



NATO  
+  
OTAN

# THE THREE SWORDS


STAVANGER - NORWAY

The Magazine of the Joint Warfare Centre

10 October 2007 - Issue No: 10



**Changes of Command**  
**JWC & JALLC**



**EBAO and NATO**  
**Operational Claims**



**Force Protection**  
**in Afghanistan**



*NATO Centre of Excellence for*

## **COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS**

*The art of surviving and fighting in the Arctic*



Cover \_Jättå's National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) to provide cold weather training to all 26 NATO nations. Photo shows Norwegian soldiers at the winter exercise Battle Griffin 05. Photo by T. Kjosvold, Forsvarets Media Senter.  
EBAO and Operational Claims photo by Sgt. James Richardson, U.S. Marine Corps.



## Editorial

One of the hottest topics these days in NATO is the transition from Public Information to Public Affairs, at least for the PA personnel. Since our last policy, which was approved in June 2001, NATO's operational environment has drastically changed. NATO's new military policy on Public Affairs fits into this new environment and reiterates that military PA activities are part of the operational planning process at all NATO headquarters. Simply put, PA is increasing importance. We will have more articles about this transition in our December issue.

The article topics in "The Three Swords" magazine, the latest issue of which you are browsing at this very moment, range from hottest developments in NATO to the classical music concerts in Stavanger for 2007-2008 season. We hope that this wide range of topics covered really does make this magazine for everyone. One can only ask for more pages – we have already received half of the articles that will be published in our December issue!

Thank you for keeping "The Three Swords" alive!

This issue is our Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations-special, which is accompanied by some amazing pictures taken by "Forsvarets Media Senter" (Norwegian Armed Forces Media Centre). Norwegian National Headquarters in Stavanger has just been fully accredited as NATO's Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather operations and we wanted to share their joy and pride, hence we made this our cover story. We are also very proud to include the first interview with Brigadier General Jørgen Hansen-Nord, Danish Army, as the new Director of Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre. In addition, we received genius photography from the "Norwegian Trekking Association" together with useful hiking ideas for our adventurous readers. We hope you enjoy this issue as much as we have enjoyed putting it together.

Inci Kucukaksoy  
Joint Warfare Centre Public Affairs Office



Joint Warfare Centre hosted this year's first "JJJ" meeting on 20 September, which was a resounding success. "JJJ" represents the three fundamental pillars of NATO's training, namely, the Joint Warfare Centre; the Joint Force Training Centre and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre. From left: Major General Rokos, DNK A, Director JFTC; Lieutenant General Korte, DEU A, Director JWC; Brigadier General Hansen-Nord, Director JALLC and Brigadier General Ruhlman, US AF, COS JWC.

Director's Foreword	Page 3
Remarks from Brigadier General Ruhlman	Page 4
EBAO and NATO Operational Claims	Page 5
Joint Warfare Centre Change of Command	Page 10
NATO Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations	Page 13
Psychological Operations	Page 18
Force Protection in Afghanistan	Page 21
CWID 2007 and JWC's role	Page 25
Joint Urban Operations	Page 27
Teambuilding (Part II)	Page 30
JALLC Change of Command	Page 33
Interview: New JALLC Director	Page 34
JWC Sports Day	Page 38
Oktoberfest	Page 39
Hiking in Stavanger	Page 40
2007-2008 Music Review in Stavanger	Page 42

**PUBLISH AN ARTICLE IN THE THREE SWORDS!**  
We are always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you have got something to say, send it to us. We will be happy to consider it for publication. Email your articles, as well as your comments and feedback to JWC CG PAO Common (CRONOS) or [inci.kucukaksoy@jwc.nato.int](mailto:inci.kucukaksoy@jwc.nato.int).

## The Three Swords

### JWC PAO:

Cdr (SG) H. Langeland, NOR N  
Inci Kucukaksoy, NATO Civilian  
SMstSgt Juergen Eise, DEU F  
Bente H. Kleven, NATO Civilian (Linguist)

### Production and Layout:

Inci Kucukaksoy

### Contribution:

Tsgt Eric Krubsack, USA F, SMC4

The Three Swords is the authorized unofficial publication produced by the JWC Public Affairs Office. It represents a compilation of articles, reports, news and general information related to JWC personnel and their families. The articles and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy of NATO. The Editor reserves the right to edit or shorten submissions.

### Thanks:

Sergeant Andreas Henriksen,  
NOR A, CDD, JWC

### Back Cover photo by:

SMstSgt Eise, DEU F  
JWC PAO



PUBLISHED QUARTERLY



## Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte German Army Director, Joint Warfare Centre

After having passed the first busy and rainy summer in Norway, which was dominated by visits and preparatory work for our upcoming events, I am glad to see that those of you who had been on leave with their families returned safely and eager to tackle the last busy quarter of this year. I am quite satisfied with my first quarter in office, hence we not only successfully established contact with local dignitaries and community, but we also continued and intensified our good relationships with SHAPE and the Joint (Forces) Commands, including the Operational Preparation Directorate. The same time we already conducted a very successful first meeting of the “JJJ” (Joint Warfare Centre and its subordinate Joint Force Training Centre and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre). This first meeting provided the basis for an improved mutual understanding, support and co-operation as well as a better co-ordination of the three Centres to the benefit of our customers. My intention is to conduct those meetings on a regular basis twice a year.

The days will now rapidly become shorter and shorter, the weather will turn even rougher and we all may have built up some stocks; it is the right time to gear up for the upcoming months that will offer very challenging, but interesting exercises and events. As a warm up JWC Battlefield Tour Exercise “Narvik Explorer” in mid October will take us to the exceedingly interesting area of Narvik to walk the ground and be guided by our own staff and guest speakers. Next to teambuilding, it will provide a great chance to further develop our skills and knowledge by studying military history and the implications of sound or failed planning. That Battlefield Tour will be combined with an offsite with the Norwegian Joint Headquarters in order to plan further co-operation and mutual support. As I write those lines, we are just in the intensive last weeks of preparations for the third ISAF Training event this year taking place beginning of November. This event concurs with Regional Command South training conducted by the JFTC. The two events will encompass more than 800 personnel as Training Audience and Exercise Control, all of which will need to be fed, transported and be taken care of. With only a 14 day gap used for all the cleaning up, preparation and CIS configuration we will go into the NRF certification exercise STEADFAST JAW with Naples beginning of December. This exercise will see the Training Audience spread all over Europe with the Exercise Control being located in Ulsnes here in Stavanger. In this Exercise we will take agreed OCE-responsibilities for the first time. I am sure that this trial will provide insight and



better understanding on how we will share responsibilities for the planning and conduct of future exercises.

On top of it and right in front of us is the Iraqi Key Leader Training, which is aimed at promoting the understanding of NATO, command and control of joint operations, inter agency co-ordination and other issues among senior military and civilian leaders. With over a hundred Iraqi Key Leaders trained so far and having adapted the syllabus to the needs of the Training Audience again, I see with satisfaction that 30 personnel were registered by the Iraqi government, showing trust and appreciation of our work. However we will need to continuously validate the training needs in order to deliver what really is

required. In addition to the upcoming events mentioned above, we are already in the middle of the planning for exercise STEADFAST JOIST with JFC Brunsum in spring 2008, and STEADFAST JUNCTURE right after that with Joint Command Lisbon.

To sum it up, the time to come will be a quite busy one, but offering finally contentment about the achievements for the respective audiences and for us not least. Even if it thus requires parallel execution and preparation at the same time, with all of your engagement and motivation being needed, I encourage especially the old hands of you to assist and support the newcomers in order for them to adjust the pace. You are the ones to transport and share your knowledge not only for the benefit of our customers, but for the benefit of our JWC, and I already thank you for transferring your skills in order to finally keep our good and recognized work at the same high level.

Last not least, I would like to take this time to thank you all for your attendance at Oktoberfest, which is dear to my heart, because it provided the chance for all of us to get to know those we did not know before and spend a relaxed evening together. In addition, the Family Welcome Barbecue, Family Cruise and Sports Day provided good opportunities to meet away from regular business schedules and to build our team and I have to express my gratitude to those who worked hard behind the scenes setting up these events and finally driving them to success.

As we approach the end of the year with a high pace please don't miss your Christmas preparations and make sure you have the presents on hand in time. I sincerely hope you enjoy reading the present edition of The Three Swords Magazine, ranging in topics from Afghanistan, Norway to Portugal, enhanced by the interesting and important teambuilding topic and offering anew information about social and cultural life in Stavanger, which you may enjoy and appreciate.



# Brigadier General Philip M. Ruhlman

## U.S. Air Force

### Chief of Staff, Joint Warfare Centre

The Fall of 2007 promises to be a most rewarding time for NATO and the Joint Warfare Centre. We are presently at “full afterburner” in the simultaneous planning of six major exercises, three of which will occur in the next three months. The ISAF Composite Staff Element (CSE) exercise will be conducted at Ulsnes in early November and sequentially overlap with the Joint Force Training Centre’s (JFTC) conduct of its Regional Command South exercise. These two exercises will be one of the largest NATO CAX exercises ever conducted in the same location, with over 700 members of both Training Audience and Exercise Control staff located in Stavanger. Both exercises are critical in the real-world preparation of the NATO staff and forces who will conduct operations in Afghanistan in 2008.

A mere two weeks after the combined ISAF exercises, the JWC will continue preparing Joint Force Command Naples (JFC Naples) command and component staff for NRF 10 certification via exercise STEADFAST JAW. Building on their success in STEADFAST JACKPOT, JFC Naples is taking it a step further by planning to execute NATO’s first-ever Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF) to Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) transition. Their planning and execution will represent the foundation for future NRF missions of this type – quite a feat when NATO has never executed such a plan in prior history, much less in simulation. From the looks of their preparation, JFC Naples is well on their way to success.

While part of the JWC works toward these Fall exercises, other members of the JWC are working aspects of STEADFAST JOIST for JFC Brunssum, STEADFAST JUNCTURE for JC Lisbon, and STEADFAST JOINER for JFC Naples. One note about JOINER: it is planned to be the first-ever NRF exercise to employ CAX technology in a distributed environment under the umbrella of the newly conceptualized NATO Training



Federation/SNOW LEOPARD.

As if that is not enough, the JWC will continue to conduct Iraqi Key Leader training, with its seventh iteration this Fall. The course continues to be in high demand and has grown tremendously since its inception years ago.


One might think that all the exercises would be enough to keep the JWC busy – but we don’t live on exercises alone. The JWC is at the leading edge of implementing ACT’s concept development and experimentation flight plan. Using ACT strategic guidance, the Capability Development Division (CDD) team at JWC plans and conducts directed experiments to enhance NATO capability. At the same

time, CDD integrates new and innovative concepts from the strategic command. Finally, the CDD staff plays a crucial role in the NATO doctrinal process, the Lesson Learned process, and the rapid development process of JOGs for immediate distribution to the NATO warfighter. Their team is constantly busy.

Add to all this an Offsite with our partners in the JFTC, Joint Analysis Lessons Learned (JALLC); an Offsite with the National Norwegian Joint Headquarters; a Headquarters Staff Ride to Narvik, and all the planning STEADFAST and ISAF conferences in between, and well, the JWC calendar is full. Last time I checked, I had virtually no white space at all!

So, with the hustle and bustle of an intense program, I ask all the members of the JWC to try not let the stress of our mission overwhelm you. Take time to step back, take a breath, count to ten, and relax. Take care of yourself and do not burn out. You would be amazed how successful you can be if you give yourself time to recharge, even for a few minutes, during the busy day.

Above all – keep your calm, keep your composure, keep your sense of humor and smile. Smile, because you are good at what you do – and you are doing work that is important. Your nation, the Joint Warfare Centre, and NATO are proud of you.



# EBAO and NATO Operational Claims

«NATO SHOULD CONSIDER BUILDING A BETTER OPERATIONAL CLAIMS SYSTEM»

By Colonel Jody Prescott, USA A,  
HQ SACT Deputy Legal Advisor (Forward)

**A**LTHOUGH the work to develop a NATO-wide application of the concept of Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) continues, the lack of an approved doctrine or of a fully-supported suite of software is not stopping the practical application of EBAO related methods or training within the Alliance. Various NATO headquarters units, like the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), are using some variation of EBAO in their staff work and operations. Other units, like the CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE) in the Netherlands, have appreciated that EBAO is not just about enhancing staff performance, but about working with people in a theatre of operations as well. Through its contributions to training individuals and units preparing to deploy to Afghanistan in how to work with local populations, CCOE, for example, is helping ISAF accomplish the effects it is seeking to achieve among the

Afghan population.

The inevitable friction that occurs between a local civilian population and a deployed foreign military force, regardless of how well-intentioned and welcome that force might be, may lead to unintended consequences that negatively affect mission accomplishment. For example, ordinary traffic accidents that result from routine military patrolling and transit between various sites and installations in Afghanistan often occur. These accidents are of course regrettable, and even if ISAF forces are not at fault, they cause property damage and injuries among people ISAF is trying to win to its side. Individually these accidents rarely have immediate, strategic consequences, but many occurring over time can cause a local population to begin obstructing military efforts. The potential for the loss of support among Afghan civilians has become magnified because insurgent forces in Afghanistan rarely

have qualms about positioning themselves among Afghan civilians to conduct attacks against NATO forces. As a result, Afghans have incurred property damage, injury and death in the resulting combat. Among those who have suffered these losses, continued support for the Government of Afghanistan and ISAF cannot be taken for granted. It is in circumstances like these that a coherent and responsive operational claims program can be an effective part of an EBAO. Payments for various kinds of losses are being made in Afghanistan, and are having a positive effect on public opinion in many instances. This article suggests that as NATO continues its efforts to develop EBAO, and it creates new tools to help it make this concept operational, one of the things it should consider is building

---

Above: Soldier filling out a claims form during a claims payment visit to Hit, Iraq. U.S. DoD photo by Sgt James Richardson, USMC.



a better operational claims system. To help explain why this should be a priority for NATO, this article will first briefly review the history and the impact of NATO operational claims. On this basis, it will then propose steps to be taken to create a more effective NATO operational claims program.

### I. NATO OPERATIONAL CLAIMS

#### a. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia

Perhaps because of Bosnia-Herzegovina's and Croatia's unhappy experiences with the UN claims system during the existence of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), NATO's first significant out-of-area operation found itself working under a complicated and untried system involving host-nation participation in claims settlement and appeals. Under the Claims Annexes to the Technical Arrangements that implemented the Dayton Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the "receiving states," were to have the primary responsibility for collecting claims against the Implementation Force (IFOR) and its Troop-Contributing Nations (TCNs). There was no waiver of claims between the governments of the receiving states and IFOR, but combat related damages were excluded. Claims Commissions were to resolve disagreements between these receiving state agencies and the IFOR forces regarding claims. These commissions would be made up of two IFOR representatives and two receiving state representatives, all of whom were to be legally qualified. If the parties still disagreed after the commission decision, then the

claim could be referred to an Arbitration Tribunal composed of three members, whose decision was final and binding. If IFOR or a TCN did not comply with a payment order, then the claim would be sent to NATO Headquarters in Brussels for disposition. Appendices to the Claims Annexes were then negotiated to try to make the system more functional. These appendices required that Claims Commission decisions be unanimous, and claimants themselves were allowed to appeal to the Arbitration Tribunal rather than just the receiving state representatives. Finally, it was recognized that it was impractical to expect Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia to process claims against IFOR and the TCNs, so separate agreements between the receiving states and IFOR made the TCNs primarily responsible for collecting, investigating, and adjudicating claims.

