughest part. But despite the public speaking jitters, after all was said and done, every candidate gave a top-notch





The candidates from left: JFTC, Staff Sergeant Sikorski; JALLC, First Sergeant Oliveria; ACT, Petty Officer Williams; NATO School, Staff Sergeant Pogorevc; JWC, Petty Officer Tremble; SACT SEE, Petty Officer Cerami

presentation, proving to the board members that selecting a winner was not going to be an easy task.

Completing all the presentations took us to the end of day one, and there was much more in store for the next day. Wednesday began with the second task in this competition: the interview with the senior board members. Each senior advisor had the opportunity to ask one question of each candidate relating to NATO current events, structure, or policies. Their answers were graded on their knowledge of the topic and how they presented themselves in answering. Once the interviews were finished, everyone took a short recess for a special lunch hosted by Director JALLC at the Portuguese Air Force Senior Officer's Mess. The lunch was a perfect way for the candidates to relax after the interviews and enjoy some delicious Portuguese cuisine provided by the outstanding chefs and wait staff at the dining facility. After lunch the candidates retired to their hotels to get some rest, while the senior advisors went back to JALLC to deliberate on whom to select as the 2006 MMOY. A difficult decision was made, but with the announcement still a couple days away, there was time for everyone to relax and enjoy the sights and culture of beautiful Lisbon. Thursday was dedicated to Portuguese culture, and what better way to experience that culture than a trip to Azetão for a visit to the José Maria de Fonseca winery. There everyone was treated to a tour of the grounds and a chance to sample wine from one of Portugal's oldest and most famous wineries. After a nice lunch

everyone headed to the historic, riverside suburb of Belém for an exclusive tour of the Naval Museum. The trip finished off the best way possible, with coffee and cakes at Lisbon's best-known pastry shop, Pastéis de Belém, famous for its cream pastries, one of Portugal's most delicious treats. The day was a great way to show our guests from all over world the beauty and diversity of Portugal, from its food to its history.

Friday morning everyone arrived at the JALLC with much anticipation. Someone was going to be named the 2006 Military Member of the year for ACT. Candidates and selection board members gathered

in the auditorium, joined by the Director and the entire JALLC staff. The Director opened up the award ceremony by reiterating that while there is only one MMOY, each candidate had demonstrated their dedication to their Nations and to NATO and that each one should be proud of their accomplishments. With the candidates at attention, the Selection Board President, Senior Chief Petty Officer Wilberto Acre, USA N, from HQ SACT, announced the winner: Staff Sergeant Marko Pogorevc from the NATO School in Oberammergau.

After applause and congratulations from everyone in attendance, the ceremony was officially over and an hour later it was time to say good-bye, as everyone headed to the airport for their flights home. It was a wonderful week for all involved, making new friends and being a part of something so special. This ceremony allows these great junior soldiers, sailors, and airmen to be recognized for their outstanding accomplishments and dedication to NATO and is a great way to thank them for their service. As a final note, special thanks must also go to Master Sergeant Andreas Koppers from the JALLC registry and his staff, Petty Officer Pedro Soares, JALLC Photographer, Petty Officer Chantelle Feagins, SACT Administrative Assistant, and Sergeant Major Marques for all their hard work in putting the whole ceremony together. ✦

Director JALLC, BGen Cetin, TUR A, presents Military Member of the Year award to Staff Sergeant Pogorevc, Slovenian Army, from the NATO School



## *Kruse Smith Entreprenør AS wins milestone contract for work at Jåttå*



Contractor Kruse Smith Entreprenør AS has been selected to erect the main structure of the building designed to house JWC's office and training facility at Jåttå. The contract, which is the major separate part in the project, was signed on 6 February 2007, between the client, Forsvarsbygg Utvikling and Kruse Smith Entreprenør. With a total value of 127 MNOK, the contract was awarded competitively following an open tender procedure. It means that Kruse Smith Entreprenør AS will provide all concrete work for the building, to include roofing, windows and exterior doors (weather-tight building envelope). Completion of the entire building is anticipated by mid-2009, at a total cost of about 500 MNOK.

