



NATO
+
OTAN

THE THREE SWORDS

STAVANGER - NORWAY

The Magazine of the Joint Warfare Centre

5 October 2009 - Issue No: 16

REVIEWED

EBAO

DJSE

STRATCOM

PLUS!

- ACT welcomes new leader
- Security and stability in the 21st Century
- Piracy overview

LESSONS

LEARNED



JWC Public Affairs Office
PO Box 8080, Eikesetveien
4068 Stavanger, Norway
Tel: +47 51 34 2141/2142/2143
Fax: +47 51 34 2149
Internet: www.jwc.nato.int

Cover – Lessons Learned picture collage by **Sgt Brandon Chhoeun**, USA A, Assistant Media, Civil Environment Section, Joint Exercise Division, Joint Warfare Centre



Editor's Letter

Dear Reader,

Summer is definitely gone, and birds of passage are a sure sign that the fun it brought, is over. The winds of autumn will soon be rolling over the country, and periods of rain, sometimes heavy, will continue on and off, bringing freshness and clarity to the air. The remnants of summer linger in the mind, sweet memories giving new energy to face the busy schedule ahead.

My heartfelt welcome goes to all newcomers to JWC and Norway. I hope that you have settled in well and got all the administrative things organized. Maybe you have visited Norway before and know your host nation from a previous experience, or maybe you are a first time visitor and at a loss about what to expect. I can tell you that Norway is blessed with abundant natural beauty, and nature lovers can indulge themselves in exploring hiking trails nearby. The Stavanger region can have all four seasons in one single day and is like a buffet offering an assortment of treats in terms of fjords, beaches, mountains, open country, fishing lakes and rivers. The possibilities are legion, but it is up to you to make the most out of them. Nature is all yours to do with as you like and to chill out at times when your job becomes all consuming. Yours, too, are the thrill and adventure and the memories it provides.

Winter in Norway is generally long, cold and dark. Darkness is welcome, but less so than the clear light of summer. You will realize that winter in Norway is a time for thought and repose in the home. Norwegians literally hibernate. They put candle lights in their living room and have lazy evenings in the sofa wrapped up in a throw. Did I say "evenings"? Well, I meant of course what is left of them after people have finished work, attended to their duties and taken care of their children.



Food is a great way to become acquainted with Norway. Think about giving your sandwich a nice kick by adding a few slices of brown goat cheese, the national bread spread par excellence if there ever was one. Almost five million Norwegians just cannot be wrong: Goat cheese is heaven! Coastal Norwegians are ardent fish lovers and do appreciate the rich selection of sea delicacies at hand. Looking for something very special? Catch yourself a cod and make "lutefisk", which is lyed cod (or ling) boiled and eaten with stewed peas, fried bacon, potatoes – and occasionally grated brown goat cheese. It does not sound promising, but tastes surprisingly good. Close to smoked salmon, the largest Norwegian food export, is "gravlaks", which is salt-and-sugar-cured salmon seasoned with dill and often served with potato salad and mustard sauce. Most countries have their own weird dish. In Norway's case, it is a divinely tasting piece of fish: "rakørret", or fermented trout. Just thinking of it makes me emotional out of sheer happiness!

I hope that this issue of the magazine will allow you to gorge on a buffet of interesting readings, just as rich and flavourful as the culinary specialties and varieties described above. Enjoy and happy reading!

Lt. Col. Elisabeth Eikeland, NOR AF,
Chief Public Affairs Office, Joint Warfare Centre

PUBLISH AN ARTICLE IN THE THREE SWORDS!
We are always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you have got something to say, send it to us. We will be happy to consider it for publication. Email your articles, as well as your comments and feedback to **JWC CG PAO Common (CRONOS)** or **inci.kucukaksoy@jwc.nato.int**.

The Three Swords

JWC PAO:

Lt. Col. Elisabeth Eikeland, NOR AF
Inci Kucukaksoy, NATO Civilian
Bente Heill Kleven, NATO Civilian
MSG Raphael Baekler, DEU AF

Production and Layout:

Inci Kucukaksoy

The Three Swords is the authorized unofficial publication produced by the JWC Public Affairs Office. It represents a compilation of articles, reports, news and general information related to JWC personnel and their families. The articles and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy of NATO. The Editor reserves the right to edit or shorten submissions.

Thanks –

S/Sgt J Hennessey
Chief Photographer
Media Distribution/
Acquisition Team
SHAPE PAO



PUBLISHED THREE TIMES A YEAR

Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte German Army Commander, Joint Warfare Centre

WHILE the last issue of "The Three Swords" magazine dates already some time back, a lot has happened around us: Not only do we use part of our new training facility already, but also many of our Norwegian comrades, friends and colleagues have left Stavanger and are now operating the Norwegian Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) mainly from Bodø. Lieutenant General Sunde, who is now preparing to take over from General Diesen as Chief of Defence (CHOD) of Norway, has relinquished command of the NJHQ to Lieutenant General Brovold who visited JWC already on 18 September 2009. Not least, General Stéphane Abrial took over command as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) from General Mattis on 9 September 2009, which is covered in this issue of The Three Swords magazine as well.

What has not changed for sure is the very busy fourth quarter of the year for the Joint Warfare Centre: From the end of October we will conduct Exercise LOYAL JEWEL 09 (LJL 09), a re-run of Exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 09, serving as training and certification of NRF-14 within its certification process under the lead of JC Lisbon and its new Commander, Lieutenant General Stoltz. Also, LJL 09 is designed to support the certification for use in NRF-14 of NATO DJSE 2, provided by ALCC Madrid.

With almost no pause in between, Iraqi Key Leader Training-11 will be conducted with 16 Key Leaders from Iraqi Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI). To conclude the quarter in December, we will, prior to their deployment to Afghanistan, train members of the Multinational Corps North-East and Individual Augmentees for the ISAF Joint Command February 2010 rotation; and also train ALCC Heidelberg DJSE plus Individual Augmentees for the ISAF Headquarters.



While many staff have left during summer, I would like to extend my warmest welcome to our many newcomers that have arrived at the Joint Warfare Centre and our community. It is always worth grabbing some old issues of the magazine in order to get an overview of what we are doing at the JWC to accompany your formal inprocessing and hand-over in your Division and Branch (this is a first-hand experience!).

In this addition of the magazine, again you will find a wide and interesting variety of articles, centered around the focus of Paul Sewell's and Commander (N) Hallett's (ACT) et al. elaborate contributions about "Lessons Learned", the peg of this issue at hand. Take the chance to read about Major General Van

Loon's (COS ALCC Heidelberg) interview on the DJSE structure and the resultant training requirements. Make yourself familiar with an overview on maritime piracy, and read about "Security and Stability in the 21st Century", provided by Dr. Adam, Deputy of Mission, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Russian Federation. Major (P) Johnson (CDD) provides you with a sound overview of EBAO, and you can read Major Sargent's (NRDC-ITA) contribution on Public Affairs in the Afghan theatre, a worthwhile and thought-provoking article. You can delve behind the scenes of Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration 2009 (CWID 09), and make yourself familiar with destinations worth a travel in Norway and much more.

While some of the past months' community events such as the Sports Day, the Family Day or the JWC Ball will for sure have introduced you to many of people of the JWC, this issue and the months ahead will likewise make you familiar with the centerpiece of our work and efforts. Hence I wish us all a busy and interesting quarter with some of our core training events, and keep at it with your good and appreciated performance!

Change of Command at Allied Command Transformation

➤ French General Stéphane Abrial took over the position of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) from U.S. General James Mattis on 9 September. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen formally carried out the Change of Command, which took place on board of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower close to the ACT Headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. **(Article originally published at NATO website at www.nato.int)**



French Air Force General Stéphane Abrial delivers his first address as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation during a Change of Command ceremony held 9 September, on board USS Dwight D. Eisenhower. Above: NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen presents an award to U.S. Marine Corps General James Mattis. Photos by HQ SACT PAO.

THE Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral James Stavridis; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen; the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, General David Petraeus; the U.S. National Security Adviser, General James Jones; the French Chief of Staff, General Jean-Louis Georgelin; and the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, also took part in the event.

The NATO Secretary General paid tribute to General Mattis for the valuable contribution he brought to NATO's transformation process for the last three years. "From the outset, General Mattis served to demystify transformation, making the

work of the command here in Norfolk understandable and relevant to the needs of the Alliance," he said.

General Abrial's nomination followed the decision of France to retake its full place in NATO's Integrated Military Structure, which was officially announced at the Strasbourg and Kehl Summit in April of this year. To date, the Strategic Command had been headed by the U.S. commanders. In his capacity as SACT, General Abrial will lead the transformation of NATO's military structure, forces, capabilities and doctrine to strengthen the interoperability and deployability of NATO's multinational forces. "I already made clear that NATO's transformation is one of my main priorities," said Mr Fogh Rasmussen. "My goal

is to ensure that we have deployable troops, properly trained and properly equipped. And importantly, at a price nations can afford."

General Abrial takes his functions at a crucial moment in the Alliance's history, as the NATO Secretary General has just launched a process aimed at redefining NATO's Strategic Concept in line with today's security challenges.

"General Abrial, we welcome you in your new position and wish you bon courage with the challenges you face," said Mr Fogh Rasmussen. He added: "At a time when the transformation of the Alliance and ACT's role in that is at a key moment your extensive professional experience will be key." Ⓡ



Photo by ISAF PAO



Security and Stability in the 21st Century

A new, broader approach to modern security⁽¹⁾

By Dr Rudolf Georg Adam⁽²⁾

Deputy of Mission, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Russian Federation, Moscow

Introduction

It has become a commonplace discussion that security today needs a broader approach. That is why NATO at its Riga Summit in 2006 decided to adopt the strategy of Comprehensive Approach. It is worthwhile, however, to analyse in what dimensions our present security concept has been enlarged.

Dimensions of Security

Seven dimensions need to be addressed:

1. Geography: Space and distance have lost their strategic significance; we can no longer confine our security concepts to the defence of a national or Alliance territory.

2. Time: Time is the second dimension. The traditional concept of war and peace has broken down. We have to deal with crisis potentials. And to approach a crisis with some hope of solving it we

have to think in terms of prevention, management and post-conflict stabilization. Our engagements are no longer swift and concentrated but drawn out and sometimes apparently infinite.

3. Crisis Management: Crisis management has ceased to be primarily the concern of armed forces. Increasingly, we see the need for a Comprehensive Approach involving not only other means of traditional security policy like the police, judiciary and public administration, but also instruments taken from economics, education, finance, etc.

4. CIMIC: Consequently crisis management becomes a complex task, involving not only practically all government departments, but also requiring the coordination of the private sector, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and educators.

5. Alliances and Cooperation: Hardly any nation can shoulder a complex crisis management operation alone. International or inter-alliance coordination and burden sharing became a crucial aspect.

6. Regional Stability: Security structures cannot simply be imposed from outside. Any perspective for long term stabilization has to look to local indigenous structures that can be relied upon to carry the new status quo. We have to encompass local traditions and local sources of legitimacy and authority, for which Iraq is the best example.

7. Regional Actors: Finally, no stabilization is likely to succeed unless we find ways of winning the support of the neighbouring or surrounding region.

I will try to distil some general conclusions from the experiences gathered



so far in various crisis management missions from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Prevention, Conflict and Reconstruction

The first lesson seems to be this: We need an approach that takes the preventive phase, the actual conflict resolution and the post-conflict reconstruction together into one seamless concept. All three phases are not separate, stand-alone operations.

Clausewitz remarked that war was the continuation of politics with other means. The opposite is equally true, particularly in post-conflict reconstruction. After the end of open fighting, the conflict parties will try everything to win through political pressure and local unrest what they could not achieve in the field. This is, in my opinion, what we have been facing in Iraq for a long time and also in Afghanistan. It is imperative, therefore, to be just as firm and adamant during the reconstruction phase as during the actual conflict phase.

Once we start to engage in crisis prevention, we should have a pretty clear idea of what our strategic aim is. And, we should stick to this strategic aim during the conflict and reconstruction process. We have to send consistent and convincing messages. Our concept for reconstruction should inform the way we plan our military operations. And these plans should in turn be present when the gambit of preventive negotiations is laid out. The case for intervention must be the same, whether it is preventive, adversary or cooperative intervention. You cannot argue one case during the prevention phase, a completely different one for the conflict phase only to adjust your arguments again for the stabilization phase.

The international community needs a realistic and morally sound argument to intervene. When we intervene, we want to change something. It is essential to define these changes not only in a negative way, e.g. to get rid of something or somebody, but also in a positive way. We have to describe an end-state in convincing, realistic and unambiguous terms.

This argument provides leverage during preventive engagement; it lays down the conditions that have to be fulfilled if inter-

vention is to be avoided; it provides justification for operations; it directs efforts during the stabilization phase; and, in the last resort, it describes conditions for an exit strategy. It is exactly for that reason that any end-state description should be concrete, realistic and not overambitious.

Democracy, perfect respect for human rights, equality, flourishing market economy, open and critical press are noble and compelling aims, but in most cases they transgress the limits of a crisis mission. Strategic goals should be demanding, but if you err, err rather on the side of modesty and humility than on that of idealistic ambitions. What we need is a solid framework for security. Ambitious

plans for modernization, secularization, economic prosperity, full respect for human rights



"The interveners have to make clear that they are not engaged in a crisis for their own benefit, but for that of the local population." Photos by HQ ISAF PAO.

and economic development may come later. They require a range of expertise very different from that of soldiers. We should not try to impose our own standards on a country and a society, whose traditions and political structures are entirely different from ours. We need structures that fit into existing foundations. We need local involvement and local ownership as early as possible. That is why reform programmes should not be imposed, but should be endorsed by local political forces so that they become stakeholders.

A crisis management operation should have a clear and unchanging strategic purpose. This purpose gives it legitimacy in the eyes of the population of the country that becomes the target of interven-

tion and in the eyes of the population at home. Note that the transition from the prevention to the conflict phase is usually clear and irrevocable, but that much of the reconstruction effort will probably have to take place in a not entirely pacified environment. In fact, most of the stabilization takes place in the grey area between official cessation of hostilities and different degrees of insurgency or civil war. Often, you do not have post-conflict stabilization, but in-conflict stabilization – like in Afghanistan today.

It is clear that no single concept can provide guidance for a process that may take years, if not decades. Flexibility will be required. Plans will have to be modified. Priorities will have to be re-ordered. What is essential, however, is that the strategic goal of the mission remains unaltered, consistent and credible. It is therefore paramount to have leadership that is both firm in its purpose and flexible in its tactics. Above all, in a crisis management mission, leaders have to have extensive knowledge about local customs, sources of authority and economic and social structures.

Let me refer to Clausewitz again. He identified a test of wills as the heart of battle. Today, the essential will is not that of a government. It is the will of the people, as General Rupert Smith puts it: "We fight among the people, in every room, where there is a TV-set, over the radio, over the internet".

Our own people have to understand the rationale for the mission – and for the costs that may go with it. And the people in the country where the conflict is to be managed have to understand what is happening to them.

The Role of Public Opinion

In crisis management the real battlefield is the hearts and minds of the people. It is helpful but not indispensable to secure world opinion for our crisis operations. More essential is opinion at home. But really decisive is the fact that we secure public opinion inside the country we are operating in. Each crisis management hinges upon the understanding of the local people that what you and the international community do is in their very interest. The interveners have to make clear that they are not engaged in a crisis for their own benefit, but for that



of the local population. That is why proper and systematic public relations are of utmost importance. They imply that we have to show particular respect for local traditions and cultures, values and habits. Local people have the right to understand our messages in their language, in their sometimes different vocabulary. Local expertise, liaison experts, and emphasis on education are at the very heart of stabilization missions. Local people have the right to understand what is happening to them. Any crisis mission, particularly after a conflict phase, has to be meticulously accountable, its actions have to be transparent, its finances must be publicly audited. Press and Public Affairs are not an optional extra to be considered after military operations have been successfully concluded. They are right at the heart of any Effects-Based Approach.

Here, it is most important not to forget that the most decisive and lasting effect of whatever we do will be on public opinion – both within the country and internationally. You cannot rebuild a state against the consent of the people. You need legitimacy and that can only flow through formal or informal assent. That is why proper explanation of what we are doing and why it is of so elementary importance. Again, it appears that what soldiers are good at – breaking resistance and imposing control – are not the virtues required in this phase. We need administrators, diplomats, politicians, journalists who can convince, impress, and explain. Support and understanding within the local population is central to stabilization. And if it is central to stabilization, it should be central already at the time of planning the prevention and intervention phase. That is what is meant by seamless approach.

Cooperation of Military and Civilian Instruments

Another lesson to be drawn from experience is this: After the military has established a security framework, it is essential to fill this frame at once with civil instruments of security. The fighting force should be immediately followed by those who make sure that the police and the judiciary are working, that a decent and efficient administration is set up. Looking back, that one has often been the gravest and most common error. If I

see it right, in Iraq, police and administration were practically disbanded together with the armed forces. The vacuum thus created was immediately filled at least partly by irregular groups.

In Kosovo, police arrived late and inadequate numbers. The corrupt forces and criminal elements, which had fed on the war were not slow in using the gap between military occupation and the establishment of effective police forces. Some of them succeeded in gaining immunity by winning subsequent elections.

In Afghanistan we are only now beefing up local police forces to the extent necessary – almost eight years after military operations began. On the other hand, one of the reasons why the occupation of Germany and Japan after the Second World War was so successful, resided in the fact that there was an armada of well trained, well equipped and well informed civilian officers coming on the heels of the advancing battalions to make sure that police, civil administration, justice and infrastructure continued functioning.

“Security is much more than just military control. Indeed, soldiers win wars, but peace is made by civilians.”

Close cooperation and understanding of each others’ capabilities are essential between the military and the civilian side, particularly when a reconstruction phase oscillates between open conflict and stabilization, a situation we have in Afghanistan. We need police that can escalate to a military level and military that understands the principles of legal order. We need development projects that support stability and security, and we need military leaders who understand the impact of economic and social measures. Strengthening CIMIC relations is one of the most important challenges we face today.

The first two to three months after cessation of fighting are crucial. They determine the overall impression across the international community as well as in the respective country. A negative impression of what is going on sticks and cannot be washed away. There is no second chance to make a first impression.

So, the first hours are decisive. They need particularly intensive planning. To do the right thing at the wrong time adds up to doing the wrong thing, because it diverts scarce resources from the real priorities.

Of course, nothing ever goes entirely according to plan. It is essential to gather experience, to establish rapport with the local population, to explain, to win confidence, to learn about internal developments within the country. It is essential to train experts in local affairs, to collect intelligence and to win friends. Experience with local conditions has to be transmitted within the foreign troops. This presupposes continuity. Rotation should be made carefully and never too sweepingly. Otherwise lessons already learned will have to be learned a second time and often at higher costs. The knowledge of the first troops as to culture and customs, what works and what does not, cannot be learned in a classroom. It has to be passed on, on the ground. Personal contacts are precious. If there is too little continuity, all this will be lost and has to be rebuilt at extreme costs. Particularly officers in leading positions and leading administrators must be given sufficient time to familiarize themselves with the situation and make an impact. When they leave, they should have sufficient time to hand over to their successors.

Security is much more than just military control. Indeed, soldiers win wars, but peace is made by civilians. Military force may be indispensable to clear the way for non-military elements. In themselves armed forces are of little utility during the stabilization period. Filling the frame they have created with appropriate non-military instruments is one of the conditions for lasting success. The mistake most commonly made is to focus on the military success and then turn attention elsewhere. It is tempting to declare “mission accomplished” when open fighting has stopped. But it is usually premature. The real, lasting success of crisis management is always decided after the end of military operations.

We need not only an approach that is consistent over time. We need an approach that is encompassing in the instruments it brings to bear upon the situation. I sometimes feel we focus too much on some elements and tend to



overlook others. Elections and economic reconstruction seem to be essential elements. My impression is that the establishment of a reliable and functioning system of public order and justice, what we call the rule of law, is even more important. There can be little peace and economic prosperity unless there are calculable, enforceable rights. An efficient and incorrupt public administration is also a necessary precondition for economic reconstruction. Young aspiring and reliable public servants will only be generated if we have a good educational system in place.

Elections are important. Nothing can generate comparable legitimacy. Elections require a constitution with built-in checks and balances to prevent abuse of power; transparent and accountable parties with programmatic choices; freedom of the press; freedom of expression; and an understanding that to hold office is not a recipe to enrich yourself and your clan through corruption. Democracy presupposes respect for legitimacy through procedure, toleration of opposition, an acceptance of defeat and time limits for office as well as respect for the constitution. Unless these ingredients are firmly in place, elections will rarely turn out stable with enduring power structures.

Reconstruction is an extremely complex undertaking. It cannot be linear or sectorised. We need an integrated holistic approach. Whatever reform we undertake, we must be aware that all aspects of public life are like a closely interwoven net. If you pull at one point, the entire net changes its shape, and all other sectors will probably be affected. It will be of utmost importance to sequence reconstruction efforts. Should privatization come first or should old structures be kept running? Is humanitarian aid more urgent or refugee return? Should education or public utilities have precedence?

We talk a lot these days about Effects-Based Operations. Effects can be intended or unintended. They can be short-term or long-term. There is no action that simply focuses on one single effect. So, whatever we plan, we will have to consider a full gamut of effects that will follow our action like a carpet.

An imperative in preparing plans seems to be that crisis management should not be left to the military alone. In fact, it

should not be left to any single government department. What we need is as broad an analysis as possible and a careful planning of operations with regard to the broad spectrum of effects they will create. Mostly no other department has similar experience in drawing up plans like the Ministries of Defence. But they cannot possibly command the breadth and depth required for analysis and operational planning.

Unity of Effort

How do we achieve unity of effort? We have to start at home. Classical governments are organized in departments, each Ministry headed by a politician who is normally quite eager to keep his turf for himself and does not like anybody to meddle with his affairs.

