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THE THREE SWORDS

STAVANGER - NORWAY

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NATO's Comprehensive Approach

The Doctrinal Factor of Fighting Power

Strategic Communications in ISAF

The Deployed Grey Cell: "Teachable Moments"

COIN

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INSURGENCY



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Editor's Letter

Dear Reader,

The most dynamic period of the year lies ahead, waiting for you to take advantage of it. 2010 is still in its beginning, so new goals and resolutions, new plans, new dreams and new directions fuel your thoughts. Do you have "exploring Stavanger" in your goals for 2010? Spring and summer are brilliant times to get acquainted with its delights.

For example, tracing the tracks of the Vikings is a treasured attraction. Although we tend to think of the Vikings as warriors, they also were skilled traders, explorers and settlers. The Archeological Museum of Stavanger offers a round trip to visit Hafrsfjord, Sola Ruinkirke, also known as Sola Old Church, and the burial mound at Jåsund. Another option is to travel to Talgje via spectacular undersea tunnels such as Rennfast and Finnfast. Rennfast comprises one of the world's longest and deepest undersea tunnels, the Byfjord tunnel, which is 5,860 metres long and descends 223 metres beneath the sea surface and 45 metres below the sea bed. At Talgje, visit a Viking burial site or enjoy a stroll along the island's picturesque shoreline.

Explore Stavanger on a guided tour or visit the beautifully preserved Monastery of Utstein Cloister on the western tip of



Mosterøy Island. By 900, Utstein Cloister had become the property of King Harald Fairhair, the first man to claim to be the King of all Norway. It remained a royal estate throughout the reign of King Magnus the Law Mender (1263-1280) and was later given to Saint Olav's Cloister in Stavanger. The monks converted it into an Augustin convent and continued the building

activity inaugurated by their predecessors. Exploring museums is a great way to understand Stavanger's past. The Canning Museum, the Maritime Museum, the state-of-the-art Petroleum Museum, the local royal residence of Ledaal or the Bredablikk Manor are some of the museums you should consider visiting.

Music is blessedly free of language barriers and can be enjoyed by anyone, anywhere, anytime. Treat yourself to musical delights in May: MaiJazz ranks as one of Norway's most reputed jazz festivals. Stavanger Concert Hall in Bjergsted caters for every taste, spanning genres from jazz to new music and from classical to Broadway. Also Sandnes Kulturhus offers a wide selection of musical highlights.

Mark your calendars 28 June–3 July for the Stavanger leg of the annual Beach Volleyball World Tour tournament with matches being played in the harbour area. By then, you will have had time to achieve some of the New Year's resolutions you made! This year, my goals include a resolution to read more books than last year. So I say with Henrik Wergeland, one of Norway's greatest writers of all times: *"Knowing there's a good book waiting for me, makes my day happier."*

Lt. Col. Elisabeth Eikeland, NOR AF,
Chief Public Affairs Office, Joint Warfare Centre

PUBLISH AN ARTICLE IN THE THREE SWORDS!
We are always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you have got something to say, send it to us. We will be happy to consider it for publication. Email your articles, as well as your comments and feedback to JWC CG PAO Common (CRONOS) or inci.kucukaksoy@jwc.nato.int.

The Three Swords

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PUBLISHED THREE TIMES A YEAR

Back Cover –

Above: Norwegian armoured vehicles in Faryab Province, Afghanistan.
(Photo by ISAF Public Affairs) Below: ISAF TE 09/02 by MSgt Raphael Baekler, DEU AF, JWC PAO.





Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte German Army Commander, Joint Warfare Centre

When I wrote the Foreword for the last "The Three Swords" magazine, I did not imagine what we would experience over the course of the last few months – a harsh winter that I did not expect to happen. Neither did I expect that, coming from a conference, I would be stuck in Germany for some days and would finally be traveling to Norway by car and ferry instead of flying in comfortably by plane. I am glad that everybody in the Joint Warfare Centre – since our travel activity is so vast – made it home safely. Both through the winter and the ash clouds!

As is normal with the spring quarter, interesting challenges lay ahead of us; soon we will be training Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC Brunssum), Deployable Joint Staff Element 2 (DJSE2) from Allied Force Command Madrid, and the respective Component Commands during the NATO Response Force (NRF) Exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 2010; shortly after followed by the training of personnel from Rapid Reaction Corps France, DJSE2 from Allied Force Command Heidelberg and US Army V Corps during the ISAF Training Event 10/01 (ISAF TE 10/01) for their deployment to HQ ISAF and HQ ISAF Joint Command (IJC) later this year.

While at that active time of the year many of our own personnel will rotate out and leave the Joint Warfare Centre and Norway, many newcomers will arrive who have to settle in. We will have to care for a smooth transition of those personnel and also into the new building. Then, soon, we will be conducting



our first staff talks with the Norwegian National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) since their move to Bodø. By the end of May, the NJHQ transition from Jåttå to Bodø will be complete, in so far as the bunker will go non-operational. The grown cooperation, relationship and trust with our comrades from NJHQ will, of course, not vanish and I do cherish the support that we are giving and receiving in spite of the distance in between the headquarters.

Looking at the wide range of articles in this issue, which are again proof of the broad experience we hold in the Joint Warfare Centre, I have to thank all of you for committing your time and effort to our magazine. Not being able to cover all in detail, but to give you a taste,

you will find a very interesting and also clarifying article on the "Comprehensive Approach" by Lt Col Thomas Johnson; Dr Dave Sloggett writes on the "Societal Landscape" in COIN operations: a perspective that he is also presenting at our various training events as a Subject Matter Expert; Lt Col Mário Pereira introduces us to doctrine as such and its localisation; also you can look behind the Grey Cell curtain in an article by Carol Saynisch and get an insight into the other NATO installation in Stavanger, the NATO FORACS Norway, where NATO naval forces conduct their accuracy checks. It also applies to all the other well done articles – enjoy your reading and keep up your good work.

And, finally, at this prominent place, I would like to encourage Sqn Ldr Bob Dixon in his five-day endeavour at the "Al Andalus Ultra Trail" (page 64) and you all in supporting him. Tally ho.



SACT with Lieutenant General Korte at Joint Operations Centre, Ulsnes, during ISAF TE 09/02.



Article by Inci Kucukaksoy;
Photos by MSgt Raphael Baekler, DEU AF,
JWC Public Affairs Office

SACT visits Joint Warfare Centre

FRENCH AIR FORCE GENERAL STÉPHANE ABRIAL, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), visited the Joint Warfare Centre on 8 December 2009, during the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters and ISAF Joint Command (IJC) Headquarters Mission Rehearsal Exercise. Dubbed as ISAF TE 09/02, the event held the distinction of being the Joint Warfare Centre's first pre-deployment training based on the split headquarters structure for the 2010 rotations in Afghanistan.

This was General Abrial's first official visit to the Joint Warfare Centre since he assumed command of NATO's Allied Command Transformation on 9 September 2009. He was welcomed by Commander Joint Warfare Centre, Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte. During his visit, General Abrial had the opportunity to witness first-hand the ISAF exercise run by the Joint Warfare Centre and recognize the Centre's exceptional commitment to the ISAF

Headquarters in Afghanistan – NATO's number one priority. In addition, General Abrial gained insight into the Centre's content-rich programme of work; discussed the way ahead for NATO's transformation and where he wanted to take Allied Command Transformation during his tenure.

The discussions covered a broad range of subjects such as the Joint Warfare Centre's comprehensive training and exercise programme; its innovative concepts and military experimentation; the Lessons Learned process and collection of operational Best Practices; as well as use of Modeling and Simulation technology that helps Training Audiences rehearse in a realistic training environment; and, not least Iraqi Key Leader Training (IKLT). General Abrial was also briefed about the Centre's new modern training facility in Jättå.

In addition, SACT took time off his busy schedule to give an interview to Mr Peter DuBois for the Joint Warfare Centre's promotional movie. The General said, in the interview, that he was

reinforced in his conviction about the Joint Warfare Centre's unique and credible role as NATO's sole operational level training centre and its contribution to NATO's urgent mission in Afghanistan and the Alliance's overall transformation. He commented on the then ongoing pre-deployment training event and said that it directly contributed to the conduct of operations in Afghanistan and was vital for NATO's future success.

General Abrial said: "My impression of today is that the ISAF exercise is running extremely well. I had had many exchanges with people coming directly from Kabul to train with the Training Audience and the future staff members. I heard all positive comments. I also want to highlight the comment made by General Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander ISAF, that the Joint Warfare Centre's training makes a real difference: the efficiency of those who have been through the Joint Warfare Centre training has increased by at least 50 percent."



In his interview, General Abrial commented on the Joint Warfare Centre's diversified activities, exceptional achievements and reputation within NATO, adding that the Centre is an essential force for transformation throughout the Alliance. He further commented on the Joint Warfare Centre's role in making the NATO Response Force (NRF) an essential driver for a new NATO and improving NATO forces' operational level combat effectiveness, which is crucial for the Alliance's Afghanistan headquarters.

In response to questions on expectations for the future, the General said that in his vision, he expects a continued balance between meeting today's challenges and preparing for tomorrow's.

"I believe the Joint Warfare Centre's record of success speaks for itself. And, the whole NATO Alliance recognizes its reputation. The powerful leadership of Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte continuously adapt and evolve to meet the challenges. And, no doubt, we will meet the challenges of future, especially, of course, in view of what the new NATO Strategic Concept will tell us. Transformation is at the heart of what NATO should do. So, I have no doubt in the future of Allied Command Transformation or the future of the Joint Warfare Centre."

During his first official visit, General Abrial was accompanied by US Marine Corps General James N. Mattis, who was previously dual-hatted as SACT and Commander of US Joint Forces Command. Today, General James N. Mattis continues to serve as Commander of US Joint Forces Command.



General Stéphane Abrial, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT).

ISAF TE 09/02 Mission Rehearsal Training was executed from 29 November to 11 December 2009, for a Training Audience of more than 200 staff, based on the split headquarters structure for the 2010 rotations in Afghanistan. The training reflected the changes within the ISAF Command Structure and it was


modified accordingly to simultaneously train personnel who would man both the ISAF Headquarters and the ISAF Joint Command. JWC-led ISAF TE 09/02 brought with it some "firsts". In addition to being the first ISAF training based on the split headquarters structure, for the first time, the commanders of HQ ISAF and ISAF Joint Command spoke directly to the Training Audience at Ulsnes through video-teleconference. Also, for the first time, two officers of the Afghan National Security Forces provided support as role players in a JWC-led ISAF training event.

Significantly, the preparation phase of the exercise also included a "first". In the aftermath of NATO's strategic decision to adjust the ISAF military command structure, ISAF Headquarters requested the Joint Warfare Centre to deliver training to the new ISAF Joint Command. As a result, for the first time in its history, the Joint Warfare Centre deployed a total of 30 personnel in September 2009 to conduct an in theatre Mission Readiness Exercise for the ISAF Joint Command in Kabul. The aim of the in theatre training was to ensure that the then newly formed ISAF Joint Command Headquarters was adequately trained and ready to assume its tasks and responsibilities. †

SACT discussing with Peter DuBois the details of his interview for the JWC's promotional movie.



JWC deployment for Mission Readiness Exercise in Afghanistan, 30 September 2009.



I HATED EVERY MINUTE OF TRAINING, BUT I SAID,
 “DON’T QUIT. SUFFER NOW AND LIVE THE REST OF
 YOUR LIFE AS A CHAMPION.”
 – Muhammad Ali

Soldiers in theatre deserve the best training there is

By Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck, DEU AF,
 HQ SACT, Deputy Chief of Staff for Joint Force Training

AS NATO’S JOINT FORCE TRAINER, I appreciate this opportunity to outline my views on the challenges ahead for NATO in the training arena. In my opinion, it is time for a fundamental rethinking of NATO’s approach to training. The need for a sea change in the way training is now organized and delivered results from the increasingly challenging tasks facing military commanders in theatre.

They are our key customers. Our overarching goal is to provide them with the best trained troops and civilians possible. By so doing, we support their efforts to achieve their operational goals and also to get their troops safely home.

To match an ever-evolving and increasingly demanding operational environment, training has to be fast and agile, closely attuned to the changing needs in theatre. But effective training is not

enough. Training also has to be efficient and affordable to lighten the overall burden placed on nations. As Nations expect NATO training to bridge the gap between national training and specific in theatre requirements, training is a common task where NATO and Nations have to work closely together for optimal results.

Extensive efforts are currently under way to help training in many settings across NATO: national and partner training centres, NATO training facilities, Centres of Excellence, and other institutions. As I see it, the effectiveness, efficiency and affordability of NATO training can be enhanced by involving each and every one of these facilities in a more coordinated fashion. With them as a basis for our work, we can build common platforms, much more closely in sync with in theatre requirements. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, VA, assists actively in this process.

ACT has over the last months devel-



Above: HQ SACT, Virginia, Norfolk, USA. Left: Lt Gen Korte with the Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, Admiral Di Paola. Photo by MSgt Baekler, DEU AF, JWC PAO.





Together with Nations, we want to build and sustain a transparent training and education system for NATO, which covers all phases between nomination and final deployment.

From left: A German soldier with Afghan children during a patrol (photo by ISAF PAO); Lt Gen Viereck in Afghanistan; and Second Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force Engineers show an ANA soldier search techniques (Photo courtesy Australian Government Department of Defence).

oped a new system for Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation (ETEE), now approved by Allied Command Operations. Focusing NATO's training efforts, the ETEE system incorporates political and military strategic priorities as well as SACEUR's clear-cut requirements for serving commanders in theatre. It also includes, for instance, the Comprehensive Approach, Building Integrity and Gender Issues, and provides a framework within which the Joint Force Trainer and SHAPE's DCOS Force Readiness simultaneously can manage and improve the system.

Another ACT responsibility is to coordinate all individual training and education, and collective training in NATO. To improve and strengthen individual training and education, an Individual Training and Education Programme (ITEP) is being set up, based on the successful Military Training and Exercise Programme (MTEP). ITEP's objective is to build upon and complement the national training given to soldiers and civilians in transit to NATO operations and to provide them with operations-specific education and training. Multinational training has never been more valuable or more needed than today. ITEP will become operational in the autumn.

ACT is also developing a transparent and easy-to-use management system for multinational training called DASH-

BOARD, a computer system designed to manage the training plan (ITEP and MTEP merged) and the training facilities. DASHBOARD will provide transparency for all "friends of training", and will also assist in budget control. To be truly useful, DASHBOARD should include not only NATO training, but also national education and training opportunities. The system is expected to be fully operational in 2011, but the assistance of Nations is required for us to achieve this goal.

ACT is furthermore heavily engaged in Standardization. Standardization is a "must" not only for matériel or communications. It is also needed for training as a key tool to enhance interoperability in operations. ACT has recently proposed a revision of how NATO works in establishing training standards. In our view, a higher tempo in training standardization is necessary to keep up with the rapid changes in NATO's operational theatres and to reduce the overall training burden on Nations. Standardization processes are complex and time-consuming. Here

speed is of the essence to move this much-needed work forward.

The multinational training and exercises provided should be better utilized. Currently, attendance is in many instances low. This is unfortunate considering that training and budget resources are scarce. "Programme 66" is the title of our efforts to improve attendance. Hopefully, that with the combined efforts discussed above, and not the least the transparency that we bring to our enhanced efforts in training and education, we will achieve a 66% attendance rate at all our training events. We believe that this goal is attainable.

All the efforts outlined above will be continuously quality assured so that we can adapt in step with the operational requirements, and on short notice. Together with Nations, we want to build and sustain a transparent training and education system for NATO, which covers all phases between nomination and final deployment. Our ability to use the competence and synergies of all actors involved in training and education across the NATO community is critical to our success. Only through close cooperation between NATO and Nations can this be achieved. Only through common efforts will we be able to provide our officers, soldiers and civilians with the best training there is – which they merit. †



The Comprehensive Approach


and the ~~DEATH~~ of the term "EBAO"

By Lt Col Thomas F. Johnson, USA A,
Concept Development Section, Capability Development Division,
Joint Warfare Centre

THE Comprehensive Approach or CA, as it is known, has been getting quite a bit of usage in the last year. You have probably heard it being bantered around in the media; by NATO HQs in Afghanistan; in Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNFI); and even President Obama has called for a "Comprehensive Approach" in US diplomacy. But, what is this concept and where did it come from in NATO? How is it related to the Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) or does it replace EBAO? Just where are these two concepts going?

Definitions of CA

A singular definition for a Comprehensive Approach is elusive because every nation has one, but not all nations necessarily agree on what the definition is. It is also difficult to pigeon hole any one government's entire strategy. The Comprehensive Approach is in reality an international concept wedded to the UN and EU, but that does not mean their members or NATO agree on it. Germany, France and other member states of the NATO Alliance do not have the same views. Even among NATO's members in Afghanistan, and between them and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), there is a wide difference of opinion. **Figure 1** displays several differing concepts of the CA and illustrates how hard it is to get a consensus.



A singular definition for a Comprehensive Approach is elusive because every nation has one, but not all nations agree on what that definition is.

US policy has generally been in agreement with General Stanley McChrystal's (Commander ISAF) evaluation. In Afghanistan, his approach since December of 2009 is to focus on "securing population centers (...) reversing enemy momentum, fostering more responsive local government and where possible, persuading Taliban fighters

through a mixture of pressure and incentives to lay down their arms."⁽¹⁾

This strategy does not address in totality how to implement some fundamental components of NATO's concept of a Comprehensive Approach. The strategy also conflicts with some Allied national political guidance to support the Afghan national government, it does not address cooperation with outside entities, and it does not recognize the other Allied concerns of Pakistan's importance to the problem.

It is actually quite difficult to find any continuity in NATO's Comprehensive Approach. One must search through NATO source documents to find two underlying principles. These two principles have been expressed in several NATO documents, including: The Declaration on Alliance Security 2009⁽²⁾, NATO's Bucharest Summit 2008⁽³⁾, Comprehensive Political Guidance 2006⁽⁴⁾ and the Riga Summit 2006⁽⁵⁾. These two principles are:

1. Strengthening cooperation with other international actors (not limited to PFP, MD, EU, AU, UN, and OSCE);

1. CBS News, McChrystal Afghan Plan Stays Mainly Intact, 2009.
2. NATO, Declaration on Alliance Security, 2009.
3. NATO, Bucharest Summit, 2008.
4. NATO, Comprehensive Political Guidance, 2006.
5. NATO, Riga Summit, 2006.



2. Combining civilian and military capabilities more effectively.

These two principles form the nucleus of NATO's public guidance on Comprehensive Approach. The problem with the guidance is that it does not tell how NATO is to cooperate, who outside of NATO to cooperate with, or at what level NATO is supposed to cooperate. These questions are contingent on political realities within the particular region or state in which NATO forces operate. They can change in every instance, based on what the Nations of the Alliance agree to.

Relationship of CA and EBAO

That final point has now brought us back to a question posed at the beginning of the article. How is the Comprehensive Approach related to the Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) or does it replace EBAO?

If one thinks of NATO as owning two distinct instruments of power – a military instrument and a part of the diplomatic instrument – one can picture that EBAO is the military's contribution to NATO's combined diplomatic and military policy known as the Comprehensive Approach. NATO HQ's (political/strategic level) uses the Comprehensive Approach to resolve conflicts. In other words: the Effects Based Approach to Operations is not being replaced by the Comprehensive Approach, but supports it.

EBAO has been under development since 2006 to support NATO's Comprehensive Approach. The concept is fairly straightforward because its development is dominated by the military for the military and the concept provides specific planning guidance to military staffs at the operational and military strategic levels that the Comprehensive Approach does not.

EBAO had four primary components, which were to guide military operations. The four components (or functions) were *Knowledge Development, Assessment, Planning and Execution*. It is at this point during the concept's evolution, that the concept begins to encounter two real problems in reference to the Comprehensive Approach. The first problem is that none of these functions

Figure 1. Political Statements and Military Strategy vs Afghan Plan

Concept Provider	EU ⁽⁶⁾	France ⁽⁷⁾	Germany ⁽⁸⁾	US/ISAF	ANDS* Pillars
Mission Lead	EU to work under the UN	NATO	NATO	NATO	GIRoA
Means – National or Alliance Instruments	Political Military Civilian/ Development	Civilian Military	Military Reconstruction efforts	Military Foster local Govt.	Security**, Governance, Social and Economic Development
Ways – How to use the Instruments	EU capacity building of GIRoA	N/A	Capacity building of GIRoA	Secure population centres	Infrastructure and National Resources
	N/A	Security	Security and essential services	Security	Security
	Close strategic coordination of intl. efforts	Increased coordination of aid	Provision of reconstruction aid	N/A	Education and Culture
	N/A	Pakistan	N/A	Re-integrate Taliban	Health and Nutrition
	Stabilization and Development	N/A	N/A	N/A	Agriculture and Rural Development
	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Social Protection
Ends – The Objective ***	N/A – absent from the strategic debate	NATO – SASE without any political or civilian efforts	NATO – SASE without any political or civilian efforts	Prevention of Afghanistan as terrorist base/ SASE	Not affordable or achievable/ disagrees with intl. community/ wants intl. donors to contribute directly to Afghanistan govt. budget

* Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) Structure (2008).

** Security is both a means and a ways (Pillar of ANDS).

*** This section comes from **End State Afghanistan** (Royal Institute for International Relations, End-State Afghanistan, 2009).

N/A: Not Addressed.

SASE: Safe and Secure Environment

6. Council of European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union with regard to President Obama's decision on reinforced US engagement in Afghanistan, 2009.


7. French Embassy, Sixteenth Ambassadors' Conference - Speech by M. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, 2008.

8. German Missions in the US, German Engagement in Afghanistan, 2009.



intuitively complemented either of the two Comprehensive Approach principles. In order to more fully align the two concepts, EBAO needed the addition of Civil-Military harmonization as a function, as it was originally intended. The process was incongruent and un-delineated. The inclusion of Civil-Military harmonization would have given EBAO a direct link to the Comprehensive Approach.

The second problem was Execution. Execution was not developed. The creators of the doctrine focused their development efforts on the first three functions (Knowledge Development, Assessment, and Planning). Execution was assumed to be already understood, so there was no development of how a commander should have implemented his plan.



**"EVEN THOUGH THE
THE TERM 'EBAO' IS
NO LONGER BEING
USED, THE CORE
FUNCTIONS REMAIN"**

These were no small points. The combination of NATO's Civil-Military pillars is central to the Comprehensive Approach. Execution (a function of EBAO), though one of the most important aspects of any military plan, was not included or even given much of a reference in the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) at either the strategic military or operational level. Civil-Military harmonization was only given as a philosophy in the EBAO Handbook⁹ and was not considered as a primary function of EBAO. Both concepts are essential to the Comprehensive Approach but are underdeveloped or ignored in EBAO.

The Future

So, where are the concepts going? In regards to the Comprehensive Approach,

the concept is still being developed within NATO HQs. Unlike EBAO, which had a draft doctrine to help military planners when responding to crises or when planning deliberate peace and stability operations, the Comprehensive Approach has no doctrine. CA only has vague joint statements from the various NATO Summits to guide crisis action planning and five key areas of work. NATO has identified and is now developing five key areas of work in the Comprehensive Approach for implementation. These areas are:

1. Planning and conduct of operations;
2. Lessons Learned, training, education and exercises;
3. Enhancing cooperation with external actors;
4. Public messaging;
5. Stabilization and reconstruction¹⁰

In the first area, NATO is working to improve cooperation with relevant organizations and actors in the conduct and planning of operations. This addresses "how NATO conducts operations and planning". It focuses on the internal requirements of how to complete its business. This area also changes how NATO implements these two processes specifically by the inclusion of effects and the recognition of reconstruction and development in military planning requirements.

The second and third areas concern how NATO integrates its own civilian and military personnel, its partners, other international and local actors. By incorporating both sides of NATO HQs and sharing with outside organizations the experience and lessons of training and exercises, NATO hopes to promote trust and confidence internally and externally. Mutual trust, confidence and respect are thought to promote more effective efforts.

In January 2010, NATO HQs under-

9. NATO, Bi-Strategic Command Pre-doctrinal Handbook (Effects Based Approach to Operations), 2007.

10. NATO, A Comprehensive Approach, 2010.





From left: Meeting of EU Chiefs of Defence (Photo by EU); UNAMID Soldiers Train at Sudan Super Camp (UN Photo/Olivier Chassot); US Soldiers with Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment speak with a village elder in a Kuchi village in Huta, Afghanistan (US DoD photo by Staff Sgt Dayton Mitchell); an Afghan soldier provides security in Badula Qulp, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (US Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt Efren Lopez).

went a Training Needs Analysis led by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and Chaired by the International Staff. During the analysis, members from various NATO HQs identified requirements for HQ's personnel to be trained in the Comprehensive Approach concept in order to promulgate the philosophy or ethos of cooperation, interaction and transparency with organizations outside of NATO. This conceptual training was not comprehensive; it only addressed mid-level management and below. Further, it did not address how the Comprehensive Approach concept was to be inculcated below NATO HQs in SHAPE, the Joint Force Commands (JFCs) or Component Commands, which risks perpetuating the misunderstanding, which already exists.

The fourth area is recognized by NATO as an essential ingredient to successful operations. Successfully incorporating a positive and transparent public message into its operations will promote trust and

confidence within not only the host nation, but also within the international community and within Alliance and Contributing Nations' governments. This ingredient also calls for the coordination of messaging (where possible) between the major actors within an operation. By coordinating a positive message within and with partners, NATO hopes to achieve a "sustained and coherent" public messaging.

Certainly our adversaries have recognized this essentiality for messaging. Their efforts are carried out at all three levels of war (Strategic, Operational and Tactical) and are successful for two reasons. They are clear about their target, which has always been the greater community of Islam. The message is also consistent: the West is not Islamic. They have been exceedingly effective and the fact that they are still in business eight years after the start of hostilities in Afghanistan underscores how successful their message is compared to ours.

