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OTAN

THE THREE SWORDS

STAVANGER - NORWAY

The Magazine of the Joint Warfare Centre

10 December 2007 - Issue No: 11



JWC/NJHQ Battlefield Tour inside the Arctic Circle

NARVIK EXPLORER 2007



**ISAF
Training
Event
07/03**



Update
**NATO EBAO
CONCEPT**

Allied Command Transformation welcomes new leader
New NATO military **Public Affairs** policy





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Cover _ Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) and National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) had a joint Battlefield Tour, Exercise Narvik Explorer, in Northern Norway in October. Photo by SMstSgt Eise, DEU F. Photo credits for the other pictures are inside.



Editorial

Welcome to our Christmas edition of The Three Swords and the last edition in 2007. This is our first issue after becoming a "Public Affairs" office. With the change from Public Information (PI), where our tasks as PI were restricted to media relations, into Public Affairs (PA), where we have now been given two "new" tasks namely, community relations and internal information, the NATO Public Affairs policy is trying to better describe what we are actually doing and in which direction we ought to develop. The new policy put down principles that are to guide us in our struggle to keeping up with a constantly evolving media environment and hopefully making NATO come across with one coordinated voice towards our audience. Is the new PA policy a step in the right direction, or not? You can make up your own opinion by reading the background and key elements of our new policy in the article kindly provided by Colonel Boudreau from NATO Headquarters.

Our cover picture this time is taken from the Joint Warfare Centre's Battlefield Tour "Narvik Explorer" in mid October. During this one week in October, most of the JWC staff gathered in the area of Narvik to do an in-depth study of the "Battles of Narvik" and also to conduct an offsite together with key personnel from the Norwegian National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) to enhance the relationship between the two headquarters.

As always, the JWC has been through a very busy Fall with exercises and training events. This issue is a reflection of that. You can read more and view a lot of nice pictures from our Battlefield Tour, Iraqi Key Leader Training, the ISAF 07/03 training and other key events, which the JWC personnel has been involved in throughout the Fall. And, as usual, we try to provide some articles that hopefully can spark some discussion or provide some new knowledge to broaden our minds. I would especially like to draw your attention to



CDR (Sg) Helene W. Langeland, NOR Navy
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We are always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you have got something to say, send it to us. We will be happy to consider it for publication. Email your articles, as well as your comments and feedback to JWC CG PAO Common (CRONOS) or inci.kucukaksoy@jwc.nato.int.

The Three Swords

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The Three Swords is the authorized unofficial publication produced by the JWC Public Affairs Office. It represents a compilation of articles, reports, news and general information related to JWC personnel and their families. The articles and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy of NATO. The Editor reserves the right to edit or shorten submissions.

PUBLISHED QUARTERLY

Thanks:

Forsvarets Mediesenter
"Norwegian Armed Forces
Media Centre"

Back Cover photo by:

Lars Aamodt CCT

Norwegian poet Inger
Hagerup's poem provided
by Bente Heill Kleven.





Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte German Army Director, Joint Warfare Centre

I must admit, writing the second foreword for our magazine I feel like I just have written the October one; demonstrating the speed of time within the last couple of weeks. In my last foreword, I promised you a busy time and indeed I think I kept my promise. I am very satisfied with what we have achieved in this last quarter and the hard work we put into the various key tasks paid off well.

The last quarter of 2007 started off with the very promising Off-site with the collocated Norwegian Joint Headquarters, combined with an instructive Battle Staff Exercise revisiting the Narvik campaign of World War II. The team under Colonel Per Rønning, led by Lieutenant Colonel Bjørn Jenssen, provided a well orchestrated tour, and we all gained a lot from these well spent days.

Following that, we conducted a most successful Iraqi Key Leader Training. Lieutenant Colonel Johan Haraldsen and his team did a great job, not only to get the organization right, but also to establish an excellent atmosphere of shared interest, responsibility and cooperation with the training audience.

The ISAF Headquarters training we conducted was an outstanding success, not only looking at Real Life Support (RLS) and Communication and Information Systems (CIS) issues, but also the training itself. Here, I like to mention Colonel Paul Morillon who worked really hard in Kabul, and here in Jättå/Ulsnes to ensure success. On all levels, the training audience applauded JWC staff and the supporting agencies and organizations for their fantastic work. I want to thank in particular all the external supporters who were essential to accomplish the training. We are all aware of the challenges we face with the ISAF Headquarters training and, interestingly enough, a survey issued end of last year clearly states that the vast majority of ISAF personnel values NATO's ISAF pre-deployment training to a very high degree – again, proof of our excellent work.



The last big challenge in 2007, Exercise Steadfast JAW, is just ahead of us as I write these lines. This Exercise will focus on the certification of NRF 10 and inter alia validate the capability of NATO's Joint Force Command Naples to execute the transition from a NATO Response Force/Deployable Joint Task Force (NRF/DJTF) to a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) operation. I am quite confident in you that JWC will once again prove its excellent reputation and I will comment on the outcome of this event in the next issue.

Next to the preparation and execution of all these exercises, there have been a lot of other things going on, such as the tremendous work that needs to go into the PE Review and all the related tasks. The space I have is not sufficient to elaborate on all these issues; thus I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all of you who made the past quarter such a successful and rewarding one.

As always, we need to switch our high beams on and look to all the challenges we face in the first quarter of 2008. No big exercises ahead – at least not until the Computer Assisted Exercise in mid-April when we conduct Phase 3 of Steadfast JOIST with NATO's Joint Force Command Brunssum. However, as usual, we have lots of planning and scripting conferences, Academics (Phase 1) for Steadfast JOIST and JUNCTURE, Operational Planning (Phase 2) for Steadfast JUNCTURE and the next Iraqi Key Leader Training in March.

Before that, I ask you to take your leave, calm down, relax and enjoy a happy, peaceful and rewarding Christmas with your families. I sincerely pass on my best wishes to you and your families for a Merry Christmas and a healthy, lucky and good new year! While we have the luxury to enjoy this time, please take a moment and think of our comrades who are deployed in harm's way. Wish them the luck and the strength they need for a safe return back to their families.



Brigadier General Philip M. Ruhlman

U.S. Air Force

Chief of Staff, Joint Warfare Centre

You may have heard the expression “The only thing that is constant is change”. When I hear those words, I think about transformation and how true the expression applies to NATO and especially Allied Command Transformation, the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), and the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC). The Fall of 2007 saw huge transformational effects as the JWC and JFTC conducted their first ever collocated exercise at the Ulsnes facility in Norway. Although the two International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) scenarios were purposely executed in a sequential manner, the over 750 personnel who participated represented the largest group of Exercise Control, trainers, Subject Matter



Experts, and Training Audiences ever placed at Ulsnes. This put a tremendous demand on Real Life Support services, Computer Information Systems, exercise facilities, transportation, and downtown lodging. Support was flawless, allowing for successful completion of NATO’s two “top priority” events with training objectives fully met. That is not to say that there were no lessons identified. These lessons were then discussed at length in a follow-on ISAF Conference held at Jättå, where representatives across NATO came to discuss how to improve the ISAF training. Two important subjects in the discussions were how to improve individual augmentee attendance at ISAF training events, as well as how to ensure highly experienced and current Subject Matter Experts continue to be made available to support each ISAF exercise.

Other signs of NATO’s transformational change at the JWC was reflected in the simultaneous and overlapped planning of four Steadfast Series exercises, JAW, JOIST, JUNCTURE, and JOINER. These exercises represent the fulfillment of SACEUR’s and SACT’s transformational vision for three NRF certification exercises per year for each Joint (Force) Command. 2008 will be the first year this is fully conducted in its entirety. Understandably, this has the JWC working at full throttle to ensure success for Naples, Brunssum, and Lisbon. Of note, JOIST will represent NATO’s first-ever Combined Joint Task Force exercise, and JOINER will represent NATO’s first-ever effort to conduct a linked, distributed, computer assisted exercise – a key step in establishing the NATO Training Federation (NTF). One key element of transformational change is the SHAPE directed trial for JWC to be the “Officer Conducting the Exercise” (OCE). What is extremely important to understand is that in the trial, the JWC is not assuming the role of the Joint (Force) Commander in determining training objectives. That responsibility clearly remains with the operational commander, as does certification authority. However, there are traditional OCE planning and exercise execution responsibilities that the JWC can smoothly con-

duct, taking the burden off the J(F)C staff so they can focus as a training audience on scenario play, and not be distracted by the mechanics of conducting the exercise. The OCE-trial is going very well, where the JWC strength is expertise as a planning authority for the STEADFAST events, and command authority is absolutely remaining with the J(F)C commander. The end result is a continuum of efficient and effective STEADFAST Series exercises that are fully coordinated, synchronized, and most importantly, standardized.

Other areas of transformational change include the JWC’s recent formation of a Joint Air Ground Working Group (JAGWG), focused on ensuring operational training exercises fully integrate air and land plan-

ning. The joint, interdependent nature of the conduct of modern air operations with land operations requires that ISAF and STEADFAST training exercises fully expose each training audience - and that would be the entire training audience - to key aspects of air operations and effects, both kinetic and non-kinetic. The JAGWG will draw on the experience of air, land, and maritime component officers to ensure a joint, combined perspective is represented. Likewise, the working group will reach out and strengthen key ties with CC-Air Ramstein, CC-Air Izmir, Centers of Excellence such as the Joint Airpower Competence Center (JAPCC), the Warrior Preparation Center, and other air-ground agencies across NATO. The bottom line desired effect is to ensure mission success for the commander by the effective integration of air capabilities into the joint campaign, both in training exercises and real-world operations. Its clear transformational change remains everywhere.

The NATO Peacetime Establishment (PE) Review is now in Phase II, where ACT envisions a four-pillar structure, setting in place for the first time a Joint Force Trainer (JFT) at the three-star level. Work is now underway to define the JFT functions, but most probably it will centralize all ACT training and exercise responsibilities under one three-star Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS). The JWC, JFTC, and HQ ACT elements of joint exercises, training, and education are envisioned as subordinate organizations.

Finally, the construction of JWC’s new exercise facility in Jättå, Norway is underway at a rapid pace, with new floors and walls being put in place hour by hour. We expect the facility to be ready for operation in January 2010. It will serve as a counterpart facility to the JFTC’s new facility in Bydgoszcz, Poland, which is forecast to open in 2009. Everything is in transformational motion. Dynamic missions, increased responsibilities, and a very fast pace of operations are now the norm. I guess the bottom line to 2008 will be a modification to the expression stated at the beginning: “the only thing that remains constant is transformational change”.



NATO Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) Concept

By Lieutenant Colonel Charles Newbegin, USA A,
Capability Development Division, JWC

I. INTRODUCTION:

NATO's efforts to develop an Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) concept continue. To date, the Bi-Strategic Command's EBAO Working Group has successfully crafted an "EBAO Discussion Paper" and it is now before the International Military Staff (IMS) and the nations for review and comment.

Simultaneously, a pre-doctrinal EBAO draft handbook is also being developed.

The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) hosted NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT), Allied Command Operations (ACO), Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCB) and Joint Command Lisbon (JCL) during EBAO handbook development meetings, which resulted in the most completed edition to date, "Version 4.2". The Bi-SC EBAO Working Group's goal is to get this handbook reviewed and ac-

cepted by the Bi-SC commanders before year-end, thereby giving the NATO community a common direction on where Effects Based Approach to Operations within NATO is heading.

EBAO at this time is still not an approved doctrine, but since commands are using elements of EBAO regardless, it is necessary to make the commands aware of the intended common direction.



II. EBAO WITHIN THE NATO CONTEXT:

The NATO EBAO as defined by MCM-0052-2006 is “the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance, combined with the practical cooperation along with involved non-NATO actors, to create effects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the NATO end-state”. EBAO introduces old and new terminology into the NATO language.

The most important of these are:

a. NATO end-state. A single, agreed-upon, unambiguous concluding situation attained by the achievement of one or more strategic objectives determined by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

b. Objective. A clearly defined and attainable goal in the engagement space essential to military commanders’ plans. Objectives are achieved by the outcome of an aggregation of intended effects and are derived from the end-state. Their completion should lead to the achievement of the end-state.

c. Effect. The cumulative consequence of one or more actions across the engagement space that leads to a change in the situation in one or more domains. Aggregation of intended effects leads to the achievement of objectives.

d. Action. The process of engaging any Alliance instrument at each level in the engagement space in order to create specific effects in support of an objective.

e. System. A functionally, physically, or behaviourally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements, which forms a unified whole. Systems associated with national security include, inter alia, political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII).

f. Engagement Space. That part of the strategic environment in which the Alli-

ance decides to engage and where the interaction of different actors creates conditions that may be acceptable or unacceptable to the Alliance in terms of its end-state. The engagement space is divided up into the military, political, economic and civil domains.

When considering “NATO instruments”, NATO has primarily the military instrument at its disposal, and alongside it, the political instrument inherent in NAC activity and with Alliance capitals. In the NATO context, the other instruments (civil and economic) are largely held and controlled by nations and non-NATO actors. In broad terms, instruments of power are the strategic capabilities of NATO, other international entities (such as the UN), and nations to influence the behaviour and capabilities of others. These instruments (within a NATO context) are organised in such a way to illustrate (figure 1) first and foremost that NATO is a military organisation with political clout and the ability to negotiate for economic and civil support during operations. As such the acronym MPEC (military, political, economic and civil) is being recommended for use when describing the instruments of power within the NATO context.

III. SIX EBAO PRINCIPLES:

There are six principles of EBAO. These principles both describe how

EBAO works with other planning and execution methodologies, and the features of EBAO that distinguish it from these other methodologies.

- It is a philosophy that complements other philosophies such as the indirect approach and mission command,

- It focuses on the end-state and on determining the effects that must be created in order to influence the behaviour and capabilities of key actors to achieve it,

- It considers the engagement space as a system in which all actors and entities interact to create effects,

- It requires an analysis of the systems, and systems of systems, to understand the relationship between actions and effects,

- It requires harmonising the contributions of the various instruments of the Alliance and, where appropriate, the actions of sovereign states (possibly members of the Alliance) and other actors,


- It requires continuous assessment of the effectiveness of actions and adapting the plan if necessary.

IV. FUNCTIONS OF EBAO:

There are four functions of EBAO, and their related activities are mutually supportive. They are carried out in a continuous, interactive, parallel process and should not be regarded as sequential steps. The four functions are: Knowledge Development, Planning, Execution

Photos p. 5, clockwise: Completion of a new flood protection wall in Laghman Province’s Dumlam village, February 21, photo by ISAF; British soldier with an Afghani boy, photo by ISAF; Kapisa Governor Abdul Murad and U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ronald Neumann address reconstruction progress with local Afghani reporters, February 25; a view of Kabul, dod.mil; ISAF photo by Sgt. Proctor.

