



NATO
OTAN

THE THREE SWORDS

STAVANGER - NORWAY

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NEW CHIEF OF STAFF

COIN OPERATIONS

JOINT WARFIGHTING
CONFERENCE 2010

FUTURE OF

WARFIGHTING

BY GEN STÉPHANE ABRIAL, SACT



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Cover _ French Air Force
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Dear Reader,

I heartily welcome you, all the new members of the JWC, and wish you all the best for your endeavours, hoping that your transition will bring you and your family much fun and satisfaction in Norway. Some of you may already have gained a first impression of the Nordic summer, which never fails to create a fairytale atmosphere of endless days and nights soft as velvet. If, like many Norwegians, you appreciate eating in idyllic outdoor dining spots, maybe chatting away with next-table neighbours, it really pinches your heart that it will take almost a year for those lazy, laidback moments of life to return.

The low autumn light now beams through autumn foliage. Shorter days bring changes in our routines. Outdoor activities move indoors, and life will slip into a lower gear over the next two seasons. The cold, dark months of winter are coming, as are those long cosy evenings around the dinner table with friends and family, indulging in culinary pleasures such as traditional Norwegian fare, often given a modern twist. The autumn's favourite Norwegian meat is probably lamb, which comes in dozens of high-quality varieties. Potting for lobster is another characteristic of the season, as the lordly crustacean represents the supreme taste from the sea. I recently learnt that lobster was hard to sell 70 years ago. Stavanger's lobstermen worked hard for little and got only NOK 1.50 per kilo, which was down to NOK 0.25 per lobster in rural areas. With lobster today being seen as a luxury, prices have risen sharply, so you have to delete the decimal point and multiply by four to get the current price!

One of the very best things about autumn is the opportunity it offers to slow down in pace with nature. Keeping a 'weather eye' by watching clouds and making a note of changes in the winds and the seas often becomes like a sport. Being able to identify different types of clouds will help understand the kind of weather to expect. *Cirrus*, *cumulus congestus*, *cumulonimbus calvus* and *cumulonimbus incus* are all mystical and musical names that may sound like sweet poetry to you. The truth

is, however, that they bring some pretty bad weather, exactly the kind that locals love! The snow skiing season is not far away either... Skiing is synonymous with fun, fitness, and freedom as it takes you away from the daily grind. Skiing is playing with acceleration and centrifugal forces. It is also the ultimate thrill, provided you get the rhythm of it and let go of any thoughts or feelings that may hold you back. At its best, it feels like pure bliss. A ski boat takes Stavanger skiers and snowboarders at express pace (less than two hours) from the Skagenkaien Quay to the Sauda Skiing Centre, one of the major skiing arenas of West Norway. Not every day, is it, that you go by boat straight to a skiing arena. Alternatively, you may travel by car to Sirdal and rent a cabin placed at your disposal by the host nation.

I wish all of you a very happy autumn and winter. And I urge you to spend much of your spare time in outdoor activities. I for one enjoy taking my kids to the woods in autumn and winter evenings. We make a makeshift fire and lie down on the woodland floor to watch the stars in the sky above us. A few words from the visionary medieval poem of *Draumkvedet* will then come to mind: The moon now shines brightly, and the road ahead seems long, sending you off in a reverie where anything seems possible! Happy Reading!

Lt Col Elisabeth Eikeland, NOR AF,
Chief Public Affairs Office, Joint Warfare Centre

PUBLISH AN ARTICLE IN THE THREE SWORDS!
We are always looking for good articles written by our readers. If you have got something to say, send it to us. We will be happy to consider it for publication. Email your articles, as well as your comments and feedback to JWC CG PAO Common (CRONOS) or inci.kucukaksoy@jwc.nato.int.

The Three Swords

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SGM Leszek Wojtalik
(Back Cover photo).





Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte German Army Commander, Joint Warfare Centre

Five months have already passed since the last issue of *The Three Swords*. Again, it has been a busy and challenging time and, on top of that, the summer months saw a lot of personnel rotation. Eventually we moved into our new offices and exercise building with all of our permanent staff and finally got rid of the container village in front of our headquarters. All this emerged as we were in the middle of the implementation of our new Peacetime Establishment (PE). The regular rotation in connection with the PE implementation has for the first time brought the JWC down to less than 85 percent of full personnel strength. For a small organization like the JWC, which is only one-deep in many of its areas of expertise, this becomes a major challenge when conducting exercises. Also to note is that the JWC saw more newcomers this year than in the past. In an effort to help them integrate more quickly, we continue to run our comprehensive internal training and education programme, and I would like to thank all those involved in making this happen. In addition, I wish to extend my thanks to those of you who supported the numerous community activities, such as boat trips and BBQs, designed to make newcomers and their families feel welcome. Furthermore, this year's OTX took us to Szczecin, Seelow and Berlin, providing an insightful account of the years and historic events that led towards the fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as the chance to hear from eyewitnesses how Poland changed from a communist regime to a democratic country and ally, and how the people of East Germany overcame an unjust system and achieved their freedom. During a one-day terrain walk, we explored the Seelow Heights, or *Seelower Höhen*, which were the scene of the final major battle of World War II.

In Stavanger, we have successfully conducted our first *Individual Augmentee Pre-Deployment Training for ISAF*, taken part in the *Summer Congress Symposium of the Inter-Allied Confederation of Reserve Officers* and hosted the *Norwegian Minister of Defence*. However, no matter how many things you



change in the JWC, one thing stands firm: the last quarter of this year will be the busiest ever. From mid-October, we shall conduct the *IKLT 13*, which will be immediately followed by *ISAF 10/02*. Moreover, in the weeks before Christmas, we shall train Allied Joint Force Command Naples and the Component Commands of the 16th rotation of the NATO Response Force in our *STEADFAST JUNO 10* exercise.

In this edition of *The Three Swords* magazine, you will again find a wide range of articles on our current issues and future challenges. Just to mention but a few: Dr Dave Sloggett writes about "*Developing COIN Doctrine in Contact*" which is applied at all our training events. There is a *retrospect on his time at the JWC by Capt (N) Stuart Furness*, our previous

Joint Exercise Division Head. Also in this issue is the speech SACT gave at the *2010 Joint Warfighting Conference*, alongside with an article on *NATO's New Strategic Concept* by Dr Stefanie Babst, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy. JWC Subject Matter Expert, Lt Col Matthew Skuse shares "*Thoughts on Modern Counterinsurgency*".