The fifth area is the continuation of expanding NATO's past mission set, which started in the early 1990s. It concerns the addition of stabilization and reconstruction into all phases of a conflict. Today, NATO is not only concerned with Article 5 missions, but also how to repair what has been broken in nations outside the Alliance. Its goals are to promote reconstruction and to ameliorate and prevent further destabilization. NATO has already begun to expand its relevance outside its traditional realm of European defence and is now looking externally to its south and east. NATO recognizes that in order to accomplish these missions it must improve coordination with other international and non-governmental organizations (IOs and NGOs).

These areas of work have significant ramifications for the classification of and access to information between NATO and potential partners when planning operations. These areas also recognize





With the loss of **EBAO**, the **Comprehensive Approach** no longer has a direct conceptual link to planning below the **Strategic/Political level**.

that NATO may not be the lead agent in an operation, but a supporting element within a mission, possibly led by either the UN or EU. Once NATO has decided on where to engage, it is up to SHAPE HQs to begin the planning process for implementation of the NAC Initiating Directive (NACID) and determine how to employ forces.

The EBAO concept, though still evolving, was more developed than the Comprehensive Approach and was actually designed to support a future CA. The Bi-SCs have acknowledged that the functions underpinning EBAO are sound and contribute to a more holistic appreciation of the battle space (nation/region) and the effects of operations. However, the Bi-SCs have also submitted a recommendation to the Military Committee of NATO for the term EBAO to be abandoned. Their recommendation was based on three issues. These issues were: *misunderstanding of terminology, misunderstanding of the military's role in engagement outside of NATO, and whether outside interaction should be between the political or military or both.*

The development of the EBAO concept has now shifted to the development of the functions underpinning it. The first three functions Knowledge Development, Assessment and Planning without a well developed function for Execution, are now fast approaching acceptance. Although the term EBAO may be on its way to the dustbin of history, the three most developed functions underpinning it remain. The cornerstone of Knowledge Development theory is the Knowledge Development Handbook. It is the basis for the concept, part of the COPD, and is nearing completion. Once completed, the Handbook will guide implementation of Knowledge Development in NATO. The final draft is due to be published in March of this year.

The Knowledge Centre, at the operational level in the JFCs, is moving for-

ward. JFC Naples has moved beyond the theoretical and is now implementing the concept. The staffing and organization of the Naples Knowledge Centre is clearly at the operational stage. Although the interim doctrine may be published and the Knowledge Centre concept is functional, there is still considerable development required for the function to assume Full Operational Capability.

Developments in Assessment include a new Assessment Handbook, which is scheduled to be published by the end of July 2010 and the addition of Subject Matter Experts to planning staffs. JFCs are beginning to recruit Subject Matter Experts, but the process and corresponding developments will not keep pace with requirements and the missing doctrine also retards development. This conceptual and organizational gap will be an issue for the foreseeable future.

THE ACRONYM'S DEMISE was hastened on the strength of three issues. The first issue was that there was a lingering misunderstanding of the roles of the Comprehensive Approach and the Effect Based Approach to Operations and a fear that EBAO may usurp CA's application by the International Community. The problem was not EBAO's, but that the Comprehensive Approach had not been rigorously defined in NATO. As I said earlier, in order to get a proper definition you have to sift through political statements, which are by definition vague. The two primary principles of NATO's Comprehensive Approach and EBAO's Military Committee definition are not dissimilar.

The second issue was that EBAO was the attempt "to improve NATO's internal coherence and its own crisis management tools"⁽¹¹⁾ rather than the orchestration of international community efforts which is an aim of the Comprehensive Approach. In actuality, "EBAO is the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance,

combined with the practical cooperation along with involved non-NATO actors, to create effects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the NATO end-state."⁽¹²⁾ However, EBAO is defined, the reality and spirit of EBAO and Comprehensive Approach require cooperation with as many actors as NATO political elements and military forces can engage.

The third issue is that "the co-ordination with non-NATO actors created some discussions as, to a significant extent, this idea was seen as part of the political aspects of EBAO"⁽¹³⁾. This appears to diverge from the development of the COPD planning process. It also diverges from the overall philosophy of cooperation and coherence with international actors in the Comprehensive Approach. Besides these two issues, the statement is also a bit disingenuous as the politics and the military are inextricably linked. How can one say that a political policy of cooperation and coherence is to be carried out only at the political level? The military, which is the execution arm of policy that politics creates are one and the same.

There are several problems with dropping the term EBAO at the present time. The first problem is that the concepts are far from complete. The COPD still requires some further rewrite as it has ignored one of the components of EBAO, which is Execution. In its defense, it is written as a planning document, but it is also supposed to be used during the execution phase. There are currently only two paragraphs on Execution in the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive for the Strategic Operations Planning Group (SOPG) and none for the Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG). Certainly, more development is required.

Another problem is Knowledge Development. The ACT Experiment conducted last October, called ENABLER 09, found several flaws, which required correc-

11. ACT and ACO, Bi-SC Memo, Report on Progress with Effects Based Thinking, 2010.

12. NATO MC, MCM-0052-2006, MC Position on an Effects Based Approach to Operations, 2006.

13. ACT and ACO, Bi-SC Memo, Report on Progress with Effects Based Thinking, 2010.



tions. Two complete organizations (the Knowledge Management Center and the Knowledge Development Center) still require funding, staffing and operational structures, not to mention further refinement of how these organizations will actually function and inter-relate with the JFC Knowledge Center. Knowledge Development is fundamental to the core concept and especially important in all of the other functions of planning.

The third issue is Assessment. Assessment is also still under development. Despite the fact that Assessment has always been part of military operations in the intelligence community; intelligence assessment focused on adversaries. In recent operations, this has not always been applicable to the entire situation. In today's concept, Assessment depends on Knowledge Development and the execution of operations, and looks at many other facets of the engagement space to drive its processes and have added value beyond the initial planning stages. Without Assessment, Knowledge Development, Planning and Execution will miss an essential element.

Funding for concept development is also becoming more of a problem. NATO Nations are still recovering from the financial crisis in 2009 and working to balance budgets. Recent events in Greece point to still more national issues that may threaten programs under development. Credit is not a fantasy issue. NATO has recently announced cuts in funding which mirror national concerns with budgets and this will certainly affect the development of EBAO and its components. The risk is that the Alliance could have a half baked concept without the required funding to finalize and implement its processes.

A final concern is that developers recommended the abandonment of the term EBAO at the precise time of its implementation. NATO Operational Commands and SHAPE are just now implementing these concepts into their training. Exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 10 will be the first actual exercise utilizing the main concepts generated from EBAO's development. Abandonment of the term EBAO at the precise moment it is being implemented could be detri-



Above: The author participating in ENABLER 09. The topic was Knowledge Development, which is intended as a means to provide commanders and their staffs with a holistic understanding of operational environments. Photo by MSgt Raphael Baekler, DEU AF, JWC PAO.

mental to full acceptance of its concepts. More confusion could result from its premature deletion.

Even though the Military Committee acted on the Bi-SC recommendation to drop the term EBAO, the core functions and terminology remain and that is the good news. Effects, Knowledge Development, Assessment, and a better method of planning at the strategic level have been retained, even if not fully endorsed by the Bi-SCs. Great strides have also been made in defining common operational terms within NATO as well.

Ramifications

The Comprehensive Approach and the abandonment of the term EBAO have some near term ramifications for the Joint Warfare Centre. The first is that Comprehensive Approach is not a well developed or defined concept. It is more of a philosophy rather than concrete guidance. The Comprehensive Approach is being developed at the highest levels of NATO for crisis action planning. It is not being developed, nor has it been discussed being implemented below NATO HQs level. Because it has not been well defined, it risks further confusion of those elements below NATO headquarters. The Joint Warfare Centre should steer clear

of defining or using the term at the operational level, but members of the Joint Warfare Centre should be aware of its continuing development.

EBAO and its underpinning functions were not fully developed. With the loss of the term EBAO, there is no longer a defining conceptual theory guiding development of some admittedly undeveloped concepts. These concepts underpin planning in NATO military headquarters. Without a defined philosophy below NATO HQs to guide implementation, the military runs the risk of implementing an unfinished planning process without the funds to correct deficiencies already identified. The Joint Warfare Centre personnel should be aware that at the present time, the term EBAO is no longer being used and that the COPD is the only standardized document being used to guide planners.

With the loss of EBAO, the Comprehensive Approach no longer has a direct conceptual link to planning below the Strategic/Political level. The types of missions which the Alliance may be expected to undertake will require a different philosophical approach. Although the term EBAO is abandoned, hopefully the lessons and concepts which it attempted to impart will continue on. †

MULTINATIONAL EXPERIMENT



Photos by MSgt Raphael Baekler, JWC PAO

ENABLER 09: “Knowledge Development” Experiment

Article by Adrian Williamson, Experimentation Analyst,
Concept Development Division,
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THE Standalone Experimentation event, ENABLER 09, was held at the Joint Warfare Centre’s Ulsnes training facility from 30 September to 7 October 2009. Standalone Experimentation is one of three Operational Experimentation options open to Concept Developers as they seek to validate, refine and advance their concepts into capabilities. Operational Experimentation is outlined in **Panel 1**.

The subject of the experiment was Knowledge Development (KD), a topic of intense interest to NATO and to many

NATO and Partner Nations. This interest manifested itself both in the agreement of the “Multinational Experiment 6” (MNE 6) participating Nations to endorse KD for experimentation within the MNE 6 series, and in the participation of four of the MNE 6 Nations – Spain, France, Sweden and Finland – in planning or executing the experiment. The Multinational Experiment series, an important experimentation focus for NATO and the Nations, is discussed in **Panel 2**.

For those not familiar, the core function and objective of Knowledge Development

is to examine the complex operational environment (such as Afghanistan) using all available sources of information, applying systems analysis techniques and considering the inter-relationships and influences of all the PMESII* domains to support the commander and staff with comprehensive understanding for more effective operational planning, execution and assessment.

The experiment aimed to examine the proposed Knowledge Development organisations, processes and associated policies that have been under develop-



* The abbreviation PMESII is generally used to describe the interrelated systems or domains that should be considered in trying to understand a regional problem. PMESII stands for Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational and Infrastructural. It is recognized that PMESIII is incomplete lacking medical, legal, and other important systems. Rather than continue adding letters to PMESII, or change it constantly, it is understood that the term implies consideration of all relevant systems or domains.

ment within NATO. Although this aim has specific relevance to NATO commands, Nations are grappling with similar problems and so the experiment was deemed to be of wider applicability.

NATO is considering a Knowledge Network based around three entities: a Knowledge Centre (KC) within each of the three Joint Force Commands; a Knowledge Development Centre (KDC) collocated with the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) at RAF Molesworth and a Knowledge Management Centre (KMC) within SHAPE. The Knowledge Centres are already established, well defined and, indeed, had already been exercised twice, in STEADFAST JUNCTURE 09 and LOYAL JEWEL 09. Both the KDC and KMC,



We presented the **Experimentation Audience** with a series of problems set at three different stages of a crisis. Case 1 was set during Stage 1 of **NATO Response Planning** for SHAPE and the relevant Joint Force Command; Case 2 was set during the **Planning Phase** and Case 3 during **Execution**.

though, are still in the definition phase, meaning the exact roles and relationships of each are in flux. From a practical perspective, this meant that there were no KDC or KMC staff to represent these bodies in the experiment and so their roles had to be filled by others from the Intelligence/Knowledge Development community. While the Knowledge Centre does exist and has been exercised, it is critical to note that in real operations it will be highly dependent on the complete Knowledge Network, which, since not yet created, has not yet been exercised.

ENABLER 09 was the fourth ENABLER

event to be hosted by the Joint Warfare Centre and, because of the unique nature of the particular problem to be investigated, was radically different in design to previous ENABLERS.

The first difference was in the requirement for participants: while in all ENABLERS it is important to have an experienced Experimentation Audience, given both the complexity of Knowledge Development and the fact that it introduces a number of new ideas, it was essential to gather as many as possible of those knowledgeable in KD from NATO commands and the Nations for ENABLER 09. An immediate consequence of this was a limitation on scale for the event, with about 50 persons external to JWC participating and a further 17 involved as visitors or observers – far fewer than in previous ENABLERS.

A second consequence was on the fundamentals of design. In all ENABLERS, the Experimentation Audience plays an important role in the analysis: Experimentation Audience members are more than mere “lab rats”, as their experience operating within the experiment is a vital source of data. In ENABLER 09, harnessing their knowledge, experiences and analysis were identified as the fulcrum of the experiment. The design problem then became how to provide them with a realistic experience of the proposed Knowledge Network. This required stimulation through a good simulation (similar to a Joint Warfare Centre exercise and previous ENABLERS) whilst ensuring that their individual and group analysis could be fully captured and exploited (suggestive of a Seminar Wargame format). The solution was to merge these two modes of experimentation within the ENABLER 09

EXPERIMENTATION

Operational Experimentation contributes to the development of new NATO capabilities through NATO’s Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) process, either by providing information on capability gaps or about the performance of the concept being developed into a capability to fill a gap. Operational Experimentation can be undertaken in operations, in exercises or in Standalone Experimentation events. The defining characteristic is that the envisaged users of the capability are included within the “experimental unit”, that is, they become a part of the system under study. Whichever venue is selected, much of the experimentation process is the same: the experiment sponsor develops the requirement, the experiment lead defines the criteria to be measured and assessed and the design that will allow this, whilst the experiment integrator assists the design process through applying their knowledge of the constraints and possibilities of the particular event. The experiment integrator also helps to adapt the venue to meet the needs of the experimenter, where this can be done with little or no impact on the venue itself. Clearly the flexibility of the venue is very limited in Operations, with a little more flexibility in exercises and considerable flexibility in Standalone Experimentation events. The experiment is then conducted in accordance with the design and the Experiment Lead and Lead Analyst prepare a report of the experiment for the sponsor who can then incorporate these into his Concept.

Panel 1



Military Experimentation

design. We presented the Experimentation Audience with a series of problems set at three different stages of a crisis.

Case 1 was set prior to the North Atlantic Council issuing a Decision Sheet: that is, during Stage 1 of NATO Response Planning as laid out in the new Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) "Situational Awareness (Including Knowledge Development)" for SHAPE and the relevant Joint Force Command. **Case 2** was set during the planning phase and **Case 3** during execution. Data were collected as the Experimentation Audience tackled each problem. The experiment participants – both Experimentation Audience and "Response Cells" – were then brought together for facilitated discussions, led by the Lead Operational Analyst. In this way, their experiences could be recorded, explored and differences of opinion fully investigated.

Another important aspect of the experiment design was that it had to be flexible, so that changes could be made in process or organisation if and as issues arose that warranted change. This was a challenging problem as the experiment designers needed to prepare material



Left: Colonel Torsten Squarr, Chief Capability Development Division, steered the implementation of Knowledge Development during ENABLER 09. Below: Operational Analysis teams examined a series of cases based around an evolving crisis.



prior to execution and there were limited opportunities to adapt that material or prepare fresh information in response to such changes. It was achieved by preparing a limited amount of additional information and including mechanisms for identifying "change factors" and rapidly evaluating their implications and options

for experimental programme changes. In practice, it did prove necessary to change aspects of the design and the programme. For example, different relationships between the IFC and KDC were explored by reconfiguring that part of the Experimental Unit and a number of emergent issues were investigated by rescheduling a day of execution as a series of syndicate investigations of these issues. Both these changes were successfully accomplished within the experiment.

A wealth of useful data was collected during the experiment case runs, the facilitated discussions, the syndicates and the After Action Review. Moreover, it proved possible to engage many of the key KD decision makers in all or part of the experiment and, in particular, the After Action Review. The main results are discussed in **Panel 3**.

The performance of the Knowledge Network will be critical to NATO's future response to crises. The enthusiastic and skilful engagement of participants from across NATO and from the MNE 6 community in ENABLER 09 will undoubtedly have provided SHAPE with the information it needs to reconfigure and adapt its designs for a Knowledge Network, and

Panel 2

MNE

The Multinational Experiment 6 programme is a continuation of a series of collaborative experimentation activities going back to Multinational Limited Objective Experiment 1 (MN LOE 1) in 2001. The MNE series was conceived as a vehicle for developing better methods to plan and conduct coalition operations and it has been instrumental in providing data to support the development of EBAO and the Comprehensive Approach within NATO. NATO joined MNE at MN LOE 2 in 2004. The current programme, MNE 6, includes NATO; NATO Nations (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States), NATO Partner Nations (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland) and the Republic of Korea and Singapore.

MNE 6 is structured into four "outcomes", which are themselves divided into "objectives". A participant (a Nation or NATO) agrees to integrate each outcome and to act as "objective custodian" for each objective. NATO is the outcome integrator for Situational Understanding (Outcome 4) and, within this, is the objective custodian for Knowledge Development (Objective 4.1). It is in this context that NATO offered ENABLER 09 as the venue for experimentation on Knowledge Development.



to ensure harmony with initiatives such as Strategic Communications (StratCom) and its developing COPD. †

Right: The author (middle) with Operational Analysis Teams from across NATO and Partner Nations.



FACT SHEET



Multinational Experiment 6 (MNE 6)



MNE 6 is a two year multinational and interagency effort to improve coalition capabilities to counter irregular adversaries and to prevent non-compliant actors

from becoming adversaries through application of the Comprehensive Approach. Although US Joint Forces Command leads MNE 6, the Experiment involves eighteen contributing Nations and NATO who will lead or significantly contribute to the development of eleven specific objective areas during the experiment to achieve the following four outcomes:

- Gain shared situational understanding of the operational environment (led by NATO Allied Command Transformation) - Develop methods, processes, staff structures and tools to facilitate better information use;
- Synchronize efforts and assist host nations (led by United Kingdom) - Develop guidelines to improve compliance and reduce the possibility of non-compliant actors from becoming adversaries;
- Collaboratively develop and implement a shared regional or transnational information strategy (led by Germany) - Develop a framework for analysis and assessment of the information environment;
- Assess campaign progress and success in order to better adapt to the situation (led by the United States) - Develop guiding principles, methods and approaches.

(Extracted from US Joint Forces Command website at www.jfcom.mil)

RESULTS

- With limited manpower, expertise and information sources in any one organisation, it is critical to establish a Knowledge Development (KD) Network where information is shared and analysis is collaborative. The collaborative processes observed during ENABLER 09 tended to break down when workload increased – at the very point when they could have had greatest effect. Some care needed to be taken with this observation as collaboration needs time to “bed in”, but options for improving collaboration processes have been identified and recommended.
- Compared to traditional intelligence in NATO, KD requires a shift from simply delivering products (which are “accessed” by users) to more active “knowledge transfer”. This necessitates integration of KD staff and users. It also means that SHAPE must have in-house analysis in addition to its management role, if the SOPG is to be properly supported.
- A “Knowledge Base” (KB) had previously been identified as a key supporting capability for KD. The ENABLER 09 seminar sessions explored issues that need to be addressed before the KB can be implemented, but it was concluded that a lack of a KB should not be a reason to delay other aspects of KD implementation.
- KD is similarly interdependent with NNEC, IKM, collaboration and “reachback”. To the extent possible, KD work needs to focus on the strands of development that are specific to KD – the systems perspective and all-source systems analysis addressing PMESII domains – and must merely seek to influence and leverage these other activities.
- The IFC already provides excellent analytical products and has some KD capabilities. However, to provide increased KD support to SHAPE’s SOPG (and Strategic Communication) and the three JFCs, especially in specialist areas of PMESII, will require enhancement which is integrated into the KD Network.

Panel 3

BEST PRACTICES



A LESSONS LEARNED ENABLER FOR NATO TRANSFORMATION

By Paul Sewell
Lessons Learned Branch, Capability Development Division
Joint Warfare Centre

Above: The Joint Helicopter Force provides a fleet of helicopters that support the troops on the ground in Afghanistan (Photo by Maj Paul Smyth MoD/Crown Copyright 2010). Soldiers providing security during a school assessment in Afghanistan (US Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt Francisco V. Govea).

Introduction

Our engagement spaces throughout the world are in constant flux. Gone is the focus on bombs and bullets and military might alone. Instead, knowledge is the new ammunition and we use it in our daily lives. It is a commodity we are constantly collecting, integrating, exploiting and sharing. Regardless of whether

you are an operator, staff officer, Subject Matter Expert or General, we are all knowledge managers in the business of transforming information to best serve our needs. In this so-called network enabled world, we are constantly inundated by information and knowledge, which is constantly changing and updating such



that we are at risk of suffering from information overload or “analysis paralysis”. The reality however is that we do not need more of either, but rather, better ways to harness what we already have. Knowledge Management is recognition of these needs and through its processes and principles it attempts to utilize the value that knowledge contains. The ideal of Knowledge Management is to make the right knowledge available to the right person at the right time and place. One force multiplier in this management of knowledge might be the use of Best Practices.

A recent example of the success of Best Practices is the EU’s Operation Atalanta. This naval operation, responsible for tackling Somali piracy, demonstrated that those ships using Best Practices are significantly less likely to be attacked by the pirates than those that don’t⁽¹⁾. These Best Practices were often very simple checks and processes but served to delay the pirates long enough while military assistance was on its way.

A second important example is the TF Helmand in Regional Command (South) (RC[S]) and their approach to Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Their Lessons Learned Staff Officer and a C-IED group developed a very dynamic process for responding to new IEDs, sharing feedback, and implementing them back in their training. It has proved to be extremely effective and very responsive, transforming raw data into valuable knowledge to update the Commanders’ situational awareness. More so, it is broadly shared with the intent to save lives that would have otherwise been lost to outdated information⁽²⁾.

Collecting Best Practices

Most would recognise the value of Best Practices, but they are like the weather – everyone talks about it, but no one does anything about it! So in late 2007 the Joint Warfare Centre began to collect operational Best Practices from various

1. “Anti-piracy strategies proving effective,” UN says, 28 January 2010, CNN.com.

2. A great deal more information about this can be found in the JALLC report on “The Lessons Learned Process in ISAF”, released February 2010, page 15.

Knowledge is the new ammunition (...) It is a commodity we are constantly collecting, integrating, exploiting and sharing. Regardless of whether you are an operator, staff officer, Subject Matter Expert or General, we are all **knowledge managers** in the business of transforming information to best serve our needs.

sources. The Joint Warfare Centre took on the task due to its unique placement within NATO. Firstly, the Joint Warfare Centre has strong links within the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) arm of NATO, specifically with its parent organisation, HQ SACT, and its sister organisations, the Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) and the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC).

More importantly, as NATO’s operational level training centre, it interacts with most of Allied Command Operations (ACO) by regularly training all the Joint (Force) Commands and the Component Commands. With their embedded training teams mentoring and teaching in the ISAF and NRF exercises, the Joint Warfare Centre is best placed to not only capture new Best Practices but to also disseminate existing Best Practices to

those that will benefit from them. With these points in mind, the Joint Warfare Centre arguably has the best and closest contact with the rest of NATO and therefore best suited to the central collection of NATO’s Best Practices.

So why are Best Practices important? Why do we bother collecting them? If it’s not obvious enough, the chances are that if you benefited from some process or technique then someone else will too and so it should be shared as Best Practices ultimately help expedite the continuing Transformation of the Alliance to meet the ever-changing security environment.

On a simpler level, Best Practices are a simple mechanism for spreading ideas. The more good practices we are exposed to, the more chance that the cross-fertilisation of ideas occur to create those



Insurgent weapons, munitions and Improvised Explosive Device components recovered during the joint Special Operations Task Group/Afghan National Security Force operation against the insurgent stronghold in southern Afghanistan. (Photo courtesy Australian Government Department of Defence).



new Transformational concepts, which are so important to the Alliance. This will then help us focus more on sharing the collective tacit knowledge³ which we would have otherwise kept to ourselves.

By sharing Best Practices amongst each other we are also opening the channels to communicate. For example, if you spoke to someone from Strike Force NATO (SFN) about one of their Best Practices then you are more likely to keep that communication open in the future. Ideally, for the Joint Warfare Centre, the goal is to disseminate Best Practices to commanders and their staffs within NATO who may wish to adopt and evolve them for their own purposes.

What is a Best Practice?

So, what exactly is a Best Practice? The term Best Practice is now heard everywhere, so much so that it could be considered a cliché; in the military we seem to use it as widely as we use the term Transformation. It is constantly used but could you define it? This is not simple to answer as there are so many definitions of Best Practice, mainly because it depends on the many different cultural, service and contextual blends we apply to it. While generally seen as a "better way" of doing things, the Joint Warfare Centre takes a pragmatic approach and has the following definition:

A Best Practice is a technique, process, or methodology that contributes to the improved performance of an organisation and has been identified as a possible best way of operating in a particular area. Ideally, a Best Practice should be adaptive, replicable and immediately useful.

While some may argue the definition and offer alternatives (such as "Good" over "Best" Practice), the general direction of these definitions is the same: *a Best Practice is a demonstrated effective*

3. Tacit knowledge refers to the knowledge kept in people's heads such as rules of thumb, hints and tips, experience, insights and so on. This extremely valuable source of knowledge is rarely harnessed by organizations.



“What got NATO where it is today will not get us where we want to be tomorrow. Therefore we must be constantly mindful to continue to improve our collective capabilities.”

way of doing things. It is for this reason we want to spread its benefits as widely as possible.

When defining Best Practices, it is important to also define what they are not, and *Best Practices are neither Doctrine nor Lessons Learned.* In essence, both Doctrine and Lessons Learned have a longer term focus and are typically more multifaceted. They also are greater in scope in terms of longer term change. For example, doctrine can detail a whole system of processes including its sub-processes, templates, and so on. Whereas Best Practices may serve as the basis for future development of doctrine and, while just as valuable, are best seen

as “quick fixes”, “useful hints”, or “one step solutions”, allowing them to be utilised quite easily. Often a Best Practice can be read in a couple of minutes and quite possibly be applied relatively quickly. Therefore, it is more representative of a single or smaller process even though it can contribute to the larger scope of doctrine or a Lesson Learned. Also, Best Practices are not typically mandatory; rather they offer an alternative to current practices, which can be adopted appropriately within each Headquarters.

