NATO OTAN

THE THREE SWORDS

STAVANGER - NORWAY

The Magazine of the Joint Warfare Centre

3 November 2008 – Issue No: 14

LANDMARK CEREMONY:
Foundation Stone laid for new JWC Facility

JWC welcomes new Chief of Staff:
Brigadier General Scott D. West

ISAF SPECIAL:
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Interview:
JWC's new CIS infrastructure design

ENABLER 08-2:
C-IED experimentation at JWC, a top priority concept for HQ SACT

JWC TURNS 5

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Cover _ Norwegian Minister of Defence, Anne Grete Strøm-Erichsen and Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre laying the Foundation Stone of new JWC Facility, 23 October 2008. Photograph by MSG Baekler, DEU AF, JWC PAO.

TURNING 5: HAPPY BIRTHDAY DEAR READERS,

The magazine you are holding in your hands is not only this year's last issue of The Three Swords, but also the first issue to mark the happy fifth birthday of the Joint Warfare Centre. NATO will celebrate its 60 years anniversary next year, and JWC is a successful, dynamic offspring of the Alliance. As a mark of this, the Foundation Stone for the new JWC facility was laid during a ceremony on 23 October which, symbolically enough, is exactly five years to the day that JWC was officially inaugurated in 2003.

The Three Swords magazine is a dynamic forward-moving magazine, always remaining in step with JWC as it grows and changes. Its success is due not only to the PAO team's efforts, but also to the active contribution from each and every one of you. Without your enthusiasm and firm belief in this organization, the magazine would not be able to mirror its diversity. The magazine's variety not only reflects upon the different aspects of JWC as an organization, but also speaks volumes about all the truly fabulous people on its staff.

It is with pleasure and humility that I write my first editorial as Chief PAO. I am truly grateful for this opportunity to serve JWC and will do my very best to live up to my new responsibilities. My previous experience working as "PIO" on the national side may, I hope, help create a synergy between national and NATO information practices. My team and I will certainly work hard to reach our goals in the interest of Public Affairs.

As a representative of the host nation, I have a responsibility to welcome new arrivals. Right now, as I type these words, many of you may feel you see Norway through heavy rain, high winds, darkness, and overcast skies. Don't panic; just a reminder that the rough weather season is here and will last for another four months or so. In Norway, there is a saying that there is no such thing as bad weather, only bad clothing. Quite so! I invite those of you who are yet to challenge nature in Norway to unplug, get outside and look around. I promise that you will not be disappointed. You serve with NATO in Norway for a limited period of time. Make the most of it, focusing not only on work, but also on exploring Norway. Back in 1893, the Norwegian politician, philosopher and farmer Anders Vassbotn wrote a piece he called **"Å leva, det er å elska" - "To Live Is To Love"**. It later became a cherished poem and hymn. Vassbotn lived at Volda, Sunnmøre, in the northern part of West-Norway. Awesome nature and hard work at the farm may have inspired him to write poetry. Let the following verse of his poem accompany you on your Norwegian tour:

To live is to love the best
Your soul could ever give;
To live is always to strive
Towards nobler goals;
To live is to realize
The greatest value of life;
To live is to pursue truth
In all your ways;
To live is to forget
All injustice and lies;
To live is to do as the ocean does
--- Mirror God's Heaven.

HAPPY AUTUMN AND HAPPY READING!

Lt. Col. Elisabeth Eikeland, NOR AF,
Chief Public Affairs Office, Joint Warfare Centre

PUBLISH AN ARTICLE IN THE THREE SWORDS!
We are always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you have got something to say, send it to us. We will be happy to consider it for publication. Email your articles, as well as your comments and feedback to JWC CG PAO Common (CRONOS) or inci.kucukaksoy@jwc.nato.int.

The Three Swords

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The Three Swords is the authorized unofficial publication produced by the JWC Public Affairs Office. It represents a compilation of articles, reports, news and general information related to JWC personnel and their families. The articles and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy of NATO. The Editor reserves the right to edit or shorten submissions.

PUBLISHED THREE TIMES A YEAR

Thanks _
CDR Dr Dusan Marincic, Slovenian Army, JTDD, JWC

Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte

German Army
Commander, Joint Warfare Centre

With the just completed summer season, a calmer phase has come to an end as well... After the execution of Steadfast Juncture 08, and ISAF Training Event 08-01, which was followed by Allied Reach 08 in July, we began a period of well-deserved block leave. This was a phase without major exercise execution events – but it was full with many planning activities! Still, that allowed us to spend a little more time than usual with our families. After diverse divisional offsites, we concentrated our efforts on Stand-Alone Experimentation Exercise Enabler 08-2. Now, we are busy with several planning events and preparations for the upcoming Steadfast Series of Exercises and our final ISAF training event this year.

This summer of 2008 has also been a time of significant personnel turnover at the Joint Warfare Centre. Not only do we welcome Brigadier General Scott D. West, and his wife Jane, in our Headquarters and community, who took the Chief of Staff position from Brigadier General Ruhlman on 19 August, but we also welcome many new staff members of all ranks and nationalities and their families. I hope all of you have settled by now and the houses, kindergartens and schools are sorted! Big personnel turnovers always represent a challenge in terms of transfer of knowledge, personified experience leaving the entity, teambuilding and also personality. Existing and proved structures have to be transformed and advanced along with the incorporation of the "newcomers".

I would like to take the opportunity to encourage all those newcomers not only to work hard to become professional in their respective positions as soon as possible, but also to grab or download and read as many of The Three Swords magazines as you can get, and thus, get a well balanced overview of the Joint Warfare Centre and our activities; with regard to the broad variety of themes and topics covered in our magazine, that doubtlessly help you to orientate. In the context of the help and support from your colleagues and comrades you will quickly feel "at home" in the JWC, I am sure.

Fortunately, the summer also afforded opportunity to conduct events such as the JWC Sports Day (congratulations again, our Joint Exercise Division!) or the reknowned Oktoberfest, both provided opportunities to get to know the new faces around you.

Just having returned from the well orchestrated staff ride, OTX Plunder, daylight hours may become less but working hours grow longer. Many of JWC's main efforts in terms of the execution of exercises and the visibility of our training efforts to other headquarters can be found in the upcoming quarter: IKLT is ongoing, we will shortly start Steadfast Joiner and ISAF TE 08-02 is back-to-back with it. The next two months will almost flash by...

As we work through our Program of Work, our new Training Facility is growing steadily. The building itself is almost finished. The Three Swords issue at hand provides you with an update from Mr Dag Malde about the construction process and it also includes an interview with Mr Garry Hargreaves about the technical enhancements that are being planned for the new building, which have no equivalence in NATO and will put us on the edge of technical infrastructure. The Norwegian Minister of Defence, Anne Grete Strøm-Erichsen will conduct the Foundation Stone Laying Ceremony on 23 October, the date that also marks the fifth birthday of our Centre.

Further, you will find an article about Stand-Alone Experimentation Event Enabler 08-2, which investigated one of the most important NATO concepts under development – the C-IED concept – and casually aimed at improving internal JWC experimentation processes and capabilities. WgCdr Andy Jones penned an article about Steadfast Juncture 08, having seen JC Lisbon deploy to Stavanger and finally making up for around 900 Training Audience and EXCON personnel at Ulsnes. There is an article about our overall ISAF Training by Lt. Col. Bob Taylor, and an overview of ISAF TE 08-01 by Lt. Col. Pedersen, having prepared NRDC-T and augmentees for their current mission in ISAF HQ. Lt. Col. Keith Morgan from US Air Force Special Operations Command offers a factor-based analysis proposal of the complexity of the ISAF mission. And, Mr Pete Dubois gives a glance behind the scenes of World News Today. There is even much more to discover! Enjoy reading.

Joint Warfare Centre Celebrates Fifth Anniversary

The Foundation Stone for Joint Warfare Centre's (JWC) new training facility was laid during a ceremony on 23 October, which is exactly five years to the day that JWC was officially inaugurated in 2003.

By Inci Kucukaksoy; Photographs by MSG Raphael Baekler, DEU AF; JWC PAO

NATO's Joint Warfare Centre celebrated its fifth anniversary during the Stone Laying Ceremony for its new training facility on 23 October 2008. Among the notables attending were the Norwegian Minister of Defence, Anne Grete Strøm-Erichsen; Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre; Vice Admiral Jan Reksten, Commander Norwegian National Joint Headquarters; Mr Frode Sjursen, President and CEO of Norwegian Defence Estates Agency (NDEA), the managing authority of the construction; Mr Reidar Bringedal, NDEA Regional Director, along with representatives of many civilian and military authorities and the members of the media.

Like those present, Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte was in an anniversary mood: "We are delighted," he said, "to mark our fifth anniversary with such a unique and special event." He then went on to say: "The construction of the new JWC training facility underlines what I consider to be one of the greatest achievements of the past five years. I see it as a major advancement for the future of the Joint Warfare Centre. You can see it rising from its base in splendour and imposing a striking figure. Its construction is a testament to the commitment of NATO and Norway to the future of the Joint Warfare Centre."

JWC'S NEW BUILDING IS CRITICAL TO NATO'S TRAINING CAPABILITIES

The Foundation Stone Laying Ceremony represented the successful beginning of the most advanced training facility ever available to NATO.

The construction of JWC's new training facility is a NATO-funded infrastructure project, which was approved on 6 December 2004, and the money was authorised on 25 April 2006. Just like the Joint Warfare Centre itself, the new training facility is a ground breaking transformational concept for NATO. Built on an area of 13.390 square metres, the five-storey new building will give the Joint Warfare Centre a state-of-the-art exercise, experimentation and conference facility, while providing a transformational, computer-heavy simulation environment that is highly realistic.

Norwegian Minister of Defence, Anne Grete Strøm-Erichsen

The training facility can accommodate over 1,000 people at once. It includes an auditorium seating 600 and a TV studio for the generation of scenario news.

For the innovative Computer and Information Systems implementation, JWC is working with the Norwegian Ministry of Defence; JWC's superior Headquar-

CONTINUED ON PAGE 53

Spotlight on the new training centre

6 December 2004: Construction approved by NATO.
13.390 m²: Area of construction.
The training facility can accommodate **over 1,000** people at once. It includes an **auditorium seating 600** and a full **TV studio**.
1 April 2009: The civil work construction of JWC's new training facility is scheduled to complete.
Final cost of the construction is around **750 million NOK.**

During a handover ceremony at the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) on Tuesday 19 August 2008, Brigadier General Scott D. West, U.S. Air Force, took over as Chief of Staff of the Joint Warfare Centre from Brigadier General Philip M. Ruhlman, U.S. Air Force. For the first time in JWC, a ceremony was held to welcome an incoming Chief of Staff. With this premiere event, a new tradition is born in Joint Warfare Centre.

JWC welcomes new Chief of Staff: Brigadier General Scott D. West

By Inci Kucukaksoy; Photographs by MSG Raphael Baekler, DEU AF; JWC PAO

BRIGADIER General Scott D. West, U.S. Air Force, assumed the position as Chief of Staff for the Joint Warfare Centre on 19 August 2008. Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, German Army, Commander JWC, led the handover ceremony, which was attended by the JWC staff and their family members, along with representatives of many civilian and military authorities. Several dignitaries from Stavanger also graced the occassion. The ceremony kicked off a new tradition at JWC by marking the arrival of a new Chief of Staff.

Brigadier General West arrived to JWC from Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, where he was the Commander of the 613th Air and Space Operations Centre. Although this is his first NATO assignment, Brigadier General West has an international background, with previous appointments taking him from Korea to Germany and Hawaii. His major awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, the Air Force Achievement Medal, the Joint Meritorious Unit Award, the Combat Readiness Medal, the Korean Defense Service Medal, and the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal.

Relinquishing the position he held for two years, the former Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Philip Ruhlman, U.S. Air Force, will next assume the duty as Commander of the 36th Wing, headquartered at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.

At the ceremony, Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, expressed great appreciation for Brigadier General Ruhlman's invaluable contribution to the Joint Warfare Centre. His "broad leadership experience, excellent knowledge in all questions of training, exercises, standardization, evaluation, strategy, and concept and doctrine development was of great advantage to the Joint Warfare

Centre," the Commander said, adding: "He always acted in line with the Commander's intent and to the best of the Joint Warfare Centre as a trustworthy, loyal and competent advisor."

Lieutenant General Korte's speech conveyed words of friendship and goodwill for the future.

"We all say thank you once again for your excellent and comradely work, and we wish you and your family good luck, success and God bless you all."

Lieutenant General Korte then warmly welcomed Brigadier General West to the vital NATO mission. He expressed his best wishes for success and talked about the role of the Chief of Staff and the challenges he faces amid high expectations.

Lieutenant General Korte described the role of Chief of Staff in terms of mission and responsibility accompanied with complete loyalty and faith. He said: "The Chief of Staff, who is at the same time the Deputy Commander of JWC, is without doubt the central and most important position at the Joint Warfare Centre. (...) The Chief of Staff is the alter ego of his commander. With him, the commander shares all his thinking and planning. Without him, he makes no important decisions."

Brigadier General West said in the ceremony: "This is my first assignment to NATO. I am excited about working in the Joint Warfare Centre, where multinational thinking, collaboration and action contribute to the success of NATO and 'respect' is an adjective others use to describe our organization. Plus, living in Norway is the icing on the cake; few places in the world are so scenic. So, for a first assignment in NATO, I don't think I could have received a better duty."

He then told the audience that he and his wife, Jane, look forward to joining the outstanding team of military and civilian professionals at the Joint Warfare Centre and said that they are very pleased to be given the opportunity to live in Norway and learn more about this multifaceted country.

Addressing the Joint Warfare Centre staff, he said: "I look forward to serving with you, and working to improve NATO's command and control capabilities. Both General Korte and General Ruhlman have expressed their appreciation for the professionalism of the JWC

staff, and each voiced a great sense of pride. I know a sense of pride will grow on me, and I will work with each of you to be an effective and competent part of the outstanding multinational team you have built."

Brigadier General West did not forget to mention the support he received during his move to Stavanger.

"In 19 military moves around the world, this transition has been the best, both professionally and personally," he concluded.

"Both General Korte and General Ruhlman have expressed their appreciation for the professionalism of the JWC staff, and each voiced a great sense of pride. I know a sense of pride will grow on me, and I will work with each of you to be an effective and competent part of the outstanding multinational team you have built."
- Brigadier General West

Brigadier General Scott D. West, U.S. Air Force, Chief of Staff, Joint Warfare Centre

Brigadier General Scott D. West is the Chief of Staff of the Joint Warfare Centre, Supreme Allied Command for Transformation, NATO, Stavanger, Norway. The Joint Warfare Centre is comprised of representatives of NATO and Partnership for Peace member countries, and promotes and conducts joint and combined experimentation, concept and doctrine development, and operational-level training to improve NATO's capabilities and interoperability. Key responsibilities include Battle Staff Training for the operational headquarters of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and NATO Response Force (NRF). The Joint Warfare Centre also conducts Iraqi Key Leader Training for senior representatives of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Iraqi Ministry of the Interior.

Brigadier General West entered the U. S. Air Force in 1982 after graduating from The Citadel. His first assignment was as a civil engineer Homestead Air Force Base in Florida. In 1984, Brigadier General West entered undergraduate pilot training in Mississippi and later completed lead-in fighter training at Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico. Brigadier General West learned to fly the F-16 in 1986 at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, and continued to fly/instruct in the F-16 at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and MacDill Air Force Base, Florida through 1994. His next tour was as staff officer in the Pentagon where after he attended the Air Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. In 1998, Brigadier General West completed duty as assistant operations officer and operations officer at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, and in 1999, took command of the 36th Fighter Squadron at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea. He next attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort McNair, Washington D.C., and assumed command of the 8th Operations Group, Kunsan Air Base, Republic of Korea. In January 2003, he was assigned as Chief of Forces Division, (J-8), on the Joint Staff, and in 2005, assumed his duties as vice commander of the 52nd Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany. Brigadier General West subsequently commanded the 27th Fighter Wing at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, and the 613th Air and Space Operations Center, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, until joining the Joint Warfare Center in 2008.