When the TCNs and the claimants could not agree on settlement, the newly established IFOR Claims Offices in Sarajevo and Zagreb would seek to mediate the cases. Only when mediation was unsuccessful would cases then go to the Claims Commission. The IFOR Claims Offices became operational in March 1996, and assumed five main roles. First, they processed claims against the IFOR headquarters itself. Second, they served as points of contact between the TCNs and claimants. Third, they were to conduct the Claims Commission and Arbitral Tribunal hearings. Fourth, they maintained a central database of claims statistics throughout the theater. Finally, and very importantly, they provided claims guidance and suggestions to the TCN claims offices on the avoidance, the processing and the settlement of claims.

There were a number of challenges to conducting operations under this claims regime in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Several NATO TCNs quickly identified that being required to pay claims under the Technical Arrangements was not possible under their respective domestic fiscal laws. This led to the adoption of various informal and practical measures, like ensuring that when a claimant brought a TCN before a Claims Commission or an Arbitration Tri-

bunal, at least one of the members of the hearing body was appointed by the TCN. Since unanimity was required in these procedures, a TCN would always be presented with a decision with which it agreed. Damages to receiving state roads were another significant, high-level issue. IFOR forces, particularly U.S. forces, extensively used theater roads to bring in troops, equipment and supplies. Road authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia each filed claims for millions of U.S. dollars for damages to their roads. Eventually, it was decided that these claims should be transferred to the (by this time) Stabilization Force (SFOR), and denied as being the "unavoidable results of conducting the operation," similar to combat damages. Other issues included determining the law to be applied to claims, especially when local law was required; determining standards for compensation; having to deal with the lack of ownership documentation for damaged property; the need for effective translators, and different interpretations of the language in the agreements regarding claims by various TCNs. Finally, many TCNs either had no claims program or saw no reason why they should be paying claims on this sort of operation.

Under the current claims procedures, the role of the now European Union Force (EUFOR)/NATO Headquarters Sarajevo claims offices remains essentially the same as it was under IFOR. They still support the Claims Commission and Arbitration Tribunal processes and hearings, and in the event the responsible TCN cannot be found to settle a meritorious claim, the claims offices may settle the claim using EU or NATO funds. Helpfully, the procedures set out the responsibilities of TCN claims offices, and set out in detail the tasks of the headquarters claims offices. One task which is new since the first IFOR claims offices is the assertion of affirmative claims on behalf of the headquarters against those who damage its property. The procedures provide a detailed and clear description of the claims process, which serves not only as a model to TCNs on how to process their claims, but also provides transparency to the claimant. The procedures note two kinds of claims that are specifically non-cognizable: those arising from "Combat and Combat Related



Photo by KFOR HQ



Activities” and from acts of “Operational Necessity.” “Combat and Combat Related Activities” include those things that involve protection of the force, such as firing weapons and maneuvering in combat, the movement of military vehicles, and the occupancy of real estate. The concept of “Operational Necessity” excludes “claims for damages that may arise as a direct and foreseeable consequence of lawful detention of persons, riot control activities, and force protection activities (...) conducted in furtherance of the mandates.” Importantly for purposes of this article, the procedures note that there may be situations in which TCNs are able and choose to make an **ex gratia** or **solatium** payment on claims barred for these reasons, but that in such cases the settlements are not subject to the claims appeals process.

Two cases from Bosnia highlight how such provisions work in an operational setting. In the first case, a man indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) filed a claim against a TCN for damages caused to his house during his arrest by the TCN’s troops in December 1997, an arrest which he resisted with rifle fire. Both the man and a soldier were wounded during the exchange. The SFOR Legal Advisor opined that the claim was without merit. First, an investigation by the TCN contingent showed that the soldiers had acted properly within their rules of engagement (ROE). Second, the mission in which they implemented their ROE was lawful, pursuant to the ICTY indictment. Third, the man knew or should have known that he was indicted, and that he had no right to resist arrest. He therefore assumed the risk of damages to his property when he chose to fire upon the arresting soldiers. In the second case, villagers filed claims against SFOR for property damages caused by SFOR troops in March 2002 while searching their village for another individual indicted by the ICTY. Although their claims were rejected as arising from combat or combat related activities, the SFOR commander authorized **ex gratia** payments to correct “perceived wrongs” and to help the villagers repair their village.

The NATO claims operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia are beginning to draw to a close after almost 12 years.

During this time, they have received approximately 13,200 claims. Many were denied or settled in other fashions, but for those claims settled with cash payments, the total for all the contingents is approximately €11,700,000 out of approximately €75,000,000 claimed. They provide excellent case studies of just how complex and expensive it can be to conduct a large-scale, long-term military operation seeking to bring stability and the rule of law to a war-torn area, in part through the payment of meritorious claims resulting from its mere presence in peacekeeping operations.

### b. Kosovo

Under the June 1999 Military Technical Agreement between the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that discontinued hostilities between the opposing forces and allowed the entry of KFOR into Kosovo, KFOR forces were not liable “for any damages to private or public property that they may cause in the course of duties related to the implementation of this Agreement.” This caused some political awkwardness, since the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) intended to pay claims, and the situation was no longer really a combat operation. Certain contingents chose not to pay claims at this point. Eventually, the problem was resolved by a UNMIK/KFOR joint declaration that included the commitment for both international entities to “establish procedures in order to address any third party claims for property loss or damage and personal injury caused by them or any of their personnel.” The UNMIK regulation, which implemented the joint declaration in August 2000 provided that both UNMIK and KFOR would set up their own claims commissions to settle third party claims. Claims resulting from “operational necessity” were barred, but importantly for claimants, the regulation was made effective retroactively to 10 June 1999.

Although some KFOR contingents had already begun paying claims, the first KFOR Claims Office in Kosovo did not begin operations until 2001. At that time, it already had a backlog of about 100 claims. Although it was on a smaller scale, the KFOR claims operation was similar in many respects to the claims operations

in IFOR/SFOR, and it dealt with similar challenges, such as the difficulty of establishing property ownership in a formerly communist country, and in establishing reliable valuations for goods and services in a war-torn economy. Preventative claims measures proved very successful, however, in easing the way for the conduct of exercises and the building of roads on land that the affected Kosovars now considered to be private property. Coordinating with local civilians and municipalities in advance, letting them know how their claims would be settled, and then paying in cash made a very positive impression on people who had become accustomed to having the government do as it liked with little or no compensation.

Some KFOR units were based in countries that were already NATO members, like Greece, or which had signed the PfP SOFA, like Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The claims provisions of Article VIII, NATO SOFA, applied in these countries, which meant that the host nation, or “receiving state,” was responsible for collecting, investigating, and adjudicating claims, and then billing the responsible TCN, or “sending state,” for 75% of the costs of the claims. The North Atlantic Council granted a waiver of this provision to Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, so claims in these countries were processed in a fashion similar to that in SFOR at the time. For example, by August 1999, the NATO Claims Office in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had already settled about 120 claims of the approximately 300 it had already received during the KFOR operation.

Under the current KFOR claims procedure, the tasks of the HQ KFOR Claims Office are very similar to those of the NHQ Sarajevo Claims Offices. The HQ KFOR Claims Office serves as the primary “point of contact for all claims against KFOR generally.” Claims against HQ KFOR are handled there, and claims against TCNs are forwarded to them to be handled under their own respective national procedures. TCNs are encouraged to use the HQ KFOR procedure as model if they do not have one of their own. The HQ KFOR claims officer is responsible for maintaining oversight of all claims in Kosovo, and to report



to the HQ KFOR LEGAD on their status. The claims officer is also the fund manager for the HQ KFOR claims account, and in this role coordinates closely with the HQ KFOR J8. When the specific TCN at fault for an otherwise meritorious claim cannot be identified, the claims officer will seek guidance from JFC Naples whether payment should be made from the HQ KFOR claims account. Finally, the claims officer is responsible for convening the Kosovo Claims Appeals Commission when necessary. In the event a claimant is dissatisfied with a claims decision, and it is against either HQ KFOR or a TCN, which voluntarily participates in the Kosovo Claims Appeals Commission process, he can appeal a decision to the commission. The commission will be composed of three judicial officers, one appointed by the force against whom the claim lies, and two appointed by the HQ KFOR LEGAD, or if authorized, the HQ KFOR claims officer. The decisions of the commission must be unanimous, but they are not binding. If the TCN does not participate in the commission process, the HQ KFOR claims office may still play a non-binding advisory role in disputes about claims. Although only three TCNs and HQ KFOR currently participate in the Claims Appeal Commission process, on the whole the program has been successful. In the eight years since the beginning of the operation, the total number of claims filed in Kosovo is now slightly over 900, and claims settlements have paid out approximately €250,000.

### c. Afghanistan

Under the Military Technical Agreement between Afghanistan and NATO, ISAF is not legally liable for “any damages to civilian or government property caused by any activity in pursuit of the ISAF mission.” Claims resulting from property damaged or injuries incurred outside the scope of the mission, however, were to be submitted to the Afghan Transitional Authority, which would forward them to ISAF for disposition. At least as early as ISAF IV (August 2003), however, the ISAF commander made a policy decision that for force protection reasons ISAF would compensate for mission-related damages where it was at fault, or where the TCN, which caused the damage, could not be identified. The

command recognized that the payment of otherwise proper claims supported ISAF efforts to help restore the rule of law in Afghanistan. Ordinarily, TCNs would handle their own claims, and although not legally obligated to pay mission-related claims, could decide to settle them on an *ex gratia* basis. The ISAF Legal Advisors Office drafted a claims policy based in part on the SFOR and KFOR policies, and provided guidance and reviewed cases and documentation for TCNs upon request.

Although the draft policy was not formally approved at this point, it was staffed with SHAPE and it served as a working document for successive ISAF rotations. The current policy reflects in certain respects the evolution of the ISAF mission over successive ISAF headquarters rotations. It sets out the responsibilities and processes of the ISAF HQ Claims Office, which include assisting TCNs with claims when requested, forwarding claims to TCNs, maintaining claims files and databases, investigating and adjudicating claims against the ISAF HQ, and serving as the fund manager of the ISAF HQ claims fund. Each TCN is required to appoint a claims representative, and routine coordination takes place between TCNs and the ISAF HQ Claims Office. One practical benefit of this coordination, and the TCNs being encouraged to provide claims forms to those who may have suffered damages, was quickly seen in the area of traffic accidents. After accidents, potential claimants who were given such forms tended to go back to their business, whereas those who received no forms tended to follow ISAF vehicles back to their compounds.

Claimants are not required to submit their claims through Government of Afghanistan officials because of the austere conditions, and in cases where the responsible TCN cannot be identified, the ISAF HQ Claims Office will pay the claims if they are meritorious. Claims against the TCNs are handled under those countries' respective procedures. Claims against the ISAF HQ must ordinarily be filed within six months of the damage suffered. Claims for contractual issues, combat damage, and operational necessity are not accepted. The ISAF HQ claims procedures also set out a limited appeals mechanism for claimants who are dissatisfied with deci-

sions on their cases. In cases involving claims against TCNs, the ISAF HQ Claims Officer will offer a non-binding, advisory opinions on the claims if the claimants file a request for reconsideration. The TCNs are required to forward the claims files to the ISAF HQ Claims Officer when such requests are made. If a claimant is unhappy with the ISAF HQ Claims Officer's decision on a case, then the claimant may “submit a request for reconsideration to the ISAF HQ Senior Legad.” The standard applied on requests for reconsideration is whether the original decision is “clearly erroneous” or is a “manifest injustice.”

As the ISAF mission developed to encompass the entirety of Afghanistan, ISAF forces found themselves in combat situations with Taliban and other forces, a situation which probably had not been fully contemplated when the claims provisions were agreed to in the MTA - which was only intended to cover Kabul and its environs. It is one thing to deal with the claims business that results from conducting lightly armed patrols in a largely peaceful capital city - quite another to be engaged in brigade-sized combat operations against an unscrupulous and determined foe. The increased scale of the ISAF mission has led to an increase in claims, and unfortunately, an increase in the numbers of Afghan civilian casualties and property damage. These losses have become a very significant concern of both the Government of Afghanistan and NATO, and efforts are being made to find ways to both reduce the impact of combat related damage.

Realizing the negative mission impact and the inequity of being unable to reimburse innocent Afghans for the losses they suffered because of combat, certain NATO countries created and contributed to Post-Operational Humanitarian Relief Fund. Unfortunately, only a handful of countries have contributed to this account, and at the time of this writing approximately a third of the €400,000 in the fund had already been disbursed. By way of rough comparison, between 2003 and 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense reported that it had disbursed about \$1,900,000 in *solatia* payments from unit funds and more than \$29,000,000 in condolence payments under the Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERP) to Iraqi and



Afghani civilians who had suffered property damage, injury or death as a result of combat (the majority obviously paid to Iraqis). While both the NATO and U.S. military programs are complemented (and in instances overshadowed) by the efforts of other national and international aid donors in Afghanistan, they are the only ones under commanders' control. Reports from the field in Afghanistan suggest that such payments, either in cash or in kind, can be effective in relieving both the hardship and the heartache that accompanies combat damages.

#### d. Pakistan

Pakistan requested humanitarian assistance from NATO in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake it suffered on 8 October 2005. Negotiations to allow NATO forces access to Pakistan culminated in a Draft Exchange of Letters (DEOL) between Pakistan and NATO on 4 November 2005. In the DEOL, NATO personnel and foreign contractors were essentially given the status of experts-on-mission. Specifically with regard to claims, the DEOL provided that Pakistan and NATO would waive all claims against each other for unintentional death, injury, or property damage caused to their forces by the acts or omissions of the other. Claims for damages against NATO personnel and contractors by third parties, however, were not waived, and were to be "transmitted through the governmental Pakistani authorities to the designated NATO Representative."