Site preparation, to include excavating and earthmoving work, is currently ongoing for the lot to be cleared. Concrete work began on the site in March. Per Egil Steen, project manager at Forsvarsbygg Utvikling, comments: "This is a complex and challenging project, and we shall certainly be very pleased to commence construction work. In Stavanger, we have a highly committed and competent project organization, which will provide solutions for this exciting project in liaison with the users and our consultants."

### **NEW BUILDING FACTS**

The five-storey new facility designed by Telje-Torp-Aasen Architects is sited next to the existing office building and will provide 13,400 square meters of space. The roof ridge height will be the same as that of the existing office building, with surfaces and colours to match those of the latter. NATO's office and training facility will train NATO staff both inside and outside Norway, effectively blending classroom and computer-based learning.

## **JWC Outstanding Contributions of 1<sup>st</sup> quarter**

Lt Col James Clark, GBR A and WO Christoph de Coster, BEL A.



### **New Composition of JWC Civilian Staff Association Committee**

The following members were elected or re-elected at the CSA AGM on 20 March 2007:

#### **Chairperson:**

Ms Bente Heill Kleven, NOR,  
CG PIO Linguistic Office, ext. 2171

#### **Vice Chairperson (\*) :**

Mr Uwe Sprenger, GER  
SMC4 CIS Support Branch, ext. 2633

#### **Secretary (\*) :**

Mr Mario Oliveira, PRT  
CDD, CDE, ext. 2564

#### **Treasurer:**

Mr Knut Rørvik, NOR  
NCSA CIS Squadron, ext. 2732

(\*) New Member



## ISS MIDDLE SCHOOL THEATER PRESENTATION 2007 "Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory"

What a great show! The International School Stavanger Middle School presented outstanding performances playing "Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory" from 15-17 March 2007. The students were very well prepared by the highly motivated ISS staff, and they played their given characters with lots of fun, but in a very professional manner. Colourful "Oompa Loompa" dances and "Brazzle Dazzle Day" songs made the auditorium look like being dipped in "Hot Chocolate". Lots of proud NATO JWC parents came to see their kids performing on stage during this superb three-day event. To ISS staff and students: Well done! And, thanks a lot for the fantastic trip to a world of pure imagination, and a truly scrumptious dream. Pictures of the show may be downloaded from ISS Middle School website at [www.isstavanger.no](http://www.isstavanger.no). (Text and picture by Lt Col Dieter Stoll, DEU AF)



## 2007 FASHION SHOW

For the fourth year in succession, the NATO Thrift Shop and International Women's Club joined forces to present a *Fashion and Action Show* in the Community Centre. Joint International Women's Club presented second-hand outfits on stage in order to address the shopping fever of the female-only audience. The event was a lot of fun with music and snacks. The proceeds of this event will go to a chosen local charity: This is actually the third time that donations will be forwarded to the *Stavanger Crisis Centre for Women*. To assist such events, please come along to the Thrift Shop, located at the Gausel Magazine near the Library on any Thursday, between 10.30 and 14.30 hrs, and do not forget to bring your unwanted goods! We will offer them on your behalf. (Text and photo by Lt Col Dieter Stoll)



## JWC/NJHQ Staff Skied in Sunshine!

Once a year, JWC/NJHQ staff and their families come together during a ski day! This year's all day event was sponsored by NDLO Rogaland on March 21. The huge ski resort at Tjorholmfjellet had slopes for every skill level, from beginner to advanced. The pictures of the ski day were provided by Lt Col Charlie Malschaert, NLD F, who believes that a day in the mountains on his snowboard, while the sun beamed through, was worth to celebrate for. "This is the very best snow to board on!" he said.




## JWC/NJHQ Get New Vehicles

On February 21, during a ceremony at Soma Camp, JWC Chief Transportation Branch, Maj Danielsen, NOR A, announced that JWC and NJHQ received two new vehicles for the fleet, which costed around 870,000 Norwegian Krone, provided by the JWC funds. "I am very pleased that we were able to receive these long awaited vehicles. They will further enhance our capacity to deliver improved transportation," Maj Danielsen said.





JOINT WARFARE CENTRE



*Air Marshal Walker, Director JWC, hands over the keys of the two new minivans to the Transportation Branch during a ceremony at Soma Camp, 21 February 2007.*