Figure 1 - NATO model for EBAO





and Assessment.

a. Knowledge Development (KD): Using Systems Analysis, knowledge about the different political, military, economic, social, infrastructural and informational (PMESII) aspects of the strategic environment will be developed. From an EBAO perspective, knowledge is developed from a variety of data and information from both classified and open sources. It is developed using a Systems Analysis process, which in turn relies heavily on analysts with expertise in different domains and regions of interests. While NATO has a potential capability with intelligence reach-back to national/NATO intelligence resources, the development and exploitation of non-military expertise within NATO Headquarters, ACO and other external organisations must be developed.

b. Planning: The introduction of EBAO will build upon existing NATO doctrine and processes in order to improve NATO's ability to plan and conduct op-

erations in complex environments, in close cooperation with non-NATO actors and non-military instruments. In anticipation of a requirement to commence planning using EBAO, the Strategic Operational Planning Group (SOPG) will find it necessary to consult with experts from both NATO and non-NATO entities, as applicable to the operation, to identify potential friction points, and if possible begin to harmonise purpose and effort. Particular attention should be given to Knowledge Development data, geographic data, and available resources. SACEUR strategic advice to the NAC will include considerations of options, potential NATO end-states, objectives and strategic effects by NATO and non-NATO means.

c. Execution: Execution in an EBAO requires the command and control of military forces and interaction with other non-military means to conduct integrated, coordinated or synchronised actions that create desired effects. To accomplish this, harmonisation is

needed between military and civil actors. The execution phase of a NATO operation starts with the issue of the NAC execution directive. During this phase, the EBAO process is intended to harmonise military actions with those of other non-military entities to achieve the NATO end-state. During execution, comprehensive and continuous assessment creates feedback that may result in actions being modified. This principle calls for frequent and less disruptive adjustments to the plan, making even fundamental changes potentially less costly in terms of momentum, resources and political will.

d. Assessments: The application of EBAO presumes adaptability, not predictability. Assessment of the engagement space involves monitoring and assessing the outcome of all actions taken across the whole engagement space and all associated effects. From a military standpoint, effects-based plans require continuous assessment in order for informed adjustments to be made.



Progress of actions, creation of effects and achievement of objectives towards the accomplishment of the end-state are all assessed via a continuous cycle. This cycle measures current status and trends, and provides feedback to the planning and decision process. This assessment process applies to all levels to support assessment at the next level. The collector may be a non-NATO asset, further highlighting the requirement for interaction and cooperation where possible amongst all instruments and relevant actors.




Figure 2 - Cyclic nature of EBAO

V. EFFECTS:

Effects play a crucial role in EBAO because they contribute to the accomplishment of objectives and the end-state. Actions are designed to create effects that contribute to changes in the capabilities, behaviour or opinions (perceptions) of actors within the engagement

space, and to changes in the strategic environment. Effects can be physical and non-physical.

Although all physical effects will lead to some form of non-physical effect, their primary purpose will be to influence the capabilities of actors, while non-physical effects are principally directed towards an actor's behaviour (also referred to as the cognitive domain). Within the physical and non-physical categories, the following types of effects occur:

a. **Desired Effects.** Desired effects are those that have a positive impact on the achievement of the objectives.

b. **Undesired Effects.** Actions on the system may create undesirable effects that disrupt or jeopardize the achievement of the objectives. These should be identified and mitigated if possible.

Depicted in the diagram is an expanded view of the interactions of each of the MPEC families of objectives, effects and actions (FoOBJ, FoE, and FoA) at the various levels within the engagement space. Also depicted are undesired effects and how they can impact the various MPEC domain objectives.

An example of activities and/or actions that can create undesired effects is military actions such as bombing a bridge (point 1 in Figure 3) in order to deny adversary manoeuvrability and lines of communications. This may also

cut off civilian commerce and life saving emergency lines of communications as well as NGO access to the area, thereby possibly creating or at least contributing to undesired effects such as local populace unrest; humanitarian crisis; displacement of local populace; financial losses; negative media coverage; and loss of NGO support and cooperation. All of these, in turn, can negatively impact objectives.

A second example could be economic sanctions (point 2 in Figure 3) such as establishing an embargo or increasing tariffs on adversary goods in order to cut funds and supplies available to the adversary. This may also reduce the amount of emergency supplies, foods stuffs, and income for the local populace, thereby creating or at least contributing to the same previously mentioned undesired effects.

Mitigating the impact of these undesired effects if they can not be avoided requires the various MPEC domains to coordinate their FoOBJ, FoE, and FoA with each other and to have fragmentation orders (FRAGO) or branch plans in place to deal with fall-out from undesired effects.

VI. WHAT IS NEXT:

The next step for the Bi-SC EBAO Working Group is the coordination for a re-write of the ACO Guidelines for Operational Planning so that it includes EBAO. Prior to this there may also be a Joint Operational Guideline created to further guide the operational commanders in the direction NATO is taking for EBAO. Finally, another sub-working group was recently created to address the exercise design and the training/education challenges surrounding the implementation of EBAO into the NATO way of conducting business.

VII. CONCLUSION:

Although the language associated with EBAO might appear to be new, the idea that effects and actions are (and have always been) elements of the analysis, planning, execution, and assessment processes normally associated with military operations is not. Commanders and staffs should recognise that every-




Figure 3 - EBAO interaction at the tactical, operational and strategic levels



thing being done in an operation (and life) creates desired and undesired effects (planned for or not). Therefore it is prudent for analysts, planners, and commanders to view their plans and operations not only from the purely functional perspectives of their specialities, but also from a wider viewpoint. This holistic view allows commanders to recognise how the effects and actions of their plans and operations might affect or be affected by other plans and operations. To this end, EBAO does not seek to replace the existing analysis, planning, execution, and assessment processes. Instead EBAO seeks to enrich them by providing a more comprehensive, coherent, and coordinated way of thinking. This will enable commanders and planners to see beyond the military means being employed by introducing the description of effects and enhancing interaction with other actors.




◀ NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, Marine General James Mattis, speaks at Allied Command Transformation's and U.S. Joint Force Command's change of command aboard the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, November 9, 2007. Photo by U.S. JFCOM Public Affairs Office.

Allied Command Transformation, U.S. Joint Forces Command honour outgoing commander, welcome new leader

By U.S. Navy Chief Petty Officer Chris Hoffpauir

Lt. Col. Newbegin is pictured with the draft EBAO handbooks, which should be approved by Bi-SC Commanders before year-end. Photo by JWC PAO.



NORFOLK, Virginia -- U.S. Air Force General Lance Smith relinquished command of NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to U.S. Marine General James Mattis at a change of command ceremony aboard the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, November 9, 2007.

As Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), Mattis will lead the transformation of NATO's military structures, forces, capabilities and doctrines to improve interoperability and military effectiveness of the Alliance and its partner nations.

As Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, he will oversee maximising present and future military capabilities of the United States by leading the transformation of joint forces in the ar-

reas of providing joint forces to combatant commanders, joint training, joint interoperability, and joint innovation and experimentation.

Both NATO and U.S. leaders praised Smith and welcomed Mattis during the ceremony on the ship's hangar bay.

"He has been an exceptionally creative leader here," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen said. "If General Smith is anything, he is a superb leader. Over the last two years he has focused on striking a difficult balance between providing forces while at war, and capabilities to fight in that war and win it, and preparing America and NATO for the challenges of tomorrow."

Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England acknowledged Smith for his accomplishments during the past two years as USJFCOM commander.



Change of Command

"You've contributed greatly to the future readiness and success of NATO and America's armed forces by contributing to the transformation of the military for the 21st century," England said to Smith during the ceremony.

England presented Smith with the Defense Distinguished Service Medal in recognition of his leadership of USJFCOM since 2005.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Claudio Bisogniero spoke of Smith and his tenure as SACT and presented him with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Meritorious Service Medal.

"General Smith, two years ago you became only the second person to assume the post of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation," Bosigniero said. "You have taken a young NATO strategic command and guided its growth and development. You have given these different elements a common identity and concretely helped to consolidate the transformational focus that is so important for our Alliance."

Smith, who will officially retire in January 2008 after 38 years of service and is the only U.S. Air Force General to command both organizations, explained what an honour it was to lead the commands.

"The progress and achievements forged by the incredibly dedicated members of these two commands has been remarkable," Smith said. "We have blended support to America, and NATO forces engaged in major combat operations across the globe, with preparation for our future security needs, and I believe both commands have struck a good balance be-

tween these often competing tasks."

"There is no doubt," Smith continued, "our job is to meet the needs of our customers - providing the best possible support to the men and women preparing to go in harm's way, whether for combat operations or humanitarian relief."

Smith also offered some words of praise and support for the incoming commander. "I know of no better choice to lead Joint Forces Command and Allied Command Transformation into the future than General Jim Mattis. As an officer and a leader, he is a proven winner who understands the art and science of warfare, and the complex relationship between the two."

"Jim, there is no shortage of work to be done, but you are gaining two outstanding teams who will take you as high and as far as you want to go. Our time together this week has further convinced me that you are exactly the right man for the job. Congratulations and good luck."

Mattis, most recently served as Commanding General of the I Marine Expeditionary Force, Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, and Commander of U.S. Marine Forces Central Command.

Mattis discussed his enthusiasm in taking over both organizations. "We have all inherited our freedoms here today thanks to the blood, sweat and tears of our predecessors, and here today ambassador, secretary, chairman, I pledge to give all I have got to build the strongest coalitions, the most agile forces, and the most ethical defenders of our nations, because we too have an

obligation to pass on these freedoms to our children and our children's children. Thank you. I look forward to working with all of you."

Mattis becomes the first U.S. Marine to command USJFCOM since its renaming in 1999. U.S. Marine General John J. Sheehan commanded the command's predecessor, U.S. Atlantic Command, from 1995-1997.

Mattis, a native of the Pacific Northwest, graduated from Central Washington State College and entered the Marine Corps in 1972.

As a Lieutenant, he served as a rifle and weapons platoon commander in the 3rd Marine Division. As a Captain, he commanded a rifle company and a weapons company in the 1st Marine Brigade.

As a Major, he commanded Recruiting Station Portland. As a Lieutenant Colonel, he commanded 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, one of Task Force Ripper's assault battalions in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As a Colonel, he commanded 7th Marines (Reinforced).

Upon promotion to Brigadier General, he commanded first the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade and then Task Force 58 during Operation Enduring Freedom in southern Afghanistan. As a Major General, he commanded the 1st Marine Division during the initial attack and subsequent stability operations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. As a Lieutenant General, he commanded the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and served as the Deputy Commandant for combat development and integration.

Mattis' joint and staff assignments include: Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Executive Secretary to the Secretary of Defense; Director, Marine Corps Manpower Plans and Policies Division; Head of Enlisted Assignments Branch, Personnel Management Division, Executive Officer, 7th Marine Regiment; and Operations Officer, 1st Marine Division.

He is a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the National War College.



U.S. Air Force Gen. Smith, NATO's former Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, arrives to relinquish command to General Mattis. Photo by U.S. JFCOM PAO.



ISAF Training Event 07/03

and a personal reflection at the end of tour with the Joint Warfare Centre...

By Lieutenant Colonel Michael von Normann, DEU A
Planning Team B, Joint Exercise Division, JWC

Photos by SMstSgt Juergen Eise, DEU A
JWC PAO

I HAVE been working for two years now with the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). The first six months as a planner/coordinator within the JED ISAF Planning Team B, and one-and-a-half year as the Section Chief/OPR for the JWC ISAF Training Events. ISAF TE 07/03 is the fifth ISAF training in which I am involved. After training events for the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC, ISAF IX, Spring 2006), the Multinational Corps North East (MNC NE, ISAF X, Fall 2006), an Individual Augmentee Training (IAs from all over NATO, Spring 2007) and the LCC Heidelberg (LCC HD, ISAF XI/1, Summer 2007), I can conclude that this event was for many reasons the most challenging, but at the same time the most satisfying experience for me as an OPR, that's for sure. But why is that? Various aspects in the planning and preparation of ISAF TE 07/03 made this training really unique for me personally. Please allow me first to give you some background information on what ISAF TE 07/03 was all about, before I elaborate a bit on the peculiarity of my final training event combined with some personal remarks.

When I was initially informed about the composition of the ISAF TE 07/03 Training Audience (TA), I was a bit worried. After having experience with a well prepared HQ ARRC (they had been running through 18 months preparation prior to arrival in Stavanger), and after the experience with MNC NE from Szczecin/POL (they had received the Afghanistan mission only five months prior to their deployment into theatre) – both representing completely differ-

ent types of TAs – I thought I could not be more challenged. But I could! The TA for ISAF TE 07/03 was JFC Naples. This, in itself, was of course not a challenge at all. However, the fact that JFC Naples was only the leading headquarters and all in all six NATO headquarters were contributing in order to build the ISAF Core Staff Element (CSE) was a challenge for the JWC. And, on top of this, a considerable number of individual augmentees from nations could be expected to fill billets of the ISAF Core Staff Element (CSE). Nevertheless, the planning team realized pretty quickly that NATO's Naval Striking and Support Forces (STRIKFORNATO), who was in

lead in terms of TA manning, would do an outstanding job and provided us with a detailed manning document from the very beginning. This document was continuously updated on a weekly basis and changes from that first draft to the final version had been marginal.

Although our overall training concept have not changed – Missions Specific Training (MST), Electronic Working Practices (EWP), Functional Area/Functional Systems Training, Battle Staff Training, Mission Rehearsal Exercise – bits and pieces had to be refined and fine-tuned based on observations and lessons identified from the previous training in summer 2007.



Left: Gen. Korte and Gen. Moran at Ulsnes Training Facility. Below, officers listening to the briefings at Ulsnes Auditorium.

Left: Ambassador Daan W. Everts (NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan); General Korte thanking Col. Morillon for his successful conduct of the ISAF exercise.

The main differences within the training blocks are the following:

- MST, ½ day in total, focused on the absolute necessary subjects; welcome address by HQ ISAF DCOS Ops, MG van der Til; and five lectures with briefers from ISAF HQ only,
- EWP, ½ day in total, focused on the absolute necessary applications,
- FAT/FST, two days, mainly Subject Matter Expert (SME) driven in terms of preparation and execution,
- BST, two days, mainly SME driven in terms of preparation and execution, rehearsal and walk through HQ ISAF Battle Rhythm (e.g. Joint Operations Planning Group, Joint Targeting, Commander's Update and Assessment, Joint Operations Coordination Review Board,

tion between the operational command HQ ISAF and the tactical level RC (S). However, having 800 people (comprising groups, ISAF CSE TA and ISAF CSE EXCON as well as RC (S) TA and RC (S) EXCON) working in Ulsnes on a daily basis has been a challenge for all who were involved in ISAF TE 07/03 (just to mention the coordination and synchronization of various scarce sources like office space in Ulsnes, workstations for TA and EXCON, conference facilities, plus accommodation in the Stavanger area or the bus transportation schedules).