A command pilot, Brigadier General West has logged over 2,500 hours in the F-16, T-37, T-38 and A-10 aircraft. His awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, the Air Force Achievement Medal, the Joint Meritorious Unit Award, the Combat Readiness Medal, the Korean Defense Service Medal, and the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal.

By Adrian Williamson, OA, Concept Development Division, JWC
Photographs by MSG Raphael Baekler, DEU AF; JWC PAO

C-IED C2 Experimentation at Joint Warfare Centre



22 to 26 September 2008 witnessed the execution of **ENABLER 08-2**, NATO's third Stand-Alone Experimentation event to be hosted at JWC's Training Facility in Ulsnes. 150 participants from the NATO Command Structure, NATO Nations and PFP Nations executed a Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED) experiment as experiment controllers, data collectors/analysts, C-IED Subject Matter Experts, members of Experimentation Units (i.e. the "lab rats") or as the Experiment Response Group.

A total of 20 headquarters/units and 26 Nations were represented, giving some indication of the breadth of interest that C-IED, one of the top priority concepts for HQ SACT, holds for the NATO community and its Partners.

ENABLER 08-2 was scheduled by HQ SACT to support the concept development work of NATO's C-IED Integrated Project Team (C-IED IPT). The C-IED IPT believed that obtaining the right C2 structure (i.e. organisation) and supporting processes are critical to tackling the IED threat and, in discussion with HQ SACT experimentation experts, identified Stand-Alone Experimentation at JWC as the best means of providing the information they needed to support these developments.

Once this was decided, planning teams were stood up to develop both the detail of the experiment and of the event to support it. As always, the planners had to consider a complex set of criteria including the aims of the experiment, the mechanisms through which the experiment could operate, time constraints, manning constraints, training requirements and a significant array of risk factors that needed to be mitigated or managed. The final design they produced included:

- Four experimental units;
- Eight experiment execution periods through which a series of separate stimulation "storylines" based on current ISAF data were programmed;
- an innovative Response Group structure;
- appropriate use of C-IED Subject Matter Expertise;
- and a complex data capture plan.

When experimenting in exercises or operations, it is usually impossible to run multiple Experimental Units. This restriction does not hold for Stand-Alone Experimentation Events and so, in **ENABLER 08-2**, it was possible to meet two of the C-IED IPT's key requirements.

The first was to compare their proposed organisational structure with existing structures. They considered this important both to benchmark their proposed capability and because it provided a means of identifying elements of each that had particular merit, hence enabling a composite solution to be built up if that was what the experiment indicated to be best.

The second requirement, which evolved from the ini-

A total of 20 headquarters/units and 26 Nations were represented, giving some indication of the breadth of interest that C-IED holds for the NATO community and its Partners.

tial experiment risk analysis, was to include two copies of their proposed organisational structure. The aim here was to identify any variables not associated with experiment parameters under study (such as variability in experience within experimental units) so that these would not confound the analysis. For these reasons, four Experimental Units were employed in **ENABLER 08-2**.

The overall design met all the key requirements of the IPT. It did so within manpower and time constraints and it also enabled a strong training offering to be made to those organisations sending staff to form up Experimental Units. This could only be achieved through close cooperation between HQ SACT Experimenters, the C-IED IPT and JWC. To achieve this, two planning teams were set up, one developing the event, the other the experiment, with clear delineation of responsibilities between them, but working hand in glove. This proved an excellent arrangement, with cooperation between HQ SACT and JWC stronger than ever before in experimentation. This will be used as a template for future experimentation activities.

Initial Assessment of ENABLER 08-2:

A full assessment of **ENABLER 08-2** as an event must await completion of the experiment team's analysis of an extensive data collection effort. Initial indications are very promising. It appears that the experiment will have met all its technical objectives. Moreover, there has also been a wealth of interesting material produced by the Experimentation Units themselves as a result of having operated the structures and procedures allocated to them and thus having experienced "first hand" their strengths and weaknesses. As a consequence of their experience of **ENABLER 08-2**, the C-IED IPT has given an initial expression of interest in a follow-on experiment, possibly linked to an exercise in 2009 or 2010.

Finally, and although **ENABLER 08-2** was an experimentation event dominated by experimentation requirements, the event clearly imparted significant training benefit, providing all participants with the type of situations and problems that they may have to face in theatre and, in the case of those Experimental Units operating their own structures and procedures, presenting a valuable opportunity to shake them down before they have to be used "for real".

Conclusion:

The success of the experiment can be attributed to a number of factors. These include having learned lessons from designing and executing previous Stand-Alone Experimentation events, the adherence of experiment planners to the processes developed as a result of this and the ability of JWC experimenters to pull in expertise on Scenario Development, MEL/MIL design, CIS design for experiments and Real-Life Support from across JWC.

Moreover, the importance of the closeness of the working relationship between HQ SACT and JWC cannot be overstated. In conclusion, it appears as if **ENABLER 08-2** has been the most successful Stand Alone Experimentation event yet hosted by JWC. ✦

His Majesty King Harald V at Ulsnes Training Facility to inspect Home Guard Exercise

◀ JWC's Colonel Per Rønning, Chief Concept Development Division, meets His Majesty King Harald V during ENABLER 08-2 event. The Norwegian King visited Ulsnes in order to inspect the annual Home Guard Exercise for Rogaland Home Guard District 08, dubbed as "HV-08". The significance of this exercise was that it was the most extensive exercise conducted by HV-08; exercising sea, land and air forces of the Norwegian Home Guard, involving 200 vehicles and four sea vessels. About 1,300 soliders and officers from the HV-08 participated this exercise. The exercise headquarters was located in a bunker at Ulsnes.

JWC Training Facility UPDATE

By Dag Malde, JWC Special Advisor on Construction Project, Photographs by JWC PAO

IN 2005, I stated in The Three Swords that we were making dreams come through with the development of a facility to cater for a variety of requirements such as education, training, exercise and lessons learned. I also said that up to this day, there was no facility like this available to you across NATO. We are now approaching the time when our dreams will come through!

As you know, the Capability Package 9B0401 was approved in December 2004. Following this approval, a lot of planning was required to make the "cook book" or the Type B Cost Estimate for the building. The project finally received money authorization mid-2006. The planning was complicated and involved the Users to a great extent under the now-defunct User Coordination Group, but also in separate meetings with the Division Chiefs. To make place for the new building we had to tear down 12 old buildings. This work started in June 2006.

We started with the removal of 100.000 cubic metres of stone with a "big bang" at the start of 2007. A period of great excitement was initiated when we had to evaluate the possibility of the JWC canteen sliding down 100 metre lower in the terrain! It was also a surprise when we blew several tons of stones into the back yard of some neighbors living 150 meters away from the detonation place.



The end of civil work at the new building is approaching.

If you look out of the window of E-Block today, you can see that the outside construction work of the building is approaching the end. Not so visible is the ongoing work inside. There is a lot of activity on installing generators, uninterrupted power supplies, electrical transformers and large cooling and ventilation machinery with connection to pipelines throughout the entire building, and we should not forget all the cabling for electricity and the AIS fibers.

Principally, the main building is built to host two separate functions. The three bottom floors are designed to accommodate the Training Audience of a CJTF of 525 personnel separated into day and night shifts.

The largest capacity for an exercise on these floors is 1,072 men. The two top floors are office accommodation only. These two floors together with the E – Block, Gauzel Magazine and Soma will accommodate our official Peacetime Establishment of 280 personnel with some extra support of 55 personnel. All together these facilities will, therefore, room 335 personnel.

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Making a Difference in NRF

By Wg Cdr Andy Jones, GBR AF,
JED Exercise Planning Branch, JWC
Photographs by MSG Raphael Baekler, DEU F; JWC PAO

STEADFAST JUNCTURE 08

EXERCISE planning is like golf. To the spectator there is always an element of schadenfreude[1] in watching an exercise being sliced into the woods, splash into a lake, or even, after a great drive, trickle at the last minute into a cunningly placed bunker. To the player however, it is always more satisfactory to stay on the fairways, hit the green in the prescribed number of shots, and to be able to mark your card with a great score that improves your handicap. From the planner's perspective, Steadfast Juncture 2008 was always going to be a straightforward course. With a standard Nato Response Force (NRF) setting, just four exercise locations, an experienced Core Planning Team and a keen Training Audience led by Joint Command (JC) Lisbon, planning went really well from the very start, and the relationship between the JWC and JC Lisbon planning teams genuinely superb. Being so straightforward there was the opportunity to set new standards and perhaps try a few experimental shots.

One thing that worked out surprising-

Exercise Directors VTC at Ulsnes

Exercise Centre

Deployable Joint Headquarters (DJTF), Ulsnes, Gym Building

ly well on Juncture 08, was the Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE) trial. As part of a SHAPE–ACT initiative to relieve the operational headquarters of the burden of exercise planning, Commander JWC was nominated OCE and placed in the lead of the planning process. This forced JWC planners to look very closely at how responsibilities should logically and effectively be divided between the Training Audience and JWC. The delineation was made fairly simply: the TA would do the operational stuff, and JWC would take care of the exercise artificialities. As a result, Juncture 08 had nominated individuals, rather than faceless departments or branches responsible for all elements of exercise planning; accountability is invaluable.[2] The second advantage was that JWC was responsible for the quality and content of exercise planning documentation, which is a good thing.

There was, however, one potential hazard looming on the course that caused concern in a number of the players. For

Training Audience, Auditorium

SITCEN evening update

Juncture 08, unlike most Steadfast Exercises, Ulsnes was planned to be the Main Exercise Location, and both Exercise Control Staff (EXCON) and the majority of the Training Audience would have to squeeze into, and live side-by-side, at the JWC Interim Training Facility. As planning matured it became apparent that the exercise would be one of, if not the largest exercises ever hosted at Ulsnes, and many elements of exercise support would be close to capacity. From start to finish approximately 900 personnel would in-process and spend at least part of the exercise on the Stavanger waterfront at Ulsnes. With this, many people to be accommodated, equipped, fed, and moved around Stavanger, there was always potential for what one unnamed senior JWC officer referred to as a "train-wreck".

The train-wreck did not happen. The RLS and CIS planning and execution were excellent, with both experienced JWC teams on top of their game. The Training Audience were well prepared and there were far fewer surprises or need for changes than we have seen before. Much of the credit for this is due to the JWC C4/Information Management team who made the complex world of exercise communications more transparent than ever. Both EXCON and the Training Audience were therefore able to concentrate on STARTEX without indulging in that edgy and sometimes spectacular last-minute reorganisation so beloved by the unprepared.

Another reason for this rapid start-up was JC Lisbon's familiarity with Ulsnes. A successful site survey, followed by a Battle Staff Training in which the JC Lisbon arrived in the USS Mount Whitney and practiced a Deployed Joint Task Force Headquarters (DJTF) transition from afloat to ashore ensured the Training Audience were familiar with the exercise location, and how they were expected to fit into it.

Having many of the Training Audience at Ulsnes gave the facility a real operational air, with Lisbon's custom-built and comprehensive approach focused DJTF packed into the Gym, the UK Joint Force Air Component Command, along with its French augmentation in the Holmen Building, and the Italian Special Forces Command adding a Mediterranean flavour to the Ulsnes Quay, with a display of sunglasses fit for Cerasia! The Land Component Command, formed from the Rapid Reaction Force France, along with the French Joint Logistics Support Group and CBRN elements, were deployed to an austere training camp in Suippes, in the Champagne region of France. Spanish Maritime Force, the Maritime Component, conducted Juncture 08 during a cruise around the islands of the Western Mediterranean aboard SPS Castilla.

Like a round of golf, each exercise has some great shots and some not so great; sometimes we have to play a risky shot to save the hole. On Juncture 08, to maximise the number of exercise days, we planned, at risk, only four days of EXCON training. A bespoke programme was developed that cut to a minimum

As the exercise started, it was very interesting to watch the dynamics as up to 18 General Officers, both active and retired, and their senior civil environment counterparts threw themselves into the exercise play and the opportunities provided by the new Cerasia scenario.

the need for formal presentations and maximised hands-on training within work areas. This was complemented by a scripted mini-exercise aimed at consolidating training, rather than practicing specific exercise play. The programme was an ongoing initiative, which, despite causing a little grumbling amongst the more reactionary of the club members, worked well, and once experienced, was very well received. In retrospect, a five-day EXCON training period remains the ideal, to allow EXCON augmentees a fighting chance of fully appreciating their place in the complex world of the Exercise Control.

As main exercise location, Ulsnes attracted a large number of Senior Staff in both the Training Audience and EXCON. As the exercise started, it was very interesting to watch the dynamics as up to 18 General Officers both active and retired and their senior civil environment counterparts threw themselves into the exercise play and the opportunities provided by the new Cerasia scenario. This level of senior involvement stirred up a feeding-frenzy of initiatives, discussion and debate that provided an extremely dynamic and realistic level of operational play, whilst also providing no mean challenge for the MELMIL[3] and Civil Environment Management teams who ran a very well conceived, controlled and executed exercise.

It is interesting to observe the different ways in which the NRF Command Groups approach the Steadfast Series Exercises; some take the opportunity

Clockwise: Analysis Team meeting; JWC EXCON; Exercise White Cell

to observe their staffs in action, some immerse themselves in the exercise. JC Lisbon went very much for the latter. Commander NRF 11 led from the front, encouraging his Force Commanders to throw themselves into the scenario and make the most of the training opportunities offered, particularly working with the Civil Environment role players and the media. This manifested itself in some excellent meetings of NRF senior staff with Cerasian and IO/NGO officials. Commanders and staff at Ulsnes, Suippes and SPS Castilla provided authentic and entertaining interviews that brought the scenario to life through our simulated media, **World News Today**. The positive and proactive approach of NRF 11 achieved a momentum that was complimentary to the play provided by JWC and that was maintained throughout the exercise.

One thing that did not have the major impact anticipated was of Stavanger being a European Capital of Culture for 2008. It was feared that a lack of transport and hotel accommodation caused by the increased influx of visitors to the City might impact the exercise. In fact we planned around the issue and utilised the Norwegian Military Camp at Madla for accommodation. This gave the exercise a real operational air, as Training Audience headquarters worked and messed together in military barracks, albeit decorated with a little more pine that might be expected in Tytan, the host nation for NRF 11, in the middle of Africa!

Overall, the exercise was a great success, the weather was as good as it gets in Stavanger, and everyone went away happy and better trained to conduct Nato Response Force operations. The situation bodes well for Steadfast Juncture 09, which will also be led by JC Lisbon. Hopefully utilising the same scenario, working with the same Joint Headquarters, and with fewer participants at Ulsnes will allow the planning team to spend less time planning and a little more time on the golf course. ✦

NOTES:

(1) A German word, loved by the British, expressing the guilty pleasure felt when observing the misfortune of others.

(2) There are still as few functional areas that resist any attempt at exercise planning. These outlaws live in isolated tribes and cause chaos and terror when they ride into town for an exercise. Although they shall remain nameless here, we (the exercise planning teams) know who they are and we will continue to track them down, bring them into the fold one by one, exercise by exercise.

(3) The Main Event List is NATO's procedure for running exercise play.

Photograph by ISAF PAO

ISAF MISSION REHEARSAL TRAINING

TRAINING FOR OPERATIONS



By Lieutenant Colonel Bob Taylor, CAN A OMM, CD, Joint Training Development Division, Joint Warfare Centre

With appreciation to Captain Sonia Dumouchel-Connock, and the Maple Leaf

KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN ~ A combined operation targeting a critical insurgent logistics node in Maywand District, west of Kandahar City, has ended successfully.

The week-and-a-half long Operation Roob Unyip Janubi (Southern Beast in Pashto) comprised more than 1,000 Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel.

The forces disrupted insurgent safe havens and transit routes through the Band-E-Timor region of Maywand District, a key insurgent logistics hub that fed fighters, supplies, and money into Helmand and Kandahar provinces. Afghan and ISAF forces also worked to improve security along a key road that traverses the south, and set the conditions for the establishment of an enduring security presence in Maywand.