The Joint Warfare Centre also created another concept to complement Best Practices: *Common Operational Issues (COIs)*. Whereas Best Practices





show potential better ways of doing things, Common Operational Issues represent the opposite: all those common and recurring problems faced by all operational headquarters. Prior knowledge of these issues can be extremely valuable to the various Training Audiences as they can learn to avoid these issues rather than committing them.

Sharing Best Practices

It is not only important to simply capture Best Practices but also to share them and this has been the focus of the Joint Warfare Centre for some years. Historically, the Joint Warfare Centre has used Best Practices in a number of ways to help NATO Transformation. Briefly, here are some of the ways the Joint Warfare Centre injects Best Practices back into the NATO bloodstream:

4. This NATO Unclassified package can be made available by contacting the author.

- **Best Practice Package:** This was a small publication distributed in 2009, which offered a selection of Best Practices to introduce the reader to the concept of Best Practices as well as feature some of the most valuable Best Practices from the last years. This is a good “first read” when trying to understand the scope of Best Practices⁽⁴⁾.

- **The JWC Best Practice Database:** The JWC’s Lessons Learned Branch manages a simple database, which stores both Best Practices and the Common Operational Issues. It is searchable and easily accessible to anyone with a NATO Secret computer (<http://lldb.jwc.nato.int/sites/LLDB/BPDB/default.aspx>).

- **The Senior Mentors & Observer/Trainers:** These retired General officers and Observer/Trainers constantly use Best Practices and Common Operational Issues as learning points when they train and mentor the staffs during the exercises. Especially with the Senior Mentors, with their years of real world experience and judgement, they are able to deliver these Best Practices for maximum impact.

- **Phase I – Academics:** This is the first part of the NATO four-phase exercise model, where the Subject Matter Experts from the JWC present a week long series of briefings on key elements of an Operational Headquarters. This is a blend of traditional operational briefings as well as a forum for newer concepts, such as the COPD, to the Training Audiences. All these briefings however are infused with Best Practices from each of these disciplines and reinforced with the years of experience.

Where to from here?

What got NATO where it is today will not get us where we want to be tomorrow. Therefore we must be constantly mindful to continue to improve our collective capabilities. We must also realise that knowledge itself does not change

behaviour. It needs to be applied to be of value. This will begin when we can encourage people to change their mindsets and start applying Best Practices for their benefit. This is the reason for the Joint Warfare Centre’s new Best Practice initiative.

Where are we now?

Currently, all Best Practices are validated internally by the Joint Warfare Centre’s Subject Matter Experts. While this has proven effective, it meant that we restricted the possibilities for further developing and sharing Best Practices.

But where do we want to be?


In 2010, the Joint Warfare Centre plans to revitalise the Best Practice project to involve more of NATO and its organisations. While more information will be sent out formally in the near future, the remainder of the article will detail this new process. The thrust of the new approach is to encourage broader involvement in NATO, not only to capture more Best Practices but to make them more available to a broader audience for the greater benefit. (Check the Figure on Page 22 while reading the following Steps).

Step 1: Someone in a HQ has a practice, process or method which has helped them. This has been shown to be really effective at their Headquarters and they would now like to offer it to the rest of NATO. This potential Best Practice (notated as “bp”) is then sent to the Joint Warfare Centre for consideration and entry into the JWC Best Practice Database. This should be submitted with a Best Practice Submission Form available from the JWC Best Practice Database.

Step 2: When the “bp” is received by the JWC’s Lessons Learned Branch, it is checked for clarity, understanding, and a solid justification is given for why it is a Best Practice. Why is this? Ideally this is so that the reader can immediately understand its impact and value.

Step 3: The potential “NATO BP” is then sent to the members of the NATO BP community. This Community of Practice





The New Best Practice Process (above) and the 5 Steps: This model moves away from the JWC-centric approach and instead focuses on using the “collective brain trust” NATO-wide as well as the Joint Warfare Centre. This is best explained by going through each of these steps individually.

will be a new initiative and the most important part of the process. The reason for this is twofold: The first is to serve as a means to better share new Best Practices throughout NATO. Each member of the community is then empowered to then distribute it within their own headquarters as appropriate. The second benefit of the NATO BP community is to see if there are any better Best Practices to the one originally submitted. If so, then these submissions are welcomed for consideration.

The NATO BP Community: Who should be a member of this NATO BP Community? If the goal is to spread these Best Practices as broadly as possible ideally its membership could extend to headquarters within the NATO Force Structure, the NATO Command Structure, as well as the various agencies, Centres of Excellence and national assets. The OPR may be placed within the traditional J7 or Lessons Learned role, in the Knowledge Directorate of a Joint Force Command, or even those with a personal enthusiasm to distribute such practices.

Step 4: From the selection of potential Best Practices, the NATO BP Community will then determine the best candidate based on a number of clear, objective measures. From this, one of three things could happen:

1. The “best” of the potential Best Practices is selected;
2. More than one best practice is selected, as they each have merit, or;
3. Elements of several potential Best Practices are combined to create a more robust Best Practice.

A part of the philosophy of Best Practices is to keep us open to different possibilities and approaches rather than limit to only one final option. Therefore it is important to note that consensus within the BP Community is not always necessary. On the contrary, the main thrust is to ensure that this stream of Best Practices continues to flow throughout NATO as well as the dialog to support and develop them. In reality, a practice or process needs only to be helpful to one person to be of value and so searching for a practice that is universally useful to everyone is simply futile. Instead we want to focus on progression not perfection.

Step 5: In this final step, the endorsed Best Practice then becomes a *NATO Best Practice* and is entered into the Joint Warfare Centre Best Practice Database. This database then serves as a repository for all the Best Practices and Common Operational Issues, which have been distributed and endorsed throughout NATO. Also, the content in this database will be reviewed annually to ensure it remains current and does not become obsolete.

The Next Step: 2010 – The year of the Best Practice?

The success of NATO and the security of its Nations depend on how it efficiently uses the resources and capabilities available. We must not only contend with the current security threats but do so within our collective political and economic restraints. This is especially important with the ever-decreasing budgets that we are faced with today. Therefore, any effort we can make to become more effective and efficient must be started now. The collection and distribution of Best Practices serve as a means to contribute to this effort. The broader the network and the deeper the channels of communication between our Nations, headquarters and Centres of Excellence, the easier it will be to transmit these essential Best Practices from one corner of NATO to the other for our collective benefit. †

► For more information on Best Practices you can either access the JWC Best Practice Database (<http://lldb.jwc.nato.int/sites/LLDB/BPDB/default.aspx>) from a NATO Secret computer or contact the author directly paul.sewell@jwc.nato.int

THE GUIDING FORCE

LEADERSHIP



By CDR Michael Hallett, USA N,
HQ SACT, Lessons Learned Staff Officer Course Director

THE LESSONS LEARNED (LL) process constitutes a method through which an organization examines what it has done, is doing, and how to do it better. This includes reflection on what the organization is doing well in addition to areas in which the organization needs to improve mission execution. The insights and understanding generated by the analysis phase of the Lessons Learned process add value to the command by enabling learning from previous similar operations (both in terms of what to do and what not to do) and how to correct problems that emerge in the complex dynamic en-

vironments in which we operate. However, this Lessons Learned methodology itself requires the use of scarce time and attention resources. The requirement to expend extra effort to actually analyze activities in order to improve them competes with the demands of everyday world; where the short term demands of tomorrow devour the energy necessary for effective contemplation of the past – even when that contemplation is directed toward improving the future.

Therefore, in this resource constrained environment, engagement by the command leadership is essential to ensure adequate resources are dedicated to

utilizing the Lessons Learned process so that the command is optimally prepared for its mission. The preparation via the Lessons Learned process includes both benefiting from good practices developed by others and avoiding their mistakes.

LL capability leadership is essential to foster an institutional culture that not only accepts the need for the organizational self-examination that underpins a successful Lessons Learned program,

Above: General Stanley McChrystal, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, addresses members of his staff, photo by ISAF PAO.



Lessons Learned

but embraces it. Strong leadership engagement in Lessons Learned activities will enable the command to apply the knowledge from their own experiences and the experiences of others to significantly improve mission accomplishment.

Engagement

Engagement includes providing Lessons Learned guidance, prioritization of observation areas and remedial action implementation, and communication about the process phases. It also includes promotion of the gains to the organizational ability to excel a robust Lessons Learned capability can provide.

Guidance

Leaders provide guidance in three ways:

- promulgation of LL related texts;
- prioritization of attention and activity through the phases of the LL process;
- endorsing implementation steps.

Textual Guidance

Leaders must promulgate Lessons Learned command directives and policy in order to explain the nature of the command's Lessons Learned activity. While higher-level texts, like the NATO Lessons Learned Policy and the Bi-Strategic Command Directive 80-6, provide the overall guidance, leaders at each command must explain, through, for example, command directives or Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), what they want their staffs to do in regard to Lessons Learned. In many cases, this guidance may simply require tailoring higher-level guidance to the specific circumstances of the command. In other situations, this guidance may need clarification, spelling out, for example, the implementation process in the operations area or how to share Lessons Learned related knowledge and information with Allied or Partner forces and representatives of major international organizations.

Prioritization

Attention is a scarce resource – and the areas of possible observation in the complex, dynamic environments in which we operate are vast. Therefore the organizational leadership must provide priorities

in the observation, analysis and implementation phases of the Lessons Learned process to guide command and other analysts attention focus. This focus direction requires selecting the crucial areas of observation, and screening the resulting observations for those issues worthy of further analysis. These can be obvious, for example, like finding causes of a fratricide incident, or subtler, like looking for ways to improve existing procedures or collecting *good practices* to share with a unit recently arrived in theatre.

It is not possible to exhaustively deal with each dimension of every issue – prioritisation of effort is essential and this prioritization includes not only prioritizing issues to observe, but also the degree and type of implementation activities. In setting these priorities, answering questions like the following can be helpful:

- Observations, in which areas, are important to the command?
- What Lessons Identified (LI) will receive the resources necessary for implementation?
- What organizations should be approached to facilitate Lessons Identified implementation currently beyond the resources of the organization, but that are crucial for capability improvement?
- How should remedial actions be executed?
- What coordination with external action bodies is required?
- How will we validate that the remedial actions have generated the desired effects?

Guidance through prioritization is also required for determining the scope of a proposed solution. The leadership must answer questions like:

- How complete should the solution be?
- What degree of effort will be dedicated to this issue?
- What aspects of the recommended remedial actions are essential to have, and what are just nice to have?

An adequate solution tomorrow is often worth more than a "gold plated" or near perfect solution fielded a year from

now. The leadership must decide about the trade-offs necessary for each implementation process – the costs in time, money, people and the opportunity costs associated with a focus on one topic over another must all be addressed. With this guidance the Lessons Learned organization can develop and execute a program of work focused on improving top priority capabilities.

Endorsement

Once the Lesson Identified (the root cause or causes and the recommended remedial actions) is articulated, the command leadership must approve the recommended remedial actions and commit to implementation. This activity constitutes endorsement.

Endorsement has two parts: Selection and Tasking. These are informed by the prioritization activity. The selection of the recommended Remedial Actions (RA) requires reviewing the RAs to determine their validity. The result of the review is a decision by the leadership concerning which recommended Remedial Actions are actually going to be implemented.

Some Remedial Actions may be good ideas, but "nice to have" rather than essential, and so not worthy of the expense to implement. Others need to be implemented as soon as possible and some, in the judgement of the commander, may no longer be applicable or have in other ways "missed the mark" and should therefore not be implemented.

This judgement does not entail that the analysis was flawed. Due to the speed of change in the highly complex environments in which forces operate, a Remedial Action formulated in March, to remedy a situation observed in January, may have been affected by changes in other elements of the environment such that the recommended Remedial Action is no longer appropriate.

The second part of endorsement, tasking Action Bodies to perform the actual implementation work, is the most difficult. Extensive involvement by the organizational leadership is required to motivate implementation activity. Why is extra effort by the leadership necessary here? Isn't business as usual sufficient to get Remedial Actions implemented? No, be-



cause these recommendations are almost always in excess of the normal programs of work or activities assigned personnel are responsible for executing. Thus LI implementation is “extra work” the utility of which may not be immediately apparent.

Therefore, implementation requires that the organizational leadership appropriately prioritize, provide resources for implementation activity and create incentives to execute. How can this be done? Leaders must make explicit the connection between the desired ends and the work necessary to create the enhanced (safer, faster, lower cost, etc.) means in order to motivate staffs to get the work done. In other words, they must show the staff “what is in it for me” to justify the effort. Especially, the early stages of developing a command Lessons Learned capability may require using examples from other similar commands until the command has its own Lessons Learned success stories to tell. These concrete narratives will motivate participation more than a list of completed LI and LL.

Therefore, tasking implementation activities is a key element of ensuring ef-

fective implementation, and a core leadership task. Tracking the status of this work is essential to ensure that Lesson Identified Remedial Action implementation activity is not lost in the shuffle of response to the demands of the daily work and thus falls behind schedule until the LI becomes stale.

The endorsement step will usually be a mere formality in cases where the commander is asked to endorse Remedial Actions generated by his/her own Lessons Learned organization. In these situations he/she will be familiar with the entire process as it has developed, and will have provided guidance such that a recommended Remedial Action which in his/her judgement has missed the mark will seldom be submitted for endorsement. However, in situations where the recommended Remedial Actions were generated by an external analysis organization there will often be cases of disagreement concerning the relative importance or even utility of various recommendations. Successful implementation is especially reliant on Lessons Learned leadership guidance in these situations.


Promotion

The second component of leadership’s Lessons Learned engagement, Lessons Learned promotion, consists of two major elements: sharing the products of the Lessons Learned process and promoting the Lessons Learned capability itself.

Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned sharing increases organizational Information and Knowledge Management (IKM) productivity by making knowledge available at very low cost in time, money and attention. This sharing provides the surplus value of the Lessons Learned system that organizations can use to increase their productivity and thus in the military context, mission accomplishment. In spite of an evolving shift in mindset from approaching decisions on sharing information based on the other’s “need to know” to an approach based on an imperative to share, due primarily to security considerations the command leadership must make the explicit decision on what Lessons Learned related information to share and how to share it. This includes answering questions like the following:

- Is the information worth sharing?
- Can it safely be shared?
- If so in what form [journal article, database entry, presentation, report] and at what classification should the information be distributed?

The Lessons Learned leadership activities: SELECT, ENDORSE, PRIORITIZE, TASK, TRACK and PROMOTE are embedded in the larger command [communication](#) process.



THE LESSONS LEARNED CAPABILITY adds value to operations not only by enabling learning from the past, but by developing habits of analysis and innovation necessary to deal with the high speed complex environments in which we operate today.

In coalition operations this sharing is essential, given the short in theatre time frame for many forces. If they are unable to learn from the experience of other coalition members prior to arrival in theatre, by the time they figure out the complex nuances of their mission, redeployment preparations will begin.

Promotion through Incentive Creation

The second, deeper component of Lessons Learned promotion requires the creation of incentives to not only to participate fully in the process, but to enthusiastically wring every ounce of improved capability from the Lessons Learned meta-capability⁽¹⁾. Our enemies learn quickly

1. A meta-capability is a capability that improves other capabilities.



– we must learn faster and the Lessons Learned capability can help us do that.

Accelerating learning requires creating appropriate incentives. In many organizations, the incentives related to information sharing concerning Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned, often stimulated by mistakes committed, are all negative. In other words, there is a strong *disincentive* to share information about sub-optimal performance because doing so will harm one's career. This is not unusual or specific to the military – admitting mistakes is difficult – and no one wants to look stupid⁽²⁾.

Incentives are required to motivate action, and therefore appropriate incentive creation is a vital aspect of leader's promotion of the Lessons Learned capability as a tool for organizational improvement. Absent a set of incentives to encourage sharing the Lessons Learned sharing will remain inadequate. Why does this matter? A Lessons Learned unshared forces others to bear the costs, in money, time and people to learn the same lessons. Thus, the Lessons Learned process failure to share means that we are putting colleagues at risk unnecessarily.

Performance incentives

Positive incentives are necessary in order to overcome this natural resistance to sharing deficiencies: therefore, leaders must make sharing deficiencies, the analysis of those deficiencies and the capability improvement that result from implementing the Remedial Actions a contribution to a career, not the excuse for ending it. The amount of information shared, measured in terms of Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned, could become a positive component of performance evaluation – for example, fitness reports could read "shared x LL resulting in x man hours saved" so sharing becomes an asset instead of a perceived liability in the personnel evaluation process.

2. The presence of this disincentive is the root cause of the central importance given to making a clear distinction between the LI to LL process and the evaluation and assessment process. Evaluation is concerned with grading performance - the LL process is concerned only with improving performance.

Emphasizing the positive

A rhetorical approach based on putting Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned in terms of *good* or *best practices* can create additional incentives to share. Although a mistake was the original motivation for the formulation of the *good* or *best practice* (it would not have become an object of attention if everything had simply occurred as the established procedures indicated it would) putting the information and knowledge gained in terms of a *good practice* provides a positive shield behind which the originating mistake can remain hidden. As a result of this approach, the knowledge gained from overcoming mistakes can be placed in the foreground, but the mistakes, and the people who made them, can remain in the background. This highlighting of the positive creates an incentive to communicate the improvements to techniques, processes and procedures that will improve mission accomplishment – the fundamental point of our Lessons Learned efforts.

Conclusion

The Lessons Learned capability only succeeds if it facilitates questioning of command activities, not only when actions generate unintended consequences (someone is injured, mission setbacks occur, the local community becomes less willing to act in ways that support an improved [from the NATO perspective] security situation, and so on) but when the mission seems to be going well. This openness to questioning and constant "second guessing" of command policy can be perceived as detrimental to good order and discipline. So, the question may arise: Does a Lessons Learned process undermine military leadership capabilities? This is not an insignificant question. If the command leadership does not support development of an enhanced Lessons Learned capability, the capability will not develop.

Yet, this concern should not be overstated: military leadership is not based on the provision of unquestionable orders from on high but regularly involves input from subordinates in order to make the best possible decisions in high risk, dynamic, complex environments. Thus a

robust Lessons Learned capability does not pose a threat to military leadership, in spite of the contribution the openness fostered by the Lessons Learned capability to flattening hierarchies. However, understanding why some might find the Lessons Learned capability threatening is beneficial for those involved in the LL capability, for it can enable them to better address these concerns in their training.

The Lessons Learned capability adds value to operations not only by enabling learning from the past, but by developing habits of analysis and innovation necessary to deal with the high speed complex environments in which we operate today. It is thus merely another tool that command leadership can employ for enhancing decision making in order to enhance mission accomplishment. As Clausewitz explained, "*continual change and the need to respond to it compels the commander to carry the whole intellectual apparatus of his knowledge within him. He must always be ready to bring forth the appropriate decision. By total assimilation with his mind and life, the commander's knowledge must be transformed into a genuine capability.*" (On War, page 147) The Lessons Learned capability enhances this intellectual apparatus.

Incorporating Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned from previous similar operations during the mission analysis phase of the planning process will enable the command to benefit from past experience in order to execute missions more effectively. By providing the guidance for observation, prioritization of implementation activities and creation of the incentives for operators and staffs to enthusiastically participate in the Lessons Learned process, leaders play an essential role to ensure the resources expended on the Lessons Learned capability provide a worthwhile return on investment or we are focused on learned not as a good in itself, but as a means to improved mission accomplishment. †

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STRATEGIC



COMMUNICATIONS



IN ISAF

By Colonel Arthur Tulak, USA A,
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WHILE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (STRATCOM) is not a new concept in NATO, it has seen dramatic refinement in both theory and application over the last 18 months. StratComs' newfound elevated status in NATO is due in large measure to the fact that Allied Command Operations (ACO) is managing major operations in multiple theatres, which are critical to the security of Alliance member Nations, and which require a StratCom effort that is

fully coordinated and aggressively implemented. The United States military identified StratCom as an organized discipline focused on coordinating all military information activities in September 2004.⁽¹⁾ The still in draft concept of StratCom was put into action only two months later in support of Operation Unified Assistance; the US PACOM*-led humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations following the December 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Subsequently, StratCom has been codified in

US Joint Doctrine in JP 3-13, Information Operations⁽²⁾, and StratCom staff organizations are found in the headquarters of the Combatant Commands and their subordinate Service Component Commands.

1. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, September 2004.

* US PACOM: United States Pacific Command.
2. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006, p. 1-10.



The policy and operations aspects of StratCom in NATO have only recently been codified in policy and operations guidance, which now allows for the more confident execution of SACEUR's intent to improve Allied Command Operations StratCom capabilities and execution in peacetime and mission headquarters; and StratCom execution in the mission headquarters, namely KFOR and ISAF.

StratCom in NATO was developed in response to the requirements imposed by real-world operations, where in the information dimension of operations, adversaries continue to contest NATO's policy aims. While StratCom has only recently been codified in NATO, its practitioners already have a developed body of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), as StratCom has been planned, executed, and assessed in Operations Joint Enterprise in the Balkans, and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Allied Command Operations, responding to the need of commanders in the field to unify their communication efforts, published *ACO Directive 95-2* on 15 September 2008. This Directive, updated and re-published just over a year later on 19 November 2009, tasked both the peacetime and mission headquarters to establish procedures and battle-rhythm events and to re-organize to effectively plan, coordinate, execute, and assess StratCom and its integrated and synchronized subordinate elements of Public Affairs (PA), Information Operations (Info Ops), and Military Support to Public Diplomacy (MSPD). The Directive tasked all headquarters under ACO to establish ad-hoc or permanent staff organizations and processes to support the SHAPE StratCom battle-rhythm.

The Directive also clearly established the responsible office at SHAPE for coordinating the StratCom efforts for ACO, appointing the first Chief of Strategic Communication, Mr Mark Laity, to oversee the coordination of StratCom from SACEUR down to every ACO NATO HQs.

ACO's implementation of StratCom provided flexibility to its subordinate headquarters to re-organize or re-task according to their own capability and structure, rather than mandate a "one-



Mark Laity, the first Chief of NATO Strategic Communication, at JWC-led Iraqi Key Leader Training 10 (IKLT 10), Ulsnes.

size-fits-all" solution. Working Groups were established that brought together a StratCom "community of interest" to achieve the desired levels of coordination. The NATO StratCom community of interest included the two US Combatant Commands linked to operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, namely, US European Command (US EUCOM) and US Central Command (US CENTCOM), both of whom have functioning StratCom staff elements that very quickly integrated into this collaborative approach. US EUCOM participates in the ISAF-focused StratCom efforts, while US CENTCOM coordinates with ISAF through Headquarters US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A).

SACEUR's intent for the implementation of StratCom within ACO is to create adaptable structures that work in a collaborative fashion and with initiative to innovate. Commander JFC Brunssum (JFCBS) further elaborated in his intent for StratCom a strong emphasis on collaboration across several layers of command, reaching over the borders of Command and Control and breaking out of the traditional stove-piped communication channels³.

Accordingly, StratCom coordination achieves speed by flattening the coordination layers so that all layers are working collaboratively to ensure a co-

ordinated response action to crises, or to take the initiative. While speed is important, accuracy of information is paramount, which requires the certainty of fact-checking, which takes time and is a brake on speed. By maintaining open communication vertically and laterally, the process of discerning the facts to achieve certainty reduces reaction time to facilitate speed. Similarly, when opportunities for taking the initiative arise, the entire StratCom community can quickly develop a common approach, tailored for each level of operations in parallel fashion.

ACO Directive 95-2 was the defining moment in the development of a discipline of StratCom within NATO, which resulted in significant changes in ACO HQs to put into operation effective strategies, staff organizations/procedures, and a supporting battle-rhythm to effectively coordinate all military information activities in the on-going combat and peace support operations commanded by SACEUR. The operational requirements in Afghanistan and the Balkans had trumped the traditional sequence of first setting policy, determining doctrine, and then developing the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures to implement policy and doctrine.

NATO Policy for StratCom, PO (2009) 0141, would not be published until 29 September 2009, over a year after the first version of ACO DIR 95-2 had been published on 15 September 2008. Critically, the policy provided the NATO definition for StratCom, key operation principles, and established the roles, authorities, and relationships between the various NATO HQs for the coordination, execution, control, and assessment of StratCom.

Key to Commander JFCBS intent for the implementation of StratCom in ISAF, is that it was to be done in accordance with NATO policies and procedures. *Major Chris Sargent's* article in the October 2009 issue of this magazine, highlighted the changes in organization, battle-rhythm, and staff procedures at HQ ISAF when the StratCom Directorate was established in January 2009. This re-organization represented the implemen-

3. See COM JFCBS, Annex UU to "JFCB OP-LAN 30302, REV 4, 09 APR 2009, CONFIDENTIAL REL ISAF".





Afghanistan Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta listens a wounded Afghan officer. At the back are the ISAF Commander General Stanley McChrystal, together with the ISAF Director of Communication, Rear Admiral Gregory J. Smith. Photo by US Army Sgt David Alvarado.

tation of ACO DIR 95-2 in ISAF, which provided a staff structure that permitted more effective coordination of the major components of StratCom (PA, Info Ops, and MSPD). The new ISAF StratCom Directorate followed the collaborative approach initiated at SHAPE, in that it was established in full partnership with HQ USFOR-A, the war-fighting subordinate HQs of CENTCOM in Kabul. The result was a combined ISAF/USFOR-A StratCom Directorate, built and led by Brigadier General Michael Ryan, US Army, who exercised authorities under both the Oper-

ation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and ISAF mandates, reporting to both COM ISAF and CDR USFOR-A. The new structure recognized the special relationship of the PAO as the Commander's special advisor for Public Affairs, as well as the NATO policy restrictions on using PAOs as Info Ops Staff Officers, and vice versa⁽⁴⁾. In establishing the ISAF StratCom Directorate, COM ISAF also recognized the role of the CJPOTF* as a separate command, but whose activities were to be coordinated by the Director STRATCOM.