The aid mission to Pakistan lasted three months, and concluded in January 2006. The number of third party claims against NATO appears to have been very small, and in fact, there may only have been one. The Joint Command Lisbon legal advisor drafted a claims policy for use during the operation, but it had not been approved by SHAPE prior to the end of this short-term mission. Regardless, a review of its essential features is worthwhile, because it is a significant example of a practical and expedient means to deal with claims in a mission of short duration. First, the role of the deployed headquarters regarding claims was to serve as a point of contact with the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and as a conduit to pass the claim to the TCN that was alleged to have

caused the damage. Second, the headquarters required TCNs to notify it of the final disposition of the claims, so that it could inform the MFA. Third, "in cases involving rescue, where a TCN is the rescuing party unless the TCN has caused the situation that requires rescue, the TCN should not normally pay damages as a rescuer." Finally, in the event the proper TCN could not be found, the headquarters would determine whether it would pay the claim on an *ex gratia* basis. The policy also contained a claims form, which required the claimant to provide basic information, briefly described the claims process, and provided an MFA point of contact.

## II. A PROPOSAL FOR A NATO OPERATIONAL CLAIMS PROGRAM

NATO currently has a claims policy at the strategic level, but it is very basic, and appears to represent a consensus as to the major features of past operational claims programs that were found to be generally acceptable. Importantly, however, it recognizes what is probably the most significant factor in developing any operational claims policy or program. A headquarters may impose an obligation upon itself to pay claims in a particular way, and may suggest that its process is a model – but the NATO members and other TCNs must be free to follow their own fiscal laws and regulations. With this principle in mind, the first step to creating a more effective NATO Operational Claims program should be to create a NATO Operational Claims Office, perhaps at the SHAPE level, that can take into account operational realities in a particular theater of operations. This office could serve many functions: an advocate for operational claims at the strategic level, the developer of a standard administrative program for conducting operational claims, a point of contact for operational claims information, a trainer for deploying units or individuals, a reach-back resource for deployed claims operations, a potential funds manager, and a resource for planners and a repository for operational claims information and files.

**There is no reason why a NATO headquarters should deploy without a standard operational claims program.** It would of course need to be adapted to best fit

each mission, but those adaptations could be relatively minor, and are perhaps already reflected in current NATO operational claims programs. Its core should consist of proven methods and language for conducting operational claims, such as a ready-to-use database to track claims, a filing system, and standard claims forms that could be translated into local languages. There is no shortage of models; the EUFOR/NHQ Sarajevo claims procedures and processes, for example, show that it is possible to create a mature, manageable and transparent claims program that is widely accepted – and the models are in many respects similar to each other.

Staffing claims operations in part requires legal personnel, because some claims can be settled on the basis of legal obligations. With the increasing use of funds like the Post-Operation Humanitarian Relief Fund, however, to settle meritorious, but legally barred claims, it may be useful to take a more holistic approach to manning and funding. This should probably include close coordination with CIMIC, engineer, and SOF assets both in pre-deployment training and training in theater. Relying on deployed legal advisors and paralegals to handle both legal claims and *ex gratia* and *solatia* payments like the U.S. military does in Iraq and Afghanistan is unrealistic given the ordinarily leaner legal staffing of a NATO operation.

## III. CONCLUSION

NATO's history of resolving operational claims is one of success, but not necessarily the success of pre-mission planning. Concurrent with its efforts to develop EBAO, NATO needs to consider creating new tools that reflect an understanding of effects in practice. A standing NATO Operational Claims Office and a ready-to-deploy operational claims program should be high on the list of new initiatives to be considered. To make these measures more effective, new methods of funding should be examined to provide greater flexibility to commanders in the field and their staffs in resolving the various kinds of operational claims. ✦

The article represents the official views of neither the JWC nor the U.S. Army JAGC. The full version of the article including endnotes can be found at [link.jwc.nato.int/media\\_centre/The\\_Three\\_Swords\\_magazine](http://link.jwc.nato.int/media_centre/The_Three_Swords_magazine).



Royal Norwegian Naval Music Band



General Smith, Air Marshal Walker and Lieutenant General Korte salute the colors



General Smith passes the flag of the JWC to Lt. Gen. Korte, signifying the passing of the Directorship of the JWC to him

# Joint Warfare C to Lieutenant C

Story By Inci Kucukaksoy; Photos by SMstSgt Juergen Eise, DEU F, JWC

**L**IEUTENANT General Wolfgang Korte, German Army, assumed command of the NATO's Joint Warfare Centre during a change of command ceremony, which took place on July 13, at JWC's interim training facility in Ulsnes. JWC's historical day brought together many civilian and military authorities as well as several dignitaries and media from Stavanger.

U.S. Air Force General Lance L. Smith, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, was the reviewing and presiding officer of the ceremony. During the ceremony, JWC international staff and family members also bid farewell to United Kingdom Royal Air Force Air Marshal Peter B. Walker who served as the Centre's Director for two years since taking up his post February 3, 2005.

The ceremony started with the arrival of the color guard while the assembled flags of the nations serving at the JWC



Air Marshal Walker and Lynda Walker



WO Guichard, FRAN



Guests at Ulsnes waiting for the start of the Ceremony

# Centre Changes Command General Wolfgang Korte

PAO and WO Jacek Sumislawski, POL A, Graphics Production, JWC

fluttered in the morning breeze. During the transfer of authority the JWC flag passed from Command Sergeant Major Jackie Guichard (highest ranking non-commissioned officer in the JWC) to Air Marshal Walker, to General Smith as the higher Headquarters' Commander, to Lieutenant General Korte, incoming and now Director of the JWC, and back to Guichard.

Upon completion of the transfer of command, General Smith, Air Marshal Walker and Lieutenant General Korte made speeches, respectively.

General Smith commented on how an event like this was such a bittersweet occasion, where the international staff and family gathered to say farewell to one exceptional leader, Air Marshal Walker, and welcomed another, Lieutenant General Korte. "Air Marshal Walker's leadership has been a driving force from a Cold War-postured Alliance to a more flexible and adaptable fighting force, better able to contribute to the defence of all

member nations whether it be Article 5 or the fight against terrorism," Smith said.

General Smith expressed his appreciation for JWC's tremendous impact on training. He said JWC tripled its capacity for major training exercises, and would provide three major training events per year – one for each of NATO's Allied Joint Force Command headquarters, in addition to the Mission Rehearsal Exercises for ISAF Headquarters and Regional Command South in Afghanistan. "Starting with detailed preparation, the Joint Warfare Centre has drastically accelerated exercise feedback, increasing the value of every 'lessons learned'."

General Smith highlighted that JWC was a vital strategic centre and NATO's investment was staggering.

"NATO's commitment to her premier training centre is clear: Manning is at an all time high of 88 per cent and climbing, and a 60 million Euro investment will produce a state-of-the-art fa-



Lieutenant General Korte, DEU A

## Lieutenant General Korte appointed new JWC Director

Lieutenant General Korte's some of the previous assignments include MOD Bonn as Assistant Branch Chief Personnel Management (1990 to 1992) and Branch Chief (1994 to 1996); Chief of Staff German Army Forces Command in Koblenz (1999 to 2001); Commander 14<sup>th</sup> Armoured Infantry Division (2001 to 2002), where he deployed to Headquarters Kosovo Force, Pristina, as Deputy Commander of Operations (2002 to February 2003). In 2004, he became Deputy Commander German Army Forces Command and served in this capacity as Deputy Commander ISAF V for six months. From January 2005, as Commander German Army Training and Doctrine Command, he was responsible for a wide variety of tasks including further Army concept development and the development and implementation of training concepts. Units under his command included the German Army Officer School, the NCO School, all Branch Schools and all training facilities including the Army Battle Training Centre and the Battle Simulation Centre. He became Director Joint Warfare Centre in the rank of Lieutenant General on 13 July 2007. Lieutenant General Korte is married to Rosalia and they have two daughters.





Lieutenant General Korte, Director JWC

cility in time for a ribbon cutting in 2010.”

General Smith also commended that the JWC was leading the way (in NATO) in diverse areas, publishing handbooks on Countering the Improvised Explosive Device Threat, Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), Joint Personnel Recovery and Combat Battle Staff Procedures. “These guides are in use today by both NATO and Partner Nations with warriors in harm’s way in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans,” General Smith said.

In his last formal address, Air Marshal Walker thanked JWC’s international staff for their generosity and Norway for her support as the host nation. He pointed out that saying good-bye to Norway would be very hard for everybody in the Walker family. “Norway has been a superb host. Lynda and I felt very settled here. We have enjoyed it enormously, and we will be sorry to leave,” he stated. General Smith presented Air Marshal Walker with a NATO Meritorious Service Medal and Legion of Merit while serving as a member of ACT.

In his speech, General Smith highlighted Lieutenant General Korte’s background, which has uniquely prepared him to lead the Joint Warfare Centre into the future. He praised Lieutenant General Korte both personally and professionally.

“We could not have found a more capable leader to guide this critical institution at a time of such great change in the Alliance. I know General Korte will keep the Joint Warfare Centre on the leading edge of transformation, and continue to support the warfighter as they prepare for the difficult and dangerous challenges they face,” he stated.

“Welcome aboard.”

Lieutenant General Korte assumed command of the Joint Warfare Centre following his recent assignment as Commander German Army Training and Doctrine Command. Lieutenant General Korte gained operational experience during his assignments as Deputy Commander Operations of Headquarters Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 2002 and Deputy Commander of Headquarters International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan (ISAF) in 2004. During his address, Lieutenant General Korte eloquently stressed the importance of training, education and experimentation.

“The soldiers of our Alliance and Partners are doing their duty in almost all crisis areas of the world. Day by day they risk their lives and health for their countries and the values they are standing for. All of us here, from Commander down to the youngest soldier, do understand that to support those of us who go out in harm’s way has to be, and indeed are, our highest priority. That is not only to provide the necessary equipment, state-of-the-art weapons and everything else they need to stand the challenges, it is also to provide the best preparation they can get before they go on a mission, the best and most comprehensive training possible, from individual training and education at tactical level up to complex exercises and mission rehearsals on operational level,” he said, adding, “Comprehensive training and education is the best force protection.”

According to Lieutenant General Korte the leadership in NATO has to monitor closely what is going on in operations and analyze changes. This includes listening to the soldiers and commanders serving at the front line; developing the solutions to their problems and implementing them as fast as possible.

“I am aware that there is no easy solution to all problems, no will there ever be answers to all questions. However, we should not fail because we fight competences, because we cannot agree on burden sharing or because we think to be efficient is more important than being effective. A military force is not a business company.”

Lieutenant General Korte also addressed his Norwegian partners in Norwegian, saying, “I forbindelse med de to besøkene våre her i Stavanger har min kone og jeg ikke bare fått oppleve landets skjønnhet, men også den spesielle gjestfriheten til beboerne i landet.”<sup>1</sup>

He applauded the hard work here at the Joint Warfare Centre and stated that JWC’s success has been a team effort.

“I am convinced that with the support of the Joint Warfare Centre team, my Commander and his staff in Norfolk, and in close cooperation with my comrades in JFTC and JALLC and in all other NATO staffs and headquarters, we will be able to continue where you have handed this responsibility over to me and we will add our share to the further development of a successful Alliance. God bless you.” ✨

<sup>1</sup> During our two visits to Stavanger, my wife and I also had an opportunity to explore the beautiful scenery of Norway and enjoy the hospitality and courtesy typical of this country.



General Smith, US AF  
Supreme Allied Commander  
Transformation (SAC-T)

# NATO Centre of Excellence for

# COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS

By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

Photos by Torbjørn Kjosvold

ON 31 July 2007, Norwegian National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) in Stavanger was fully accredited as NATO's Centre of Excellence (COE) for Cold Weather Operations (CWO). Centres of Excellence are created by single nations, or through agreements between multiple nations to bring together experts with experience in specific areas.



Centres of Excellence are designed as an opportunity to contribute to the transformation of NATO with their extraordinary commitment and sustained excellence in service, research and interaction with other institutions.

The Norwegian Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations accommodates a variety of winter training requirements, from consultancy to individual or unit level training with qualified winter weather experts, says Major Siri Cecilie Løken.<sup>1</sup> COE-CWO was established as an interim organization on 1 August 2004. The provisional agreement which put the permanent organization at the disposal of NATO and Partner nations was signed on 14 July 2005 at Allied Command Transformation (ACT) Headquarters in Norfolk, USA by former Norwegian Minister of Defence Kristin Krohn Devold and former Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani.

Since then, COE-CWO has been providing education and training under sub arctic conditions to all 26 NATO Nations and Partners. In addition, NJHQ and COE-CWO offer and coordinate training in Norway to foreign units all year round. This combined effort encompasses training areas, infrastructure, manpower and expert knowledge drawn from all the Norwegian Armed Forces.

"We are like a network organization here. We have a small staff of four officers who basically coordinate requirements and establish connections between our



customers and Norwegian military and civilian institutions offering various kinds of winter competence. It is a COE-CWO priority to provide quality education for operations in cold and mountainous regions," Major Løken said.

The Centre was built up under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Svein Inge Roedland, Norwegian Army, who is currently assigned to the Joint Exercise Division of NATO's Joint Warfare Centre. He led the establishment of the Centre

by putting together a mix of different educational modules, instructors and communication systems to satisfy the needs of the NATO Alliance. Today, COE-CWO is directed by Lieutenant Colonel Tor R. Aandalen, Norwegian Army.

In addition to COE-CWO, Norway has designated host nation units for Allies who want to hold their unit level cold weather training, or regular training at other times of the year, in Norway. Allied Training Centre South at Voss (capacity to host 300 personnel), and Allied Training Centre North in Harstad (capacity to host 941 personnel) are both full-time dedicated host nation units.

<sup>1</sup> At the time of the interview, which was conducted in February 2007, Major Løken was part of the NJHQ COE-CWO team. She is currently deployed to Oslo.





*Soldiers who participate in  
Winter Warfare Course at Dourefjell  
Photo by Lars Skjegstad*

Also, various parts of the Norwegian military organization support the COE-CWO. These are the Norwegian Defence Academy, Norwegian Defence Research Institute, Norwegian Defence Medical Organization, Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization and several centres of expertise within the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Home Guard.

It is important to note that cold weather training in Norway did not start with the COE-CWO; rather, such training has been a tradition for many nations for many years. The United Kingdom Royal Marines, for instance, have been coming to Norway for winter training for over thirty years now. Exchange of experiences between Norway and the Allies is a priority with the aim to further increase knowledge in this field as expressed in the words of Norwegian Minister of Defence Anne-Grete Strøm-

Erichsen, who said: "Given Norway's geographical location on the North Atlantic Ocean, Norwegians, civilians as well as military, always had to cope with severe weather events at sea, on land and in the air. Generations of experience in mastering harsh conditions form the basis for the Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations. Norway does appreciate that other nations have significant knowledge in this field. We, therefore, encourage other nations to contribute to the program."

According to Major Løken, being trained and equipped for cold weather operations also improves each and every soldier's skills and confidence.

"This training is very important for combat effectiveness. We are trying to prepare Allied forces in the best possible manner for NATO operations worldwide – in Afghanistan for instance. But if you

take a country like Sudan, you may say that troops don't really need cold weather training. However, knowing how to survive and fight in harsh climates gives you confidence in your ability to cope and prepares you for the worst."