It is not up to me to evaluate or assess the training but let me state that from my perspective this training event was much better planned in terms of the JWC cross divisional working proce-

our mission. No question, there is always room for improvement!

Finally, what made this training event so unique and special for me? I would like to point out five areas where I owe my special thanks.

Firstly, let me highlight the tremendous working relationship between the Subject Matter Experts Branch and the Exercise Planning Branch. By relying on each other and taking everybody's recommendations for improvement in various areas into consideration, the daily work was characterized by trust and mutual support. My special thanks goes to Colonel Paul Morillon (FRA A) and Lieutenant Colonel Bob Taylor (CAN A).

The second area which was a real pleasure to work with all the time was

Fro

Col. Schelchshorn, Lt. Gen. Korte, Brig. Gen. Abraham, Maj. Gen. Rokos, RAdm. Cooling, Brig. Gen. Jaques-Bart.



- MRE, four days, four main events, which are totally in line with "ISAF Lines of Operations", incorporating a solid and mature air play, which was not to be a stand-alone event, but fed into all four events in order to emphasize the air/land integration of ISAF daily operations.

The ISAF exercise became more "exciting and challenging" when JFC Brunssum directed the JFTC to execute its Regional Command South RC (S) training at the Ulsnes training facility, at the same time! It has to be understood that this time the two training events were only co-located but not interlinked in terms of interac-

dures than it had been done before.

Additionally, the way the training was executed ensured that everybody in the TA had a much better understanding of what he/she is expected to contribute to the ISAF mission, and therefore is quite well prepared for the upcoming real world mission. That is what we owe to the future ISAF CSE staff members: Giving them the confidence in what they are supposed to do; to make the ISAF Headquarters machinery work, and support them in building a cohesive team. Again, this is just my personal opinion, but I guess that we have accomplished

Real Life Support (RLS). Mr. Jim Hatton, the responsible planner from RLS, used his military background and common sense and helped us wherever and whenever possible. Jim, thanks for sorting out all issues together with the team!

Lieutenant Colonel Geir Jensen (NOR A), Major Anne Haraldsen (NOR A), and Mr. Daren Gildert were the main planners within SMC4. Although 2/3 of the team were new in ISAF planning they focused immediately on the hot spots and they even attended our Refinement Conference in Kabul in order to better understand structures and procedures



in ISAF Headquarters in terms of CIS. Without your outstanding help and support from the technical side of the house throughout the entire planning process including the execution, the training could not happen at all.

The fourth area is the JWC Capability Development Division representatives. This time it was mainly Lieutenant Colonel Chuck Engel (USA F) who had been deeply involved in the scripting and development of a more relevant and substantial air play and in how to incorporate and execute it during ISAF TE 07/03. His expertise, based on a five week deployment to Kabul, and his advice was always welcomed and very valuable. Chuck, thanks a lot and also thanks to Colonel Per Roenning (NOR A) who was once again part of the EX-CEN and helped in many different areas, while preparing and running the MRE.

And last but not least, let me mention the outstanding good team effort within my planning team (actually the merged planning Team B and Team E). Everybody in the team – no matter how long he has been working for the JWC individually – has spent a lot of time and hard work into the preparation of ISAF TE 07/03. Many good ideas were brought up by our newcomers combined with the experience and expertise from the “older” team members guaranteed an exceptional planning phase from JED Exercise Planning Branch side.

Information Management was filled with life from the very first moment throughout the entire planning process. Some new approaches here, especially filling the MEL/MIL Chief with JED staff and the composition of the Battle Staff Training, which was build up as common effort by JED and JTDD, are worth a mention too. Thank you very much all in Team B and Team E!

I want to conclude with a mention

Facts from the two training events:

- Training Audience, ISAF CSE: 160 staff
- EXCON, ISAF CSE: 291 staff
- Training Audience, RC South: 147 staff
- EXCON RC South: 201 staff

Right: Officers and enlisted at JWC's Ulsnes Training Facility commemorated "Remembrance Day", 11 November 2007.



Right, top: Lt. Col. von Normann; Norwegian TV2 interview with Lt. General Korte and General Ramms, Commander JFC Brunssum; Col Per Rønning with General Ramms and a shot of the training audience.

that I am very grateful to all who were involved in making ISAF TE 07/03 happen (also all that I have not mentioned by name), and who supported in such an extraordinary manner. You all did a tremendous job and without your advice, support and help, I, as the Officer with Primary Responsibility, would not have

been able to do my job at all. Thanks for your comradeship, and it was a real pleasure to work with all of you the last two years. I wish all in JWC and everybody whom I worked with during the last two years all the best for you and your families and take care!

Bye-bye, cheers and ha det bra!



THE CHANGING FACE OF HEALTHCARE IN AFGHANISTAN

Photos and Story by CDR Rick Stead, GBR Navy
Joint Training Development Division Medical SME, JWC

These two days, and those people I encountered during them, have changed my view of the country for they are the future of the Afghan healthcare system. While we must accept that there are no short-term solutions, with these inspiring young people, and others to follow in their footsteps, Afghanistan has, in my opinion, a very bright future.



Boarding the plane for my flight to Kabul from Oslo, I was well aware that the civilian healthcare system in Afghanistan was fragile, but was not truly aware of the amount of development required to bring them into the 21st Century. What did become clear during my short stay in Kabul was the significance of the developmental steps taken by the healthcare system in the last 12 months.

As a result of the Taliban destruction of the healthcare system, Afghanistan has some of the worst health indicators in the world. The average mortality age is in a similar bracket to those of Liberia and Sierra Leone, and considerably worse than both Somalia and Sudan. In addition, infant and maternal mortality are extremely high, way above those of comparative countries (see map on Page 17). What I found during the first few days of my stay only served to confirm these statistics, as I was fortunate enough to witness the current state of healthcare for myself.

One of my first duties was to escort the NLD Surgeon General on his visit to ISAF and the Afghan National Military Hospital. The Military Hospital is described as the best Afghan equipped and staffed in the country, either military or civilian. Much foreign investment has taken place in the hospital including provision of a CT scanner, Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), digitised radiography, and ultrasonography to name but a few. However, the Emergency Room (ER) the wards presented a very different picture. Patient care was often provided by relatives and sanitation left much to be desired.

ANA soldiers from the recent bus bombings in Kabul were being cared for here, though all had to provide their own pharmaceuticals as only the very basics were provided by the hospital. The same applied to the one paediatric ward in the hospital. However the telling point came in the Intensive Care Wards. No patients, why? No ventilators, no monitors and no trained staff. As I subsequently discovered, the only intensive care beds currently available in Afghanistan are provided by ISAF and the Coalition, which



probably accounts for why 75% of their bed occupancy is taken up by ANSF and local national patients.

This visit left me quite despondent. If this was the best hospital in Afghanistan, what hope was there for the rest of the country? The future looked bleak. The following three weeks saw me covering the CJMED medical operations desk for two weeks and then I attended a one-week effects based planning working group, which acknowledged the difficul-

...the only intensive care beds currently available in Afghanistan are provided by ISAF and the Coalition

ties in healthcare provision but placed an operational timeline of around 15 years for any real progress to be made.

In other words it did nothing to allay my fears. However, two days in late October were to change my view, and give me real hope for the future of healthcare in Afghanistan.

Tuesday the 30th October allowed me the opportunity to accompany the CJMED Reconstruction & Development representative (Lt. Col. Marcel van Toor, NLD Army) and CSTC-A MEDAD (Colonel John Mitchell, USA Army) to the opening of a new, urgent and primary care clinic in one of the safer districts of Kabul. This clinic had been refurbished with money donated by CSTC-A and USAID and was now capable of providing a reasonable standard of nursing and emergency care.

However, it was the staff that really made the clinic visit worthwhile. Many of them, both men and women, had been

educated abroad having fled the Taliban oppression during the preceding years but were now returning to help build the new healthcare system. One in particular had chosen to return recently after 16 years living in San Diego, working as a realtor. She believed that the future for Afghanistan was bright and though she acknowledged it was long term held a vision of a system comparable to those found in western societies. I found it somewhat incomprehensible that she would choose the dusty Kabul over her comfortable life in San Diego but, as she herself said, this was her home, her future, and she wanted to be part of the new Afghanistan.

Later, as we made to leave this opening, the Minister of Public Health, His Excellency Dr Sayed Mohammad Amin Fatemi, invited us to a dormitory opening at a medical faculty the following day, an offer we could not refuse.

Wednesday duly dawned and we awaited the call from CSTC-A confirming timings for the day's events. This eventually came though our trip was almost curtailed following an SVBIED threat on the main roads around the



capital. In spite of this we, including our new French Medical Advisor Col An Nguyen-Tu, did make it out of the Headquarters and arrived at the Wazir Akbarkhan Medical Faculty just as the ceremony was about to start. We made our way into the hall and past a line of children holding flowers for the Minister. This ceremony followed a similar pattern to the previous day with prayers and speeches and thanks given the U.S. for the donations (all in Dari) which, in all, lasted well over an hour.

It was however lightened by the arrival of the children to sing to the Minister, in Dari of course. What they sang I will never know, but as with all these types of events it brought the widest smiles and the loudest round of applause of the day. This event was particularly remark-

than a little apprehensive.

However, as it turned out, we should not have been worried. We were met at the top of the stairs by around 20 young women, all eager to show us where they lived. The first room we were taken into was around five metres by five metres and was home to five nurse students. Each had her own bed and locker and in the middle of the room was a table. The table was laid with fine linen, a bone china tea service and had fruit, both fresh and dried, biscuits (cookies to the US readers), nuts and a variety of traditional Afghan snack foods. Each room we were taken to was the same. Beautifully clean with a wonderful table setting.

In the last room we were encouraged to eat and drink with the students. They appreciated the chance to practise their

graphs taken with these odd western medics. It was during these conversations that we discovered they were each paid only around \$50 per month and had provided the table spreads from their own pockets.

Furthermore, the salary they received from the Government during training required them to indenture themselves to Government service for around 15 years following its completion.

One of the students explained that while some were from Kabul many had travelled from the four corners of Afghanistan to be trained, and for many, this was the first time away from their families. She had been forced to flee to Pakistan some six years earlier following the Taliban persecution of her family. Now, she had returned alone in order to train as a nurse and devote something for the future of her country. Not only was she living away from her family on a very meagre wage by western standards, but was sending money back to Pakistan in order to help support them. Once again, like the clinic staff of the day before, all exuded a drive and enthusiasm rarely encountered in westerners of the same age. This was their Afghanistan and their future.

The whole experience was incredibly inspiring and truly humbling as it brought home how much we, in western societies, merely take for granted. As we descended the stairwell to leave, with

...Afghanistan has seen access to the Basic Package of Healthcare increase from 70% to 82% of the population in the last 12 months. As a direct result, the levels of infant mortality have fallen by around 25% thus saving the lives of approximately 87,000 children

able as this type of activity would have been prohibited during Taliban times.

As this ended and the Minister departed for the tour of the facilities, having cut the opening ribbon with great pomp. The ISAF party held back, talking to one of the teaching staff, an Afghan doctor who fortuitously spoke both French and English. Ten or so minutes of discussion passed and we found we had lost the main tour party. The Afghan doctor duly guided us into the dormitory in an attempt to catch the ministerial party. However, as we entered, we finally realised that this was actually a faculty for nurse training and we were entering the female nurses dormitory – oh, to be able to read and understand Dari!

Given the briefings we had before entering the country, regarding contact with Afghan females, we were all more

English and were eager to have photo-




the promise of a return with the printed photographs, we left behind the babble of young women talking. Young women who believed in their country's future, were prepared to invest not only time, but a great proportion of their lives, in building a working healthcare system in Afghanistan. It was a joy to hear.

While this country clearly still has a long way to go, the implementation of the Afghan National Development Strategy and its Medical Lines of development has taken a step in the right direction in allowing these young men and women to follow their goals and contribute to the provision of healthcare in this fledgling system.

The impact is already visible. Afghanistan has seen access to the Basic Package of Healthcare increase from 70% to 82% of the population in the last 12 months. As a direct result, the levels of infant mortality have fallen by around 25%, thus saving the lives of approximately 87,000 children.

While, to coin an analogy, the ISAF medical facilities in treating Afghan patients are providing fish to eat, the donations from aid agencies and the mentorship of CSTC-A are helping these strong, determined and self driven young people to become competent fishermen. And, with a developing Ministry behind them beginning to manufacturing their fishing rods, they will in time and with the right help, be able to cope for themselves.

It was a privilege to meet these people and my short time spent with them has only strengthened my conviction that ISAF must stay the course in order to support the Afghans in the birth and development of their future country. These two days, and those people I encountered during them, have changed my view of the country for they are the future of the Afghan healthcare system. While we must accept that there are no short-term solutions, with these inspiring young people, and others to follow in their footsteps, Afghanistan has, in my opinion, a very bright future.



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www.mapsofworld.com

JWC personnel (deployed for 4-5 week tours) in front of the ISAF Headquarters, Kabul, Afghanistan, 19 October 2007. From left: SSgt Mark Ledesma, CDR Rick Stead (author of this article), Fl Sgt Stephanie Macocco, LTC Gary Hill, SGM Meelis Koger. Photo provided by SGM Koger.

IO, NGO and White Cell operations are critical for JWC NATO exercises

"WHITE CELL"

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MISSION IN SUDAN




By CDR Christian Haggemiller, DEU N and MD, Analysis Officer for CIMIC, and Marvin Thordsen, Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC)

THREE times between November 2006 and June 2007, I deployed from the JALLC to the NATO Lessons Learned Training Cell in the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Joint Command Lisbon and the JALLC were tasked to train AMIS personnel on a newly developed Lessons Learned (LL) process and I was the JALLC member of that team. With this article, I hope to relate some of my experiences while involved in NATO's support and engagement in Ethiopia and Sudan.

THE NEED FOR AMIS LESSONS LEARNED

On 19 August 2006, the National Redemption Front ambushed an AMIS-escorted aviation fuel convoy in the vicinity of Kouma, Darfur and inflicted heavy casualties. Seventeen fuel trucks were taken and 32 drivers were abducted. The African Union's (AU) immediate reinforcement and rescue operation, in response to the ambush, was plagued by problems and setbacks.