Under the leadership of Rear Admiral

Gregory Smith, USA N, the combined ISAF/USFOR-A StratCom effort has continued to improve in both capability and impact, even with the challenges associated with resourcing the stand-up of the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) Headquarters with Info Ops, PSYOPS, and PA staff officers. The combined structure has allowed for the first time since the stand-up of ISAF in 2003 to have a common set of StratCom, Info Ops, PSYOPS objectives for both the OEF and ISAF mandates, eliminating gaps and further improving coordination within the StratCom community of interest. ISAF Annexes for StratCom, Info Ops, PSYOPS, and PA are now aligned with their CENTCOM and USFOR-A counterpart Annexes and Appendices. Noteworthy new capabilities include the Atmospherics Program Afghanistan (APA), and the Traditional Communications (TRADCOM) program. The APA provides additional non-intelligence information gathering, while the TRADCOM program facilitates communication with the Government and traditional community structures.

THE NATO DEFINITION OF STRATCOM emphasizes that the process starts at the strategic level, that is to say, at NATO HQs, where the Alliance member Nations coordinate the policy aims that StratCom will

* CJPOTF: Combined Joint PSYOPS Task Force. 4. MC 422-3 and MC 457-1 both specify this restriction.

NATO Definition for NATO Strategic Communications,

29 September 2009: The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy (PD), Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (Info Ops) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations, and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims.

— NATO Strategic Communications Policy 0141, 29 September 2009

ACO Definition for NATO Strategic Communications, ACO DIR 95-2,

19 November 2009: In concert with other political and military actions, to advance NATO's aims and operations through the co-ordinated, appropriate use of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs and Information Operations.

— ACO Directive 95-2, 19 November 2009



STRATCOM IN NATO WAS DEVELOPED IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY REAL-WORLD OPERATIONS, WHERE IN THE INFORMATION DIMENSION OF OPERATIONS, ADVERSARIES CONTINUE TO CONTEST NATO'S POLICY AIMS.



StratCom team at Joint Warfare Centre's interim training facility in Ulsnes during ISAF TE 09-01. Photo by MSgt Raphael Baekler, DEU AF, JWC PAO.

support. The ultimate purpose of StratCom is to ensure that all communications to external audiences are achieving a mutually reinforcing effect under the direction of the Commander. StratCom-specific staff organizations are necessary only at headquarters responsible for achieving effects at the strategic level, these are the four-star headquarters, namely SHAPE, JFC Naples, JFC Brunssum, and ISAF.

Operational level HQs, such as KFOR and the ISAF Joint Command, are organized along conventional lines and support the StratCom battle rhythm and plans developed at the strategic level HQs. At the ISAF Joint Command, coordination of StratCom is achieved not by a StratCom staff element, but rather via the ISAF StratCom Working Group (SCWG) battle-rhythm event. At the operational and tactical level, Info Ops, PA, and PSYOPS staff officers will ensure that military information activities conducted as part of framework operations are supporting the StratCom objectives published in Annex UU of the higher HQ OPLAN. The Info Ops, PA, and PSYOPS objectives in Annexes O, X, and L, respectively, are also mapped to support the Commander's StratCom objectives in Annex UU.

At HQ IJC, which is at the operational

level, the PAO, Info Ops Director, and CJPTF Commander work together to synchronize their activities and ensure they are supporting the ISAF StratCom objectives. Assessment reports are provided for each of these areas to the ISAF StratCom Assessment Branch to drive future StratCom planning. The ISAF StratCom Assessment Branch produces a weekly StratCom Assessment Report, which supports planning at all levels of operation. These assessments are also integrated into the ISAF Campaign Assessment process, to measure the effects achieved in the information dimension. The StratCom ASSESSREP is applied to the planning of future operations to make refinements to improve effects achievement.

To provide updated D&G to the subordinate commands of IJC, NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), ISAF Special Operations Forces (SOF), and the Regional Commands, the Info Ops and Plans Branch of ISAF Communication Directorate publishes StratCom Coordinating Instructions, covering a six week period. The guidance is published as a FRAGO – and is therefore an order to execute, but it also provides the necessary analysis of the problem that

subordinate units do not have the luxury to accomplish on their own. These Coordinating Instructions ensure that IJC and Regional Command military information activities are linked to the Commander's priorities for StratCom for upcoming operations. Each of the StratCom Coordinating Instructions is based on the forecasted operations, expected enemy activities, and the recent assessment.

Looking to the future, ACO DIR 95-2 emphasizes the continuing development of capability and resources to plan, coordinate, execute and assess effective StratCom: "SACEUR expects continued emphasis to be placed on resolving the existing resource, equipment and training challenges currently experienced across the StratCom capability area – from tactical to strategic level."⁵ The primary capability areas requiring attention are Info Ops, PSYOPS, and Public Affairs. If real progress is to be achieved, then there are several challenges to be overcome as outlined below.

The various headquarters of the NATO Command Structure, Force Structure,

5. ACO Directive 95-2, ACO Strategic Communications, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, 19 November 2009, p.11.



and Mission Structure are not properly manned with trained staff officers for these key StratCom capabilities. In the NATO mission headquarters, the investment in StratCom personnel has been the absolute minimum. In ISAF, the combined approach between ISAF and USFOR-A has overcome this lack of investment, however, the same cannot be said for KFOR. In most NATO Force Structure HQs, the under-investment continues, and the weak link is generally the Info Ops staff element. Typically, the Info Ops staff element in the NATO Force Structure HQs are not adequately resourced in either the peacetime or crisis establishment (PE and CE respectively) manning documents, and require ad-hoc plus ups for exercises or missions in order to accomplish mission essential tasks.

A key shortfall in each of these capability areas is obtaining qualified personnel, which is a function of the training and personnel management functions that are primarily the responsibility of the member Nations. Training is available at both national and NATO training centres. The NATO School at Oberammergau (NSO), provides three Info Ops Staff Officer courses, three shorter Info Ops Senior Leader courses, two PSYOPS courses, and three Public Affairs courses per year. These courses are generally at full capacity, but still, many NATO HQs continue to have untrained personnel manning their Info Ops, PSYOPS, and PA staff sections. This is especially so in NATO Mission HQs (ISAF, IJC, the 5 Regional Commands, and KFOR), where this lack of training has a significant negative impact on mission accomplishment. NATO must better coordinate the use of the NSO to ensure that staff officers assigned by the Nations to perform these StratCom functions are trained before, or shortly after reporting to their gaining unit.

In addition to optimizing course slots at the NSO in support of operations, ACO must encourage and assist where necessary the ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) to send their Info Ops, PSYOPS, and PAO staff officers to the Joint Warfare Centre ISAF/IJC Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) rather than allowing them to rely on on-the-job training in theatre. With both national and NATO



Joint Warfare Centre's Media (Functional Area) Training programme.

courses available, the lack of pre-deployment training cannot be excused⁶. With regard to the ISAF mission, the TCNs forming the RC HQs must fully resource the StratCom staff capabilities spelled out in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), and then fill these staff elements with trained and qualified personnel in the StratCom capability areas.

Finally, the Nations must do a better job of managing, tracking, and exploiting the training and operations experience of their personnel assigned to StratCom capability areas (in particular Info Ops, for which few armies have identified a skill identifier or additional specialty code). Far too often, staff officers who have completed a tour in a NATO Command Structure, Force Structure, or Mission Structure HQs are not asked, nor are they given the opportunity to re-invest their experiences into the doctrine and training development of StratCom in their national military. This should be a two-part effort of both NATO and the Nations to capture and apply the Lessons Learned through experience. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and ACO must work together to put a more effective mechanism in place to capture this experience and apply it to doctrine development and training refinement at the NATO School.

The last year and a half have seen marked and steady improvement in the effectiveness of StratCom, which was

made possible by the decisions of SACEUR to invest in this critical area to support on-going operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Sustaining this progress will now require a broader investment of effort, to include coordination between ACO and ACT to link doctrine and training improvement to Lessons Learned in on-going operations, and to ensure that there is a Lessons Learned process to capture successful Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. Further, the NATO Nations must also follow suit and ensure they are providing trained personnel to fill StratCom billets, are providing sufficient manning for StratCom related staff elements, and are capturing and re-investing the experience of their officers assigned to StratCom billets in NATO headquarters. †

6. There are only a handful of nationally-provided Info Ops courses. The existing national Info Ops courses run NATO member Nations are: 1) **United Kingdom**: National Info Ops Course (NIOC) at the UK Defence Academy in Shrivenham; 2) **Canada**: Peace Support Training Center Info Ops Course, Canadian Forces Base Kingston; 3) **Germany**: NATO Info Ops Course offered at the Op Info Zentrum in Mayen, and; 4) **United States**, Joint Info Ops Planners Course at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk VA.

The Societal La



The Key to the Hearts and Minds of a Population

By Dr Dave Sloggett

IT is axiomatic that military commanders wish to understand the centre of gravity of their adversaries. Sun Tzu is one of a number of writers that is often quoted liberally by those trying to change the dynamics of modern warfare. "The Art of War" is probably one of the most quoted and interpreted books in history; let alone just in the field of military history. Paragraphs of the insights provided by Sun Tzu are lifted and contextualised to modern conflicts. His insights are indeed enduring, stand the test of time and still feature, in many presentations, on the development of Counter Insurgency (COIN) doctrine.

Today's military confrontations and conflicts take place in a very different setting where the media modulates the perspectives of the public; the Vietnam factor where the war was brought into the living rooms of the United States

now plays into wider target audiences. In today's globalised world, under the magnifying lens of the ubiquitous media, warfare cannot be prosecuted arbitrarily. Both hard and soft power need to be applied, in a proportionate response.

Of course attitudes vary as to what is proportionate. In the wake of the terrible events of September 11th 2001, many Americans felt that the language of President Bush captured the essence of how many were feeling at the time in the United States. The "wanted dead or alive" poster evocatively expressed many people's views on the barbarity of the attacks. Time mellows such feelings and a sense of balance returns and old concerns about the speed with which COIN operations can be conducted against an agile adversary that seems to be able to reconstitute itself at will and morph into new forms plagues sen-

timent. As the body bags return home, people's concerns start to move and attitudes change. The wider public begin to change their views and the case for maintaining the war becomes that much more difficult.

Political landscapes also change in response to these shifting public attitudes and new directions for policy emerge and subtle shifts occur in the balance of the application of power. President Obama has introduced just those subtle changes alongside the greater focus on the application of soft power in Afghanistan as a result of General McChrystal's review and the surge of additional combat troops.

Despite additional troops on the ground, always a pre-requisite for any real progress to be made in COIN operations, the ability of the enemy to blend into the background and hide amongst



andscape



family and friends is an additional challenge for contemporary COIN operations. The societal landscapes in Afghanistan are complex and need to be understood to new levels of detail if approaches are to be adopted that can create the conditions for reconciliation and political solutions to develop. In this regard Afghanistan is not unique. There are many similar security challenges awaiting military forces in the future that will require an equally nuanced application of the hard and soft power.

The problem with COIN is that it is rare for clear winners to emerge as COIN operations are rarely successful through the application of kinetic power alone. A balanced approach has to be found. Applying this appropriate balance of hard and soft military power is likely to become de-rigueur for military commanders in the future and their success will indicate their ability to develop their own art of war. Failed and failing states in places across the world will always have the potential to become safe havens for terrorist groups; they show agility in exploiting societies that are unable to deliver basic support to their populations.

Terrorist groups across the world have become adept at securing support from

the local population when they start to run schools, hospitals, provide justice and deliver important social services to the poor and needy highlighting the failures of what are supposed to be central governments.

The Taliban also benefit from living amongst the people, having clan and tribal ties, understanding and being able to avoid the obvious pitfalls with local customs, traditions and creeds. The insurgents understand how, in situations where just getting the basics to survive are a daily problem, that they can secure the hearts and minds of the people and their support for their broader agendas if they fill the vacuum left by a failing state. It was General Sir Rupert Smith who coined the phrase “war amongst the people” in his treatise on the subject; *“The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World”*.

In the early days of the operations in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, many commentators started to quote the British experience of COIN in Malaya as being something that should be appreciated. The term “hearts and minds” quickly came to the fore as the major issue — get the population onside, deny the insurgents support, and they will wither and die.

However a slightly deeper appreciation of the way the campaign in Malaya was conducted reveals serious difficulties for contemporary COIN operations conducted in the face of the media.

The British moved large parts of the population away from the insurgents, creating physical space between them by creating camps in which the population could be regulated and controlled. The insurgency in Malaya, which always depended upon the local population for support, withered, started to look inwards arguing amongst itself and rapidly became irrelevant. As this process unfolded the momentum in the campaign swung towards the British and the offer of incentives to leave the insurgency be-

Above from left: American and British soldiers with local Afghan leaders and Afghan National Policemen near Marjah, Afghanistan (US Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Albert F. Hunt); Soldiers at patrol chatting with locals (UK/MoD Crown Copyright 2010 Photo by Major Paul Smyth); Brig. Gen. Levent Colak, Regional Command Capital Commander, and members of the Turkish Civilian Military Cooperation Team visit with children at the Vatican Children’s Orphanage in Kabul (Photo by ISAF PAO); A local village woman speaks with a Lithuanian soldier in Chaghcharan (ISAF photo by US AF TSgt Laura K. Smith).




gan to take its toll and those that were not ideologically committed started to leave the insurgency. Timing was everything in ensuring that this transition occurred successfully.

Whilst this approach worked in Malaya other major campaigns, such as those in Oman and Kenya followed subtly different trajectories. In COIN there is no one-size-fits-all solution to how to bring stability to countries that often have many underlying societal issues, such as a legacy of ethnic confrontation and conflict, which makes the adoption of a common approach to COIN difficult. Pointers of the subsequent difficulties that would emerge were present in the Balkans campaigns, as geographically isolated ethnic communities needed to be reassured and protected from local ethnic majorities. Reassurance of the population is a common facet of the kind of information operations that need to be undertaken to underpin wider ranging campaign objectives.

That said one consistent message does emerge from nearly all of the recent NATO operations is the pivotal position and attitudes of the local population. Their views of what is happening matters. Any attempt to reconcile people that are ideologically motivated by specific religious viewpoints may well come across situations where trying to reason with such people is difficult. In such situations *the heart guards the mind* as the fanatical interpretation of the religion prevents reasoned argument with such individuals.

In this situation it is important to recognise that societal landscapes tend to be punctuated by many other factors, tribal and clan ties, customs, creeds and traditions that govern the way a local population will react to the changing nature of COIN operations. Criminality also plays a role and can define how people will react to military power. The narcotics overlay in Afghanistan is one such example of how other agendas can become significant in determining how a population reacts to military operations that may appear to threaten their livelihoods.

It is a well known phenomenon in psychology that populations can suddenly change their position *en masse*. Once they have moved another aspect of



psychology, called cognitive dissonance, plays a role as having gone through the process of reconciling themselves to the new attitudes people become reluctant to quickly shift back towards their old positions. Social science research in the field of reconciliation is a relatively new science; emerging at the start of the 20th century, but some of its emerging insights, such as the role of Social Dominance Theory, which provides insights into historical grievances that underlie the societal landscapes are vital guides for any process of reconciliation.

The issue for military commanders engaged in COIN operations is how they apply military force, using a balanced approach of both hard and soft power, to create the conditions in which such large-

Above: Children of the city of Marjah, Helmand Province, attend a ceremony on 25 February 2010 in which the Afghan flag is raised over their town signifying a monumental step in taking back the city from Taliban insurgents. (Photo by ISAF PAO).

scale movements of the attitudes of the population can be created. General McChrystal clearly recognises these issues and his approach to the campaign in Afghanistan reflects a desire to gain greater insights into the mosaic of attitudes, beliefs, values and customs that modulate the societal landscapes in places like Afghanistan and Somalia and conduct activities that pay specific attention to the situation prevailing at the local level.

Political leaders somehow always imagine that solutions are in their hands



and that these can be imposed from the top down. It is a huge weakness in the democratic model when it is felt that once a political leader is elected and that local Governors are in place all will be well. Out the political framework is place and you are well on the way is a view often cited by many commentators. In places like Afghanistan, and in future conflicts carried out against similar complex ethnic and societal backgrounds, it is from the ground up that solutions need to be built. In Afghanistan that is difficult and one adaptation of the power to the edge approach is to encourage developments at the local level, through establishing close contacts with villages and their leaders, that builds a bottom up approach.

Timing is everything and the population must be increasingly marginalised from the insurgents to create the basis of a trajectory along which they willingly chose to move, quickly. One facet of increasing the marginalisation of the local population is to be capable of capitalising upon events that occur when our adversaries cross red lines and upset the population. Despite recent efforts by the Taliban to adopt the ideas offered by Mao Tse-tung, when he laid down a series of rules of how his fighters should treat the local population, events can still create tensions between the insurgents and their natural constituency; the population. The Taliban are clearly concerned that their actions might help create the conditions where the population, despite strong tribal and clan ties, become increasingly marginalised and perhaps even alienated by specific events. Where the Taliban conduct summary executions and intimidate people there are always opportunities for fleeting opportunities to arise when, through swift initiatives taken on the ground, the rapid disenfranchisement of the population from the insurgents can be achieved.

The events in Al Anbar province in Iraq are a good example of how populations can suddenly shift their position. When the local people in Al Anbar realised the full implications of the religious interpretations of Sharia Law that was at the heart of the insurgents thinking, they quickly rebelled and took control of their region. A swift political response to the

population reaching this tipping point enabled many people to be brought into the political process and to reject the kind of fundamentalism advocated by the Sunni extremists in Iraq. This has a major impact upon the societal landscape.

Those involved in the creation of the Awakening Councils were brave men. They saw the need to stand up to what was happening, but many of them have and continue to pay a price for their stand. Whilst Al Qaeda and its cohorts in Iraq have been seriously weakened, they have not been eliminated. Recent outrages in Baghdad, whilst not at the frequency previously seen, show the enduring nature of the problem that faces the Iraqi Government as the reconciliation processes take time to finally make the message and appeal of the insurgents irrelevant to the population.

Organisations, such as Al Qaeda, draw upon their ideology as their centre of gravity. It is the place from which they derive their strength offering the rewards of paradise to often illiterate young men whose view of the world has been coloured and manipulated. Paradoxically, as events in Al Anbar showed, this strength can also be a great weakness. By being unable to adapt their interpretations of their ideology and by sticking rigidly to its rules the insurgents in Al Anbar drove the population away from them and helped create the Awakening Councils. Al Qaeda's affiliated organisation in the

Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has recently issued calls for the insurgents to learn the lessons of Al Anbar and be more flexible in their application of their ideology.

Arguably, and examples like the recent statements made by AQAP illustrate this point, Al Qaeda has shown itself to be a learning organisation. Its ability to adapt and reconfigure itself has been shown as several instances or variations of Al Qaeda have emerged and then morphed into another form. In its latest form it has adapted the model taught at many western business schools called "power to the edge".

This envisages business managers delegating responsibility to the outer reaches of an organisation lowering the degree of central control. Al Qaeda facilitates the application of this model using the Internet as a means of creating spontaneous franchises all over the world encouraging both the lone wolf and groups to spontaneously become involved in acts of terrorism. The journey to becoming involved is made very easy with lots of material being made available on the Internet. The opportunity for people to make the journey into terrorist activities, perhaps initially through being involved in peripheral activities such as fund raising, is made easy. In such situations, where genuine grievances exist in many communities around the world about their situations, it is not difficult

“The issue for military commanders engaged in **COIN operations** is how they apply military force, using a **balanced approach of both hard and soft power...**”





Above: UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown greets delegates at No 10, Downing Street, London, prior to "Afghanistan: The London Conference". The one-day London conference on Afghanistan, organized by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, is highlighting European civilian and foreign aid contributions to Afghanistan. (Picture: newsteam.co.uk Crown Copyright)

for people to become more intensely involved in terrorist activities.

The conference on Afghanistan in January 2010 is focused upon the other route; how to bring people out of being involved in the insurgency and any associated support for wider terrorist goals. A key element of the conversations emerging from London is to offer financial incentives to the Taliban to lay down their arms and join a peace process. Taliban leader's names are being withdrawn from United Nations so called black lists as part of an approach that seeks to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. There are, as we all know, many ways to skin a cat. The question is does such an approach really work when the Taliban think it is they who are in the ascendency, and not ISAF?

Perspectives matter, and there are many in the Taliban who believe that they are currently the ones in a position of strength. They see the efforts by

NATO political leaders in offering money to some fighters to give up is a clear indication of just how weak the NATO's position is at present. Many in the senior leadership of the Taliban believe that a victory over NATO is within their grasp.

The timing at the moment, driven as it is by a number of major political overtones, does not augur well for a successful outcome for NATO. Buying off the Taliban will not create the foundation of a long-term solution as the elements are not in place for this to succeed in the medium term. Before this is done it is vital that the Taliban's position is weakened seriously so that they become increasingly marginalised from the local communities in which they are embedded. Initiatives to help local people improve their daily lives are important. But they are only part of a much wider-range of activities that must be undertaken.

This is why for the short-term there will be a continuing need to maintain momentum with the military operations. The application of hard power is needed to create the conditions in which the soft power elements can be brought to bear when the time is right. NATO and its military forces still need to do the hard graft to create the conditions where the Taliban start to become marginalised from their local societies. This requires new

forms of agility in the ways of conducting military operations that balance the application of hard and soft power.

Only when this foundation is created will other initiatives designed to create the conditions where some can be reconciled have an impact. There is no short-term silver bullet in Afghanistan or for that matter in many other places where some degree of military intervention may be required in the future.

Counter Insurgency, COIN, as a genre of future operations, is a long game where commanders that adapt and find new ways of applying "the art of war" will be successful. Agility is, and will remain, the *sin qua non* of successful COIN operations. †

▶▶ Dr Dave Sloggett has nearly 40 years of working in the intelligence arena during the Cold War and recent conflicts. He is a frequent visitor to operational theatres and a contemporary writer on approaches to Counter Insurgency. His current research focus is upon the development of models of the societal landscapes of countries that are, or may become, the focus for stability operations. He can be contacted on his email: davesloggett@yahoo.com

HYBRID THREATS

ADAPTATION OR IRRELEVANCE?

By Thomas Meyer

THE ALLIANCE AND ITS INDIVIDUAL NATIONS are currently faced with the most significant challenge in its 60+ years of existence. Nations have invested considerable national treasure, time, money and manpower in developing the most formidable conventional and nuclear deterrence known to mankind. The success of this investment is seen in the flourishing societies of 28 sovereign Nations and many Coalition Partners and was amply demonstrated in November 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. But this single mental track, almost tunnel vision, is now working against the Alliance. NATO's conventional supremacy has been much slower to adapt than those of possible adversaries. As historians Cohen and Gooch point out, *"Where learning failures have their roots in the past, adaptive failures suggest an inability to handle the changing present."*⁽¹⁾ The current and future security environment requires a top-down re-examination of the basic Articles of the Alliance.

— Does the current Article 5 and non-Article 5 approach apply to future situations?

— Will the ongoing revision of the Alliance's strategy provide the ability to deal with an increasingly complex environment?

Environment and Threat

It is no longer wise to discuss the environment and the threat separately. They nourish one another and they depend on

each other. The days of defending the Fulda Gap with massive armour formations have evolved to a non-uniformed opponent with the capability to:

- employ conventional and non-conventional means, possibly nuclear, over a large area, possibly world-wide;
- using very adaptive means, possibly terrorist or criminals, and motivated by extreme, even fanatical, religious or ethnic views.

These opponents may be "uneducated" by Western standards, but they are not stupid. They are versed in the lessons of history, they know our doctrine, organizations, tactics and procedures and they will work very hard to exploit the seams in our armour. Today with an internet

connection and money from various criminal ventures, or assistance from belligerent states, an opponent can acquire advanced military technology previously available to only advanced nations.

History provides many classic examples of hybrid warfare, but it is only necessary to examine recent lessons to see the clear indications for the future. I do not intend to cite detailed examples, but will only suggest that professionals at all levels, from strategic/policy to

Below: Members of the Camp Eggars Force Protection team assess the damage of a vehicle born improvised explosive device (VBIED) which exploded near the German Embassy and a US base. The VBIED killed and wounded multi-national personnel and damaged vehicles and nearby buildings. ISAF Photo by US Air Force Tech Sergeant Brenda Nipper.



1. Cohen and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes*, First Vintage Books Edition, May 1991, page 27.





tactical, become very familiar with the 1980 Afghans against Russia; today's Afghanistan fight; the Chechens success in Grozny; the Balkans and Serbian moves into Kosovo; and maybe most classic and striking: the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war. Hezbollah leaders describe their forces as a cross between a conventional army and a guerrilla force, and they believe they have developed a new model.

As General James Mattis, US Marines, notes, it provides a professional edge to those willing to invest the time to study history. To simply improvise out of ignorance, "by filling body bags as we sort out what works" is an act of incompetence⁽²⁾. Do we think other possible opponents have not studied this conflict? Do we believe that without a bureaucratic struc-

General Stanley McChrystal, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, provides an update on the Counter Insurgency strategy to coalition forces in Regional Command North (RC-North). (Photo by ISAF PAO).

ture, with an autocratic leadership they have the ability to adapt very quickly?