"We know that, given the way we came into Band-E-Timor, we took them by surprise," says the Task Force Plans Officer Major Fraser Auld. "Any insurgents in the area that did manage to get out had to have done so in a hurry because they left exploitable material behind."

During the first days of the operation, ANSF and ISAF personnel found and destroyed 60 20-litre ammonium nitrate containers wired for immediate use as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). This represents a find of 960 kilograms of explosives. The forces also found 60 kilograms of opium, drug manufacturing equipment, multiple small arms, and components of a mortar.

In addition to putting a serious dent in the insurgent operations, Afghan and ISAF partners also set positive conditions for enabling governance in Maywand.

"The Maywand District Leader, Haji Mullah Noor Masoud, was able, for the first time, to go to the Band-E-Timor area and hold a major shura with approxi-

mately 75 elders and villagers," Major Auld says. "Haji Mullah Noor Masoud listened to the concerns of the people and emphasized that for peace and security to come to the region, the people must deny safe haven for the Taliban."

The operation saw no major combat incidents and a drastic reduction in the number of IED incidents on the key road traversing the southern province. "During the operation, there were no vehicles, military or civilian, that were targeted on this road," says the Task Force Operations Officer Captain Chris Quinlan. "Security was established by the overwhelming presence of ANSF and ISAF forces."

The insurgents did not stand and fight the multinational force, but chose instead to abandon their positions. "Perhaps the insurgents did not stay and fight because they believe that the ANSF and ISAF will eventually leave," says the Task Force Commander Brigadier General Denis Thompson. "If they do, it is a grave misjudgement on their part. ISAF and Afghan forces are in active dialogue with the key leaders of the district and, together, we are developing a robust plan to provide this lasting security."

In an area that up until now has had a limited presence from the Afghan government or ISAF forces, this operation demonstrates that Afghan and ISAF forces have the initiative and are making progress, are reaching farther with more forces and integrating more partners, more effectively.

"We achieved all our aims with this operation," Brigadier General Thompson says. "We have set the conditions for the positioning of more ANSF and ISAF forces in Maywand District, and have served notice to the insurgents that we will henceforth have an enduring presence in this area that was critical to their operations."

THE SUCCESS STORY cited above is not unlike countless others happening on a regular and recurring basis throughout the entire ISAF area of operations. In order to set conditions for the effective conduct of operations in ISAF, pre-deployment training happens in each troop-contributing nation, as well as within NATO.

Since the start of ISAF, Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum has developed with Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), and NATO School Oberammergau (NSO), a number of ISAF pre-deployment training programs. Commander JFC Brunssum is the Officer Conducting the Exercise for all ISAF training events and has the overall responsibility for this training. When training is provided for ISAF Regional Command Headquarters staff, the Officer Directing the Exercise is normally Commander JFTC, while ISAF Headquarters' (ISAF HQ) training events are directed by Commander JWC.

The ISAF Headquarters training event is conducted twice annually and is the definitive Mission Rehearsal Training (MRT) for staff officers deploying to ISAF HQ. The Training Audience for this MRT is typically made up of staff officers

JWC's ISAF Headquarters Mission Rehearsal Training: "Crawl, Walk and Run"

Train Core Staff Element personnel and targeted augmentees to enable them to follow counterpart training in theatre and to function effectively as staff within ISAF HQ.

- **Mission Specific Training:** Predominantly academic in nature and is structured to provide additional mission-specific lectures in order to enhance the ADL already completed.
- **Functional Area Training:** Training Audience get to know staff practices associated with their own branch or section within ISAF Headquarters.
- **Functional Services Training:** FST lectures and workshops are conducted for personnel who require specific functional services skills to perform their jobs in ISAF HQ.
- **Battle Staff Training:** The Training Audience is taken through the processes and procedures to effectively contribute to cross-functional plenary meetings and decision support boards/working groups. BST is an effective bridge between functional training and the Mission Rehearsal Exercise.
- **Mission Rehearsal Exercise:** MRE is conducted through the execution of a detailed script, which has been written into the NATO Joint Exercise Management Module (JEMM).

Photograph by ISAF PAO


Joint Warfare Centre's ISAF training event is conducted twice annually and is the definitive Mission Rehearsal Training for staff officers deploying to ISAF Headquarters.

General Korte with Deputy SACEUR General Sir John McColl during ISAF training (Page 21).

from a selected NATO headquarters Core Staff Element (CSE), as well as invited individual augmentees. Other individual augmentees destined for ISAF HQ are required to attend NSO's Individual Augmentee Pre-Deployment Course (IAPDC). In addition, all deploying staff officers are directed to complete an unclassified on-line Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) package prior to attending the IAPDC or other ISAF training event. The ADL package contains mission-specific information regarding Afghanistan geography, culture and recent history, the role of the many International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations (IO/NGO) working in the country, basic Counter Improvised Explosive Device theory, as well as covering the ISAF mission and daily life in ISAF.

The aim of the ISAF HQ MRT is to train Core Staff Element personnel and targeted augmentees to enable them to follow counterpart training in theatre and to function effectively as staff within ISAF HQ. The MRT has been the key training event for ISAF HQ staff since the beginning of NATO involvement in the ISAF mission and has evolved and improved constantly since inception. The MRT model covers all needed phases of training: Mission Specific Training (MST), Functional Area Training (FAT), Functional Services Training (FST), Battle Staff Training (BST) and a full scale Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) based on a very realistic ISAF scenario heavily supported by EXCON personnel, observer-trainers, analysts, and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from ISAF HQ.

The content of the MRT, based on the phases MST, FAT, FST, BST and MRE, and developed to take the Training Audience through a "crawl, walk, and run" learning experience, serves to build on any previous training and increase individual members' personal confidence in their own readiness to deploy, as well as that of their team. The MRT is supported by near-real time operational information and data collected from ISAF HQ a few short weeks prior to the training event, thereby allowing Training Audience personnel to conduct research and practice their staff procedures prior to actually deploying into theatre. The MRT is not a certification, validation, or other form of test for the Training Audience. Rather, it is truly a mission rehearsal for ISAF HQ staff officers.

The training event commences with MST. The MST is predominantly academic in nature and is structured to provide additional mission-specific lectures in order to enhance the ADL already completed. The content of the MST is based on approved training objectives and is provided in this venue because the information is either classified or so current that it would quickly become obsolete should it be presented in ADL format. MST briefers and trainers come directly from ISAF HQ and bring the latest information with them.

The second phase of the MRT is the conduct of FAT. It is in this phase that Training Audience members take time to get to know staff practices associated with their own branch or section within ISAF HQ. In addition, CSE personnel will become accustomed to working with augmentees assigned to their branches and staff integration will commence. Presentations are provided to the Training Audience, by SMEs who come to the MRT from ISAF HQ, and work assignments are given in order to cause the deploying staff to research ISAF-specific staff practices and approaches to solv-

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ing branch-specific challenges. Vignette-based research projects may be used to facilitate active learning about ISAF HQ.

As a means of providing variety in the training day, FST lectures and workshops are conducted for personnel who require specific functional services skills to perform their jobs in ISAF HQ. By the end of the FAT portion of the MRT, all personnel are competent in the use of their assigned functional services applications and are comfortable working as branch members within ISAF HQ.

As the training event gains momentum, the BST unfolds with a "STARTEX Brief", which paints the scenario picture and tasks all personnel to commence working as ISAF HQ staff officers. In this phase of the MRT, the Training Audience is taken through the processes and procedures to effectively contribute to cross-functional plenary meetings and decision-support boards/working groups. The BST typically features a significant amount of coaching and mentoring, where ISAF HQ SMEs provide personal insight into the actual workings of ISAF HQ. This gives the Training Audience a rare opportunity to learn, at a slow pace and without the pressures of real-world combat operations, how planning and supervision of operations happens at the operational level within ISAF. The BST provides an effective bridge between functional training and the MRE. The BST model is based on a combination of vignette and inject-based challenges provided to the Training Audience. All vignettes and injects are specifically designed to prepare all players for the upcoming full-scale MRE, and are governed by approved training objectives.

The MRE features planning and coordination tasks that are based on actual ISAF HQ operational orders and supporting documentation. The Training Audience is guided through all of the staff processes inherent within ISAF HQ. This ranges from the deliberate conduct of operational planning, through the management of daily reports and returns, to the oversight and response to tactical combat activity, such as when ISAF soldiers come into contact with the enemy. The MRE is conducted through the execution of a detailed script, which has been written into the NATO Joint Exercise Management Module (JEMM). The rate of play can be adjusted to provide the maximum possibility for success. If some elements of the script do not achieve the intended staff outcome, a replay or modified re-insertion of the appropriate storyline may be done. By the end of the MRE, deploying staff will have practiced all of the skills they will require when they deploy to ISAF HQ. They will have rehearsed their mission.



The author, JWC Lt. Col. Bob Taylor, with former Chief of Defence Canada, General Rick Hillier at Ulsnes.

ISAF Headquarters Mission Rehearsal Training is a realistic training event that directly contributes to the conduct of operations in ISAF.

SUMMARY:

The ISAF HQ MRT is a realistic training event that directly contributes to the conduct of operations in ISAF by allowing CSE and targeted augmentee staff officers to rehearse their assigned tasks prior to actually deploying. Each MRT is updated to incorporate the latest available staff practices and operational information. The exercise takes Training Audience personnel through a "crawl, walk, and run" learning experience and reinforces confidence in individual, as well as team abilities to perform while deployed to ISAF HQ. All staff are exposed to the composite nature of operations in ISAF and are challenged to examine the ISAF mission with a view to understanding the many facets of restoring governance and stability in Afghanistan.

The experience gained by attendance on ISAF HQ MRTs in Stavanger facilitates easier transition to real-world operations and sets the conditions to effectively plan for and support operations such as Operation Roob Unyip Janubi. ✦

ISAF Training Event 08-01

By Lieutenant Colonel Kaare Pedersen, DNK A,
Planning Team B, Joint Exercise Division, JWC
Photographs by MSG Raphael Baekler, DEU F;
JWC PAO

AT JWC, we have now been training ISAF Headquarters (ISAF HQ) staffs for quite some time and for the last period, the overall training concept has not changed. We are fine-tuning and adapting as necessary based on observations, lessons identified and the current ISAF HQ focus. There is always an ongoing process to continue to improve quality and currency of the training offered to the deploying personnel, but no significant changes. Because of that, I will not elaborate extensively on the training concept, but focus on three issues: the training in the Standing Headquarters, the internal JWC ISAF training "planning" environment, and the Training Audience.

TRAINING:

The Standing Headquarters providing the Core Staff Element for ISAF Headquarters in the fall 08 was NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Turkey (NRDC-T). Therefore, together with 180 invited augmentees from Nations, NRDC-T was our Training Audience for TE 08/01.

Before coming to Stavanger considerable preparation is undertaken by the Standing Headquarters. In the case of NRDC-T, they also ensured that all de-

"There is a significant difference between the assessment of the lead CJ5 planner and the CJ4 Sergeant with the latter having a more practical, executing role; but, both need to know and understand how each other is contributing to the mission and the role each play."

ploying personnel executed the necessary national, individual pre-deployment training as well as medical and physical preparations. Then NRDC-T executed an extensive training program at their home base in Istanbul, in preparation of the Mission Rehearsal Training at JWC. Their program included individual training in the form of Mission Specific Training, Functional Area Training and Functional Systems Training.

In addition to these individual training elements, NRDC-T executed a Battle Staff type of training activity in preparation for the collective training to be undertaken at JWC. This training was aimed at preparing the staff members for collective training by taking them through a number of cross divisional 'vignette' (scene setting incidents and problems) based discussions, involving all ranks and working together in groups. Each sequence of this training started with "setting the scene" and presentation of the subject for discussion - this was done in plenary. Then, the subject was

discussed in syndicates with members from across the staff. Each branch representative in a syndicate presented the branch specific view on the subject and supported by the syndicate facilitator, discussions were aimed at achieving a broad knowledge to the staffing issues and the subsequent implications for the branches involved. Finally, each vignette was concluded in a plenary session with a short presentation from one or two selected syndicates.

I think that there is great benefit in this type of training - it improved the training audiences' general situational awareness and knowledge of cross-divisional staffing and subsequent planning implications. In addition, it also presented to us, as observers, and in particular to the staff itself, a very good appreciation of the issues and the staffing skills required in an operational level HQ like ISAF.

There is a significant difference between the assessment of the lead CJ5 planner and the CJ4 Sergeant with the latter having a more practical, executing role; but, both need to know and understand how each other is contributing to the mission and the role each play. Having these type of vignette based discussions that cover cross divisional and all-ranks syndicates clearly facilitate greater knowledge and understanding by everyone.

PLANNING ENVIRONMENT:

Next on my agenda is the way that we work internally at JWC in preparation and execution the ISAF HQ training. As I said earlier the training concept has not changed too much. But, having been part of this environment for almost two years, I have seen significant change in the execution of the ISAF HQ training. I attribute this to the now redeployed lead OF-5, JWC's "Mr. ISAF HQ Training", Colonel Paul Morillon. Under his lead, we developed a tremendous working relationship between the Subject Matter Expert Branch, the Joint Exercise Division planners and exercise supporters, the Real Life Support planners and the CIS planners from SMC4. This excellent working relationship is the prerequisite in order to deliver the high quality training, which we owe to our deploying colleagues.

From a staff officers' level one can have many "good" ideas about how we should be organized, but, in the end, the organization is merely the personnel put into it and "where there is a will there is also a way". I believe there is considerable support and willingness in the cross-divisional ISAF team at JWC. We should continue the excellent work, and strive to maintain this high level of cooperation and coordination necessary to improve our ISAF HQ training.

TRAINING AUDIENCE:

Now to a few words on participation. With the introduction, two years ago, of the "Composite Model" for ISAF HQ manning, we experienced a significant reduction in the numbers of Training Audience attending JWC ISAF training events. Part of this was due to a more focussed assessment of the training need, allowing only staff participating

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in the key processess in the HQ to join training. However, the other issue is the not very encouraging fact that a portion of those actually targeted by the training activities, not part of the Core Staff Elements, but individual augmentees from Nations, report for training in smaller numbers than we would like. If you consider the effort put into the preparation and execution of the training against the numbers that reported for training, it can be a considerable challenge to motivate the trainers, both external and internal, to develop the best possible training.

But, it all depends on how you calculate. The Core Staff Element we train is constantly providing ISAF HQ with approximately one third of its key staff members. With the amount of targeted augmentees attending our Mission Rehearsal Exercises we are only achieving a level of training a bit less than half of the key staff members - this could be better; after all the training plays a significant part of the support to our colleagues deploying to NATO's priority one mission: ISAF.


Lt. General Korte with Deputy COM NRDC-T Major General Nowakowicz

In addition, I would add the comment that the better and more comprehensively we train our people then the better are the chances that our nations will send more for the next training event. All staff officers and in particular those of us also being senior national representatives, should continue to ensure we make the best possible effort in promoting the need for this vital pre-deployment training in the hope we can improve participation and prepare our forces as fully as possible.

Lastly, ISAF TE 08-01 was executed as planned, 13-27 June 08. The Core Staff Element and Individual Augmentees were provided excellent training, the inclusion of a CC Air Ramstein training session for air augmentees worked well, JWC was praised and as always we identified plenty of lessons that are now in the process of being "learned" in an improved version of JWC-led ISAF HQ training in December 08. ✦


The author, JWC Lt. Col. Pedersen.