Last but not least, I would like to take the opportunity to thank a member of the JWC, Ms Inci Kucukaksoy. Without her excellent work, this magazine would not have become what it is today. For five years now, she has been doing an outstanding job and putting massive effort into creating the magazine. Without her daily support and advice, we would not be able to publish *The Three Swords*, which is recognized in NATO as one of the best researched, balanced and fun-to-read magazines, thus contributing to the overall credibility of the Joint Warfare Centre. Moreover, without her, the recently published *JWC History Book* would not exist. I have received letters from outside organizations that have received a copy of the book. They not only send their thanks, but also praise how well the magazine and book are designed, presented and edited. Ms Kucukaksoy is a very modest person who does not like to be put into the spotlight. For this reason, I would like to take this opportunity to thank her on behalf of all JWC and all readers.



2010
JOINT

WARFIGHTING CONFERENCE

By U.S. Navy 1st Class Petty Officer Sarah R. Langdon, HQ SACT
Photos by Michael Carpenter

Combatant and Coalition Commanders: What will they need five years from now?

CO-SPONSORED by the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) International, the U.S. Naval Institute and the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), the fourth Joint Warfighting Conference took place from May 11-13, 2010 at the Virginia Beach Convention Center. For three days the conference provided a venue for several influential government and senior military leaders from both the United States and NATO to discuss future capabilities and important issues facing future joint warfighters.

This year's theme, "Coalition and Combatant Commanders: What Will They Need Five Years From Now?", aimed to provide insight into the NATO and coalition goals of proactive coalition build-

ing and what capabilities they need to achieve those goals. Each day of the conference featured plenary addresses by military leaders to include French Air Force General Stéphane Abrial, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation; U.S. Navy Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr., Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command; U.S. Army General David Petraeus, the then Commander, U.S. Central Command (*current Commander of ISAF and U.S. forces in Afghanistan*); and U.S. Marine Corps General James N. Mattis, the then Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (*current Commander of U.S. Central Command*).

General Abrial kicked off the second day of the Joint Warfighting Conference with an opening speech on the future of warfighting and the coalition. "Five

years down the road our emphasis will be on the coalition," Abrial said to the more than 500 guests assembled for the speech. "Our commanders will not be fighting alone. They will be fighting alongside nations and will be cooperating with other nations. (...) Save a few exceptions, all future military operations will take place in the multinational environment. The multinational environment is here to stay."

General Abrial also emphasized the importance of building the collaborative relationships ahead of time and avoiding *ad-hoc* coalitions, which he admitted were easy to assemble, but just as easily prone to fall apart. He discussed the need for commanders to pay attention to public opinion and underlined the need to understand the importance of





Strategic Communications. One subject General Abrial stressed was the need to change the way all nations and partners view and share information.

"We need to move toward an environment where caveats are rare, where protecting sovereignty and protection of sources are the exception," he said. "We need to shift from the 'need to know' to the 'willing to share.'" This included, he added, integrating with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civilian organizations. The new hybrid threat has many characteristics, General Abrial said, which fall outside traditional military strategies. He said that recognizing these characteristics, whether they cause humanitarian crisis or have an economic impact, often times require assistance from civilian organizations.


Throughout the three-day conference, ACT and USJFCOM leadership and Subject Matter Experts provided a joint speaking engagement booth; the first in the four-year history of the conference, and presented specific topics such as changing the operational environment, Information Technology (IT) needs and capabilities, the multinational environment, information sharing and evaluating Lessons Learned.

U.S. Army Brigadier General Anthony Crutchfield, Director of USJFCOM's Joint Centre for Operational Analysis, and Danish Air Force Brigadier General Peter Sonneby, Commander of ACT's Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) gave a joint presentation on the partnership between their respective agencies. During his brief, Crutchfield emphasized

the importance of collecting and disseminating Lessons Learned, because it directly impacts protecting and saving the warfighter's life no matter the country or military. "The bottom line is you have to figure out how to improve the warfighting capabilities," Crutchfield said. "I don't care what uniform you wear or what flag is on the shoulder of your uniform. We're all fighting and dying together. We ought to be learning from each other."

Netherlands Royal Air Force Major General Jaap Willemse, Assistant Chief of Staff for ACT's Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC), spoke with JFCOM's U.S. Navy Captain Shawn Lobree, Deputy Director C4 Systems Directorate, on "Joint





THE PANELS INCLUDED:

- Power Shifts: Who's Up? Who's Down? What's Changing?
- Fresh from the Fight: What Do Company Level Leaders See as The Threats? What Should Be Done to Secure the Homelands? What Needs to Be Done to Make the Interagency Pieces Work?
- Battles of Competing Narratives: Why Do They Matter?
- Small Unit Excellence: What Will It Take?
- How Do We Fight Through a Digital Meltdown?
- What Needs to Be Done to Make the Joint/Coalition Force Acquisition Interoperable?

QUOTES:

General Abrial: "The coalition commander will need, in five years, a strong and confident North Atlantic Alliance as the core of his coalition. He will then reap the rewards of years of Alliance work on interoperability, information sharing, and consensus building."

General Mattis: "I don't care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are; if you cannot create harmony – even vicious harmony – on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you really need to go home."

Brigadier General Crutchfield: "We're all fighting and dying together. We ought to be learning from each other."

Major General Willemse: "We need an open and free information exchange if we really want to win that battle [in Afghanistan]."

and Multinational Information Sharing." Willemse explained how NATO is implementing the Afghan Mission Network; a network designed to be used as a primary Coalition (C4ISR), or C5 network for International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which will allow the free flow of information between ISAF and Partner Nations. Major General Willemse said: "When you look at the operational problem, the bottom line is Coalition forces cannot effectively communicate. We need an open and free information exchange if we really want to win that battle [in Afghanistan]." In addition to outlining specific technological, cyber and communication capabilities needed by warfighters in the future, the representatives all stressed the importance of coalition building and pushing nations, partners and the coalition to share information.