Departments are focussed on their own policy, their own terminology, their own budgets and their own cultures. A recent Iraq Study Group came to the following conclusion: "Focus, priority setting and skilful implementation are in short supply. No single official is assigned responsibility or held accountable for the reconstruction effort. There are insufficient contact points to coordinate with foreign partners". In some countries this experience has led to the creation of special institutions, like the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit and the Global Conflict Prevention Pool in the UK, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Teams in Canada and the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the USA.

What is needed is jointness between government departments. Each department should look upon itself less as an exclusive holder of competence and more as a contributor to a common effort. We need more standardized procedures, more of a common mentality, a high degree of interoperable technical and administrative instruments. Conflict management is usually located in many different government offices; coordination alone is not always likely to produce the best result. This presupposes that the strategic goals are set above the departments. What is needed is a centre in which plans are worked out, decisions prepared, coherence of actions enforced. The European Security Strategy states categorically: "In a crisis, unity of leadership is indispensable". Such a

centre could be located either on cabinet level or within one particular Ministry and could be given overall charge to coordinate. One option would be a Special Commissioner for Conflict Prevention, Management and Stabilization, supported by staff from various departments. It could grow out of the existing interdepartmental circle "Civil Crisis Prevention, Conflict Management and Peace Consolidation". My proposal would be to give this task to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because it mostly has the mandate to coordinate and focus various government activities abroad anyhow. Why not also in crisis missions?

The second tier in which we have to coordinate better is between government and NGOs. By experience I know that NGOs are fierce to remain independent of official influence. They should, however, be invited to share their analysis of the situation with the official mission and also to share plans and intentions with other players. Thus, wasteful duplications could be avoided, unintended contrary effects avoided and synergies created.

The third level is between government and the private business sector. Reconstruction requires private investments. The technological know-how and the experience in production lie outside the scope of governments. It is necessary to assess very early, already in the prevention phase, what resources and what technical skills will be needed in an eventual reconstruction phase. It is imperative to discuss the conditions under which private businesses might be motivated to help rebuild: Security, property rights, infrastructure, judiciary system etc. I personally have experienced how intervention does create serious discrepancies in the economy. Normal economic activities are disrupted. The presence of foreigners and their respective purchasing power create financial bubbles and second economies, from which the majority of the local population is excluded. Incentives are turned upside down: A driver earns more than a surgeon, a porter more than a judge. If these imbalances persist for too long they can entail very serious economic and social upheavals.

The final level is coordination on the international scale. First, we should start with a common understanding of the



nature of the challenge: What are the causes? Where should leverage be applied? Who are the opponents, who can we count upon as supporters or allies? We also should formulate the end-state scenario jointly among all participants in an operation. We need an agreed joint strategic assessment and an agreed strategic goal. We need understanding about the resources likely to be required, about rules of engagement, responsibilities, specialized roles.

Implementation of Plans

We then need to formulate a common implementation plan. We need to assess potential challenges and obstacles to the end-state and an estimate of forces and resources required to achieve it. In this respect, I would like to see other government departments, particularly Ministries of Foreign Affairs, learn from the strategic planning skills of Ministries of Defence. We should try to define benchmarks against which we can gauge whether we are on the right track or not. And we need in the end a joint steering and assessment centre which is responsible for the implementation of the strategy and which is tasked to flexibly develop the original plan further in light of events unfolding.

Conclusions

1. We need a long breath and we should try to consider prevention, conflict and reconstruction as three different aspects of one mission. This comprehensive mission should be designed from beginning to end as one consistent seamless effort.

2. We need a holistic approach, one that assesses planned effects on as broad a background as possible. We need to get priorities right and to integrate our various instruments, inside and outside of government, in order to achieve synergies.

3. We should strengthen government structures for planning and conduct of crisis missions. It is essential that someone recognizable is in charge, and that he has authority and experience to coordinate various instruments.

4. We need joint analysis and close coordination among alliances or coalitions which assume jointly the task of intervening. It is essential that solidarity is kept and demonstrated.

What practical conclusions could be drawn from this?

First, we need a new approach to training and giving government officials the qualifications they need for scenarios. We should create joint training modules for young aspiring diplomats, military officers, policemen, development experts and legal experts so that they can develop a common understanding, learn how to operate within the culture of a different government department and learn how to communicate effectively and safely. We should encourage a reservoir of experts to rotate between these departments so that they can build up experience and personal networks that transgress the narrow bounds of department thinking. For future crisis mission experts this would mean that they should gather practical operative experience in crisis management early and extensively in their careers. For diplomats it would mean that they put emphasis less on policy formulation and more on policy implementation. They would have to acquire skills in management and operational controlling. Service on a crisis mission would become an essential, if not obligatory step in career development.

We should ensure that experience gathered in crisis missions is not lost but analysed, fixed and handed over to the next generation. We should do this across all departments and preferably together with NGOs. Why not establish a school offering training in crisis management – a school for Conflict Prevention, Counter Insurgency and Post-Conflict Reconstruction? Such a school might be a mixture of high-level staff college and research institution. It could evaluate past missions, identify weak points, distil errors of judgement, develop new management procedures that minimise the risk of failure. It should provide capacity to accompany any crisis mission with the appropriate information and data base. It should offer both general background courses and specific training modules tailor made for individual crises. This could be done on a national level. But it might be more ingenious to do it on an international level.

MILITARY FORCE may be an indispensable ingredient of any crisis management, but it is neither decisive nor

particular useful after the threat of open violence has receded. We have to improve our ability to marshal other government resources to fill the frame military force may have created. These resources should be focussed, coordinated and preferable subject to a united leadership. We need to connect these government resources with the contributions from outside governments – NGOs and private sector. And, finally, we have to intensify international coordination to ensure we create synergies instead of unconnected and therefore often frictional bilateral approaches. We need to see crisis management as a holistic challenge, involving all government departments, and as a unified challenge requiring a seamless, coherent and consistent approach through all phases.

In the end a crucial question will be whether we draw the necessary conclusions in terms of organizing government work and training our best people. What we need is a new mentality that thinks less in terms of separate departments and more in terms of contributing to a strategy that rides right across all departments. We need to intensify the cooperative structures between the most important international actors – UN, NATO, EU and others, but especially between all actors – national and international – in our own countries. ☉

(1) Based on a presentation by Dr Rudolf Adam at Everest Conference, Bonn 2007.

(2) Dr Rudolf Georg Adam:

Deputy of Mission, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Russian Federation, Moscow;

FORMER POSITIONS:

- President, Federal College for Security Studies (BAKS), Berlin;
- Vice-President, Federal Intelligence Service (BND), Berlin;
- European Correspondent (CFSP, development of the ESPD), Federal Foreign Office, Berlin;
- Head of Division, Disarmament and Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin;
- Policy Planning, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin;
- Political Officer, German Embassy, Moscow;
- Speechwriter for President Dr. Richard Weizsäcker, Office of the Federal President, Bonn;
- Various positions in the Foreign Service;
- Study and Promotion at the Universities of Tübingen, Munich and Oxford.



EBAO

A Comprehensive Explanation

By Maj (P) Thomas F. Johnson, USA A,
Concept Development Section, Capability Development Division,
Joint Warfare Centre

Photos by SHAPE PAO

Introduction

EBAO (the Effects Based Approach to Operations) has become a highly contentious, some might even say, unpopular issue both within and outside the NATO Alliance. Many officers have asked me questions such as these: "What are you going to do now that you don't have a job in EBAO?" or "How does it feel to be unemployed since USJFCOM has stopped EBO?" and "Did you hear that EBAO is

dead?" or even "When can we KILL it?" all of which, have been quite common.

I do not know how many times I have been asked these questions since I left the Joint Forces Staff College en-route to my new NATO assignment. Admittedly, most have been American officers in either the Joint Forces Staff College or within the various NATO headquarters, but strangely enough, they are not

the only ones asking the questions! Last January, I attended the NATO Staff Officer's Course in Oberammergau, Germany. Can you guess which briefer was the most controversial? That's right, the poor guy who presented a brief on the Effects Based Approach to Operations!

Part of the negative feedback stems from recent developments in EBO (Effects Based Operations). For several years,



NATO has been experimenting with “effects” and developing the concept of an “effects based approach to operations”. The recent announcement that COM USJFCOM (Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command) had abandoned U.S. efforts at making EBO part of Joint U.S. doctrine resounded in both NATO and Allied Nations.⁽¹⁾ The announcement that EBO was to be dropped, came as a significant surprise to some as many had confused the EBO and EBAO as one and the same. EBAO is the military’s contribution to the Comprehensive Approach. This contribution is one of the center piece projects being developed under the auspices of a North Atlantic Military Committee Memoranda: MCM-0052-2006. The memoranda states: *“Understanding the Alliance’s ambition to approach crisis situations from a more holistic perspective, future Expeditionary Operations should be placed in the context of an effects-based approach involving the comprehensive integrated application of combat power and other instruments of the Alliance to create desired effects.”*⁽²⁾

The challenge is to understand both EBAO and EBO. This is not due to a lack of effort at explaining the concepts. The sheer volume of articles and opinions on the United States’ Effects Based Operations (EBO) and NATO’s Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) demonstrates the amount of time and thought

invested in these concepts. The purpose of this article is not to change minds or criticize decisions taken on the utility of EBO, but rather to distinguish the two planning methods, and explain why EBAO might still be important to NATO now, and illuminate EBAO’s possible future.

Differences Between EBO and EBAO

The two concepts actually share considerable amounts of theory and procedure; however, it is their distinctions which are important. There are three primary distinctions between the two concepts, which are: legitimacy, terminology and application. These three distinctions arise from the perspective of the organization, whether as a single nation or alliance.

The multi-national composition of NATO’s political-military level (the NAC) imbues the concept with a more idealistic viewpoint. The NAC’s recognition of EBAO gives the concept immediate legitimacy on an international scale through the collaborative requirements to achieve acceptance. The concept is an accepted requirement for civil-military operations and is meant to strengthen the legitimacy of military operations. Unlike a national operation, NATO forces require intensive coordination through different national representatives in order to ensure that individual governments are not entangled in operations that may be against those

same governments’ national interests. Because there has to be consensus among the 28 Nations in order to approve any military action by the Alliance, legitimacy is more readily apparent. International law has always viewed unilateralism as illegal, even when that action occurs within a state. Principle 3 and 4 of Article 2 of the UN Charter expressly forbid the use of force without approval:

1. *All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.*
2. *All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.*

The House of Lords recently used this interpretation when citing the Nuremberg judgement when it rejected former Chilean President Pinochet’s claim that he had a right to immunity for actions committed in his capacity as head of state. “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”⁽³⁾

There is also a significant difference in terminology. The figure on the left depicts the two concepts’ definition of “effects”^(4, 5). EBO is more narrow and concerned with actions. EBAO is broader and concerned with objectives. The difference is in the perspective.

Besides the differences in their definition of “effects”, there is also a subtle difference in how the U.S. and NATO define their concepts of EBO and EBAO. EBO, as late as 2006, had yet to be defined, accepted or standardized by all U.S. services and even the U.S. Air Force had three separate definitions that used EBO and EBAO interchangeably^(6, 7). Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) J. P. Hunerwadel, U.S. Air Force, claims in a 2006 article that EBO has been in the common military vernacular since 2001. He provides USJFCOM’s 2004 definition of EBO as “operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or



Dueling Definitions

EBO: U.S. Effect

1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect.
2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action.
3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom.

— U.S. Joint Publication 3-0

EBAO: NATO Effect

The cumulative consequences of one or more actions across the engagement space that leads to a change in the situation in one or more domains. Aggregation of intended effects leads to the achievement of the end-state.

— Bi-SC EBAO Handbook



The sheer volume of articles and opinions on the U.S. Effects Based Operations (EBO) and NATO's Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) demonstrates the amount of time and thought invested in these concepts.

change system behavior or capabilities using intergrated application of select instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.”⁽⁸⁾

Not unexpectedly, NATO, due to its multinational perspective came to a separate definition. The current NATO EBAO terminology is “the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance, combined with the practical cooperation along with involved non-NATO actors, to create effects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the NATO end state.”⁽⁹⁾

EBO seems to focus on military operations and planning along with the integration of other instruments of power. It leads one to believe that the other instruments are subordinate to the Military instrument. EBAO is focused on the application of all the instruments of international power (political, military, economic, and civil) as well, but it is also concerned with other non-NATO actors. Instead of EBO's focus on the “big M” (Military) leading the other instruments and the accomplishment of military objectives, EBAO focuses on how the military fits into the North Atlantic Council end-state along with non-Alliance entities, the other instruments of Alliance and international power.

Aside from the differences in perspective and definitional outlooks, the primary difference is in their application. EBO, being the earlier concept, has its modern roots in the Middle East and the Balkans. Although not yet recognized, EBO's principles were successfully applied by the U.S. Air Force in Libya, Gulf War I and Kosovo, via its ability to bring about systemic collapse through the targeting of nodes, key infrastructure, and leaders in systems. EBO reached its pinnacle of development during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). EBAO on the other hand, is not focused on just the military. The North Atlantic Council has specifically aimed for a Comprehensive

Approach to address all sources of international power. This approach appears to address apparent weaknesses in EBO's military centric paradigm.

Although popularly blamed for the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) failure against Hezbollah in the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, EBO was not the primary cause of the failure. According to Matt M. Matthews in “We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War” the IDF was unprepared for the war. Although the concept of EBO is widely discredited, there were several other larger issues that were not addressed by Israel prior to the war. The IDF was not ready, trained, or equipped to fight a conventional campaign. Over confidence in the use of air power at the expense of ground maneuver was also cited as contributing to IDF failures.⁽¹⁰⁾

EBO was also incorrectly applied by the Israeli Defense Forces against Hezbollah. Ron Tira, a former Israeli fighter pilot and outspoken critic of EBO, characterizes the concept by “EBO's aim is to paralyze the enemy's operational ability in contrast to destroying its military force. This is achieved by striking the headquarters, lines of communication, and other critical junctions in the military structure.”⁽¹¹⁾

This difference between the two concepts was recently played out on the ground. Up to the end of the second Gulf War, the U.S. concept of EBO had been continually gaining acceptance. Once the Iraqi insurgency started in 2003, the theory no longer had the same relevance or utility. Although militarily defeated, the nation still required solutions from other instruments to address the root causes of political dissatisfaction. It is having arrived at this final point that one can now understand General James Mattis' reasoning when he states, “NATO's policy focuses on the whole-of-government/Comprehensive Approach. In short, NATO's Effects Based Approach to Operations does not fully mirror U.S. EBO.”⁽¹²⁾

Why EBAO is important now?

There are several reasons why EBAO is now coming to such prominence within NATO. Five key reasons EBAO is being considered as a possible NATO doctrine are:

1. Composition of the NATO Alliance and the necessity for standardization;
2. Collective defense and collective security;
3. Dwindling resources;
4. Changes to international operations;
5. The media.

These five keys represent the primary drivers of change.

THE ALLIANCE is currently made up of 28 Nations with an additional 24 Partner countries. Almost half of NATO's current members joined after the end of the Cold War and most of its newest members were not well versed in either NATO tactics or terminology. Most, having come from the former East Bloc, were more familiar with Soviet doctrine. Even among Alliance partners that have been participating for many years, standardization of practice within NATO is important. The U.S. is a prime example. The recent scuttling of EBO is merely a testament to the different doctrines, which have been promulgated. A common doctrine is needed to align the different military processes.

NATO's primary mission since 1949 has been the collective defense of Alliance members within Western Europe. This mission is codified by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Originally, the treaty was to protect members against former USSR and Warsaw Pact Nations. Since the early 1990's, Western militaries have been increasingly relied on by their political leadership to intervene in ethnic conflicts around the world. Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Chad, Ethiopia and Sudan are but a few examples. This same reliance has been played out in Europe and NATO by the increased support of national militaries performing operations generally categorized as insurgencies, nation building, peace enforcement or peace keeping type activities.

This long term trend towards collective defense affects all military entities within the Alliance and has affected the nature of missions being conducted by NATO forces. As the global interconnectedness is increasingly recognized and marginal-



ized, failing states continue to fall into more or complete chaos; systems once thought secure are becoming threatened. The disenfranchised elements within these societies are trying to gain control over their perceived and actual deprivation. Leaders of many countries in both NATO, the EU and the oil producing regions of the Middle East have been increasingly occupied by East African pirates preying on the shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden and the approaches to the Suez Canal in order to extort money from international shipping.⁽¹³⁾ The Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, the Hutus in Rwanda, Hezbollah and Hamas in Palestine and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka are also examples.

Military and civilian leaders are slowly recognizing that the "small conflicts", which have characterized most of human history and disturbingly enough, are intruding more and more frequently upon the national and international conscience, are the more likely events of the next few decades. The old order of large political and national blocks has dissolved with the breakup of the former Soviet Union and its satellites, the continued disintegration of economically marginalized nations, aversion to globalism and a resurgent nationalism (even among previously stable European nations) is not making for a more secure environment.⁽¹⁴⁾ Because of these changes in collective security, NATO is having to rethink its strategy.

Dwindling resources are another reason for the shift in emphasis on kinetic operations. Western militaries are much smaller than they were in the past and their ability to project power or even to get into another country are greatly limited. Although the U.S. has recently increased its military end strength due to operational requirements, most nations have either conducted or are completing significant reductions in the size of their

Cold War forces. Other NATO Nations have a significant problem filling agreed contributions. The British Army is but one example of the state of NATO forces supporting Afghanistan. The British Chief of the General Staff recently called for additional troops, as there were not enough in the U.K. to defend against a major terrorist attack.⁽¹⁵⁾ Western governments' attempts to address these issues will be hampered as the current economic crisis continues to affect military budgets.

Of course there are exceptions to this trend and some critics in the military establishment have not wanted to abandon the highly kinetic operations of past wars. Desert Shield/Storm (1990-1991), Operation Enduring Freedom (2003-ongoing), the Israeli/Hezbollah conflict (2006) and the Russian invasion of Georgia (2008) demonstrate the trap of focusing on peace-keeping, peace-making, and counter-insurgency type operations to the exclusion of conventional warfare. These examples provide ample ammunition for those who argue against the reliance on new methods to address the contemporary operating environment. However, despite these current exceptions and critics skeptical of intervention, the focus of western governments and military operations are re-balancing forces from kinetic, force-oriented wars to smaller, manpower intensive, asymmetric, and domestically motivated conflicts such as insurgencies.⁽¹⁶⁾

International operations have changed since the end of the Cold War as well. Militaries and the Red Cross are not the only entities on the battlefield. Today, there are many International Organizations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Governmental Organizations (GOs) mixed into the fabric of any conflict.⁽¹⁷⁾ Some of these institutions are willing to work with the military and others are not. All non-military organiza-

tions are attempting to benefit the communities they serve and thus may have goals that align with those of the military. Therefore, the general consensus is that somehow there should be more coordination of activities. Redundancy of effort wastes precious manpower.

The media is another influence, which is having a dramatic effect on military operations. The international media brought the Vietnam war into the homes of civilians. Today, information through television, personal video and the internet is forming public opinion and support in ways only dreamed of post Second World War. This is especially important for all democratic militaries as political figures depend on public support. One only has to remember Abu Ghraib and the Madrid Train bombings to recognize the power of the media and public opinion.

Where is the concept going?

Because of the many factors which are contributing to a general decline in NATO's military flexibility, NATO's political leadership is pondering how to leverage the efforts of all elements of Alliance power. It makes perfect sense to try to synergize the efforts of all stakeholders and make the military efforts at stabilization more effective. This translates into considerable support for EBAO at the upper most levels of NATO. NATO representatives were invited to the UN Headquarters for talks on 11-12 December 2008, which was to be led by NATO Ambassador Erdmann. The recent signing and joint declaration of cooperation between the UN and NATO demonstrates the cooperation and coordination between the two supra-national entities.⁽¹⁸⁾ This is also a tangible sign that the political sphere of NATO is moving forward with its Comprehensive Approach.

NATO's concept of EBAO is still under active construction. Representatives from both ACT and ACO are currently driving a Bi-SC EBAO Working Group. This group is responsible for focusing recommendations on the achievement of MCM-0052-2006, providing recommendations on how to implement EBAO, determining resource gaps and milestones, and the preparation of an implementation program for the smooth and cohesive tran-

EBAO is not focused on just the military. The North Atlantic Council has specifically aimed for a Comprehensive Approach to address all sources of international power. This approach appears to address apparent weaknesses in EBO's military centric paradigm.



sition to EBAO within NATO.

To date, the Joint Warfare Centre has been an active participant of the group, which drafted a pre-doctrinal Handbook published in December 2007, and begun work on two of the four main pillars of EBAO. Two of the pillars (Assessment and Knowledge Development) are now being drafted as Handbooks to be issued to NATO commands. A third pillar, CIM-IC, already has a doctrine and the fourth pillar, Taxonomy, or the Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD) continues to make revisions from testing conducted during the GOP (Guidelines for Operational Planning) Experiment conducted at SHAPE Headquarters in February 2009.

As early as November 2008, the Chiefs of Staff for the Strategic Commands were presented with an interim agreement stating that the EBAO concept is still going forward within NATO. It appeared that by December 2008 the agreement would be signed. Appearances however, were premature. This delay was an unfortunate development, as a signed agreement would signal the beginning of implementation for the concept and formal training of staffs could begin. Unfortunately, since the document has yet to receive bilateral signature, training has yet to be implemented.

JWC members took part in the recent Bi-SC workgroup, which met in September 2009 at SHAPE HQ in Mons, Belgium, to discuss and consolidate EBAO concepts. During the workgroups, the Knowledge Development and Assessment Handbooks were proofed and updated; an Implementation Plan for EBAO was further developed and recommendations were forwarded to SACEUR and SACT for the creation of a High Level Implementation Group (HLIG). This steering committee, composed of Flag level officers, would be responsible for driving implementation within NATO.