The second part of the equation, the environment, as it applies to hybrid warfare, must be considered from the entire spectrum of warfare. At the strategic level, the world is the environment. We must be prepared to address world-wide criminal networks that support opponents through terror activities, financial support and media outlets. This requires a total multi-national approach sup-

(...) the threat will be centred in population areas. Our opponents must **blend in with the local population**, they need **logistical support** from the population and they are prepared to obtain this support **by any and all means necessary**.

ported by UN actions. The highest levels of NATO leadership must determine if a military strategy exists to address a combination of adversaries and threats. Defence planners must determine if Alliance forces have the capabilities to engage non-state actors. Military leaders must determine whom they need to talk to and work with to provide a secure environment. French Army Colonel Roger Trinquier emphasized the importance of strategic coordination when he offered the following reflection: "The struggle against the guerrilla is not a war of First Lieutenants or Captains. The number of troops that must be put into action, the vast areas to be covered, the necessity of coordination with many diverse organizations, the politico-military measures to be taken regarding the populace, close coordination with elements of the civil administration—all requires a plan established at the very highest command level."⁽³⁾

The critical importance of establishing a correct strategy cannot be over emphasized. A correctly formulated strategy will drive tactics⁽⁴⁾. It took the Americans considerable time to realize that they were at war in Iraq, and secondly that they must begin conducting Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations. The cost of this mistake in precious national treasure was considerable. All these elements combined – of environment and threat – point directly to a Comprehensive Approach. All elements of national and international power must be applied in a coordinated, concerted and lengthy manner. The 2009 Multiple Futures Project⁽⁵⁾ provides a good study of the breath of the hybrid threat environment and the need for a total solution if the Alliance is to maintain its relevance and effectiveness.

At the operational and tactical level, the "environment" has all the aspects found at the strategic level, but the

2. Gen. James Mattis, "The Professional Edge," Marine Corps Gazette, February 2004.

3. Thomas E. Ricks, "Fiasco", the Penguin Press, 2006.

4. Thomas E. Ricks, "Fiasco".

5. Multiple Futures Project, 2009.



threat will be centred in population areas. Our opponents must blend in with the local population, they need logistical support from the population and they are prepared to obtain this support by any and all means necessary. The population must see distinct and long-term advantages in supporting Alliance forces. This situation means urban combat, combat that may be as fierce as any history has seen. But it is imperative that the insurgents do not have a safe haven, and it is absolutely necessary to separate the insurgents from the local population. As of this writing, the Alliance does not have a concept for urban operations, and the existing doctrine is inadequate to address the complexities of urban warfare. This is a complex and very difficult environment for the operational and tactical commander. We are faced with the fusion of conventional and irregular capabilities in a compression of time and space. This is where we see an opponent who has, can and will continue to adapt very quickly. Do we have the flexibility to operate within the opponent's decision cycle?

Future Implications and Solutions

All the pieces of the solution are available. The historical handwriting is very clear and the implications, if ignored, will be an Alliance that is irrelevant for successfully confronting hybrid threats. The



Alliance must adapt as well. We cannot apply Cold War (conventional solutions) to contemporary and increasingly complex problems.

The first step is the fresh thinking exhibited by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in exploring the nature of urban operations, Strategic Communications (StratCom) and COIN. This intellectual discussion and innovative thinking must occur throughout NATO and its member Nations. Research projects, war-gaming exercises and education venues must be focused on this problem. But this research and discussion must be turned into actionable concepts, doctrine and training in short order.

Above: Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff holds a shura with local leaders in Marjah, Afghanistan on March 29, 2010. Mullen addressed their concerns for the future after Operation Moshtarak to remove Taliban insurgents in February. (DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist Chad J. Mc-Neeley.)

The initial action within our research of the solution is to connect the basic dots that comprise the problem. We must relate the factors that the opponent is basically an insurgent that has infiltrated urban areas and will conduct hybrid warfare. On this foundation, we superimpose the understanding that the environment is now a world-wide compression of the

From left JWC Commander Lt Gen Korte, SACT General Abrial and Commander USJFCOM General Mattis at JWC (Photo by MSgt Bækler, DEU AF, JWC PAO).





Left and above: The paper developed by the Institute of International Relations and the Institute of Strategic Studies outlining comprehensive proposals for the new NATO Strategic Concept. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen addresses the students of Georgetown University on 22 February 2010 about the new Strategic Concept. (Photos by NATO PAO).

operations for extended periods. This will require a major reorganization and powering down of capabilities traditionally found at the division level or above. The legacy organization of infantry and armour battalions/companies will not suffice on a hybrid battlefield.

As engagement lessens, reconstruction of all elements of the society must be aggressively implemented. As before, the full participation of NGOs is critical. The cycle immediately revolves back to building a stable nation.

Actions that should be given immediate attention are as follows:

1. Current work on formulating the new Strategic Concept should fully recognize and embrace the changing environment and threat. Policy decisions are needed to implement a Comprehensive Approach.
2. Alliance military commanders should develop capabilities, force structures and plans to implement the new strategy. This includes establishing programmes and procedures to fully incorporate NGOs.
3. Nations need to ratify the proposed COIN doctrine; develop Tactics, Techniques and Procedures and begin national training programmes to implement the doctrine.
4. ACO and ACT should develop COIN training standards for individual and collective training; develop Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) courses on COIN; and ensure COIN is included in formal military education programmes.
5. ACT should relook the publication of an urban operations concept, abandoned last year. This work along with concepts on Strategic Communications and terrorism would serve to complement the hybrid concept and provide a complete base of intellectual study. †

traditional levels of war. The lines between strategic and tactical are blurred to the point that they do not exist. We understand the operational components of these three elements. There exists a wealth of practical and successful experience within the nations that can be applied to this equation.

With this foundation, we can apply Alliance power to weak or failing states using the elements of Political, Economic, Military, Social and Informational (PEMSI). We can build a more stable nation, and hopefully, an ally. As in all phases of countering the hybrid threat, we must know whom to talk to and whom to coordinate with. The importance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) cannot be over emphasized. This is a long-term effort and will be expensive, but much less expensive than the expenditure of blood and treasure in the event of war.

The elements of building can be intensified into a more aggressive posture of deterrence if the identified nation or region is not responding. The key actions, in both building and deterrence, are to gain cultural awareness, trust and confidence of the local population. World-wide trust and confidence must be gained through the implementation of an aggressive media campaign. Without

the support of our national populations and their governing bodies, any efforts will be short-lived.

If building and deterrence fail and direct military action is required to engage the insurgents, the tenants of Counter Insurgency must be applied in the classical manner. Conventional firepower is of the absolute least importance. Protection, cultivation and improvement of the population is the only goal. Forces deployed to such action must be configured to execute the traditional Three Block War* and more. This will require the habitual mixture of combat, combat support, Civil-Military cooperation (CIM-IC), intelligence, engineering and medical down to the lowest level possible. These units must be fully capable and flexible enough to conduct distributed

*What is Three Block War?

The Three Block War is a concept described by US Marine General Charles Krulak in the late 1990s to illustrate the complex spectrum of challenges likely to be faced by soldiers on the modern battlefield. In Krulak's example, soldiers may be required to conduct full scale military action, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian aid within the space of three contiguous city blocks. The thrust of the concept is that modern militaries must be trained to operate in all three conditions simultaneously, and that to do so, leadership training at the lowest levels needs to be high. The latter condition caused Krulak to invoke what he called "strategic corporals"; low-level unit leaders able to take independent action and make major decisions.

Source: Wikipedia

The Doctrinal Factor of

FIGHTING POWER

Photo by ISAF PAO

By Lt Col Mário José Vieira Pereira, PRT A,
Doctrine Branch, Capability Development Division, Joint Warfare Centre

NATO DOCTRINE sees *fighting power* as the armed forces' ability to fight and achieve success in operations⁽¹⁾. For NATO, *fighting power* is made up of an essential mix of several inter-related factors or components: the **moral, perceptual, physical** and **doctrinal** components. The moral component is generally understood to mean the personnel's *will* to fight, based on their conviction of the rightfulness of the cause for which they strive. The perceptual component has to do with how leaders and commanders perceive what is going on in the engagement space, including their own means, and how closely their perceptions match reality; it refers, broadly speaking, to *information*. The physical component relates to the *means* to fight – manpower and equipment (held together by collective performance, readiness and sustainability). Finally, the doctrinal component, **doctrine – principles to be followed and ways of doing** or, in general, **what is taught** – is viewed

as the binding factor of the other three. Indeed, only adequate doctrine allows the military to consistently achieve a good perception of what is going on in the engagement space, including what relates to their own means, and to consistently make the best use of them to achieve effectiveness and efficiency in action. If misperceptions or faults in the use of means arise (usually the former leads to the latter), it is not uncommon that doubts about the rightfulness of the cause start to arise as well.

As it appears from the above, NATO regards *fighting power* as a function of will, information, means and doctrine, and not only the means themselves.

With this conceptualization, it might be of interest to analyze how NATO has managed its *fighting power* in all its components over the years and, in particular, in recent times: from the calls for withdrawal from Afghanistan to the perception of the Afghan peoples, communities and conflict drivers, from the means employed to the doctrine applied over time.

This article will not go into those issues as they are too broad for a short analysis. It will just present a very brief look at the binding factor of *fighting power*, doctrine. After sketching up a brief and very rough picture of the existing NATO doctrine for military operations, it will explore the processes the Alliance has in place to produce doctrine and provide some considerations not only on points that might require some attention, but also on the roles of the Joint Warfare Centre and the doctrinal publications.

The range of NATO's military doctrine

NATO's doctrine for military operations ranges from the high-level principles and concepts of employment of military forces to the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures used at the lowest levels of military activity, encompassing virtually every military function and every area of employment of military capabilities.

Physically, doctrine comes in the doctrinal publications NATO produces – Allied Publications, Guidelines, Directives and

1. AJP-01(C), paragraph 0278.



Standing Operating Procedures, even if the latter two should be conceived and considered more as means of conveying orders than as doctrine.

Allied publications include⁽²⁾ 5 first-level Allied Joint Publications, which are the overarching doctrine publications for military operations, as well as 34 second-level Allied Joint Publications, 53 Allied Tactical Publications, 10 Allied Logistics Publications, and 9 Allied Procedural Publications. This total of 111 publications forms the essence of NATO's military doctrine⁽³⁾. Together they make a considerable volume of doctrinal information not always easily manageable. In addition, there are 26 Allied Administrative Publications related to the previous ones to add to the pile. A further 29 publications are in the process of being ratified or developed. So, all in all, we have more than 160 publications, apart from the Allied Communications Publications, which constitute another set not accounted for here⁽⁴⁾.

The doctrine production process

As NATO is an Alliance of sovereign Nations, the authority to decide on how things in principle are to be done – doctrine – lies with the Nations. Publications that include more than just procedural information on how to do things are approved by all Nations, ratified as Standard NATO Agreements (STANAGs), and regarded as fundamental doctrinal publications. Besides the NATO Committee for Standardization, the Alliance has established several formal boards⁽⁵⁾ and working groups⁽⁶⁾ under the Military Committee to address the different areas of military doctrine and other fields of standardization. These boards and working groups are made up by representatives of the Nations. To manage and support the standardization processes, the NATO Standardization Agency was established.

Producing a doctrinal publication is far from being a simple process. For the cases where all Nations (consensus rule) are required to approve the final output – Allied Publications in general – and given the scope and complexity of the task, a more sophisticated kind of process than just having someone to write a

book had to be put in place.

The process normally starts with a directive being issued at high level for doctrine in some field to be developed or with someone identifying a void in the existing doctrine and subsequently proposing that a project of writing a new publication or amending an existing one be initiated. Next, there is an assessment of the proposal, which either recommends the project be called off for not corroborating the proposal, or leads to a directive for the project to be carried out. In this latter case, the publication should possibly be ready within an 18-month period, plus 6 months for each additional draft that may be required⁽⁷⁾ (timelines are approximate, of course). A period of 18 months is the time required for:

- a study draft to be drawn up by a writing team under the aegis of the NATO Standardization Agency and submitted to Nations and NATO bodies for comments;
- the comments to be sent back to the writing team and incorporated into what becomes a ratification draft;
- the ratification draft to be sent to the NATO Standardization Agency and from there to Nations for approval;
- the ratification draft to be forwarded back from Nations to the NATO Standardization Agency for ratification and promulgation.

Should a Nation fail to approve a ratification draft, the publication will not be NATO approved. It will be neither ratified nor promulgated and the identified doctrinal void will not be filled. Sometimes a ratification draft remains in suspense for months or years until a consensus among all Nations is achieved.

Points worthy of some attention

In respect of the above, the first issue that might deserve some attention is to what extent the concept of *fighting power*, as stated in AJP-01, is common perception NATO-wide. What percentage of NATO personnel – NATO leaders, NATO commanders of all levels and staff officers of all NATO structures – perceive *fighting power* as a function of the factors or components referred to above?

If the percentage of personnel sharing the AJP-01 definition of *fighting power* is much below 100%, then, why is that? What is wrong? Does the problem arise from the doctrinal concept of *fighting power* as presented by AJP-01 or from the way *fighting power* is perceived across the Alliance? The author's understanding is that people when faced with the issue may easily agree with the AJP-01 wording, but that generally there is no consolidated, assimilated awareness of all the factors that actually make up the concept of *fighting power*.

Should this understanding be correct, then NATO's training system suffers from significant deficiencies to the extent that it leaves people with an inadequate, faulty perception of NATO's main asset – *fighting power* – which is used for collective defence, for deterrence and to be played in the political arena, if needed.

The second issue to merit some attention is NATO's doctrine-writing process. As we have seen, it is a lengthy process. So, an inevitable question has to be answered: Are the timings adequate? In other words, does it provide timely solutions for the voids that are at the origin of the processes of doctrine writing? Sometimes it does, but not always. With everything just going faster and faster, doctrine solutions less and less often are accomplished on time. Some examples could certainly be cited but it is not the purpose of this article to elaborate on specific cases.

One thing is clear, though: the transformational journey NATO has embarked upon contains all the components of *fighting power*, doctrine included, but is yet to embrace the process of doctrine-writing itself. While changing the doctrine, the process of doctrine-writing

2. February 2010.

3. The remainder of the doctrine (Guidelines, Directives, Manuals, etc.) is entrenched in Allied Publications.

4. These fall under the sphere of the NC3A rather than the NSA.

5. Air, Joint, Land, Maritime and Medical Standardization Boards (or MCASB, MCJSB, MCLSB, MCMSB and MCMedSB for short).

6. 36 working groups under the 5 Military Committee Standardization Boards and 45 panels under the various working groups.

7. AAP-6, paragraph O216.



has remained unchanged and is yet to be reached by transformation. As a result, as long as the process of doctrine-writing remains as lengthy as it is now, in many cases it will not be able to produce updated doctrine that meets the new realities brought about by transformation. In some areas doctrine will drop behind. The impact such shortcomings may have on *fighting power* is yet to be assessed, but should not be overlooked, unless NATO's current doctrinal concept of *fighting power* is incorrect.

Although some see it more as struggling to survive, NATO is alive and kicking: At least it is in theatre, conducting military campaigns. This being so one can always argue that things are not as bad as they may seem at first blush from a superficial analysis. A more in-depth analysis may thus be required to confirm or dismiss a superficial one.

The role of Joint Warfare Centre

As a warfare centre, an organization meant to address issues of war fighting at the highest field level – the operational or campaign level – the Joint Warfare Centre has been fulfilling a central role within NATO by helping NATO forces develop the consistency they, as the essence of *fighting power*, need in order to be reliable assets for the Alliance. And, since real strength always depends on people, with the moral factor being paramount to it, the collective performance that the Joint Warfare Centre helps enhance, contributes towards providing manpower with the “other face of the coin” of the moral factor, which is confidence in the effectiveness of performance.

Since the Joint Warfare Centre's contribution towards building the Alliance's *fighting power* falls mainly in the *collective performance* element within the *physical* component through the Centre's training function, it is important for everyone involved to have a clear picture of the conceptual sources from which the Centre draws for the training it offers.

If the main sources for the training the Centre provides are “NATO approved” doctrine, as they are supposed to be, an analysis of what is being conveyed to

the audiences seems to be needed, given not least the long-delayed ratification processes that affect some publications, rendering them out of date. On the other hand, if at this stage the main sources for some areas of the training are consistently doctrine that is not “NATO approved”, it would seem appropriate to raise the question of whether the Alliance really needs “NATO approved” doctrine.

In a second area of contribution to building NATO's *fighting power*, the Joint Warfare Centre has been shaping doctrine, its binding factor through the development of concepts, the identification and dissemination of Lessons Learned, the doctrine assessment function and the development of Joint Operational Guidelines. These are all areas at the core of NATO's transformation drawing corresponding attention at the relevant levels of the Alliance.

The role of doctrinal publications

Reverting to the *doctrine-writing* process, this very specific part of *doctrine-making* has almost entirely escaped the Alliance's attention. The Alliance has focused on standardizing doctrinal architecture and publication layouts rather than on the specific transmission function inherent to doctrine, which, in a way, when it comes to reaching audiences, is comparable to the information-conveying function of the media. Doctrine audiences are totally different from media audiences, of course, but they are still audiences to be reached; audiences that need to understand doctrine down to the very finest details. Merely knowing the doctrine is not enough. Understanding the doctrine is what really allows us to make the better judgement on how to apply it when facing action. And, for the doctrine to be properly understood, it is fundamental that the publications themselves present it in a way that fosters or facilitates understanding.

Although not at the centre of the *doctrine-making* process⁽⁸⁾, *doctrine-writing* deals specifically with the transmission of doctrine, which is the real reason why doctrine exists: To be transmitted in order for it to be applied by all those involved in the organization's actions. If the organization disseminates something

else than its approved doctrine, or if, for some reason its approved doctrine is poorly transmitted (for instance if its publications have deficiencies of some kind), problems in applying doctrine should be expected, to a greater or lesser degree, or at least some additional effort should be spent to contribute to the doctrine's consolidation.

In any case, the instances involved in the writing and production of doctrine should question the *doctrine-writing* process and the writing techniques they employ, and analyze the state-of-the-art in the field. Moreover, they should ask questions such as whether it makes sense for NATO to insist on having doctrine formally approved by Nations, and if it makes sense to stick to such a lengthy doctrine writing process.

Conclusion

As long as NATO remains committed to its founding principles – an Alliance of sovereign Nations taking decisions by consensus – its fundamental doctrine will be a matter for Nations to agree upon and approve. However, the *doctrine-writing* process could be significantly improved. Some improvement in this particular field does not necessarily mean that changes to the approval process will have to occur. And, some improvement should be sought since, after all, what is at stake is NATO's *fighting power* as the Alliance sees it, with its four components, and the role of the *doctrinal component* as its binding factor.

At stake are also the implications of the incoherence arising from the fact that NATO considers doctrine not only to be a component of *fighting power*, but even its binding factor, while at the same time, in some cases, tacitly allows the very same doctrine not to keep pace with the other components. Ultimately, at stake is how NATO balances the various components of its *fighting power* and, for the sake of this article, how it manages its doctrine. †

8. Doctrine-making in strictu sensu, that is defining how things in principle are to be done, is at the centre of the doctrine-making process (in the broader sense.)

Interview



BATTLE-SCARRED BUT PROUD

By Lt Col Elisabeth Eikeland, NOR AF, Chief PAO
Photos by MSgt Raphael Baekler, DEU AF,
Joint Warfare Centre

THE JOINT WARFARE CENTRE conducted HQ ISAF Training Event 09/02 from 27 November to 10 December 2009. And, for the first time, two officers of the Afghan National Security Forces provided support as role players in a JWC-led ISAF training: They were Colonel Mohammad Wassel, Afghan National Army and Lieutenant Colonel Noorullah Mutahedi, Afghan National Police. I had the privilege to interview both of them during this significant training milestone.

The army and the police have complementary roles in bringing security to Afghanistan. Their mission is very demanding given the complex and ambiguous situation throughout the country. However, according to Colonel Wassel and Lieutenant Colonel Mutahedi, there is a wealth of optimism and patriotic feeling amongst Afghan security officers, quite in line with the significant and highly visible progress noted in the development of the Afghan National Security Forces in

terms of capabilities and professionalization, and in earning the confidence of the Afghan population.

Colonel Wassel, when asked if the numbers of desertions from the Afghan National Army were still high, acknowledged that there had been a problem in the past. This is not seen as a current issue though. "The desertion rate is very low and everyone who believes the contrary is seriously misguided," he observed.

Force protection is one of the key components of security but can be very difficult to ensure in Afghanistan. Here is one example: Almost every big contractor in Afghanistan hires non-state security companies to protect their personnel and infrastructure. Although these firms registered with the Afghan government, their situation creates confusion as they employ people who are neither civilians nor combatants. Do this booming private



Above left: Lt Col Mutahedi briefing at Ulsnes; right: Lt Col Mutahedi; below Col Wassel and the linguist Mr Wahab Habib.

security industry and its growing involvement in national security affect the Afghan National Security Forces?

"They have, for various reasons, a very negative impact," Colonel Wassel confirmed, adding: "This is partly so because many Afghans join them for better pay and easy working conditions. They can go on patrol for 24 hours one day and then have the next day off. This cannot happen in the Afghan Army. Obviously, the firms make a profit, which is why they stay. Since the government is determined to train and strengthen the Afghan National Security Forces and



encourages recruitment to the military, then indeed it would be appropriate to get rid of non-state security companies. Trained government security forces will form a reserve for the state whereas private companies cash in on security services and then pull out."

The key here is reliable and efficient military and police forces. And along with that comes an emphasis on training, more and more rigorous training, in particular field-training to help the forces meet the challenges of warfare. Colonel Wassel said that as a soldier he was optimistic when asked how soon the Afghan National Security Forces would be in a position to take overall responsibility for internal security. "I cannot make a precise prediction," he went on to say. "I represent the army, so I will talk about the army. The Afghan army is highly professional and well trained. It has a very good reputation among the Afghan population too, which is an asset. People trust army officials because they understand the army's good work. And the army has done nothing to make people point fingers of criticism at them."

The Colonel further noted that his optimism was also based on another facet, namely that training has increased substantially. "We have foreign friends working with us and they will not leave us alone," he observed adding: "We are prepared to fight alone and defend our

country even if foreign peacekeepers are not with us. But as long as they are, and thanks to their collaborative efforts, we will get stronger every day. Unlike us, you [Norwegians] have not gone through a decade of war. Still, I am optimistic that one day my country will be like yours and come out of misery. This may not happen in a heartbeat but hopefully soon enough. And believe me this is the hope of all Afghans. One of our major challenges is illiteracy, which is the breeding ground of insurgency. If our education system develops well, we will always be successful. Everything is interlinked."

It is known for a fact that the reputation of Afghanistan's national police has lagged behind that of its well-respected army. The police were widely criticized for insufficiencies in manpower and service capabilities and also had a history of corruption. With the support of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan and the Coalition and US forces in the country, they have lately made an effort to repair and rebuild their image.

A huge reform is taking place in Afghanistan. Tackling corruption, restoring public confidence, improving overall police capabilities as regards to leadership, command, control and communication, training and equipment tell of a fierce determination to make a real difference to Afghanistan and give its people hope for a better future.

"We are more confident now," Lieutenant Colonel Mutahedi observed. "God willing, with faith and trust in the police increasing, we are hopeful that more competent and trustworthy people will be recruited in the future. It is not out of the realm of possibility to bring the national police on their feet in the short order to protect the population and Afghan national interests."

The Lieutenant Colonel also stressed that the Afghan police works very hard to earn public trust. "I am very optimistic. If our new government is truly one that works for the interests of the nation, it is possible to help our country and our police come out of the existing problems," he said.

Afghanistan is battle-scarred, proud and fascinating. Its scars mirror the trauma caused by many long years of war and violence. "The Soviets came for occupation and we still suffer from it, physically and emotionally. I was a student at the time of invasion and was hopeful all along that they would eventually leave. But, we spent all that time in misery and despair. My wife had to put an end to her medical education in university and my entire family and relatives split at the time of occupation," Colonel Wassel said, who is the father of eight children.

For everything that has happened, Afghanistan is making slow, yet inspirational progress, occasionally stumbling, but always hopeful, once again alive with hopes for a better future for coming generations. Visit the website of NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan at www.ntm-a.com. It provides information that is extremely valuable to understand and appreciate the progress of the Afghan National Security Forces.

According to Colonel Wassel and Lt Colonel Mutahedi, a sense of patriotic duty and a sincere desire to defend Afghanistan have taken root and continue to grow amongst Afghan security forces. There is also a strong desire to improve access to education, which in the words of Colonel Wassel is "interlinked to security", in order to establish a better future. The Afghan National Army officers, in particular, are very much in charge, rising to meet all the obstacles, which is all the more heroic and inspiring, as the future of Afghanistan is in their hands. †

FACTS and FIGURES as of December 2009

ANA	Strenght	OMLT Fielded	Target Strength (By October2010)	OMLT Required
	97,011 troops	121	134,000	180

Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) Troop Contributing Nations: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom.

ANP	Strenght	POMLT Fielded	Target Strength (By October2010)	POMLT Required
	94,958 policemen	28	96,800	475

Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (POMLT) Troop Contributing Nations: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom.

A surge of enthusiasm...

By Wahab Habib

I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO ATTEND the Joint Warfare Centre training for HQ ISAF/IJC personnel this past November, as the linguist for the two members of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) who were the first ever ANSF members participating in any JWC training event. As an Afghan who has lived in the West for the past 27 years and returned to work in Afghanistan only recently, I found myself being more than an interpreter for my ANSF clients as well as many other participants in this training session. The novelty of having Afghan ANSF members present as Subject Matter Experts in this training, unlike other novelties, did not wear out even to the last day of training. There was tremendous interest by all to meet, speak with and get a feel for two living, breathing members of the ANSF, the development of which is the utmost priority of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and everyone who is going to be deployed there.

On the other hand, the experience of a lifetime of attending the training in Stavanger was even more exciting for the two ANSF members. As long and as eventful as the days were, packed with office calls with Generals; preparation and presentations of briefs on the state of the ANSF; practicing in mock Commander's Update and Assessment rehearsals; and giving interviews to the press (real and pretend); the two officers found time to take on the Stavanger sights in the evenings, and I found myself being their guide (one who had never been to Stavanger himself), navigating through not just the streets of downtown Stavanger, but also through cultural confusions while at the same time trying to keep up with the en-

thusiasm, curiosity and energy level of someone who has arrived in a Western country for the first time. The calm and rather relaxed pace of life and the orderly and relatively lightly travelled roads in Stavanger presented quite a contrast to the hectic pace and the chaotic traffic of Kabul's roads. Being guests of NATO in Stavanger, these gentlemen were the recipients of some extraordinary treatment. They were given a day off with a car and a high ranking Norwegian Officer as a tour guide who took them to such places as the Stavanger Oil Museum, the Three Swords Monument, Old Stavanger and many other sights. There were also special arrangements made for the Afghan guests regarding their meals and their daily prayers. But what these guys were most impressed about had nothing to do with bright lights and shiny streets of a rich well-developed European country. What impressed them most was seeing firsthand the level of the NATO commitment in the Afghanistan mission as a whole and the Joint Warfare Centre's commitment to expanding the role of Afghans in future training exercises.