The last day of the event closed with a speech from General Mattis who spoke at length on the importance for commanders to have the ability to unite their forces and create harmony among all services, alliances, partnerships and civilian agencies. "In this age, I don't care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are; if you cannot create harmony – even vicious harmony – on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you really

need to go home, because your leadership in today's age is obsolete. We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines."

Along with the USJFCOM and ACT booth, the conference featured other military organizations and commands to include the Joint Forces Staff College, Navy Warfare Development Command and the Navy League of Hampton Roads, as well as industrial representatives showcasing the latest in communication systems, computer, electronic warfare equipment, global positioning systems and intelligence gathering systems to name just a few. †






SPEECH

by General Stéphane Abrial, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) at the Joint Warfighting Conference, 12 May 2010

Thank you so much, General Mattis, for such a kind introduction, but mainly for your friendship and your constant and determined action in favour of cooperation between us and between our commands. Thank you for your invitation to address an audience upon whose work so many in our Alliance depend. I am honoured to launch the second day of this gathering that is quite clearly the most prominent of its kind anywhere. This is precisely the sort of event that should be replicated throughout the Alliance and I offer my admiration for the foresight of its sponsors and partners. What a fascinating series of panels you are treating us to throughout this day. And what a compelling question you have given us to work on, General Mattis: *"Combatant and Coalition Commanders: What Will They Need Five Years From Now?"*

Sadly, I believe that the assumption that there will be operations five years from now is a safe bet. This leads to one of my main messages as a custodian of NATO's military future: that we need to balance the energy and attention we devote to the operations of today with that devoted to preparing for the operations of tomorrow. Striving for excellence in our support to General McChrystal⁽¹⁾ and ISAF, to which Allied Command Transformation is wholeheartedly committed, can be no excuse for neglecting the McChrystals of 2015 or 2025. No situation, however challenging, can justify compromising the future. The book *'7 Deadly Scenarios'*⁽²⁾ cites as an example the wise yet agonizing decision by the U.S. Navy to send its very best carrier pilots back to the Continental U.S. after Pearl Harbour to train new pilots rather than

keep them in the fight in the Pacific. The five-year horizon is a tricky one. No one is afraid of making predictions for 2050 – by the time they find out we're wrong all we risk is some serious teasing in the nursing home. But five years is a tangible if elusive future. In 1987, who would have projected a European security environment by 1992 with no Warsaw Pact or Soviet Union? Five years ago, who would have predicted a French Supreme AI-



(1) This speech was made when General McChrystal was Commander ISAF.

(2) *7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century* by Andrew Krepinevich.





Industrial representatives at the Joint Warfighting Conference 2010.

lied Commander in Norfolk? I know that the great American philosopher Yogi Berra once said, "it is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future". But for the sake of stimulating our discussions, I will offer six reflections on our combatant and coalition commanders' needs five years down the road – with, as you would expect from me, an emphasis on the word coalition – for foremost among my assumptions is that those commanders will not fight alone. They will fight alongside other nations and in cooperation with other organizations – and we must consider together what we can do today to meet their needs of tomorrow.

So, my first observation is that coalitions will be the rule. Coalition work is tough and has long been counter-intuitive – you may be familiar with the observation by French Field Marshal Ferdinand Foch, who had himself struggled in leading the Coalition of Allied Forces at the end of World War I: *(quote)* "I lost some of my respect for Napoleon when I learned what it was to fight a coalition war." Another Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, echoed Foch's remarks almost to the word in 1948. But as Churchill said, "The only thing worse than fighting with Allies is fighting without them". Despite the difficulties, working as a coalition has become more and more our default mode – my own coun-

try's Defence White Paper two years ago stated that "save in exceptional cases, all our [future] military operations will take place in a multinational framework". France's full participation in NATO's Integrated Military Structure is partly a recognition of this, but this is true of almost all our Nations, for several reasons. Even if imperfectly, it shares the burden – the stress on finances and the stress on often overstretched forces. It shares the political responsibility and increases legitimacy – at home, on the international scene, and in the host nation. And, in a break perhaps from the times of Wellington, Foch or Eisenhower, it may now bring a specific operational added value in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The 2006 U.S. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual states that: *(quote)* "Many other countries' military forces bring cultural backgrounds, historical experiences, and other capabilities that can be particularly valuable to COIN efforts." So multinational operations are here to stay.

However, and this is my second point, you can't just improvise a coalition. Well, as history shows, sometimes you have to play a pick-up game – but you should avoid it. Coalition work should be prepared well upstream, and that's one of the basic functions of the Atlantic Alliance. Contributing to an IBM Global Business Services study last year,

the British Royal United Service Institute assessed that collaboration between Allies in Afghanistan, imperfect though it is, was perceived as better than in Iraq, and drew the conclusion that "an established military Alliance (NATO, in this case) is likely to prove more effective than *ad hoc* coalitions." And that point is made despite even the fact that all but one among the national contributions of over 1,000 men in Iraq in 2004 were from NATO members – bringing to the operation much of the accomplishments in interoperability made through the years. My point is: all other things being equal, NATO operations are more effective than *ad hoc* coalitions, and *ad hoc* coalitions are more effective when they capitalize on common practices and standards developed through NATO than when they don't. I don't know if we fully appreciate what 60 years of the Alliance have accomplished in that respect, and how much more divergent our forces would be without it. Multinational operations are not simple – but investing time and effort in NATO today is one of the most efficient ways in which to help the commanders of 2015.

My third point is that coalition commanders will need political support.