Work progresses on another NATO pillar, Taxonomy. In February 2009, SHAPE J-5 and ACT, supported by the Joint Warfare Centre and JFC Brunssum, conducted an experiment to test the latest revisions to the GOP. These new revisions to the GOP have become the COPD. The new Chapters are dedicated to the Strategic Operational Planning Group and the Joint Operational Planning Group.



The new guidelines incorporate more aspects of EBAO, such as Knowledge Development and Assessment concepts and a deepening of wargaming processes by the inclusion of Blue, Green and Red Teaming.

Another Bi-SC EBAO Workgroup is scheduled to take place in ACT, Norfolk, Virginia, this November. Although unpublished, the agenda will most certainly include as a topic, the upcoming exercise **ENABLER 09**, which will be hosted by the Joint Warfare Centre. The Joint Warfare Centre will contribute to further concept development in Knowledge Development and the COPD by taking active roles in both Multi-National Experiment 6 (MNE6) and ENABLER 09 to be conducted in October 2009. Multi-National Experiment 6 and ENABLER 09 are anticipated as a validation of Knowledge Development structures and processes.

Conclusion

Today, there is still considerable misunderstanding of what the concepts of

EBO and EBAO are on both sides of the Atlantic. The differences between EBO and EBAO are not significant, but important. Both concepts employ some of the same methodologies, but it is in the employment of the military instrument in cooperation with other instruments that makes the difference. It is especially important for commanders and staff to understand these differences in order to employ the military instrument of NATO effectively.

Because of the composition of the NATO Alliance and the enlargement of its member nations, standards and procedures within the NATO framework require standardization. This cohesiveness during operational employment of NATO forces is threatened without proper doctrine for all member nations. The continued work on the evolution of EBAO attempts to provide a cohesive framework for the Alliance to conduct operations in this ever changing environment.

In light of recent developments from the political representation of the NATO



Participants of the "Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP) Experiment" conducted at SHAPE Headquarters in February 2009. The new guidelines incorporate more aspects of EBAO, such as Knowledge Development and Assessment.
Photo by SHAPE PAO.



Alliance and in their requirement for NATO to develop how it will contribute to the North Atlantic Council's Comprehensive Approach, there are not any indications that NATO will discard the concept. What is apparent is that when viewed with a perspective on the changing political landscape and events, which are occurring outside of the traditional responsibilities of the Alliance, the importance of the concept becomes clearer. Failure to adapt to changing circumstances or environment usually ends in extinction.

Currently, the very term of EBAO is under considerable pressure for change. Movements are now underway to propose a new term for the concept, in part to distance the concept further from EBO. Whether or not this eliminates or introduces change to the concept is yet to be seen. There have also been proposals within the EBAO community to discard the concept and keep the pillars that have been proven by trial and time. The one thing that remains certain about EBAO is that the discussion will continue. ⊕

Works Consulted

1. J. N. Mattis, USJFCOM Memorandum, Assessment of Effects Based Operations, 2008
2. NATO, Expeditionary Operations Overarching Conceptual Vision and Framework (Draft), 2008
3. Foley, Conor, Legal Interventions, 2007
4. USJFCOM, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, 2008
- 5 & 9. NATO, Bi-SC Command Pre-Doctrinal Handbook, 2007
- 6 & 20. USAF, Air Force Glossary, AFDD1-2, 2007
7. USAF, Operations and Organization, AFDD2
8. J. P. Hunerwadel, "The Effects Based Approach to Operations Questions and Answers" 2006
10. Matt Matthews, "We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War" taken from "Breaking the Amoeba's Bones", Strategic Assessment, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, The Long War Series Occasional Paper
- 11 & 12. J. N. Mattis, JFCOM Memorandum, 2008
13. Cropsey, Seth, The Weekly Standard, "To the Shores of Tripoli..."
14. Osgood, Carl, Executive Intelligence Review, "Counterrevolution in Military Affairs Ambushes the U.S. Army", 2006
15. Harding, Thomas, The Daily Telegraph, "Britain almost out of troops...", 2008
16. NATO Research and Technology Organization "Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors", 2008
17. UK MoD "Multi-Agency Operations"
18. NATO Press Release "Final Communique Meeting of the NAC at the Level of Foreign Ministers", 3 December 2008
19. USJFCOM, Commander's Handbook for an Effects Based Approach to Operations, 2006
21. Zoltan Jobbagy "Scrutinising Effects Based Operations: On Military Genius, Causality and Friction in War"
22. Milan N. Vego, Joint Forces Quarterly "Effects Based Operations: A Critique", 2006
23. David W. Pendall, Military Review "EBO and the Exercise of National Power", 2004
24. Smith-Windsor Brooke, "Hasten Slowly NATO's EBAO", 2008
25. Justin Kelly and David Kilcullen "Chaos Versus Predictability: A Critique of EBO", Australian Army Journal, 2004
26. Flug Review "Stieglitz Outlines Luftwaffe Future" 2006
27. Jonsdottir, S.V., Times Online, Iceland's Economic Collapse fires a "Saucepan Revolution", 2009

Establishing Allied Command Counter Intelligence Support to ISAF in Western Afghanistan

By William Holcombe, former Commander Jättå Detachment, ACCI

Photos by ISAF Regional Command West PAO

ALLIED Command Counter-intelligence's (ACCI) mission in Afghanistan is to provide terrorism, espionage, sabotage and subversion (TESS) awareness and investigations in support of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). As such, ACCI supports all ISAF personnel assigned in Afghanistan at the various Regional Commands. ACCI recently established the Herat Field Office (HFO) at the Regional Command West – [RC (W)] Headquarters to help fill a counter-intelligence gap in ISAF in support of both the ISAF and RC (W) commanders.

Herat Field Office's first rotation of agents arrived at Regional Command West in March 2008. Its direct headquarters, Afghanistan Detachment (ADET), is located at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul. ADET laid a basic foundation for the incoming crew several weeks prior to their arrival, which allowed them to begin operations from the onset. The initial crew of Herat Field Office consisted of five agents, four Americans and one Italian. The Office also had one

interpreter assigned on a full time basis. At the same time, while conducting operations, Herat Field Office coordinated with both ISAF funded contractors and Afghan businesses to construct its building from dirt plot to a fully functioning two-storey building. This was accomplished within about a five month period. ES-KO International, based in Monaco,



REGIONAL COMMAND


WEST – RC (W) is led by Italy, with Spain in charge of the Forward Support Base. Albanian and Slovenian forces provide Force Protection for the Forward Support Base. There are four Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) within RC (W) area of responsibility:

- **PRT HERAT (ITA):**
Herat Province
- **PRT Qala-e-Now (ESP):**
Badghis Province
- **PRT Chaghcharan (LIT)**
Ghor Province
- **PRT Farah (USA)**
Farah Province

ISAF REGIONAL COMMANDS coordinate all regional civil-military activities conducted by the military elements of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in their area of responsibility under operational command of ISAF.

AFGHANISTAN

Kabul. Area: 245,000 sq. m
 200 (estimated). Governm



provided most of the work. Among those employed to work on Herat Field Office's building included individuals from Italy, Kosovo and Afghanistan. The two-storey building is self-sufficient, providing both a secure working and living environment. It is centrally located on the Forward Support Base, providing the agents the ability to coordinate with all other intelligence and security organizations within close proximity.

Although Herat is one of the more affluent cities in the country, it was still evident of the poverty level of the majority of the population. Therefore, jobs available on the ISAF installation were highly sought after with highly skilled Afghans, to include an electrician, approaching Herat Field Office for cleaning positions upon completion of the building. These local workers, however, were not fully vetted for the most part. This meant they had to be escorted at all times, but still posed a possible security risk.

Herat Field Office assisted the RC (W) security by providing advice and assistance when possible in the interview process for those seeking employment on the RC (W) compound, not just those assigned construction jobs related to HFO. These interviews were the primary opportunity for the Forward Support Base Security Officer, who is ultimately responsible for conducting the interviews, to talk with the Afghans to determine any possible derogatory information precluding employment and/or access to the base.

HERAT FIELD OFFICE sought to identify and neutralize any possible threats within Regional Command West's base of

operations, to include the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The RC (W) base is co-located with the Herat International Airport, which poses unique challenges to the security forces of both ISAF and the host nation. Both civilian and military flights operate from the same location. International flights arrive frequently from Iran and Turkmenistan. This key location was also a popular target of insurgent attacks, with frequent threats made and occasional rocket attacks against the airfield and adjacent compounds. HFO, during its liaison with Afghan authorities, continuously received information on up-

coming attacks directed against the Herat Airport. In return, Herat Field Office notified ISAF and coalition security personnel of the threats. The relationship HFO developed with the authorities resulted in timely action taken to neutralize or limit the threat directed against ISAF personnel and facilities. In the majority of instances, the information Herat Field Office received, occurred within a day or two at most of the reported threat. RC (W) also employs personnel from non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization and ISAF contributing nations, adding another dimension to the threat. During

RC (W) Commander Brigadier General Paolo Serra (ITA A) (left) shaking hands with former ISAF Commander General David McKiernan (USA A). Photo by ISAF.



the first Herat Field Office rotation, employees with “Ciano International” were kidnapped as they were leaving in two vehicles from the base to downtown Herat. Of the five people kidnapped included an Indian and Nepalese.

Just to give you a glimpse of the dimension of threat, one of the key players in Herat is a former key official of the Herat city government, who has been linked to Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (a terrorist group) and the Taliban. He is believed to be responsible for the increased violence in Herat over the past year, including rocket attacks against the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan and Herat Airport. It is reported that he

friendly and content on just providing the best they can for their family. However given the poverty, some looked at ways to supplement their income any way they could. Corruption, like in most of Afghanistan, is rampant at all levels of government and business. This was an issue not just for Herat Field Office, but for RC (W) as well when working with the local officials. It became apparent fairly quickly that some level of corruption would have to be accepted as the norm, and the Herat Field Office agents needed to adjust accordingly when engaging with the local officials and citizens in order to not get trapped into this cycle. Some saw ISAF as just another way

village of Azizabad, Shindand District, Herat Province in August 2008, erroneous information is purposely provided to ISAF and the Coalition Forces. In the aerial bombing in Azizabad, misleading information was provided to the United States military, in which some reports resulted in 90 civilian casualties. The man who provided the information has subsequently been sentenced to death by an Afghan court. These attacks are a way for tribal vendettas to occur. It is imperative Herat Field Office provides accurate information to the RC (W) Commander to prevent these types of incidents from occurring, since the media firestorm can distort the truth. It also added an extra

“

Although Herat is one of the more affluent cities in the country, it was still evident of the poverty level of the majority of the population.



is based in a small village close to the Herat Airport in the district of Gozareh, Herat Province. However, he is known to frequently move around making it difficult to target. Adding to this is his popularity amongst some of the villagers.

Herat Field Office was able to gain credibility with the RC (W) immediately by providing information on possible rocket attacks against the base. Although not necessarily always within Herat Field Office’s mission, the agents still reported any information, which would benefit the command. This man was not the only threat targeting ISAF, but remains one of the main instigators in the region.

THE HERATIS as a whole are very

to supplement their income and would provide information they perceived ISAF wanted to hear, not necessarily always what was fact.

While money was always a major factor, other assistance such as medical aid and food was in great demand as well. By showing at least some compassion towards their well being, the locals offered more support to the agents. However there is a fine line when it comes providing assistance in return for information, as one never could tell the true intentions.

As seen in the media, Afghans will provide information to ISAF, which has resulted in civilian casualties. In several instances, such as the bombing in the

burden in determining the validity of the information provided to the agents. With the high illiteracy rate in the Herat Province, what the radio and other media outlets state is most often taken as fact. The Taliban in the area were more affective in using the local media than ISAF, and is something being addressed.

The significant figure in Herat is the current Afghan Minister of Energy Ismail Khan. Khan, although based in Kabul, still exudes great influence throughout the Herat Province. Khan, an ethnic Tajik, was a former Governor of Herat Province before being removed by the Afghan President Hamid Karzai. As a former Mujahedeen and Northern Alliance com-



mander who fought the Soviets and Taliban, many in the Province still have fond feelings towards him. What has developed is an environment of a power struggle between Khan's associates in Herat. This has resulted in a significant base for organized crime, which at times spread into links with insurgents operating in the region. This also affected ISAF PRT projects, as the local leaders would demand kickbacks before any work could progress.

Iran has had a strong influence in Herat throughout history, both positive and negative. Given Herat's proximity to Iran and the history between the various ethnic groups, it is understandable that Iran would have a vetted interest in the region. Iranian companies have contracts for infrastructure projects throughout the region. These workers face the same dangers as their Afghan counterparts, with several Iranians kidnapped and some subsequently killed. However, there is ample evidence of Iranian intervention into Afghan affairs, and reporting of support to individuals associated with insurgent groups. Local senior Afghan government officials play both sides for their personal gain. They will publicly denounce Iranian influence, but at the same time reach out for assistance. Insurgents smuggle drugs along the main supply routes leading through the southern and northern sectors of the Herat Province into Iran, and receive money



An ISAF operation, conducted in cooperation with the Afghan National Army, led to the discovery of a weapons cache near Shindad containing machine guns, automatic rifles, cartridges, rockets, a launcher and grenades, antitank and antipersonnel mines, detonators and five kilogram explosives. Photo by ISAF.

and/or weapons in return. Identifying the high ranking individuals with links to the insurgency and Iranian participation remains a priority for the agents. By identifying these links, the agents can assist in neutralizing the threats against ISAF and the Afghan government.

HERAT FIELD OFFICE provided much needed investigative and operational

support to the RC (W). The first rotation laid a strong footprint for future rotations to exploit the threat against ISAF as well as the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Its mission in Afghanistan covers the full spectrum of ACCI's charter, and offers a rewarding experience for all the agents assigned. Working with several nations in a deployed environment provides opportunities to exercise each agent's expertise not always possible back at home station. Herat offers many contrasting conditions, given its rich history and proximity to Iran. Lessons learned from the deployment are brought back to all the various NATO installations, increasing the effectiveness of all NATO personnel. As long as ISAF's presence in Herat is required, Herat Field Office will provide the necessary counter-intelligence support. ☩

"Our mission is about building a future of hope and progress for the Afghan people."
— General David McKiernan,
former ISAF Commander



Picture collage by Sgt Brandon Chhoeun, USA A,
Assistant Media, Civil Environment Section, JED,
Joint Warfare Centre



Public Affairs in the Afghan

By Maj Christopher Tom Sargent, GBR A, NRDC-ITA
Photos by MSG Raphael Baekler, DEU AF, JWC PAO
Cpl Jta Joosten, 1 (GE/NL) Corps

“There is only one thing worse than fighting with Allies, and that is fighting without them.”

– Winston Churchill, April 1945

ALTHOUGH the description the “Global War on Terror” is now out of favour in the corridors of power in the United States, it remains an apt description when setting into context the current operational environment. It is almost eight years since the 9/11 attacks on the United States, which proved the catalyst for the opening moves in the ongoing operations being conducted in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

After eight years of operations, the focus for individual Governments and the U.S. led coalitions has seen a shift from Iraq to Afghanistan. This shift has meant an increase in terms of men, materiel and finance with which it is hoped that a lasting solution may be found. As the political and military focus has shifted, so has the focus of the media. This focus in many ways adds value to the operation particularly at the strategic level. With the focus on Afghanistan and the

region as a whole we can expect to see an increase in resources and finance, which will allow a lasting solution to be realised. There are of course negative aspects to this shift in focus, in particular the rapid increase in numbers of media; the so called “Fourth Estate”, added to the already dynamic, yet complex Afghan operating environment. The way in which we, as a NATO coalition alongside Operation Enduring Freedom, are able to manage and shape this media environ-





their collective future. Presidential Elections, increased troop deployment and the question of regional stability have all captured the interest of the media and despite the global recession this will remain a constant theme. As the interest and focus in Afghanistan grows, so will the demands placed on the military's ability to prosecute an effective media campaign. Our actions within the Public Affairs domain must reflect this shift change and must evolve in order to remain a credible and effective actor within the operational structure of the coalition. Of particular relevance to this change in media focus to the Public Affairs Office in theatre has been the advent of the Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) and the need for a more cerebral approach to media engagement.

The past six months in Headquarters ISAF have seen an increase in media related activities. The focus of the media operations has been firmly fixed on dealing with the increase in media attention and ensuring that we are postured to contribute to the overall Information Operation Campaign. The introduction of STRATCOM Branch has caused some ripples within the wider NATO community. Whilst these concerns are recognised, it is important to understand that the concept itself is sound and serves only as a coordinating function. Whilst national caveats and national regulations must be strictly adhered to, we must recognise the need for a doctrine governing media and information operations to be further developed in order to reflect the Contemporary Operating Environment and the operational needs of those prosecuting the operation on the ground. Public Affairs must be postured to be proactive in their approach rather than reactive, this will only be achieved if there is integration and coordination between all those involved in messaging. Rather than dismissing the concept of STRATCOM we must embrace it, adapt it and make it work for the media component within the wider campaign plan.

WE ARE FIGHTING a tenacious and effective enemy who have an acute understanding of the need and uses of propaganda. Although we do not recognise

their actions as Public Affairs or Information Operations, we must recognise their ability to use these areas to further their strategic endstate. We strive to be first with the known truth; the insurgent merely strives to be first. On the modern battlefield speed and tempo is vital to dislocating the enemy and denying him freedom of movement. Modern technology means that the war is prosecuted under the media spotlight where action on the field can be beamed live to a global audience. The insurgents understand this and use the media spectrum to great effect to misinform and misrepresent events. They are not trying to inform the media, they are trying to influence them in order that they may undermine political will and through it, the support for the war. Whilst we lose tempo due to our restrictions, the insurgent gain it through achieving influence and speed in favour of accuracy and the truth.

We cannot and will not mislead or use the media for propaganda purposes, but at the same time we must gain the upper hand in message dissemination through a comprehensive approach through all STRATCOM actors. This is a wicked problem and whilst addressing it physically, we must ensure that we remain true to our own laws and guidance that define who and what we are as democracies. Further development of STRATCOM both as a physical and conceptual component within our approach must be achieved if we are to maximise the effect of the information domain on the modern battlefield. This requires an understanding and an ability to implement an effective campaign within the guidelines received from higher authority.

Whilst STRATCOM provides a coordinating function that better enables and empowers ISAF PA assets to provide effective and coordinated messaging across theatre, we must also ensure that we understand who exactly we should be targeting. We live in an age where the thirst for information drives many facets of our collective societies. As a result, the media environment places increased demands on our military to provide accurate and up-to-date information. The idea of the "Strategic Corporal" is particularly relevant when we consider the media and

ment will be instrumental in contributing to the final outcome. The task is further hampered by the opinions and requirements of individual nations within the theatre operations. We must recognise these caveats for what they are, whilst ensuring that we approach the very real problems that we face with a dynamic and proactive approach.

A CHANGE IN ADMINISTRATION within the United States of America was bound to herald a shift change. As the military main effort shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan, so the Afghanistan theatre moved out of the shadow of the Iraq based operation in the eyes of the media. The year 2009 has been declared the pivotal year for Afghanistan, her people and



their ability to influence a target audience, be it domestic or international. This in itself creates complexities that further effect the way in which PA plan and conduct their approach to the media.

Currently it is the ability and influence of the international media and the effect that it can have on our own domestic audiences that drives our engagement plans rather than our own profiling of what the media can provide

“Further development of STRATCOM both as a physical and conceptual component within our approach must be achieved if we are to maximise the effect of the information domain on the modern battlefield.”

in terms of wider campaign effects. The Operational Centre of Gravity remains the Afghan population; historically the only way in which a long term success can be achieved in a Counter Insurgency Campaign is by influencing this centre of gravity. STRATCOM must ensure that their efforts and energies are focused on being able to influence the Afghan population in order to demonstrate the commitment of ISAF and more importantly



Clockwise: Press conference during ISAF pre-deployment training in June 2009 at JWC's training facility in Ulsnes; Commander's Update meeting led by Major General Charles Sullivan, CAN AF, participated by STRATCOM representative and the author; the media internet page during the training event.



the effectiveness of the Afghan Government and Security Forces. In support of this the PAO must be empowered and enabled to inform the Afghan media and through it gain influence within the Afghan population. There are of course many complications that face ISAF when





trying to achieve this focused engagement with the Afghan media.

The international media is a powerful and influential body that focuses the efforts of higher commands and political leadership alike. The demand for information means that our own focus has perhaps drifted from the Operational Centre of Gravity to the point where more of our energies are focused on justifying support for the war than are given to winning it.

In recent months the vast majority of media engagement has gone to an international audience rather than an Afghan one. Whilst we would be naive to not expect to have to justify the expense of this war in terms of "blood and treasure" to our own domestic audiences, we cannot afford to do this at the expense of justifying our actions to the Afghan population. The media effort must be split evenly to ensure that that the focus for ISAF, the Afghan population, is fully demonstrated.

Despite the requirement to engage with the Afghan Media, it must be recognised that the ability to achieve tangible results is hampered by the capability and structure of the media itself. The Afghan media environment is immature and as yet underdeveloped. Although there is a

residue potential, thirty years of war and persecution has taken its toll. The ability and reach of the media required to inform and influence target audiences across Afghanistan is limited by infrastructure, literacy and the media skill set that we expect as a norm from the International media. In order to inform the Afghan population through their own media we must first enable, and then empower it. This will take reconstruction and development outside what we normally would expect to do and certainly away from the capabilities of military forces alone.

If we wish our messages to be disseminated to a wider population then we must invest, not only through inclusion of Afghan journalists, but through their education and media development. We must also recognise that Key Leader Engagement must include the key opinion formers and influencers within the Afghan media environment. The situation that confronts ISAF is dynamic and changeable across the military spectrum. The

problems are all wicked in nature and we must approach them in a manner that enables and includes all actors, agencies and influencers. The demands placed upon all members of ISAF are challenging but by no means insurmountable. We must however adapt and change to meet these demands. If we are to win in the information/media domain we must be able to utilise all assets available and adopt our Tactics, Techniques and Procedures to meet the associated challenges.