One of the most popular courses COE-CWO has to offer is the Allied Officers Winter Warfare Course, which includes three Field Training Exercises with 10 nights out in tents and alternative bivouacs. Other subjects covered during this course are: Leadership during winter warfare, winter equipment, nutrition, cold injuries, survival, bivouacs/shelters and avalanche theory. Also in 2006, the Special Forces Winter Warfare Course was initiated for the first time. Here, the aim is to train for winter operations with focus on small unit tactical movement, observation posts and close target reconnaissance.

An invitation for the 2008 season has been issued by the Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations to all NATO and Partner nations, and includes the following courses:

- 7 January-15 February 2008  
Allied Officers Winter Warfare Course
- 7 February-14 February 2008  
NATO Avalanche Warning Course
- 31 March-11 April 2008  
Commanders Winter Warfare Course

NORWAY is an ideal country for field training operations in the cold, given an intense weather system and lots of uninhibited land to train in. The natural variations in geography and climate provide excellent training conditions for experienced as well as less experienced units. The COE-CWO assists the units in choosing conditions and training area.

According to Vice Admiral Jan Rekten, Commander National Joint Headquarters, the military community as well as many civilian explorers and scientists have benefited greatly from using a sub arctic climate as a vehicle to develop and sharpen personal skills and unit performance prior to challenging deployments and expeditions.

"Cold weather operations probably offer one of the best environments possible for leadership development at the tactical level," he said.



In order to improve their operational prowess in cold and mountainous terrain as well as the challenging coastal waters of North Norway, nearly 8,500 soldiers from 18 different nations participated in Exercise Cold Response 2007, which ran from 5 to 14 March 2007. Exercise Cold Response 2007 was the most extensive exercise in Norway this year, which aimed at preparing forces to tackle full scale crisis management under harsh winter conditions.

In February, Norway will host and conduct EODEX 08, a combined live exercise scheduled to take place in the Tromsø area, North Norway, the purpose of which is to train, exercise and evaluate multinational NATO/PfP Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) divers operating in a cold weather environment, including operations in a multi-threat scenario.

In addition to providing expert training and hosting large exercises, Norway is also hosting the annual Cold Weather Conference, the first of which was conducted at Gardermoen, Oslo, in 2006. This year's seminar, entitled "The Cold and Wet Environment", is to be held at Elverum, from 4-7 December 2007. The Cold Weather Conference is a forum for exchanging experiences in order to build and hone cold weather skills within NATO. Therefore, nations are encouraged to take full advantage of this opportunity. The overall concept of cold weather training supports the Alliance's transformation effort that promotes readiness, deployability, flexibil-



His Royal Highness King Harald of Norway (left) visits Cold Response 2007  
Photo by Vegard Breie

COE-CWO staff, from left: Major Livar Salte, Lieutenant Colonel Tor R. Aandalen and Frank Tore Laugen.

Photo by Kjetil Eide, PIO NJHQ



**CONTACT COE-CWO**  
 J-7 – Training and Exercise  
 Norwegian National Headquarters  
 PO Box 8085, N-4068  
 Stavanger, Norway  
 Phone: 0047 5134 3490/91/92/93  
 Fax: 0047 5134 3459  
 Email: coe-cwo@mil.no

ity and interoperability. The Norwegian COE-CWO is one of the sixteen Centres of Excellence within NATO.

From 1 August, Lieutenant Colonel Tor Aandalen has been appointed as Director of Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations. He said that many important events have occurred since the conduct of the interview with Major Løkken. The most significant one is, as already mentioned, NATO's North Atlantic Committee accredited COE-CWO by end of July. Lieutenant Colonel Aandalen commented: "With this certification NATO is showing Norway and our Centre an enormous confidence. But, for us, it is also a great challenge to be able to live up to the expectations."

To be able to achieve their goals, Director is very interested in finding areas to cooperate with the JWC. He is convinced that both organisations would benefit from such a cooperation. The initial talks have already started! ✈




Photo by Torbjørn Kjosvold

**Training Areas  
in Norway**



## MILESTONES in the history of COE-CWO


- 1 August 2004:  
COE-CWO stood up as an interim organization
- 14 July 2005:  
Signature of the Memorandum of Understanding, which established the Centre
- 28-30 November 2006:  
Beginning of negotiations for certification between ACT and COE-CWO.
- 31 July 2007:  
NJHQ officially certificated as NATO's Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations



Photo by Torbjørn Kjosvold




Photo by Torbjørn Kjosvold



An avalanche caused the death of 16 Norwegian soldiers during the NATO exercise Anchor Express in 1986  
Photo by Odd Steiner Tollafsen

# PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS



*Winning people over by convincing them*

Pictures and article by Major Joerg Fischer, DEU A  
SME Psychological Operations, Joint Training Development Division, JWC

**T**HIS motto above is similar to most NATO-missions. It might be worded "Winning the hearts and minds of the population", but the meaning still remains the same. It is the starting point for PSYOPS forces stepping on the battleground. But, before they do that for you, let me introduce you of our work here at the JWC. We, the Subject Matter Experts for Psychological Operations at JWC's JTDD, are providing the training to NATO's operational headquarters in our field of expertise. That is a challenge in itself, especially in our field of Psychological Operations. The challenge is not because of nations building up PSYOPS forces out of non-existing or small foundations. These are our normal "construction sites" to work on.

JWC's challenge is to support these sites with the right "engineers", because only well trained Subject Matter Experts can provide everything that is needed by our Training Audience without being

proven the fool. As a starter and also as one of the most important facts: PSYOPS is not accomplished with good ideas. A solid foundation is mandatory to be taken seriously at missions and training events to gain the expected outcome! We, and our counterparts in various NATO forces, are not only soldiers; we are also specialists on our subject.

#### OUR EQUIPMENT: FUNCTIONAL AND RUGGED

In order to be able to fulfill their mission, it is not enough for PSYOPS soldiers to know how to handle a rifle, pistol or personal gear. These are basic skills, common to all of us wearing (different) uniforms. In addition to military skills, the knowledge of psychological and editorial basics and the use of media technology are extremely important prerequisites. As in the civilian media world, the quality of the PSYOPS products depends not only on the creativity of the editors. It also de-

pends on state-of-the-art equipment. In order to ensure a high quality of various media products, equipment must meet the highest standards and be constantly updated within the realm of possibility. PSYOPS equipments include:

- portable loudspeaker systems, suitable for use with parachutes
- State-of-the-art radio equipment
- Video production capabilities, professional cameras with various video formats. Digital cutting systems, video animation programs for editing and producing digital effects
- Different means to produce PSYOPS print products depending on the country of deployment and the purpose of the products, including reach-back printing facilities
- "New Media" like Internet, products on CD and DVD can be used where no Internet access is available
- communication by SMS, MMS and WAP.



But, as always, equipment is only one of our tools that allows us to fulfill our mission in the best possible way. We also need to know how to use those tools effectively. How can we do that?

**THE SECRET IS IN “MEDIA MIX”**

In order to reach the population in the countries of deployment as much as possible, campaigns are launched using different media. The possibilities are wide-ranging. Here is one campaign example from Afghanistan: Soldiers in Kabul often found themselves looking into the muzzles of all sorts of weapons pointed at them by children. But children were putting their own lives at risk with such pranks. The reaction of a soldier who thought he had to act in self-defence would have been fatal.

To help solve the problem, handbills were designed offering children exercise books in exchange for their toy weapons. Since the product was designed to appeal to the children, more pictures were used than text. The text was printed in two languages spoken in the country, Dari and Pashtu.

The campaign was extremely successful and in the long term contributed to the safety of not only the children, but that of the soldiers, as well. This also provided an opportunity to distribute school stationery to the children. These simple handbills can be quickly produced in the country of deployment even under adverse conditions.

That was one example for PSYOPS work on a mission. You have certainly



*The author at a school in Kabul. As part of a CIMIC-PYSOPS project, the school was renovated and children received many toys.*

experienced other ones as well on your missions like for instance the following one about demining activities.

Background: Demining activities in Afghanistan are funded by donor countries both within and outside the UN system. The UN has budgeted a reported \$80 million for mine clearance and associated activities in Afghanistan this year, including maintaining 5,600 deminers.

Afghanistan is considered by mine experts to be one of the three most heavily mined countries in the world. About 60 Afghans fall victim to mines each month every year. Major demining activities

like mine blastings are being publicly announced and promoted by the PSYOPS Media. TV spots are broadcasted, articles are written in the “Sada-e-Azadi” (Voice of Freedom) newspaper, posters



and handbills are given out. All this is done to raise mine awareness of the Afghan population, mainly the pupils, the most innocent victims!

This also shows, how PSYOPS is not only supporting our own forces but also GO/NGO’s. Why do we support them? Very easy. Everyone supporting us in reaching our mission end-state can also be supported by us and our means! Demining is part of reaching the end-state of a safe and secure environment. So we’ll support it!

Other examples are e.g. periodicals, posters, target audience radio, TV spots.



*Lt. Gen. Korte (right) Director JWC, participating in the demining activities in Afghanistan during his assignment as Deputy Commander ISAF*



**BUT, HOW DO THEY REACH THE TARGET AUDIENCE?**

By using scientific skills! Our teams out on different missions are always supported by a whole bunch of scientists and other specialists, either in theatre or in reach back installations (mostly the rear locations of the specific PSYOPS units). They consist of ethnologists, country specialists, psychologists and many more well trained officers and civilian employees/scientists. They will, together with the Target Audience Analysis Teams on the spot - or by supplementing their results with add-on studies, develop long lasting high impact campaigns with different centres of gravity to reach the mission endstate.

One last word on the growing importance of PSYOPS: Most NATO armed forces had to face more or less major downsizings. But, although being affected by these downsizings, many NATO forces are raising their numbers and equipment for PSYOPS forces. Politicians have recognized, that PSYOPS is a very effective way of saving blood on the battlefield. PSYOPS has proven that on various missions.

I would like to finish with a quote from Lt. Gen. R. Hillier, CAN A:

“The ISAF PSYOPS capability and equipment is most impressive and the work they are doing is vital to the NATO mission. COMISAF considers this to be the most powerful tool in his possession...” (Source: COMISAF ASSESSREP, 2005).

I hope I was able to give you a “sneak a peak” view on this growing field of non-lethal influencing. Keep always in mind: PSYOPS is nothing to be done by generalists – it’s a specialists job! You as military leaders have the opportunity to utilize them. Just do it!

For any further questions or PSYOPS product examples feel free to contact me at the JTDD SME Branch! ✈

Major Joerg Fischer, Joint Warfare Centre  
 Direct Dial: (+) 47 51 34 2351  
 Email: joerg-dieter.fischer@jwc.nato.int



*Top: Afghani child smiling to the camera (Mazar-e-Sharif)  
 Middle: An example of a PSYOPS trifold used by Regional Command North. This was one of the most successful campaigns in Kabul.  
 Below: At a girlschool students are reading “Sada-e-Azadi” (Voice of Freedom) newspaper.*

د ایساف- دشمال راک، تاسوته د یوې منصفانه راګرې ورګرې وړاندیز کوي.  
 مونږ ستاسو پلاستيکي ټوپکونه او ټوپانچې د درسي موادوپه بدل کښي اخلو.

ISAF RAC North offers you a fair deal!  
 We trade your toy gun for school notepads!





**T**his is the land  
of the Afghans  
and the sons of  
this soil cannot be deceived  
therefore withhold your  
hands, as your agents  
cannot succeed, listen oh  
child of imperialism to my  
views and thoughts; don't  
play with fire and sit quietly,  
for I am the Afghan who  
made the British flee.

*Old Afghan song*

# EXPERIENCES IN AFGHANISTAN

## A Force Protection Perspective

Pictures and article by Wg Cdr R G G Woodward, GBR AF  
JWC Force Protection SME, Joint Training Development Division

### INTRODUCTION

Many JWC readers will be aware the JWC has an ongoing policy of deploying its staff officers to ISAF Headquarters in order to support ISAF Headquarters as personnel either undertake their much deserved Rest and Rehabilitation, or help fill, for a short time, open positions. Whilst this not only helps the ISAF Headquarters fill the manning void, the secondary effect is it enables the JWC staff officer to gain valu-

able experience in the day-to-day working of an NATO Operational Headquarters. This experience can then be translated into a significant input to the ISAF training events conducted at the JWC. As the JWC Force Protection (FP) Subject Matter Expert (SME), I was already involved in delivering ISAF training. Thus the opportunity to deploy to ISAF Headquarters for a five-week period was too good to miss!

Consequently, between 8 May and 13 June this year, I deployed to ISAF Headquarters to support the Theatre Force Protection Officer within the J3/7 Branch. Initially, the intent was for me to help develop, at the operational level, FP plans and procedures. However, the timing of my deployment coincided with a requirement from SACEUR for Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCBS) to conduct an initial





*Force Protection Survey Team,  
Afghanistan*

FP survey of NATO installations within Afghanistan. This team was headed up by J3 Staffs at Joint Force Command Brunssum, thus being the JWC FP SME and deploying to Afghanistan during this Survey period I found myself seconded! The fulltime team comprised 12 personnel with a mix of FP specialisation and experience.

### THE TASK

The team had a very clear remit and a very challenging timetable in which to complete the survey. The FP survey needed to cover a number of FP areas, which included: Security, FP Engineering, Infrastructure Protection, Health Protection Consequence/Emergency Management and CBRN Defence. The FP survey headings were taken from the new AJP 3.14 – Force Protection. Whilst not the primary focus of the FP survey work, this was an ideal opportunity to validate this new AJP within an operational environment. Before I move on to the experiences of my deployment, it is perhaps appropriate that I give a definition of FP, because within the NATO community FP means different things to different people! So FP is defined as: **“Preventive measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, materiel, operations and activities from threats in order to preserve freedom of action and operational effec-**

**tiveness thereby contributing to mission success.”** (AJP 3.14).

Bearing in mind I am writing an article for the JWC, I should also highlight that FP is a joint function. Joint functions need to be considered by the commander in determining the capabilities required for a joint force. Nations have differing FP philosophies, policies, and priorities. Essentially, the differences focus on the ultimate reason for FP: the physical protection of a national contingent itself plus supporting elements, or enabling the force to conduct its mission unimpeded by the actions of an adversary. Furthermore, in a multinational force, such as in Afghanistan, these differences should be reconciled into an overall joint FP policy; otherwise the insurgents will continue to exploit them. So, there you have it!

### THE FP SURVEY TEAM PROGRAMME

The survey team programme was particularly busy and many areas needed to be covered. The need to move quickly to and from locations within Afghanistan made for interesting logistics planning.