Brigadier General Levent Colak (left), Chief CJ3 HQ ISAF

EXERCISE SNAPSHOT, by Colonel Kemal Ozbek, TUR A, NRDC-T Chief Special Forces

"Under the leadership of Brigadier General Levent Colak, Turkish Army, designated CH CJ3 HQ ISAF, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps - Turkey (NRDC-T), was in Stavanger, Norway, for Mission Rehearsal Training prior to their departure to Afghanistan. 75 Turkish and 21 Allied officers, NCOs and a number of augmentees as part of the Standing Headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will take over the duty in Afghanistan soon. In this respect, a series of training events were conducted, including, Electronic Working Procedures, Functional Area Training, Mission Specific Training and Functional System Training. Upon completion of the main training phase, NRDC-T conducted a Mission Rehearsal Exercise under the supervision of Subject Matter Experts, who are very skilled military personnel either currently serving in or just returned from the ISAF Mission. Since the schedule was very loaded, the Training Audience had a very busy time at Ulsnes. The group was very eager and warmed up for their duties in a short time. They were challenged with many realistic situations that are happening very often in theatre. JWC personnel and their guests have showed a wonderful example of team work.

During all training phases, higher NATO HQ Commanders visited and observed the Training Audience. The flag officers, **Deputy SACEUR General Sir John McColl**, **Deputy COM JFCB Air Marshal Chris Moran**, **DCOS OPS JFCB Major General Daniel Hahn**, **Deputy COM NRDC-T Major General Stanislaw Nowakowicz** were all impressed by the professionalism, dedication and performance of the group. Brigadier General Colak, who had formerly served one year in Afghanistan, also highlighted the importance of Commanders' experiences to the Training Audience.

In addition to many activities in town related to Stavanger's being the Cultural Capital of Europe in 2008, we also had the European Football Championships taking place while we were in Stavanger! So, the training was quite colorful, with highly international, though, at the same time, very competitive spirit. Thanks to the NRDC-T personnel (we wish you good luck in ISAF mission), thanks to the JWC, and thanks to the Stavanger people."

Photographs by ISAF PAO

The CATCH 22 of ISAF

Part I & II



By Lt. Col. Keith Morgan, US AF Special Operations;
Instructor, Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corp,
Iowa State University

Introduction:

NATO's mission in Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), is probably the most complex mission ever faced by any military command. An Alliance, fighting as a coalition, conducting expeditionary operations, while executing a counter insurgency; it is difficult to imagine a more complex environment in which to conduct military operations, but this is what ISAF faces.

In March of 2007, I deployed from the Component Command Air - Ramstein (CC-Air Ramstein), a NATO air headquarters, to ISAF's Regional Command South (RC-S) in Kandahar. Prior to deploying, I had had assignments on an operational level staff for three years, served on a component level staff supporting US operations in Afghanistan, and instructed for three years on the British Advanced Command and Staff Course, teaching defense studies and operational level planning. This background knowledge on operational art, NATO, and the Afghan theater should have equipped me well for my duties at Kandahar, unfortunately, this was not completely the case.

During my deployment, the immense complexity of the ISAF mission presented me a problem too difficult to

US Marines prepare to go on patrol with the Afghan National Border Police in Helmand province, southern Afghanistan.The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit is conducting operations in Afghanistan as part of NATO's ISAF. (Photograph by NATO)

ISAF soldiers heading towards Khyber, southern Afghanistan, has came upon what they suspect is an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). (Photograph by NATO)

completely organize and conceptualize during high tempo combat operations. It was only after three months of analysis upon my return from ISAF that I was able to finally understand the combat environment in Afghanistan.

This is the first of three articles that describes why the mission is complex, identifies the major influences affecting ISAF, and provides a methodology to analyzes how changes within the ISAF environment influence the success/failure of the mission. These articles will also provide a way to graphically illustrate to military/civilian leadership the pros and cons of different courses of action.

What this article does not do is present any completely new concepts; instead it hopes to bring together, in one document, information spanning tactical to strategic levels of operation and first through fourth level analysis.

> "These articles will also provide a way to graphically illustrate to military/civilian leadership the pros and cons of different courses of action."

The first challenge faced when dealing with the complexity of the ISAF mission was to develop a framework for analysis of this multifaceted problem. The initial step in building this framework was to identify the major factors influencing ISAF operations, of which, twenty-two are presented for consideration in this and the next article. These 22 major factors create a **"CATCH 22"** situation for the ISAF command where it seems the solution to one problem creates others as equally difficult to solve.

Photograph by ISAF PAO

To overcome this "Catch 22", planners need to understand how these factors are linked to appreciate the intended and unintended consequences that can

An ISAF mechanic is inspecting the engine of a F-16 Fighting Falcon before a routine flight, at Kandahar Airfield. (Photograph by NATO)

result from changes to one of these factors. A three dimensional matrix was used as a framework to organize the factors and highlight the linkages between them. One matrix for each level of command (strategic, operational, and tactical) was constructed and each major actor within Afghanistan (ISAF, Government of Afghanistan [GOA], and Taliban) was assigned an axis within the matrix. Then factors were positioned within the appropriate matrix along the proper axis. The third article in this series will propose a process to use wargaming and graphs to evaluate how the environment within Afghanistan might change if one of these factors changes.

Photograph by Master SGT Keith Brown, US AF

The use of matrices and graphs would make it seem as if it is believed the counter insurgency problem in Afghanistan can be solved strictly by quantitative analysis, the opposite is true. The connections between inputs and outputs within the Afghan environment are not linear with respect to their relationships or magnitude; therefore the same input may give significantly different outputs.

Instead, what makes this series of articles important is the processes they offer, which, if properly utilized, will help staffs better develop and evaluate solutions to the problems they face.

ISAF: A New Paradigm for NATO

Before beginning to conduct first level analysis, readers must first understand why ISAF is very new and unique for NATO. As we conduct our analysis, keep three terms in mind; expeditionary, coalition, and counter insurgency (COIN). Each of them individually can greatly complicate the execution of a military mission and almost all of the 22 factors identified spring from the fact ISAF encompasses aspects of all three of these types of combat operations.

However, we are dealing with a war that not only brings all these issues together, but also with the fact that NATO

is transforming from a static Cold War structure to a more dynamic organization. When you consider all these issues, you can start to appreciate the complexity NATO faces with the ISAF mission.

Strategic Factors For ISAF (Z axis)

This article begins at the top of the command chain to evaluate factors influencing the strategic environment and our first matrix of issues is illustrated in Figure 1 below.



Figure 1: Strategic Dynamics

Our analysis starts along the Z axis looking at NATO as an organization, ISAF as a military command, and Troop Contributing Nations, to determine how these entities influence the conflict in Afghanistan. To begin with, it must be remembered that the governments of the nations supporting ISAF are democracies and each government's ability to retain power is dependent on the support of their electorates. It is widely known that electorates of many of these countries are very sensitive to the possibility of military casualties in Afghanistan, as highlighted in a document produced by the WEU, which stated, "Each deployment [to ISAF] arouses fierce political debate at home, particularly when there is high risk of casualties."[1] This sensitivity to casualties should be recognized as a critical issue for the coalition. In fact, the avoidance of casualties is more than a strategy consciously chosen by Western nations, but rather as an ethos, which has led to the structuring of Western militaries around technology and firepower to reduce the chances of friendly casualties.

Conversely though, the electorates of these countries will not stand to see their military, or the militaries they are associated with, cause significant civilian collateral damage. This is especially true for countries that sent troops to ISAF under the banner of reconstruction. Unfortunately, this creates a dilemma for ISAF, which desires to use long-range firepower on the battlefield to protect their own troops, but also recognizing these weapons usually deliver greater explosive effect at ranges where it is difficult to accurately determine if civilians are present on the target. A number of claims of collateral damage from the use of long range weapons during ISAF operations have generated concerns amongst US and NATO officials that civilian casualties may be undermining the resolve of German and Italian governments to continue their support of the ISAF mission.[2]

A third factor influencing public support for ISAF operations is the financial burden of these military operations. As an example, Julianne Smith, Director of International Security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, lists the impact of military spending on social programs as a key reason why more troops are not offered up to NATO for the ISAF mission.[3] As the long-term price of ISAF mounts in the Troop Contributing Nations, both in terms financial cost and casualties, it must be anticipated public support for the ISAF mission will decrease over time.

Finally, the fact NATO is an Alliance acting as the framework for a coalition with non-NATO countries greatly reduces its speed of action and unity of voice/direction. If one nation were to leave the coalition over a dispute on how operations are conducted, the negative momentum created could cause a subsequent withdrawal of support by other nations. Furthermore, unlike recent operations built with the US as the major framework nation, the ISAF mission is a built on the NATO framework of the 26 nations, which make up its political arm - the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Each of these nations essentially has an equal vote on the formation of political guidance for the conduct of military operations. This unique political structure makes it difficult for the NAC to provide the good strategic guidance to NATO military leadership essential for the development of a clear, well defined campaign plan.

Government of Afghanistan (GOA) (Y axis)

Within Afghanistan, the Afghan populace is a strategic asset caught between the Taliban, ISAF, and the GOA. They have lived in a country, which has been racked by warfare for almost as long as the region has been known as Afghanistan. It is also a population of a tribal nature, not given to recognizing the validity of a central power's authority over them. Due to the relatively high poverty rate within the country, most inhabitants are focused on procuring the basic resources they need to survive. Those Afghans that are not hard-core Taliban will be looking

to see what ISAF and the GOA, vice the Taliban, have to offer them in terms of short and long term security.

Most Afghans who view the ISAF mission favorably recognize there will be some collateral damage as a result of the fighting, but when collateral damage does occur they are looking for lasting positive results. When operations create damage, but do not provide visible lasting security and a better environment (further discussed in the ISAF/Operational Section), there will likely be a loss of support by the Afghan populace for ISAF and the GOA.

On the other hand, a defensive strategy, which only concentrates on developing the Afghan Army and only conducting offensive operations when enough troops are available to hold captured areas can be equally as detrimental to the cause of the GOA, as it may allow the Taliban sufficient time to organize and establish themselves as the defacto government in minds of the populace in the areas where ISAF is not present. This need to maintain the support of the Afghan populace drives a need to balance offensive/defensive operations and becomes major influence within the strategic environment of the GOA.

Support from the Afghan population is vital to President Karzai as he struggles to maintain control of a highly fractionalized government transitioning from an initial make-up of the war lords sharing power with him to a democratically elected government. The mere presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan is a flash point for President Karzai, for example, a WEU report states foreign troops fighting in Afghanistan, "…causes friction with the Kabul government, accused by its opponents, the 'legal' opposition included, of being a puppet government controlled by the Americans."[4]

Additionally, collateral damage caused by ISAF can contribute to this friction; if President Karzai speaks out about civilian Afghans' deaths he risks alienating the forces helping to keep him in power -if he does not, the opposition will attack him politically. This section begins to demonstrate how factors internal to Afghanistan have linkages to issues on the X and Z axes.

Taliban (X axis)

On the third axis for this matrix is the Taliban insurgency, a movement that sprang from the jihadist movements, which helped defeat Soviet forces in the 1980's. In the chaos that followed the retreat of the Soviets, it was the Taliban's ability to bring security and stability to Afghanistan (albeit often through extreme measures) that brought them to power, not a large popular appeal of their ideology.[5] Following their defeat at the hands of the US and Afghan resistance movements, a dedicated core leadership of Taliban returned to insurgent tactics to regain power within their country. These hardcore insurgents are tied to the support from the local population to supply the men that will become their fighters, the basic resources they need to sustain themselves and the ability to hide them when they are not actively fighting. They hope to gain the support of the locals by offering them a better environment through their ability to re-impose order through enforcement of their strict rules and laws, or if that does not work, through coercion and intimidation.

"Support from the Afghan population is vital to President Karzai as he struggles to maintain control of a highly fractionalized government transitioning from an initial make-up of the war lords sharing power with him to a democratically elected government."


Photograph by ISAF PAO

At the strategic level, the Taliban are relying on the fact that they are fighting for their homeland to give their fighters the incentive to continue the struggle over a long period of time, recognizing the populace of the Western nations of ISAF do not have equal patience for a cause not directly tied to their daily lives. This has created strategic race between ISAF's ability to finish their mission and the Taliban's ability to wear down the resolve of ISAF.

An additional aspect of Taliban strategy is the use of the press as a tool to translate tactical actions into strategic success. Understanding the populace of nations contributing troops to ISAF are significantly influenced by the media, the Taliban look to create situations for the media, which will erode support

for the ISAF mission in Western nations. Through their orchestration of collateral damage events where ISAF is blamed for civilian casualties or by creating a security environment that seems to demonstrate there is a "lack" of progress by ISAF towards their final goal (both linked back to factors on the Z axis), the Taliban wear away support for the ISAF mission in the West.

The geopolitical environment around Afghanistan is another factor affecting the military capability of the Taliban. Through religious and tribal ties across the Afghan/Pakistani border, the Taliban are afforded training-grounds, resupply and winter time safe havens. The Pakistani government's desire to maintain good relations with the US and NATO nations by aggressively pursuing Taliban in their country, is constrained by a desire to not create a backlash of support for Islamic fundamentalist who oppose the Pakistani government. The Taliban routinely use this situation to maintain safe-havens from which to attack NATO forces.

On the other side of Afghanistan is Iran, openly hostile to many countries involved in ISAF and suspected of supporting the Taliban in their fight. The then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote in an article in the The Economist, "In Afghanistan it is clear that the Taliban is receiving support, including arms from, again, elements of the Iranian regime."[6]

Finally, there are foreign fighters that come to Afghanistan in the "second jihad", bringing new tactics like suicide attacks to the Taliban. These outside influences broaden the nature of the conflict for the ISAF and change the internal dynamics for the Taliban.

Summation of the Strategic Factors

These factors all come together at the strategic level as depicted in Figure 1 and as you might expect, most of these factors are tied to the political aspects of the ISAF mission. For ISAF and the GOA, there is the need to balance offense with defense to maintain the support on the home front both in the short and long term. This can put the need to conduct kinetic operations at odds with prevention of collateral damage or limiting the expenditure of resources at odds with reducing the overall length of the mission. The GOA is balancing the need for support from Western governments with the negative impact created by outsiders conducting combat operations in their country. Finally, the Taliban are balancing the benefits of support from outside of Afghanistan with their desire to control the fight. Additionally, they are budgeting their resources to ensure they can keep up the fight long term and outlast NATO.

In the next section, we examine the factors affecting the operational and tactical levels of combat operation and readers will hopefully begin to fully appreciate the complexity of the ISAF mission. Once the environment surrounding ISAF is fully described and potential linkages highlighted, the final article will focus on a process to evaluate how the actions of ISAF leadership and its troops in the field will affect the effort to defeat the insurgency within Afghanistan.

PART II: OPERATIONAL LEVEL FACTORS

We now move on to identifying and organizing operational level factors. Operational level plans should take into account the factors detailed in the previous article plus those in Figure 2 below. The associated text helps articulate why each factor is important and it identifies linkages between the factors.

Figure 2: Operational Dynamics



ISAF (Z axis)

Military commanders at the operational level translate strategic guidance into operational plans detailing how military resources in the theater will be used to reach the political objectives. One of the


Photograph by ISAF PAO

first decisions ISAF commanders must make is whether to adopt an offensive or defensive posture during COIN operations. In Afghanistan, offense requires troops to aggressively pursue, flush out, and kill or capture the enemy, with an emphasis on defeating the enemy where ever they are. This philosophy greatly increases the probability of combat between the Taliban and ISAF, which also increases the likelihood of collateral damage due to civilians being caught in cross-fire of the subsequent fire fights (highlighted in the strategic section). If ISAF had unlimited resources, following offensive action, troops would stay and hold the terrain until insurgent activity in the area was completely neutralized.



Unfortunately, due to a lack of resources, many times this is not the case in Afghanistan. The local population endures fear and collateral damage as fighting sweeps through their area and then shortly thereafter ISAF departs and the Taliban return; thus failing to provide the local population any increase in security.

Conversely, in the long-term, an offensive strategy can be justified as it may decisively disrupt the insurgency through quick attrition of its fighters and destruction of the command structure. This can relatively rapidly break the back of the insurgency shortening the overall length of the conflict, thus reducing the resources NATO must expend on the mission (again, tied to strategic factors).