AMIS is the AU's first full scale peace-keeping operation and has the objective of bringing peace to that troubled area. It is led by the AU and is supported by partner nations, NGOs, the EU and NATO. The operation has been ongoing for almost three years and the challenges and complexity of the conflict have



required continuous reinforcement of personnel and material; demands that have required the AU to re-examine and redefine its operational approach.

To better understand all the factors that led up to the Kouma ambush and the problems experienced in the aftermath, an ad hoc AMIS/Canadian Lessons Learned (LL) team was tasked to analyse the incident. The resultant report was extremely well received at all levels within AMIS and AU and became the driving force behind the AU's realisation that they needed to develop a LL system of their own within AMIS.

Two weeks after the Kouma ambush report was released, and despite multiple other commitments and scarce resources, the AU committed itself to the

establishment of a LL process within AMIS. The Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), the senior AU Headquarters for AMIS, issued a "Note Verbale" to the EU and NATO, requesting support for a comprehensive AMIS LL exercise to train and familiarise the AMIS personnel with the LL process in order to enhance future AU peace support operations and support AMIS in advance of transitioning to an AU-UN Hybrid mission.

The EU and NATO offered assistance, recognising that the AU would always have the lead in these efforts to support Africa as it searches for solutions to African problems. This philosophy mirrored the views of AU's Chairman, Alpha Oumar Konaré, former president of Mali (Read on Page 21).

Soon after, the roles of EU and NATO as support elements to the AU were clarified, and it was agreed the EU would assist NATO in the development of the LL process by leveraging its experience and existing assets (military and CIVPOL advisors) that were already in theatre.

Within NATO, Joint Command (JC) Lisbon and the Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) were tasked to support the effort by providing Lessons Learned personnel and expertise to form a train-the-trainer program for AMIS personnel. This was accomplished by the formation of the NATO Lessons Learned Training Cell (NLLTC) with



the first team member from JC Lisbon deployed in late October 2006 to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In early November 2006, the JALLC team member (your correspondent) was deployed.

LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS AND TRAINING AT AMIS

We began our work in Addis Ababa at the headquarters of the DITF, located in the Hilton hotel. The Hilton is a comfortable place that became my second home during this and two follow-on deployments to AMIS, especially after returning from the less comfortable conditions in Khartoum and El Fasher. It is convenient to reach the work site, i.e. just go downstairs, and was also well located to explore Addis Ababa, which is a fascinating and exotic city, and has a surprisingly enjoyable climate, situated as it is at an altitude of over 2400m. It has the largest market in Africa, interesting cuisine (if you have not tried Ethiopian food, you must) and some consider it the "Brussels of Africa", as it is home to the AU, the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the UN Conference Centre.

NATO has a small presence in Addis Ababa, led by the NATO Senior Liaison Military Officer (SMLO) to the AU/AMIS under the responsibility of JC Lisbon. This position is responsible for coordination of NATO strategic airlift support for AMIS troops/material, staff capacity building within DITF, and maintaining relationship to AU/AMIS. These responsibilities have now been expanded to include support in establishing a LL process within AMIS, which our team now began in earnest.

Once the NATO Lessons Learned team arrived in Addis Ababa, the first challenge was to develop a LL process, based on a draft AU LL SOP, that would be acceptable for all three levels of headquarters in AMIS. Simultaneously, JC Lisbon created a LL Database specifically designed for the AMIS Headquarters. Our partner during this phase was LTC Charles Debrah, Ghana Army, DITF Planning and Training Head, who staffed all of our work, gave us access to other branches and provided valuable feedback.

After having staffed a design of an AMIS Lessons Learned process, the next job was to promote it within all three AMIS headquarters (DITF, AMIS Headquarters in Khartoum and the Forward headquarters in El Fasher) in order to get the maximum support from the AMIS staff before proceeding with training AMIS LL personnel. This required travelling to the other two locations.

Travel to Khartoum was difficult because of visa issues, both for the NATO and AU members. Eventually, all team members succeeded in getting multi-entry visas, but on the first few trips, the whole team was not able to go together.

Travel to El Fasher is only possible via Khartoum. Khartoum, on the confluence of the White and the Blue Nile, is a hot and humid city, which takes a lot out of the traveller, especially with frequent sandstorms. It is, however, a very safe city and the presence of Chinese investment is noticeable everywhere.

El Fasher, on the other hand, located in the middle of Darfur, is isolated and dangerous. Two weeks before we came for our second training visit to the Forward Headquarters, we were informed of a great tragedy, in which one of our trainees, a young Major from Ghana, was gunned down and killed during a carjacking close to the headquarters.

Concurrently to promoting the process and building consensus, we began

the train-the-trainer project, which started in November 2006 and ended in May 2007. Officers such as Lt. Col. Yahaya Ssekitto of Uganda and Deputy Police Commissioner Thomas Ekebe from Nigeria were trained in a three-cycle program, over a period of several weeks, which began with a basic familiarisation, then introduction to analysis and Lessons Learned tools and finally practical exercises. Despite most of these officers already having more than enough work in their other headquarters' roles, they gave us their full attention and quickly understood what Lessons Learned are all about.

The idea was that once trained, these DITF LL personnel would be able to carry on training and promoting the process within AMIS without any NLLTC support and so enable them to generate their own LL resources. They then accompanied us as we travelled to the other headquarters to train personnel there, and led much of the training themselves.

During our final visits to all three headquarters, we debriefed the command groups on what we had achieved. Overall the NLLTC trained almost 50 AMIS personnel on the AMIS Lessons Learned process and AMIS now has a significant corps of individuals who have the skills necessary to conduct and generate their own Lessons.



DITF LL personnel presenting their results from the practical training exercise to the Command Group, at DITF, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.



PERSONAL REFLECTIONS

If I were asked what my lasting impressions are after several months of involvement with the African way of doing business, I would point out the following:

Working with individual officers and members of the AU was a distinct pleasure. Men such as Lt. Colonels Debrah and Ssekitto are dedicated to helping AMIS succeed and served as an inspiration for the NATO team members. Our trainees were extremely enthusiastic, worked hard and were very honest describing problems they faced. Some had very impressive background knowledge and even a prior knowledge of Lessons Learned. Nonetheless, some aspects of working in Africa require adjustment on the part of Western military officers. Schedules and appointments change regularly, often at the last minute, and there is a different attitude towards time and deadlines, which affects planning and expectations. An open mind, flexibility and improvisation skills are definitely called for. Once you understand the staffing and decision making process, which can differ greatly from ours,

at the end of the day, most of the agenda can still be accomplished. Quite simply, you must understand the culture you are operating within to maximise the impact you can make on missions such as this.

Just as in NATO, there is a common misunderstanding that Lessons Learned means evaluation and is frequently equated with blaming a person or an organisation. But in Africa, where courtesy and formality are the platform of communication, criticism and blame are perceived as extremely rude and can present an even larger barrier to achieving improvements based on lessons.

However, once the beneficial intent of the LL process, and the difference between it and evaluation was clear to the audience, the NLLTC were exceptionally well accepted at all working levels, and an honest and strong relationship was developed.

Currently, the three AMIS headquarters are understaffed and in many areas personnel are dual-hatted, so implementing a LL process has added - and will continue to add - a significant burden, which has to be prioritised with respect

to scarce resources. Under these conditions, it is not optimistic to expect that the AMIS LL Cell will produce instant results. In spite of this, the great enthusiasm and skills of the trained personnel and the effort that has gone into creating LL training reflects the AU's commitment to transformation and developing its capabilities and this new process should be continuously encouraged and supported. Possibilities to continue support could include establishing ongoing training and support visits to the AMIS Headquarters when personnel rotate or organising AMIS LL workshops where key personnel could produce lessons and recommendations.

This same view can be applied to AMIS on a more general level. AMIS is often portrayed as ineffective in the media, and the mandate as not robust enough. And the mission does face major obstacles and challenges in Darfur, like the lack of adequate materials and weapons, the harsh living conditions and the doubts of those who do not think AMIS is able to protect the population of Darfur. But one must note that AMIS is the first-ever major multinational operation the AU



In a refugee camp, women gather around a Non-Governmental Agency where they received help and assistance. More than 2.2 million people were displaced from their homes as a result of civil war. Photo by Allied Land Component Command Public Affairs Office, March 2006.





Advanced Lessons Learned Training group in Forward Mission Headquarters, El Fasher with NLLTC and DITF LL trainers in May 2007. The author is third from left.

has led, and as with any new organisation, the capability for operations of this nature will improve with time. The fact that the AU has even taken on such a challenge should be seen as a significant positive step for the whole continent. It is also impressive to recognize how so few people - there are just 60 personnel in each headquarters - are running such

a complex operation in an area as vast as France.

The planned AU-UN Hybrid mission will bring not only considerably more troops, material and a more robust mandate but new structures as well. The AMIS LL process will certainly need to be adapted to new C2 hierarchies. But, AMIS has a LL process that is op-

erational. The question now is whether this project can be considered “accomplished” or if the AU will need ongoing support from NATO.

It must be remembered that, for the small investment of half a dozen people, NATO has helped the AU develop a strong, new capability, possibly reducing the need to send greater resources at a future time. Where NATO can provide assistance to partner organisations which in turn enhances stability, it is clearly a win-win for both parties.

“No one else except Africa has a stake in securing Africa’s future. The continent must forge a united front in setting and maintaining its own agenda, dictated only by its own needs and the imperative of applying home-grown prescriptions that are adapted to its particular conditions. The assistance that we obtain from our international partners can only be additional or supplementary to our own hard work and resources. We are the architects of our own destiny.”

African Union Chairman Konare (2006)

CDR Haggemiller is a doctor in the German Navy Medical Corps, who serves as JALLC staff officer for medical and CIMIC analysis. In addition, he spent his childhood in the Central African Republic, Cameroon and Zaire, where his father worked as an agricultural researcher for the UN-FAO.



“The universe is transformation; our life is what our thoughts make it.”

- Marcus Aurelius, AD 121-180

TRANSFORMING IRAQI KEY LEADER TRAINING

By Lieutenant Colonel Johan C. Haraldsen, USA A
OPR IKLT, JWC

THE BEGINNING

On 28 June 2004, at the Summit Meeting in Istanbul, Turkey, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to support a request from the Iraqi Interim Government to help train Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in accordance with UN Security Resolution 1546. The aim of the mission was to help Iraq to meet its own security requirements with a new professional cadre of military and civilian security officials. NATO's efforts would focus on training and equipping; not combat operations.

By August 2004, the Initial NATO Training Implementation Mission (NTIM-I) advance party, which included 45 personnel drawn from ACT Headquarters, SHAPE, JFC Brüssel, JFC Naples and the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), arrived in Baghdad, Iraq with a mission to identify the present and future training needs of the ISF. On 16 December 2004 the mission was renamed the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) and placed under the umbrella of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) in order to coordinate and synchronize support to the ISF.

In close coordination with MNSTC-I, NATO has focused NTM-I's mission in three areas; the coordination and delivery of out-of-country training for ISF at NATO schools or other national training facilities, the coordination and valida-



“Iraqi Key Leader Training (IKLT) is a critical priority for the Joint Warfare Centre, Allied Command Transformation, and the NATO Alliance. Over the past three years, the course has grown and improved tremendously, completing now seven sessions. JWC IKLT stands as a shining, highly professional example of NATO training and education at its best. It continues to be in very high demand by the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense, and the JWC is here to meet their needs in forging a strong Government for the future of Iraq.”



**Brigadier General
Philip Ruhlman,
U.S. Air Force,
JWC Chief of Staff**

tion of donor nations' equipment offers to Iraq, and the development of an ISF education and doctrine infrastructure.

Out-of-country opportunities were quickly offered to the ISF and by October 2004 courses were being hosted at the NATO School in Germany and NATO Communication and Information Systems School in Italy. The JWC in Stavanger, Norway was given the mission of developing and hosting a training course for senior members of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (IMOD) and Iraqi Ministry of Interior (IMOI) with the aim of training military, police and government officials to understand Joint Command and Staff procedures in order to improve the overall capability of the ISF.

This course was named Iraqi Key Leader Training (IKLT).

IRAQI KEY LEADER TRAINING

In November 2004, JWC hosted its first iteration of IKLT with the following training objectives:

- Promote understanding of NATO from a strategic perspective, including SACT/JWC roles and responsibilities,
- Promote inter-agency coordination efforts to effectively and efficiently accomplish missions,
- Promote understanding of command and control arrangements, with particular emphasis on Joint Operations Centre working relations/methods,
- Understand and practice inter-agency communications,
- Understand and implement the concept of liaison.

A training program was developed based on a pedagogic learning model, also known as directed learning. In this model, the lecturers had complete control of the pace and direction of their presentations, and were directly supported by controlled and facilitated group work and study visits.

The consecutive translation method was selected to translate all verbal presentations from English to Arabic, and Arabic to English. Although slow and time consuming, it fit well with the learning model selected. The IKLT academic and social program was then developed based on the training objectives.



Photo above Lieutenant General Korte, DEU A, Director Joint Warfare Centre; below, Lieutenant General Eikenberry, USA A, Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, photos by SMstSgt Eise, JWC PAO.

The change to the andragogic teaching model resulted in a marked increase in the sophistication and quality of the program

Lectures and briefings for the initial iterations of IKLT were given in a wide variety of subjects including Command and Control in strategic and tactical operations, Crisis Management, the Operational Planning Process and Civil-Military cooperation. This was further supported by an extensive JWC-led visitation and social program, which incorporated visits to the Stavanger Police and Norwegian Joint Headquarters.

JWC decided at the initiation of the program to apply the same rigorous Training Improvement processes to IKLT, that it does to its operational deliverables to NATO. Through the active involvement of training analysts in IKLT, it became apparent after several iterations that the program would have to evolve or else be “out cycled” by the rapid increase in the capability and professionalism of the ISF. The IKLT staff and JWC analysts responded by carefully assessing both participant and lecturer feedback, and working with NTM-I staff in Baghdad to better understand the changes in the training audience.

The initial result of this was a change from consecutive translation to conference translation for both English to Arabic and Arabic to English. Conference translation is a method of instant translation of the speaker’s words in his own language. This is achieved by expert translators using high quality electronic equipment to convey the required version through the participants’ headsets.

This change also enabled the use of more sophisticated and integrated audio visual technology. The immediate result of employing this methodology was that presentations became shorter and more concise because the presenter was able to speak in “real-time”. Additionally, more time was available for questions and comments from the participants.