- 10-15 May: **Kabul International Airport (KAIA) APOD**–Regional Command (Centre) (RC(C))
- 16-21 May: **Kandahar Airfield (KAF) APOD**–Regional Command (South) (RC(S))

- 22-25 May: **Chagcharan-Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)**–Regional Command (West) (RC(W))

- 27-28 May: **Herat Forward Support Base (FSB)**–Regional Command (West) (RC (W))

- 30 May-2 June: **Mazar-e-Sharif FSB** – Regional Command (North) (RC(N))

- 4-12 June: **HQ ISAF** – RC(C)

It is not my intention to describe in detail the FP issues encountered during our visits to the various bases and organisations nor indeed would the classification issues allow me to do so. However, my intention is to give you the reader a general overview of the FP issues encountered within Afghanistan. It goes without saying that the final reports written by the team were very comprehensive and detailed and gave recommendations on areas where commanders could improve their FP posture. Furthermore, there was also the opportunity to pass on ‘best practice’ where appropriate. In the next paragraph, I have highlighted some key FP challenges/issues encountered during my short visit.

### FP CHALLENGES

**Environment.** The first observation is perhaps the most obvious one. However, it cannot be overemphasised the effect the environment can have on the conduct of



operations and the subsequent FP related issues. It goes without saying that the environment within Afghanistan is particularly harsh and this was no more so demonstrated than when we visited Mazar e Sharif (M e S) in RC (N) where the temperatures at mid day were reaching 45° C! This can increase to 50° C! Clearly, during the summer months any personnel conducting FP duties, such as external foot or vehicle patrols or control of entry duties, need to ensure sufficient manpower to avoid heat stress. Additionally, the operational FP task given had to be tailored accordingly. Acclimatisation is a key factor and commanders have to be aware of the extreme environmental conditions as well as the real risks to personnel, especially in the area of environmental health. Additionally, it is often forgotten that Kabul is at a height of 1800m above sea level, so when you first arrive you not only experience the high temperatures during the summer but also the altitude and air quality when you undertake any physical activity!

**Risk Management.** Total FP is both unachievable and unaffordable even in the most benign environments. FP must be based on Risk Management; that of minimising risk, not eliminating it. Casualties are an implied reality in military

operations as we all know too frequently from daily news reports from Afghanistan. Casualties, deliberate or accidental, are a reality of military operations, and the desire to avoid them totally may well impact adversely on the achievement of the mission. Furthermore, nations have different tolerances to risk and often when casualties ensue, the potential to undermine political resolve is highlighted. An example of which is the withdrawal of personnel from Afghanistan by the Republic of Korea. I would also highlight that Risk Management is not risk avoidance and the balancing of risk is the commander's business. During our visits this issue certainly taxed the commander's mind and there was always the need to ensure they correctly balanced their activity in line with the limited FP resources available. As one commander remarked "the FP process will always be a compromise". Should FP priority be given to those units deployed 'forward' or should the FP priority be given to those personnel or assets in the 'rear', bearing in mind the asymmetric threat?

**Planning.** As NATO continues to develop through the Transformational process it has been recognised that the responsibility for FP must be shared. The Cold War days of FP being specifically a national

responsibility are long gone. In today's environment it is both impractical and inefficient to do so. Clearly, some nations have greater FP capabilities than others. The countering of the increasing numbers and sophistication of IED threat is but one example. During our short visit we saw some very good examples of a coordinated FP approach by units. Specifically, at Kandahar Airfield the FP task was overseen by a UK FP Headquarters; however, a number of FP resources such as specialist camera equipment and operators, mortar locating radar equipment and operators, and perimeter guards were provisioned by other nations. The key however, is that the overall FP plan was integrated and coordinated across those areas providing FP assets. Having this coordinated (especially in C2) approach has clearly had a significant effect on the FP posture of the APOD, resulting in a significant fall in insurgent-related incidents. This was a very good example of how a coordinated FP approach can have a real force multiplying effect. KAF's approach to FP planning within a multinational environment is certainly a case of FP 'best practice'. As you would expect the team took every opportunity to 'spread the word'. The role and environment under which each military base is operating within Afghanistan is different and each experiences its own unique challenges. However, in the four years since NATO has been in Afghanistan in its ISAF role, there is greater emphasis by nations and plans staff to ensure FP planning is both integrated and coordinated at both the operational and tactical level.

**Caveats.** In NATO operations, nations often place caveats on how their forces may be used and/or specific restrictions to those personnel operating within the AOR. There is no doubt that the placing of National caveats in Afghanistan places restrictions on the planners especially at the operational and tactical level. Currently, there are many examples of nations who, for legal and political reasons, have placed restrictions upon their military equipment and or personnel.

For example some nations might include restrictions on the use of helicopters during the night or the Rules of Engagement. Caveats are nothing new and na-



*Author in Kandahar; below Combined Force Protection Operations Centre in Kandahar*



# Force Protection

tions even placed caveats on their forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. The question arising from this issue is the 'so what'. In short, to a commander and planner these caveats need to be understood and factored into the planning and consequence management equation. An FP example could be that a nation places a caveat that its FP personnel are only permitted to conduct external patrols in armoured vehicles rather than on foot. Clearly, at the tactical level it is on foot where the interaction of the soldiers with the population is key to winning the hearts and minds. In turn, this caveat places a planning restriction on the commander forcing him to consider alternative ways of achieving the same effect. FP is not immune to the operational limitations arising from caveats however, there was certainly a 'can-do' attitude within the nations to try and work through the issues.

**Training.** The final issue I will highlight concerns training. Clearly, NATO invests considerable time and resources to develop and improve its training. As a member of the Joint Warfare Centre, I would say (wouldn't I!) we are getting better, but my experience within Afghanistan is that within the area of FP there is certainly room for improvement! At the individual level and




*Photo by ISAF HQ PIO*

team level, nations still focus on their own FP training needs; however, when it comes to collective training there is a void in the FP training requirements. I have already mentioned the new AJP 3.14 Force Protection publication, which has done much to take FP doctrine forward, but only at the operational level. It is clear that there is still a void for joint FP doctrine at the tactical level, especially in multinational operations within an APOD, MOB or FSB. We do need FP standardisation, especially at the tactical level to ensure the standard of training matches the current FP threats and challenges NATO will face now and in the future. Nations are very much aware of the issue and the collective training they receive prior to deployment and, to some degree, when they arrive in theatre is better, but, as always, more can be done.

## CONCLUSION

I was particularly fortunate during my deployment to be able to see so much of the Afghanistan operational environment and it was certainly a huge opportunity to see so much of the country albeit most of it from the air! It is worth remembering that the country is geographically larger than France, with very challenging lines of communication and operational environment. Planning for and conducting FP measures is equally challenging in a surrounding that has 37 Troop Contributing Nations with over 37,000 personnel deployed within it. Clearly, the Regional Command Headquarters face differing challenges and in meeting the FP requirements they work hard to plan and risk manage their limited resources especially when faced with the added issue of national caveats.

There is no doubt that NATO troops will be in Afghanistan for some time yet and the continued planning for FP of both personnel and equipment will be an enduring theme. Many nations have learnt many Force Protection lessons, especially in dealing with IEDs, but we need to ensure our FP planning, doctrine and training, at all levels, is robust enough to meet the challenges and threats that our military and civilian personnel face on a daily basis in Afghanistan. ✦



*Force Protection in Afghanistan*

# CWID 2007 & JWC's ROLE



By Tugrul Sengezer,  
CIS Analyst, CDD, JWC

**T**HE NATO Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (CWID) is an annual NATO Military Committee-approved event designed to bring about continuous improvement in interoperability for the Alliance. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) provides direction and management to the programme, while NATO and Partner nations sponsor interoperability trials with specific objectives defined by NATO and nations. NATO CWID exists in the context of the larger coalition U.S. CWID, both use CFBL network and a common scenario. Some NATO CWID tests are performed via CFBL Network at national sites. Throughout this article, CWID means NATO CWID.

The NATO CWID programme focuses primarily on testing and assessment of NATO and national C4I<sup>1</sup> systems, with particular emphasis on those that will be deployed within a Combined Joint Task Force or NATO Response Force (NRF),



thus improving the interoperability in NATO. In addition, NATO CWID provides a venue to conduct technical testing of fielded, developmental and experimental systems in the context of a coalition scenario, which brings skillful engineers together with the military operators and commanders.

Since 2005, CWID has been hosted by Norway in Camp Jørstadmoen, in the vicinity of Lillehammer. Lillehammer will be the home for CWID until 2010. For CWID 07, NATO C3 Board (NC3B) tasked ACT to focus on three major issues:

- NRF Test and Validation: Conduct testing, in support of NRF certification, to assess the interoperability between C4I systems required in NRF 11 and 12.
- NATO Network Enabled Capability:

provide network tools to facilitate management of information, enabling automatic discovery and integration technologies, which promote loose coupling between C2 systems and components.

- Current NATO operations: Test and assess the interoperability of systems supporting current NATO operations.

In 2007, more than 21 NATO and PfP nations and various NATO organizations participated with 78 national and 18 NATO systems. This is the result of the remarkable successes of previous years, which has generated a growing interest in CWID.

<sup>1</sup> C4I systems - Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Systems.



JWC started supporting ACT in this event in 2005, and continued in 2006 and 2007. In 2007, as tasked by HQ SACT, a JWC team of SME and CIS Analysts (CDR S.Vatsel, SWE N; Mr. Sengezer; Mr. Oliveira; Mr. Bartek) are represented on the CWID Management Team and JWC is a key member of the Assessment Working Group. Accordingly, JWC attended the planning conferences and contributed to the definition of Information Exchange Requirements (IERS) and the transformation of IERS into NRF Interoperability Test Requirements (IOTRs). CDR Vatsel was one of the key contributors to this process, starting from 2005. At the end of CWID 2007, he left JWC for his new assignment in Swedish Naval Forces. JWC also played a key role in writing the Final Report which will be issued in September 2007.

Being in the execution phase as assessors gave us the unique opportunity to work closely with DJTF's and Component Commander's operators and systems, and also to assess all 140 tests, related with NRF 11 and 12. The chance to see what systems nations are developing, also provided an opportunity to preview current trends and tendencies. In total, there were around 1,160 tests, including national trials, conducted during CWID

2007 execution.

ACT DCOS-T, Lt. Gen. James Soligan and Vice Admiral John Stufflebeem, Commander of JC Lisbon (NRF 11 and 12) were visitors to CWID 07 execution. They both expressed their expectation that CWID will be an important tool in assessing NRF interoperability, highlighting that a closer coordination with ACO is required.

In addition to those findings by high ranking officers, JWC SMEs had the following expertise and observed findings as value for JWC :

- The lessons learned at CWID can be used to contribute to STEADFAST Exercises & Training in the preparation of handbooks, which will cover description of information exchange requirements between JFCs/DJTF and Component Commands, impact of new C2 capabilities on how to exchange information in JFC/DJTF and C2 structure, and how to conduct information management and situational awareness during exercises. These lessons are to be used in the planning & execution cycle of our exercises in academics (Train the Trainers), scenario and MEL/MIL preparation. With these experiences, we may be appointed as C2 SMEs and OTs.

- One of the most important findings

was learning how information flows throughout the chain of command, i.e. DJTF and Component Commands. Having this kind of knowledge, JWC can contribute to the development of standard SOPs for C2 doctrine to improve JFCs situational awareness.

- Contribution to concept integration and experimentation (EPOW) is another area. Nations and NC3A develop new concepts and/or capabilities for NRF. By assessing them, JWC CIS analysts are able to analyse and decide if these concepts or capabilities are suitable for being included in the Experimentation Program of work. A good example of this could be contribution to the planning and execution process of ENABLER.

- CWID, being one of the biggest interoperability events, has a unique CIS infrastructure, especially for experiments and demonstration solutions. Expertise acquired from this infrastructure can be utilized in the design and implementation of the JWC Experimentation Battle Lab, in order to meet future requirements.

Bringing all collected experiences and findings to life will be a challenge.

Above all, efforts of JWC SMEs in CWID 07 were highly appreciated by ACT, the CWID community, and continuation of JWC support is expected. ✨



NATO photos Copyright NATO C3 Agency

NATO CWID provides a venue to conduct technical testing of fielded, developmental and experimental systems in the context of a coalition scenario, which brings skillful engineers together with the military operators and commanders.



«Populations have become the center of gravity in this new battle space»

By Tom Meyer, HQ SACT  
Joint Urban Operations  
Integrated Project Team

# JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS

**G**ET ready – or face a tremendous problem! The hand writing is on the wall of history that fighting in urban areas is very difficult in every aspect of military operations. This was true in Staligrad, Berlin and continues today, in Bagdad and Kandahar.

It is also quite obvious that urban operations are the location of choice for any potential adversaries. They fully understand that urban environments negate many of the advantages and capabilities that the NATO Alliance has spent decades developing and perfecting.

Urban Operations go well beyond the range of traditional military actions and

embrace every aspect of modern life. Populations have become the center of gravity in this new battle space. Cities are the center of political, economic, social, cultural, fiancé and transportation for all nations or regions. We are all very familiar with the statics of projected urban growth. The absolute requirement on commanders and their staffs to understand these factors and the physical infrastructure of a city is proven every day during NATO current operations.

Volumes have been written about urban operations, the problems to be uncounted and the capabilities that will be needed. The NATO “RTO SAS-030 TR-071 - Urban Operations in year 2020”

released in 2002, provided a clear pathway to begin addressing this issue and providing solutions. Over five years later, we are barely beyond the starting point.

Wake up NATO! There has been enough talk, enough studies, conferences, meetings, etc. Nations need a clear “Urban Operations Concept”; a modification or addition to the Alliance doctrine that addresses urban warfare and a training strategy and standards in order to fulfill their Alliance obligations to train their forces. Our major training sites do not have urban scenarios. The significant capabilities of the RTO could be more fully utilized or focused to solve urban related technical problems. All



this is needed now! Operational commanders, staffs and individual soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen wrestle with urban operations every day. We have the talent and experience to solve these problems – what we do not have is time to waste.

Let me review where NATO is in the areas of providing a concept, doctrine, training and technology application.

Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has established since late 2006, a Joint Urban Operations Working Group (WG) in order to facilitate a joint urban operations capability that leverages, integrates and synchronizes the efforts of nations in direct support of current and future urban operational requirements within NATO.

A NATO- wide workshop was held in February 2007 to establish a Community of Interest (COI) and begin an aggressive exchange of information, ideas and operational requirements. A web site was established ([www.act.nato.int](http://www.act.nato.int)) on the ACT Transformation net.

Upon standing up, the WG immediately determined the need to focus down from a very large and complicated area, urban operations, to those specific areas where near term benefits could be realized. Interestingly, they chose Concept/ Doctrine, Training and Technology. Some of the deliverables produced or being worked are:

- A revised Concept for Combined Joint Urban Operations based upon the USECT conceptual framework. This version has been developed in concert with several nations, tested in experimentation during Joint Urban Warrior, and staffed with ACO during a summer 2007 workshop. Efforts have begun to coordinate and inter-relate various other concepts under development.