Another hidden factor that may lead ISAF staff to adopt an "offensive" strategy is this is the teaching in many Western military staff colleges. It is often taught that the key to a military victory is through offensive operations as they are the avenue to gaining and maintaining the initiative on the battlefield. In COIN operations, the initiative often times is not measured in combat operations and direct destruction of the enemy through offensive ops. Rather, the initiative is gained through the development of a willingness of the population to accept the indigenous government as the best choice to provide a better environment. Furthermore, it will be the population's willingness to assist the government by providing actionable intelligence that will lead to the disruption of the insurgent network and defeat the Taliban.

Finally, ISAF commanders serve for approximately for one year. For most, this year represents their one chance to make a mark as a combat commander. Adopting a defensive strategy does not usually provide these commanders with noteworthy, quantifiable results. It is unlikely any commander would openly acknowledge this as a driver in their decision making process, but it must be considered as an incentive for them to adopt an offensive posture.

An alternative is for ISAF to take on a more defensive posture - concentrating NATO resources on the development of the Afghan military as the main objective; facilitating the use of indigenous forces to secure the countryside and contribute to the fight. This strategy centers on conducting operations outside secured areas only when sufficient numbers of Afghan troops are available to hold and control the newly captured regions, denying insurgents safe heavens and slowly starving them of resources. It also prevents re-infiltration by the Taliban after combat operations; significantly reducing the chance combat will be required in the same location twice. Additionally, as Afghan troop assume responsibility for security operations ISAF's exposure to enemy threats should decrease with a corresponding reduction in the number of coalition casualties. The down side to this strategy is it may allow the Taliban the time they need to establish the infrastructure necessary mount a decisive military offensive on ISAF/Afghan military forces or to develop a defacto government within the regions they control.

A defensive strategy can also increase the amount of time coalition forces are involved in Afghanistan as the development of a professional military from scratch is a lengthy process. If NATO involvement in the conflict lasts for many years it can be anticipated that prior to the establishment of a secure environment within Afghanistan, the cumulative effective of friendly casualties and the long term expenditure of resources may erode support on the home front to the point that it causes ISAF to admit defeat and withdraw (see strategic factors).

At the upper levels, the military structure within the ISAF/NATO command chain can create problems. The responsibility for operational level planning and conduct of operations is split between headquarters located in Europe to those in Afghanistan. Also, staffs in Europe support ISAF as one of many of their functions (such as is the case with JFC Brunssum), whereas the ISAF HQ in Kabul has a full-time focus on the command and control of the fight in Afghanistan. This distance from the fight and lack of focus on ISAF often prevented these Europe based staffs from keeping up-to-date on current operations and properly supporting HQ ISAF in their efforts. Conversely, many personnel filling billets within the ISAF command structure within Afghanistan are only in their positions for a maximum of one year, significantly reducing continuity and the "corporate memory" essential to counter insurgency operations. This lack of consistency and level of focus between the commands within Europe and Afghanistan creates frictions between these commands.

Below the HQ ISAF level, command is divided into five distinct geographical regions, each with a regional commander selected from the military that has a preponderance of forces in that region. The southern region is unique as the overall commander for the region rotates amongst the three main countries that share responsibility for this region. This region is also further divided into four more sub-regions, each under the

control of the commander having the preponderance of forces in these sub-regions. It is not hard to see how this creates conflicts of interest for the commanders of these regions. While regional commanders receive direction from the ISAF chain-of-command, they must also deal with inputs from their governments, who have a vested interest in how their troops are employed. As can be expected, the political direction coming from these Troop Contributing Nations can run counter to NATO guidance and may have significant affect on the way national forces execute the ISAF mission.

GOA (Y axis)

The GOA and Afghan military start to be sidelined at the operational level as most military actions are planned and executed by ISAF, although this is changing as more Afghan units are trained and made combat ready. The main contribution of the GOA is to recruit personnel for the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police to build the security structure that will eventually replace ISAF forces.

Of more importance are local GOA officials who, through their public support or resistance to the NATO mission, can be either an asset or liability to ISAF. As pointed out in the opening section of this paper, Afghanistan is a society still built on a tribal structure and officials at the local level, the tribal leaders, can significantly influence whether the populations of a region support the Taliban or ISAF. While it must be acknowledged other factors, such as a desire to protect illicit activities, corruption, and power politics, influence whether local GOA officials support ISAF, NATO operations that create negative feelings toward ISAF in their districts will make it very difficult for officials to publicly support ISAF even if they wanted to.

Taliban (X axis)

Operationally, the Taliban also have a balancing act to do. They must weigh the positive impact to their cause of inflicting ISAF casualties against the negative impacts of inevitable Taliban losses. The Taliban must keep pressure on ISAF by causing casualties, which will erode support on the home front for the Western nations (a strategic factor), while ensuring they maintain enough resources and recruits to continue the military aspects of their operations long term. The ratio for acceptable friendly and enemy losses is significantly different for the Taliban than it is for ISAF; currently the Taliban and its followers are willing to sustain significantly more losses than NATO forces. Understanding the motivational factors within the mind of Taliban fighters is a key factor in determining how to dissuade potential future fighters from joining the Taliban cause.

> "Operationally, the Taliban also have a balancing act to do. They must weigh the positive impact to their cause of inflicting ISAF casualties against the negative impacts of inevitable Taliban losses."

The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School paper, "The Taliban" identifies three categories of insurgents, each fighting for different causes. The first tier of fighters is the long time, hard core, well trained fighters and some foreign fighters who are unlikely to stop fighting until they are killed or captured. The second tier of fighters is those hired to guard poppy fields or are brow beaten into laying Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), who may benefit from a better economic and security situation as it may allow for the development of alternative sources of income or the ability to resist Taliban coercion. The third tier is those who have no affiliation with the Taliban or GOA, but benefit from the lawlessness that the insurgency creates.[7]

While these insurgents do not benefit from the growth of GOA control in their areas, they are not likely to directly challenge the government once it reaches significant strength in a region.

The effect of civilian casualties and collateral damage is also another area where the operational level environment is different for the Taliban and ISAF. Unlike ISAF, the Taliban want to see large numbers of civilian casualties as a result of combat operations, if they can be tied to ISAF, since it is incumbent upon the parties in power to provide a safer and more secure environment for the population.

A key component of the civilian casualty game is the media, as the media has higher expectations that ISAF will operate under more stringent standards of conduct when it comes to reducing collateral damage. Media reporting tends to imply that with the advent of high tech night vision devices and precision guided weapons, ISAF should be able to prevent almost all civilian casualties, regardless of the actions of the Taliban. The Taliban understand this fact and often prefer to conduct combat operations near civilians as any collateral damage is much more likely to have a greater negative impact on the ISAF mission vice the Taliban cause.

Summation of the Operational Factors

At the operational level, the linkages between cause and affect start to be more direct. The results of the selection of offensive operations will rapidly be translated into many effects that can be observed; a change in friendly and enemy casualties or change in local support for ISAF. Additionally, the connections between individual factors become less bilateral and tend to cascade throughout the different levels of command often affecting multiple actors.

For instance, the affects of protecting ISAF troops with long range combat power has impacts inside and outside the Troop Contributing Nations of ISAF. It can have a positive influence within Coalition/Alliance nations by reducing friendly casualties, but when it is linked to collateral damage, it negatively affects support both within the populations of the Troop Contributing Nations and the Afghan people, which positively affects the Taliban's strategy. The interaction

and complexity of all these factors, and their influence outside the realm of military operations, makes it difficult for the NATO/ISAF command staff and politicians to have a well organized understanding of operations in Afghanistan.

Tactical Factors

Commanders at the tactical level are often the ones making the decision on whether to use kinetic combat power, and for them many of the issues outlined in the first two matrices are distant and academic. These commanders are faced with making decisions quickly and their choices provide them almost immediate feedback; either the mission is a success or a failure and there are friendly casualties or their troops return safely. Conducting an objective evaluation of the impact of their tactical decisions on the operational and strategic factors outlined above, prior to each tactical action, is unrealistic. At this point, what drives their actions are the factors listed below in Figure 3.

for their decisions, but during contact with the enemy a limited time to react and desire to protect their own troops drives their decisions. They are forced to make split second decisions on whether to use long range fire power to achieve their mission and enhance the safety of their troops or close with the enemy to use shorter range weapons.

Due to the dynamic nature of COIN operations, ISAF tactical commanders will likely have limited knowledge of the environment surrounding the enemy's location to be able to judge the likelihood of civilians being in the target area. ROE and the commander's intent should help guide them to understand the strategic implications of their actions, but time does not afford them the opportunity to contemplate these issues as thoroughly as has been done in this paper. Therefore, if the commander's intent is to take the offensive and to pursue the Taliban, tactical commanders are likely to be taking more risk when it comes to collateral damage issues.

Furthermore, if the command atmosphere is one that accepts or condones liberal interpretation of the ROE this can also set the conditions for greater risk acceptance by tactical commanders. Commanders must balance risk of collateral damage with possibly stifling initiative or creating a "bunker" mentality through ROE that is too restrictive, or stressing too defensive of a strategy, that concedes the initiative to the enemy. The crafting and disseminating guidance for the tactical level, appropriate for all situations, is a dilemma for ISAF staff.

Figure 3: Tactical Dynamics



ISAF (z axis)

For the tactical commander, training, Rules of Engagement (ROE), and the commander's intent lay the foundation

GOA (y axis)

As for the GOA, they have little or no inputs at the tactical level when the upper end of kinetic power is used. If the unit is an Afghan-only unit they will probably not have the tools needed to request and utilize artillery, mortars, or airpower. When ISAF-only troops use these forms of combat power, there are no Afghan personnel directly involved in the decision process. For Afghan National Army unit with a Western training teams embedded it is the commander of the ISAF training team who will control the application of artillery or airpower.

Taliban (x axis)

At the tactical level, the Taliban have a large amount of freedom of action. They usually operate in very small groups and their mission is relatively simple; inflict the greatest number of casualties on ISAF troops. This lack of large and regi-

Photograph by
Pfc. Micah E. Clare, U.S. Army

mented command and control structure makes it difficult to target and destroy them by traditional military means. Insurgent tactics allows them to move through the populace and choose to a time and location of attack, recognizing attacks from locations, which endanger civilians can often neutralize ISAF firepower. Taliban understand that with each direct engagement with ISAF troops they face overwhelming combat power, but they take this risk to demonstrate strength within Afghanistan and to the public of the nations contributing troops to ISAF. Taliban troops also know their operations will not provide immediate decisive military victories, but they take this risk with the understanding their tactics tie down ISAF troops in large numbers, hoping their overall strategy will cause ISAF to leave, as the Soviets and other foreign troops have done in the past.

> "The tactical level of operations is focused on the immediate environment. ISAF tactical commanders depend upon understanding the commander's intent and their previous training to guide them appropriately during engagements."

Summation of the Tactical Factors

The tactical level of operations is focused on the immediate environment. ISAF tactical commanders depend upon understanding the commander's intent and their previous training to guide them appropriately during engagements. For the Taliban, a limited command and control structure means they must also translate the general guidance into tactical action. The mission is easy and hard for both sides in different ways; ISAF tactical commanders have overwhelming firepower, but its use can have negative strategic impacts. The Taliban are militarily at a huge firepower disadvantage, but through the use of insurgent tactics they can even out the power equation in the long run.

This rather lengthy review of the military factors within the Afghanistan environment in these first two sections was executed as a snapshot in time within a relatively static framework. The third part to be published in the next edition of The Three Swords looks at how NATO staff officers can approach conceptualizing and visualizing the dynamic interaction of these factors. It then offers techniques to adapt current methods of wargaming to help NATO staff understand how variations within the military environment (either through the actions of NATO or one of the other actors within Afghanistan) will affect the counter insurgency struggle and influence ISAF's ability to meet its military objectives. ✦

NOTES:

(1) Gutiérrez, Ignacio Cosidó. "The role of European forces in NATO missions in Afghanistan", para 86, Assembly of WEU Document A/1962, as accessed 6 June 2007 at http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/s#sions_ordinaires/rpt/2007/1962.php

(2) "US Fears Ebbing European Commitment", Taipei Times, p.5, 27 August 2007, as accessed at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2007/08/27/2003376019 on 3 November 2007.

(3) Smith, Julianne, "NATO Reluctance to Send More Troops to Afghanistan Should Be No Surprise", Center for Strategic and International Studies, 20 September 2006, as accessed at http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_progj/task,view/id,783 on 3 November 2007.

(4) Gutiérrez, Ignacio Cosidó, para 43.

(5) "The Taliban", p 2, Program for Cultural & Conflict Studies, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, as accessed at http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Pubs/The%20Taliban.pdf on 4 November 2007.

(6) Blair, Tony, "What I've Learned", The Economist, 31 May 2007, as accessed at http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9257593 on 2 December 2007.

(7) "The Taliban", p 5.

The third part of this article will be published in the March edition of The Three Swords magazine.

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Media Training for Today's Operational Environment

By Pete Dubois and Laura Loflin Dubois
"World News Today"
Media Simulation Section, JED, JWC

MEDIA training and simulation remains a relatively new concept for many NATO member countries. It was not all that long ago that the media were considered the enemy; something to be avoided at all costs or at least kept at a safe distance. Much of this thinking stemmed from a perception that widespread media coverage of military operations was poor, inaccurate or both. However, military commanders have begun to realize the critical role the media plays in their operations, and as a result media training and simulation is now a highly demanded element of operational level training. Television, newspaper, radio and even the so-called "new media" of bloggers, independent journalists and web journalists are now simulated during many military exercises.

Consideration of the media is particularly important for NATO commanders, whose staffs come from 26 NATO member nations as well as multiple coalition and partner nations. The ability to

successfully get a message out is much more critical when operating in such a diverse environment. There is a direct correlation between public perception of an operation and the level of support the people of the nation are willing to provide. Winning the hearts and minds of the people no longer just refers to the location in which the operation is ongoing, it is also essential to maintain the backing of the people of each nation providing support to the operation.

Maximizing the media and using it as a tool is not a new concept for our enemies, who have proven time and again to be quite masterful at using the media to further their agendas. Arguably, insurgents and terrorist groups are doing a far better job at using the media in their campaigns than many modern militaries around the world. After all, the root concept of terrorism is to inspire fear among the people. It is not the actual act, but the fear of the act that intimidates. Thus, the insurgents' success cannot just be attributed to the conduct of attacks, but by making sure people are aware that they are capable of doing these acts, and they have successfully been able to do that through the media.

In the past, insurgent or terrorist videos used to be very basic productions shot with low quality consumer camcorders. Today, however, many of these videos are shot on digital video and include flashy graphics and animations all designed to grab the viewers' interest and keep their attention. This is a testament to the progression and effectiveness of the media that our enemies have quickly recognized.

It is also clear insurgents carefully time their operations, such as suicide attacks and bombings to garner the greatest amount of media coverage possible. They consider broadcast timelines, particularly in the nations they are targeting, as they plan their attacks to ensure news of their acts reach the largest possible audience. Their goal is to erode the support of each participating nation, resulting in the country pulling its troops out of the region, ultimately affecting NATO's ability to sustain the operation.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, insurgents rarely deploy for an attack without a video camera. They are masters of marketing themselves, and the results have been quite effective, with the goal of intimidation achieved.