We must understand our environment and fight to become masters of it, only then will be able to ensure that the so called fourth estate is truly reflective of what is actually happening on the ground. As an organisation we must have the ability to look in (Afghan centric) and build, whilst at the same time looking outwards and sustaining. Within media operations all actors are important but none more so than those who we are fighting to protect. ☺

All you want to know ABOUT SENIOR MENTORS and more



By General (Ret.) Sir John Reith,
Lead Senior Mentor, Exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 09

SOME of our nations within NATO have had Senior Mentor programmes for many years and others have never introduced one, but the NATO programme began some four years ago, initiated by Headquarters Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and is still run by it today.

Senior Mentors (their collective noun is a "sage") are senior officers, retired from active service and always of two-star rank or higher, who have been recommended for the programme by their Chief of Defence (CHOD). The Senior Mentor pool is normally some 12 strong, with the right balance of expertise amongst its members to be able to provide coverage and support at the joint and component level, two available for each environment, for all exercises.

In the autumn of each year, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation writes to the Chiefs of Defence (CHODs) requesting nominations to fill any vacancies that have occurred in the pool that year, specifying the particular expertise required for each. The nominees recommended, having submitted their biographies, go through an initial screening process to ensure they meet the requested parameters and are then called forward for interview. An Interview Board consisting of the Deputy Chief of Staff Allied Command Transformation, the Lead Senior Mentor and the Lead Concept Developer interview the individuals and make recommendations to SACT as to suitability. SACT then makes his selection and informs the CHODs. Those selected have to go through two full exercise cycles before qualifying to "fly solo" as a Senior Mentor.

The individuals selected have to have had command at flag level, recent operational experience and also have the personality to be able to work constructively and sensitively with any commander, of any nationality or background, they are likely to be required to mentor.



Clockwise: General (Ret.) Sir Reith, Senior Mentors during exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 09 at Ulsnes Auditorium, General (Ret.) Klaus Reinhard.



The primary function of a mentor is to coach and advise the commander he is working with. In doing this he has to be careful not to undermine his principal's authority in any way; he has to act as a shadow, picking up points or issues and discussing them privately with the commander. He gives the commander the benefit of his experience, intuitive skills and knowledge, and provides insights because of his ability to stand back and look at the challenges without direct involvement, thereby providing a more balanced view for consideration.

Many commanders use their mentors as "sounding boards" to air their views and possible doubts, which they could never share with their staff, knowing that the discussion is in absolute confidence. Mentors always have to be discrete.

Mentors also, when not engaged with the commander, supplement the efforts of the Observer/Trainers from Joint Warfare Centre, by providing advice to the staff on specific issues or explaining concepts to

the uninitiated. The Senior Mentors play a full part in the Academic Phase of the STEADFAST series of exercises by providing practical advice and anecdotes from operational experience at the end of presentations, in order to enhance the credibility of what has been presented. They also assist in facilitating syndicate discussions and run break-out seminars.

Finally, Senior Mentors when working very closely with the Observer/Trainers, in the various headquarters during an exercise, provide them with top cover. The Observer/Trainers are normally of relatively junior rank, OF-5s and OF-4s, but they have to deal with OF-5s and flag rank officers on a daily basis. If they encounter any difficulties, which they are unable to resolve themselves, in relation to those in the HQ senior in rank to them, they are able to enlist the rank and authority of their Senior Mentor for support on their behalf. If you are interested and wish to know more, ask a Senior Mentor. They do not bite – well, rarely... ✦

By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO
Photos by MSG Raphael Baekler, DEU AF



NRF 13 Certification

STEADFASTJuncture 09

STEADFAST JUNCTURE 09, the major, joint decision-making Command Post (CPX) and Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX) started on 19 May 2009 and continued until 31 May 2009 simultaneously at six locations. It involved 1,812 military and civilian personnel from various headquarters and units assigned to or supporting the 13th rotation of the NATO Response Force (NRF).

The main exercise location for NRF 13 headquarters was the Joint Warfare Centre's Training Facility in Ulsnes, which at

the time hosted approximately 700 personnel. They represented the full spectrum of NATO Nations, as well as some Partnership for Peace (PfP) Nations. The exercise was designed to train, validate and certify NATO's Joint Command Lisbon to assume responsibility of the NRF 13 during the period from July 2009 to January 2010.

The exercise was coordinated by Vice Admiral Bruce W. Clingan, USA Navy, former Commander Allied Joint Command Lisbon. It was directed by Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, German

Army, Commander Joint Warfare Centre.

The purpose of the NRF is to provide a fully integrated combined land, sea and air force that is able to respond at short notice to a wide variety of operational commitments and missions anywhere in the world. The Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE), a new concept which was initiated in 2008, aims at improving the NATO Command Structure with regard to increased flexibility and mobility. As the most efficient Command and Control at the operational level, the DJSEs will be on a very short notice to move. On a ro-



Training

tational basis, DJSEs will be designated to support the NATO Response Force. The purpose of the Deployable Joint Staff Element is managing operational tasks in an austere environment as the "extended arm" of the Joint Force Command Headquarters, which remains out-of-theatre.



STEADFAST JUNCTURE 09 emulated the planning and execution of a NATO Crisis Response Operation using a fictitious exercise scenario located beyond NATO's geographical area and based on the NATO Response Force (NRF) and Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE) concepts. In the exercise, Allied Land Component Headquarters Heidelberg provided the first DJSE and served as the "extended arm" for Allied Joint Command Lisbon. Thus, LCC HQ Heidelberg provided the Joint Force Commander, on the ground in theatre, with a lean, flexible, rapidly deployable operational headquarters element.

During the exercise, DJSE concept was tested for the first time at the Joint Force Command level, with special focus on the interaction between the Joint Headquarters Main and the Joint Headquarters Forward Element.

During the exercise, Joint Command Lisbon led the development, testing and implementation of the new DJSE structure. Therefore, this exercise served as a step towards a Limited Operating Capability of the first DJSE provided by LCC HQ Heidelberg.

"We are fully engaged in this robust exercise, which is the last formal training event for the NRF 13. This training is intended to achieve the real world operational proficiency. That's the mandate. And we only have to look at the types of events that are occurring in the real world today to understand why it is important that we are focused on real world proficiency. We are pushing as far forward in real-world operational proficiency as we can to try to explore the edges of the operational art," said Vice Admiral Bruce W. Clingan.

Exercise Director, Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre said STEADFAST JUNCTURE 09 was a successful exercise. "This success is directly attributed to the efforts of



**KOMBI BLDG
EXCON, HICON,
Grey Cell, SITFOR**



**SCHOOL BLDG
LOCON**







**GYMNASIUM
JHQ FE**

ULSNES EXERCISE LAYOUT

Higher Control (HICON): Higher headquarters that issues orders and command the Brigades.
Lower Control (LOCON): Replicates national or governmental institutions, civil organisations and other military/ civilian formations.



**AUDITORIUM
VTC**



**BOATHOUSE
Media (Motion
and Print)**

Training

the planning staff and the determination of the various training audiences to work together in a systematic, coordinated fashion throughout the NRF orientation and crisis response planning. The overall result was a well-prepared training audience that met the challenge of a demanding scenario and MEL/MIL during Phase III," he added.

THE JOINT WARFARE CENTRE has been responsible for the detailed planning and overall execution of NATO's STEADFAST series of exercises since 2006. JWC provides the Exercise Control (EXCON) structure responsible for ensuring that the exercise aims and objectives are met. JWC also provides training teams during the exercise who assisted the NRF 13 training audience in meeting the exercise training objectives. ⊕

JEMM MONSTER: "The computers work just for me!" - Drawn by Hope Carr on the white board in the media room.





“DJSE structure requires more training than ever,” Major General Van Loon, Chief of Staff NATO’s ALCC HQ Heidelberg

NATO released the Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE) concept in mid-2008 to meet operational command and control requirements by realigning its command structure for high agility and optimum deployability without committing too much of its precious personnel or material resources.

The vision of DJSE focuses on mobility – the ability to deploy and sustain the forward deployed element of a much larger Main Headquarters outside NATO’s traditional remit to solve compelling, real-world challenges. From an organizational design perspective, the new model headquarters will comprise two equal elements: a Main Headquarters capable of expanding into a highly agile Forward Element of about 210 personnel.

Recognizing the need to respond swiftly and decisively to crises outside NATO boundaries, the main aim is to achieve a more streamlined and mission-focused command and control structure as well as a dramatic boost in NATO’s deployment readiness.

Headquarters Joint Command Lisbon has the lead in the DJSE development,

testing and implementation. Allied Land Component Command Headquarters Heidelberg (ALCC HQ HD) and its sister command Allied Land Component Command Headquarters Madrid (ALCC HQ MD) are the “Force Commands” that will eventually consist of two highly mobile DJSEs each. ALCC HQ HD has been directed to provide the first DJSE for certification.

Major Impact on NATO’s Command Structure and Capabilities

Major General Ton Van Loon of the Royal Netherlands Army currently serves as Chief of Staff ALCC HQ HD. He outlined the progress of NATO’s DJSE initiative in an interview from Exercise STEADFAST

“If I were to sum up how NATO can become highly deployable, it would be these three words: training, training, training!”

JUNCTURE 09, which was conducted in May at the Joint Warfare Centre’s Training Facility in Ulsnes, and during which DJSE’s Initial Operating Capability was certified.

“DJSE is a continuation of NATO’s effort to transform itself,” Major General Ton Van Loon commented, adding: “This new vision represents our adaptability in response to the ever-changing character of the security environment. To achieve success in complex environments we want to make sure that NATO becomes more deployable and more readily available.”

With an eye on the future, the DJSE concept will have a major impact on the NATO command structure (NCS) and the overall military capability of the Alliance.

“I think the most interesting part of the DJSE vision is to have two equal elements comprised in one headquarters, one working from a static position while the other focuses on rapid deployability only,” the General continued. “They both work together as one for one command. So, on the one hand, there is the Main Headquarters that develops strategic planning, assessment and analysis; on the other hand there is this relatively small team, the DJSE, which you can



just grab and send off to the site of a developing conflict before the situation gets out of hand.”

He also noted that “today’s operations are often far away from Europe and require robust command and control. DJSE is part of establishing that mission-focused command and control capability across the NCS.”

A New Set of Challenges

Major General Van Loon went on to explain that working with counterparts during Exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 09 helped bring about a better understanding of the DJSE concept and capabilities. “It is a different paradigm from what we are used to,” he observed. “We are developing a pretty innovative way of commanding units. The DJSE vision is clear, but its overall structure is still being developed. During the exercise, we certified its Limited Operating Capability. This exercise greatly helped DJSE forward as areas for improvement were identified.”

NATO’s military transformation includes a shift of the focus of forces from defence against conventional attacks, to deployable responses to asymmetric threats. “We are conducting big and small scale operations. That should not be a problem. The difference we see now is that military, civilians, governmental and non-governmental organizations and even industry partners are indispensable



for conducting today’s missions.”

He continued to say that the security environment in which soldiers focus only on direct military-to-military engagement with a forward area and a rear area no longer makes sense. “Again, today’s battle space is very dynamic,” he added, “and threats are not strictly military in

nature. So, in this complex security environment the challenge is on the one hand to be a war fighter – and let there be no mistake about it: we need to fight hard – and on the other hand be able to deal with a vast array of people and help international organizations rebuild societies under stress. So, traditional war-fighting and comprehensive nation-building need to be brought together and that’s the massive challenge that faces our soldiers that go in harm’s way.”

Supply and Demand

Major General Van Loon went on to explain more work is required to advance the NATO DJSE concept, referring inter alia to the enablers that support the DJSE commander in theatre and how they will work together.

“For instance, we need to figure out exactly how we develop a fast, rapid deployable command post with the correct CIS attached to it so that it can actually do the job without having to build on from scratch over and over again. You would never deploy a headquarters led by an Admiral without providing a force protection battalion. So, how do you incorporate this force protection battalion? Or, how do you make sure that the logistical support group gets the right level of augmentees within and outside the NATO Response Force? Those issues still need to be worked on so that we can

“We increased military’s awareness on humanitarian and international organizations.”


Gianni Rufini, from 1997 to 2001 Director of VOICE, the network of European Non-Governmental

Organizations (NGOs) active in emergency and humanitarian aid worldwide, served as the IO/NGO Subject Matter Expert of the “Grey Cell” for Exercise Steadfast Juncture 09. He strongly emphasized that the STEADFAST series of exercises amplifies the understand-

ing of the various civilian humanitarian and military roles, and boosts more effective and efficient coordination. Rufini explained that an effectively coordinated effort between civilian agencies and the military is essential due to the changing nature of international operations since the end of the Cold War. He said: “We have increased the military’s awareness as it pertains to the role of humanitarian and international organizations. We have made serious effort to introduce an increasing number of elements of realism into the scenario and the way we played.

I believe that we have made quite a progress in this sense. Some components of the military system are very inclined to respect our role and try to find the best way to cooperate with us. Others still underestimate what civilian agencies do on the battlefield. Very few people know indeed that the NGOs provide almost 90 percent of the humanitarian response action in any crisis. The eight largest NGOs have a budget that exceeds that of the entire UN system. This should give you an idea of the importance of these civilian agencies.”

Gianni Rufini went on to say that the general public unfortunately tends to see NGOs as suppliers of food and basic services only. “This is not true. With the increasing number of emergencies during



continue developing the DJSE concept. It is kind of new to all of us.”

Training, Training, Training!

In October 2003, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) stood up NRF. The biggest driving engine of NATO’s continuing transformation is a standing, deployable joint task force combining land, air, sea and special forces into one powerful package. It can deploy within five days of a NAC decision to conduct stand-alone operations for 30 days. So, how will DJSE affect NRF?

“In each NRF rotation, NATO’s Joint Force commander will have a DJSE in his command structure together with the overall NRF force generation package. So, from that perspective much remains unchanged. However, if you look at it from the training perspective, vast changes are afoot. We have to remember that the DJSE concept is based on split headquarters with one static main headquarters at home base and a second one operating in a combat zone, both united under a common banner. Such a structure requires more training than ever. I truly believe that training is key to the success of this transformational concept. If I were to sum up how NATO can become highly deployable, it would be these three words: training, training, training! Training is the only way to go. What we are doing right now in Sta-



vanger is vital. We all benefit from being able to work so closely. If we want to run with the DJSE concept successfully, we have to put in a lot of energy and dedication. Training is a means to demonstrate how a deployable, functionally aligned combined joint command post will operate in the 21st century. We are training

ourselves to transform our mind-set. And the Joint Warfare Centre plays a crucial role in this process.”

Applying Comprehensive Approach toward a Shared Objective

In every exercise the Ulsnes training facility is transformed into the area of operations of a combined joint command headquarters. The training that the Joint Warfare Centre provides to NATO’s operational commands is tough and demanding in order to prepare them for operations and give them the confidence needed to succeed in these complex environments.

“There is one more reason why realistic training is very important,” Major General Van Loon said. “We note that operations are becoming more comprehensive, involving a vast array of people and organizations. It is not enough to know how to conduct traditional war-fighting missions, how to move ships, divisions of infantry or airplanes around. You now need this knowledge in a perspective where other agencies, such as the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the International Organizations (IOs), the United Nations (UN), diplomats, humanitarian and development staff workers all have their own mandates. The training provided by the Joint Warfare Centre is forging a Comprehensive Approach to operations, and it is a very realistic combined joint training of units on the road to deployment.”

the 1990s, the responsibility of the humanitarian organizations became mainly ensuring local communities a point of reference, which helps the management of the entire community from all points of view. We are talking about education, hygiene, water, sanitation, psychology of traumatized people, nutrition issues. We are talking about re-organizing the entire society. We are talking about what a state is no longer able to do. In a complex emergency you do not have the state anymore. You do not have the traditional power. People are abandoned to themselves and they do



not only have material needs. Rather, they have mostly social, psychological, legal and cultural needs that need to be fulfilled. Being a humanitarian worker today requires extremely sophisticated professionalism. You must know about culture, medicine, soldier issues, protection, security, legal issues. You must know about everything that concerns a society, especially a society in a crisis situation. This profession has become very complex and sensitive, and requires a lot of expertise, a lot of training and is not for anybody. Your responsibility is ensuring life and death for people, ensuring fulfillment of all their needs, ensuring the stability of the entire society.” Gianni Rufini also pointed out that their guiding principles are humanity, impar-

ality, and neutrality. He said that interaction between military and civilian actors on the ground is a necessity. It is important, however, to draw attention to the limits placed on civilian organizations. “Humanitarian organizations must act to preserve those limits not only as a philosophical matter, but as a formula for protection. As long as we are perceived as neutral, nobody will attack us and nobody will be hostile to our action. But if we are perceived as a party in the conflict, then this would hamper our operations and pose serious threats to our organizations. This is why we have this obsession for neutrality, which is an operational issue rather than an existential one,” he concluded.

“The most efficient military operation will only be effective if it is synchronized with and integrated into a broad, interdisciplinary effort.”



Dr. James Orr, Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice and National Security Studies at Tiffin University, Ohio, United States, served as the UN Political/Legal Advisor

of the “Grey Cell” for Exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 09. The exercise highlighted the role of the military in a modern peace operation and humanitarian assistance, while laying emphasis on the challenges of conducting military operations with multinational forces and contributing civilians such as the IOs, NGOs, GOs and other instruments of the political power. The dynamic joint training at the Ulsnes training facility focused on a streamlined command and control as this function remains one of the most legally and politically charged issues in modern military operations.

Dr. Orr served for 24 years as a U.S. Navy Judge Advocate after he retired with the rank of Commander. In his last assignment, he served as the Deputy Legal Advisor for NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT). We asked his opinion on how civil-military aspects blended and functioned during Exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 09. He pointed out that their harmonized employment is a prerequisite for the achievement of successful outcomes in demanding environments.

“The military capabilities are, of course, an essential part of any response to conflict situations such as that presented in this scenario. What is very necessary to remember, though, is that the military capabilities can only be effective if they are a part of a much broader approach, one that includes significant attention to the humanitarian and political aspects of any crisis situation. Whether this is referred to as a ‘Comprehensive Approach’ or some other fashion, the reality is that even the most efficient mili-

tary operation will only be effective if it is synchronized with and integrated into a broad, interdisciplinary effort,” he said.

Dr. Orr highlighted the interdependence of civilian and military organizations in complex emergencies. While pointing out the differentiation of civilian humanitarian and military roles he still urged for better understanding and partnership. Why is this cooperation necessary?

“As we have seen in exercises like this, the military component has its own structure, its own perceptions and methods of analysis, and there are always a number of ‘fault lines’ between those perceptions, processes, and structures and those of the other agencies and organizations involved. Many times the result is for the military to work at fitting all the civilian organizations into the military organizational structure, rather than looking to see how the military structure needs to adapt to fit in better with the civilian and political efforts. Exercises like this, which raise the familiarity of the staffs with how the civilian organizations and agencies will work, are essential for building the commonality of understanding that is necessary for and effectively integrated approach to a crisis,” he said.

STEADFAST JUNCTURE 09 (SFJE 09) Distinguished Visitors’ Day clockwise: David Keane and MSG Baekler; CC-Air HQ Ramstein Commander General Roger A. Brady, USAF; Director JFTC Major General Ib Johannes Bager, DNK A, and Commander JWC Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, DEU A; SFJE 09 DV’s group picture.





From top left: EXCON scenario meeting during SFJE 09; JWC scenario team members, Mr Hellebust and Mr Schjøberg, Lt Col Turner.

By Sqn Ldr Bob Dixon, RAF,
 Joint Exercise Division, Joint Warfare Centre
 Photos by MSG Raphael Baekler, DEU AF, JWC PAO

A year in the life of Chief Scenario for STEADFAST JUNCTURE '09

STEADFAST JUNCTURE 2009 (SFJE09) started before I joined the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). The process of directing world-class training for operational staff-processes is more complex and detailed than I ever imagined. JUNCTURE was over a year in the making, involved a huge amount of people and must have made the JWC and Allied Joint Command Lisbon (JC Lisbon) Officers of Primary Responsibility (OPRs) age ten-fold in that time.

Within minutes of arriving at the JWC on 18 August 2008, I was handed the responsibility of being 'Chief Scenario' for an exercise I had never heard of, in a region that does not exist, covering strategic level interaction with Computer and Information Systems (CIS) I had never seen, abbreviations that meant little and Country Books I did not understand. This was out of the comfort zone of a Royal Air Force Helicopter Tactics Instructor.

The Initial Planning Conference was held in a very nice hotel just outside Lisbon in September 2008. It lasted four days and I was shadowing Mr Ulf Schjøberg from the JWC's Scenario Section,

who was to mentor me until I was ready to take charge. Discussions during the scenario syndicate ranged from the scenario (quite obviously) to the Intelligence reporting process to be used and the computer systems that would enable it. I am still not sure how the latter falls to the scenario team, but everyone seemed to be OK with that, so it was about time I learned what BICES and NITB meant.

EXERCISE STEADFAST JOINER '08 ran in early November and that allowed me to see the conduct of a Phase III from the SITFOR⁽¹⁾ perspective, so I got insight into how exercises play out. In mid-November, I attended the MEL/MIL⁽²⁾ Strategy Conference and an Exercise Planning Group in SHAPE. Things were not getting much clearer.

By the time the Main Planning Conference came round at the end of November, I was beginning to understand that Cerasia was just someone's imagination and that the MA terrorist organisation was not really going to attack my family. Prior to the conference I had issued a number of documents that set the scene of the problem that NATO would have to resolve (a GeoStrategic situation, Country Books, a

Road-to-Crisis and a number of others). These were the basis for discussion in the conference on how the scenario should develop and I was able to play a much more active role in this conference than I had in the one a few months prior.