- Publishing a JFATG that will also contain an overall training strategy for urban operations within NATO. Target date for release is January 2008. Coordination is also under way to develop courses for posting on the NATO Distant Learning Network and for presentation at Oberammergau as part of their ongoing joint operations curriculum.

- The IPT is working towards publication of a Capability Area Improvement



Photo p. 27: Australian army soldiers during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2007 in Shoalwater Bay, Australia, June 26, 2007. The biennial exercise is designed to train Australian and U.S. forces in how to operate in an urban environment. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Jeremy Lock.

Above: Helicopter-borne insertions prepare soldiers for a number of urban operations. USMC photo by Cpl. Sadaghiani.

Top, p. 29: Soldiers run for cover during an urban warfare fighting demonstration. DoD photo by Ssgt John Houghton.

Below: Marines as part of "Training in an Urban Environment" August 13, 2007. USMC photo by Cpl. Will Lathrop.

Plan in June 2008. This plan will build on the original 2020 study, several experiments and input from ACO and review of the NATO Long Term Capability Requirement (LTCR) 2005. Work to date, has identified four main capabilities and efforts are underway to investigate possible solutions including RTO study/research projects that could possibly fill gaps.

- A second NATO wide Urban Operations Workshop is being planned for May 2008 to be help in the NL. This





workshop will build on the base established in February 2007, and will address specific topics.

– Publish a Pre-Doctrinal Handbook to serve as a bridge between the JUOO concept and possible release of actual doctrine. This handbook is designed to provide commanders and staffs recommendations of the latest procedures and practices relative to urban operations. It will incorporate Lessons Learned in coordination and with the cooperation of JALLC.

These products and efforts represent only the first steps and basic requirements to move the urban ball down the field. There needs to remain an aggressive and capable focal point for these efforts and products. A Bi-SC agreement between ACO and ACT is the logical step forward.

The next level of progression in the three key areas of Doctrine, Training and Technology might look like this.

### GENERAL

A needed first step would be for all concepts to be developed or revised with an asymmetric approach. There needs to be an approach that inter-links or relates concepts.

If we are to operate in an asymmetric or EBAO environment, our concepts, doctrine and training should mirror that reality or requirement.

### DOCTRINE

The AJOD needs to conduct a through review of all joint doctrine and revise as needed to reflect urban operations and the larger issue of EBAO. The urban battle space cannot be brushed aside as if it is another type of terrain like jungle, desert, etc. The components and actors are far too complicated.

The NATO CJUO Concept should be reviewed every 18 months to ensure that it is current with trends, lessons learned and technology advancements. This is not a stagnant document; the combination of social, religious and cultural factors are ever evolving. Valuable lessons learned from ISAF need to be constantly monitored and applied if appropriate to the urban operations concept and training guidance.

A major step forward would be to link the JALLC with the lessons coming from Iraq. If this is not done very soon, we are doomed to relearn the same hard lessons at the expense of Alliance soldiers' lives.

### TRAINING

When the concept is in place, doctrine can be developed on a parallel course with training. The NATO Training Group (NTG) could advance this effort very quickly based upon the work already done by such working groups as FIBUA-MOUT and Non-Lethal Working Group.

Their efforts at the tactical level coupled with the Training and Simulation working group and specifically UCATT's would produce a quality training environment. This melding of this work will not happen without the aggressive and capable leadership from ACT through the NTG. The pending publication of the FIBUA-MOUT Handbook is a perfect example; but rather than taking almost two years to publish it, this could/should have been done in months.

Enhancements to our training must be attacked simultaneously from top and bottom: Commanders and staff officers through the NATO school system in Oberammergau and Rome and soldiers and junior leaders through their parent nations' programs.

Most Alliance nations have MOUT sites of varying degrees. Is it unreasonable to expect that these sites would teach at least similar techniques; that they would employ the same standards to evaluate performance; that their weapons simulators would be interchangeable or operate on the same laser code? This is a reasonable and attainable definition of "Interoperability"!

A really novel idea would be to ensure that one MOUT site in each nation is linked in a federation that would enable them to conduct computer simulations together from home station. This network could also be tied into the Combined Federated Battle Lab (CFBL) net and therefore utilized during the major Multi National experiments conducted around the world.

There is a lot of progress that could be made with the application of relatively small amount of resources. As has been previously stated, NATO has the structure, experience and talent to address all aspects of urban operations – we just need to ensure we have the support of ACT and ACO and start moving the ball. ✦

Tom Meyer, LNO from Joint Urban Operations Office to ACT. Assigned as a core member of ACT Joint Urban Operations Integrated Project Team. 43 years of combined military and defence contractor experience in military operations, defence planning and experiment/exercise management.



# Team building

## PART II

By Lt Hilmi Ozdemir, CG/DOS, JWC and Ltjg Aysegul Ozdemir, Turkish Navy


### TEAM VERSUS GROUP

Bring together your all-stars and create a new team. Will they produce stellar performance? Probably not. The best string quartet is not created by assembling the greatest violinists, cellists, and violists. In sports, the best teams are not the all-star gatherings. And in business, a collection of the best individuals from marketing, finance, production, and research does not guarantee the best multifunctional team.

When John Amatt led the 1982 Canadian team on successful Mount Everest Expedition, only three people reached the summit. Many climbers who were part of the team, whose lifetime ambition was to stand on top of Everest, made the conscious choice to stay in the base camp. Why? Because they knew, the effort was likely to fail if everyone tried to make it. They chose to forego their individual dreams in favor of helping the team succeed. This was not John Amatt's first time to plan an Everest expedition. Ten years earlier, with one of his friends from Norway, he had gathered a team of world-class climbers from many different countries, for the challenge. But, at the last minute, he backed out. Officially, it was to get married. But, "that was just an excuse," he said later. "I knew that, despite having the best climbers in the world, this expedition would not succeed. Everyone wanted to reach the top for his or her own glory or that of his or her country. No one seemed willing to make decisions for the good of the team." His fears proved founded. Not only did the team not cooperate to make it to the top, at one point, these sophisticated expert climbers even indulged in a rock-throwing fight!

A team is not just a bunch of people with excellent skills who work at the same time and in the same place. As emphasized within the team definition in July 2007 issue of "The Three Swords" magazine, a real team is a small group of very

different individuals who share a commitment to working for common purpose, common goals and approaches and feel themselves mutual accountable. The key point here is not the equality and/or superiority of skills, talents, and experiences, but the commitment to the common purpose and performance goals.



Stephen P. Robbins has discussed and summarized the basic differences between groups and teams and visualized these differences as depicted in the figure above. He used **goal, synergy, accountability, and skill** aspects of the teams and groups to make the comparison.

A group is number of people that interact primarily to share information and to make decisions to help each group member perform within his or her area of responsibility. The main goal of the groups is to share information to the possible extent, and they do not have a common purpose and commit themselves to reaching common performance goals.

Robbins uses almost the same justifications as Katzenbach and Smith do in their books, while mentioning about different behaviors of groups and teams. Groups make no serious effort to find a common path for moving ahead together. A working group relies primarily on the individual contributions, of its members for group performance, whereas a team strives for a magnified impact that is incremental to

what its members could achieve in their individual roles. Unlike teams, a working group uses its purpose solely to delineate individual roles, tasks, and responsibilities. Groups pay attention to individual outcomes and results. In a group, members distrust the motives of colleagues because they do not understand the role of other members. Expressions of opinion or disagreement are considered divisive or non-supportive. Group members are usually reluctant to convert conflicts and differences into strength and challenging goals by discussing those conflicts and differences. It is not realistic to think we can live or work others without some conflict, but by communicating about the differences and focusing on the common goals, we can be a team. In a team, members work in a climate of trust and are encouraged to openly express ideas, opinions, disagreements, and feelings. Group members do not take responsibility for results other than their own. In contrary to working groups, teams require both individual and mutual accountability.

Since the lack of diverse or complementary skills within groups, we expect no synergy or negative synergy sometimes from these groups. It is possible to find various skills, even exceptional ones, in the groups; however groups cannot take the advantage of these skills by integrating them in order to create strength within the team. Group members usually use their skills, so to speak "stand alone" skills, to perform their individual tasks.

### JOURNEY FROM GROUP TO TEAM

Groups develop across time very much like people do. People experience childhood, adolescence, young adulthood, adulthood, and old age. Childhood is associated with dependency. Adolescence usually contains some periods of conflict. Young adulthood requires that people



spend a lot of time developing trusting relationships and preparing for work careers. In adulthood people spend a significant amount of time working, and in old age people typically reduce their focus on work. Research has found that groups also experience periods of dependency, conflict, trust and structuring, work and disengagement. Group development and human development have much in common. In this section, we will talk about a journey starting from group and ending at team from psychological, organizational, and technical perceptions.

Carmazzi's "Caveman Effect" approach well explains how the psychological reactions affect the team effectiveness. The caveman's brains got bigger and more developed. Individuals became torn between finding their own path and gaining their own recognition, versus conforming to the group. Physical strength was no longer the dominant factor for influence. Now, people could think! Survival was no longer the acquisition of food and shelter; it had become a fight of ability. The more intelligent you were (and able to apply it), the more valuable you had become. The more influence you could exert over others, the more powerful you became.

We began to compete for significance trying to show others how important and able we are, and if they believed us, or in some cases feared us, we became even more important. Groups evolved into teams but the fundamentals of our survival instinct, our emotional evolution and the emotions that drive us were still there, and a major part of our psychology. Our ability to work at our peak in teams depended on the way these emotional drivers and understanding the dynamics they promote. We now seek better ways to improve ourselves and our performance, but our caveman nature sometimes gets in the way. While our modern brain is influenced by numerous factors of emotional drive, the three that came from our caveman days are still central to our performance in teams: The drive to belong, the drive for security,

and the drive to be significant. The journey to the evolution of highly effective teams is scattered with the angry beatings and quiet disillusionment of cavemen everywhere. Effectiveness is against our nature. Only in the face of our inadequacies can we evolve, can we increase our ability to be intelligent in our actions, and can we assist others in their evolution. The advantages of this growth are a happier, less stressful, and more productive life. The consequences of not evolving are a life full of reaction, stress and unfulfillment.

Unlike teams, working groups rely on the sum of "individual bests" for their performance. Working group is a group of people for whom there is no significant incremental performance need or opportunity that would require it to become a team. People who call themselves teams but take no such risks are at best pseudo-teams. Pseudo-team is a group of people for whom there could be a significant, incremental performance need or opportunity, but it has not focused on collective performance and is not really trying to achieve it. These teams are the weakest of all groups in terms of performance impact. In pseudo-teams, the sum of the whole is less than the potential of the individual parts. Potential teams take the risks to climb the curve. Potential team is a group of people for whom there is a significant, incremental performance need, and that really is trying to improve its performance impact. However, potential teams require

more clarity about common purpose, goals, and approaches. There is no collective accountability in potential teams. Real teams are the teams that best fit in our team definition provided previously. High-performance team is a group that meets all the conditions of real teams, and has members who are also deeply committed to one another's personal growth and success.


The journey from group to real team is not always an easy and comfortable one. There are a lot of potential risks and possible disappointments on the "leap of faith" line to possible team. Like human beings, groups have some rocky times on the road to maturity. The slope from potential team to real team is quite steep and requires a considerable amount of effort. Susan A. Wheelan breaks this whole journey into four stages that she thinks they really occur in groups in the real world like:

- Stage 1:** Dependency and Inclusion
- Stage 2:** Counterdependency and Fight
- Stage 3:** Trust and Structure
- Stage 4:** Work and Productivity.


Wheelan also suggests that there are 10 key areas that team members should pay attention to in order to ensure the productivity of their team: goals; roles; interdependence; leadership; communication and feedback; discussion; decision making, and planning; implementation and evaluation; norms and individual differences; structure; and cooperation and conflict management.

- As a conclusion we shall:
- Have the common understanding on the terms and definitions
  - Focus on team basics
  - Assess our current team effectiveness
  - Put effort to be a real team by improving our effectiveness in some key areas such as communication, leadership, planning, and conflict management. 🇺🇸

*Officers and Petty Officers from the Spanish, Ukraine, Italian and Turkish Navy on board of NATO's Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean flagship, FGS Schleswig. Photo by JFC Naples.*



Ltjg Aysegu Ozdemir



Lt. Hilmi Ozdemir



## JWC marked sixth anniversary of September 11, 2001 attacks

The community at Jättå somberly marked the sixth anniversary of the September 11 attacks with a ceremony at the 426<sup>th</sup> ABS. The sequence of events started with a moment of silence, which was then followed by MSgt Oslica's welcoming remarks. Msgt Nasto briefed on "Ground Zero Joint Military Story" and looked back on that day six years ago when terrorists hijacked four jetliners and killed nearly 3,000 people. The somber ceremony stressed immense emotion felt for the American people throughout the entire world in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. The remembrance day ended with closing prayers and "Amazing Grace", a well-known Christian hymn, which is often played in services to honour the deceased.

*JWC staff stood sternly as Ms. Shannon Smith sung the U.S. National Anthem*

## JWC/NJHQ Battlefield Tour 2007



## Exercise NARVIK EXPLORER<sup>1</sup>



The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) will conduct Exercise Narvik Explorer from 15-19 October 2007. This two-tiered exercise will involve an Academics Phase and the Battlefield Tour. During the Academics program, the members of the Core Planning Team will combine their individual productions into a consolidated presentation using archive material and multi-media support. The Battlefield Tour will visit German defensive locations and Allied landing sites around Narvik. The tour will also include a visit to the War Museum.

Lieutenant Colonel Jenssen, NOR A, CDD, JWC, commented

that the objectives are:

- to enhance professional development of the JWC staff through studying military history and discuss how 'lessons learned' applied to today's situations and JWC exercises,
- to conduct a team building activity that informs, educates and stimulates thought-provoking debate as a result of studying historical military operations.

The Battles of Narvik were fought from April 9 until June 8, 1940 as a naval battle in the Ofotfjord and as a land battle in the mountains surrounding the Norwegian city of Narvik as part of the Norwegian campaign of the Second World War.

<sup>1</sup> A background article including the programme can be found at [link.jwc.nato.int/media\\_centre/The Three Swords magazine](http://link.jwc.nato.int/media_centre/The%20Three%20Swords%20magazine) (July Issue).

Photos provided by Sergeant Andreas Henriksen, NOR A, CDD

Source: Forsvarets Media Senter



# JALLC

## CHANGE OF COMMAND

### Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre



On 8 August, Brigadier General Jørgen Hansen-Nord, Danish Army, relieved Brigadier General Mehmet Çetin, Turkish Army, as Director JALLC. Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Director JWC, presided over the ceremony and Lieutenant General James Soligan, ACT DCOS Transformation, was the guest of honour. Numerous high-ranking guests from the local community, including the Turkish and Danish ambassadors, flag and general officers from our host nation Portugal, and Lieutenant General Mario de Oliveira Cardoso, PRT A, Deputy Commander of our NATO neighbour, Joint Command Lisbon, attended the event. After a compelling ceremony in the JALLC courtyard, guests proceeded across the street to the Officers Mess of the Portuguese Air Force Operational Headquarters, renowned throughout the Portuguese military, for an excellent lunch.