NATO has been challenged for some time to get messages out quickly after attacks have occurred. This is because of several factors. The insurgents are

PRACTICAL INTERVIEW TIPS

DO

- ✓ Find out all you can about the interview
- ✓ Anticipate questions you will be asked
- ✓ Determine your audience
- ✓ Write out messages you want to convey
- ✓ Practice answering the questions
- ✓ Ask for makeup if needed - men too!
- ✓ Wear glasses if you need them
- ✓ Use frequent but natural hand gestures
- ✓ Sit up straight in chair
- ✓ Smile when appropriate
- ✓ Convey enthusiasm
- ✓ Talk about personal experiences
- ✓ Use simple language
- ✓ Assume you are "on the record"
- ✓ Set the record straight
- ✓ Stay calm
- ✓ Always be honest
- ✓ Bridge to your messages
- ✓ Take every opportunity to tell the NATO story
- ✓ Relax

DON'T

- ✗ Fail to prepare
- ✗ Cover or gloss over the truth
- ✗ Speculate
- ✗ Smile or grin inappropriately
- ✗ Wear sunglasses or polarized glasses
- ✗ Make nervous gestures
- ✗ Roll or shift your eyes
- ✗ Say anything you don't want on the air or in print
- ✗ Use acronyms or technical jargon
- ✗ Answer hypothetical questions
- ✗ Say "no comment"
- ✗ Argue
- ✗ Talk to the camera
- ✗ Let the reporter put words in your mouth
- ✗ Just answer "yes" or "no"
- ✗ Assume you won't be asked about impor– tant issues that may be outside your "lane"
- ✗ Assume the reporter knows nothing about the military

WNT STATS: 2 years, 13 events, 11 locations in 8 countries, 83 newscasts, 100+ senior officers media trained.
"World News Today: Often imitated, never equalled"

planning and conducting the attacks, so they will naturally come online faster with their statements. The insurgency also has a more streamlined chain of command, and is not tied down with the bureaucratic necessities of an organization like NATO, in which products such as press releases must be approved at multiple levels prior to release. And the insurgency is also not bound by the same rules as the military. They don't have to check facts; they frequently make false statements that cannot be verified by the media, and yet are often still broadcast by many media outlets. Finally, bad news is more interesting to the media, and often NATO messages are overlooked in favour of more sensational stories.

With all that being said, this does not mean it is impossible to successfully interact with the media and thus get essential messages and stories out to the public. The first step is to understand how the media works and to be prepared for interaction and engagement. NATO military commanders have to treat the media like any other weapon system in their arsenal. Just like when a new aircraft is bought or a new tank is delivered, there is a plan for personnel, training and sustainment of that weapon system. A soldier would not deploy with a weapon he or she was not trained to use, and that is why media training prior to deployment is essential.

Journalists from all fields spend years training and perfecting their skills at asking provoking or pointed questions, therefore it stands to reason that military leaders should spend some time perfecting their communication skills to successfully handle these types of questions. It should not be assumed that a safe way around this is to have a Public Affairs officer handle these interviews. The PAO team is indeed a unit's expert on dealing with the media, but they are not by any means the only people who are able to speak with the media. Reporters prefer to interview operators and newsmakers, not spokespersons. PAOs are good for background information and are key to setting up interviews, however, most reporters understand they can get better quotes or soundbites from those closely involved in an operation.

> In Afghanistan and Iraq, insurgents rarely deploy for an attack without a video camera. They are masters of marketing themselves, and the results have been quite effective, with the goal of intimidation achieved.

This is why media training prior to deployment is so essential for military commanders and their key leaders. A commander should not wait until the camera is running and a million people are watching to consider the importance of media training. By then it is too late, the damage is done, and it cannot be taken back.

The challenge for many of NATO's senior leaders is that there are not many opportunities for structured media training. Some NATO nations provide it as a function of Staff College, but most do not. Media training has historically been considered a national responsibility, but most nations simply do not have the resources or the expertise to get to a level of training necessary to prepare them for real world media encounters.✦

Media training sessions include group training, one-on-one interview training with two on-camera interviews, and an analysis. **Because you may end up on CNN!**

REAL WORLD FEEDBACK
Lt. Col. Sarto LeBlanc,
Chief PAO for RC-S

"The media training that I received last year during the MRE was great, as it has helped me to provide an excellent preparation for my Commander and the senior staff to handle the media interviews with the Afghan and international press. I have recommended my replacement to take advantage of this training as well."

"The Commander, Major General Lessard, met with several international media outlets during the past months in theatre. The working relationship that I was able to develop during the media training has helped me to support him while he was interviewed by Nic Robertson, CNN Correspondant, in July. The Commander applied all of the lessons learned during his media training and the outcome of his 30-minute interview is a positive result of this media training."

The Joint Warfare Centre's Media Simulation Team provides television media simulation and basic media training for commanders and their staffs during NATO Response Force (NRF) exercises and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission rehearsals. The team falls under the JWC's Joint Exercise Division. Although this capability is only two years old, the staff has already trained well over 100 senior leaders from all over Europe and their services are in constant demand. In addition to the NRF and ISAF missions, the team has also supported exercises with the Joint Force Training Centre, the Maritime Component Command Headquarters Naples, and provided customized media training to the French Rapid Reaction Corps.

The media training sessions are tailored to each exercise or event, but there are some basics to each one. Normally, the commander and senior staff are provided a group briefing that sets the foundation for successful media encounters. This includes discussions on the importance of media in military operations, and, thus, the importance of media training as well as the development and delivery of critical messages. Practical interview techniques are also covered including interview planning, preparation and post-interview analysis.

In both interview settings, the key to success is advance preparation and practice. Preparing key messages that are backed with examples and personal experiences provide the strategic foundation for the interview. Practicing the delivery of these messages in advance will allow for tactical success once the cameras are rolling.

In closure, the results of advanced media training can be seen at all levels, from junior staff officers in public affairs positions to senior commanders going into major operations. It is not unusual to see NATO Commanders and spokespersons trained by the JWC media training team on CNN, BBC or other international media outlets. Many attribute their success with real world media to the training they received from the JWC's Media Simulation and Training team as well as exposure on the JWC's media simulation "World News Today" during exercises and mission rehearsals.

Continued from page 11

The JWC will have full Multi-Media Functionality including a fully equipped television studio capable of producing and streaming live video.

"The auditorium will include an overall multimedia system, with a multimedia control function"

The new building will house a 600-seat auditorium, several conference rooms, training facilities, office space and administrative areas. The large build with curved roof is the auditorium (Photograph on Page 11). The auditorium will include an overall multimedia system with a multimedia control function. Sound and picture will be transmitted to the two largest, flexible Conference Rooms in the main building at the second floor. We will, therefore, be able to brief maximum 800 people at the same time.

The total space of the E- Block and the new building is approximately 17.000 square metres. The building will be ready for CIS installation first quarter of 2009. The CIS installation is a challenge, and planned to be finalized mid-February 2010.

It is possible that we can move into the Office Accommodation late 2009, if the CIS core functionality with an interim security accreditation is available.

▲ General Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre, at the construction site.

The Training Audience will not use their accommodation until a System Shake Down, which will be performed in 2010.

The price of the building is set to 73 million Euro. ✦

JWC NATIONAL DAYS

4 July: United States Independence Day
1 September: Slovakia Constitution Day
28 September: Czech Republic Statehood Day
3 October: German Unification Day

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Exclusive Interview

"We are on the verge of implementing a system that has no equivalence in NATO."

Garry Hargreaves, JWC Chief CIS Plans and Requirements Branch

In the first issue of the JWC magazine back in 2004, PAO interviewed Mr Garry Hargreaves, then Chief CIS Support Branch, on the technical enhancements that were being planned for the new facility. The article was titled "Building Innovation" and offered a number of ambitious visions of the future. Since the multi million euro invitation for bid (IFB) for the information technology (IT) infrastructure is now ready for release and that invitation contains specifics of the technical solution to be provided, we thought it would be interesting to find out how much correlation there is between the aggressive projections offered back then and the reality that will be installed into the new facility during 2009.

Q. In the first episode you stated that the JWC was set to be the most complex facility in the NATO inventory. Has time supported this vision or has hindsight diluted this somewhat?

A. This particular projection has stood the test of time well. We are on the verge of implementing a system that has no equivalence in NATO. It is an IT architecture that would be the envy of many major corporations and has the rest of NATO sitting up and taking note. Indeed, the new NATO HQ IT Project Managers are observing what happens at the JWC before deciding finally upon the IT infrastructure for their systems. That many technical working group experts are sitting tight and awaiting the results of our project is both intimidating and complementary.

Q. One of the challenges you referred to during the interview in 2004 was a "grossly undermanned technical staff". That would jeopardise both the project and any attempts to provide Operations and Maintenance (O&M) once the facility was ready for handover. Does the spectre of lack of support still hang over the project?

A. Not to the same extent. It took several years of cajoling and the coincidental posting of a JWC staff officer into an NCSA planning office in Mons to finally convince the authorities that the IT support structure was inadequate. A significant increase in the NCSA Squadron has now been agreed and the PE has a heavier civilian component than has become the norm. That said having an allocation of posts is one thing, getting those posts filled with competent staff remains a challenge and is probably the biggest long term risk to leveraging the maximum benefit from the new technology.

Q. You also stated that "the IT should not be the Programme of Work (POW) bottleneck". Have you been able to ensure that the IT is an enabler, rather than a limiter?

A. The IT will not be the bottleneck, the systems and services will be so flexible and manageable that we will be able to move from plan to activation more smoothly and rapidly than we do today. Changes will be effected swiftly and networks will be able to be re-dimensioned in a key stroke. The days of technicians having to visit offices to load software or effect fixes or changes will cease and users will be able to access "their" desktops from anywhere in the JWC. The architectures are designed to be able to facilitate the full spectrum of our perceived workload shifting from the conceptual experiments and interoperability trials following lessons learned or concept developments through to large scale training events with a fraction of the time and effort currently used.

Q. So you can do more, with less, faster and cheaper. What's in it for the user?

A. Well, you won't see very many PCs littered around in the future for a start. You will have a keyboard, display and a mouse all connected to a stateless de-

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vice the size of a pack of cards or perhaps mounted in the cable trunking like a power socket. Your desktop will be able to be sent to any location in the building - if one day you need to work with a multidimensional team (say a planning team) then all you have to do is select the area - your desktop will be there waiting for you. You will have a stable platform, where the IT will realise and react to faults whilst you work. You will be dynamically allocated the processing resources you need, when you need them. All that said that many of the major benefits of the new environment should go largely unnoticed by the typical user.

Q. You appear to be talking about a significant divergence from the way in which IT services are provisioned and maintained today. For the sake of our busy readers – can you in some way try and summarise the main difference?

A. Automated desktop and network provision via software rather than manual transportation of computers and laborious patching, different skill sets of the staff, capacity management becoming more critical than configuration management (far fewer hardware configuration items for the configuration management CM trained people out there). Perhaps a table would illustrate some of the potential differences more clearly:



Garry Hargreaves in front of the CIS infrastructure design tenets display during the ACT Seminar in 2006.

Legacy IT Architecture	Proposed IT Architecture
Network configuration and PC distribution manually achieved taking days/weeks	Tailored desktops (simulated PCs) provisioned in minutes to anywhere in the JWC
Infrastructure tear down and purging takes days	Desktops and network activated with a finite lifespan - automated tear down procedures possible
Hardware from multiple vendors running equally diverse software	Much less hardware and a virtual single operation and maintenance view of the operating systems
Lack of control due to population churn leading to loss of equipment	Integrated alarm systems, which will warn if a piece of equipment leaves the building without authorisation
Support organisation based on technological stove pipes (e.g. network section, FS section etc.)	Re-organisation based on functional deliverables e.g. multi skilled teams servicing all the requirements of a network (an MS team or a NU team)
CIS budgets based upon a three year turn over of 33% of the holding	Fewer replacements (5-7 years), but more expensive and potentially more intrusive
Single event network leading to strict event de-confliction whereby weeks are lost between events	Triple event related networks able to switch from development/preparation into operation in a key stroke (or two)

Q. So it appears that it was a good guess back then – what do you put that down to?

A. Firstly that the JWC's technical staff were involved from the outset and given unprecedented freedom to manipulate the designs to fit our vision back in 2004. The initial designs were based on traditional PCs – basically a repeat of what we now have in Ulsnes. That represented, from an IT perspective, an unaffordable O&M burden. The Host Nation Norway was convinced to adapt the plans to ensure that we will get what we need. Secondly, we were empowered by our Host Nation, the NATO IS and our ACT Capability Managers to go with what we thought was right – things that didn't fit the criteria extracted from the user requirements analysis and the high level designs, that we helped generate, were dumped. Thirdly, we engaged, internally and externally, with other IT

providers and training establishments learning at each opportunity and finally we engaged the CIS Support Agency – NCSA, as soon as they had the ability and knowledge to be able to contribute to the process. All that, coupled with the fact that the predictions were fairly non-specific, led to the statements made in the first magazine standing up fairly well to the test of time.

Q. I would like to ask how you intend taking the designs into operation, but before that could you indulge our more technical readers with an explanation of what the concept is all about?

A. The description below tries to capture the main features and components of this concept. I will try and keep it at a broad level – for more detail please speak to the **CIS Support Office**, which I will introduce later.

SIGNIFICANT FEATURES:

One of the main feature of the design is a purpose built Data Centre and a CIS "Operations Room" where the technical staff, service desk, telephone exchange, message handling, CIS hardware and software are all located. The designs for this area can be seen below:

In the diagram you can see the communications rooms, which will be against the rock of the mountain, coming left are the simulated TV studio for the generation of scenario news. The CAX and the experimentation laboratory are seen on the right of the diagram along with a shared Conference Room. In the centre of the picture is the Data Centre, which will be a tightly controlled and managed area housing all of the management systems, memory, processing and cable patches (more than 6000) for the JWC. The Data Centre is surrounded by technical staff on all sides with the majority of the NCSA robustly positioned enabling oversight of all the IT management systems. The CIS Operations Centre will be orchestrated from the technical leaders seated in the yellow horseshoe. Both the JWC staff and the visiting audience will use the service desk, which is situated between the technicians and the workshop as shown in blue - a personnel and equipment consolidation effort.

So the JWC Data Centre concept is an example of where technology has completed an evolutionary full circle, perhaps you might remember mainframe computers, and NATO at large is looking very closely at reducing the IT footprint and personnel by withdrawing distributed computing resources into a more manageable consolidated solution. The overall consolidation concept that JWC will use (and NATO is increasingly interested in) is captured by the term "Virtualisation".

Virtualisation basically means providing the same levels of service to a process or a client as if that process or client was running on its own dedicated hardware platform, whilst in reality the platform is common resource within a pool of processing capability. Hence the comparison with large main frame computers and relatively "dumb" (today's terminology is "thin") terminals. There are a number of vendors now offering virtualisation and the most popular and mature is the offering of VMWare. Since the IFB and subsequent contract for the new facility will be brand naming VMWare, all references to services and processes below are made to the VMWare software suite.

So, why then is virtualisation poised to sweep through the IT market place? The driving factor is the spiralling cost of the operation and maintenance. In the paragraphs below, I will explain how this driving factor blossomed from a simple idea to improve the utilisation of spare server capacity to something that can be extended throughout the IT value chain.

JWC DATA Centre

VIRTUALISATION BENEFITS:

Server Consolidation and Infrastructure Optimization: This represents the origins of virtualisation and is consequently where this technology is most mature (JWC was the first NATO facility to virtualise servers back in 2004). Today's powerful computing assets were originally de-

"JWC Data Centre concept is an example of where technology has completed an evolutionary full circle..."

signed to run a single operating system and a single application — take as an example something we are probably all familiar with — the CNAFS service. CNAFS has its own server, sometimes busy, sometimes not. The same can be said for our web servers or many others. A significant majority of servers run applications and processes at something approaching 10-15% capacity. The remaining 85% is used very infrequently or only at start up. What virtualisation does is make it possible to run multiple operating systems and multiple applications (e.g. CNAFS, WISE and say MCCIS) on the same server at the same time, thereby increasing the utilisation and flexibility of hardware.



Physical Infrastructure Cost Reduction: Since you are able to make use of the spare capacity then it follows that you can reduce the number of servers and related IT hardware in the Data Centre. You don't need as many boxes and hence this leads to reductions in space, power and cooling requirements. In today's economic climate anything that is greener has a distinct advantage and virtualisation offers a consolidation ratio of 40% – 75% resulting in significantly lower IT provisioning and running costs. Automated server start up and shut down during periods of peak or trough demands reduce recurring electricity bills.

Improved Operational Flexibility & Responsiveness: Virtualisation offers a new way of managing IT infrastructure and can help IT administrators spend less time on repetitive tasks such as provisioning, configuration, monitoring and maintenance. Hundreds of workstations can be deployed in a matter of minutes, they can be established from a template that has a particular profile (e.g. an ISAF workstation) and lifespan to coincide with a given timeframe by which time they are automatically decommissioned and the assets released ready to support future demands. Alternatively, they can be more permanent and configured with unique performance settings that will satisfy demanding process users.