Over the last eight years, ISAF contributing governments have suffered, as a result of their commitment, to a degree none anticipated in the beginning. The political price European leaders have had to pay at home has often been considerable. One European Nation's governing coalition even unravelled specifically over its Afghan policy. The appetite for other such operations in the coming years has been greatly diminished, and Secretary Gates himself notes in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs that *(quote)* "[t]he United States is unlikely to repeat a mission on the scale of those in Afghanistan or Iraq anytime soon" citing the "institutional challenge" they have represented. Since the trend towards protracted engagements may well continue, the coalition commander of 2015 will need to pay close attention to public opinions in dozens of Troop Contributing Nations, and never underestimate the importance of Strategic Communications. He will great-





General Petraeus participated the Joint Warfighting Conference 2010 via video-conference.

ly benefit from the stability and political-military capital conferred by a consensus-based mandate, and must take care to promote the health of that consensus. The ISAF Coalition has proven remarkably resilient. By holding firm despite the pressures upon it, it has given General McChrystal a chance to implement a new counterinsurgency strategy that will, I believe, deliver encouraging results in the coming months. This resilience is due in no small part to the Alliance and its consensus-building mechanisms. Yes, it takes longer to achieve agreement in a consensus-based organization, but once that agreement is reached, its members are more strongly committed to seeing the mission through. *Ad hoc* coalitions may be easier to assemble, but they are also quicker to unravel. Looking into the future after the Kosovo campaign he had led in 1999, General Wes Clark wrote that (*quote*) "the United States will be fortunate indeed if it has alliance political and military 'machinery' like NATO to assist in forging and sustaining shared interests and common commitments."

My fourth point is that coalition commanders will need the trust of Troop Contributing Nations – and participating Nations will need to trust each other. I am referring in this case to the issue of caveats. I'm not here to bemoan or vilify caveats: they are most often a direct result of the internal

political pressure many leaders have to endure and are the price for their country's commitment to an operation. Some caveats are the results of national legal or even constitutional requirements, and will not be easily resolved. But in our Alliance and in our Coalitions we need to move towards a culture where caveats are increasingly rare. It is a question of effectiveness, and it is a question of faith and trust in the coalition commander, as well as in the common rules of engagement. There is a corollary to reducing caveats: the sharing of intelligence. I know I'm far from being a lone voice on this topic, and that moving from the "need to know" to a "will to share" is a mantra at JFCOM to the point that I wouldn't be surprised if General Mattis decided to have "will to share" tattooed on his knuckles. Well, he's right – about sharing, not about the tattoos.

And, I am very grateful to Lt Gen Oates, who in the kickoff address yesterday morning emphasized that very point in the field of Counter-IED. Trust is a two-way-street, and if an ally or partner can entrust a coalition headquarters with the command of its troops to conduct, for example, kinetic targeting, that ally cannot be kept away from relevant intelligence by anomalies such as 'for eyes only' rules that create duplication and frustration. While there will be some intelligence that nations are not willing to fully share for legitimate reasons such as sovereignty

or the protection of sources, that should be the exception rather than the rule. Some of the main obstacles to a satisfactory flow of information in a multinational operation are also technical. That is why one of the most important of ACT's many collaborations with JFCOM, and others, is the Afghan Mission Network being implemented in ISAF, and which should reach Initial Operational Capability this coming July. For the first time, this network will link COMISAF and his staff with all his subordinates' national networks. It will be a notable improvement on the current cumbersome practice of the 'sneaker net', of putting the information on a disk or drive and manually moving it from one system to another, which is not secure, is very labour intensive and ensures that information is never fresh. This system, part of our NATO Network Enabled Capability, will not be ISAF specific, but will be used from the outset in future operations. Information and intelligence sharing is difficult, it is sensitive, and it needs to begin with a first circle of trusted partners. For all our countries, this first circle is NATO, which for each and every one of its members is not just one Alliance among many, but its preeminent international commitment. It is the natural framework through which rules and protocols can be developed, and eventually expanded to partners in a broader coalition.

My fifth point is that coalitions will consist not only of nations' armed forces but of various civilian organizations as well; the commander will need a Comprehensive Approach. I

can no longer imagine a serious security crisis that can be resolved by military means alone. There is every reason to believe that operations in five years will increasingly deal with hybrid threats in one configuration or another. The common characteristic of these threats is that they often bypass the conventional strengths of our militaries by using mixed modes of operation – for example irregular, anti-access, terrorist or criminal. Our response has to include a whole range of economic, informational, social and political effects, which the military cannot deliver alone. Hence the Comprehensive Approach, which is all about mobilizing



capabilities that may already exist but are insufficiently resourced or synergized, because they belong to players who are inadequately networked: Nations outside NATO, as well as national, international, or Non-Governmental Organizations. This is particularly true in peace support, humanitarian or counterinsurgency operations; and as the panel yesterday on "Securing the Homeland" forcefully showed, threats such as terrorism also call for an integrated response. Our own NATO maritime anti-terrorist operation *ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR* in the Mediterranean has for example shown us how important it is to coordinate with the port authorities of bordering countries to fight the smuggling of illicit materials.

NATO is well placed to contribute to a flexible Comprehensive Approach framework, where the military in general, and specifically the coalition commander, can be, depending on the situation, a coordinating, facilitating or enabling force for multiple players. A key-word on bringing together such a diversity of actors is flexibility: each situation is often very specific, and will require its own type of collaboration. Basically, what I wish to foster is a deeply ingrained culture of cooperation and mutual respect, on our part and on the part of the other stakeholders. Such a shift cannot be instituted by decree. Groundwork has to be conducted over many years to build trust with, for example, NGOs, IOs or even national governmental agencies whose cultures are different from ours. As for the military, there is long-term work to be done in the education and training of leaders who will develop the mindset needed to operate with players who will not fit neatly into our organizational charts. I like the expression in the U.S. COIN Field Manual of not seeking OpCon (Operational Control) or TaCon, but "Handshake-Con". The future commander will not aspire to unity of command, but to unity of effort. The Comprehensive Approach will be the environment in which future commanders will need to operate.

My sixth and last observation is that interoperability must be hardwired into a program's initial DNA. The NATO Secretary General recently lamented that the ISAF Commander in Helmand province needed four different sets of ra-

dius to communicate with four national contingents, and that Friendly Forces Tracking Systems allowed nations to track only their own forces – despite the fact that so much Close Air Support, for example, is provided by one ally's forces to another. We all know this is inefficient, costly – because in trying to solve the problem, we end up spending twice for the same capabilities – and sometimes lethal. I would like to say that things are improving through the years, and they are – those who, like me, served as fighter pilots in the first Gulf War know that we've come some way since then. But as operations in ISAF demonstrate every day, we are not moving forward quickly or effectively enough. Real progress in common standards and protocols, often acquired through NATO, has been made, but it has often been offset by the increasing technological gap between the U.S. and even its closest allies. And we all know that this gap will not be filled by a sudden boost in European defence spending in the near future. But in five years I do want my successor to be able to say with confidence that things have improved in this regard.