After the Christmas break, I briefed the scenario to (what seemed like) around 12,000 people at JC Lisbon's Phase Ib. Chief MEL/MIL (Lt Col Jay Turner) and I were also supposed to be conducting some collaborative planning with Lisbon personnel to produce strategic initiation documents while we were down there. However, 'plans never survive first contact with the enemy' and we were informed that SHAPE would now produce the documents. We were also informed that we should go to Mons the following week as the JWC needed to ensure that the SHAPE-produced documents would trigger the correct responses from the Lisbon Joint Operational Planning Group for the exercise.

After the application of a mix of gentle caressing and sledgehammer blows, Jay and I managed to encourage a NAC Initiating Directive and Strategic Military Assessment out of SHAPE's planning



group. I would like to think I was capable of the gentle caressing, but Jay was as smooth as silk and I am from an area of England where influence is not carried out delicately.

I missed the Crisis Response Planning in Phase II at Lisbon. I would like to have been there to see Lisbon in action, but as my wife was nine months pregnant I was not getting much of a say in what I did with my life at that point. My beautiful baby daughter was born half way through the Phase II; at no point was I tempted to suggest any name that had any connection with JUNCTURE. Phase II concluded with Lisbon producing an Operations Plan that they would work to in the Phase III.

MEL/MIL Development and MEL/MIL Scripting added the detail to the exercise plan that had been developed by JWC, JC Lisbon and SHAPE representatives. Personnel from all components arrived at the JWC Training Facility at Ulsnes to ensure that there were sufficient, desired and realistic situations for their components to deal with. My role, along with Chief MEL/MIL, in these phases was to guide everyone in the agreed direction⁽³⁾ and to ensure that the 'good idea fairy'⁽⁴⁾ stayed within the bounds of the setting.

Prior to the execution there were many documents to produce in order to complete the setting and allow a Comprehensive Approach to the problem. The NRF also required the intelligence from theatre it would have gained itself between its initial elements' deployment and the date

the exercise started. This task was made a little harder as Commander JC Lisbon wanted to run additional staff training in the week preceding the execution's work-up phase. He wanted to use some of the documents for the start of the exercise for it, so that his staff would not have to learn different information so close to the exercise. This was, of course, a sensible decision, but added a small additional time pressure. Finally, Phase III was upon us. The culmination of all the preparatory work was held between 24 and 31 May 2009. As Chief Scenario, I worked in the EXCON at Ulsnes, however, there were six exercise sites (see below) and over 1,800 people involved. I have no idea how RLS and CIS support was effected to run such a successful exercise. More clever people than I deal with such issues.

In order to create as realistic a training environment as possible there was a comprehensive non-military involvement in the EXCON. Role-players were contracted from International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations to replicate real-world CIMIC interaction. There were also international media and 'bad-guy' Info Ops capabilities to add realism to the exercise; these were designed to add pressure and consequence to NRF thinking and actions. These people resided within the 'Grey Cell' (led by Lt Col Svein Rødland) and SITFOR (led by Col Yuksel) which are the main tools to direct the Training Audience (TA).

The execution of Phase III was carried out like previous exercises. There was a busy daily routine for EXCON and the TA alike; the Event Managers (Sqn Ldr Gannon, Maj Carreiro, Lt Col Wege and Lt Col Dion) and Response Cells (led by Col Rønning) created a myriad of injects for the TA to cope with and SITFOR and the Grey Cell carried out the necessary actions for the injects. As Chief Scenario, I had to ensure RFIs⁽⁵⁾ were addressed, that the intelligence play was correct and that everything progressed consistently with the scenario.

A difference that confused most people for SFJE 09 was the direction to use generic nations for NATO. For exercises, NATO now comprises N91, N92, N93, N94 and N95. For example in SFJE 09, the French SOCC were now not French, but from N93, with generic capabilities not their real-world ones - I avoided falling into the trap of briefing this at Lisbon's Distinguished Visitors' day as starred of-



Officers ask questions and want answers.

So what was SFJE 09 aiming to achieve? It was trying to achieve a number of things: NRF 13 certification; Full Operational Capability declaration of the DJSE; use of TOPFAS 2.5/3.0 as a planning tool; SHAPE involvement as an execution element; the use of Generic Forces; the force generation process to derive the MNDDP⁽⁶⁾; and a follow-on exercise of LOYAL JEWEL 09. It accomplished most of it, with LOYAL JEWEL due to follow in November 2009.

My thoughts after SFJE 09 are that the JWC runs first class training for NATO and its staff work with professionalism, dedication, enthusiasm and humour in the face of consecutive obstacles. I have had to work way too closely for too long with a British Army Royal Engineer⁽⁷⁾ which is a distasteful mission. My reward for successful completion of my assigned task is I have been told to do it all again for LOYAL JEWEL, with the same Royal Engineer. I should ask for extra pay. ✦

Notes:

(1) 'Situation Forces' represent any other unit that is not NATO, or Grey Cell specialists (UN, International Organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations)

(2) MEL/MIL means Main Event List/Main Incident List and it is the method by which NATO introduces situations for the Training Audience to deal with/resolve.

(3) This job is commonly known in British military as "herding cats".

(4) The good idea fairy is a lovely individual who has a very vivid imagination and comes up with some excellent ideas of how things may happen. Unfortunately, she rarely bothers to understand the boundaries within which she should work, sometimes gets a little over-excited and often proffers her ideas 10 minutes after the deadline has passed.

(5) Requests for Information.

(6) Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan or how all the forces are going to get into theatre where they should be at the time they should be there with all their support.

(7) Chief MEL/MIL, Lt Col Turner.


FACTS...

Exercise Locations & Participants

- Mons, Belgium (total: 31)
- Elmpt and Ramstein, Germany (total: 689)
- Italian Navy ship ETNA, Italy (total: 126)
- Ulsnes, Stavanger, Norway (Main exercise location - total: 701)
- Lisbon, Portugal (total: 266).

Participating Headquarters

- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
- Allied Joint Command Lisbon (JC Lisbon)
- Allied Land Component Headquarters Heidelberg (LCC HQ Heidelberg)
- Allied Air Component Headquarters Ramstein (ACC HQ Ramstein)
- Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)
- Italian Maritime Force (ITMARFOR)
- French Special Operations Command (FR SOCC)



Cover Story

LESSONS LEARNED

Picture collage by Sgt Brandon Chhoeun, USA A,
Assistant Media, Civil Environment Section, JED,
Joint Warfare Centre

A bureaucratic burden or a valuable skill set?

By Paul Sewell,
Lessons Learned Branch, CDD,
Joint Warfare Centre

Introduction

Over the last few years, the term Lessons Learned has emerged as an all-encompassing concept promising to help NATO transform quicker and more efficiently. General Mattis, the former Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, put it best when he said, "There is no reason to send troops into the fight and get them killed when a 'Lesson Learned' the month before could have been used for training".

However, like most of these other "new" transformational concepts, such as Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), Information Operations (Info Ops) and a Comprehensive Approach, Lessons Learned is often seen as an unnecessary "added-extra".

For those encountering the Lessons Learned for the first time, this may appear true – just another complicated

process designed to take us away from our main tasks. However, you are encouraged to take a closer look.

Lessons Learned is a skill set

Look beyond the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and processes and you will find that at the core of Lessons Learned is a simple skill set. This skill set is easily learnt and can be applied by anyone regardless of their area of expertise, be it Logistics, Intelligence, Personnel and so on. In fact, anyone with a drive to improve what they do should consider adding this skill set to their "toolbox" of skills.

The purpose of this article is to expand upon some of the benefits of this simple process to illustrate that Lessons Learned is something of value rather than an overly complicated bureaucratic process.

Lessons Learned provides a structure for improvement

When we start thinking about how we can improve what we do, we often approach it haphazardly. That is, we might stumble upon some way of doing things better and tell ourselves that it is worth remembering; only to forget it minutes later. Perhaps we do manage to remember an improvement, but we may then jump to conclusions about its effectiveness and rush into implementing it without thinking through the broader consequences. Unfortunately though, history is full of examples of introducing good ideas, which were poorly thought through.

Take it a step further. Imagine it was a great idea, which you then successfully implemented in your own area of work and you have seen great results. But if you do not then spread that idea



to others, its value stops with you and goes no further. We constantly fall victim to these and other problems whenever we try to improve what we do. This is not to mention all of the other problems we experience when we try to get others to implement this idea. It is fair to conclude that the path to continuous improvement has many twists and turns; and to be executed well needs a guide to ensure the most is made out of any potential improvements. Here, the Lessons Learned process (**detailed in the Bi-Strategic Command Lessons Learned Directive 80-6**) helps by giving a simple structure, which tells us how to progress from that first observation all the way through to a Lesson Learned. This progression follows a simple step-by-step process, which can be used as such a guide.

THE JOINT WARFARE CENTRE (JWC) has seen great benefit from this structure over the last two years with its own Lessons Learned process. It is now an integral part of the JWC's Exercise Planning and Execution processes helping the organisation to improve with each exercise and event. Developing this process for over two years now, we have recognized the value of following each of the steps in the process. This is because each step adds value to the initial observation culminating in a solid body of Lessons Learned, which is then folded back

in to the future exercise planning.

The main driver for this is the Lessons Learned Board (formerly known as the Training Improvement Board) chaired by the Chief of Staff. This is a crucial board as it ensures that the lessons identified become learnt in the organisation.

At this point though, many may think that this process is developed for organizations in mind, or for committees or working groups. While this is true, another benefit of the Lessons Learned process is that it is scalable.

“While we have reached a level of competency with managing lessons at the operational level, the next milestone will be the effective transmission of Lessons Learned to those who need it.”

The Lessons Learned process can be used by anyone

Because it is so simple, the Lessons Learned process can be scaled to any level. This means that not only a Headquarters can use it, but also a division, team or even an individual can use the process for their continuous improvement. The steps only need to be ex-

panded or contracted according to the users. For example, while an organization, like the Joint Warfare Centre, may spend a number of days on analysis, an individual using the process may only use half an hour for their own individual specific observation. The important point here is it does not matter if it is one person or a whole organization; as long as these core elements are present in your improvement process then you can guarantee solid progress.

Lessons Learned provides guiding principles

Another subset of the process, which you can add to the skill set is its three guiding principles: cooperation, communication and coordination.


These are important because, regardless of any individual successes, their value will never go beyond the individual unless promoted to a broader audience using these principles.

These three principles have been extremely helpful with the Lessons Learned process at the JWC. There is coordination amongst the Divisions for the entire exercise planning and execution process. Using the JWC's Lessons Learned database (LLDb), when an issue arises the Lessons Learned Analyst coordinates with the relevant Division to see if it can be solved in real time. If not, then the coordination continues when the separate Divisions work together at the Lessons Learned Board Working Group (LLBWG). Here, representatives from each Division come together to discuss those remaining major issues.

Communication has also shown to be vital at every stage of the process. This means encouraging all staffs to submit their observations in the LLDb even from the very beginning of the exercise planning stages. This momentum then grows as the exercise progresses, culminating in a considerable collection of observations which are then transformed into Lessons Learned.

In fact, these three principles, in the author's opinion, are the next major step for the NATO Lesson's Learned community. While we have reached a level of competency with managing lessons at the operational level, the next milestone

JWC contribution to NATO Lessons Learned process:



will be the effective transmission of Lessons Learned to those who need it and when they need it, thus fulfilling General Mattis' vision. In some regards, the JWC has taken its first steps with the publishing of its first Best Practice package. This short publication outlines some of the current Best Practices captured from various exercises and has been distributed through NATO for broader use.

Lessons Learned promotes flexibility and innovation

As the engagement spaces throughout the world continue to diversify, the Alliance faces new and evolving threats. We are all aware of the devastating effects of asymmetric warfare on our traditional military structures, regardless of how powerful they are.

The "fittest will survive" is no longer relevant or useful. History is full of examples of superior military forces being bested by smaller, more agile groups. It is no coincidence that Afghanistan, NATO's number one area of focus, is known as the "Graveyard of Empires".

Instead, the mindset we should consider adopting is that those with the most flexibility win. Those with the ability to respond in a greater variety of ways will ultimately prevail. Consider the Taliban in Afghanistan. They have an intimate understanding of the culture, mountainous terrain, the languages, and so on. They even have their own tax assessment systems to apply to the farmers. It is no surprise that armed with this broad range of alternatives for leverage that the Taliban



Paul Sewell discusses some of his observations with staff during a meeting at Joint Warfare Centre.

is providing NATO with such strong challenges. If this is so, how can NATO also learn to become more flexible?

The "hammer" of our traditional military forces has utility but it is not enough. This is why **Transformation in NATO** is so important and we have seen the emergence of the "softer side" of the military in areas such as Information Operations and CIMIC. On this point, it is heartening to read (the new ISAF Commander) General McChrystal's recent guidance to Counter Insurgency and his non-military, non-kinetic approach.

It is not by chance that Lessons Learned is a major pillar of Transformation. When applied properly and using the three core principles, it provides the means to capture all of those good practices and learned lessons from the different corners of the NATO and helps to distribute them throughout the Alliance and thus enabling transformation. On a smaller

scale, the more we, as organizations, teams and individuals embrace Lessons Learned as a part of our working culture, the quicker, more efficiently we can respond to current and future threats.

In closing, there is another real benefit for the reader to consider in adopting this Lessons Learned culture and mindset. Consider for a moment the variety of things we use in NATO on a regular basis: computers, email, the chain of command, photocopiers, the operational planning process, stationery, military structures and so on. Although we take them for granted, if you go back long enough, there was a time when each of these "things" or ideas had not yet been invented. It was not until someone had a new thought; a unique thought, which no one had before and thus creating this new idea.

The more we immerse ourselves in the flow of good practices and Lessons Learned we naturally become exposed to more ideas, concepts and perspectives than we would have otherwise. This ultimately broadens our repertoire increasing our capacity to cross-fertilize existing ideas to create new ideas. With this in mind, it is worth remembering that the next big idea in NATO could come from any one of us.

So, why bother with Lessons Learned? Lessons Learned is important not only because it provides a structured guide to harnessing continuous improvement but it also promotes the innovation of new ideas, both of which can be major enablers for NATO Transformation. +

LESSONS LEARNED Core Guiding Principles

COOPERATION is the willingness of people or organizations to work or act together for a common purpose or benefit.

COMMUNICATION is the art or technique of using words effectively to share thoughts, information or ideas.

COORDINATION is the skillful and effective interaction of parts into an integrated and harmonious operation.

Cover Story

Photo by ISAF PAO

Introduction to the NATO Lessons Learned Capability



"Transformation Fuel"

By Commander Michael Hallett, USA N, HQ SACT,
Lessons Learned Staff Officer, Course Coordinator and Director

Captain Michael Smack, USA N, HQ SACT,
Lessons Learned Staff Officer

Commander Manuel Mota, PRT N, HQ SACT-SEE,
Lessons Learned Staff Officer

Lt. Colonel Poul Soegaard, DNK AF, HQ SACT,
Lessons Learned Staff Officer

Lt. Colonel Jean Henri Pinot, FRA A, HQ SACT-SEE,
Lessons Learned Core Staff

AS AN ALLIANCE, NATO faces challenges in gathering the insights and knowledge gained by National forces in theatres such as Afghanistan and sharing those hard won insights with other Alliance Member, Partner and Troop Contributing Nations. Given the rapid pace of turnover of most NATO forces, developing a means to capture knowledge generated in real-world operations, and sharing this knowledge with National forces soon to head into theatre, is essential.

NATO is attempting to improve information and knowledge sharing through a robust pre-deployment training system, including certification of national pre-deployment training. In addition, under the leadership of Allied Command

Transformation, located in Norfolk, Virginia, NATO is enhancing the NATO Lessons Learned (LL) capability in order to facilitate operational knowledge transfer.

This article will provide a brief introduction to the NATO LL capability in three parts. First, it will provide two examples of the utility of an effective LL capability in order to provide a rationale for expending resources on enhancing the NATO LL capability. This will be followed by a discussion of the NATO LL actors and a description of the NATO LL capability elements. After a brief review of the NATO LL process, the article will conclude with comments on the steps NATO is taking to address some of the challenges described.

NATO LESSONS LEARNED CAPABILITY

The natural human resistance to self-examination and publicizing mistakes generates challenges for organizational learning and knowledge sharing, but as the examples of Battle of Tarawa (The value of Lessons Learned: Operation Galvanic, Page 39) and "KNiFE" (page 45) show, these challenges are not insurmountable. NATO has attempted to manage these challenges by establishing a NATO-wide LL capability. The LL infrastructure, an organic part of the NATO Command Structure, has enhanced NATO's organizational ability to learn; but improved links to and from National Lessons Learned organizations are required before the capability can reach its



full potential. We will now briefly describe the main components of this capability, starting with the major NATO Lessons Learned players.

THE NATO LESSONS LEARNED PLAYERS

The NATO Headquarters, consisting of the North Atlantic Council, the International Staff, the Military Committee and the International Military Staff sets the NATO LL Policy. This policy, further discussed below, provides the overarching LL guidance to the NATO Command Structure and the Nations.

“Everyone is a player in the NATO Lessons Learned Capability.”

The two strategic commands, Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) together execute that policy. The NATO LL Policy assigns Allied Command Transformation the lead on LL in NATO, but in practice ACT always works closely with ACO on all LL related activities.

Allied Command Operations (ACO) is responsible for coordinating and directing all NATO military operations. As a consequence, it is the primary customer of Lessons Identified (LI) and LL at the strategic level. ACO has three major subordinate commands: Joint Forces Command Brunssum; Joint Forces Command Naples; and Joint Command Lisbon. Each of these commands have organic LL organizations focused on their individual operational activities. (Figure 1, page 40).

NATO's TRIPLE Js Joint Analysis Center: The JALLC

Analysis is crucial for the LL process. Although everyone, with some training, can perform the analysis step of the five step LL process (further discussed below), some especially complex observations require specialized analysis expertise in order to formulate appropriate remedial actions. Therefore, NATO, like



History

The value of Lessons Learned: Operation Galvanic

In November 1943, U.S. amphibious forces assaulted *Tarawa Atoll* in the Gilbert Islands. 970 Marines were killed. There were 3110 total casualties (17 percent of forces engaged) and 90 of 125 LVTs destroyed. 323 of 500 crew “Killed, Missing or Wounded”.

Problems were observed with Command and Control of Joint Operations, Air Support Coordination, Communication Equipment, Logistics and Intel/Reconnaissance.

Faced with the massive loss of life, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps embarked on a rapid analysis of the attack. Three Lessons Learned (LL) reports were written: “the Task Force 53 After Action Report”; “LL From *Tarawa*” (extracts from observers’ comments); and “100 Mistakes Made at *Tarawa*”.



Battle of Tarawa: fierce battle for control of Tarawa Atoll during WWII. Copyright: Associated Press, 1943.

Three months later, in February 1944, the U.S. assaulted *Kwajalein Atoll* in the Marshall Islands. The islands were more heavily defended, the enemy positions better fortified, but there were 61 percent fewer US service members killed. Why? The answer is *an effective Lessons Learned process*. According to Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC, in his “*Across the Reef: The Marine Assault of*

Tarawa”, Shaw [Henry I. Shaw, Jr, the Chief Historian of the Marine Corps] believed that the prompt and selfless analyses, which immediately followed *Tarawa* were of great value:

“*From analytical reports of the commanders and from their critical evaluations of what went wrong, of what needed improvement, and of what techniques and equipment proved out in combat, came a tremendous outpouring of Lessons Learned.*”

With sufficient willingness to identify problems and implement solutions in the form of changes to tactics, techniques, equipment and procedures, the LL capability can have a significant impact on mission accomplishment.


U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, the official USN Historian of WWII said, “*The tactics used at Kwajalein (after Tarawa) proved a willingness to learn on the part of the Army, Navy and Marine high commands.*”

However, he goes on to say “*seldom has military thinking been so agile and open to suggestion, so eager to grasp any new idea, which sounded reasonable. How promptly were the hard lessons learned at Tarawa put into practice.*” (extracted from History of United States

Naval Operation, Vol VII, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls.)

His qualifier about the agility of military thinking remains all too true today. The willingness to ruthlessly examine one’s own deficiencies and rapidly expend the resources to make necessary changes is not overly evident. This is in part because of human nature – self (individual or organizational) examination is difficult. However, given the cost paid in human lives of the failure, to improve capabilities to the best of our ability, we must strive to maximize the efficiency of the Lessons Learned capability.

NATO Lessons Learned Guidance and Players



many nations, has developed specialized analysis organizations to support the LL capability. The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre, located in Monsanto, Portugal, is the NATO specialist for joint LL related analysis.

The JALLC receives its direction and guidance concerning its analysis resource focus from the Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) Prioritized Analysis Requirements (PARL) List. Through this process, the NATO Command Structure commands submit their analysis requirements up the chain of command to their higher headquarters (within ACO or ACT). SHAPE and HQ ACT then jointly prioritize the analysis requirements and issue the PARL. These prioritized Analysis Requirements (ARs) are then collated into an annual JALLC Programme of Work (POW). The POW is regularly reconfigured and re-prioritized to ensure that the limited JALLC analysis resources are focused on the highest value analysis requirements.

The JALLC also manages the NATO LL database, which is an especially rich source of LL knowledge within NATO.

The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) and Joint Forces Training Centre (JFTC)

The LL process is useful not only for operational commands, but also for those focused primarily on training. Both JWC and JFTC apply the LL process to their training activities.

THE JOINT WARFARE CENTER plays an important role in the NATO LL capability. The JWC conducts the ISAF pre-deployment training, and has developed a sophisticated LL process. This process focuses on improving the training curriculum as well as training execution.

In addition, according to Mr. Paul Sewell of JWC, "The JWC maintains a Best Practice Database. This Database represents a collection of Best Practices and Common Operational Issues gathered from the many NRF and ISAF exercises JWC conducts every year. These Best Practices are collected by JWC and then made available for the benefit of the rest of the NATO forces."