Increased Application Availability & Improved Business Continuity: We have all witnessed the frustration of downtimes as our traditionally configured services are denied us, either through a planned downtime or more worrying (and more frequent of late) unplanned downtimes. Virtualisation offers a significant improvement in service availability by the capability to migrate entire virtual environments (user and server) with very little interruption of service. Currently, this is achieved by a "watchdog" connection that triggers another server to take the load of a failed one within a few milliseconds. Although as we look into 2009 it will be possible to have a shadow environment running in parallel and this will ensure that even the milliseconds denial of service will be a thing of the past.

VIRTUALISATION KEY COMPONANTS:

The first thing to realise is that virtualisation is software and this software is called ESX Server. It is the ESX server that makes the hardware think it is running on its own platforms. It offers the user a simulated dedicated PC interface when in fact it is a shared resource. ESX performs load balancing and is constantly self checking and self healing. How these and the advantages listed above are delivered is explained in more detail below:

High Availability (HA): VMware HA continuously monitors all physical servers in a resource pool and restarts virtual machines affected by server failure. This service is performed by an interconnecting "heartbeat" which is able to initiate a restart on a separate machine in near real time and without human intervention.

Dynamic Resource Allocation (DRS): DRS monitors and balances utilisation across resource pools and aligns resources according to the demands of the user. In this way, it is possible to allocate additional IT resources to the high priority or demanding applications. The dynamic allocation of resources is determined by the policies set by the administrators and can be individually applied or as a group (e.g. the training event network). As new machines are created, re-activated or decommis-



sioned, DRS will shift machines to maintain optimal loading and performance. If the demands outstrip the server load additional servers on stand by will automatically start and begin to carry the increased demand. Additionally DRS will take advantage of new servers added to a resource pool by redistributing virtual machines without system disruption. Conversely servers can be taken out of service to enable hardware to be released for maintenance or replacement without the service being affected.



Virtual Machine Mobility (VMotion): This is the software package, which enables virtualised servers, storage and networking to move an entire running virtual machine instantaneously from one server to another. The entire state of a virtual machine is encapsulated by a set of files stored on shared storage, which is accessed by both the source and the target ESX servers concurrently. The active memory and precise execution state of a virtual machine can then be rapidly transmitted over a high speed network. Since the network is also virtualized by VMware ESX, the virtual machine retains its network identity and connections, ensuring a seamless migration process.



VMotion

Lifecycle Manager (LCM): The LCM is where the business meets the supporting organisation – SMC4 as the JWC's CIS "intelligent customer" and NCSA as the service provider. In an environment where servers and desktops can be generated either automatically or at a key stroke management "machine sprawl" is clearly an area of concern. LCM, via a web interface, will manage virtual machines through the well known JWC configuration change request (CCR) processes and will use automation to reduce the cost of administering and managing the virtual environment. It is the LCM software that will be used to establish policies, manage the change request process and eventual decommissioning. In much the same way as CCRs are handled today the user makes a request for a virtual machine. Each request is then routed for approval within the organization. Once approved, the virtual machine is deployed automatically — LCM has all the required information about what resources the machine needs. This level of intelligence eliminates potential manual errors as virtual machines are deployed to a pre-defined and approved location for a finite time. Virtual machines are moved into a decommission process that involves archiving and ultimately deleting the virtual machine when it is no longer needed. A process that I am sure will feature regularly in the training environment. A simplified diagram of our LCM process is shown below:



Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI): If you are able to accept that the servers in a traditional architecture are not efficiently used then when you extend this to the PC the advantages become very obvious. Consider your PC in your workplace — just how much of the time is it idle, either switched off or waiting patiently for your next keystroke? So, instead of having your machine whirring at your feet, you take all that computing power and place it in the Data Centre, there when you need it and available for something else when you don't. It delivers PC - like performance to the user. The

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

desktops actually reside on the virtual servers in the data centre. The users see only a picture of the desktop through their thin client thereby increasing desktop control and manageability. It also provides new levels of reliability as faulty desktops can be identified and replaced on the fly with no intervention required by the user or maintainer.

VIRTUALISATION CHALLENGES:

Reclaiming all the computing power back into the Data Centre is not a risk free activity. Traditional boundaries of responsibility are at best hazy and in some cases disappear altogether. A careless keystroke could potentially take out the whole environment and the technical staff will need to make a significant leap in their understanding of areas, which were traditionally stove piped. Change and configuration management practices will need to adapt to the new environment where generating new services and desktops is so easy. CIS budgets, that were relatively easy to forecast based upon a three year PC refresh cycles, will also change to reflect a scenario involving a major "refit" less frequently. How these will that be received by the NATO resource committees is an area of concern. What is clear is that virtual environments require a different level of care than their physical counterparts. Many organizations move to virtual environments because of their natural capabilities for easier management and the potential for greater availability and uptime.

What is not readily understood is that virtual environments in some ways add their own set of risks that must be properly managed separately from pure physical environments. These risks align with three greater concepts — their improved density, their greater complexity, and their enhanced capabilities for automation.

Increased Density: First and foremost, most organizations incorporate virtualisation into their networks because of the driving need to consolidate physical machines. That is not really case for the JWC since rapid deployment and environment change were our driving factors. Nonetheless the consolidation activity reduces the total number of physical machines in the environment while allowing for the same number of network services to operate as before. One concern associated with this increased level of density surrounds the capacity for more individual services to operate on the same physical hardware. Physical hardware failure characteristics are common across devices. This is the case regardless of whether a single operating system (OS) instance is installed directly on the physical hardware or a virtualisation solution is implemented to consolidate multiple machine instances. In the case of virtualisation, the difference is that a host failure can impact more than one service. An increase in density due to virtualisation consolidation means a corresponding increase in outage exposure when a host fails.

Greater Complexity: Currently the IT support organisation is made up of staff who are able to perform system administration on what constitutes only a small part of the total virtualised infrastructure. We have lifters and shifters to move PC's, cable terminators, hardware accountants – all the standard components of a traditional support organisation. Many of these functions will be reduced significantly or simply disappear altogether. They will have to be replaced by very highly skilled (much more so than the administrators of today) Virtual Infrastructure Administrators, who will require considerable training and nurturing on site. Just how we handle the churn associated with military posting cycles is yet to be seen, but if not trained, the IT personnel could become a liability. Indeed the management may not want to see the JWC's "brain" tampered with by anyone who is not qualified.

Enhanced Automation: It may seem odd that this is considered in the "challenges" part of this article but the reality is that this technology has the ability, if unchecked, to run itself — make new machines when it feels it needs to, have the capacity to generate hundreds of desktops in minutes, have the capacity to decommission them as quickly. A server could be running on a platform at one moment and shifted to another server in

JWC CIS Support Office team picture taken outside the CIS Support Office.

another rack at the next. A cyber attack would no longer be a threat to a single service; but could take out the whole environment. Enhanced automation will have to be only as automated as the centre can manage.

SUMMARY:

Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) is a complex term for the simple concept of consolidating end-user desktops on a centralized server. VDI uses virtualisation technology to create user desktops. The benefits to the VDI approach include lowering cost, simplifying patch management and provisioning new applications to users in seconds; minimal downtimes and reductions in the resources associated with new application deployment and access the users' desktop environment from any location. It is no surprise then that the favoured solution for the JWC is a virtualised infrastructure.

MANAGING THE TECHNICAL TRANSFORMATION

It has been said that the installation at JWC will probably be the single most technically advanced investment NATO has made. Normally, a new service might be deployed or a new technology introduced onto an already existing CIS platform. The selection of VI as the architecture that will support all services means that rather than a gradual evolution normally experienced the JWC will be subjected to a dramatic leap in technology that will affect all the services delivered. Getting to grips with this technology represents the highest risk item that needs to be managed. We were aware of this many months ago and proposed to initiate a joint (NCSA/SMC4) CIS Support Office that would be the focal point for all things CIS related. A short summary from the terms of reference of this group are shown below:

- Provide status updates through the JWC management structure to the JWC Command Group;
- Generate joint (NCSA/SMC4) CIS policies, plans and routines well before activation;
- Internal project management of items contained in the CSO issue log;
- Facilitation of a long term corporate planning and knowledge resource;
- Assistance to Host Nation's requests for support in coordinating CIS support during contract negotiations, installation, commissioning and acceptance;
- Timely provision of credible NATO staff to participate in contractor provided training;
- Projection of NCSA recruitment timeframes (Completed);
- Determination of the long term training requirements for NCSA technicians, engineers and planners;
- Offering technical commissioning and acceptance testing assistance to the Host Nations;
- Provision of quality control advice and configuration management support.

CIS SUPPORT OFFICE (CSO)

It has been agreed that the CSO will be managed from within the SMC4 Plans and Requirements Branch. The office will be led on a day to day basis by Lt. Col. Frank Ruckes, a dedicated and experienced planner, he will have access to a small but permanent cross functional team on an as required and increasing basis. The office is physically located in a recently refurbished garage that is close to the National Support Element buildings. Lt. Col. Frank Ruckes, Mr Maciej Koczur and the lead NCSA planner, Maj. Tommy Reiestad, will have permanent occupancy in this otherwise "hot desk" area. Lt. Col. Ruckes will provide me with a daily update during intense periods of activity and I will translate that into a

weekly brief for the SMC4 Division Head so that he is able to select pertinent information for the Command Group. This weekly brief will also be provided to the ACT CAPCO (Capability Coordinator) and MISPO (Mission Sponsor) and the NATO IS as the representatives of the ultimate owners of the capability — the contributing NATO Nations.

Finally, one of the core members of the CSO (Mr Sprenger) is also a member of the Transition Working Group and will enable the bridge between IT provision and transition requirements. The office will be a hive of project activity at some times and during other times the group will address issues such as configuration management policies, business continuity plans, service restoration procedures, service level agreements, SOPs, training schedules, budget preparation and the capturing of changes required to keep the facility up to date with emerging requirements. Our desire is to have these all in place, tested and understood before project handover so that the CIS community can hit the ground running and be ready to offer the output oriented side of the business levels of service and responsiveness that are currently unachievable.

CONTACT US!

In order to ensure that we can capture bright ideas, worries and respond to requests for information we have created a CSO portal and a mailbox. We invite anyone with an input that could have CIS repercussions to post these off to the CSO and they will be noted and acted upon. These may be escalated to project issues or even translated to the Host Nation as a specific project risk. If these issues lead to items that cannot be provided or corrected within the scope of the current authorisation, we will use them as the basis for planning future enhancements. Our commitment is not limited to facilitating a state of the art facility — it is to keep it at that level through its lifetime — and that means thinking about future evolution before the current one even exists.

The email address is cso@jwc.nato.int on the high or low side and we are open for business. The CSO members have already toured the building and are embarking on awareness training for project management and virtualisation depending on their skill sets and the office requirements. ✦

By Bente Heill Kleven,
Linguist, JWC PAO

in public spaces

Public Art Norway, or KORO, is the Norwegian government's professional body for the creation and presentation of public space art. KORO is striving for high quality, diversity and innovation in art projects designed to take place outside galleries in order to reach wide and varied audiences across Norway. Another key idea is to engage the public in unusual ways.

Indeed, as KORO says, art expresses human creativity and originality. Through art, reality is adapted in order to convey new experiences, new understandings and new insights. Also, producing art for public spaces is a way of expressing a democratic idea that upholds the right of every person to experience art, while at the same time pushing the sphere of public art into new and unmapped territory, as can be seen for instance at Norway's new Opera House, in Oslo.

KORO's beautification efforts find an echo in the general public as the artworks managed by the organization make up Norway's largest and most frequently visited collection.

Art projects designed to beautify public sector buildings, including military ones, have been at the heart of KORO's activities since 1976. Today, upon application to KORO, an amount of up to 1.5% of the construction cost may be set aside for the decoration of the inside of new buildings.

Several pieces decorating **JWC** and **NJHQ** premises are loans from the KORO collection. Six of them will be on view in the Canteen until March 2009, including the painting titled "THE YOUNG CELLIST", a piece acquired in 1990 directly from the artist, Danish born but Stavanger based Annalise Convad. The piece exemplifies the artist's lifelong engagement with light and colours, which she loved to play with in her former atelier located a stone's throw from JWC, in Eikesetstubben at Jåttå. Like her husband Harald Stokkeland, Annalise Convad sought aesthetic inspiration from masters like Matisse and Cézanne and became one of Rogaland's most cherished painters. Both wife and husband remained unmoved by shifting trends in the world of art. Their life and art are explored in a biography titled **Det gode lyset - The Good Light**, which is a beautiful tribute to their world and work. Annalise Convad's CV is available at www.kik.no/personsp?id=T1450090 &visalt=1. The remaining pieces in the Canteen exhibition will be presented in full detail in the next issue of **The Three Swords**.

Several pieces decorating **JWC** and **NJHQ** premises are loans from the KORO collection.

"The Young Cellist"
Annalise Convad

By Gordon Ramsay, Chief Community Support Branch, JWC

Sightseeing Cruises & Concert in the Lot

The JWC community participated in two sightseeing cruises during the summer of 2008. The first was on 1 June, and the second was on 14 September. Over 150 community members participated in each. The first took us down Gannsfjorden, past Viking Football Stadium, to Hommersåk and then past the Stavanger Islands. The second took us through Amøyfjorden, to Rennesøy and then past Dusavik. The cruises, organized by Community Support Branch, gave our community a chance to see these wonderful areas from a different vantage point with our families and friends. They also allowed our newcomers and their families an opportunity to further the friendships that they have made already. Each trip was met with sunny skies and fair seas adding even more to the enjoyment of all and the chance to snap some beautiful pictures!

On 23 August, the JWC Community hosted its first "Concert in the Lot" with two acts. Phil Jackson began by playing classic rock in the Community Club and the evening's headliners, the "Real Neils", a Neil Young tribute band from Stavanger, then played a two-hour set outdoors in the parking lot. Over 200 people attended the concert, enjoyed grilled burgers and great music.

GOLD again for JWC's sports star!

By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

JWC's Ercan Ozkan (Graphics Section) is clearly world-class in the 55-59 year old age group as he continues to take home indoor championship gold medals. This year's success already includes four wins: the 60-metre hurdles at the Nordic Veteran Indoor Championships in Reykjavik, Iceland and the Norwegian Indoor Championships in Hamar, Norway as well as the 100 and 200-metre hurdles at the Turkish Master Athletics Championships in Izmir, Turkey and the European Masters Games in Malmo, Sweden.

"Sports taught me that you should never underestimate yourself, or anyone else for that matter. Sports also taught me the spirit of competition and how to look towards the future for the next opportunity to win. What sports do is to give you the craving for success," he says.

It has been an astonishing year. Ercan Ozkan, competing in the 55-59 age group ran fantastic in the 60-metre hurdle event at the Nordic Veteran Indoor Championships in Reykjavik, to win in a time of 8.28 and break his national indoor record. He also won the 60-metre and the long jump titles at the Norwegian Indoor Championships in Hamar.

Also here, he came second in the 200 metres with 27.69, breaking his national indoor record. He then took first place in the 100 and 200 metre events at the Turkish Master Athletics Championship in Izmir. Strong winds made July's European Masters Athletics Championships quite hard and Ozkan finished fifth, running a very decent time 13.28. In September, the European Masters Games (EMG) in Malmo, Sweden, brought him another astonishing success. He won both the 100 and 200 metre runs in 12.90 seconds and 26.54 seconds respectively, again breaking his national outdoor records (he holds a total of six national records to date). In addition, he ended third in the long and triple jump competitions.

"Healthy sporting experiences help creating a healthy body. Sports keep you younger from the inside out and translate into longer life expectancy! You are happier and more satisfied. Sports sustain the strength of your bones and are vital to keeping your muscles strong, your heart and lungs youthful, and your brain sharp. I met some people at the Master's who are competing simply for the fun of it and to prove that they are in super form. And that's great! I like the idea of being in super form and breaking records to prove it!"