To be sure, interoperability is a cloth woven from many threads, of which education, training and the experience of working together are among the most important. But integrating the imperatives of alliance and coalition interoperability in the very DNA of every defence industrial programme is also critical, and is an important rationale behind the initiatives ACT is taking to develop a real strategic partnership with industry from both sides of the Atlantic. That is the way forward, and I am encouraged by the very positive response I have had – not least by companies represented in this room – to our new 'Framework for Collaboration with Industry'. Likewise, I am resolutely strengthening our links with the European Defence Agency to make sure that the current development of a European Defence is a force for increased interoperability.

TO SUMMARIZE what I believe a coalition commander will need in five years: he will need a strong and confident North Atlantic Alliance as the core of his coalition. He will then reap the rewards of years of Alliance work on interoperability, in-

formation sharing, and consensus building. He will also need the skills required to lead a combined joint multinational civilian-military operation. We therefore need NATO to reaffirm its purpose and clarify its Level of Ambition. That is why our Alliance is engaged in the elaboration of a new Strategic Concept that will be finalized next November.

I am fully confident that NATO will come out of it strengthened, notably in its determination to guarantee its members territorial integrity – sometimes a precondition for them to confidently commit troops to expeditionary operations. We need a NATO that is also more systematically engaged with its closest partners: not only with its adjacent neighbours, such as non-NATO EU countries, but with the Nations throughout the world that are by her side in her efforts to promote world peace. Improving their interoperability and giving them access to our training makes perfect sense given the odds that they will keep on taking part in coalitions built around NATO.

And finally, we need NATO to reform its Command Structure, which is widely considered to be outdated. That process also is well underway, and I believe a NATO combatant commander in 2015 will be better supported by a clearer, leaner, more flexible and less costly chain of command. We only need to turn on our TVs to know that challenging times are ahead, with our investment in defence under growing budgetary pressure, and the level of foreseeable threats not diminishing. Maintaining our collective security in this context will be possible only through more intensive cooperation among allies, and with active involvement and cooperation of the industrial representatives in the room. Together we can continue to make great improvements in our ability to operate effectively and with more interoperability in our military and non-military endeavours.

In times like these, and with an eye to operations five years from now, we strongly need to recommit ourselves to an Atlantic Alliance that forms the backbone of multinational operations, enables improved operational effectiveness, and in the words President Obama used in Oslo, continues to be "indispensable". Thank you, and I will be happy now to take any question you might have. †

VISIT OF NORWAY'S MINISTER OF DEFENCE

The Minister with
Lieutenant General
Wolfgang Korte,
Commander JWC.



Photos by Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO



Norwegian Minister of Defence Grete Faremo visited the Joint Warfare Centre on 6 September 2010 to meet with Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre. During her visit, the Minister received briefings and detailed updates on the Centre, all of which covered a broad range of topics such as the way ahead on NATO's transformation, the comprehensive training and exercise programme of the JWC, innovative concepts and experimentation, as well as Lessons Learned. While there, the Minister also toured and was briefed on the Centre's new state-of-the-art training facility. To conclude her programme, she had an interview session with the local media where she reiterated her support to NATO's transformation and the Joint Warfare Centre's important role in that important mission. She also commended the Centre for its well-functioning organization and strong professional community. †



JWC welcomes new Chief of Staff

Brigadier General ★ Steven J. DePalmer

By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer assumed responsibility as Chief of Staff, Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), from U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Scott D. West during a Handover Ceremony on Thursday 12 August 2010 at the 426th Air Base Squadron's Community Activity Centre in Jåttå, Stavanger, Norway. German Army Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander JWC, presided over the ceremony. He said goodbye to Brigadier General West and warmly welcomed incoming Chief of Staff Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer, to whom he tendered his best wishes for a successful mission.

In his keynote speech Lieutenant General Korte thanked the outgoing Chief of Staff for his outstanding contribution, professionalism and unwavering commitment to the Joint Warfare Centre. He emphasized the important role of the Chief of Staff in terms of mission and commented on Brigadier General West's vision, energy and leadership. Lieutenant General Korte said: "The Chief of Staff is without doubt the most important position at the Joint Warfare Centre. The Chief of Staff is the alter ego of his Commander. The relationship between the Commander and his Chief of Staff is based on absolute trust and mutual loyalty." Reflecting on Brigadier General

West's time at the Joint Warfare Centre, Lieutenant General Korte said that Brigadier General West had been the most suitable, trustworthy and competent advisor, which he pointed out had been highly rewarding for the Centre.

In his turn, Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer said in his speech that he was looking forward to his new assignment. He thanked everyone for the welcome given to him and his family since their arrival. "Thank you for the warm welcome this afternoon as well as for the fantastic reception provided to Sheila and I and our three daughters when we arrived on Monday in this wonderful country. 'Tusen takk!'" he said.



Reflecting on the Joint Warfare Centre's place in NATO, Brigadier General DePalmer said: "For the last 61 years much has changed in the world since the creation of NATO. But, a few things remain the same. Our member states remain committed to promoting peace and security. However, if diplomatic efforts fail, NATO must possess the capability through a Comprehensive Approach to undertake crisis management and, if necessary, conduct collective defence through civil-military operations. And this is where the Joint Warfare Centre is critical to NATO's success. In the spirit of collaboration and cooperation, the professionals of the Joint Warfare Cen-

"NATO must possess the capability through a Comprehensive Approach to undertake crisis management and, if necessary, conduct collective defence through civil-military operations."

tre continue to provide the best training for our NATO forces. Whether preparing ISAF staff for duty in Afghanistan, training the NATO Response Force or supporting experimentation projects, the excellent reputation of the Joint Warfare Centre continues to spread throughout the Alliance."

Brigadier General DePalmer added, in regard to his predecessor, that he was grateful for Brigadier General West and his wife Jane's outstanding leadership at the Joint Warfare Centre and in the local Stavanger community. "I want to recognize the enormous contributions of my predecessor, Brigadier General West. Sheila and I know that we have big shoes to fill and as a family we look forward to the adventure. Thank you," he concluded.