The combination of the LL and Best Practices processes not only enables JWC to constantly improve its training delivery but also to ensure that the LI, LL and Best Practices from ISAF operations are incorporated into the pre-deployment training. Thus, those deploying

to ISAF are equipped with the latest in mission related knowledge.

THE JOINT FORCES TRAINING CENTER specializes in, "training for NATO and Partner forces to improve joint and combined tactical interoperability" according to its NS CRONOS webpage. Recently, JFTC has focused on improving Operational Liaison and Mentoring Team (OMLT) training as part of NATO's support to enhancing the Afghan Security Forces. LL from the field are constantly incorporated into this training. It also carries out the training activities for the ISAF Regional Commands Staffs.

Member Nations

NATO is an Alliance of nations and the nations are the primary source of observations, LI and LL within the NATO Capability. However, although the nations gather LI and LL constantly from operations and exercises, they do not always share the LI and LL with the NATO LL organization. This hinders the ability of other Alliance members to benefit from the knowledge constantly generated by other nations. Therefore, improving the links between national LL organizations and the NATO LL organization is a key area of emphasis for the NATO LL community.

Partner Nations

As members of organizations like the Partnership for Peace, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Mediterranean Dialog and perhaps most importantly, Troop Contributing Nations to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, Partners make essential contributions to the NATO LL capability. In addition to vital contributions in ISAF, Partners are also active in exercises and concept development and experimentation activities that generate LI and LL. For example, Sweden co-hosts with the U.S. Exercise VIKING, an extremely complex exercise, notable for the extensive involvement of civilian dimension actors in all phases, from pre-exercise planning, to the exercise itself and the final exercise evaluation. The robust evaluation process in VIKING 2008, which built on the progress made in VIKING 2005, enabled the team to enter eight LI and one LL into the UNCLASSIFIED version of the





THE NATO LESSONS LEARNED CAPABILITY ELEMENTS

We have briefly described the need for a LL capability and the major players within the NATO LL capability. Now, we will discuss in more detail the NATO LL capability elements.

Thinking of LL as a capability encourages the development of a richer understanding of the LL process. An effective LL process requires more than a database and a few people performing after action analysis. An effective program requires doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, facilities and interoperable information (DOTMLPF-I) and knowledge management systems at all levels of the chain of command. The LL process rests on the foundation provided by these "Capability Elements" and depends on those elements for its operation. We will now look at each of the capability elements in more detail.

Doctrine and Policy

Doctrine and policy provide the overall capability guidance. Both are often based on a concept paper. The concept paper is a high level document that describes the capability and its utility for the organization. This concept need not be especially long – three to five pages can suffice.

The policy documents, based on the concept, articulate the details of the LL capability. For example, the NATO LL policy spells out the guiding principles, vision, capability elements description, end state, roles and responsibilities and links to other LL organizations of the NATO LL capability.

There is no need to develop the doctrine and policy from scratch: many national and NATO samples are available that can be readily tailored to meet

NATO LL database. Sweden also hosted the first NATO LL Staff Officer Course at the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT) in May 2009.

Lessons Learned in ISAF

Member, Partner and Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) all participate in ISAF. NATO strongly supports the ISAF LL capability with training and reach back support. The ISAF LL lead is based at the ISAF HQ in Kabul, but much of the LL related activity takes place at the Regional Command (RC) Headquarters. Issues that are beyond the capability of the RCs to resolve are sent to the ISAF HQ LL cell. If they are unable to resolve the issue, they can reach back to JFC Brunssum to access additional NATO resources. One prominent example of reaching back for support from the NATO command structure was provided by the Bi-SC Report on a fratricide incident that occurred in Afghanistan in 2006. The remedial actions associated with the Lessons Identified included not only ISAF, but the NATO Command Structure and national education and training programs to produce the improved capability.

Centres of Excellence (COEs)


The Centres of Excellence are voluntary groups of nations who cooperate on capability improvement within a specific functional area, such as Defense against Terrorism, Civil Military Interaction (CIM-IC), or Cyber Defense. When COEs are

accredited by NATO, they commit to contribute to several "pillars", one of which is Lessons Learned. The COEs, due to their functional specialization and close working relationships with the nations are especially well suited to support the sharing component of the LL process through various dissemination means including training material production, publishing newsletters, annuals (e.g. Top 10 COE X LL 2009, Top LL from RC South 2009), and reports (e.g. Talking to local government officials in Afghanistan: LI 2009) and entering Observations, Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned into the NATO LL Databases.

International Organizations

The NATO LL Policy explicitly invites contributions from major international organizations. Within a Comprehensive Approach, LI and LL sharing between NATO and the international organizations with which NATO operates in the field is essential.

Elements and Process Relationship: Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability



specific national needs. The adoption of existing doctrine and policy has the additional advantage of facilitating LL system interoperability. In today's complex environment, many, if not all, military operations will be executed with partners of various kinds and the ability to engage in the institutional learning process necessary for military success will be facilitated by information and knowledge management system (of which LL is one type) compatibility.

The North Atlantic Council, the highest decision making body within NATO, promulgated the NATO LL Policy in October 2008. This policy roots the rationale for developing a LL capability in the need for NATO to continuously improve and develop a full range of political military capabilities. The policy places the responsibilities for the LL capability with commanders at all levels.

"Bi-Strategic Command Directive 80-6 Lessons Learned provides the high level practical guidance on the execution of the Lessons Learned capability."

As discussed above, ACT has the lead on development of the NATO LL capability at the Strategic Command Level and below. This means that, working closely with Allied Command Operations, ACT works to ensure that the NATO LL Capability is functioning adequately.

The guidance for the NATO LL capability at the Strategic Command level and below is provided by the Bi-Strategic Command Directive 80-6, Lessons Learned. The directive "... is applicable to all levels of NATO Command Structure within ACO and ACT, as well as those national and multi-national HQs from the NATO Force Structure participating in exercises and operations in NATO."

The directive makes explicit where the LL responsibility resides: it reads "Lessons Learned is a command responsibility and each command and body under the SC structures will operate its own internal LL processes."

This is an especially important point,

one that is often lost sight of in practice. LL execution is not the responsibility of major analysis organizations, or a small group at a higher headquarters: every command must have a LL capability, and this capability needs to be interoperable with the broader NATO LL capability. If each command has a robust LL capability, and is sending LI beyond their capability to implement up to the next highest level of the chain of command in order to access more powerful resources to affect change, the LL Capability as a whole will contribute to overall capability improvement. The failure to execute LL capability at each command level results in a top heavy program, less responsive to operational needs and insufficiently connected to end users.

ORGANIZATION

Organization in "DOTMLPF-I" concerns organizational design. The primary question of LL organizational design is "What organizational shape will generate the most effective LL outputs?" This question of a satisfactory organizational design for an LL organization has several dimensions. For example, should the LL organization be predominantly service based, or should it reside in a central location, like a training and doctrine command or within the Ministry of Defence? Should the LL organization be distributed throughout the force, or reside with the force structure of the dominant force within the country? In addressing these questions, two main hazards face organizational designers: First, is the possibility that the organizational design will create stovepipes hindering the sharing of Lessons Learned information. For example, placing the responsibility for the LL capability with each service could lead to LIs remaining within each service. In a joint environment, in which most NATO operations will take place, the inability to share lessons among the services will hinder mission accomplishment and expose forces to unnecessary risks. On the other hand, each command and service needs to have a robust LL capability because most implementation activities will take place internally.

Second, reliance on a strong central LL organization, located for example at the Ministry of Defence, has its own risks. One, it could find itself isolated and

unable to rapidly influence implementation of changes identified through the LL process. Two, robust service level or Ministry of Defence level organizations could give the impression that the LI to LL process requires action only at these levels, and obscure the vital need for all service members and organizations to support the process. Training to emphasize that the LI to LL process is an all-hands responsibility, (though some will be more expert in the process than others), is essential to manage these risks.

TRAINING

Training in relation to establishing a LL capability has several components: LL staff officer training, analyst training, and all hands training. Each of these components can be taught at a basic, intermediate or advanced level.

The individual staff officer LL capability training focuses on ensuring that the select group of officers designated as LL experts possesses the knowledge and capability to administer the LL capability and provide training to others in his or her command on LL related subjects. Academic courses, like the NATO LL Staff Officer Course, and Advanced Distance Learning courses on LL in addition to pre-deployment training, like that associated with ISAF, are especially useful in this regard.

Although the LL capability training includes an introduction to analysis techniques and procedures, additional specific training (including post-graduate study and on the job experience with qualified analysts) is required to create fully qualified analysts. This expertise can be further developed through utilization of national analyst courses or the analyst course offered by the JALLC.

Technical training on the collection, storage and dissemination of LL related information is also essential. The amount of training required will depend on the nature of the system used. Process improvement insights can issue from anywhere in the organization – junior personnel, by examining the situations with fresh eyes, can be especially fruitful sources for observations and suggestions for improvement. Therefore, all-hands training is essential – a LL capability cannot succeed if it is viewed as the domain of a small group of experts. Everyone



must make observations and contribute to the implementation and validation of recommended remedial actions. This training should be incorporated into the command orientation and other command training programmes.

Training the trainers: As in all training, a strong focus on training the trainer is required in order to sustain the knowledge base created by the initial training. The national or command LL staff must have the capability to provide individual LL staff officer training, analysis training, technical training and all hands training and thus ensure the operation of their command or national LL capability. Without this training capability it is extremely difficult to sustain a LL capability as the burden of re-learning the LL capability elements with each new officer assigned LL duties can lead to capability collapse.

MATERIAL

Material in the LL context refers primarily to the storage, collection and dissemination means available to support the capability. The capability requires software not only to enable the collection, storage and disseminating of observations, LI and LL, but it must enable the management of LL activities such as endorsement of recommendations and tasking and tracking implementation activities. It is these activities that constitute the heart of the LL capability – not the library functionality provided by a listing of items in a database.

The specific needs of the organization (Command, Nation, CoE, etc.) will determine the form the software will take. A single system for the entire organization has many advantages, foremost among them that it facilitates information sharing – the need for translation between the various systems disappears. In addition, it is only necessary to train LL staff on one system, and only a single group of people is required to manage the system, instead of subsidiary organizations being forced to independently bear the costs of system maintenance.

The advantages of a multitude of systems centre mainly on the ability to limit knowledge of the LL capability content. Except in the obvious cases of not allowing enemies the insight into processes and procedures provided by the definition and discussion of various problem

sets facing the force, the bias should be toward sharing. Therefore, one inclusive system (or a system of systems automatically linked so that the seams are invisible to the user) is recommended.

LEADERSHIP

Within the LL context the leader provides three key elements: guidance, engagement and promotion. Guidance refers to the direction of focus and provides answers to questions like the following: What observations are important to the command? What LI will receive the resources necessary for implementation? What organizations should be approached to facilitate LI implementation currently beyond the resources of the organization, but that are crucial for Alliance capability improvement? With this guidance the LL organization can develop and execute a program of work focused on improving key capabilities.

Engagement refers to the allocation of analysis, and most importantly, implementation resources. The leadership must decide what remedial actions to focus on implementing, and what action bodies should be tasked with the implementation activities.

Promotion takes place in two ways. First, by creating incentives to participate in the LL process. These incentives are necessary in order to overcome the natural resistance to sharing deficiencies – the leader must make sharing deficiencies, the analysis of those deficiencies, and the capability improvement that result from implementing the remedial actions a contribution to a career, not the excuse for ending it. Second, promotion includes sharing the fruits of the organizations LL capability with others. Through this sharing others can profit from the knowledge gained, often at extremely high cost, by other Alliance members.

PERSONNEL

LL is an all-hands responsibility. Although some will develop greater expertise in analysis and implementation activity management, for a LL capability to generate actual capability improvement, everyone must participate in the program. As seen above in regard to training, which includes all-hands training as well as more specialized training for those with greater capability respon-

NATO LL DATABASE IMAGE AND LINKS:

According to COM JALLC, the NATO Lessons Learned Database (LLDb) serves two functions: it acts as an archive of information, and as a staffing tool. As an archive, the LLDb serves to store and allow the sharing of observations and lessons during their solution. As a staffing tool, the LLDb acts as a kind of tasker tracker, allowing stakeholders and users to update the LLDb on the progress of issues, and to coordinate cooperation between different agents in the LL process.

The NATO LLDb software complements another JALLC tool: the Observation Collection Program. This is available for free download from www.jallc.nato.int and serves as a data collection tool. It allows analysis teams to store data in a systematic and easily searchable format, and then to share that information with their teams on one 'server' at the end of an analysis phase. The software complements the LLDb and allows a direct upload from OCP to the LLDb. Thus the collection phase and the sharing and staffing phase of the lesson learned process are technically connected.

The LLDb can be found on the NATO Secret WAN at nww.jallc.nato.int, and an UNCLASSIFIED version is on the internet at www.jallc.nato.int. The software has been accredited by NCSA and is available to NATO commands at no cost. **Contact the JALLC for additional information.**

sibilities, a functioning capability requires the active involvement of all-hands and personnel with the time and resources to perform the "heavy lifting" of the LL capability: the analysis (for both pattern discernment and recommendation validation), recommendation formulation and implementation tasks. Therefore, while the bulk of the LL personnel will be military, often executing their LL responsibilities as a normal integral part of their daily activities and natural efforts to increase the effectiveness of those activities, LL experts are necessary. Especially in the area of performing complex analysis, civilian experts will play an important role. The presence of these specialists in LL organizations will improve the speed at which the analysis product is delivered and ensure a high degree of analytical rigor. Therefore, the LL capability will include personnel who are generalists, with just enough LL program knowledge to ensure the insights they gain in the course of their duties benefit the larger forces, as well as expert civilian analysts and staff officers diagnosing the specific military problems, for-



ulating recommendations and rapidly implementing those recommendations. Lessons Learned are knowledge products to generate practical differences in operations, not simply for the sake of knowledge. Therefore, LL personnel are more like mechanics than librarians – the point is to make the machine or organizations work better, not to manage reports about the condition of the machine or organization through time.

FACILITIES


The facilities required to support the LL system differ little from those required for other forms of knowledge management. Good communication links between operational headquarters back to parent commands who can provide the implementation support the war fighters require is especially important. Without connections to the larger LL implementation system the local LI will be rendered sterile.

INTEROPERABILITY

Interoperability enables different organizations to share their observations, Lessons Identified, remedial actions and Lessons Learned. This has several advantages. First, it improves the quality of recommendations by increasing the size of the potential LL capability inputs. This exposure enriches pattern analysis and thus solution recommendation to deal with the root causes of challenges, not the possible ephemeral components of particular situations that caused difficulty. Interoperability is made tangible through the use of common terminology, processes, training and systems. Indeed, common terminology is perhaps the most important contributor to effective interoperability. With common terminology people can rapidly learn from shared LL content, even if the means to share that content are suboptimal. However, learning from the experience of others when it is put in entirely different terms, or worse, similar terms used in different ways, degrades comprehension and thus common action to ameliorate or eliminate problems.

THE NATO LL PROCESS

The LI to LL process is a structured method for solving problems. It includes an analysis phase – figuring out what the problem is and its root causes – an innovation phase – generating new solutions



to the problem, which includes implementation of those solutions (the most difficult part) and a dissemination or sharing phase, when the improvement is made available so that it can improve the practices of others. The LI to LL process employs elements of the overall LL capability. In many ways, this process is structurally analogous to the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) model for decision making described by John Boyd.

From the LI to LL perspective, we can designate these steps into the following activity systems: identify, analyze, commit, and implement. In addition however, the LI to LL version of the OODA loop includes an integral focus on internal and external sharing. The LI to LL process begins with the observation of a problem or deficiency. The analyst examines the series of events for an underlying pattern. If there is a pattern, and the deficiency is not simply the result of a unique circumstance, then the analyst must determine the root cause. Once the root cause is identified recommendations for remedial actions are formulated. This bundle of pattern, root causes of the observations constituting the pattern, and remedial action recommendations constitute a Lesson Identified. This process can take place at all levels of the chain of command – from a platoon on a patrol in Patika to the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Hence the robust methodology is applicable at any level of war: from a platoon's tactical patrol, the conduct of a joint operation, to the strategic and even grand strategic activities of an Alliance or nation.

Each Command should implement remedial actions associated with its Lessons Identified. Only if implementation is beyond the command's capability and responsibility does the LI need to be pushed up to a higher level of the chain of command for action. Implementation of an Lessons Identified generates an

Lessons Learned. A LL, according to the Bi-SC directive, is "an improved capability or increased performance confirmed by validation when necessary resulting from the implementation of one or more remedial actions for an LI" (Bi-SC Directive 80-6, Lessons Learned). When the LL is shared, the process is complete.

CHALLENGES

We have discussed briefly the capability elements and steps in the process. It is now time to turn our attention to a few of the major challenges facing the NATO LL capability. These challenges can be divided into two major areas – inadequate sharing and sub-optimal implementation.

The inadequacy of LL sharing is in part a result of the influence of two fears; fear of improper security disclosures and the fear of control loss. The fear of improper security disclosures is reinforced by the mental habit of limiting information sharing based on a need to know. The fundamental assumption governing sharing from this perspective is that someone must prove a need to know, and demonstrate the ability to keep that information secure at the original level of classification, before they can receive it. This was appropriate in the Cold War, and is still appropriate in many areas, but it is less so in complex engagement spaces where mission accomplishment requires a Comprehensive Approach. The military tendency to over classify information not only hinders coordination with non-military partners, but also among the military forces of Troop Contributing Nations. Lessons Learned information, when generated, tends to stay within National LL systems and thus does nothing to improve the capabilities of other national forces also operating in the same area and therefore facing similar challenges.

Can NATO solve this problem? In many cases, the answer is "No". The nations





A contemporary multinational example: **KNiFE**

control their own information, and thus it is the nations that must change their own policies and procedures to privilege sharing over information stove piping. This is a complex issue, beyond the scope of our discussion here. The JALLC produced a report on it in the ISAF context, entitled, "Sharing, Release and Dissemination of Information in ISAF, that provides additional information on this extremely complex subject"⁽¹⁾.

The second related obstacle is caused by the fear of losing control, and thus power, based on disclosure of information and knowledge. Knowledge is power: sharing it and receiving nothing directly in return is insufficiently appealing to motivate people to spend the time necessary to make the sharing happen. This is significant not only within military commands but also for non-governmental and private voluntary organizations. Sharing information can erode competitive advantages and thus the "safer" course of action is to retain the information within the organization, rather than sharing it freely to improve the capability of other "competitors".

In addition, there is often a fear that sharing a LI or LL will put the organization doing the sharing in a bad light. Even if no punitive measures from a higher headquarters result from the admission of mistakes, the awareness that a mistake was made can be perceived as damaging the status of the organization, or reducing the faith of "consumers" in the organization's competence.

The current adversarial approach, constantly probing for weaknesses in both friends and enemies in order to gain an advantage needs to be tempered with an emphasis on cooperation in pursuit of congruent goals in order to actualize the transformational potential of the NATO LL capability. As an intermediate transformational step, changing the incentive structure from one that gladly seeks out deficiencies as an excuse to punish to a system that rewards a robust LL capability that generates improvements will help alleviate, though never eliminate, this difficulty.

What can NATO do?

Though NATO cannot entirely allay these fears or solve the problems they generate, NATO is taking steps to ameliorate their effects.

The gains generated in terms of operational effectiveness generated by a single nation's LL capability are magnified when shared with other nations. The sharing of LI and LL among nations is a major strength of the Alliance's LL capability, even if such sharing remains suboptimal.

The Knowledge and Information Fusion (or KNiFE) capability developed by the U.S. Joint Forces



Command focused on Improvised Explosive Device (IED) defense, is an example of multinational LL effectiveness. The KNiFE fuses many different databases and other sources of information concerning IED-defense and produces lessons learned and best practices for the warfighter. It thus reduces the information and knowledge management burden warfighters face by providing them with rapid response to requests for information anywhere and at any time. By creating a functional area LL process, and embedding it in a LL capability, KNiFE makes a significant contribution to the IED fight and thus demonstrates the utility of Lessons Learned.

1. The JALLC is coordinating with member and partner nations to understand current national LL flows and overcome barriers to LL information sharing. Specific steps include the following:

a. Identifying national points of contact (POCs) within operational forces to coordinate LL flow from operations back into NATO for two reasons. 1) to better prepare the next set of forces and 2) to ensure LI and LL are integrated into the NATO Education and Training programs and ensure that the nations have the opportunities to include them in their own national pre-deployment training.

b. Working with National Liaison Representatives/Partner National Liaison Representatives to flow NATO information, like analysis reports, into national LL organizations.

These and other similar efforts to reach out to the nations have already begun to bear fruit.

2. The ACT LL Core Staff, working closely with the TNCC at ACT, is reaching out to the various Centres of Excellence as they enhance their LL pillars. The COEs, given their functional area focus and close relationship to the nations, will be increasingly important players in the LL universe.

3. In addition, NATO has stepped up its LL training efforts. The first NATO LL Staff Officer Course was held in May 2009 and the next two sessions will be held in September and 7-11 December 2009. This and other training, including additions to NATO School courses, is gradually changing organizational culture through modifying the perceptions of the LL capability and mindset of potential participants. ✦

(1) It is CLASSIFIED, but is available to NS CRONOS users at www.jallc.nato.int



Right: CDR Hallett, one of the authors, in Farah, Afghanistan, serving as part of ISAF.

“The biggest enemy to learning is the talking teacher.” – John Holt

Advanced Distributed Learning



By SMSGT Garry Smith, USAF,
ADL Program Manager, Training Support Branch,
JTDD, Joint Warfare Centre

ADVANCED Distributed Learning (ADL) has been defined basically the same way by many people and organizations. Rather than use the long definition, we will simply define ADL as “any education or training opportunity in which the instructor and the student are not co-located and the learning opportunity is available anytime and anywhere.” And our vision is to “provide access to the highest quality education, training, and performance aiding, tailored to individual needs, delivered cost effectively, anytime and anywhere.”