This handover represents the conclusion of three years' hard work and accomplishment for General Çetin, who will return to Turkey to be promoted to Major General and assume duties as the head of Strategy Development in the Turkish MOD. In his farewell speech, he commented:

"In my three exciting, tiring and stimulating years, I have had the pleasure of seeing many improvements to the work of the JALLC acknowledged by nations and supported by our strategic and operational commanders. (...) We started working by implementing a new JALLC structure and the reorganisation of JALLC divisions and branches. We shifted JALLC analysis efforts to concentrate on NATO operations. We have deployed JALLC officers to every NATO operational theatre; from Afghanistan and ISAF, to Baghdad and NTM-I, from Kosovo and KFOR, to the Darfur region of Africa and AMIS, from Pakistan and the

relief operations after the deadly earthquake, to Greece and the 2004 Olympics and to operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean sea and to Cape Verde and Steadfast Jaguar in support of NRF exercises. Many solid analysis reports on operations, exercises and training have been written and published and it seems like we have addressed every warfighting and peacekeeping issue challenging our Alliance: Command and Control, transfer of authority, relief operations, CIS, force tracking, funding, Intel, Mission Rehearsal Training, force protection and Reach Back – and our current projects are just as representative: targeting, multinational logistics, ACT's training oversight role, Intel architecture, operational Mentoring Liaison Teams and CIMIC. Our reports have drawn the attention of the highest levels of NATO in Brussels, the North Atlantic Council, like the reports on ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the disaster relief operations in Pakistan and on Operation Active Endeavour in the eastern Mediterranean Sea."

General Çetin praised the JALLC staff saying that all this would not have been possible if he was not surrounded by a very professional, knowledgeable and enthusiastic staff; some of the best which NATO nations have to offer.

"You have never let me down. I would like to thank all of you for your endless energy, dedication to duty and superb professionalism over the last three years. By working together in this pleasant and peaceful environment at JALLC, you have united your power, energy, wisdom and experience to achieve success, bringing JALLC the visibility and credibility we enjoy today. I also thank the ACT and JWC staff for their continuous support and cooperation. We have appreciated the close working relationship with your staff and, as part of the ACT organisation, our successes are also yours".

JALLC is pleased to announce that registrations are still being accepted for the **2007 Lessons Learned Conference**, which will take place in Lisbon, Portugal from 23-25 October 2007. For more information or to register, please contact: Lt. Col. Crespo at +351 21 771 7021 or [jallc021@jallc.nato.int](mailto:jallc021@jallc.nato.int) or Lt. Col. Mirodonie at +351 21 771 7023 or [jallc023@jallc.nato.int](mailto:jallc023@jallc.nato.int)



# ONE ON ONE WITH THE NEW JALLC DIRECTOR

By Chuck Ridgway,  
Production Branch, JALLC

**Sir, your post prior to assuming command at JALLC was as Danish National Liaison Representative (NLR) at HQ SACT. What were your specific jobs there and what experience from there do you consider directly applicable to a further post in the ACT organisation?**

My primary job as the NLR was to be the link - or conduit - between the Danish CHOD and SACT, and between their respective headquarters. So, on a day-to-day basis, I would follow the work of ACT and inform my CHOD, the Danish Military Representative at NATO Headquarters and the National Military Representative at SHAPE on general issues and, especially, on issues that my nation has a special interest in. Conversely, I would also keep HQ SACT informed about national developments, such as Transformation initiatives and issues that we had in Denmark, specific projects, and the like. Every now and then, I would get specific requests to seek information, which I would handle. And of course, these would go both ways, from Denmark to ACT and ACT to Denmark. A significant element of my job was to organise national visits to HQ SACT such as political and military delegations - our Minister of Defence visited HQ SACT twice during my tour of duty - staff talks, technical visits, etc. as well as arrange similar ACT visits to Denmark like SACT visits to my CHOD. Then there is the normal, daily interaction with the headquarters. We would receive briefings on specific topics SACT would want us to convey to our nations, projects which were ongoing, updated status, so that we could prepare the staffing back home. A very important part of my work was to interact with my NLR colleagues. 24 NATO member nations and 10 PfP-nations have NLRs at SACT and the daily interaction amongst NLRs is actually very important, and beneficial. The more experienced NLRs would help those less experienced, which made for a very good way of working together. In spring 2004, the NATO NLRs organised an "NLR Roundtable", so that we had a structured, but voluntary way of working together. We drafted what we called the



Guidelines for our cooperation, and that was really quite productive. We had regular meetings headed by the Dean and I was actually the elected Dean of NLRs for two years. Apart from all the day-to-day work, I also represented my nation to HQ SACT at social events, to other U.S. military commands in the Hampton Roads area, and to the local community as well, primarily to the City of Norfolk and to the City of Virginia Beach. There was a lot of representation to the community. To the other part of the question, from this wide array of tasks I think I got to know ACT quite well and to understand the transformation agenda that ACT is driving on behalf of NATO. Personally, I believe this is a great benefit for me in my new position, and hopefully for the JALLC as well.

#### **What most struck you about ACT and its role in NATO?**

Coming from Denmark and having been very engaged in our national transformation, I would like to mention that my nation realised very early on the need to fundamentally transform our national defence in order to meet today's and tomorrow's challenges. And we did that; a rather painful process that is still ongoing but well underway despite all the chal-

lenges and opposition that you would expect. Many nations have done likewise and the creation of ACT in 2003 is the result of a political consensus in NATO that we need to transform our Alliance. That said, it has struck me how difficult it has been for ACT to drive the Transformation process, the Transformation agenda, in NATO. There is a lot of high quality and innovative work being done by our colleagues at HQ SACT - but also a lot of hurdles, or opposition if you will, against their products and proposals, despite the express political decision to transform NATO. There are a variety of reasons for this, I guess. The "not invented here" syndrome, the "no changes here, please, go transform someone or something else", "yes, we need to change, but not the way ACT has proposed", protection of national interests, etc. The three first examples we should be able to overcome. If there is a will, there is a way. As to the question of national interests, we must respect those interests as NATO decision-making is based on consensus. It doesn't mean that we cannot discuss and argue, but at the end of the day, the consensus principle is the strength of NATO and we need to respect that.

**How do you see the JALLC developing**



**and what role do you see for its products: analysis reports and the Lessons Learned Database?**

I see the JALLC continuing to produce high quality and precise analysis and Lessons Learned reports that NATO commands and entities request from us; in time for them to be helpful and of real value. I would also like our colleagues in NATO and member nations to get a better understanding of what we do, and what we can do to help them overcome whatever problems they face. The Lessons Learned process at all levels is a continuous process and is actually defined by the recently signed Bi-SC Lessons Learned Directive. Naturally, we at the JALLC play an important role in this process, but further to our specific role we want to reach out to everybody else engaged in Lessons Learned; to cooperate, to share our expertise, to give advice, help train - almost anything that can assist and help improve conditions for our colleagues engaged in NATO missions. I think our annual Lessons Learned Conference, which is coming up in late October, is a very important element in this reaching out to our colleagues. So is the Lessons Learned Database that we have established and that we maintain. It is important to stress, however, that we are not and should not be the only one entering Lessons Identified or Lessons Learned into the database. Any command, any headquarters, any nation can and should enter Lessons Learned that are considered of value to a broader audience into the Lessons Learned Database. That way the Lessons Learned Database could and should be the place everybody in NATO and member nations could go to seek information.

**You spent many years working in your nation's MOD. How does that compare to working in an environment and what elements of that experience helped you at ACT?**

I did work in my nation's MOD for many years, and it's very exciting I would say. Naturally, in some ways working in a national environment is easier because you are entirely familiar with language, culture, customs, procedures, etc. That said, working in a political environment such as the Danish MOD - and in Denmark we have a very long tradition of coalition governments, even minority governments - and having the opportunity to work closely

with a wide spectrum of government institutions teaches you a lot about processes, a lot about negotiation, and how to make compromises and reach consensus. And I think that has been very useful for me and will continue to be here at the JALLC as well. Working in an international environment is very different, but also very exciting. You must do your best to understand and to respect the opinion of others. You must acknowledge that "our national way" is not necessarily the best way for all - and I would add that that applies to everybody! Very often, you find out that your colleagues from other nations bring a lot of knowledge, experience, and good ideas to the table. That has been one of the great experiences for me during my tour at HQ SACT and I'm happy to say that I also see that happening here at the JALLC.

**What motivates you?**

I have always liked being a soldier. I think it is very important for nations to have a military defence, and it is very important for a nation like mine to be a member of an Alliance. So being a soldier has always been very meaningful to me. When I was in the units, as an XO or commander, working with my soldiers was very satisfying; as was the very quick process that you have in tactical units, you know, the observe, analyse, decide and execute. You do that very quickly when you are in command. In my staff positions, I have always tried to do my best to come up with solutions rather than to present problems. Whatever I was engaged in, I felt I had something to bring to the table. And I have always said to myself, and I say it to my soldiers as well, "a task worth solving is worth doing well." And when times get tough, and things are difficult, I tell myself, and again, I tell my soldiers, "if it were an easy task, I wouldn't have asked you to do it."

**Why did you join the military?**

I joined the Danish Army in 1972. My goal when I was drafted as a private was to become a reserve officer, and then pursue a civilian university education. But when I was drafted, I joined a regiment that my family has traditionally joined, the Guards of Hussars, and at that time, this regiment was an armoured reconnaissance and tank regiment. And, partly the tradition, and partly the technological side of tanks spiked my interest and I decided to stay.

You had all the technological challenges and the fun of driving tanks, but also a high level of responsibility for your soldiers, your troops. And, you had to set the example. A great challenge for a young man at 20 and very rewarding. It is very quick and once you decide and execute, you have the results immediately in a tank. That's very powerful and I think that speaks to most young men.

**Can you tell us about your family?**

My father was a Lieutenant Colonel in the same regiment I later joined and he was a great inspiration for me. On a personal level, not for my military career, because I actually intended to pursue a civilian education and career and it was the excitement and responsibility of being a young officer that changed my mind. I was married for twelve years and I have three almost grown up children, who live in Denmark. My son is two years into his studies, my elder daughter has just started at Copenhagen Design School for graphic design and my youngest is in high school.

**What are some of your hobbies?**

I've always been a keen sportsman. I have done a variety of sports, mostly for fun. But, more seriously for many years I was into fencing and was on the Danish national military team for fencing. Nowadays it's golf. So I plan to take advantage of the great courses here in Lisbon.

**Last question: How do you feel about your new mission as Director JALLC?**

As I said at the change of command ceremony I was very proud when my CHOD nominated me and I was accepted by SACT to succeed General Çetin. I think the JALLC and what we do here is of the utmost importance to our Alliance and more specifically to our colleagues who are down range. Whether it is on NATO missions or missions mandated by the international community, what we do will impact how national contributions are effective. We must bear in mind that our colleagues are under pressure and we all must do our best to help them. I am committed to do my best. I have promised that to the JALLC and I promised that to the command structure. There is a Danish proverb saying, "a burnt child avoids fire" - basically, that is what the Lessons Learned process is all about- avoiding repeating mistakes. ✦



## NATO RETURNS TO BATTLE CREEK FOR TECHNOLOGY TRAINING

By CDR Jeff McAtee, US Navy  
Supreme Allied Command Transformation, Det. 113

**N**AVY reservists from across the United States will be attending the third Navy Information Technology training exercise at Michigan Army National Guard Distance Learning Center, Battle Creek, Michigan on September 29-30, 2007. The exercise – the only one of its kind – is part of a series of events hosted by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Detachment 113, based in Battle Creek, Michigan, and the NR JC LISBON Detachment based in Madison, Wisconsin.

The primary goal of this year's event is to train NATO sailors in the support of their active duty command, but also to enhance their own career development. Sailors will gain the technical skills necessary to become valuable assets to the Navy and NATO when performing their annual training. According to Captain David Price, a focus of this particular training session is professional development and exercise support, including lessons learned from help desk support and network administration.

"The exercise will increase reservists' technical and professional IT skills by exposing them to the hardware side of information technology," Price said.

A NATO instructor will provide web-based instruction and facilitate classes and labs in the use of specialized software. This includes the development and operation of Web Informa-



tion Services Environment (WISE) site capabilities and SACT utilization from the perspective of a site administrator. During the sessions, students will navigate and enhance WISE pages utilized in their home units.

An important by-product of this event is the professional networking

among the sailors from the different units. The next time they run into each other, it may well be in a foreign country under less than ideal social conditions. Having already established an effective working relationship, these sailors will be able to get down to business immediately. Information Technology Senior Chief John Fauer said, "Networking is essential in order to know who does what and how well they do it. That way you can take the extra time to train if they need it. You want to bring out the best in each person so they can do the best job possible." Earlier this year, SACT Det. 113 hosted a training exercise on NATO's Operational Planning Process (OPP). 17 Navy Reservists representing five units from as far away as Washington, D.C. and Salt Lake City took part. Like the IT exercise, the OPP training gave reservists the tools needed to more effectively support their active duty commands during the NATO exercise STEADFAST JACKPOT in Europe last June.



## "Project has developed at a speed almost without parallel," says NATO Office of Resources

**C**ONSTRUCTION work for Joint Warfare Centre's new five-storey training facility, which can accommodate more than 1,000 people simultaneously, is currently ongoing at Jättå. The project is worth a total of EUR 54 million. According to plan, it is scheduled to be completed during the first half of 2009. The flooring will total 13,400 square meters. And, there will be a total of 330 office spaces for the permanent staff. The building is designed by LMR Arkitektur AS. According to NATO Office of Resources, the building project "has developed and brought to its current stage at a speed almost without parallel."

"The work is going well. The JWC staff will move into the office part of the building in 2009, after we install and test all the technical systems. Functional services will be integrated and tested by the first quarter of 2010. We will then perform a system shake down, and if that is successful, we can use the training facility in the second quarter of 2010," Mr. Dag Malde, JWC Project Manager said. The interim training facility at Ulsnes will close once the new building opens.





## FAMILY WELCOME BBQ and INFORMATION DAY

Saturday, August 18, 2007 saw the JWC community host its inaugural Family Welcome BBQ and Information Day. This event afforded our community a fantastic opportunity to greet our newly arrived personnel and their families, catch up with friends on what they did over the summer and have our children meet some others in our Community. The day included free drinks and grilled hamburgers, chicken wings and pølse for community members, information displays from 22 JWC Clubs and Associations and local community organizations and activities for children. The Central Cellar and BX also participated by offering 10% discounts on Norwegian souvenirs.