The incoming Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer assumed his new duties immediately after the Handover Ceremony. †



**Brigadier General
Steven J. DePalmer**
U.S. Air Force
Chief of Staff
Joint Warfare Centre

BRIGADIER General Steven J. DePalmer is the Chief of Staff of NATO's Joint Warfare Centre, Stavanger, Norway. The Joint Warfare

Centre is comprised of representatives of NATO and Partnership for Peace member countries, and promotes and conducts joint and combined experimentation, concept and doctrine development, and operational-level training to improve NATO's capabilities and interoperability. Key responsibilities include battle staff training for the operational headquarters of International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and NATO Response Force. The Joint Warfare Centre also conducts Iraqi Key Leader Training for senior representatives of the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and Iraqi Ministry of the Interior.

Brigadier General DePalmer graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1985 with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering. He completed pilot training at Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas and lead-in fighter training at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico. He learned to fly the F-15C at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida and was assigned to the 71st Tactical Fighter Squadron at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, from May 1987 to December 1989. His next tour was with the 57th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Keflavik Naval Air Station, Iceland, and he returned to Langley with the 71st Fighter Squadron and the 27th Fighter Squadron from July 1991 to June 1995. He then attended the Air Command and Staff College and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. In July 1997, he was assigned to Naples, Italy as the Executive Officer to the Commander, 16th Air Force. From July 1998 to July 2002, he was assigned to the 48th Fighter Wing, Royal Air Force Lakenheath, United Kingdom, and commanded the 494th Fighter Squadron. He then attended the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy and assumed command of the 32nd Air Operations Group, Ramstein Air Base, Germany in May 2003.

In May 2005, Brigadier General DePalmer was assigned as Vice Commander, 48th Fighter Wing, Royal Air Force Lakenheath, United Kingdom. In February 2006, he became Vice Director of Operations at HQ NORAD, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. He subsequently commanded the 53rd Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, from April 2008 to May 2009, and then served as Vice Commander, 14th Air Force, (Air Forces Strategic), Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. He joined NATO's Joint Warfare Centre, Stavanger, Norway in August 2010.

A command pilot, Brigadier General DePalmer has logged over 3,000 hours in the F-15C/E, AT-38B, T-38, and T-37 aircraft. His awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Air Medal with three oak leaf clusters, and the Combat Readiness Medal with four oak leaf clusters.





Photos by Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

You have worked in Italy, United Kingdom, and Germany – how does multinational experience help you in this job and your future endeavours?

Working in a multicultural environment can be an enlightening experience – you learn as much about yourself as you do about others. You also learn to see issues from multiple perspectives, allowing a better assessment of the challenges. As member of the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) team, I hope to contribute to NATO's continued success in defence and security.

What experience from them do you consider directly applicable to your position here?

I have worked in organizations where operations were distributed geographically – the JWC is similar. For instance, this week (*second week of September*) we have personnel directing training at seven different European locations as part of the NATO Response Force spin-up. We also have the JWC personnel in Afghanistan preparing for the ISAF Mission Rehearsal Training in November. With so much decentralized execution, it is important to push decision-making to the lowest level to ensure success.

In your own words, what does NATO's transformation mean to you?

NATO's transformation is a critical task required to keep the Alliance credible and at-

tractive to current and future member states. Often we think of transformation as a technological leap forward, but really it is more of a deliberate and disciplined process. Our improvements in capability, whether in the areas of lethality or decision-making, are usually the sum of small improvements in training, tactics, procedures and equipment. In the end, transformation requires hard work to accomplish.

What has struck you most about the Joint Warfare Centre so far?

The diversity of talent throughout each Division. Given our aggressive Programme of Work, each JWC member is critical to delivering a quality product to our NATO forces. It is satisfying to see how well everyone pitches in to help make each Joint Warfare Centre exercise a success.

Do you believe that we are making a difference in theatre in Afghanistan?

Absolutely. I saw it this week in the feedback provided by personnel who completed our first ISAF pre-deployment training programme in Ulsnes. Our objective is for everyone to arrive in theatre ready to perform their job with only minor updates – I believe we were successful.

How would you describe success?

I think of success as achieving an objective or goal with style. We want our Train-

ing Audiences to appreciate their JWC experience so much that they look forward to future interactions with the JWC and ACT as a whole. One way to do this is to be humble, approachable, and credible to our customers. It also helps to be willing to learn new concepts for accomplishing NATO missions.

Do you have people that you look for guidance or inspiration?

Yes, I have been lucky to work for and with some great leaders – officers, civilians, and enlisted. It seems with every job I learn more about leadership and followership – both are necessary skills for successful organizations.

Why did you join the Air Force?

To serve my country and to see the world. So far, so good.

Who are your favorite writers?

David McCullough is a great writer – he definitely does his research. I am now reading *In the Graveyard of Empires* by Seth Jones. It is well documented and provides a good perspective on the recent history of Afghanistan.

What are your favorite sports game?

I enjoy all sports, but right now I enjoy playing soccer and basketball. I also enjoy running and hiking – Norway is great for this!

THE CHIEF OF STAFF Handover Ceremony took place at a critical period for the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). As an outcome of the recent Allied Command Transformation Peacetime Establishment Review, the Joint Warfare Centre implemented a reorganization effective 1 August 2010, and reassigned some key components of its workforce.

The NATO Peacetime Establishment (PE) is known as the document that contains North Atlantic Council authorized structure of any NATO body. Endorsed by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Virginia, Norfolk, U.S., the new Peacetime Establishment of the ACT and its subordinate commands aims to maximize operational excellence, and more efficiently discharge resources for transformational capabilities such as Lessons Learned, Doctrine, Training and Education programmes in order for all commands to accomplish their respective missions, roles and tasks.



New Faces and a New PE Structure for the Joint Warfare Centre

By Inci Kucukaksoy
JWC PAO

The reorganization aims to utilize the best from the Joint Warfare Centre's outstanding workforce and enable it to more efficiently and effectively accomplish responsibilities as charged by NATO. The new JWC PE establishment

consists of all together 256 posts at the Joint Warfare Centre, of those 195 military filled by 19 NATO Nations and 1 PpF Nation as well as 61 posts for civilians coming from 10 NATO Nations. The biggest impact for the Joint Warfare Centre


has been the creation of the DCOS Joint Force Trainer, a three-star General based at ACT. To this effect, the Commander Joint Warfare Centre will be assigned as a two-star General, based in Stavanger, Norway, falling under the pillar of the three-star DCOS Joint Force Trainer in the future.