The Advanced Distributed Learning initiative was launched in November 1997 by the United States Department of Defense to “ensure access to high-quality education and training materials that can be tailored to individual learner needs and can be made available whenever and wherever they are required.” The objectives for ADL development are to ensure learning and training opportunities are “accessible, interoperable, durable, reusable, adaptable and affordable.”

Functional Objectives

ADL supported instructional products are designed to have the following characteristics:

- **Accessibility.** The ability to access instructional components from one remote location and deliver them to many other locations.
- **Interoperability.** The ability to use instructional components developed in

one location with one set of tools or platform in another location with a different set of tools or platform (note: there are multiple levels of interoperability).

- **Durability.** The design of instructional components is such that it does not require redesign or re-coding to operate when base technology changes.
- **Reusability.** The design of instructional components is such that it can be incorporated into multiple applications.
- **Adaptability.** Instruction is tailorable to individual and situational needs.
- **Affordability.** Increase learning effectiveness significantly while reducing time and costs.

Because the traditional training framework, focused on training at set times and places, could no longer effectively address training and education needs of NATO, the Alliance soon followed the USA and adopted a similar ADL initiative. As part of the NATO Summit in April 1999, the ADL education and training concept was endorsed as a viable training concept. Later, in May 2002, the Joint Planning Document initiating the multinational collaboration efforts for ADL with NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations was signed and published. In June 2006, Allied Command Transformation Directive 75-11, Joint Advanced Distributed Learning, was approved and signed mandating ADL be considered for all training, learning, education, and simulation when feasible. Also, in 2006, ACT’s shared ADL training and course

repository was developed and activated. This training system and repository is located on NATO Unclassified and NATO Secret at jadl.nato.int.

Why did NATO adopt ADL? The changing needs were a direct result of increasing deployments, often involving rapid movement to locations around the world. Today’s dynamic threat environment requires NATO forces to deploy on a moment’s notice, often to conduct operations that cannot be adequately predicted and for which they have not planned or practiced; thus effective distributed learning and use of ADL has become ever more important for NATO forces. Future forces must be highly adaptive, learning forces that organize to meet threats effectively and rapidly. They must continuously learn, simulate, and rehearse, whether they are in school, at home stations, at home, en route to, or in the theater of operations. NATO forces of the future must be able to work in combined operational environments enabled by in-



Lt. Col. Steve Phipps, USAF, evaluates the JWC ADL Course.



formation superiority. Training products developed to implement the advanced distributed learning initiative use modern communication technology to deliver high-quality training to service members. Again, making education and training available "anytime and anywhere."

One misconception of "anytime and anywhere" is "make them do it at home." The intent of ADL is not to have you do more on your personal time, off-duty time. It is intended to offer learning opportunities at a lower cost, increase productivity, and make training available as the users need – during their normal duty hours.

NATO and Joint Warfare Centre exploit the advantages of ADL. Among the advantages are:

- Cost savings
- Increased productivity
- 24/7 accessibility
- Global distribution
- Tailored learning
- References
- Promotion of collaborative learning

Costs associated with training and JWC exercises typically include time, travel, lodging, meals, other fees, and loss of duty time. With ADL, these costs are reduced; for the training is made available while the user or exercise participant is still at home-station. For example, some users may not need to travel for training, at all. Others, such as JWC exercise participants, "deploy" to the exercise for a shorter period of time affording him/her the capability to accomplish home-station duties while completing the exercise pre-training and saving travel and TDY funds. This results in lower costs and impact for all involved.

ADL also results in increased productivity. As mentioned before, the need to leave the workplace in order to gain access to training is eliminated: the individual can morph the training into his or her duty schedule. With twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week (24/7) availability to training, the individual can

access the training at anytime, from anywhere. Examples are the JWC's STEADFAST and ISAF exercise participants. Each enrolls and completes pre-training (or learning) for foundational knowledge prior to arrival at the exercise locations.

ADL provides the ability to reach people anywhere on the globe with a uniform and consistent approach. Course materials can be consistently updated/upgraded with updates being immediate as situations and training needs change.

Learning is tailored based upon individual needs. Users can discuss, debate, and interact with instructors and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) through the news feeds and chat areas of NATO ADL. Learning is also self-paced allowing users to focus on areas he or she may need or feel require special attention.

Advanced Distributed Learning is not a concept for training and education of the future – it is training and education of today that evolves as technologies progress and training needs change. ☩

NATO's Military Committee visits Joint Warfare Centre

On invitation of Headquarters Allied Command Transformation, NATO's Military Committee visited the Joint Warfare Centre on 17 June 2009. The visit was part of the Committee's annual visit schedule, which is designed to enable the Committee to receive detailed updates on activities of NATO commands as well as its wider agenda.

During the visit, the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, Italian Navy, and Committee representatives from all 28 NATO Nations were briefed by Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, German Army, Commander JWC, on the Centre's mission. Later they observed the execution of the JWC-led ISAF pre-deployment training event.

On the second part of the visit, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Admiral Luciano Zappata, Italian Navy, covered key transformational issues for HQ SACT. He provided the Chairman and the Committee representatives updated information on a wide array of topics, including future security conflicts and required capabilities; NATO's joint training program, as well as an in-depth analysis of NATO's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device

(C-IED) training and recent advances in Modeling and Simulation (M&S) training capabilities. The Military Committee also had an informal discussion on education, training and exercises focused on today's operational requirements. In this regard, NATO's Multiple Future's Project and the Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation Study conducted by HQ SACT were selected as valuable tools for framing

discussions on one of the key issues during the visit: how new technology can improve and better support education, training and exercises.

Admiral Di Paola, Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, emphasized the importance of these demonstrations to NATO's Military Representatives in contributing to their understanding of the requirements, evolution and implementation of new technologies in future and ongoing military operations.




Lieutenant General Korte (left) with Admiral Di Paola, Chairman of NATO's Military Committee. Right: Admiral Zappata. Photos by MSG Baekler, DEU AF, JWC PAO.



PIRACY

AN OVERVIEW Part I

By Lt Cdr Bastian Fischborn, DEU N, ⁽¹⁾
Aide-de-Camp, Joint Warfare Centre



NATO Operation Allied
Protector. Photo by NATO
Maritime Component
Command Northwood, U.K.

IN the first half of 2009, piracy related incidents have nearly doubled in comparison to last year, as the International Maritime Bureau reported. The increase can be ascribed to activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. In the first six months of the year worldwide 78 ships have been boarded, 75 fired at and 31 hijacked. 561 crew members were taken hostage, 19 injured, seven kidnapped, six killed and 8 are missing. Imagine that happening in air traffic!

Due to increased military naval presence in the area, the pirates moved to other, still adjacent areas, such as the coast of Oman and the southern Red Sea. The majority of attacks have been conducted against tanker ships carrying oil.

Introduction

It has become an everyday newscast topic and also security concern: Piracy. The hijacking of the supertanker Sirius

Star off the coast of Somalia in November 2008 and the case of "MV Faina" have triggered media frenzy. Clearly, piracy is not a new phenomenon. However, the frequency and scale of recent acts of piracy are a real cause for concern, with the coast of Somalia being regarded currently as the most perilous waters in the world. While the hijacking of a plane appears in the news immediately, the attention is considerably lower when a ship is concerned. Recently, the name of the city of Stavanger appeared in the news as related to the German container vessel "MS Hansa Stavanger" of Hamburg based shipping company "Leonhardt & Blumberg".

80 to 90 percent of the world's cargo is carried on waterways and often has to pass through narrow and shallow stretches of water, such as the Malacca Strait dividing Malaysia and Indonesia, the Bab-el-Mandeb between Yemen and Djibouti, the Suez Canal to sail from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean, to name a few. Our economies rely heavily on transport, be it raw or processed goods, with, as stated, up to 90 percent of the world's trade being carried by the international shipping industry.

While it is difficult to quantify the volume of seaborne trade in monetary terms (figures for shipping trade are traditionally in terms of tonnes or tonne-



"MS Hansa Stavanger"

The German container vessel had been hijacked by Somali pirates approximately 400 nm (740 km) off the Somali coast in April 2009 when enroute to Daressalam in Tanzania. She had been diverted to Harardheere north of Mogadischu, where she and her crew been held for four months before having been released on 3 August 2009 and having returned to Mombasa on 8 August 2009.



miles and therefore hardly comparable with the monetary based statistics for the value of the world economy), about 380 billion USD in freight rates are estimated to be contributed by the operation of merchant ships, accounting for 32 trillion tonne-miles in 2008. Shipping is relatively cheap. It would become much more expensive if insurance companies raised premiums or if ships had to sail longer routes in order to bypass choke points. In fact, several shipping companies have begun to reroute some of their slowly-steaming, bigger ships to sail around the Cape of Good Hope instead of passing through the Suez Canal, Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb. In this area of some of the world's strategic maritime choke points, around 10.000 ships, dhows and fishing boats are active daily, carrying thousands of tons of raw and finished goods. Approximately 20.000 major ships transit this area in between European and Asian waters annually.

The success in combating piracy in the Malacca Straits in past years is testimony to the effectiveness of close cooperation between coastal states, their police forces and the armed services. Therefore and because of the initiation of the first EU NAVFOR operation "Atalanta", focus has shifted towards the Bab el Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia, where the situation is worsening, mostly due to poverty, despair, the lack of state authorities, regional cooperation and resources.

The terms: Piracy and Armed Robbery

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines "piracy" as "any illegal act of violence, detention or depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft, which is directed against another ship or aircraft or persons or property on-board such on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State".

Often times, the terms "piracy" and "armed robbery" are used in conjunction with each other in just one term. Some other legal terminology counts "piracy" as well as "armed robbery" as two distinct cases of "robbery" in general, which is commonly defined as taking the property of another with the intent to permanently deprive the respective person of

that property by means of force. "Armed robbery" is then referred to as such an act involving the use of a weapon. But where does this distinction lead? In practical terms: Nowhere.

More interesting is the interpretation that distinguishes between "piracy" as any of the above mentioned acts taking place on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any State and "armed robbery" as one of the above mentioned acts "occurring in ports or territorial waters". This distinction thus broadens the maritime arenas in which the illegal act is occurring.

The International Maritime Organization's (IMO) position applies especially because the pure aggregation under the

Hot Spots

As long as mankind sails the seas, pirates have been around their shipping routes. History dates back to centuries well before Christ and is not seldomly connotated with romantic impressions of Vikings, Buccaneers, the Victual Brothers, Peter Pan or the Pirates of the Caribbean.

Established by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 1981 as one of its special divisions, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) was mainly to deal with maritime crime, fraud and malpractice. It records piracy like attacks dating back to the early 1970's. In 1992, IMB established the Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in order to provide sailors and seamen a



bullet of "robbery" has no consequences on the sailor or the prosecution of an illegal act. The application of the term "piracy" and "armed robbery" in two different arenas is especially more useful, as there are different ways of law enforcement and prosecution applicable (while we all recognize that at the very moment you are facing a gang of some armed guys pointing an automatic weapon at you at 2 am on your bridge deck, it may not really make a difference to you whether the position of your ship is within or outside any territorial waters).


While prosecution of acts of piracy and armed robbery is delved into in Part II of this article, whenever "piracy" is mentioned elsewhere, an act of piracy or armed robbery is meant to simplify matters.

24-hour first point of contact to report attempted or actual attacks or suspicious movements, any information pertaining to maritime crime or security. By raising awareness in the shipping industry of risks stemming from piratical or armed robbery attacks, the PRC aims at reducing and finally eradicating piracy and armed robbery by information sharing and provides a practical on-line service with detailed reports and warnings on piracy to seafarers.


The International Maritime Organization (IMO) as a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN), headquartered in London, was established in 1959, and aims at developing and maintaining a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping. Its scope of functions includes safety, environmental concerns, legal



Combating Piracy



Piracy and marine fraud is estimated to be a 16 billion USD "industry".



matters, technical co-operation, maritime security and the efficiency of shipping.

In 1983 Sweden submitted documentation to the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), IMO's most senior technical body, stating that piratical attacks had risen to an alarming level, whereupon "piracy and armed robbery" were established as fixed items in the MSC's work program in order to research on the scale and the areas of the problem. Comparable to the PRC's reportings, IMO publishes monthly reports on piracy. Piracy usually occurs in areas without effective government control or where corruption is rife. The International Maritime Bureau lists the following prone areas:

- **Natuna Besar, Indonesia**
South China Sea;
- **Tioman Island, Malaysia**
South China Sea;
- **Manila, The Philippines**
South China Sea;
- **Malacca Strait**, connecting South China Sea and the Indian Ocean;
- **Singapore Strait**, south of Singapore, east of Malacca Strait;
- **Chittagong, Bangladesh**, Bay of Bengal (north of Indian Ocean);
- **Ghana**, northern Gulf of Guinea (West Africa);
- **Lagos and Bonny River, Nigeria**, northern Gulf of Guinea (West Africa);
- **Somalia**, Gulf of Aden/Western Indian Ocean. (See World Map above)

REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY unfortunately mention only a fraction of the number of incidents, for various reasons: There may be concern that a report would embarrass the state in whose territorial waters the incident occurred; there is concern that a successful attack and probable negative press would reflect on the Master's competence and


the shipowner's reputation; there sure is the belief that an investigation would disrupt the vessels schedule; and there sure is the will to avoid the shipowner's insurance premiums from increasing.

Shipowners are well aware that authorities are unlikely to solve a particular crime, indeed. Rather, there is the notion that local authorities themselves may be involved. Operating a vessel costs between 15.000 USD and 60.000 USD per day. One only has to imagine how big the loss would be, when you have to stay in port for a two week period to have foreign police undertake an investigation on board. It simply costs time and money. Unless there is a murder or a vessel seizure, the act of piracy may well go unreported. Piracy and marine fraud is estimated to be a 16 billion USD "industry".

In order to get an overview on recent developments and trends that have been developing over the past few years, the following statistics, based on both IMB and IMO reporting, are interesting to look at, showing the steady decline of events in the Malacca Strait and the recent surge in events off the coast of Somalia.

Patterns: Attacks and Motives

The sequence of a piratical attack is quite typical: A ship is sailing in narrow and shallow waters, navigating at slow speeds due to limitations in or close to traffic separation zones or a ship sailing far off the coast and rather on her own, with clear range around them. Merchant ships are not as maneuverable as warships because of their load and the resulting metacentric height (simply said, the factor influencing the lever of a ship's body to stay upright in the water, affected by both the centre of mass and the centre of geometry of the ship). Furthermore, many of them run on heavy fuel oil, with languidly operating and reacting engines, whose rate of speed has to be carefully adjusted and planned for. What you can do with a Navy ship, that is to say for example stopping her within one or two ship lengths, you would not be able to do with a merchant ship. Merchant ships are run by a rather small crew unlike warships where the bridge can become crowded with personnel for this and that. It may be clear to a seafarer, but the watch officer, helmsman



and probable additional outlook on the bridge handle a lot of things and events: Navigating, steering, keeping the logbook, reporting to traffic stations, spotting and receiving pilot boats, verifying electronically navigational data with sea charts and nautical handbooks, keeping proper look-out for ships navigating in close vicinity, staying clear of trawlers, finding the right flash signal emitted by a lighthouse or fairway buoy, operating stability tank pumps, interpreting weather reports and notices to mariners and not least: maintaining the bigger picture.


In addition, the sea area may be unknown and crowded. The traffic patterns of coastal traffic may be different than expected. It may just be unknown or unfamiliar. They may encounter fog, non-working equipment, poor English speaking operators on radio channels, strong currents and winds, heavy rain disturbing radar equipment. Concentration is almost a hundred percent focused to a semicircle from port abreast over dead ahead to starboard abreast of the ship, of which the main focus again is a smaller sector left and right of dead ahead, whether anything could come to interfere with your intended course, supervising the helmsman and on the ship's position in the navigable water (a ship's position unfortunately is not a dot on a map but an area of sometimes sizeable scale). In other words: On the bridge, people are really busy. The time of the attack is almost always between 01:00 am and 06:00 am, when the rest of the crew is either in noisy engine or control rooms below deck or simply asleep.

So, how can pirates board a considerably bigger ship rather unnoticed? Big ships are not necessary big ships above the waterline. Fully loaded, container, general cargo carriers or tankers lie deep in the water, with only small freeboard to overcome for an attacker. The pirates would approach the steaming ship undetected in her wake in fast, highly maneuverable and small boats. Navigational radars provide a good picture of what is ahead and abreast of a ship, but not as good a picture of what is astern and in close vicinity; this has to do with obstruc-



Below: The crew of "MV Faina" stands on deck for the U.S. Navy to be able to assure themselves of their well-being. Standing above are Somali pirates guarding their prisoners. Belize-flagged "MV Faina", loaded with 33 battle tanks and heavy weapons allegedly bound for Kenya, was captured by Somali pirates in September 2008. She was released in February 2009 after "substantial action of the Ukrainian Secret Service", according to the Ukrainian Government. An estimated 3.2 million USD were paid in ransom.

Left: Boarding of the freighter by pirates.



tions such as the superstructure itself or cargo stored on deck that constrain radar coverage. In addition, the wake itself would cause radar clutter, that can well be filtered in the radar settings. But by filtering clutter, you run the risk of filtering small boats that do not have radar reflectors fitted (as ships and boats normally have, whereas speed boats used in a pirate attack have surely not). Once close to her, the boarding would take place by means of grappling devices and rope-ladders or ropes, the armed party would make their way to the bridge and overpower the bridge crew, from there taking control of the ship. (Apart from the danger to the crew and ship itself, the hazard posed by a ship carrying dangerous cargoes steaming unattended in confined waters should not be forgotten.)

Speed, routing, timing and freeboard are thus the factors it all comes down to. Once you have the perpetrators close by, there is hardly a chance for the crew to defend themselves or the ship. Masters hold strict orders from their shipping companies and the shipowners' association to "surrender" if they cannot escape the attackers by zig-zagging or an aggressive gesture. Crews are typically unarmed and shipowners are skeptical about proposals to hire armed security personnel - because they fear for their crews, ships and cargo. Furthermore,

many flag nations have placed a ban on arming merchant vessels.

Types of Attack

Several types of attacks can be distinguished: The first type being the objective of getting at the cash and personal belongings on board, which has always been prominent. Secondly, it may involve off-loading valuable cargo, i.e. aluminium ingots, copper, timber, wire or minerals, all of which are hard to trace. In this case, pirates often act on order and already have a customer for their prey. It is not unlikely that sooner or later the cargo will find its way back into regular, legal commerce. Thirdly, hijacking the ship, then sailing her to a position close to the coast and demand ransom for her release, a business that promises to be very lucrative.

The ransom demands have increased tenfold in recent years. In the case of the Sirius Star, the hijackers are said to have demanded an eight-figure sum. As with the "MS Hansa Stavanger", a sum of 2.75 million USD has been paid by the shipping company. In the case, where the crew is either killed or set free, a fourth option would comprise sailing her to into a secretive port to be repainted and renamed - not necessarily reflagged and registered, of course. She often becomes a phantom ship used for



Combating Piracy

transporting illegal cargo. If all that does not pay off - scrapping is a fifth alternative. Taking into consideration present day scrap prices, a ship of medium size would bring another 1-2 million USD in revenue, scrapped in for example, a spot in Southern India where probably nobody asks for detailed documentation as to where the ship comes from.

The attackers should not be envisaged as a desperate gang of unorganised banditos, in fact their business is highly organised and they are well equipped. Typically, operating from a bigger mother ship disguised as a big fish trawler, providing facilities for the crew, a good seagoing ability ("MS Hansa Stavanger" was entered 400 nm off the Somali coast, that is 740 km) and endurance, small crews would detach in high speed vessels to aim for their target, armed with automatic weapons, rocket propelled grenade launchers and close quarters fighting weapons. Their willingness to execute force is distinct, any chivalrous conduct can undoubtedly be ruled out. And they know from beforehand what they are attacking - corrupt authorities, a widely dispersed information network and technical means as AIS and LRIT make it possible (see infobox on AIS and LRIT.)

Patterns: Sequence of a Hijacking

Once a vessel has been captured for purpose of ransom demand, a rather typical 4-step procedure would take place:

It all starts with sailing to a pre-planned anchorage area that gives the pirates access to support means from shore or ship in order to cover the extended following periods. Depending on the size of the ship and the estimated risk of other pirate groups to seize her, up to 60 personnel can arrive on board, working in two-watch shifts. (The Master will attempt by any means to notify his shipping company with a distress call of the hijacking.)

In a second step, one of the early persons coming onboard will be the negotiator, a crucial link between the pirates' superiors and the ship owner. The negotiator will regularly visit the ship, as he normally has to deal with several cases concurrently and will maintain a rather neutral posture in the negotiating process. It is likely that he is educated and fluent in English. The pirates will aim to keep the crew in a confined space, some

of them sent to operate the diesel generators or the galley. While the Master would usually remain separated from his crew, the crew would be asked to make phonecalls to their families and/or press in order for them to portray that living circumstances on board would be dire in order to put pressure on the negotiating process. Mock executions are not unlikely and often times it has been found that the pirates made the crew portray a worse situation than subsequently is found to have existed.

During the third step, eventually the pirates and vessel owner will come to an agreement; ransom would be paid by delivery from a tug boat or dropped by parachute from an aircraft. Once the ransom is received, others who have been responsible for guarding, attacking, supplying and negotiating would gather on board to demand their share, a situation highly dangerous for the crew because of physical disputes arising being likely to resorted by threat or use of weapons.

Finally, the hijackers and associated personnel would quickly disperse, leaving the ship on her own and disappear to shore or their mother ship. As for the released ship, she would normally sail to a safe harbour, debriefings with authorities take place, sometimes the crew is exchanged where those having been through the hijacking are sent home to their families, and eventually she carries on with her schedule.