It has become increasingly difficult for many Afghans to remain optimistic about future even for those who are involved with the Government of Afghanistan and NATO in the job of trying to change the course of where the country is headed. As with many things in life, the job of rebuilding in Afghanistan has its good days and its bad days. Unfortunately, with passage of more than seven years since the fall of the Taliban and the start of this process of rebuilding, many average Afghans have seen the security situation deteriorate in their cities and corruption by government officials become the rule.

There are many Afghans who believe in the NATO mission and what it is doing to combat these issues. Unfortunately, many have given up, and others have lost their initial enthusiasm. What I noticed with my ANSF clients participating in the JWC training was a gradual surge in enthusiasm about the future of their country!

With every day that they spent being Subject Matter Expert's for the ISAF Joint Command or the Combined Joint Operation Center Training Audience, they were more impressed at the level of detail with which the training was conducted, and the commitment and attention to detail of the Training Audience to learn their future job functions in Afghanistan.

They were also invited to sit in and participate in several Key Leader Sidebar session where high level strategic discussions and exchanges of opinion took place. On the last day of training programme, the Joint Warfare Centre's Commander General Wolfgang Korte invited his Afghan guests into his office for coffee where he presented them with Certificates of Appreciation, as well as parting gifts. The Commander spoke at length about his vision to increase the role of Afghans and specifically that of the Afghan National Security Forces in these training programs.

All of this continued to reinforce their previous impressions and drive home the point that NATO is not about to give up on this mission and as bad as things might get in Afghanistan on any given day, an organization of the NATO stature has a vision and commitment to turn the tide.

For the Afghans participating at the training here and for the millions back home, the odds of seeing their beloved homeland become a peaceful and prosperous nation is looking very good. What if all Afghans had a chance to witness for themselves how much hard work and dedication goes into NATO's Afghan mission? Or maybe with more Afghans participating at future training sessions in Stavanger, Norway, they will go back home with a positive and hopeful attitude and help bring this attitude to many other Afghans. †

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A Real Cast of Characters: How Deployed Grey Cell Role Players Create “Teachable Moments”

By CAROL SAYNISCH

A CLEVER MEDIA SNARE

The chief of the Bench Maji region emerges from closed-door talks with the NATO officer — a dignified man high in the command chain of the newly arrived peacekeeping force — to face a gaggle of reporters and cameras waiting outside the meeting room. Sweeping a colorful caftan-draped arm toward the officer, who stands close by his side smiling, the chief pronounces their private session a great success.

“And I want to thank our NATO brothers for promising to provide us with weapons, in addition to fulfilling our other requests to supply us with food and water,” the chief grins as reporters furiously scribble and cameras whirl, capturing the hearty handshake between the chief and the officer that seals the deal.

All the while, the NATO officer seems frozen in place, smiling and nodding in apparent agreement to everything the chief is saying, no doubt distracted by the media spectacle and not really listening. The officer is unaware that — in

front of a world audience that will see this “breaking news” captured on TV as well as on newspaper and Web pages — he, as NATO’s designee, had smiled and nodded his way into tacitly confirming something that had not happened during the sensitive talks.

In fact, the NATO representative had not offered to arm the people of the Bench Maji at all: to have done so would have compromised the local balance of power and constituted a serious breach of a fragile ceasefire his NATO troops had arrived to uphold. Hoping to gain public support for his own interests, the Bench Maji chief had simply laid a clever media snare for the officer, who blindly blundered into it. On the world stage, not only did NATO now appear to sanction delivering guns to Bench Maji, its smiling, nodding negotiator seemed pleased to be doing so. **CUT.**



INSTEAD OF A DIPLOMATIC GAFFE OF GLOBAL PROPORTIONS, this was a “teachable moment” — one of many during a NATO STEADFAST series training exercise, the fictional scenario set on the nonexistent continent of Cerasia, a doppelganger for Africa where the UN has tasked NATO to intervene between the squabbling notional nations of Tytan and Kamon.

The real-world Bench Maji region is in Ethiopia; in STEADFAST’s make-believe world, it is located in Tytan, close to the disputed border with Kamon.

NATO Observer/Trainers watched the lights-camera-action drama play out, then stopped the scenario for on-the-spot feedback for the officer, who could not conceal his shock once he realized what had transpired and how it all would have played back on the BBC, instead of World News Today (WNT), the fictional media outlet operating within the scenario. The WNT cameraman, reporter, and assorted Cerasian newspapermen





The Joint Warfare Centre exercise scenario team, 26 April 2010. Photo by Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO.

were all role-players, as was the Bench Maji chief, engaging the “Training Audience” that included the appalled peace-keeping-force officer. For that officer and his aides⁽¹⁾ it was a lesson learned the hard way: always maintain situational awareness even in the face of a media onslaught and never put yourself in a position to appear to agree publicly to terms not negotiated privately.

For the role players, it was a carefully orchestrated “gotcha” lesson, part of the world-class training environment allowing deployable NATO forces the chance to make their mistakes — and as humans, mistakes are inevitable — in a safe, closed training environment where the goal is to edify, not embarrass.

There were three STEADFAST exercises in 2009; two more are in the works for 2010. Each time, role players operate as part of a so-called Grey Cell within Exercise Control; but in addition to a primary Grey Cell covering the Training Audience’s headquarters, there is always a subsidiary Grey Cell, a separate contingent assigned to the “field” in a separate location from HQ, where the Training Audience is usually operating in tent cities

1. To protect the confidentiality inherent in JWC training exercises, neither specific members of the Training Audience nor their precise training locations are disclosed in this article.

pitched on a NATO joint base somewhere else in Europe.

THE GREY CELL

British Royal Navy Cmdr. Bill Chambers steers the cast of deployed Grey Cell characters as they navigate their way through the scenario, delivered as injects sent down computer pipelines via the Joint Exercise Management Module (JEMM) database tied to the mother ship — NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre’s exercise command nerve center at Ulsnes. In 2009, Chambers’ group was deployed to STEADFAST exercises in Greece, Germany and Denmark.

“The small team that deploys from Joint Warfare Centre to the Land Component Commander’s location is a sub-

set of the main Grey Cell that works alongside the operational HQ,” says Chambers. “It is therefore down-range supposedly, operating at the provincial or regional level, dealing directly with host nation and international organizations/non-governmental organizations (IO/NGO) representatives.”

Chambers thinks the rise in importance of the Grey Cell as a training vehicle has developed in line with current operations in conflicts around the world. “Military forces are no longer expected to engage in ‘industrial warfare,’ where massed armies or large naval fleets line up against one another to battle it out,” he says. “The more complex situation we are faced with today is best described as ‘war amongst the people,’ where the

“The more complex situation we are faced with today is best described as **‘war amongst the people’**, where the ‘enemy’ is indiscernible from the local population. This development is also coupled with the **exponential growth in the number of international organizations and non-governmental organizations** and thus the number of civilian actors that might be encountered in theatre. **The Grey Cell does its best to replicate this scenario.**”



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The self-described "ancient mariner" joined the Royal Navy in 1973; Chambers' military career originally focused on diving, ordnance disposal and gunnery.

"However, my most recent tours have been with NATO," he says. "15 months with the Training Mission in Iraq and before that, as a member of the Deployable Joint Task Force HQ based in Naples. I can't begin to tell you how much things have changed at the Joint Warfare Centre since I first deployed here for training in 2004."

And, Chambers has changed, too, evolving from his previous "guns and ammo" persona into a civil/military affairs expert as he leads deployed Grey Cell and its eclectic assortment of highly skilled role players. "For me, part of the enjoyment of deploying with the Grey Cell to the Land Component Command HQ is the opportunity to work with a group of fascinating people from a wide variety of backgrounds, many of whom have no previous military experience," Chambers reveals. "My challenge is to get this wonderfully disparate bunch of individuals in the right place, at the right time, in the correct role, which is not always as easy as you might think."

Joint Warfare Centre contracts individually with the civilian role players, whose real-life credentials include experience as ambassadors, NGO officers, UN officials and television network reporters. They draw on their extensive backgrounds to role-play counterparts similar to their actual professions as they engage the Training Audience in a variety of scenario vignettes, such as that played out with the Bench Maji chief.

Other role players are active-duty, reserve or retired military officers from assorted countries. Role-playing newspaper journalists, for example, are almost always portrayed by reservist augmentees, most commonly supplied specifically for each exercise by special arrange-



Above: British Royal Navy Captain Stuart Furness, Chief Joint Exercise Division of the Joint Warfare Centre briefing during the Distinguished Visitors day for Exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 09. Photo by MSgt Raphael Baekler, DEU AF, JWC PAO.

ment with the US Navy and trained in role-playing techniques prior to StartEx.

THE GREYING OF THE WHITE CELL

Perhaps one of the biggest changes the cell itself has undergone in the last year is a shift in its scope and nomenclature, as the EXCON entity once known as the White Cell morphed into what is now called the Grey Cell. JWC's Joint Exercise Division Chief, British Royal Navy Capt. Stuart Furness, orchestrated the cell's revised name and mission.

"During the exercises, I noticed that the White Cell tended to focus on IO/NGO issues and there was a lack of coordination with those responsible for role playing regional military and non-military (e.g. local officials)," Furness observes. "Creating a Grey Cell, which includes the previous White Cell (IO/NGO), media and regional non-IO/NGO players has created a more cohesive team and the required coordination."

A naval aviator, with vast experience in warfare planning and tours in Iraq and Afghanistan on his resume, Furness quickly saw value in producing as realistic a training environment as the computer simulation would allow – and role players were the key.

"It is sometimes easy to work inside the military environment and without being challenged face to face," he says.

"Role players replicate the difficult elements of a campaign (the safe and secure environment), provide realism and test the Training Audience to do what they will have to in country and which many are not comfortable with – press interviews for instance!"

Before and during an exercise, the two Grey Cells coordinate closely through the Ulsnes-based control function, with role players reporting their observations and comparing notes.

"Daily coordination meetings take place and of course we use JEMM to control the injects," Furness notes. "However, with all role playing, there is an element of 'on-the-spot' decisions which the role players we have are good at. We have developed a trusted list of (role-playing) IO/NGOs we routinely work with and they keep within known boundaries and back-brief as required. That is the hardest part of the exercise control and something I monitor closely through the Chief Grey Cell."

Furness and Chambers agree that the ideal Grey Cell role player must be skilled on many levels.

"Role players who have recent experience have more credibility," Furness states. "But role players need to realize they are not there to push a personal agenda; they are there to train NATO forces about to be on stand-by for op-



Deployed Grey Cell

erations – they need to see their role as making the Training Audience better at what they do. So, we look for a mix of personal characteristics and experience. Good interaction comes from those traits – testing, yet not out to embarrass those being trained.”

Chambers has made it a point to try to assemble his deployed team based on that combination of competency and chemistry, with role players known to have proven success in a particular role.

DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS

For all three 2009 STEADFAST exercises (code-named Joist, Juncture and Loyal Jewel), US Navy Reserve Cmdr. Ben Taylor portrayed Lt. Gen. Tahir KaKa, leader of Kamon’s 40th Infantry Division.

“In this role, I am the on-the-ground commander in the Tori Pocket region and act as the primary Kamon Military representative to the Commander, Land Component Command (COMLCC) of the NATO Response Force,” Taylor explains. “The role is critical in the training, not only to the general staff officers and members of the Land Component Command, but directly to the COMLCC.”

One of the primary training objectives in the STEADFAST exercise series is for Commander Land Component Command to conduct a Land Military Commission.

“In the case of the current STEADFAST scenarios, a Land Military Commission is a negotiation forum where the military

commanders of the two previous warring factions meet to discuss an organized withdrawal of a disputed region [the Tori Pocket wedged between Tytan and Kamon],” Taylor says.

“As one would expect, ensuring a civil meeting between two parties that share a centuries’ old history of conflict, different cultural backgrounds, and vastly different agendas is challenging for the most skilled negotiator. This is precisely the situation we put Commander Land Component Command in: to call upon skills that might not be second nature to a military commander, to drive understanding that the commander is to facilitate the two opposing parties and not necessarily execute a plan.”

Lt. Gen. KaKa always finds himself sitting across the negotiating table from Tytan’s military representative Lt. Gen. Arhbin Dityki, South Awassa Corps Commander – often portrayed by retired Norwegian intelligence officer Espen Steffensen – while the NATO Training Audience commander attempts to mediate the role players’ heated disputes. Taylor and Steffensen arrive for the conference dressed for the occasion, sporting all the trappings of their alter-egos including berets, uniforms, unit patches, and even role-playing bodyguards. Kamon and Tytan flags are part of the elaborate backdrop staging.

Another key player at the negotiating table when KaKa and Dityki hash out their

differences is the UN Military Observer (UNMO) played by Norwegian military veteran Per Astad. Astad spent more than five years of his active-duty career working as an UNMO in Africa, Central America, the Balkans and the Middle East. He replicates those responsibilities and actions in Cerasia as the UNMO assigned to the Tori Pocket where he guides the Training Audience in figuring out their duties and the fine points involved in implementing and upholding the ceasefire.

“UNMOs are unarmed and their working environment and everyday safety very much is in the hands of the commanders on the ground. If UNMOs are perceived as not being trustworthy, their working relations would suffer and also the safety of the UNMOs would be put at risk,” he says, adding that Training Audiences often come to the exercises with the attitude that they are an occupying, not peacekeeping, force.

“Sometimes (the NATO Response Force) forget they are a guest in the country. Not appreciating the local culture and tradition of the host nation is always a mistake. Such attitude may create a more difficult environment to operate in than what would have been the case if local leaders have been invited onboard at an earlier stage.”

“These roles, together with the other Grey Cell role players, have challenged the traditional NATO military way of thinking, and hopefully prepared its leaders and personnel to better face and understand other, and maybe unknown, cultures and countries where NATO forces could be deployed during a conflict or a humanitarian crisis,” asserts Steffensen. “The challenge is at times to balance the learning process and the scenario by taking ‘time out’ and explaining the whys.”

TEACHABLE MOMENTS

If asked, most role players say they believe the Training Audience learns just as much from out-of-role, side-bar conversations during “time outs,” either immediately following a scripted role-playing engagement or in a separate, arranged feedback session.

Left: The Deployed Grey Cell team in Elmpt, Germany.



“These roles, together with the other Grey Cell role players, have **challenged the traditional NATO military way of thinking**, and hopefully prepared its leaders and personnel **to better face and understand other, and maybe unknown, cultures and countries** where NATO forces could be deployed during a conflict or a humanitarian crisis.”

Sally Sammons, an NGO role player who served with the American Red Cross in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, thinks that, in past interactions she's had with the Training Audience, “both Grey Cell and the military felt comfortable enough to ask and give candid questions and answers. This to me was when the military truly learned and almost understood why NGOs were sometimes so difficult.”

Sammons cites a moment during the STEADFAST exercise in Elmpt, Germany as an example. “The military there seemed to (understand military-NGO interaction) already and therefore presented a challenge for us to be a challenge for them,” she recalls. “Where I do think we were able to help them was at a meeting scheduled for questions outside the exercise. The military there was interested in international disaster response and took the time to use the Grey Cell expertise to get information and clarification on disaster response.”

Sammons frequently teams with Francesca Dell'Acqua, a Subject Matter Expert on international relief efforts. In addition to working for NATO since 2007, Dell'Acqua currently schools students in humanitarian affairs and emergency operations at the Institute for International Political Studies in Milan, Italy. With UN, European Union and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe experience during humanitarian and electoral missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nigeria, Serbia, East Timor, Indonesia and Jordan, Dell'Acqua takes a ‘tough love’ approach with the Training Audience, her role-playing self (UN deputy humanitarian coordinator) as fierce an advocate for innocents trapped by conflict, pov-

erty and disaster as her real self. Her intensity, coupled with her hard-earned credibility working in some of the earth's worst trouble spots, helps her get her points across to military ‘students’ who may not fully understand how IOs and NGOs fit into an already-complicated tactical landscape.

“My presence at the Land Component Command level is fundamental to provide a direct interface with the humanitarian side of the United Nations. I represent the civilian humanitarian community deployed in the area of crisis,” she says. “Conflicts (between humanitarian organizations and the military) may arise and sometimes it is necessary to de-conflict and understand each other to minimize the effect of collision. The exercise is the perfect environment to take time to understand what we can do together and why sometimes it is necessary to work (apart).”

On the diplomatic side, Ed Willers is among a distinguished core group of elite government-service professionals providing the Training Audience with the know-how to interact with local, regional, national and international political leaders. A 33-year veteran of the Canadian Foreign Service posted to Dar-es-Salaam, Berlin, Prague and Pretoria, as well as the assigned special advisor for regional affairs in his nation's Africa Bureau, Willers keeps his skills current by serving on the faculty of Canada's Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. His last Steadfast role in Oksboel, Denmark had him playing the part of Elias Lytybu, leader of the Bench Maji's legislative council.

“This allowed us to introduce [to the Training Audience] the complications of the political ‘gap’ and tensions that can

exist between government and elected representatives, and the differences between what government undertakes and what community leaders can deliver. It can be ‘messy,’ but peace operations are messy,” Willers says.

While Chambers and the role players do their best to recreate the scenario's mythic Cerasia and believably transport the Training Audience there, reality frequently intervenes, making real life a real challenge. “Denmark in November is not the Horn of Africa,” Willers wryly points out. For instance, a WNT report filed from the mock LMC meeting location – parched desert in the storyline; North Sea-rimmed Jutland in actuality – showed the role-playing reporter pelted by freezing rain, steam erupting from her mouth into the frigid air as she spoke her on-camera lines. Sometimes, female role players find gender-specific latrines in short supply; only a flimsy curtain separated “boys” from “girls” at one location; at another, it took a 10- minute hike to reach the rest facilities.

Deployed Grey Cell military locations also come with varying degrees of technical infrastructure, making exercise Web pages slow to load and putting a crimp in the flow of information through JEMM. Inject manager Zdenko Kovacic says he grapples with some version of these issues at every exercise.



Maj Kovacic

“JEMM is only a tool that helps EXCON people to develop, execute and control the exercise's flow, but from remote locations it is always tricky to use the tool, because of bandwidth and many hoops through different routers and switches,” the Slovenian Army officer observes,



noting that he hopes next-generation software will solve some of the problems that can bring the inject software at deployed locations to a screeching halt. On one exercise, all computer network access went dead when the host nation's defense net went down for routine maintenance, halting all deployed-site inject delivery until it came back up.

In another instance, Kovacic spent an entire day at the airport trying to locate seven missing bags containing vital equipment. And Lt. Gen. KaKa was almost a no-show at a planned inject event when the airline misplaced role-player Taylor's luggage containing the Kamon leader's uniform, which arrived days later after a multi-continent odyssey.

But Joint Warfare Centre leaders and role players concur that these challenges are dim blips on screen colored by bright successes. "Over the past 12 months and the last three NRF exercises, as the employment of the Grey Cell has developed, we have seen much greater coherency between the activities of the various elements that deploy from Joint Warfare Centre," Chambers remarks.

"By the end of Loyal Jewel, a close working relationship had been established between IO/NGO/host nation role players, representatives of the media and the members of the Training Team. I believe this has made the delivery of training support far more effective and I hope we can make further improvements in 2010."

As for the Training Audience officer whose teachable moment came at the hands of faux Cerasian diplomats and replicated media, he expresses gratitude for the training opportunity. "I have no scars," he says, still smiling. "I have Lessons Learned." ↗

► Carol Saynisch is a contracted JWC media SME role player. A former CBS-TV network reporter/producer and newspaper columnist, she has a Masters' degree in International Relations from Boston University. For the last 16 years she has trained military forces in Mali, Senegal, Kenya, Kuwait, South Korea, Germany, Japan and the US.

Top 5 tips for successful role playing

Due to budget constraints or staffing shortfalls, military augmentees are sometimes asked to step in to fill a scenario role during an exercise to supplement contracted Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). Here are some basic suggestions for first-time SMEs or augmentee role players to consider as they prepare to engage the Training Audience (TA):



Replicate, not parody

SMEs are hired for their real-world expertise in a particular field; they don't have to guess how someone in their profession acts in certain situations when interacting with the military – they know based on experience. But if an augmentee is tasked to portray a character within the scenario based on a real-world persona – a journalist, for example – but has no journalistic background, there is danger the augmentee may deliver a performance based on a stereotype of how he or she thinks a journalist would act, rather than how a journalist would really act or react in a scenario-driven situation. The result may be an exaggerated parody of the profession instead of a faithful replica, depriving the Training Audience of a realistic engagement and the learning associated with it. To "keep it real," the augmentee (using the journalist example) can:

- Watch how actual reporters conduct themselves during televised news conferences on a government channel where events are shown in their entirety.
- Observe journalistic output, noting writing style and content of finished articles or TV reports with regard for probable questions that prompted the answers contained in the stories.
- Seek out a SME on the exercise or during the prep phase who might have the required background, and ask for advice on how to play the role.



Know the scenario

Role players must know the entire scenario thoroughly, not merely where or how their own individual roles fit into it. This will help to more completely create the artificial reality needed to assist the Training Audience and to understand the context of why the Training Audience may be responding to a role player in a certain way. Remember that the scenario is a resource, and the injects are tools with which to challenge them, teaching them to do the right thing.



Know the military doctrine and training objectives

Although military Training Team Observers have oversight on making sure the Training Audience adheres to military doctrine as the scenario proceeds, role players may be called upon to test this adherence, especially where injects are specifically designed to probe doctrinal compliance. Being conversant with the underlying doctrine and the training end-state can help role players fine-tune their portrayals.



Watch, listen and adjust

As in a game of three-dimensional chess, scenario interactions can unfold gradually with multi-level effects. A role player, in consultation with Grey Cell and Training Team leaders, may need to adjust role portrayals in the midst of play based on how the Training Audience is dealing with a scenario situation and whether injects are created or modified in dynamic scripting as the exercise progresses.



Once in role, stay in role

It's vital to remember that Training Audience members are also playing roles: their new duty positions during a deployment. It is difficult enough for them to live in this new world within the notional dimensions an exercise requires, but even more difficult if SME and augmentee role players bounce in and out of role during an interaction. The role player should never discuss "scenario" or "exercise" with the TA in the midst of a scripted event, even if the TA tries to draw the role player out of role with procedural questions about the exercise. The role player's goal is to maintain the artificial reality consistently at all times to give the TA the best possible chance for success – and not leave the TA confused about whether the role player was switched "on" or "off" during an exchange.

Director NATO CIS Services Agency Visits NCSA Squadron Stavanger

JOINT WARFARE CENTRE

By Uwe Sprenger,
NCSA Squadron Stavanger IS Services Section Chief
Photo by MSgt Raphael Baekler, DEU AF, JWC PAO.

Lieutenant General Kurt Herrmann, Director NCSA, paid a visit to NCSA Squadron Stavanger on 3-4 November 2009. The visit provided an opportunity for the General to familiarize himself with the Squadron's work and gain insight into the support it provides to its customer, the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC).

The visit began with Command Branch and Service Branch briefings followed by a guided tour of the Joint Warfare Centre's new training facility. The Director was very impressed with the Centre's installations, thought to be the most capable and state-of-the-art facility of its kind in NATO. The Director NCSA noted that the Joint Warfare Centre will see a dramatic leap in technology advancement with technologies that span the entire spectrum of the services provided. Clearly, mastering these technologies represents the highest risk item that must be managed. "It requires the determination of the long term training requirements for the Squadron's technicians, engineers and planners," he observed.

The second day started with an office call on Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre. Next, a JWC command brief was given by Brigadier General Scott D. West, Chief of Staff JWC, followed by a presentation of the current infrastructure of the JWC interim training facility in Ulsnes.

Lieutenant General Herrmann was able to get first-hand insight into exercise LOYAL JEWEL 09 as well, a joint decision-making Command Post and Computer-Assisted Exercise, for which the Ulsnes training facility was the main exercise location, hosting about 540 personnel. The exercise aimed to reach Advanced Opera-



Lt Gen Herrmann (third from left) with NCSA staff.

tional Capability for NATO Response Force (NRF) 14. It was conducted by Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz, Commander Joint Command Lisbon, with Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander JWC, being the Exercise Director. Allied Land Component Command HQ Madrid provided the Deployable Joint Staff Element and served as the "extended arm" of Allied Joint Command Lisbon. Thus, the Madrid-based Command provided the Joint Force Commander on the ground in theatre with a lean, flexible, rapidly deployable operational headquarters element. The exercise was intended to achieve real world operational proficiency.

Lieutenant General Herrmann was briefed on the NRF exercise concept, on the roles and functions of the Joint CIS Coordination Centre and on the customer-service provider relationship between NCSA Stavanger CIS Squadron and the Joint Warfare Centre. He also met with flag level Training Audience members such as Lt Gen Stoltz, Commander Joint

Command Lisbon; Lt Gen Cayetano Miró Valls, Commander CC Land Madrid; and Maj Gen de Carvalho, Chief of Staff CC Land Madrid; in order to examine current levels of CIS support and possibly future requirements for exercises related to the Deployable Joint Staff Element concept. While in Stavanger, the Director also talked to NCSA Squadron Stavanger staff. He met highly motivated military and civilians and got a realistic impression of the challenges of providing CIS services to both the static environment of the Joint Warfare Centre and less static environments, such as exercises and events conducted simultaneously at the Centre and other locations and units throughout the year. The Director got a consistently positive picture of NCSA Squadron Stavanger's outstanding contribution to the Joint Warfare Centre, a busy facility that is actively engaged in a key mission for NATO: providing high-quality, professional training to personnel set to deploy on major NATO operations. †

PIRACY

AN OVERVIEW Part II

By Lt Cdr Bastian Fischborn, DEU N,
Aide-de-Camp, Joint Warfare Centre



A MONDAY MORNING, IN THE NORTHWESTERN PART OF THE INDIAN OCEAN, the Captain of “Beluga Recommendation” notices a long light blue line on his radar screen – something fast is approaching. Nine days prior, she sailed from Thailand, loaded with heavy lift cargo bound for Haifa, Israel. Routine – and not routine... To get to Haifa, she has to sail the Gulf of Aden. In 2008, the “BBC Trinidad” of the same shipping company “Beluga Shipping” was seized by pirates. The negotiations for ransom went on for several weeks.