Adoption of the conference translation method also made it easier for the IKLT staff to evaluate changing the learning model. The assessed increase in the capability and professionalism

of the ISF presented unique challenges for the IKLT staff. It was essential that the course would not duplicate what was now being presented in the newly opened National Defense College (NDC), Joint Staff College, and Senior Staff Officer Course established in Iraq with the mentorship of NTM-I. To maintain the uniqueness of IKLT and maximize the flexibility in the program offerings, the IKLT team responded by changing the learning model from the pedagogic to an andragogic teaching model.

An andragogic teaching model is based on recognizing and building on the individual and collective experience of the participants. It is participatory oriented and enables the participants to “steer” the presentation to address issues relevant to their own individual and collective requirements. The change to the andragogic teaching model resulted in a marked increase in the sophistication and quality of the program.

By being able to draw on the rich source of experience in the training audience, and being problem centred, the lecturers were able to focus on the learning process rather than just the knowledge content.

Mr. Graham Day of the Pearson Peace Institute exemplifies an IKLT lecturer

who immediately took full advantage of the new learning model. His previous three hour lecture on police reform was transformed into an interactive discussion on security infrastructure and the root causes of violent lawlessness that was culminated by the participants creating a security infrastructure for one of Iraq’s provinces. Both the sophistication and complexity of the debate in the presentation confirmed what the earlier analysis had indicated, and Mr. Day was able to use the participants themselves to raise the level of discussion and compensate for the lack of case studies and models. This immediately made the presentation more relevant to the current situation in Iraq.

Based on the success of the andragogic teaching model, IKLT was expanded to include senior-level presentation blocks in Operational Leadership, Counterinsurgency Fundamentals and Leadership, and Middle East International Relations and Security.

The feedback from the participants of the most recent IKLT iteration has validated the new teaching model and has prompted the IKLT team to prepare presentation blocks in Strategic Leadership and Organizational Management for future courses.

THE FUTURE

The IKLT team and JWC will continue to transform both the methodology and content of Iraqi Key Leader Training to meet the needs of the ISF, so they can assist their government to address the security needs of the Iraqi people.



From left, Admiral Jan Reksten, Commander Norwegian National Joint Headquarters; Major General Roald Sundseth, DCOM NJHQ; Brigadier General Philip Ruhlman, COS JWC and Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Director JWC. Photo by SMstSgt Eise, JWC PAO.

By Colonel Brett Boudreau, CAN A
Public Affairs Advisor to the
Chairman of the Military Committee
and Spokesperson for the NATO
Military Committee



Reader for a Brave New (Wired) World

Highlights of the New NATO Military Public Affairs Policy



For thousands of years, telling the story of military operations was left mainly to powerful military men who had personally participated in the battles: Thucydides' Peloponnesian Wars, Grant's Memoirs, Frederick the Great's writings, Napoleon's Maxims and even Churchill's dispatches from the Boer War are well-known examples. Given the technology of the day, there was little chance of timely dissemination of the information, and distribution was limited, usually available only to elite (literate) audiences. Illustrations or paintings were the only means of showing what happened, and these were usually commissioned for dramatic propaganda effect, not necessarily to portray historical fact.

Today, the means of creating and disseminating information globally is in the hands of virtually anyone in the world with access to a computer or even a cellphone. It has never been easier for organisations such as NATO to promulgate information about their activities to local, national, regional or international audiences – be they supportive, indifferent, opposed or enemy in disposition. Conversely, it has never been easier for

Photo above: General Ray Henault, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, responds to media questions about the transformation of Lithuania's armed forces during a recent visit to Vilnius. Also pictured, the Lithuanian Chief of Defence and the Minister of Defence.



adversaries or other commentators using the same technologies to promulgate their news, views and opinions, with the aim of influencing perceptions, behaviours and public policy choices. Of note, these actors are not necessarily constrained by the same rule sets that govern our public communications.

For NATO, the post-Cold War, post-9/11 era has been marked by operations of unprecedented scale, scope and complexity in locations far from the traditional Euro-Atlantic geographic area. Presently, this includes concurrent operations in Iraq, Sudan, the Mediterranean, the Balkans, transiting the Horn of Africa and in Afghanistan; for the first time in its near-60-year-history, the Alliance

For NATO, the post-Cold War, post-9/11 era has been marked by operations of unprecedented scale, scope and complexity in locations far from the traditional Euro-Atlantic geographic area. Presently, this includes concurrent operations in Iraq, Sudan, the Mediterranean, the Balkans, transiting the Horn of Africa and in Afghanistan; for the first time in its near-60-year-history, the Alliance is engaged in sustained ground combat operations. NATO now has 64 members and Partners, up from just 16 in 1989, all with different communication needs. On the media front we should recall that Al-Jazeera started broadcasting 24/7 Arabic news only in 1996, Google dates from just September 1998, and YouTube is barely two years old. In a few short years, therefore, NATO's political dynamic has evolved, the operational environment has changed, and the media industry has transformed.

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Until recently, among the factors that limited NATO's ability to more effectively tell its story to audiences was a military public information policy that was dated and not attuned to the tectonic shifts afoot in the communications field.

The low organisational expectations of the function was well described in the MC457 NATO Military Public Information policy (June 2001), whereby "the NATO PIOs' working rhythm is mainly determined by a number of routine events, such as Change of Command ceremonies, training and exercises."

In September 2007, the Military Committee – NATO's 26 Chiefs of Defence – agreed a new military Public Affairs (PA) policy for the Alliance. More than two dozen major policy enhancements have been made, including a functional name change; a clarification of the aim, mission and definition of public affairs; an articulation of five PA principles; and a greater degree of empowerment for members to communicate more openly

to external and internal audiences about what they do. A number of other minor fixes to "clean up" legacy shortcomings have also been introduced. For instance, NATO was still establishing Coalition Press Information Centres (CPICs) in theatres including Afghanistan. These are now referred to as NATO Media Information Centres (NMICs) to reflect that NATO operations are not coalition operations, and that "media" is a more comprehensive term than "press".

The previous policy document was in itself the first such effort to articulate a more holistic approach to the function, replacing "Censorship of Information in Times of Crisis and War, 1976", and "MC Guidelines on dealing with the Press, 1997." MC457 initially served the PA

function well. It filled a yawning policy gap, spoke to the importance of proactive communications, and confirmed a reporting chain for PA direct to the commander. The policy was a particularly useful bulwark against encroachment from a new information activity coordinating capability – Information Operations – that was finding its own policy legs and place as well in the late 1990s, and threatened to subsume PA under its direct control.

Still, in light of the dramatic changes in the political, operational and media environments, the policy was due for revision. MC457 was informed by NATO lessons (distinct from lessons learned) from the relatively benign IFOR/SFOR operations, the Kosovo air campaign and the subsequent KFOR mission. The policy pre-dated the 9/11 attacks, 24/7 worldwide coverage of NATO's worldwide operations, and did not anticipate the power of the Internet, or the concomitant rise of the citizen journalist. In short, it was not surviving contact with the enemy.

The most obvious difference between MC457 and MC0457/1 is the name of the function – from Public Information to Public Affairs. Two reasons informed the decision to change. Firstly, in the previous policy, public information meant media relations and by definition, therefore, internal information and community relations were specifically excluded. To be sure, a modest number of brochures, newsletters and publications populated NATO headquarters and some outreach activities did take place. These were not, however, explicitly provided for by the policy and were applied inconsistently in different HQs, the level of ambition being driven by the force of the commander's personality or the PA office's creativity. The new policy acknowledges internal information and outreach as specific functional elements of PA, and calls for investments in each.

Second, sharing half its functional

Photos on P. 25: Danish co-pilot C130, photo by ISAF PAO; media during NATO live exercise Steadfast JAGUAR 2006, photo by JWC PAO; camera shot during the press conference by Younus Qanooni (speaker of the Afghan Parliament), 12 March, photo by ISAF.



name with Info Ops was causing confusion in direction, planning and policy/strategy work at many NATO headquarters. In the field, the understandable desire on the part of commanders to have a coordinated approach to information activities (“give me one neck to choke”) was tending towards Public Information being assigned to the J-3 or a Joint Effects section, often under direction of an artillery officer on the grounds that the function was but a “targeted fire”. This flew in the face of MC policy as well as many NATO nations’ doctrines that deliberately separated Info Ops from PA, so as to protect the organisation and the function against public and media charges of lying or truth manipulation.

In MC0457/1, Chiefs of Defence were careful to strengthen the existing distinction of a separate but related Info Ops/PA relationship, whereby coordination takes place “with” each other, rather than PA being coordinated “by” Info Ops.

Previously, the policy defined the function’s objective as being “to inform the general public about the Alliance and its activities, providing as much information as possible to the citizens of NATO and Partner countries and to other nations when the situation warrants such extension.” This formulation did not specify why the communication was needed, and seemed intent on providing a significant amount of information to an amorphous “general public” for the sake of it. The new policy describes the mission of NATO military PA as being, “to support commanders by communicating accurate information in a timely manner to audiences to improve public awareness and understanding ... thereby enhancing organisational credibility.”

Public Information was previously defined as “information which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the public fully informed, thereby gaining their understanding and support.” There are a number of problematic issues with this construction. From an evaluation perspective, there is no metric to measure and validate when a public, let alone “the [general] public” is “fully informed”: by any measure, the function was destined to fail. “Gaining



U.S. Army's own satellite news service in Atlanta (Technical Operations Centre for the DVIDs), July 29, photo by DVIDshub.net.

understanding” is also a phrase used in some national policies and doctrines, which to this writer looks and sounds very much like the intent of psychological operations, which deliberately sets out to modify behaviour. We do not expect that Al-Queda or other opposing forces are going to give us understanding and support, yet they certainly are one of the groups to whom we are communicating messages about our organisational intent.

NATO military PA is now described as “the function responsible to promote NATO’s military aims and objectives to audiences in order to enhance awareness and understanding of military aspects of the Alliance.” This is a stronger depiction of a function that actively engages media and commentators, to promote the aims and objectives of this organisation, and to improve public awareness of what it stands for, and what it is about.

Principles can be a useful guiding compass and particularly helpful in a semi-specialised function like PA where few nations have established it as a career field, and personnel are regularly

dispatched to fill NATO billets with limited training in the discipline. Applied with common sense and good judgment, principles serve as an intuitive checklist for PA staff and commanders alike in easy (a minor media query) or difficult situations (unit is engaged in a firefight, major equipment damaged, embedded media on scene, newswires running claims of many dead NATO soldiers and civilian casualties caused by NATO).

In the face of the new media and operational realities, the updated policy articulates five NATO PA principles:

- **Tell and show the NATO story** means that practitioners are Alliance proponents first and foremost, not national staff.

- **Provide accurate information in a timely manner** is critical to functional and organisational credibility. The PA impact of an activity is often directly proportional to the timeliness of the PA effort or response: the same information delivered quickly by NATO representatives can have a qualitatively different effect than the same information delivered a day later or even an hour later. Some nations prefer this principle de-



scribed as “maximum disclosure with minimum delay” or a similar formulation. This, though, does not really reflect the reality of reputational management practice, which needs to be able to run the gamut from “maximum disclosure with minimum delay” to “minimum disclosure with maximum delay”, depending on the issue and the context.

- **Ensure that information provided is consistent, complementary and coordinated.** The commonly held view is that “singing from the same song sheet” means that all parties are saying the same thing. This ideal state may be possible in national settings, but in NATO, there are real nuances in messaging required when communicating with so many different national target audiences. This principle recognizes that explaining a mission such as ISAF to American audiences is qualitatively different than the messaging needed for Dutch, German or Bulgarian audiences. It means that NATO members need to be singing in harmony, not necessarily singing exactly the same notes.

- **Practise appropriate operational security** is used in place of “security at source” found in several national directives, as it seems to convey a better sense of using common sense, good judgement and situational awareness when dealing with media and the broader public.

- **Conduct work mindful of multinational sensitivities, and respectful of the local and regional cultural environment.** NATO operations can be adversely affected by culturally inappropriate references or communication activities. Conversely, the effect and impact of communications is made stronger when it is informed by an understanding and appreciation of local custom, tradition and culture.

The statement in the new policy that says “all NATO HQs are required to have a PA capability” is an emphatic expression of support to resource the function by the Chiefs of Defence. Obviously, the needs will vary considerably amongst headquarters, depending on need, local circumstances, operational tempo, and breadth and scope of the mission. All air, land and sea Allied Component Command headquarters, for instance, do not

necessarily need to be organised the same, nor do they need the same PA capabilities as joint force HQs or SHAPE.

The policy does establish a minimum military requirement for each headquarters. This is described as being “**PA plans and policies, media operations, media monitoring and analysis, and production (writing, imagery, and web services).**” Certainly, it is easier to draft and approve policy statements than it is to make them operational and build effective, sustainable PA capability at each NATO headquarters.

While a full operational capability is not likely to be realized in the short term, staff are at least sensitised to the fact that the Military Committee wants to enhance the function, not to see it reduced further. It is hoped this expression of intent will provide some defence against further personnel cuts to the function that could stem from the new NATO Command Structure establishment (the “PE Review”).

NATO policy is to release accurate information with minimum of delay that is consistent with operational security and propriety. Given that everything NATO does or does not do is potentially subject to public scrutiny, characterizing the “intent of effort” helps prioritise work, assign resources, and establish reasonable expectations regarding outcomes. Previously, PA approaches were

defined as “passive”, “semi-active” and “active”, generally being left to imagination and interpretation as to how much staff effort should be expended to support a particular event, activity or issue. Now, approaches are described as “reactive” (not promote wide awareness, but a plan and lines may be developed in anticipation of media or public queries); “active” (routine effort to promote awareness); and “very active” (significant and deliberate effort invested to promote awareness).

The MC0457/1 document also now describes two categories of military spokespersons, and all NATO military headquarters are required to identify someone, be it an individual or by job assignment, as the public face of the organisation. Those who by virtue of their position or appointment are expected to speak to the media, including commanders and Chief PAOs, are official spokespersons. Designated spokespersons are those persons including media relations officers and subject matter experts who would be expected to speak to issues within their particular area of work knowledge.

The policy’s section on Internet and e-based communications has been significantly enhanced in response to the tremendous opportunities and challenges the Internet affords organisations and their communicators. It recognizes that



“World News Today” producer Pete Dubois says many of ISAF spokespersons and leaders seen on international news have been trained in front of “World News Today” cameras.

Media Training at the Joint Warfare Centre. Photos are taken by Sgt Chhoeun, USA A, during the RC South training event from 13-18 November 2007.