Geographical Factors

Working conditions in Somalia are ideal – for pirates. There are many reasons for the dramatical surge in events in this particular sea area:

- **Accessibility:** Somalia's long coastline along the Gulf of Aden provides a variety of opportunities to mount a shore base from which to access one of the bottlenecks of maritime sea trade; the favourable weather conditions only seasonally being disturbed by winds and monsoon branches.

- **Freedom of choice and acceptable risk:** Around 20.000 major ships are transiting the area annually, the majority of them is equipped with modern reporting systems and crews have undergone "anti-piracy-training". The information network of the Somali pirates though enables them to prepare for their attack in very detail. Recent tactics show that if they are after a particular ship, they would mount a false-attack elsewhere in order to produce distress calls and thus draw patrolling naval ships' attention away from their prey. The insufficient amount of warships present (above all of the affected African navies and coast guards) plays in their hands – all in all, the calculable risk still promises large profits.

- **Political system and institutions:** There is no functioning government, armed forces, police or judicial system, to say nothing of a coast guard in Somalia. Since the overthrow of Siad Barre, Somalia has fallen apart into three "state"

AIS

AIS is a VHF tracking system installed both onboard ships and with Vessel Traffic Services. AIS stands for "Automatic Identification System" and provides data such as position, course, speed, cargo, ports-of-call via radio-data transmission. AIS is helpful both in collision avoidance and contact management on the Electronical Chart screen, but also allows not only Traffic Services but instead Maritime Authorities (customs, coast guard, navy, police) to monitor vessels' movements. The IMO "Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea" dictates AIS be fitted onboard all vessels above gross tonnage 300 tons and passenger vessels regardless of their size.

LRIT

LRIT stands for "Long-Range Identification and Tracking" and was proposed by the United States Coast Guard at the IMO in London to track ships outside VHF-range. In May 2006, LRIT was established by the IMO in a resolution amending the "Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea". Ships of states having contracted to the IMO are obliged to report their position to their respective Flag Administration (the respective national authority responsible for enforcing maritime regulations) four times a day and thus giving other contracting countries the possibility to obtain the data. LRIT equipment on board transmit their data via satellite to Land-Earth-Stations and then to LRIT Data Centres (i.e. the European Datacentre run by the European Maritime Safety Agency EMSA). Together with AIS data and last-port-of-call and next-port-of-call information, LRIT assists in clearing the "maritime clutter", by detecting anomalies in shipping and thus heighten Maritime Security Awareness. The "Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea" dictates LRIT be fitted onboard the same vessels as AIS, and additionally on drilling platforms.



fragments. Somaliland, a more or less stabilised, internationally not recognised de facto-regime in the northern part; the 1998 self-declared, autonomous region of Puntland in eastern Somalia and home to most of the pirates operating bases ashore. The rest of Somalia is fought about by various factions of extremists trying to fill the power vacuum, while neither the Transitional Federal Government nor the Islamic Court Union possess any real executive power able to establish a judicial and societal order in the country.

• Nothing to lose: Somalia has a plethora of young, unemployed men, having almost nothing left to lose and ready to take high risks. According to the London based NGO "Chatham House", pirates of the coast of Puntland made a revenue of around 50-100 million USD in 2008, that is 100-200 percent more than the annual budget of the autonomous region of Puntland. Piracy has become an industry there, employing former fishermen, soldiers and so-called "gunmen", free-lanced gangsters from the capital region; still, the big fishes in this business assuredly do not live in Somalia but would be found rather in London, Dubai, Mombasa or elsewhere in the world. The

demonstrative idleness of Puntland authorities (in so far as you can call them authorities) is proof of the high turnover in this business.

Links to financing further criminal and/or terrorist activity and organised crime by means of piracy are most obvious. What must not be forgotten though is the fact that foreign fishing fleets, such as European, Chinese and Korean ones, use state-of-the-art large scale fishing methods that have exhausted the fish stocks upon which the locals rely as their main source of income. Don't we have to do with a symptom of a cause that is quite parallel to poppy-growing in Afghanistan?

CONNECTION TO PART II

A view into history proves that even in earlier times pirates could not be deterred from their actions by passive means. Yet, ancient Rome, the United Kingdom in the 18th century and European sea powers in the 19th century had a common recipe for success: They sought out the pirates in their hideouts and consequently applied force. So far, the benefits to pirates clearly outweigh the costs. Read in Part II of the article about: Protection from pirates; Patrolling

and Naval Cooperation—Malacca Strait; EU NAVFOR/Operation Atalanta and CTF150/151 and Legal aspects. ✦



(1) The author serves as Aide-de-Camp to the Commander Joint Warfare Centre since July 2007. His "naval upbringing" is the Operations Branch of the German Navy, in above water warfare and mine warfare, in the latter of which was his appointment before coming to JWC and where he will return to.

German EU NAVFOR-Atalanta warship FGS Rheinland-Pfalz, March 2009. Photo by EU NAVFOR.



Internet Resources

Piracy Live Map at the International Chamber of Commerce - Commercial Crime Services:

<http://www.icc-ccs.org>

Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa) run by EU NAVFOR <http://www.mschoa.org>

Maritime Safety Committee Resources (inter alia Reports on Piracy related events) <http://www.imo.org/circulars/mainframe.asp?topic id=327>

PART II

- Protection from Pirates
- Patrolling and Naval Cooperation
- EU NAVFOR/Operation Atalanta and CTF150/151
- Legal Aspects



NET NERDS AT NATO EXERCISE

CWID '09

Mission Objective: To push nations towards stronger and more airtight high-tech collaboration

By Sarah Engan Johansen
 Communications Adviser, Norwegian Defence Education and Training
 Centre for Command and Control Information Systems (CCIS)

Translated by Bente Heill Kleven,
 Linguist, JWC PAO

THE air is dry and the building quiet. No silence in the Italy room, though. In fact, there rarely is. One would never have thought that the brown brick building used for the event could hold as many people as it does. Inside, several hundred computers and some 1,200 people have been brought together to work out how to improve communications NATO wide. Technicians, engineers and data nerds from across NATO spend all June at base Jørstadmoen, Lillehammer, testing and experimenting with various brands of communication equipment from NATO nations.

International Communication Wave

Fifteen nations and various NATO agencies participate in the event, named CWID and held for the sixth time at Lillehammer. The purpose is to provide better communication capabilities between NATO nations.

A number of objectives have been set for the event including testing a wide range of communication systems from those of the NATO Response Force (NRF) to the more ordinary, every day systems currently being used by NATO nations.

Development and Networking

A pungent smell of sweat fills your nostrils as you stroll along through the building – but this is different from the odour in the fitness room! The air stands still and is warmed up by an early summer sun pouring in through large glass panes, and a high number of PC screens and hard drives working at full speed. Most of the faces you spot are pale (those in the Italy room may be an exception) and belong to people packed together in class rooms, all of them busy creating networks across national boundaries. Much of the purpose of the event is just that – networking, both socially and professionally, across frontiers.

Major Fred Anton Mykland is one of the few to have flush, colourful cheeks. As Head of Norway's Host Nation Support Cell and National Lead for Norway's contribution, he knows quite a bit about working long hours for weeks and months on end to get the exercise up and going. Throughout the year, members of the CWID management team, host nation representatives and national leads of various nations meet to prepare the event, which involves a considerable amount of extra work for Major Mykland for the simple reason that CWID is held in Norway. Indeed, in addition to the preparations required for Norway to be able to fill its host nation role, the Major has prepared a number of trials and experiments to be conducted during the event. Norway provides inter alia tests for the NORTaC and NORCCIS systems, which support tactical and operational levels of operations respectively. The objective is to make those systems operate in the



best way possible with NATO command and control systems. "We have learnt big things from participating in CWID, both this year and the previous years. Seeing that findings from the events here have a direct positive impact on missions in Afghanistan for instance, gives us a lot of inspiration to take the development of NATO communication systems further," said Major Mykland, smiling.

Vital training

"CWID is important to NATO, simply because communication technology is not a thing you can test while in use," OCE, the Dutch Major General Koen Gjisbers, pointed out. Whenever there is a need for testing and training, you cannot just shut down lines, map systems and messaging services used by ISAF in Afghanistan. "Such systems must be up and running at all times. Imagine the consequences if NATO forces on missions suddenly become unable to communicate and exchange information. Any faults and deficiencies have to be cor-

rected swiftly, so it is important that error detection; testing and development can be performed at an exercise like CWID. In this way, we ensure that all technologies implemented in our operational areas are thoroughly quality checked and work as they are meant to," the CWID boss emphasized.

More Input from End Users

Busy people carrying briefcases and computers keep on running in and out of the exercise area. After a long day including many demonstrations and explanations regarding the various systems in use, Chief INI, Norwegian Major General Roar Sundseth, finally hit the cooling air outside. "I believe it is important to include a higher number of operational users," he said, adding: "we must put in an effort to make our data and communication systems more user-friendly. To achieve this, operators and engineers will have to work together."

"CWID is an important move to push NATO nations towards a stronger, more airtight kind of high-tech cooperation. At the same time, it is essential not to convene IT experts only. As Norway and NATO shift towards a more network-based defence structure (NBD), it is important to think of those who will operate our systems," the Major General went on to say, adding that technological

solutions should be adapted to the users' requirements. "We shall not manufacture IT systems for engineers and experts only. Operational users have to tell us what they need in terms of functionalities for their IT systems. Here, I see a potential for closer cooperation," he concluded. The Major General will now work to draw more of those who actually use the systems involved into future CWID events.

CWID parallel to NATO

At the end of June, Major Mykland and his team started feeling the fatigue. However, they straightened their back a little more than usually as OCE, Major General Koen Gjisbers, in his concluding remarks stressed that Norway in its host nation role had done more than could reasonably be expected. He gave Major Mykland his assurance that Norway had made the visitors feel welcome and well looked after, which must be nice for the host to hear at the end of such a long and demanding party.

What is certain, though, is that providing satisfactory communications is just important after CWID as it is during the event. Adequate communications capabilities save lives in a line of operation like that of the Armed Forces. Events such as CWID will, therefore, play a very important part in the developing tomorrow's NATO. +



NATO Military Committee led by Admiral Di Paola attended CWID 2009 in Lillehammer to take stock of the progress made in training, technical evolution and interoperability between the Alliance military forces.

New!

Starting in this issue and to become a regular feature, is a series of articles exploring exciting activities and places of interest that speak of Norway's past and present and scenic beauty. The idea is to tip you off on top things to do and suggest activities for a great day or weekend out.

M Y N O

**By Lieutenant Colonel Elisabeth Eikeland, NOR AF,
Chief PAO, Joint Warfare Centre**

I always find it difficult to recommend attractions to visit as many of my favourite destinations are rugged mountains or out-of-the-way places in North Norway. Since I was born in Haugesund and grew up in the Stavanger region, I have had the chance to visit many of the top sights to see on both sides of the Boknafjord. “Yes, please, I’ll have both,” the famous English philosopher Winnie-the-Pooh used to say. I am no different than he is. So my intent here is to give you a taste of both.

Vestiges of history at Haugalandet

Haugalandet is the area between Bømlafjord in Hordaland County and Boknafjord in Rogaland County. To

some extent, this is the cradle of the kings of Norway. At Avaldsnes, the oldest residence of Norway’s kings, you may follow in the footsteps of King Harold Fair Hair, who brought Norway together under one kingdom. The Olav Church, the Nordvegen History Centre and the restored outdoor Viking Farm, all to be found at Avaldsnes, allow you to delve into history with kings and princes and their bondservants serving as your guides. The church and the History Centre offer a majestic view over the protected fairway of Karm-sundet, previously called Nordvegen (“The way North”), a name that later developed into Norge, or Norway.

Vibrant and livable Haugesund has the national monument of Haraldshaugen, locally known as the “Harold stat-

ue”, erected in commemoration of the unification of Norway by Harold Fair Hair. Put in place in 1872 to celebrate the millenium of the battle of Hafrsfjord where Norway allegedly became one kingdom, the monument towers to the north of Haugesund city centre at the site where Harold Fair Hair is said to be buried. One of the most reliable sources for this may be sought in the Heimskringla, a saga on the lives of

“At Avaldsnes, the oldest residence of Norway’s kings, you may follow in the footsteps of King Harold Fair Hair...”





RØVÆR



the Norse kings written down in 1220-30 by the Icelandic saga writer Snorre Sturlason. The monument itself is a huge burial mound surrounded by a granite wall of 29 memorial stones, one for each of ancient Norway's provinces. The top of the mound features a 17 meter tall granite obelisk, with four bronze panels covering its base. Each panel describes scenes of the life and times of Harold Fair Hair.

Laid back atmosphere at Røvær Island

The desolate and undisturbed Røvær is a great place to escape and is only a short ride (25 minutes) out of the hustle and bustle of Haugesund. The sea crossing can be quite an adventure. There is something special about Røvær and its sheltered coves and nearby angling places that ever since the Stone Age have induced man wish to settle in this island. Even fragments of Viking settlements have been identified here. In the

early 1800s, Røvær provided accommodation for as many as 20,000 fishermen taking part in the herring fishery. Røvær's population peaked in the 1950s when 170 people lived here. Today, this car-free island community counts roughly 110 souls. Tourist accommodation is available all year round.

A visit to Røvær is unforgettable and you will always hanker back to this island and its delicious komler. These large dumplings of potatoes and flour are a real treat. They come under a variety of local names and have a combination of different garnishes such as salted mutton, boiled or mashed swede, bacon and bacon fat.

Travel Instructions

• Catch an express boat to Røvær

Boats out to Røvær leave from the express boat terminal on the Inner Quay along Smedasundet, which is the narrow neck of water running through the Haugesund city centre. The express boat terminal is a five to ten-minute walk away from nearby bus stops and parking areas.

The Flag Route ships coming in from Stavanger or Bergen moor close by. Allow two minutes or so to transfer to the express boat. The coastal buses operating between Stavanger and Bergen will drop you off at the Flotmyr bus terminal as will the local buses. The



express boat terminal is about twenty minutes away on foot and only four minutes away by taxi. Haugesund Airport is a 30-minute drive (by car or bus) from the quay.

• How to get to Avaldsnes

You have the option to travel by boat or bus to Haugesund, from where bus services operate to Avaldsnes. You may also travel by car driving north from Stavanger on the E39 through the Rennfast link (two submarine tunnels) to Mortavika ferry terminal. Ferry to Arsvågen. From Arsvågen, continue on Rv47 via the Karmsund bridge to Avaldsnes. From Avaldsnes, return towards Stavanger via Skudeneshavn to allow you to enjoy the romantic charm of this small town reminiscent of the days of sail (exceptional examples of old building traditions; rich maritime heritage).

Pictures:

- Above, clockwise:
Feistein Lighthouse;
A charming garden in Skudesneshavn;
The Pulpit Rock.
Left: (all pictures from www.flickr.com from [flinch photostream](http://flinch.photostream))
1. King Harold Statue;
2. The Olav Church;
3. Beach at Karmøy.



Sand dune coast of Jæren

Jæren is the open, low, pastoral landscape flanking the North Sea from the Boknafjord all the way south to Dalane. This 65 kilometres long stretch totaling 1,070 square kilometres is the largest low country area of Norway, reminding strongly of Danish landscapes. It has Norway's longest sandy beach, Orrestranden, which is a five-kilometre long expanse of fine sand. I grew up next to this beach, living in a house built one year before the beaches of Jæren were totally protected by law. All Jæren beaches are open to the general public. The coast of Jæren offers many natural wonders and is rich in cultural heritage. Cycling and walking tourists to this area are spoilt for choice.

The Hå old rectory is one of those wonders. Originally a farm simultaneously on the shipping lane and the routes of traffic overland, it was in use as a rectory from 1668 to 1919. Today, it has reinvented itself as an exhibition and cultural institution. It lies on the bank of the Hå river near its exit into the North Sea. A highly sought-after salmon river since the 17th and 18th centuries, the river became well known in England and Scotland for its outstanding salmon fishing in the 19th century, and the first tourists arrived to catch salmon. The Hå river was once home to freshwater pearls with the King of Denmark holding the license to explore for pearls.

On the property there is also a large coastal burial ground comprising 60 graves or so, ranging in date from the 4th-century (relics from the Great Migrations) to approximately 1000 AD. The entire field was archeologically excavated back in the 1950s.



Close to the Hå old vicarage, the Obrestad lighthouse was erected in 1873. As part of the defensive structures set up by the German forces during World War II, it was equipped with a watch tower which the Germans had built as a look-out post against enemies. Air raid shelters were also constructed on the lighthouse grounds.

When the light was automated in 1991, the keeper moved out, and the living quarters were fitted out as holiday flats to rent on a weekly basis or for week-end breaks all year round. The Obrestad lighthouse also makes a good spot for an excursion and is open to day trippers. In 1998, it was protected under the Norwegian Cultural Heritage Act. Around the lighthouse, the countryside is quite enchanting with walking paths along the sea. In summer, open-air concerts are staged at the lighthouse's outdoor arena.

In the 1930s, Obrestadbrekkå was the venue of one of the most spectacular ski jump contests in the history of ski jumping in Norway. Thanks to an enormous effort of voluntary community workers, a competition held on 16 February 1938 drew a crowd of 4,000. Its success prompted a subsequent competition the year after. However, as there was little snow that winter, snow had to be brought in for the event, and it took a whole week to provide a suf-

ficient snow cover. Straw bales, almost floating in the beach pebbles, formed the end of the landing slope. 3,000 people watched the champions of the time jump, achieving lengths that were more or less the same as those of Holmenkollen, i.e. roughly 45 metres. All proceeds from the 1940 event went to benefit the Finns, who fought the battles of the Finnish-Soviet Winter War in an epic struggle for Karelia (1939-1940). One of the last ski jump events at Obrestad took place in 1940. No more competitions were ever held.

Obrestadbrekkå:
Picture is from
Kongevegen i Hå
Turhandbok by
Hanne Thomsen




Other pearls along the coast of Jæren include the old Jærish farm grounds and buildings of Grødalstunet; the Kvassheim lighthouse where you can enjoy your lunch packet inside a restored lighthouse (accommodates a cafeteria); and the old seaside graveyard at Varhaug. No longer in use, its grave stones alone tell a long tale of history. It has a monument commemorating the hundreds who died when the Russian naval vessel "Ingermannsland" with 900 on board went down off the coast of Jæren in 1842. 400 lives were lost.

Directions:

The national roads Rv 44 and Rv 503 will take you the Jæren area. Watch out for signs for the attraction you want to visit.

Orre beach



HIKING TIPS

My favourite experience this summer is an outdoor exposure to gale force winds and driving rain on a hike across the Arctic high mountain nature of Hardangervidda (1,360 meters above sea level). Using guy ropes and stones for securing the tent from the wind was a must. Being held by adverse weather conditions for 18 hours or so is quite an adventure, and I was surprised at how much I enjoyed it. As I sank into the warm relief of my sleeping bag that night and my frozen fingertips began to melt, I thanked God with a grin that it was July and not January! Later it felt good to return my extreme weather tent for repair, knowing that the forces of nature had put me to a test of my limit. You will find similar adventures for yourself.

“Our sincerest thanks and appreciation to all!”



**Community
News**

The past few months has been a very busy, enjoyable and, at times, poignant period for the JWC community. Poignant since it has been that time of year where we have said “goodbye” to departing friends and colleagues and enjoyable since it also has been the time when we welcome new families and comrades. Numerous community events allowed us to say our farewells and our welcome. Over 160 attendees participated in our June family cruise up to the entrance of Lysefjord at Forsand. Even seeing the approaching veil of fog and rain that afternoon did not detract from the fun and companionship that all enjoyed.

Our Welcome BBQ and Information Day attracted over 250 community members to discover over 40 groups

representing JWC Sports and Recreation Clubs, local artisans, sports associations, service organizations, museums and society. Free grilled burgers and pølse highlighted the day as well as martial arts and Pacific Island dancing demonstrations.

Our second family cruise past Renneøy, Mosterøy and Hundvag attracted over 170 people on a bright, sunny and dry (!) day. The tour around the islands with wonderful views of small villages, cottages and the picturesque hills was fantastic. Of course, after weeks of almost nothing but rainy days, the outing was most welcome by all.

The 2009 JWC Sports Day was held at Madla Camp on September 4th with Divisional teams participating in beach

volleyball, basketball, sailing, golf, football, ultimate frisbee and, of course, the exclusive JWC Heptathlon. Weather and conditions were great as Joint Exercise Division (JED) emerged victorious for a second consecutive year!

JWC and our surrounding host communities offer a large variety of cultural, recreational and sporting opportunities for our families. We believe that you will be able to find something that you enjoy, and hope that you take advantage of these activities. Our community events would not be successful without our participants and especially our large number of volunteers.

**By Gordon Ramsay, Chief
Community Support Branch, JWC**

Memorial Day in Kristiansand

Every year, Denmark and Norway commemorate the Danish sailors who died during the Battle of Heligoland in 1864. It is a very special day to recall the great sacrifice that some gave, and honor them. The Memorial Day is held at the churchyard in Kristiansand, where the sailors are buried, and has always been conducted by the senior Danish naval officer posted in Norway. Each year, the city of Kristiansand dignifies the memory of the fallen Danish sailors by hosting the Memorial Day. Danish and Norwegian military units, predominantly naval, participate in the memorial parade, concluding with a reception on the visiting Danish naval units. You can read more about Battle of Heligoland at <http://navalhistory.dk>.



Lt Col Pedersen, DNK A



Left: Cdr Sg Hjorth giving annual speech at churchyard in Kristiansand



Photographic flight with Royal Norwegian Air Force, Stavanger, June 2009.

Photographer: MSG Raphael Baekler, DEU AF, JWC PAO
▶▶ "My Norway" article page 56.