The Director, Lieutenant General Korte provided warm opening remarks by welcoming all new families to the JWC community and encouraging the community to partake in activities and immerse themselves into local culture events. Displays and information kiosks from local organizations included the Stavanger 2008 Organization Committee, the Stavanger Chamber of Commerce and Industry's Expatriate Service Centre, Rødne Cruise Lines, Idereiser Travel, the Stavanger Storm Lacrosse Club, Elix Sports Centres, Yoga School Sunde, Conoco Phillips and the Kampsportinstituttet. One of the highlights of the day was the martial arts demonstration provided by the Kampsportinstituttet.

Over 300 community members visited the displays, shared some of the delicious grilled foods and were able to receive some excellent information on what our Community offers. Thanks to the 426<sup>th</sup> Services team and our volunteer cooks for their great support, our clubs and outside agencies for their superlative information displays and to the Community for making this event a resounding success!

(Contributed by Gord Ramsay, Chief Community Support Branch)



## U.S. Independence Day BBQ at Jättå

In celebration of the U.S. Independence Day, the U.S. Element hosted a free BBQ lunch for all Jättå community, including the families. The festivities also included a display by Harley Davidson Stavanger!



## JWC BOAT CRUISE

On Sunday, 26 August 2007, 183 members of the JWC community enjoyed a three-hour boat cruise departing from the inner harbour in Stavanger. The cruise proceeded to the Tungenes lighthouse, through the Linesundet, around the idyllic Rennsøy Island landscape and past Byøyene before returning to the harbour.

This event afforded our community another great chance to meet and enjoy each other's company in a social setting. After an uncertain cloudy start to the day that morning, we were blessed with fantastic weather and smooth seas for the cruise on the M/S Rygefjell. The area around the Rennsøy Islands and the Linesundet are not generally thought of by people when wishing to do local sightseeing tour. Regular tours generally proceed to the Lysefjord either to Prekestolen, or Pulpit Rock, or to the town of Lysebotn. This cruise afforded us an opportunity to see a different part of our "back yard", here, in the Stavanger area. Thanks to all of Community members who made this trip a truly memorable and enjoyable event!

(Contributed by Gord Ramsay, Chief Community Support Branch).



# JWC SPORTS DAY



By Gord Ramsay, Chief Community Support Branch; Photos by SMstSgt Eise, PAO

Although the day started wet and cool, the rain soon stopped and conditions were excellent, at least for the footballers, for the 2007 Inter-Divisional Sports Day. The competition was held on Friday, 7 September 2007, at the Norwegian training base KNM Harald Haarfagre in Madla, with lunch provided at the installation's dining hall. Divisions and the USAF 426<sup>th</sup> ABS contributed teams in football, volleyball, basketball and hockey, each with a view to ending the day as the "2007 JWC Divisional Champions" and holding the accompanying bragging rights.

After a vigorous warm up led by our Sports Officer, Lt. Marita Ims, the teams proceeded to their pitches and courts with supporters in hand, prepared for what turned out to be a fun yet competitive day. The Director, Lieutenant General Korte, noted in his closing remarks that events such as this were instrumental in promoting team work, taking a short respite from our daily workload and allowing all to get to know each other a little bit better. Results were: Football champions - Support Division; basketball champions - SMC4; volleyball champions - SMC4, and hockey champions - Support Division. Overall champions, (based upon participation rates, results in each sport and games played), were Support Division on whose behalf Colonel Rob Peacock accepted the "Sports Day Championship Trophy" from the Director.

Thanks to all participants who braved the early morning elements and the likelihood of weekend muscle stiffness to make this a fun and successful event! Thanks as well to all supporters who cheered us on!

# Oktoberfest



*«Escape from asphalt and shopping malls into a fairy-tale world of breathtaking mountains, sod roofs, rocky trails, wild reindeer and more waterfalls than you can count.» Peggy Grodinsky, Houston Chronicle.*

# Hiking in Stavanger

By Inci Kucukaksoy, with contribution from  
Bente Heill Kleven, JWC PAO

Photos by Stavanger Turistforening

[www.turistforeningen.no](http://www.turistforeningen.no)



Stakken

Kjerag



NORWAY's magnificent scenery and well-marked roads make her a hiker's paradise whether you enjoy hiking in steep mountains or along quiet moorland trails. Norwegian Trekking Association (Den Norske Turistforening, or DNT), which was established 140 years ago, is the biggest national organization dedicated to promoting outdoor activities and protecting Norway's hiking trails and natural areas that surround them.

DNT has 55 local member associations in Norway. Stavanger Turistforening, the third largest DNT association in Norway, is packed with quality hiking gear, inspirational books and photography as well as all the stimulating information you need to get the very best from your walks. Even as I sat down to make an interview with Mr. Worsøe, DNT's local Marketing Manager, about an activity I haven't done much, I was still happy to be part of it. I told him that our aim was to offer the Joint Warfare Centre personnel an exciting alternative to the hustle and bustle of the busy city life by exploring the best trails in Stavanger during the weekend. So, is there a particular track that gives people a perfect sense of both adventure and serenity?

"There are so many possibilities in Stavanger," he says. "The best marked tracks are on the other side of the fjord, between the area of Dalsnuten and Lifjell. Here, you can get an impressive view of the Jæren and the Ryfylke fjords. It is one of the favorite day trip destinations in the city. Also, it is very easy to get there, and you can hike for about five hours."

Mr. Worsøe says that Norway boasts a varied landscape from flat farmlands to steep mountains, so even if you are new to hiking, it is an easy sport to do (you may take your grandmother with you), and you are always rewarded with amazing views. "You can walk in the lower parts, across glaciers and grasslands, rocky mountains or beaches. It is the variety that interests people most."


There are some 1000 km of DNT marked routes<sup>1</sup> and 35 cabins just waiting for you to use across the counties of Rogaland, Vest-Agder, Aust-Agder and Telemark. You can eat, rest or find shelter for the night in these DNT self and full service "huts" or mountain lodges, at a cheaper price if you are a member! If you are not a member, you can still use the DNT facilities. For membership benefits you can visit DNT's website at <http://www.turistforeningen.no/english>.

Mr. Worsøe told me that his favorite hike is to walk between the mountains south of the Lysefjord to Kjerag, which is a "spectacular trip with a spectacular view". Another preference is to go to Suldal where you can walk around the old summer farms where cows were brought to graze up for the summer in the old days. There are some farms still in business in the area, but most of them are abandoned and lifeless now. Occasionally, some are put up for rental. "I can feel our history in the walls of these farmhouses," Mr. Worsøe says. This is a region of fjords, lakes and rivers and many folk tales.

But, make no mistake. Ticks are bad news when you do hiking. Ticks are the leading carriers of diseases to humans, second only to mosquitoes worldwide. It's the ticks saliva transmitted through the bite that causes the disease.

"Ticks are in the lower parts because they cannot survive in harsh winter conditions. If a red ring develops around the bite area, it is dangerous and you must immediately see a doctor," Mr. Worsøe warns. According to him, however, the biggest danger is not ticks, but rather going up in the mountains without adequate equipment such as rain and wind-proof outerwear, hiking gear and a map to take you comfortably through your day. So, if you are after some hiking adventure, you must, for a start, invest in some "real" boots.


Everybody who loves unspoiled nature, fresh air, tranquility and magnificent scenery of narrow fjords, snow-capped mountains, waterfalls, islands and vast moors, would feel lucky to



Odd Inge Worsøe  
Marketing Manager  
Stavanger Turistforening

be in Norway. So, if you want to know more details about the daytrips from the beaches to the highlands, or even longer hiking adventures, please visit the DNT. The office at Olav V's gt 18 is at your disposal for information and further suggestions for touring. ✈

<sup>1</sup> 400 km during winter time



Arboret



Lifjell



Melands Grøna



# From Classics To Now, MUSIC For All Tastes

By Bente Heill Kleven  
Linguist, JWC PAO

## STAVANGER SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA (SSO)

**Rife Competition:** The Stavanger Symphony Orchestra enjoys an excellent reputation internationally, much thanks to an impressive roster of several of the world's best known conductors, including in the past [Franz Brüggen](#), [Alexander Dmitriev](#), [Philippe Herreweghe](#), [Susanna Mälkki](#), and, currently, [Fabio Biondi](#) (Artistic Director of Early Music) and [Steven Sloane](#). So no wonder then, why 50 violinists from across the world recently auditioned for two violinist positions on offer and 17 applicants replied to a vacancy notice for the position of oboist.

**Concert Season:** The SSO's 2007-08 season will feature some of the most colossal works for orchestra, including [Brahms' Symphony No. 2](#), [Bruckner's Symphony No. 2](#), [Dvorak's Symphony No. 7](#), [Honegger's Symphony No. 3](#), [Nielsen's Symphony No. 5](#), [Rachmaninoff's Symphony No. 3](#), [Sibelius' Symphony No. 7](#), [Schumann's Symphony No. 1 \(Spring Symphony\)](#) and [Wagner's Tristan and Isolde](#), as well as performances of works of classical and contemporary composers such as [Bartok](#), [Beamish](#), [Bernstein](#), [Bloch](#), [Buene](#), [Debussy](#), [Elgar](#), [de Falla](#), [Fauré](#), [Gerhardt](#), [Grieg](#), [Händel](#), [Lang](#), [Liadov](#), [Porter](#), [Prokofiev](#), [Ran](#), [Ravel](#), [Rimsky-Korsakov](#), [Saint-Saëns](#), [Schubert](#), [Svendsen](#), [Tveitt](#), [Waxman](#), [Åm](#). The new season also offers other

highlights, such as [Bartok's rhapsody for violin and orchestra](#), [Dvorak's cello concerto](#), [Mendelssohn's violin concerto](#), [Nielsen's clarinet concerto](#), [Beethoven's piano concerto No. 5 \(Emperor Concerto\)](#), [Grieg's piano concerto in A Minor](#), and [Tchaikovsky's piano concerto No. 1](#), all performed by a cast of internationally acclaimed soloists.

**Focus on Grieg and Bartok:** Honouring Norwegian composer [Edvard Grieg's](#) on the 100-year anniversary of his death, the project [Folk Dance & Home Country Heritage](#), scheduled for November, will focus on creative juxtapositions of pieces by [Grieg](#) and Hungarian composer [Bela Bartok](#), whose music was invigorated by Norwegian and Hungarian folk music traditions respectively.

**Chamber Music and More:** Members of the SSO are also involved in a series of chamber music concerts as well as in a very special project named [Sounds from the Cathedral](#), or [Kyrkjelyd](#), which focuses on performances of old and contemporary church music. Some 75 concerts are scheduled over the period 2007-2008 in the Stavanger area, larger cities of Norway and abroad.

Pictures at top Copyright Stavanger Symphony Orchestra.



## COOL JAZZ SEASON IN STORE FOR STAVANGER

Stavanger Jazz Forum was set up in 1989 for the purpose of promoting jazz and improvised music. Organising concerts is an important part of that effort. Each year, an impressive roster of jazz headliners perform in Stavanger, including in 2007/08 French-African drum superstar Manu Katché's Quintet, Norwegian jazz vocalist Solveig Slettahjell's Slow Motion Quintet and French guitar legend Marc Ducret's Trio. Want to know more? Please, go to list of web site addresses in separate frame.

**ALSO TO NOTE** for those who want to sit back and soak up the stillness and serenity of Christmas: Rosa frå Betlehem, a performance of well-loved Christmas carols to share, fronted by Norwegian folk singer Sondre Bratland. Stavanger Cathedral on 19 December at 20:00 hrs. (Photos below, left Manu Katché; middle Solveig Slettahjell. Right Larry Coryell.)



## STEVEN SLOANE AN AMERICAN MAESTRO IN STAVANGER



Steven Sloane was born in 1958 in a Los Angeles hospital, which had Hollywood in its name. Not surprisingly, his mother liked to say that he was born in Hollywood. "That's how you become a star," the Maestro said, with a laugh at a pre-concert talk on the night of his debut with the Stavanger Symphony Orchestra (SSO). Although he put his fingers into many kinds of pots, he never became swept-up into the Hollywood film industry, but got a well-rounded musical education, studying viola, musicology and conducting at the University of California (UCLA). Despite his impressive talents for instruments, when he much later in life asked his German violist wife Tabea Zimmermann to help him hone his violinist skills, she cut him short: "It's too late, honey!" Through his conducting engagements with orchestras, festivals, choruses, and opera companies, Steven Sloane has won rave reviews for concerts across Europe and in America. Compelling programming, theatrical flair, and impressive baton technique are key words in this connection. He is said to be one of the most adventurous and innovative conductors in the business, and he also has a reputation for being an orchestra builder, to which he himself objects, pointing out that having fun when playing music is what really matters to him. His passion for the unusual orchestral repertory, substantial commitment to contemporary works, and willingness to challenge convention have found an outlet in performances of works by a host of contemporary composers, including emerging American ones, and he

has excelled in the work of composer and performer Frank Zappa, presenting music close to his Californian roots. Beginning this season, Maestro Sloane is thrilled to lead the Stavanger Symphony Orchestra (SSO), as Chief Conductor, in the years to come. For his exciting debut on the podium of the orchestra, on 30 August 2007, he chose the romantic, rarely performed *Japanischer Frühling* by Norwegian composer Ludvig Irgens Jensen and, for the second half of the program, Gustav Mahler's 5<sup>th</sup> symphony, thus demonstrating not only his interest in eclectic juxtapositions of music of divergent styles, but also the vision and scope of music-making he brings to his new post. Indeed, in addition to boosting the SSO to a new level of artistic standards and putting it firmly on the international music map, his central focus is also to bring together his multifaceted experience and the Norwegian symphonic tradition. However, with Norwegian music yet to be his forte, the Maestro admits that he has a steep learning curb to climb. (Sloane's picture Copyright Stavanger Symphony Orchestra.)

2007/08

Jazz, Blues & Classical Music  
Dates for Your Diary

Find out more from

[www.sso.no](http://www.sso.no)

[www.icmf.no](http://www.icmf.no)

[www.rogaland.musikk.no](http://www.rogaland.musikk.no)

[www.tradjazzweekend.no](http://www.tradjazzweekend.no)

[www.maijazz.no](http://www.maijazz.no)

[www.stavangerjazzforum.no](http://www.stavangerjazzforum.no)

[www.solveigslettahjell.no](http://www.solveigslettahjell.no)

[www.manu-katche.com](http://www.manu-katche.com)

[www.marcducret.com](http://www.marcducret.com)

[www.stavanger-bluesclub.no](http://www.stavanger-bluesclub.no)

[www.stavanger2008.no](http://www.stavanger2008.no)

[www.instituteforlivingvoice.be](http://www.instituteforlivingvoice.be)

[www.touscene.no](http://www.touscene.no)

## Joint Warfare Centre changes command to Lt. Gen. Korte 13 July 2007

From left: Air Marshal Walker (GBR), outgoing Director; General Smith (USA), Supreme Allied Commander Transformation; Lieutenant General Korte (DEU), incoming and now Director of the JWC.