ACT Public Affairs Conference, Norfolk, Virginia, USA, 30 September-5 October 2007_ The agenda included discussion of public affairs support to ISAF experimentat
 Photos by JWC PAO and ACT PAO.

those who post information, news, views or opinions to the Internet using a blog can be as competitive and influential as the most established and largest media outlets. Citizen journalists may not be accredited media, but they are engaged in the security debate, be they well informed or otherwise. They can exert influence over public perception and un-

derstanding of NATO's operations and activities, and thus should be considered and factored into PA plans.

The authorities and guidelines in the policy respecting public electronic communications by NATO members are no different than those for other forms of external communication. Just as a letter to the editor by a NATO staff member

is subject to an approval process, the fact that the technology exists to allow virtually anyone to broadcast to the world, does not give blanket authority for NATO personnel to do so. The Internet provides excellent opportunities for our personnel to distribute useful and compelling information about NATO activities to audiences, consistent with security, propriety, and

guidance from supervisors and subject matter experts within the operational command chain. The procedure for "initial exercise press releases" has also been made much less onerous. In short, the old policy required that all NATO exercises be publicly announced ahead of time, the news release following a tortuous approval path including the entire Military Committee and the Political Committee agreeing on every word of every release. This was impractical to administer at all headquarters, and in fact the information was public knowledge in any event, a result of early civil-military contacts, including significant local and even national media coverage. The new policy, with very limited exceptions, devolves responsibility and accountability for assessing the need for a release to the headquarters conducting the exercise, and vests approval and release authority in the headquarters scheduling the exercise.

"Media embedding" is a real buzzword. Embedding refers to the opportunity for accredited media representatives to live with military forces and thus have



David Axe, a blogger, speaks during the ACT Public Affairs Conference, saying that blogs have a young audience and wider distribution than the traditional media.

- New Media Is
- Nimble
 - Flexible
 - Modular
 - Open-source



greater access with fewer restrictions on movement than a standard media visit. Simply put, a blanket NATO media embedding concept would not have passed muster in several nations. The new policy, though, describes a concept of “media integration”, in which Allies are encouraged to allow media access to its operations and other activities, including hosting accredited media at field headquarters or units.

Casualty notification has always been a sensitive subject, and unfortunately, NATO now has more experience to better inform itself in this regard. The new policy builds on the approach that has been in use now at ISAF for some time. It requires NATO PA offices in theatre to acknowledge deaths or serious injuries to personnel under NATO command, in accordance with the PA principles.

Ideally, NATO military PA will inform media first, and thus be ahead of adver-

sary efforts to shape and frame media coverage of the situation for their own purposes. This holds true in the case of single or multiple casualties from one or more nations. Release of the name, nationality and personal details remains a national responsibility.


Finally, the new policy revises the lexicon of PA-related terms, and includes a separate section describing the 15 PA products in wide use within NATO. This should help offices communicate a specific and unambiguous need – after all, national distinctions between a news conference, media opportunity, presser or newser, have sometimes led to different expectations and given rise to problems. What is not included and remains to be defined and agreed upon are the two important terms “Strategic Communications” and “Information Strategy”. There remain significant philosophical differences among nations as to what

these mean. Consensus of the 26 nations is not expected soon, and linguistic work-arounds to these two terms continue.

In summary, effective public affairs support to commanders at NATO field and standing HQs requires that the function be resourced and fully integrated into the decision-making process for military operations, policy development, programme design and service delivery. As such, a capacity to manage and deliver public affairs programming is expected at all NATO military HQs. This is not yet the reality and many systemic issues militate against substantive quick fixes.

New policy is admittedly not the silver bullet to the Alliance’s strategic communications challenges. Still, the discussion to develop a more solid policy foundation, to have it approved and then to start implementing it can hopefully be the catalyst for cultural change in our organisational communications.

Colonel Boudreau works in the Military International Staff as the Public Affairs Advisor to the Chairman of the Military Committee, and as the Military Committee’s spokesperson. His previous assignment in Canada was as Director of Military Public Affairs Plans and Operations, and as the Branch Advisor for the function.



426 SERVICES LARGEST EVENTS

By CJ Simonsen, Recreation Specialist, 426 Services Community Activity Centre- After making a surprise visit to the ISS on Monday 6th August, Spiderman then made a brief appearance at AAFES surprising the staff. Spiderman was brought to the base by the USAFE (United States Air Force in Europe) as part of their moral booster Summer Program Extreme Summer. Another exciting evening was enjoyed by over 150 children at the “3 Sword Club” when they were entertained by the Party Animals Live. There were stilt walkers, balloon animals, face painters and singing and dancing where all the children could join in. The party animals were brought here by courtesy of Armed Forces Entertainment. There will be more free AFE shows coming to the base in 2008. Ever tried bowling with a turkey? That’s exactly what 20 members of the Community tried to do on Friday 16th November with the best of three rounds winning the turkey. It proved not to be so easy as everyone thought! And of course, the first photo is taken from Halloween where we had “Trunk or Treat”! There will be plenty more events happening throughout December and lots of things planned for 2008. For more information on upcoming Services events check out our website www.426services.com.

Capability Development Division Joint Experimentation

Exercise Narvik Explorer

Article by Wg Cdr Jamie Sharp, UK F
Capability Development Division, JWC

Photos by SMstSgt Juergen Eise, DEU A
JWC PAO

IN October 2006, 70 members for the JWC successfully completed the first ever JWC Battlefield Tour and Staffride, "Exercise Tungtvann" in the Telemark region of Norway. Following on from the success of this event, it was decided to make the JWC Battlefield Tour and Staffride an annual event. The 2007 event, "Exercise Narvik Explorer", was an ambitious undertaking combining a Battlefield Tour and Staffride with a joint JWC/Norwegian JFHQ Offsite event, inside the Arctic Circle in Northern Norway.

This year's Battlefield Tour focused on the "Battles of Narvik" fought during the Norwegian Campaign of 1940. The Battles at Narvik saw both joint and combined operations being undertaken

for the first time in World War II, and also the first combined operation to recapture occupied territory. So, the importance of studying such a campaign is evident. As well as being a highly interesting study of military history, it was important from the outset that the aim of the tour was focused on investigating and analysing successes and failures of the campaign from both the Allied and German perspectives. This would enable JWC officers and enlisted to put lessons from that campaign into the context of NATO operations today.

Planning for the event commenced in earnest in January this year with the formation of a Core Planning Team (CPT) led by Lt. Col. Bjorn Jenssen under the guidance of Chief CDD, Col. Per Roen-

ning (the fact that Col. Roenning hails from this part of the world is pure coincidence). The CPT consisted of JWC staff representing the six nations involved in the campaign - British, French, Norwegian and Polish personnel - representing the Allied side and German and Austrian personnel representing the Axis forces.

In addition, budget, PAO and transportation personnel were all represented in the CPT. Given the challenges of conducting an event of this size, it was crucial to get the basics right at the outset and transportation was a key enabler for the success of the tour. Major Ingvar Danielsen did a sterling job throughout the planning and execution to ensure the team were in the right place at the right time and with the correct mode







of transport, be that by aeroplane, ship, coach or train.

The Battlefield tour was conducted in 3 Phases, with Phase 1 the planning and recces, Phase 2 a full academics programme held at the JWC, and Phase 3 the actual execution at Narvik.

During Phase 1, the requirements for the tour were scoped and a skeleton programme for the execution week was developed. In conjunction with this, SMEs were identified from National sources, both military and civilian academics, of the countries represented at Narvik. This ensured that Phase 2 could be conducted by a team with a wealth of knowledge on the Campaign that would prepare the participants as fully as possible for Phase 3. The academics programme was conducted over two identical days at the JWC, and provided JWC and Norwegian JHQ staff with the opportunity to gain a detailed insight and analysis of the road towards the Campaign and the operations themselves.

We were lucky to have distinguished visiting lecturers such as Professor Olav Riste from the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and Major-General (Retd) Hovland former Commander of the Norwegian 6th Div. who provided a unique perspective on the Campaign from the Grand Strategic down to the tactical levels. Additionally, members of the JWC CPT had researched and then presented their analysis of specific national elements of the Campaign with the aim of providing the audience with sufficient detail to gain the maximum benefit during Phase 3. The first of the two days was rounded off with a most enjoyable reception for the CPT and guest lecturers hosted by the COS.

Phase 3 was planned in such a way to provide a feel for the environment as well as a detailed representation of the events in April to June 1940, using a



combination of 'stands', mini planning exercises for the audience, walking the terrain, amphibious fjord crossings and a trip into the hills to General Dietl's Headquarters. It was also very important to the CPT to ensure that during the actual tour, there was an opportunity for everyone involved to have time to reflect on the sacrifices made on both sides during the Campaign.

Having managed to successfully transport 100 personnel 800 miles north of Stavanger, courtesy of a chartered SAS aircraft, the first day was spent receiving initial briefings regarding the two Naval Battles of Narvik before embarking on the KV Nordkapp for the transit from Ramsund into Narvik. This followed the route that the German, and, subsequently the British warships took as they engaged in the initial battles of Narvik. It also provided a unique opportunity for the team to orientate themselves and enjoy some stunning scenery.

The day was rounded off with a fascinating visit to the Narvik War Museum followed by some well earned R & R in the hotel bar and a reception for the off-site participants.

Day 2 was the main effort regarding the actual battles with Major Knut Hagen of the Norwegian Military Academy and Major-General Hovland leading the two groups expertly around Laphaugen, Gratangen, Øse and Bjerkvik. The team were required to conduct a series of mini-planning exercises which provided active participation on a cold and damp day. Day 3 was primarily concerned with the environment and terrain

of the area, with the groups undertaking a memorable amphibious fjord crossing and landing, with the help of amphibious landing craft provided by the INGBN 6 Div (Nor), before 'tabbing' up Orneset-Taraldsvik mountain, the steep terrain the Allied forces fought up immediately following the landing. Given the state of some team at the top of the hill, this provided an excellent method of seeing at first hand the conditions the soldiers fought and we were not being shot at! The walking continued in the afternoon with another long trek on the Ankenes peninsular to see first hand the Polish 2nd Battalion approach to Narvik.

On Day 4, we turned our attention to remembering the sacrifices made by all involved with the Campaign with a moving and poignant ceremony held at the Narvik War Memorial, led by the Norwegian 6th Division Chaplain, Lt. Col. Roald Lindaker. Individual ceremonies were then held by the nations represented at the respective memorial sites, to complete a very special and memorable morning. The team then boarded a train for a stunning trip up into the hills to see General Dietl's Headquarters and experience the iron ore railway, which was the focus for the operations 67 years ago. For some, the afternoon was spent exploring the wreck of 'FF George Thiele' at the head of the Rombaken Fjord.

Our final evening was spent as a team having dinner together in the hotel. This provided an opportunity to thank our guests for outstanding support and for some competitive singing between our Swedish and Norwegian members. This marked the end of the formal Battlefield tour. Our trip back to Stavanger took us on a cultural tour through the area towards Harstad, followed by visits to the impressive 40.6 cm Adolf Cannon, the most northerly stone built church in the world and local museum.

Exercise Narvik Explorer had been an ambitious undertaking and given the feedback from the members of the Tour a hugely successful one. Given the demanding programme of the JWC, to have a window to participate in such an event and travel, learn and socialise as a group, resulted in a thoroughly rewarding experience. The challenge now is to build on this success for 2008's event.

A Holistic Approach to Project Management

By Lt. Hilmi Ozdemir, Command Group/DOS, JWC
and Ltjg Aysegul Ozdemir, Turkish Navy

EVERYBODY defines “project” according to his background, education and training, experience, work environment, and perspective by emphasizing different aspects of project that he thinks those aspects are the most important ones from his own perspective. People also define project, based on the size and type of their projects that they work with. This takes us to an environment where many different project definitions are created and hired. We consider this situation as the first challenge in the project management. Since having a clear terminology is very important especially at the outset of any project, we need to search or create and adopt project terminology for our projects.

There is no universally accepted project definition, even though there are several bodies of knowledge that provide some standard terminology out in the business. However, we still can talk about some typical characteristics that a project might have. According to Andersen S. Erling (Project Management, 2005), projects will typically:

- Execute certain tasks
- Be temporarily or limited in duration
- Initiated by the base organization
- Produce certain outcomes/deliverables and assist change for the users
- Involve several people with different experience and qualification
- Have resources (IT systems, machines, etc.) within given budget
- Attract the interest of many people and groups, stakeholders, within the project, base organization, and elsewhere
- Be influenced by uncertainties within

and beyond the project.

Some researchers take the use of project management approach back to ancient times when the Great Pyramid of Giza (2550 B.C.) was built. Some of them think that project management approach was used during 16th century. However, almost all researchers agree that the use of project management started in 1950s with the modern meaning when scheduling techniques such as Critical Path Analysis (CPA) and Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) was created.

When we go to the roots of the term “project”, we see that an action of entrainment of events had been appointed to this term. The Latin word *projectum* means, “to throw something forward”. The word “project” originally meant, “something that comes before anything else is done”. When the word is initially adopted, it referred to a plan of something, not to the act of actually carrying this plan out. Something performed in accordance with a project was called an object. This use of project changed in the 1950s when several techniques for project management were introduced. (“Project Management in the Past”, www.lessons-from-history.com).

We believe it would not be a wise thing to list all different project definitions here. Instead of this, we can talk about different perspectives. As we all know, perspectives are the driving forces that help us shape our approaches to reality. Erling S. Andersen talks about the perspectives listed below and their focal points in his book while discussing project management:

- Task perspective: Focus on defining

the tasks, planning and organizing the work, and execute the work based on the plans. This perspective is the most widely used perspective.

- Organizational perspective: Focus on temporary nature of the project. Project, which is a temporary organization, delivers products to the base organization.

- Change perspective: Focus on goals. Project equals to Change.

- Resource perspective: Focus on how base organization prioritizes the resources for the projects. Base organization managers try to control resources into project work.


- Stakeholder perspective: Focus on the project stakeholders (who are they?) and their attitudes.

- System perspective: Focus on input/process/output. This perspective mostly deals with system performance.

In our study, we advocate organizational perspective and use the definition of project from this perspective point of view. The organizational perspective better fits especially when we deal with the Person-System-Organization (PSO) type change projects. We will use this according to Andersen’s view on project, which is “a project is a temporary organization, established by its base organization to carry out an assignment on its behalf”.