When sailing for Africa, the picture of zebra herds and the lions comes into mind – one is always caught. The captain lets his crew nail up notches in the hull, the lower deck is most vulnerable. The railings are some seven meters higher, still within reach of some rather fit. Can you really make a ship pirate-safe? On the bow davits, the Captain lets his crew affix three thick mooring lines on either side, which glide through the water parallel to the ship, as an additional bar-

rier for the propellers of approaching small craft. Two days before reaching the Gulf of Aden, the Captain summons his crew to the mess; he talks about the possibility of being attacked, about coming under fire, about which would be the safest place for his crew, about getting through or not getting through, game of luck, darkening the ship, full ahead through the needle’s eye. (continued at page 61)

Protection from pirates – on board your ship

Initiatives and law at international level as well as technical developments designed to prevent pirate attacks, are achieving success. Various non-governmental organisations and associations have – in addition to the state organisations – turned their attention to the subject and include in particular the BIMCO (Baltic and International Maritime Council; the world’s largest private shipping organization), Protection & Indemnity (P&I) insurers or the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) who support and advise shipowners, Captains and crew on measures to be taken when sailing pirate-prone waters.

This is because besides the government and the judiciary, shipping companies and the crew can and indeed want to contribute to minimizing the risk of a pirate attack or deal with it. The shipping industry wants to take steps to prepare and defend itself, they simply do

not want to put their own safety entirely in the hands of Naval forces. While, as discussed in **Part I**, low speed and free-board, inadequate planning and a low visible alert state are generally agreed upon as the common denominator of vessels liable to attack, a lot can be done on board (the following representing some core bullets out of the very useful handbooks available to shipowners and Captains to date):

Preventive Measures: The security and naval industry has presented a number of technical solutions, some more, some less sophisticated, to protect vessels and crews against pirate attacks insofar as they aim to prevent the attack at all. This includes highly sensitive close range radar systems (typically, merchant vessels look rather far ahead and are suffering from a dead-sector in radar coverage which can extend well up to 1 nm around the ship, since radar beams are obstructed by containers or the upper structure), night-vision equipment and heat cameras, acoustic and visual alarm systems, air surveillance, unmanned remote-controlled robot ships for patrols. A popular and cheap (even if merchant ships have to be a bit more careful than warships when applying it) preventive measure is sailing at high speed, carrying out zig-zag

Above: Horn of Africa.



manoeuvres, avoiding to create lee for the attackers, instead, using the bow wave and stern wash to make it difficult for small craft to approach.

Nonlethal weapons/barriers: There is a big market for ship security equipment; but many of the high-tech solutions cost a lot of money and do not always work under sea conditions; *e.g.* high waves or sea splash water. The best are often lowtech; *e.g.* to display cardboard-cutout silhouettes pretending a higher number of crew or armed guards on board, to affix barbed wire underneath the coamings and along the gunwales, to install spray valves along the shell plating spraying “chilli-water” (yes, chilli) or lubricant foam, to overflow the ballast tanks providing for a constant seawater curtain down the ship’s side (Maersk ships sailing the Horn of Africa route have order to let their ballastwater-pumps constantly running and to open the overflow valves), to convert the railing by installation of electric fences, and to create security zones to protect the crew, such as doors which cannot be opened from the outside.

Still, there are some feasible solutions, which can be operated by a ship’s crew under sea conditions and even if the crew are non-military. Most common are acoustic defence systems (Long Range Acoustic Device) emitting a directed tone capable of permanently damaging hearing and above the human threshold of pain and water gun systems such as the Unifire Anti Piracy Water Cannon System [see Infobox on Unifire page 61].

Organisational: Organisational measures play a big role in the overall context of countering the piracy threat. They start with proper planning and reporting to the relevant shipping centres when transiting a piracy prone area, the use of satellite-aided tracking systems which enable shipping companies to keep track of their vessels [see Infobox on Shiploc system], the use of high-security containers to protect the cargo, minimising of the content of the ship’s safe, arrangement of regular rounds on the vessel (unusual on board merchant vessels

in contrast to Navy vessels). The deployment of security guards on deck is of value as is the minimization of the external communications to essential safety and security related transmissions, the turning-on of additional auxiliary machinery, generators and steering motors for redundancy, the stowing of all ladders and outboard equipment. Shipowners and Captains may want to carry out crew training prior to passage, drill a piracy contingency plan, prepare their emergency messages beforehand, plan for transit of highest risk areas at night (no successful attacks have occurred at night) and have highest vigilance at first and last light since the majority of attacks take place at dusk or dawn. It all sounds rather common ground, still, if adhered to, the most simple measures are mostly effective. Add to it a general enhanced situational awareness, a well-rested and briefed crew, a practised, confident team, a clear understanding of the own vessel’s capabilities and vulnerabilities, psychological preparedness and you have done a lot to fight piracy – at least for your ship.

Patrolling and naval cooperation in the Malacca Strait – A model?

The spate of maritime robberies, hijackings and hostage-takings off the Horn of Africa in recent years make it easy to forget that, just a few years ago, piracy was an equally pressing problem in one of the world’s major shipping chokepoints some 3000 nm to the east. The fact that the Strait of Malacca now features so rarely in headline news stories about piracy is testament to the success of the cooperative effort by the littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in reducing the number of armed attacks in what was once a hotspot of organised crime – only six attacks were recorded by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in 2008-2009, where years ago piracy was omnipresent. In a report on 21 April 2009, the IMB applauded Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore for their continued efforts in maintaining and securing the safety of the strategic trade route and ascribed this to increased vigilance and

patrolling by the littoral states and the continued precautionary measures on board, not least the introduction of the ISPS Code [see Infobox on ISPS].

The UN brought Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore together in 2005 to commence a trilateral partnership of information sharing and coordinated patrols. In September 2006, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy in Asia (ReCAAP) came into force as first regional government-to-government agreement designed to enhance the security of regional waters – to date 16 countries have signed and ratified the ReCAAP. (The decision by the Lloyd’s Joint War Committee to increase insurance rates for vessels transiting the Strait of Malacca in 2005 did for sure also encourage the cooperative efforts by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.)

The ReCAAP obliges member States to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery, to arrest perpetrators and to seize vessels used to carry out attacks. Further, under the agreement, an Information Sharing Centre was established in Singapore to manage and improve data and information sharing on piracy and armed robbery amongst the signatory states and to expedite response to attacks; it is operated as a web-based Information Network.

The commencement of operation “Gurita 2005”, finally granting hot pursuit [see Infobox on Hot Pursuit] rights to each country following criminal-carrying vessels across national boundaries and into foreign territorial waters led to coordinated naval patrols and effective law enforcement in the Strait; the efforts were complemented by the establishment of a tracking centre on the Indonesian island of Batam to monitor vessels transiting the Strait of Singapore to the south and joint air patrols by C-130 Hercules planes and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Political concepts such as these are not the most prominent at the moment with regard to the situation in Somalia and the waters off the Horn of Africa – nothing is really tangible apart from financial contribution and the efforts that indeed have to be ascribed to the EU. What worked in the Malacca Strait is a



Combating Piracy

regional cooperation, but in the waters off the Horn of Africa, the preconditions are much worse than in South-Asia. To Somalia's neighbours belong instable, failing or failed states with only little economic power. Hence, the "Maritime Organisation of West and Central Africa" (MOWCA) would seem to be a rather promising approach, above all because also issues such as unlicensed fishing, human trafficking and smuggling, drug smuggling, pipeline security (only to name a few) are covered by MOWCA. In West Africa, the consciousness of the necessity of a regional cooperation reaches that far, that even the landlocked Burkina-Faso, the Centralafrican Republic, Mali, Niger and the Chad have signed the accord. This awareness is a long time coming in East Africa, but nonetheless a viable option. The presence of military forces fighting the symptoms would thus be enhanced by a strategic perspective and political leaders could purposefully advance a lasting solution.

Legal Aspects

From a legal point of view, operating in the maritime environment is sometimes more complex than operating ashore; maritime regulations often have not been fully established, legal gaps exist, and sometimes it is not clear which legal catalogue overrules which.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the "backbone" of any Maritime Security Operation; its judicial body is the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, Germany. Although this Tribunal only decides upon disputes directly arising from the interpretation of UNCLOS (*e.g.* territorial claims, the exploitation of maritime resources), it plays an important role for operations since there is a natural link between granted rights and the legitimate use of force in order to ensure them. UNCLOS divides the maritime environment in different zones, each of which granting certain rights to and obligations for the actor involved (continental shelves and archipelagos are not discussed):

Base-line: The line that all zones go back to; the low-water line along the coast.

When the coastline is deeply indented or there is a fringe of islands, a straight line is drawn along the outer edge of the coast or bay.

Internal waters: Waters landward of the baseline, where domestic law applies. Visiting nations have to ask permission to enter and any type of military activity that does not have permission of the coastal State is likely to be regarded as a provocative act and can be seen as an armed attack. Ports, bays, gulfs and river mouths belong to internal waters.

Canals: They belong to internal waters (*e.g.* Suez Canal, Kiel Canal); since they are frequently used by shipping nations, canals are to be expected to be free for every nation to transit. Full enforcement jurisdiction is enjoyed by the coastal State.

Territorial Waters (TTW): Domestic law applies 12nm seaward from the baseline; foreign vessels enjoy the right of innocent passage for the purpose of continuous and expeditious traversing of the territorial waters or for proceeding to or from internal waters. Offshore island have their own territorial waters which may lead to an extension of the 12nm-belt. With regard to military activity, the same applies as in internal waters.

Contiguous zone: It is a belt of maximum 24nm range extending seaward from the baseline, it can be claimed by the coastal State, which may exercise the control necessary to prevent or punish infringement of fiscal, immigration, sanitation and customs regulations that occur in its territory or territorial waters. It extends the jurisdiction of the coastal State. Military activities must be permitted by the coastal State.

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): A sea zone aiming to safeguard the economic interests of a nation; it may not be extended over 200nm from the baseline. All nations enjoy the right of freedom of navigation, but permission for naval activities such as maneuvers or real operations must be granted by the coastal State.

High Seas: All parts of the ocean seaward from the Exclusive Economic Zone.

On the high seas, no State enjoys a granted right of enforcement jurisdiction, no sovereign rights whatsoever apply, the justification of an act always goes back to the flag State. In order to respond to a criminal act committed by another ship's crew, the operating State has to establish that act as criminal under its domestic law or as a breach of international law.

Whenever the use of military force is considered, the Law of Armed Conflict becomes also part of the legal regime. It seeks to regulate the methods and means of the use of military force and related issues (*e.g.* detainees). Its basic principles are military necessity, proportionality, distinction and no unnecessary suffering. An act of piracy by definition occurs on the high seas. Accordingly, illegal acts within the TTW or EEZ do not fall under this definition, where armed robbery would apply in the first place (see **Part I**) and where these acts fall under the jurisdiction of the coastal State. Where this State is unwilling or unable to comply with its duty to protect fundamental rights, the right to assist (*e.g.* the legal basis for NATO-led operations) can be granted through an official State request or the mandate.

What to do with a captured pirate?

While the coastal State is held primarily responsible for the treatment and prosecution of detainees, the question of how to handle them is a constant discussion, since it does not actually help, in cases where the coastal State is a failed State.

Piracy is a crime of universal jurisdiction; this principle maintains that certain



Boarding team inspecting skiff.

offenses are so heinous and widely condemned that any State may apprehend, prosecute and punish that offender on behalf of the world community, regardless of the nationality of the offender or victim. Following UNCLOS, all States are further under a positive obligation to cooperate to suppress piracy. Consequently, the warship of any State may seize and arrest pirate ships and pirates on the high seas. The courts of the State carrying out the arrest can then try the case - provided there is domestic legislation to allow for this. If there is no domestic law which allows for pirates to be prosecuted nationally, then (and notwithstanding the position under international law) the national courts will not be able to try the pirates.

UNCLOS is a framework treaty without self-executing regulations, it does not contain detailed procedural regulations. The weakest point is indeed to be found in national penal law – some penal codes demand a whole variety of conditions be met for an offence to qualify as an act of piracy while other codes do not make any mention of piracy at all. Add to all this that modern merchant shipping is a quintessential case of internationalization with ownership, shipping company, crew, cargo and flag State possibly all involving different nations and your complexity matrix is perfect. To sum up, what is required is:

1. Criminal law which makes piracy an act of crime;
2. National jurisdiction to cover offences committed by non-nationals outside of territorial jurisdiction.

If national law does not allow prosecu-



HDMS Absalon



tion, the options are:

1. to hand suspects to another State who can prosecute or
2. to release suspects.

In case 1 of which, the handing over may not be allowed under domestic law and European law pertaining to Human Rights, the only option would then be release [see Infobox on HDMS Absalon].

So in fact, when a Navy intervenes to stop a pirate attack, they often do not know whether the pirates they catch can or will be prosecuted. Coastal States are reluctant to accept delivery and flag States are reluctant to keep alleged criminals on board.

Warships compelled to release alleged pirates due to lack of a proper legal title to hold them in custody illustrates the bewildering paradox of the exhibition of intimidating naval power and the ultimate weakness of this power to function as an effective deterrent. No matter how deterrent the presence of naval forces may be, force alone is not enough to suppress piracy, because, legally speaking, the International Community is not fighting a war against piracy, but is trying to suppress a common crime and for this the usual legislation is needed to ensure detention, custody, prosecution and punishment.

Since piracy is a common crime outside the scope of acts of war, warships (even if designated by UNCLOS to suppress piracy on the high seas), cannot act militarily, because they are no confronting regular combatants, but rather have to play a police or coastguard role. Calls for

warships to do their job and shoot if necessary, disregard the fact that pirates are individuals acting for private ends and should be treated as common criminals; measures of enforcement must therefore be taken with a care similar to that employed by the Police in connection with any normal crime.

Questionable is also the expression "Rules of Engagement" with regard to pirates – police never engage with criminals in ways analogous to military operations and it must be made clear that engagement with pirates means something different than engagement in hostilities in a war situation. This is simply illustrated by the fact that combatants in war, if imprisoned, would not be prosecuted in connection with common crimes but be either exchanged against prisoners taken by the contender or set free after the end of the conflict.

UNCLOS regulates the right and not any obligation of States to establish universal jurisdiction. On the other hand, if a State simply lets pirates go, cannot it be argued that this State is violating international customary law by omission, namely by not doing something it is entitled to do in accordance with UNCLOS?

UNCLOS and the SUA Convention

In view of the lack of modern and UNCLOS related anti piracy legislation in many countries, it is suggested to apply an International Maritime Organization (IMO) extradition treaty which defines several categories of criminal offenses at sea – the "Convention on the Suppression of unlawful acts against the safety



of navigation" (SUA Convention) which obliges parties to prosecute or extradite any person who seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof. Then again, SUA regulates multiple rather than universal jurisdiction and parties are to establish jurisdiction principally when unlawful acts are perpetrated against their ships, in their territory or by one of their nationals. On the other hand, it covers a significantly larger geographical territory than UNCLOS – at the time of the illegal act, the vessel can be anywhere at sea. The judicial discussions in that respect are not for amateurs – and the core problem remains: Piracy related jurisdiction must be incorporated into national law, because also SUA refers to national law.

Courts

So finding a forum for prosecution of suspected pirates is one of the central obstacles in successfully fighting piracy. Somalia is at present not in a position to ensure prosecution of its own citizens; the flag State of the pirated ships are often located outside the region, making prosecution a practical challenge; national penal law often does not provide for jurisdiction. It seems that a deliberately established (or converted) court could be the solution:

Relocated Somali Court: Prosecution in Somalia is not realistic, therefore, the option for relocating a Somali Court could be examined, inspired by the "Lockerbie case" where a Scottish High Court of Justice was purpose-built at a neutral venue in the Netherlands, the premises were for the duration of the trial under authority of the Scottish Court. An issue is the capacity of the Government of Somalia to enter into the necessary agreements with the possible host country of such a court.

Regional Court: With a view to strengthening local engagement in anti piracy efforts, the negotiation of a treaty between the countries in the region could lead to the establishment of a Regional Court. An option would be making use of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, seated in Arusha, Tanzania, even if an amendment to the

treaty basis would be required. (The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, Germany, is not a criminal court but instead is resolving disputes between the Parties to the Convention; the amendments to its foundation would have to be far broader than in the case of the aforementioned Court.)

International Court: While the issues of required political will, required detailed discussions on the treaty and funding and the question of proportionality between effort and expense need not be forgotten, the prosecution by an internationalized court, combining national and international judges and being located in the region could be used, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon being an example. Since lack of resources is the greatest obstacle to such courts, use could be made of the International Criminal Court; to extend its competence to cover the crime of piracy would require an amendment to the Rome Statute.

In a bid to tackle the apparent impunity with which pirates can operate, the EU has concluded deals with Somalia's neighbour Kenya (and so has the US with Kenya) and the Seychelles to send pirates there for prosecution; the EU is supporting the Government of Kenya in its judicial efforts amounting to 2.4 million €. However, the Kenyan Foreign Affairs Minister has insisted that Kenya will not become a dumping ground for every Somali pirate captured on the High Seas, apart from that Human Rights groups have raised concerns about the standard of justice that pirate suspects will face there. Not to mention when they are released from prison – they will finally have to be reintegrated into society, an issue not much addressed so far, but which will have to be dealt with in the near future.

The UN Security Council passed four resolutions within 90 days that significantly contributed to the speedy formation of the multinational task forces in the region. UNSCR 1816/2008 grants, to mention the most pertinent aspects, that "States cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government may enter the TTW of Somalia for the purpose of

repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such action permitted on the high seas." This allows pursuit of pirates from the high seas into Somali TTW and also, to take action against an act which would amount to piracy if it were occurring on the high seas and also an act of armed robbery taking place in Somali TTW which does not fall within the strict definition of piracy; further, the "use of all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery", which allows for pursuit of suspected pirates, the arrest by warships of suspected pirates, the prosecution of suspected pirates by the State of the warship conducting the arrest, the conduct of anti piracy patrols including hailing, boarding, searching and seizure of those suspected of committing piracy and/or armed robbery. UNSCR 1846/2008 recommends the application of the SUA convention, UNSCR 1838/2008 legitimates the use of weapons and UNSCR 1851/2008 legitimates operations on Somali territory and the use of ship riders, *i.e.* law enforcement officials can be embarked on board other nations' ships.

Naval Operations and NATO/EU involvement

We are all aware – the presence of international Navies cannot be the final solution to the problems in Somalia; all they can do is minimise the effects and create a safer environment for merchant traffic. However, where Navies do make a difference is in:

- providing escort to humanitarian aid supply or other vessels;
- mounting a deterrent naval presence;
- conducting surveillance;
- defending, disrupting and protecting against pirate attacks;
- conducting boarding operations on suspected pirate or armed robber vessels;
- establishing ad-hoc cooperation and coordination in the area of operations;
- enhancing stability within the IRTC and adjacent waters in the Gulf of Aden.



In October 2008, upon request of the UN Secretary General, NATO was mandated to escort vessels of the World Food Programme directed towards Somalia; Operation "Allied Provider" (conducted by Standing NATO Maritime Group 2) started in mid October 2008 and ended in December 2008, when the task was taken over by EU mission "Atalanta", the probably most visible of the many operations off the Horn of Africa.

Forces present

In total, ca. 35 ships and several maritime patrol aircraft as well as unmanned aerial vehicles are deployed in the vast area, the composition of the task forces constantly changing; the area of operations of "Atalanta" currently ranges to the Seychelles and comprises around 5 million sqkm, or the size of the European Union land mass (it takes an average frigate 4-5 days to sail the operation area south-north and 1 day east-west!). Every Commander of Naval forces will tell you that it is sheerly impossible to patrol such a vast area – still, the missions are robust enough to deter offenders if correctly concentrated and coordinated in the right areas – those of heavy traffic.

OCEAN SHIELD/TASK FORCE 508: In March 2009, NATO renewed its engagement by launching the Operation "Allied Protector" (conducted by Standing NATO Maritime Group 1), which led to Operation "Ocean Shield"; the force is also known as "Task Force 508". The RoE of Ocean Shield though are far behind those of "Atalanta" (*e.g.* only pirates arrested under "Atalanta" mandate can be transferred to Kenya)

ATALANTA: "OPERATION ATALANTA", also known as "EU NAVFOR Atalanta" is the first maritime operation ever run by the EU in the context of the European Security and Defense Policy. The mission includes protecting World Food Programme vessels and escorting and supporting merchant vessels transiting off the Somali coast. EUNAVFOR is the main coordinating authority operating the Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa).

CTF150: The multinational naval component of Operation Enduring Freedom

– Horn of Africa "Combined Task Force 150", is operating under direction of US Fifth Fleet; assigned with the task of conducting Maritime Security Operations, it is supporting anti piracy operations and operates in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

CTF151: The "Combined Task Force 151" is a multinational task force established to conduct counterpiracy operations under a mission-based mandate throughout the same area of responsibility with a specific anti-piracy remit; also under US lead.

OTHER NATIONAL TASK GROUPS OR SINGLE UNITS are present in the area, some instructed to conduct escort duties exclusively for the flag State, some openly cooperating with the bigger players. In general, the cooperation and coordination amongst the naval players involved works very well, and that also accounts for such rare cooperation partners as the People's Liberation Army's Navy.

OCEAN LOOK: The US Navy uses unmanned aerial vehicles MQ9 Reaper (these actually armed drones are however being solely used for reconnaissance) in the "Operation Ocean Look".

MSC(HOA)

The Maritime Security Center – Horn of Africa (MSC[HOA]) which is run by the EU Naval Force, is a Coordination Centre, manned by military and merchant Navy personnel from several countries who coordinate between shipping companies and Captains and the military forces operating in the region to provide support and protection to mariners. MSC(HOA) builds and maintains a maritime picture, advises on areas of specific susceptibility and Group Transit timings. To do this coordination effort effectively, MSC(HOA) needs to know about merchant vessels approaching, transiting or operating in the region and offers through its website to ship owners, ships Captains and agents to register their details securely with MSC(HOA), update positions of their vessels and receive information and guidance designed to reduce the risk of pirate attacks.

This three-level website contains gen-

eral information in its first and free level; the second level is password-protected and can be accessed by recognized members, who can send and receive relevant information pertaining to their travel and routing and are, in all aspects, covered by EU counterpiracy operations (over 6000 entities are currently registered!); the third level is the military level, secure, but unclassified, meaning that EU, NATO, Russia, China and other actors can freely exchange intelligence and information so as to coordinate most effectively their efforts.


While MSC(HOA) mainly acts by coordinating, the collection of relevant data is done by the "UK Maritime Trade Organisation" (UKMTO) in Dubai, acting as the first point of contact for vessels in the region. UKMTO receives ships' movements registrations when passing the reporting points or lines when approaching the Horn of Africa and is the day-to-day interface, talking to the ships and liaising directly with MSC(HOA) and the naval Commanders at sea.

Maritime Security Patrol Area/Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor/Transits

- The "Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor" (IRTC) is a straight, 450nm long track, separated in east and west bound traffic, stretching central through the Gulf of Aden and is the recommended path for merchant shipping. The corridor is not marked nor defined by visual navigation means as a fairway, neither is it a dedicated Traffic Separation Scheme. The "big three", EU, NATO and USNAVCENT have agreed upon rotational coordination duties of operations along the IRTC.

- The "Maritime Security Patrol Area" (MSPA) is a geographic area in the Gulf of Aden, its establishment directed by "Combined Maritime Forces" (the taskforce that CTF150 belongs to); it is utilized by all patrolling warships and positioned to maximise deployment of available forces in areas of high risk. CTF150 forces patrol the area, which is neither marked by any visual navigational means as a fairway; the pa-





Sea chart "Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor" (IRTC).

trols are intended to monitor activity both inside and outside the IRTC.

MSC(HOA) as coordinator provides for three types of protection for transiting vessels:

- several times per day, "scheduled group transits" are being offered in either direction through the IRTC in different speed classes; ships sailing in the scheduled group transit are safeguarded by picket-like distributed and patrolling warships. It is worth noting that group transits are not convoys, meaning the ships sailing in a group transit shall enter the IRTC at the time indicated for the intended passage speed even if this means that a vessel is or appears to be the single one in that transit. Neither should merchant vessels expect to be in permanent company of a warship, but all warships in the Gulf of Aden are aware of the group transit timings and have access to all details of transiting shipping. Group transits are scheduled to sail through the most vulnerable area of the Gulf of Aden at night. In the IRTC, the golden 20-minutes rule applies: If a merchant ship can prevent pirates from entering for 20 minutes, then chances are highest that a warship has reached the scene of action and can stop the attack.
- approx. once per day, "escorted group transits" are being conducted

for Russian, Chinese, Japanese and Indian merchant vessels through the IRTC by their forces under national command.

- "individual escorts" are being offered to World Food Programme and AMISOM ships.

Comparing the pure numbers of intended or attempted attacks over the recent years, one could argue that the military operations are not achieving significant success. In 2009 there were almost three times as many as in 2008. But the numbers also show: While in 2008 around 40% of attacks ended in hijacking, this number fell to 14% in 2009. Even more warships would not necessarily have a marginal utility, but what is equally important is proper planning and preparation of the passage. Shipowners who have learned that lesson and who closely cooperate with the organisations involved (registration on the MSC(HOA) website, follow their "Advice to masters", report to UKMTO at the reporting points or lines etc.) did bring their "golden geese" through the area without harm. In other words – not a single ship that complied with the "Best Management Practices" and has reported correctly for the passage of the Gulf of Aden, has fallen in pirates' hands.