He honestly enjoys indoor championships, but comments that it is difficult to participate without sponsors to support his efforts. "I pay all expenses on my own," he says. "But there is so much enthusiasm that they have all been great events I am proud to be part of."

"Age doesn't bother me. You may call me an old geezer, but I am a serious world-class old geezer!" Ozkan concludes with a smile.

Musical Excellence from German Heeresmusikkorps 12

By Lt. Col. Juergen E. Pauker, DEU A, Chief Concept Development Section, JWC

World-renowed German Army Band, Heeresmusikkorps 12 was invited to visit the European Capital of Culture, Stavanger, from 20 to 24 June 2008. Embedded in a mix of national and international bands, Heeresmusikkorps 12 had the great opportunity to perform twice in Stavanger. They gave concerts in the Stavanger Concert Hall (Stavanger Konserthus) and in the Stavanger Marketplace. Additionally, they marched in a Parade through the historic alleys of Stavanger City.

The unforgettable climax was the concert performed at the Concert Hall in front of presidents, dignitaries, military commanders and citizens. The band played an outstanding repertoire of selected marches, overtures, popular music and instrumental solos on Saturday, 21st of June. Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre, initiated this German contribution to the Stavanger Capital of Culture programme. Lieutenant General Korte thanked the Stavanger community and its leadership during his welcome remarks for their strong support to the Joint Warfare Centre and its staff and their families. He emphasised that these concerts were meant to help showcase our gratitude to the community.

On Sunday, the German Army Band participated in the Marching Parade with 65 different military and school bands. Despite the rainy weather, hundreds of music-lovers lined the narrow streets and the city jetty to cheer the passing bands. In the evening, the German Army Band led off a series of Open-Air Concerts at the Stavanger Marketplace. A packed audience was overwhelmed by the great variety of the music played and they thanked the band with long lasting ovations.

Two sides profited from the visit of the German Army Band 12. The Stavanger community was treated to an outstanding performance of music and the German Army Band experienced the great hospitality of Norway and the Norwegians. Hopefully, this will not be the last time a (German) Army Band represents NATO and the Joint Warfare Centre in front of a Stavanger crowd.

By Robert Scheider, JWC Analyst
JTDD, JWC

LACROSSE *in* LAHTI

A different kind of training event...

AFTER the summer block leave period, it is always fun to see how everyone in JWC spent their holidays. This summer, I had the opportunity and honour to coach the Norwegian National Lacrosse Team in our first international competition. We travelled to Lahti, Finland and competed in the European Lacrosse Championships.

The whole process of building a national team from the few teams in Norway began over a year before, with tryouts following the 2007 Norwegian Championships. A few people dropped out and we added a few more, finally arriving at a team of 19 players (although we could have had 23, we decided to limit the team to those who could play at the necessary level). Except for a Swede and an American with many years of experience (teams are allowed to have some – not to exceed 15% of the team - non-passport holders who meet certain requirements) most had less than four years of experience, with an average of about two years. Contrast this with teams like England and Germany, where the average experience level was over ten years! One player from Scotland - 67 year old backup goalie John Marr - had more experience than my entire team combined. The players came from four teams (Bergen, Kristiansand, and two Oslo teams) and had never played or trained together before. Our goalie had very little experience and had never had a coach. He learned to play from watching Youtube videos! Two players were unable to attend the camp and several others missed the first days. So, we had some challenges ahead of us.

We began our national team camp about a month after **ISAF TE 08/01** ended. I noticed how similar our camp was to one of our training events. I had already initiated a sort of Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) by sending out emails with things ranging from my philosophy to specific plays. Just as with exercise ADL, some read the information while others did not. Since our camp had limited training time (just like our exercises) I had to prioritise what we could train.

I began by thinking of how I wanted the team to run, including how we would play offense and defense, handle penalty situations (which, like in ice hockey, involve players being sent to the penalty box), transition play, and other aspects. Then, I worked backwards to develop

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sorts of training objectives of what we would need to learn in a total of 15 hours, spread over six training sessions.

I began the camp on 30 July with a sort of Functional Area Training, focusing on positional skills. Rather than doing generic drills, we made sure everything the players did fit into the offensive and defensive systems I hoped to teach them. After the first few minutes, I was surprised to learn that many of the terms I used - which are common in lacrosse - were new to many of the players. That was a lesson identified: explain all of the terms first. I also learned that we would have to spend more time on the basics than I expected. I managed to add a little time to the camp, but also had to simplify some things and cut others out.

We progressed to a type of Battle Staff Training, with small units working together, until we could build to a full offense against a full defense. We even conducted After Action Reviews (AARs) after each session to discuss what we learned and what we still needed to work on. Regretfully, we never had enough players in the camp to be able to run the equivalent of a Mission Rehearsal Exercise - a full ten-on-ten game situation.

We managed to get a bit of training and a few tactics sessions in before our first game in Finland and we "integrated" the players who missed the camp, just as we try to facilitate integration of Individual Augmentees during our ISAF training events. Our group was the most challenging group in the tournament, consisting of Germany, Finland, the Czech Republic, Italy, and one other newcomer - Slovakia. The Slovaks had an advantage over us, as they all played together on a combined Slovak team in the Czech league, while our players had never played together before. They took an early lead, but we improved with each quarter. The end result of 16 to 3 for Slovakia did not indicate how much our players tried and learned during the game. We conducted an AAR immediately following the game to discuss what we should continue doing and what we should change. Rather than having me tell them what they did right or wrong, the players were identified their strengths and weaknesses very well and we decided to simplify a few things and change others based on their input. We continued the AAR process after each game and even conducted a brief version during our ten-minute halftime breaks.

We managed to get a strong start against the Czech Republic - usually a powerhouse in European Lacrosse. We held them to three goals and scored two early in the second period. Unfortunately, they came back to crush us 18 to 2. Despite the loss, we had many one thing to celebrate: we corrected many of the errors that cost us penalties and turnovers in our first game. We held Germany without a goal for over ten minutes in one stretch, but also lost by large margins to them and home-team Finland. Despite the losses, our players never gave up and played hard for all 80 minutes of each game.

While we scouted and prepared for each team, we put in extra preparation for the one team in the group we had a chance to beat: Italy. They had been playing internationally for six years and also had a number of Americans and Italian-Americans. We did have two advantages over them: our players were bigger and in much better shape than most teams, including Italy. We developed a strategy to take away the Italian strengths, such as their skilled, but out of shape Americans, and attack their weaknesses. While the game was close going into the fourth quarter, we had a strong finish and won 18 to 10. I did manage to lose my voice though, but not for the only time in the tournament.

> "We progressed to a type of Battle Staff Training, with small units working together, until we could build to a full offense against a full defense."

In our second group, we faced easier competition. We struggled for 60 minutes against Switzerland, but made a fourth quarter comeback to win 9 to 5. In our final game, we crushed France 18 to 2 and managed to execute all of our systems and plays. Unfortunately, we had too few players left to be able to play Spain for 13th place, so we finished 14th.

France still had one game left. They

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had lost all seven of their games in the tournament and were playing Italy for 17th place. They asked me to coach them and I agreed – on one condition: they had to meet me at the field 90 minutes before the game started and we would do a short practice session. I also met with them the evening before to find out which players had certain strengths and weaknesses. The French team had several teenagers and ranged from 17 to almost 40, in contrast with the Norwegians, who were all between 22 and 28. Because most of them came from a single French club team, they bonded very well together. They arrived as promised the next morning at 0800 and we taught one players to play a new position (longstick midfielder), installed a new defense, refined the offense, and worked on the transition offense and defense and extra man plays. We finished at 0920 and they got a ten-minute break before playing Italy.



"Our Norwegian team is already looking forward to our next games and competing at the 2010 World Championships in Manchester, England."

Luckily, I had just gotten my voice back (too much yelling while coaching Norway), so I could yell again. The French team learned very quickly, though, and we took the lead early in the game and held Italy off for a 7 to 4 win and France's first victory ever. The only disappointment was that we celebrated the victory with German Sekt (sparkling wine) instead of real champagne!

So, that was how I spent my summer holidays. I had told my players that I would be pleased no matter how many games they won if they played to the best of their abilities for 80 minutes each game. They did that and I am more proud of their effort than of the three wins - which is probably three more wins than anyone expected us to get.

The trainer for the West German 1954 World Cup football champions, Sepp Herberger, said "after the game is before the game." Our Norwegian team is already looking forward to our next games and competing at the 2010 World Championships in Manchester, England. We have much work to do, but most of our players from this summer should be back and will improve by then. Unlike some successful teams this year, which stocked up on North American players who had a parent or grandparent born in their country (I won't mention names, but the Orange-coloured team that finished second somehow had eight Americans and Canadians, including six players who probably made their first trip to the country they represented during their training camp), we will continue to use players who play or played in Norway and contributed to the development of lacrosse here. We plan on more camps and games to improve the quality of lacrosse in Norway and the development of the National Team. My Outlook calendar already has 10-24 July marked for the World Championships.

WELCOME BBQ & INFORMATION DAY

By Gordon Ramsay,
Chief Community Support Branch, JWC

On Saturday, August 9th 2008, the JWC Community held its second annual "Welcome BBQ and Information Day". The aim of the event was threefold: to welcome new community members to the JWC family; to allow folks to catch up with friends after summer postings and leave; and to showcase to the community our Clubs and other activities and associations in the Stavanger area.

This year we had 34 exhibitors including the International Network of Norway-Stavanger 2008, the Stavanger Tourist Office, Rødne cruises, Viking Football Club, the Rogaland Historical War Museum, the Hafrsfjord Veterarian Clinic and various craft workers. The Rogaland Fire Brigade provided static display, as did the War Museum with three vintage military vehicles. The Stavanger Oilers Ice Hockey Club provided a "shoot at the goalie" contest, and the JWC Football Club conducted a football shooting accurate competition. Over 300 community members enjoyed the information stands, picked up interesting and useful information and, due to the great work of our volunteer chefs, enjoyed grilled burgers and pølse. Our thanks to all exhibitors and the community for making this a very enjoyable day!

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

ters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (HQ SACT) located in Norfolk, Virginia, United States; and also with the overall system designers of NATO Command, Control and Communication Agency (NC3A), Brussels, Belgium.

Final cost of the construction is around 750 million NOK.

The civil work construction of JWC's new training facility is scheduled to finish by 1 April 2009.

At the press conference inside the construction site, Anne Grete Strøm-Erichsen, Norway's Minister of Defence, said that the new facility has a unique design and layout, which is tailored to meet JWC's tasks as a world-class training centre. Commenting on how the construction of the new training facility will help move NATO's transformation efforts forward, she said:

"It is of great importance to Norway to have a NATO body on our soil. It visualizes our strong ties to the Alliance and our commitment to its transformation. And we are truly proud to be the host nation for JWC."

JWC'S BACKGROUND:

In 2002 at the Prague Summit, the Nations set a dramatic new course for the NATO Alliance, which included the creation of Headquarters Allied Command Transformation dedicated to the continuous improvement of Alliance and national capabilities. HQ SACT, is, in a very real sense, both the symbol of the new NATO and the architect that helps shaping the future of NATO's combined and joint operations. This is achieved through training, education, experimentation and lessons learned within NATO Alliance.

The Joint Warfare Centre is itself a product of the decisions made at Prague in 2002. Indeed, five years ago, on 23 October 2003, the Joint Warfare Centre was established as part of NATO's Allied Command Transformation, to meet the profound security challenges of the 21st Century.



JWC was then manned at around 50 percent of its authorised establishment with personnel coming from nine NATO Nations. It has gone from roughly 50 percent manning in 2004, to nearly 90 percent manning today. The number of NATO Nations represented at JWC has increased from nine to 24, plus two Partner Nations.

In those five short years, the Joint Warfare Centre has built a tremendous reputation based on the superb work and great vision of the founding officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and the civilians.

Now a world-class training centre, the Joint Warfare Centre is a busy facility engaged in an incredibly important mission for NATO. In basic terms, the Joint Warfare Centre serves as the "implementing agent" of HQ SACT. JWC has a big responsibility: it provides quality and professional training for those who are about to deploy on major NATO operations. "Training" is JWC's most visible mission.

JWC conducts:

- Biannual pre-deployment training for the International Security Assistance Force - Afghanistan (ISAF);
- Triannual NATO Response Force/ Combined Joint Task Force training for NATO operational commands;
- Biannual Iraqi Key Leader Training delivered to Iraqi Security Forces;
- Stand-Alone Experiments and Computer Assisted Exercises.

Since its creation, we have seen some excellent work to move the Joint Warfare Centre ahead. In addition to delivering several keystone training events and exercises, we have marked several other milestones as well. A few examples are:

- In 2004, the NATO Military Budget Committee approved of the Type B costing for our new building;
- In 2004, JWC conducted NATO's first out-of-country training for Iraqi Security Forces;
- JWC's initial organizational structure was amended, tested and activated in order to meet the mission of JWC;
- In 2005, JWC conducted the first "Triple J" meeting with JFTC and JALLC, a meeting which brings together subordinate headquarters of ACT at Jåttå to further their cooperation and coordination;
- In 2006, JWC achieved its full operational capability;
- JWC has made significant upgrades to its communications and information systems and modernized its computer backbone;
- JWC has maintained a cohesive military community with the Norwegian Joint Headquarters;
- In 2006, JWC hosted an ACT Seminar in Stavanger, under the theme **"Delivering Transformation"**;
- On 21 June 2006, the Kingdom of Norway and Headquarters SACT concluded a new Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) concerning the establishment of JWC;
- Another major element of JWC's transformation is the nomination of Commander Joint Warfare Centre, as Officer Conducting the Exercise.

Last but not least, JWC put its Vision into action, as "A world class training centre that drives NATO transformation forward through an innovative concept development, experimentation and doctrine development process."

By Gordon Ramsay,
Chief Community Support Branch, JWC

JWC INTER-DIVISIONAL SPORTS DAY

The second annual **JWC Inter-Divisional Sports Day** was held on Friday, September 5th 2008, at the Norwegian military training camp "Madlaleiren", beside beautiful Hafrsfjord. Although heavy rain fell during the very early morning hours, the weather cleared and by the time of the Commander's, Lieutenant General Korte, opening remarks at 08:20, the sun began to peek out of the clouds. Lieutenant General Korte warmly welcomed all participants, noting that **the purpose of the day** was have some **fun and exercise** and **to wrest the trophy from Support Division, last year's winner**!

The warm-up was conducted by two aerobics instructors from Elixia Sports Club and afforded a very good workout to most participants! The day's events consisted of round robin format **football**, **volleyball**, **field hockey** and **basketball** matches between Divisions and a joint NSE team, a **sailing regatta**, and the inaugural **JWC heptathlon**. The day ended with an inter-divisional **8 x 50 m relay race**. Lunch was provided in the form of an assortment of cold cuts, cheese, bread, orange juice and fruit.

Support Division was indeed **dethroned** as champions by a very determined and gritty performance in all competitions by **Joint Exercise Division**. Congratulations to all participants for a fun and very successful day and thanks to the JWC Sports Officer, Lieutenant (NOR M) **Lasse Matberg** and **426 Services** for their organizational efforts and help.

Rumour has it the new Joint Training Development Division Chief, **Colonel Chuck Attwood** (CAN AF) has initiated a **Divisional training program** for next year's event!



Photographs by Lt. Col. Elisabeth Eikeland, NOR AF & Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

Event	1st Place	Runner-Up
Sailing	CDD	JED
Volleyball	SMC4	JED/CDD
Basketball	CDD/NSE/SMC4	SPT
Football	SPT	JTDD
Hockey	JED	JTDD
Heptathlon	SMC4	JTDD
Relay Race	SPT	CG

2008 Overall Winning Team: JED



Activation of the Joint Warfare Centre, 23 October 2003:
(left to right) Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, NATO's first Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, saluting Lt. General Thorstein Skiaker, first Director of the Joint Warfare Centre.

Joint Warfare Centre
JOINT WARFARE CENTRE
Fifth Anniversary