We have built a project management house in order to demonstrate a holistic approach to project management in schematic way by hiring organizational approach and Andersen’s above project definition. We tried to make this very complex subject of project management, a little bit more understandable and user





friendly. When we say project, we always refer to change projects throughout the study. We will try to touch briefly on all blocks in the project management house. Our aim is just to introduce a broader approach to the ones who are interested in or dealing with the programs, or the projects to some extent. We believe that project team members might have better outlook and better define their position, responsibilities, and relationships with others with a broader approach. By doing this, those team members can get out of the box and see their contribution to the overall project's goal and mission achievement.

At the very bottom of the house, we have the project foundation blocks and the relationship blocks between the base organization and the project. These blocks are the key ones in order to have a good project start. We can build a sustainable project house only if we con-

struct the foundation strong enough.

Base organization is the permanent organization that puts the project in place. Base organization starts a project because it believes project will help accomplish its strategies in order to reach its vision. The project owner is the person or unit, in which the ultimate responsibility for the project lies within the base organization. The project owner's main job is to work as a bridge between the base organization and the project. Usually, a project owner appoints a deputy, a person who acts on his behalf, especially in the daily talks with the project manager. A project owner can also appoint a whole group to release his duties. These groups are generally referred to as steering committees. A steering committee shall be composed of senior line managers. Steering committee's main job is to optimize the relations between the base organization and the project.

Having a clear responsibility sharing between the base organization and the project is a critical issue within project management. Responsibilities must be agreed upon and set down in writing. A responsibility chart is a useful way of clarifying responsibilities between the base organization and the project. The project owner shall be accountable for mission accomplishment (outcome responsibility) and responsible for approving general plans, basic project structure and main control principles. The project manager shall be in charge of goal achievement and goal-mission compatibility and responsible for planning, organizing, and controlling the project. While both base organization and project are carrying out their responsibilities, they have to work in close coordination. At the same time, this close coordination shall not jeopardize especially the freedom of project's actions. The base organization shall more



focus on the deliverables by clarifying what it wants from the project, but not saying how the project shall produce. Otherwise, the project's creativity, innovation, and novelty may be obstructed.

Project selection strategy determines the speed of the change that the base organization can absorb. Every organization needs to determine their own strategies since they cannot accept or receive all the project proposals on the table. There are different strategies used by the organizations. Some of them prefer to wait until the need for change becomes a matter of life and death (radical changes), while some others want to keep the change speed under their control by either adapting themselves to market change speed (reactive) or scheduling changes and determining change speed (proactive). None of these strategies are necessarily better than the others. All of them can be used concurrently. It has been approved that organizations had some good results by hiring more than one strategy concurrently. Here, the significant issue is that every organization should have a project selection strategy. After selecting a project, the base organization shall answer two important questions: why and what? The answer to "why" question shall be captured in "Business Case" document by clarifying the reasons for establishing that specific project. And the answer to "what" question becomes an "Assignment" the base organization gives the project.

The project identity is an important factor in order to generate support for the project. The project identity is not something that can be assigned, but something that can be acquired or gained. Project identity is the image or outlook shared by both internal and external stakeholders. The base organization's clear mission and goals are two very important factors that help the project gain identity. Giving a simple name to the project, determining project owner, assigning project manager, establishing a steering committee, and explaining the reasons for establishing the project may also contribute the project acquire identity.

The value of the project can be simply articulated by the difference between the project benefit and the project cost.

Project benefit is the positive impacts of the project expressed in monetary terms, while the project cost includes every sacrifice made for the project, again expressed in monetary terms. It is not always that easy to express both benefits and costs in monetary terms. However, it is possible to estimate their financial impacts on the productivity as percentages. The responsibility of determining project value again goes to both base organization and the project.

The project owner and the project manager shall together define the project's mission and goals. The mission of the project expresses the main reason of project establishment and describes a future situation in the base organization, which project is set up to realize, whereas goals are the tangible aims and commitments defining the project's deliverables. Project success depends on the project delivering on time, within budget, and with the required quality. However, success also depends on the base organization making the effort to use those products. Project success equals the sum of project management success and project product success. Two main success criteria are goal achievement and mission achievement. Goal achievement is related to project management success and is project's responsibility. Mission achievement is about project product success and is base organization's responsibility.

In the organizational perspective, planning, which is one of the earliest management tasks, is essential for communication between the project and the base organization. The initial activities done within the context of planning process are combined in the project startup. Project success throughout the project life cycle mostly depends on how we effectively manage to accomplish startup activities. Here, three critical factors play significant roles, which are: common understanding, involving a wide range of stakeholders, and open communication. Organizational perspective advocates tiered planning for some good reasons such as effective management, use of delegation benefit, creating real commitments, effective distribution of technical details, effective control mechanism, easy

modification, and proper information sharing with the stakeholders. Planning process takes place in three different levels such as strategic, tactical, and operational. Strategy is something bigger than a plan. Nevertheless, it makes sense to produce plans only when we know strategies. Strategy determines the project strategy and serves to resolve challenges. When we talk about project strategy, we mean positioning (generic) strategy and implementation (detailed) strategy. Global (tactical) plan is built by the project owner by the help of project manager and project team members and mainly expresses the project's practical goals. Detailed (operational) plan is drafted by project managers and his team members and expresses the ways to reach defined goals. All these plans shall comply with each other in an integrated way.

Uncertainty is a fact of life. It is everywhere with a continuous variation in volume and effect. Technically, uncertainty is equal to necessary information minus available information. Since uncertainty is not avoidable, we need to manage uncertainty, in contrary to defensive risk management, with the aim of finding solutions that improve the project. We see uncertainty effects mostly during project selection strategy determination phase and project plan implementation phase. Uncertainty can be managed only if we understand what causes it. Typical circumstances that trigger uncertainty are lack of information, lack of knowledge, and lack of control. From control point of view, organizational perspective proposes some uncertainty management solutions like: reducing dependency on others, letting others handle uncertainty, and accepting uncertainty, but reducing the impacts of negative outcomes.

Andersen discusses two types of organizations: action organization and political organization. Action organization is an ideology-oriented organization in which everybody concentrates on the steps required to carry out the project's assignment just as defined by task perspective and is designed to generate results in the form of goods and services. Contrary to action organization, political organization is hypocrisy-oriented and allows different views and ideas to meet expectations of



many different groups just like a typical political party behaviour: "They say one thing to please one group, and take decisions that please another, and they make products that please a third". Here, there is an organizational dilemma, which is that the projects are partly action organizations and partly political organizations. Organizational perspective's solution to this dilemma is separating actions from politics by hiring a loosely coupled system. We believe two lanes connected to each other in a railroad can best visualize this solution.

The relations between the base organization and the project are an external organizational structure issue, while the relations between the project manager and the project team members are internal organizational structure. Organizational perspective discusses about three different external organizational structures such as Integrated Project, Matrix Organization (weak, balanced, strong), and Pure Organization. Organizational perspective considers strong matrix organization as the best option for change projects. The internal organizational depends on the external structure. Isomorphic, Specialty, Egoless, and Surgical Team Structures are different internal organizational structures that can be applied during phases of a project. Team development is a critical issue within organizational perspective. This perspective advocates that the project should be flexible enough to build a team that understands change process and be capable of managing change. The focal point should be complementarity that is finding a right mix of different personalities and different skills.

Project control generally consists of describing current status, assessing degree of deviation between current status and plans, conducting an investigation into the causes of the deviation, determining what needs to be done to solve the problem, and, implementing the decisions. Organizational perspective focuses on the evaluation and assessment of future goal and mission achievements. One of the widely used assessment tools is the Balanced Score Cards that gathers huge amount of status data from different resources and delivers comprehensive and manageable data to the management.

There are also holistic evaluation models for quality assurance purpose out in the business area such as X Model and European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) Model. EFQM Model is more detailed than X Model, and X Model is simpler, more understandable, and more transparent than the EFQM Model.

By the help of mentioned assessment tools and methods, projects can assess, evaluate, and reduce the project escalation effects, which is the project management's propensity to overspend resources into a specific project with a very low success probability. Most of the useful lessons learned data are obtained during the project control process. Projects are good venues that provide knowledge to the base organization and help base organization become a learning organization. The issue here is to be able to transform lessons learned data into information and then knowledge and transfer this knowledge to the base organization. Then we can talk about an organizational learning that is a process whereby knowledge enhances behavioral patterns in the organization.

Now, we have reached the roof of the project management house. Up to here we have introduced a project management theory from organizational point of view. According to this theory, project manager plays very significant role in order to make his project successful. A project cannot be a project without a project manager. When the project manager is named, the project becomes official. Project manager shall have skills in the areas of leadership, motivation, conflict management, communication, trust, and empowerment and carry out some project management tasks related to these areas.

Maturity is about doing something, resolving to do it, and having the capacity to do it. Project management maturity signifies an organization that is using its projects in an optimal way. If we consider maturity growing by stages, using staircase analogy would be a good option. The project maturity staircase has three levels: Portfolio Management at the strategic level, Program Management at the tactical level, and Project Management at

the operational level, whereas portfolio consists of several programs and program includes several projects in them.

Project management must be a discipline with space for different perspectives and approaches, one size does not fit all.

This article is extracted from an interactive CD book (A Holistic Project Management Approach from Organizational Perspective), which also has been created by the authors of this article. If you are interested in more details, please contact the authors via mehmethilmiozdemir@yahoo.com or aysegulkulekciydemir@yahoo.com.



NEWS FROM 'ME TIME' SALON

The salon has been open six months now and we have enjoyed steady business during this time. We encourage and welcome new clients to the salon. We would like to remind you that all local base community personnel whether on Jatta, Ulsnes, Madla, Soma, or Sola, including National HQ, JWC personnel, local national civilians, support elements and their family members are entitled to use the salon for treatments! We have flexible hours to suit most and treatments are available for men and women alike.

If you are thinking of a special Christmas gift for yourself or a loved one then why not give a gift that calms your mind and body creating wellness!



Merry Christmas from
Helen and Kristina



SARAH CHAYES



Story by Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO; photo by Captain Debbie Trader-Miller, U.S. Navy

How many American women drive around Kandahar, Afghanistan, in a red truck, and consult with tribal leaders, Afghan Government officials, and NATO Commanders? Sarah Chayes, recently at the Joint Warfare Centre for training of the upcoming ISAF command of Afghanistan's Regional Command South, fits the description.

HER day job is making soap. With a group of Afghans, she founded the Arghand Cooperative in 2005. Here, they transform local fruit crops and raw materials such as almonds, apricots, pomegranates and roses into "a unique line of soaps and oils, whose aesthetic beauty and skin-nourishing virtues are unparalleled". But, the molding of fragrant bars of soaps hardly sums up her varied and interesting experience in Afghanistan.

SARAH Chayes is the author of "The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the Taliban". She has an extraordinary life. As an American she lived and worked overseas in Paris as a correspondent for National Public Radio until 2002, reporting from the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East. The same year she quit reporting and moved to Kandahar, the ancient capital of Afghanistan, where she eventually became a political player fluent in Pashto, working in the non-governmental sector. Many initiatives followed when Sarah Chayes devoted herself to help reconstructing the war-torn country: She established Afghan Independent Radio (AIR), Afghanistan's first free radio station, in 2003. She helped run an Afghan non-governmental, non-profit organization, Afghans for Civil Society (ACS) until 2004. ACS was actually founded by President

Karzai's older brother, and working with him gave Sarah Chayes unusual access to Afghan and international officials from the very beginning. She sponsored the rebuilding of homes for which she raised money from private citizens in America. In May 2005, she set up the Arghand Cooperative. Being one of her great achievements, the Arghand Cooperative currently employs 12 people, but the raw material itself is bought from the Afghan villagers. The initiative has created a community in the West, and they have volunteers who do the dispatching to the retailers. One newspaper article quoted this process as a venture that "encourages farmers to grow roses instead of opium poppies."

"I am often described as a war correspondent, but I don't consider that I have ever been a war correspondent. What fascinates me is not the conflict itself, but the potential that comes after, the potential that is encompassed in a post-conflict society. I am fascinated by that, because you are rebuilding all the basic structures that are the foundations of the society," she said.

Sarah Chayes is happy in her maveric role as an active member of the Afghan society; trying to help in the ways she profoundly believes to be the best way for the country and its people. In particular, she believes it is up to the international community to hold Afghan officials to account.

"Establishing respectable and accountable structures of governance is the key in Afghanistan. Another key thing is never forgetting the fact that the remaking of a country depends on intimate understanding of the population. That's where we need improvement."

Knitting the fabric of society ...

We met Sarah Chayes at Ulsnes, during the Regional Command South preparation exercise where she worked as part of the "White Cell" team. White Cell is a military term used to define a group of civilians who participate in an exercise in order to build up a realistic exercise scenario. In the case of Afghanistan, a strong White Cell is particularly important because civilians, like Chayes, have often spent years in theatre, not just the few months of a typical military rotation, and so are crucial to adding nuanced and current understanding of conditions incoming officers are likely to encounter.

During a break from the training, we had an exclusive interview with Sarah Chayes, first about her life in Kandahar and then about the role of NATO's training events. What had inspired her in this long process, and why has she made a home in Kandahar?

"There is a kind of topos of people going to Afghanistan and falling in love with



it. It is certainly true that I feel a sense of connection to southern Afghanistan, Kandahar in particular. But that was not what motivated me. I believe that we live in an interconnected world with very rich and diverse, self-contradictory civilizations that are intimately intertwined, that have a lot to learn from, and teach, each other. When 9/11 happened, it was instantly clear to me that this was the event that was going to define the 21st century. As I said, I believe in inter-connectedness. I don't believe in the clash of civilizations, where the world is divided up into opposing hostile blocks, with the Muslim world taking over the role left vacant by the vanquished Soviet Union. If we 'lose' Afghanistan, then we are taking another step back towards a bipolar world that Europe has only now really emerged from, and which is just a terrible waste of human potential. It seemed to me that the best place to try to make a contribution was Kandahar. Because Kandahar was so symbolic: It was the other ground zero. It was like the antipode. There was New York on one side, and then there was the place where the attacks on World Trade Centre were planned. And that was Kandahar. But, later on, the degree to which I was able to integrate myself was kind of a surprise," she said.

Still, Sarah Chayes is ferociously brave to live and work in a city where women are not even supposed to speak, and daily violence is routine. She has already seen her share of the violence with two death threats as well as a bomb placed in a drain outside her front gate. She used to dress up in Afghan men's clothes when she first came to Kandahar. Now, she says, she is back to that dressing habit, because the situation has been worsening through the Fall and the city is on high alert.

In 2006, Sarah Chayes published "The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the Taliban". The book starts with a funeral, the funeral of her best Afghan friend, Zabit Ekrem, Kabul Chief of Police. "He got blown-up in an explosion in Kandahar, which killed 22 people. It was devastating on a variety of levels. One was the personal level, and the other one was for the country because he was the most gifted and constructive Afghan official I had met," she said.