Duplication of effort?

The presence of both a NATO and an EU mission has raised the broader transat-

lantic issue of duplication. Both NATO and EU officials recognize the potential for cooperation between the two institutions, but also insist on the added value they bring: NATO has all the military and logistic capabilities needed for a sustained and long-lasting effort and brings, as the embodiment of the transatlantic relationship, with it the guarantee of Canada and US commitment. The EU sees "Atalanta" as an example of best practise in several points. One being the internal organization, linear and rapid though the operation has currently more ships deployed than NATO and CTF151 combined. Second, legally, the EU has worked out an agreement with Kenya and the Seychelles for bringing seized pirates to trial. Third, the EU cooperates with Russia, China and also Iran on the issue of piracy to a degree that NATO as a military alliance with a complex relationship with at least some of those countries, can hardly match. And fourth, EU offers assets beyond military capabilities, such as foreign aid, trade agreements, investments in education and is thus purportedly equipped to pursue a more comprehensive approach.

Conclusions

What is the purpose of bringing warships to the coastal areas of the Horn of Africa if States are not legally equipped to enforce universal jurisdiction to detain and prosecute pirates? Military operations cannot replace a law that can only work if permanently enforced by effective patrolling. Undeniably, coastal States are the most able to perform these tasks in the sea area adjacent to their territorial sea, with a well law enforcement organization and a functional justice system – and here lies the dilemma.

All involved actors, including the Government of Somalia, recognize that piracy has become an organized crime and that pirates are sophisticated criminals who seem to enjoy support from the littoral communities which may receive a part of the revenues. Moreover, pirates most probably have links with some of Somalia's warring factions, being therefore part, directly or indirectly, of the struggle for power in the country. What is certain is that pirate groups enjoy some



protection from local war lords, if not directly led by them. This suggests that the phenomenon must also be regarded from a political point of view, addressing its root causes, such as endemic poverty, underdevelopment (over 2 million people are fed by external actors, primarily the World Food Programme), as well as civil strife.

So, any approach cannot be but comprehensive, one that is aimed at solving the many serious problems that Somalia faces on land. This concept of a comprehensive approach is accepted by virtually all organisations and institutions - what remains elusive to date is the actual implementation of such an approach. The only mission, so far, that the

International Community has been able to deploy to the country after the tragic experience of UNISOM in the 1990s is the African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM. But AMISOM is still conceived and organised as a peace-keeping mission when, in fact, Somalia is a country scourged by endemic and violent civil strife. And AMISOM has only relations with the internationally recognized Government, the TFG or Transitional Federal Government, but they are weak; it lacks relations with governing entities that are not recognized but which have greater control than the TFG over their respective areas (Puntland, Somaliland, Islamic Courts). And AMISOM is underresourced, currently numbering only a fraction of the number envisaged.

Only - laconically - restoring a stable and accountable Government in Somalia and creating better conditions for the Somali people, especially the young, will ultimately be able to defeat piracy - instead of repressing it. †

INFOBOX

Unifire Water Cannons

The Unifire Water Cannons are based on technology offered to Police and firefighters; they generate pressure of up to 12 bar and thereby range up to 90m. A dhau can be filled at a rate of 5 tons of water / minute and be therefore forced to heave to. Should attackers have already come on board, six cannons would suffice to protect the upper deck of a 200m container vessel by remote control from the bridge. Also, chemicals can be mixed into the water or the deck can be flooded in pre-programmed overlapping patterns.

Shiploc system

In its security catalogue of Dec 2002, IMO recommends that its member states use the satellite-based Shiploc alarm system. Transmitters concealed on the vessel emit signals at regular intervals. Satellites send the calculated position back to the Shiploc data centre. Shipowners and the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre can retrieve these data online at any time and inform local security authorities if a vessel changes its position unexpectedly. The system plays a decisive part in tracking vessels which have been seized and is also used in a similar form to track lost cargo; in this case, the transmitters are installed in the containers themselves.

ISPS-Code

Put in place in 2004 by the UN's International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Ship and Port Facilities Security (ISPS) Code comprises a set of comprehensive risk management measures. It calls for uniform guidelines for conducting port security analyses that include ship security plans, monitoring and controlling access to ports and ships, monitoring cargo and the activities of people around ports and ships and ensuring security communications.

Hot pursuit

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea advances the "hot pursuit" concept whereby Naval units can pursue ships from the Contiguous Zone or TTW onto the high seas, that are believed to have violated the laws and regulations of that State. Under international law, there is no right, analogous to that, that allows a warship to pursue a vessel from the high seas into the TTW of another State.

HDMS Absalon

The Danish command and support ship "HDMS Absalon" in September 2008 detained 10 suspected armed pirates off Somalia after they allegedly had been attacking merchant vessels and who were in possession of implements with which to board ships and weapons. Since Denmark has only national criminal jurisdiction if they had been attacking a Danish ship or citizens, they could not be brought to Denmark for prosecution nor was the evidence "HDMS Absalon" had, sufficient to other States for prosecution. The alleged pirates were set free, allowed to keep their ships but not their weapons.

MSC(HOA)

Register online with MSC(HOA) - Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa, run by EU NAVFOR and get further information and guidance for the shipping community.

<http://www.mschoa.eu>

(Continued from Page 54)

THE LONG LIGHT BLUE LINE, MUCH FASTER THAN SHIPS STEAMING AT NORMAL SPEED

— turns out to be a helicopter, the ship has reached the Gulf of Aden. The helicopter belongs to one of the Navy vessels operating in the EU/NAVFOR. Suddenly patterns change — yesterday, the "Beluga Recommendation" steamed her steady course alone, now she is in peak traffic, she is overtaking and being overtaken, ship after ship is coming in the opposite direction, warships accompanying, like on a highway. And this is intended, of course: Being close together and in company of warships, pirates have only a very little chance of coming on board and mounting an attack. It will take about 30 hours to sail through the IRTC; the "Beluga Recommendation" adheres to the scheduled Group Transit timing in her speed class and reaches the Red Sea - unharmed.

NATO Network Enabled Capability

NNEC uses current and future technology

By Megan Thum,
NNEC Communications, HQ SACT

TODAY'S WARFIGHTER, whether operating in the mountains of Afghanistan or in a remote desert location in Iraq, is fighting an evolved enemy. The tactics are different, the method of attack is different, and the technology found in even the most remote climes is often highly advanced. NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) will shift the focus onto information superiority as an enabler for combat power and allow collaboration at the speed of tomorrow by making better use of the technology of today and tomorrow.

NNEC is Vital to Operations

Nations and NATO's future operational environments will demand substantial transformation at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical. Integrated planning and execution, information sharing and responsive support are necessary to achieve success with fewer personnel and fewer resources. Ideally, this would also mean fewer casualties, but an overall more effective Alliance.

We, who are identified as NATO, Nations, industry, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and several others, must be willing and able to exchange information openly with Partner Nations to accomplish an evolving mission set. In today's dynamic environment, NNEC will enable NATO and the Nations to conduct more complex operations, and despite the deployment of fewer forces, conduct these operations with more efficiency and greater overall effectiveness.



The fourth NATO Joint Computer Assisted Exercise Forum was held at Joint Warfare Centre in September 2009. The primary goal was to promote the exchange of information and "Best Practices" between the staffs of NATO and various national simulation centres worldwide.

"Ideally, NNEC should make it possible for a commander in the field to exercise effective Command and Control allowing seamless communications down to the warfighter," said Major General Jaap Willemse, Assistant Chief of Staff Command, Control, Computer, Communication and Intelligence Division (C4I).

"Part of the work being done within the C4I Division at ACT is coordination with the Nations to make systems capable of working together and of being interoperable."

What is NNEC?

According to the official definition NNEC

is "the Alliance's cognitive and technical ability to merge the various components of the operational environment from the strategic level down to the tactical level through a networking and information infrastructure."

NNEC is NATO's commitment to standardize and harmonize NATO and national Network Enabled Capability (NEC) programmes. Common cognitive and operational aims will revolutionize the way we fight in our future conflicts. By improving collaboration in an open and dynamic information environment, NNEC enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of the AI-



liance. The NNEC approach of dynamic information sharing will enable cross-discipline information sharing resulting in information superiority and consequently substantial increase of effectiveness. To create the framework in which NNEC capabilities can evolve, three coherence areas have been defined:

- a. Operational Concept Requirement Implications;
- b. Architectures and Services Definition and Standardization;
- c. Implementation.

In addition to the three coherence areas, a steering group (Leadership and Guidance) monitors the progress and reports to the political level. Technology, warfighting methods and capabilities, threats and solutions have changed dramatically over the past 20 years. NNEC, as a capability, is a new way to think about doing business. These changes have put new demands and new requirements on the operator in the field and in the technology and communication tools organizations such as NATO employ. These new requirements demand a very aggressive approach to the speed of communication and demand that all players be on the same page.

"It is essential that all future programmes and projects adapt the policies and processes that NNEC puts forward," said Willemse. "Without NNEC our forces will not benefit from the NNEC-driven unparalleled situational awareness and understanding the Alliance requires to facilitate dynamic and responsive success in any and all missions and environments."

NNEC Can be Achieved

Bringing NNEC and its capabilities to existing projects and programmes that will affect and improve our warfighters missions is complex, but it can be and has been done as seen in the programs Snow Leopard and MAJIIC (Multi-Sensor Aerospace-Ground Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Interoperability Coalition).

Learn More about NNEC

NNEC is not limited to NATO or the Nations; it truly affects everyone at every level. To this end, the NNEC ICT organ-

izes an annual NNEC Conference aimed at disseminate the latest information on the topic and to foster an environment for discussions. The annual NNEC conference is NATO's primary forum to exchange information and views on a wide array of net-centric, NEC and NNEC related topics between all stakeholders.

In 2010 the event will focus on the complexities of information management in the environment of joint coalition forces. This yearly event draws national attention with previous registrations coming from more than 30 countries and 400 attendees.

NNEC is the capability to share information. It is the Alliance's task to actively shape an environment where people are willing to share, where policy and doctrine allow us to share, and where technology enables us to share. †

NATO Network Enabled Capability will shift the focus onto information superiority as an enabler for combat power and allow collaboration at the speed of tomorrow.

SNOW LEOPARD: Much like the basic NNEC philosophy, everything relies on the availability of a persistent, robust network infrastructure across which you can federate your capabilities into a whole on an as-needed basis. That is one of the basic principles of NNEC and if you translate that to exercising and training (Snow Leopard) that exactly parallels what NNEC aims. Using a distributed network infrastructure will be able to link or federate capabilities as required into a consistent whole and deliver the content and information you need to run your exercise and training across that distributed infrastructure. ~ Hans Jense



Above: Allied Command Transformation's Assistant Chief of Staff C4I (Command, Control, Computer, Communication and Intelligence) Division, Netherlands Royal Air Force Maj. Gen. Jaap Willemse.

SHARE TO WIN

<http://nneq.act.nato.int>




MAJIIC: MAJIIC is operationally based and it looks at the different processes and procedures that are required to fulfill functions. This is very similar to what is going on in the NNEC environment; which is not just about technology but it is also about a way of thinking about how you do your job. NNEC requires that you have to change the way you look forward and re-consider exchange of information. ~ Joe Ross



By Sqd Ldr Bob Dixon, RAF
Joint Exercise Division, JWC

AL ANDALUS ULTRA TRIAL



I'm not sure whether it is a mid-life crisis, but I have decided to undertake an ultra-marathon, when I haven't competed in anything more than a half-marathon before. So instead of 21km competitively, I am going to do 235km! Granted it will be undertaken over five days, but it will be about a marathon or greater every day.

Lieutenant Colonel Jay Turner of the British Army completed his 100 miles for charity in 2009; I, of the Royal Air Force, am doing this in 2010; so I suppose we should expect the Royal Navy to go one better in 2011 – as I look round the current candidates in the Joint Warfare Centre I won't be betting my mortgage on it.

Just to make it a little tougher the race organisers have selected a location of the Andalucian Mountains in the south of Spain. The race will reach 1700m (5000'), so no problems with a lack of oxygen, but I am guessing the 'ups' will get a little tiring and the 'downs' will affect my knees. Temperatures in the 2009 race hit close to 45°C (110°F), though the usual is around 35°C (95°F); the day I signed up to the event it was -10°C (14°F) in Stavanger, which was hardly acclimatisation training. I will also have to carry whatever I need in a backpack, so I will minimise

the weight of anything I want. Perhaps the biggest debilitating factor will be related to the date. The race starts on 12 July, which is a day after the World Cup Final and, as England are guaranteed to win this time, I will be starting with a hangover.

I am not going to win the event (the 2009 race was won in a cumulative time of 21 hrs – I'll still be on Stage 1 probably), so I have decided to run my race for charity. This will not only serve to help the disadvantaged, but will give me a focus to motivate me and keep me going when it gets tough. Actually, I have decided to run for two charities, so if you wish to support me (and thank you very much if you do), you will have a decision to make. I will be running for **Help for Heroes (H4H)** and **UNICEF**.

UNICEF is a charity that was founded in 1946 in order to provide development and emergency assistance to children. UNICEF helps children receive the support, health care and education they need to survive the threats of childhood poverty – such as preventable disease or malnutrition – and grow up to become healthy adults. It strives to protect children from violence and abuse and from exploitation through child labour or trafficking. It also protects children in the midst of war and natural disasters and provides emergency assistance, usually within 48 hours.

Help for Heroes (H4H) was started in October 2007 in the UK to provide help for injured servicemen returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. It is able to give 98% of the money it receives to its charitable work; the smallest administrative percentage taken of any charity I know. It provides Personnel Recovery Centres,

works in Combat Stress, with those who have lost limbs and many other aspects of war-related injuries. I wonder if they can help with my recovery after the run.

If you would like to support me I will be extremely grateful, as will the charity you choose. You can pledge either online, or by donating in cash. Every part of your donation will go to the charity as I will cover the race fee, flights and administration costs. If you wish to donate online the site you need to visit is:

For UNICEF — <http://www.justgiving.com/RobDixon2>
For H4H — <http://www.justgiving.com/RobDixon1>

The site is constructed for British Pound Sterling (£) currency, but you can use your credit card. If you are UK tax payer please don't forget Gift Aid. If you give me cash, please remember to let me know which charity you would like to benefit. For further information on each charity please visit:

For UNICEF <http://www.unicef.org/>
For H4H <http://www.helpforheroes.org.uk/>

I have my annual fitness test the week after the run, so it should be good training if I can still walk. I am looking forward to the event, but mostly because the in-laws are visiting Stavanger in the same week – it seems an extreme way of avoiding the visit, but needs must. I will write again for The Three Swords, after the run, to let you know at which point I died, but in the meantime I hope that you are able to support me in my effort to raise money for both of these worthwhile charities. I'd better start my preparation for the training – researching hospitals in Andalucia on the internet.

Top 10 songs for ultra-marathon

Recommended for only those under 40
(Not for Jay & Mark!)



- Doves - Pounding
- Muse - Showbiz
- Ride - Unfamiliar
- Power of Dreams - Metalscape
- Mansun - Wide Open Space
- Foo Fighters - The Pretender
- Kent - Revolt III
- The Boo Radleys - Spaniard
- 30 Seconds to Mars - The Kill
- Placebo - The Bitter End

NATO FORACS NORWAY

By Commander (SG) Anders Hegland, RNoN
Chief NATO FORACS Norway



NATO FORACS Norway building at Ulsnes.

Why NATO FORACS?

NATO FORACS stands for “NATO Naval Forces Sensor and Weapon Accuracy Check Sites”. Across the Nations sponsoring the NATO FORACS project, which are Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, only NATO FORACS has the ability to check the accuracy of sensors and weapon systems with the credibility required for safe operational use. All participating Nations agree to this principle, and their ambition is therefore to quality check their units at a NATO FORACS site prior to deployment to international/Allied operations.

FORACS History in Brief

NATO’s second oldest project, NATO FORACS, has – since it was formally set up back in 1974 – performed roughly 1,500 tests of most kinds of naval units.

NATO FORACS Norway (NFN) became operational in 1978 and has since completed its NATO mission to the satisfaction of all users. The project was set up based on an American model and the co-operation between the current eight sponsoring Nations as well as Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is still in the best of health. To date, three equal test ranges have been set up. They are:

- NATO FORACS Autec (NFA)
United States of America-Florida;
- NATO FORACS Greece (NFG)
Greece-Crete;
- NATO FORACS Norway (NFN)
Norway-Stavanger.

Beyond the eight sponsoring Nations, other NATO Nations are welcome to use the facilities, depending on availability.

Also Partnership for Peace (PfP) Nations may use the facilities provided approval is granted by NATO centrally.

Visions and Applications

The project’s visions for the future are adjusted against NATO’s operational goals and nations’ needs to have tests performed not only on their operational units, but also in connection with the acquisition of new vessels and new equipment. Because of its structure as a project, NATO FORACS is at all times capable of adapting to meet the needs of participating Nations and NATO requirements. As an example, one may cite the

possibility made available to the “Norwegian Frigate Project” to draw on the skills and infrastructure of the NATO FORACS organization in the conduct of parts of the Sea Acceptance Trials. Similar tests have been performed for other nations, but to a lesser extent than for the *Fridtjof Nansen* class of frigates.

While NATO FORACS is currently putting funds into new operational capabilities, it already provides capabilities that are little used, for instance equipment to test maritime links and perform target-tracking of subsurface objects. Also, its Electronic Warfare Simulation Capability is quite on level with similar



Left: Cdr (SG) Anders Hegland, Chief NATO FORACS Norway; below German frigate FGS Lübeck moored at NATO FORACS Norway dockside facilities.



capabilities provided to special units NATO-wide. Visions for the future tend to shift more and more in an operational direction. Not only single-ship testing, but also multi-ship testing will make its way, little by little. The project is currently in a stage where new possibilities in this respect are being considered. Nevertheless, and regardless of the future visions for new test possibilities, the project's core capacity and skills – accuracy testing of sensors, weapons and weapon systems – will remain key to everything NATO FORACS will do in the future.

Personnel and Skill Challenges

The NATO FORACS project is permanently manned by roughly 50 persons, spread out on the project's three check sites and the Brussels-based NATO FORACS Office. NATO FORACS Norway has a force of 20; mostly civilians holding special skills from the technical level all the way up to senior engineer. As elsewhere in the Norwegian Armed Forces, and technology companies generally for that matter, there are skills where manning is short.

Recruitment is not easy in today's environment, especially not in Norway's oil capital Stavanger. We still manage, at least to some extent, to recruit new

staff holding the skills and knowledge required. We also manage to retain the staff we already have in post as most of the staff leaving do so to retire. The technological challenges we face have their main focus in the area of development of NATO FORACS, the interests of which, within a Norwegian national context, frequently clash with administrative routines and procedures "forced on" the organization.

Future Applications in Norway

Operational units are expected to be tested at NATO FORACS Norway prior to deployment to international/Allied operations. The "Norwegian Frigate Project" has already set up processes for NATO FORACS to perform verification tests of some sensors and weapon systems, an arrangement expected to be carried on for all five ships concerned. Operational testing will be performed as soon as the ships enter this phase of their lifecycle.

Also the Skjold class will undergo testing, both in a verification context and in an operational context. Without a permanently stationed maritime helicopter, the *Fridtjof Nansen* class frigates are not a satisfactory weapon system. NATO FORACS Norway has in this context the ambition to conduct verification tests of

both the NH90 alone and vessels carrying the NH90 as a weapon system.


Finance

Norway's part of the total operational costs of the organization is a little less than 12 percent, which amounts to about 4 million NOK. The total operational costs of NATO FORACS Norway are a little more than 12 million NOK out of which almost 100% is thought to be spent in Norway. Or put differently, as an apropos to those whose focus is at all times on the operational costs of any operation: Norway makes a roughly 8 million NOK profit from the organization's presence on Norwegian soil!

Conclusion

I am proud of being at the head of the NATO institution with the longest history of work in Norway. The skills and competencies of the NATO FORACS Norway staff, as well as their dedicated willingness to take on all and any tasks, inspire great respect. The future carries a wide range of challenges. Internally, and in liaison with our customers and partners, those challenges will be met with the same enthusiasm that the organization has exhibited ever since it was stood up in 1974. †

The Book Corner



"There are reading habits that resemble drug addiction," the Swedish writer, critic and literary scholar Olof Lagercrantz once observed. "Imagine booksellers and librarians as servant spirits or helping hands at work in huge entertainment halls, running to and fro between shelves and tables, bringing Balzac's morphine, Hamsun's cocaine and Klas Östergren's cognac. Soon, slumber visits and deep sleep embraces the premises, and dreams start growing like Japanese paper flowers ..."

When travelling on duty (TDY), do you sometimes get a bit bored and would like something to read? Do you want tips on books to check out? The idea behind this column is to hear from the magazine's readers about their literary pleasures. Maybe you have read a book that left you excited about the world and life, or made you happy. The editor would be very pleased to receive your suggestions for reading! (*The following books are selected by Lt Col Elisabeth Eikeland.*)

NON-FICTION:

E=mc² by David Bodanis: This very approachable work of popular science explains – and adorns with anecdote and biography – Einstein's equation and its place in history.

The Code Book by Simon Singh: The Code Book traces the fascinating

development of codes and code-breaking from military espionage in Ancient Greece to modern computer ciphers.

FICTION:

The Impressionist by Hari Kunzru:

The most eagerly awaited British debut of 2002 became the brunt of harsh reviews. One critic wrote: "Conceptually brilliant and frequently striking, but fictionally it's a flawed first attempt." Several Norwegian reviewers rated it as very good, though.

The Gargoyle by Andrew Davidson:

An international literary sensation, "The Gargoyle" is also an extraordinary debut novel of love that transcends the boundaries of time. With a misfit leading character this book will charm you, enchant you, disturb you and make you believe in the impossible!



Introducing a new club at JWC

JWC BICYCLE CLUB

THE "JWC BICYCLE CLUB" was formed in January of this year to promote the well-being of its members by sports, social and other activities that support integration, cooperation and coordination within and around the JWC. It is a club for all cycling enthusiasts; whether you are a road cyclist, a die-hard mountain biker, a fearless downhiller or a touring biker, everyone is very welcome.

Membership of the JWC Bicycle Club is very reasonable. For a family of two adults and two children the cost is 300 NOK per year. Our aim is to embrace all forms of the sport and to encourage as many people as possible to try out the many different types of cycling available. As an example, a number of our members are taking part in "NORDJORITTET"



in June 2010: it is a 90 km race over mixed terrain; more details are available at www.nordsjorittet.no and hopefully the next instalment from the club will have photographs (before and after shots) and personal quotes of how our members got on in the race!

The JWC Bicycle Club will have the use of a workshop in the basement of Gausel Magasin on the JWC base. This is solely for the use of the club members to maintain and repair their bicycles. The workshop is currently being upgraded and will hopefully be available for use from the end of March 2010. The club also has a website <http://jwcbc.weebly.com/index.html> and Facebook account! Search for "JWC Bicycle Club", which have lots of useful information about races, shops,

maps, photos and lots more, so please take time to have a look.

At the moment there is just one female member of the club. It would be great if there were more women becoming members. Do not be put off because you think you might not be fit enough or your bike is a little old or it has a basket on the front... The idea is for a group of like minded individuals to come together and cycle and to enjoy each others company. The JWC Bicycle Club is looking forward to new members joining and the coming summer months where we can make the most of a beautiful country by cycling its length and breadth (not all in one go!) and enjoying taking in the sights in good company.

~ **By Paula Glen**

Sea of Poppies by Amitav Ghosh:

The sweep of this historical adventure spans the poppy fields of India, the high seas, and the backstreets of China at the time of the Opium Wars. The story is set in 1838 when compulsory cultivation of opium poppies was imposed on Indians by the East India Company.

CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS:

Books by Norwegian reporter **Åsne Seierstad:**

With Their Backs to The World: (Portraits from Serbia) Working for the national Norwegian television network, Åsne Seierstad was in Yugoslavia (today's Serbia) during the Kosovo War and NATO air campaign. The book gives insight into the conflict in the Balkans.

One Hundred And One Days: (A Baghdad Journal) Åsne Seierstad worked

in Baghdad January-April 2003, reporting on the events in Iraq before, during and immediately after the US-led invasion.

The Bookseller of Kabul: An intimate look at life in Afghanistan; although it reads like a work of fiction, this book is a true story, which only adds to its impact.

NORWEGIAN FICTION WRITERS:

The Half Brother by Lars Saabye Christensen: This is a book that cries out to be read! It is, as one reviewer has put it, "unputdownable". It is a big book - in the English translation 764 pages. Read it please because, like Tolstoy's "War and Peace" or Margaret Mitchell's "Gone with the Wind" it will stay with you for the rest of your life. (Reviewers at Amazon.com).

Shame by Bergljot Hobæk Haff: There are three different voices in the

book: a third person, the story of Idun Hov, and the excerpts of Vemund's diary. The story takes place during the course of three generations. In this way the reader is carried back and forth in time. The book explores the concept of "shame": how does it control us and how do we use it to control others. In this particular case the shame comes as the result of the traumas of the Second World War.

Psalm at Journey's End by Erik Fosnes Hansen: This fictional novel examines the myth that the musicians aboard the Titanic continued to play even as the ship sank. The novelist writes about this fascinating and shocking story of Titanic's music band during the fatal voyage with focus on larger themes such as "responsibility, fate, reason and faith."

Joint Warfare Centre's ISAF Mission Rehearsal Training directly contributes to the conduct of operations in ISAF by allowing the Core Staff Element and targeted augmentee staff officers to rehearse their assigned tasks prior to actually deploying.

TRAINING EXCELLENCE

www.jwc.nato.int