Despite the 8.5% rate of reduction in numbers of military personnel posted to the Joint Warfare Centre, the new JWC PE has further strengthened the focus on Training, Doctrine/Concept Development and Interoperability. As per the changes, the Operations output is now spread across three Divisions at the Joint Warfare Centre: Joint Training Division (JTD), Joint Exercise Division (JED), and Joint Capability Integration Division



Left: In terms of number of personnel, the French Contingent is one of the largest at the Joint Warfare Centre with the new PE.





(JCID). A large number of General Officers have already taken up their positions in accordance with the new allocations of these posts to each Nation.

The Administrative/Support area is made up of two Divisions: Support Division and SMC4 Division; as well as the Office of the Director of Staff (DOS) under which falls Functional Areas such as Public Affairs including Linguistic Services; Information and Knowledge Management (IKM), Protocol, Graphics and Registry.

New faces

Since June this year, the Joint Warfare Centre has been challenged with a surge of 'end-of-tour' departures and new arrivals: So far, 67 military staff members have left the Centre and 53 newcomers have arrived⁽¹⁾. Although such a situation is not uncommon in a multinational military HQ, there has been an initial challenge as the high number of departures

left the rest of the workforce overstretched. During this period, the Joint Warfare Centre said goodbye and thanks to Chief of Staff Brigadier General Scott West as well as officers in leadership positions such as British Navy Captain Stuart Furness, Chief Joint Exercise Division; and Canadian Army Colonel Charles Atwood, Chief Joint Training Development Division. Since June, farewell messages of employees have piled up, all speaking about their enthusiasm for working and living in Norway. Indeed, for many, working at the Joint Warfare Centre had been an amazing opportunity:

"I leave this beautiful host country with fond memories, wonderful experiences and new friends throughout Europe and North America," said U.S. Air Force Lt Col Rich Messina, former COS M/A. German Air Force Lt Col Dieter Stoll, said: "My tour in Norway was outstanding and highlight of my military career

and personal life." Royal Air Force Squadron Leader Bob Dixon said the following: "I, too, am joining the throng of people departing the Joint Warfare Centre this Summer. Thank you to all who have made my time here rewarding!" Polish Navy Commander Piotr Folta commented: "I have enjoyed very much my military tour in this beautiful and awesome country. It has been a great privilege to work with you. I will never forget it." While working at the Joint Warfare Centre was a "continuous challenge and an amazing opportunity" for Spanish Army Lt Col Luis Garcia-Peris; Turkish Air Force Colonel Fidan Yuksel thanked for the "excellent work, friendship and the happy memories." And, Hellenic Navy Commander Dimitris Adamis strongly urged people to visit Norway: "I will encourage

(1) The figures are for the Joint Warfare Centre only; it does not include NCSA or NSEs.



Farewell Ceremony for the Command Group personnel, 9 June 2010.





Above: JWC staff in Afghanistan, April 2010. Photo by SGM Michel Estrade, FRA A, Joint Exercise Division.

everybody in Greece to visit Norway at least once in their lifetime!"

There is no doubt that the newcomers are high performers and, following their newcomers orientation training where they will be given full exposure to the Joint Warfare Centre's Programme of Work, they will soon excel. The week-long Newcomers Training helped to identify and support Divisional training needs and develop cross-Divisional cooperation. Constance Benen, Joint Training Division Information Manager, who also took part in the Newcomers Training programme, said: "The Newcomers Training is an

excellent opportunity for new personnel to get an overall picture of the Joint Warfare Centre. The information they are presented with during the training is a good basis to start working in the individual areas." One of the lectures she supported had been TOPFAS, which is a software tool that helps planners share information between headquarters (Strategic, Operational and Tactical) and manage planning within their own headquarters. Even though the Joint Warfare Centre's Programme of Work is very demanding, the Centre has created a mission and culture to which employees feel

easily connected and committed. So, in the end, it is their commitment to the mission as well as the Centre's unique organizational climate that will boost their performance, help creating dynamic networks for both personal and organizational achievements and make them at least as efficient and productive as their predecessors. Every staff member is critical to the Joint Warfare Centre's mission, which is: promoting and conducting NATO's joint and combined Training, Experimentation, Doctrine Development and Evaluation to maximise transformational synergy and improve



Left: Lt General Korte, Commander JWC, addresses the staff during the Newcomers Training. **Below:** Constance Benen, JTD Information Manager.



Newcomers

NATO's capabilities and interoperability. Congratulations and Welcome to the Joint Warfare Centre! We wish you every success and hope that you will enjoy a fulfilling career with us. The Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger is a great place to live and work! ✦



ISAF 10/01



Interview
Colonel Colin Nobbs,
GBR A, Chief Support Division



Col Nobbs

What is the impact of the new PE on the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC)?

Since formation, we have been working on a series of interim establishment tables. Therefore, in many ways the impact of the new PE is minimal in that it simply aligns the structure we are all used to with the official PE. However, a NATO PE is a long term view of our structure and it will therefore never be completely aligned to current outputs. In practical terms, the trick is therefore to understand the pressures created between the PE, the current outputs and the Nations' manning policies in order to maximize our ability to deliver the Commander's outputs. So for me one of the great strengths of the

way JWC does business is that we have a clear mission and some very clear outputs that are linked to sustaining the ISAF mission and delivering transformation. Whilst the demand on all of the staff within the JWC are high, we deliver because we apply a remarkable degree of flexibility, common sense and pragmatism to the way we man our structure. If we could do anything to improve, it would perhaps be to better understand what we are not doing.

Do you believe it is a challenge or an opportunity to have so many new people in a work environment at once?