"The Punishment of Virtue" is about Kandahar, with focus on how the post-Tal-

iban political situation installed warlords back into power. "The same warlords who ruined Afghanistan have been ushered back to power by the international community," she said.

Although she details her frustrations, Sarah Chayes is genuinely in love with Kandahar and its people. Her fascination and affection are returned and she received a warm welcome from the Afghans. That's, after all, why she is still living there and knitting the fabric of the society together a bit more.

The achievements of Sarah Chayes helped her integration with the country, a man's world, into which women are simply not supposed to venture. Chayes believes part of what has helped her survive in Kandahar has been her willingness to live the way most Afghans do, and in particular, not to pay too much attention to her personal security. "I act in ways that Afghans see as being physically courageous," she says; "though it is easier for me than for them, since I haven't been through the trauma and the violence that has marked their lives for decades. But, courage is very important in their culture, and I get credit for the way I act. A friend of mine's brother once told a guest, 'Sarah is the bravest man in Kandahar!' Of course it's nonsense, but this image has helped my integration a lot."

I asked her how could there be any improvement when half of the population is not allowed to participate fully in their society. She answered with a stern face that 'women's plight' is not the main issue right now in Afghanistan and it won't be solved until security is achieved. "I don't think you can approach the status of women until there is more security. The only way you can improve the status of women is on a purely material level, and that's what I am trying to do by employing women."

"You cannot expect to re-make a country on six-month rotations"

The exercise held at Ulsnes for ISAF's Canadian-led Regional Command South was designed to improve officers' effectiveness as soon as they hit the ground. During the training, a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) was conducted with the aim to ensure that the incoming staff possesses an understanding of mission related doctrine, plans and systems specific to their individual

functions, as well as to build capable, confident and cohesive staff teams.

Sarah Chayes said that NATO's training events were extraordinary with an incredible amount of effort and integrity. But she also insisted that deployed teams should be well integrated with the local community, and also that the White Cell had a great role in achieving that purpose. "This is my second NATO training and to be quite honest, I entered the previous training in a negative frame of mind. Then, I saw how much effort goes into it, especially in creating a deep and realistic White Cell. What I can say about this training audience is that they are taking the White Cell extremely seriously, which is very positive. It means that they understand that their mission is not exclusively on the battlefield," she said.

Sarah Chayes admitted that the personality of the Commander made a big difference, especially when it comes to integration with the locals. According to her, if you had independent contacts with the community, you could avoid being manipulated by local powers.

Sarah Chayes believes in good governance to such an extent that she says a dramatic improvement in the way Afghan Government officials treat their citizens could even put an end to the fighting in the battlefield. "Let's say that a Governor helps you mount an operation that leaves 10 Taliban insurgents dead on the battlefield; but that same Governor is so corrupt that his behaviour creates 30 Taliban. So, you would actually do better if you could discipline the Governor and demand that he be responsive to his citizens."

Another change she would like to see, she said, was longer rotations.

"There is the disruption caused by short rotations. I know it is hard on people and their families, but you cannot expect to re-make a country on six-month rotations."

At the end of the interview, we asked her if there was anything she missed from her life in Paris, which she made her home after leaving the United States in 1992. "I am a marathon runner, I had to stop running in Afghanistan," she answered. "But thanks to friendships made through the Joint Force Training Centre and at the Joint Warfare Centre in Ulsnes, I am training to run this year's midnight sun marathon in Tromso, Norway...if my old bones can stand it."

THE Stavanger region will be the European Capital of Culture in 2008. This is the unrivalled, most innovative and grand-scale culture event ever in Norway. Budgeted at 300 million NOK for the period 2004-2009, the Stavanger2008 programme will offer over 1000 different events and create a new cultural experience while encouraging "openness, curiosity and adventure". Stavanger2008 is led by native Scot Mary Miller, who began her career as a violinist. In time, she became Chief Music Editor of a Scottish national newspaper, worked with the BBC, served as Head of Contemporary Music Activities at the English National Opera, and directed many international festivals both in the United Kingdom and across the United States. As a festival director, she is known for "a superb sense of artistic excellence, an exuberant energy, commitment to community and collaboration, as well as a delightful sense of humour"⁽¹⁾. She firmly believes that the essence of Stavanger2008 is to be an "open port" of art and culture; a port open to everyone - "to those who have never thought of themselves as creative, right through to those for whom the highest forms of art are daily bread". His Majesty King Harald has agreed to be the patron of Stavanger2008.

- As a Briton, how have you been involved with Stavanger2008 European Capital of Culture project?

- I started my career as a concert violinist. I was very lucky because I played with top professionals. Then, in late 1980s I started to write. Gradually, the more I wrote, the less I played. Then, I became Chief Music Editor on the national paper in Scotland. Around that time, I also got very involved in programme making; I did a lot of work for the BBC. I started to direct a festival of



An interview with

MARY MILLER

"Our Vision is Open Port!"

By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

Nordic culture in the very far north of Scotland, which is where I come from. For me, the interest in Nordic music and the Nordic work was always there; I don't even remember when that began⁽²⁾. I think it was always there somewhere in my make-up. During that Nordic Festival we did a lot of work with Norway and Norwegian composers. We gave lots of Norwegian companies their U.K. debuts, like Jo Strømgren Dance Company. We organized a big exhibition to present the works of Håkan Gullvag, one of Norway's most important painters. Actually, not just Norwegian artists, but we also worked with Danish, Swedish, Icelandic and even Greenlandic artists. I directed that festival for six years. Also, when I left journalism, I became Head of Con-

temporary Work at the English National Opera. Again, we took a lot of Nordic composers to England and the English National Opera. I then went to America for four years. I went to work in New Haven, Connecticut, to direct the International Festival of Arts and Ideas, which again involved a lot of Nordic artists. I developed a very close relationship with the Norwegian Consulate in New York. And then, by just a series of accidents in a way, I was appointed to this job in November 2004. I had to stay in America to finish off my last festival there. But I commuted to Stavanger in most of 2005 until I arrived here permanently that same year in August.

- What were the main motivations be-



hind the city's application for this title?

- I think there was this tremendous sense that this city had grown so fast, that it had a tremendous concentration of very fine cultural organizations. But, I think the primary thing was awareness that in the past the city has gone through transformations. It had herring, and it was rich. Then it became very poor. Then it had canning industry, and then it became very poor again. And then there was oil. There is this sense that 'something must be there' in the event of the oil running out. I think that there is this feeling that the city needs to be strong, powerful and confident to deal with that should it happen. So there was this sense that if there was a cultural infrastructure in the city, people would be strong, motivated and powerful, have good self-esteem and be able to meet that challenge if it came. And you need to start sooner than later. So, I think that really was the motivation. And also when you look back to the original reason why this 'Capitals of Culture' were invented way back in the 1980s, it was that the culture should empower a city the way commerce and industry did. So, I think there is a very genuine motivation behind cities becoming capitals of culture.

- In your view, what characteristics of Stavanger make it unique?

- I think Stavanger is a quite amazing, polished little city. It is a city that's a great survivor for a start. There is the sense of the city functioning as a unit, in a way it is like a very good orchestra where everybody is playing their parts. There is a lot of work to be done obviously with in-



tegration, and there is a very interesting balance of quite a high number of immigrant population and a very old population. There is a road still to travel there, so to speak. I think there is an incredible concentration of people in this city who really want the best for it. For example, if you look at the Viking Football Team and the Viking organization, that is so far beyond just a football team. It is a social force for good in the city in that the management of that team really is looking after young people there. They have all kinds of enterprises. It is a very comprehensive organization, which really believes in doing good for the city. And that's very impressive. Also, there are so many international organizations here. There are so many tremendously good schools and incredibly impressive teachers. There is something very cohesive about the city that is very impressive and very outward looking.

- About your team here: How many people are working with you? Which languages do you work in?

- For 2008, we will have 30 people. It is a very small team for a project which encompasses over a 1000 events. We have a Programme Department, and that Programme Department also encompasses a Production Department. We have an Administration and Finance Department, who are running the finance for the organization very responsibly; and integral to that is a team working very closely with our sponsors. We also have a Marketing and Communication Department. If you take our programme at the centre, because it is the programme that has to be what this is all about, everybody is locked into that programme. Everybody here speaks very good English. We also have a couple of very good French speakers and some German. But, primarily we operate in Norwegian and English.

- Are you cooperating with other cities in Europe that have already held the title? Is there any cooperation with Liverpool, the partner city?

- We are cooperating with a lot of cities that have held the title. We have very regular network of meetings, which I am

not always able to attend, but there is one member of staff who is very linked into those cities. And we have direct contact with a number of people who have directed Capitals of Culture. So there is very strong dialogue there. In terms of Liverpool, we have one or two projects, which are direct collaborations. And we have a great deal going on between our schools and the Liverpool schools. One of the things that is unfortunate about this experience is that the Director of Capital of Culture in Liverpool left about a year ago. I knew her very well and we had planned a great deal of collaboration. When she left, that possibility of collaborating disappeared. There are strong links between the cities, but there is not as much collaboration as either of us would have liked.

- The opening of the project will take place on January 12, under the main theme of Open Port. Can you describe some of the highlights of this day?

- We will have a formal opening ceremony at the Stavanger Concert Hall. The King and Queen of Norway will be here. We will have some very important international spokesmen for Norway. The performers are from Norway, Israel, France, etc. Many nationalities will be involved. There will be three brand new commissions from important Norwegian composers. In the afternoon, we will have a huge parade, which involves performers from all 26 of Rogaland's kommuner, or urban and rural districts. We have worked very hard to make sure that the new citizens of Norway are involved in that. There will be many nationalities taking part, people who have just moved here from other countries. The event, overall, is being produced by the French company CPM. They are bringing dozens of street performers based in France, comprising a very large mix of nationalities. For example they are bringing a whole klezmer orchestra and a lot of those people are not French by origin. So, it is hard for me to add up all the nationalities, but it will be a very multinational thing. In the evening we are throwing open every venue in the city. And we are planning lots of performers, concerts and events. It is very



important that this really represents the enormous diversity in this city. You know, this is European Capital of Culture; our programme is very European in that international aspect. It is critical that we remember it is not just Rogaland Capital of Culture - it has got to be a major international project in a way that has not happened in Norway before. And for the future of this city, that openness and that international sense in terms of culture are critical.

- We see many artists, intellectuals, philosophers, historians, designers and architects involved in the project. Is Stavanger2008 only a cultural project, or does it involve discussions and important talks about Europe's future too?

- I think primarily it is a cultural project, but if culture is going to underpin the way we live and the way that we want the future to be, then we have to also talk about culture's role in Europe. We have to talk about culture in the widest possible sense, you know, about how culture influences the way we think, the way we work, the way we relate to other countries and the way we relate to each other. I don't think that you can talk about culture without talking in a profound way about what it means to be European; for instance, how we see ourselves as a nation in relation to the world. For example, we have a project, one which looks at what it means to be Norwegian in 2008. So, that's essentially a project about identity. We are looking at how people express their identity through what they make, what they craft, what they create as a designer, people making ceramics or even, you know, how people design toys. How does that express their identity? And that project, which will have crafts people from all over Norway, will also have a very large international input. It is also curated by Li Edelkoort, a Dutch artist who lives in Paris, and whose primary focus is to look at global influences on how we create things for the future. So for me you cannot call this just a cultural project. The more I work on this European Cultural Project, the more I am personally concerned, having just come back from four years in America, about what a growing

gulf there is between the European culture and the American culture. But it is not something that we necessarily address in Stavanger2008. In terms of this project, I think the long term impact is the most important point of doing it; in 2009, 2010 and beyond, if the city does not feel different, then we failed. 2008 is about putting in place a different state of mind - I think that is the most critical thing. This can't be thought of as just a year long festival. We constantly think that Norway is a great place, that Norway is terrific, that we have everything. We can be very self-contained. I understand entirely why Norway does not want to join the European Union; you know Norway is just fine as it is. But I think that we have to be European citizens. We have to look and to recognize that there are extraordinary influences elsewhere in Europe that we have to pay attention to. Take the way we designed the programme - all year we are bringing in international artists and having them collaborate with Norwegian artists. There is a sharing of ideas and sharing of competence there. If there is not that exchange of ideas and competence, then at the end of 2008 there will have been nothing more than a lot of fun. If we bring people together, then we build something for the long term.

- What will 2008 hold for the Stavanger population?

- I think there are many, many audiences; there is not just one audience out there. There are some suspicious people at the moment. When we have the opening ceremony and they see everybody together and something that's never happened here before, that will be kind of, not a wake-up call, but it will be 'oh, so this is what this is!'. But, this is certainly not at all about huge extravagant parades. For some people it will be about three wonderful Shakespeare plays by Oskarus Korsunovas Theatre Company; for many schools it will be an opportunity to have workshops with international artists; for some people it might be about terrific rock concerts. They are all in the programme. If you look, there is something that can appeal to absolutely everybody. The critical thing is



that everything is at a level that is so unexpectedly high - while there is 'something for everybody' does not mean that we brought the level down. If everybody reaches up, they will find something - we really want people to take that step to a place they have not been before. I think the more people get involved, the more people make that step and participate. That is the challenge of the Open Port - a door won't open unless you turn the handle. And we want people to turn that handle!

^① Dan Miglio, Chairman of New Haven Festival, 2004, which presented over its 16-day duration 300 events, involving 1,500 artists and thinkers from Connecticut, the U.S. and more than 30 countries overseas, attracting 100,000 attendees.

^② Before moving to the U.S., Miller directed the Northlands Festival, the United Kingdom's premier festival of Nordic and British culture, situated in the rural far North of Scotland.

Photos by Lt. Col. Dieter Stoll, DEU F, SMC4, JWC

STAVANGER2008 Values:

- Freedom of Speech & Tolerance
- Hospitality & Accessibility
- Cultural Heritage & Development
- Innovation & Quality
- Architecture, Environment Aesthetics



*God Jul
og Godt Nytt År...*

And so we light one candle tonight
We light it for joy
It stands and shines for itself
And everyone present
So we light one candle tonight -
We light it for joy

So we light two candles tonight
We light them for hope and joy
They stand and shine for themselves
And for everyone present
So we light two candles tonight -
We light them for hope and joy

So we light three candles tonight
We light them for longing, hope and joy
They stand and shine for themselves
And for everyone present
So we light three candles tonight -
We light them for longing, hope and joy

We light four candles tonight
And let them burn down
For longing, hope, and joy
But most of all for peace on this earth
Where humans live.

- Inger Hagerup