Every military organization, be it national or NATO, accepts turnover as a fact of life as all nations move their military manpower on a regular basis. Within Joint Warfare Centre the cumulative affect of all the different national tour length policies is that about 25% of the military personnel turnover every year. This year, once the changes that result from the introduction of the new PE are excluded, is actually no worse than

any other. For us this change is a great strength as it creates a constant flow of new manpower, which if we have written our job descriptions properly, brings those with current operational level experience into the staff. Recent operational level experience is the building block of any warfare centre staff. In essence, it is the insights that those who have actually been there coupled with the ethos of JWC, that adds value to those on or about to deploy on operations. The turbulence can of course be seen as a weakness, which we mitigate by investing time and resources into our induction training and by having a coherent continuity plan for key tasks. Furthermore, in posts where we perceive the need for continuity, rather than recent operational experience, we look to use non military manpower. It is for this reason that the number of NATO civilians has increased in the last review. Unfortunately, we have failed to co-ordinate the removal of the military manpower and the recruiting of the NATO civilians and it is this which has increased our turbulence this year.

A RETROSPECTIVE

Photos by Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO; SSG Brandon Chhoeun, Media Simulation Section, JED, JWC.



and some thoughts **FOR THE FUTURE...**

By Capt Stuart B Furness, GBR N
Former Chief Joint Exercise Division
Joint Warfare Centre

"I believe **Joint Warfare Centre** is set to continue to run exercises using the wealth of experience it has accumulated even as we all rotate to our next positions."

Introduction

Military life is one of constant change, both personal and professional, and as I approach the end of my tour as the Chief of the Joint Exercise Division at the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), it's time to reflect on an enjoyable and professionally rewarding appointment. I would not suggest that it's all roses in the garden of NATO exercises, but it's certainly an interesting area to work in; full of char-

acters and enthusiastic people, and one worthy of a little reflection.

Achievements

I have had the real pleasure to lead a Division of 72 multinational military officers from all services, NATO civilians and scenario contractors with a remit to develop exercises to prepare NATO and Partner personnel for operational duty, either immediately in the case of ISAF Mission Rehearsal Events (MREs) or for standby periods in the case of NATO Response Force (NRF) exercises.



Training

My five Exercise Planning Teams, led by the Officers of Primary Responsibility (OPRs), have successfully coordinated with SHAPE, HQ SACT, HQ ISAF, ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and the NRF headquarters that rotate between Joint [Force] Commands (JFCs) Brunssum, Lisbon and Naples, and their supporting Air, Land and Maritime Component Commands, to deliver eight NRF (termed 'STEADFAST') exercises and seven ISAF MREs. We have trained approximately 1,500 personnel in each NRF exercise and 300–500 personnel in each ISAF MRE. My exercise role was as the Chief of the 400-strong Exercise Control Centre (EXCON), the behind-the-scenes centre that 'runs' the exercise. And for all exercises but one, where we deployed to Kabul to support the short notice training of the new HQ IJC last October, this Centre was based in Ulsnes in Norway. Ulsnes is an old Norwegian naval base, now used as our Interim Training Facility, and I really liked working there. It had that 'deployed' look and feel, and could easily be configured exactly as we wanted, given the constant support of our top-notch support, communications and simulation personnel.

My Exercise Support Branch has been equally busy developing scenarios, building up a Grey Cell and running an Ex-

ercise Media Section. I choose the term 'Grey Cell', rather than the more traditional 'White Cell', because it now includes not just exercise International and Non-Governmental Organizations (IOs and NGOs), Governmental Organizations and Police, but also Role Players from many other non-NATO entities in the real world of Afghanistan and the NRF world of Cerasia. Cerasia is the detailed fictitious world developed by the Scenario Section and used during STEADFAST exercises for non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. The Cerasia scenario is highly regarded and has also been adapted for use by many NATO Nations and commands for their own exercises.

Finally, I have seen increased coordination of the reduced resources (people and budget) as a host of NATO meetings, most notably the *Steering Group on Exercise, Training, Education and Evaluation* (SG ETEE), the *Exercise Scenario Management Board* (ESMB) and the *Five-Year Military Training and Education Programme* (MTEP) Working Groups. Our inputs to these meetings has been well coordinated following the setting up of the JWC-wide and JED-led *Resources and Planning Team* (RAPT).

Changes

Founded in 2003, Joint Warfare Centre now has a wealth of NRF/ISAF exercise experience. Some of the changes I have seen since 2007 are:

1) **Three-level NRF exercises.** The focus for training remains on the Operational (JFC) level for JWC exercises, but more exercise activity has been generated for the Strategic (SHAPE) and the Component levels.

2) **Two-level ISAF exercises.** The stand-up of the IJC has changed the focus of the ISAF MREs. They now concentrate on the IJC staff, while retaining training for the lower number of HQ ISAF personnel. To balance this, in September 2010, JWC ran the first (and pilot) Individual Augmentees Pre-Deployment Training (IAPDT) event, which gave priority to HQ ISAF personnel.

3) **Exercise Planning Conferences.** I was involved in NATO's exercises about 10 years ago and a standing comment then was that most Final Coordination Conferences were like Initial Planning Conferences. I believe that Joint Warfare Centre's experience, and the new role of Officer Directing the Exercise (ODE), have meant that each JWC OPR knows




We have trained approx. **1,500** personnel in each NRF exercise and **300–500** personnel in each ISAF MRE.





Allied Command Operations



exactly what is required at each event and can now make more decisions and accomplish more coordination.

4) Scenario Information. The requirement to provide supporting scenario data has increased dramatically. Reacting to the requirements from the exercise participants, I believe we now provide more structured and significantly more detailed information.

5) Master Events List/Master Incidents List (MEL/MIL). The MEL/MIL drives exercise activity. It is based on the JFC's exercise Training Objectives, or in the case of ISAF, the Training Specification. Considerable effort has been made to ensure it does not just concentrate on short term "ops" activity, but provides something for all the branches and staff elements throughout all levels, notably the new split Joint Headquarters following development of the NRF Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE) concept. An endur-

ing comment of those commands participating in an exercise afterwards is that "you get out of it what you put in" and the involvement of their training staffs in MEL/MIL Scripting pays real dividends. I believe we have made real progress in more sophisticated (and intense) MEL/MILs through dialogue with participating commands.

6) Grey Cell. In 2007, we were faced with the situation of a semi-formal protest by the UN participants, as we had invited them to an NRF exercise and then couldn't give them access to the exercise computer systems. Today, we have arguably achieved the Comprehensive Approach in our exercises, and replicate the interaction that NATO's forces would encounter when deployed into a theatre, with over 40 percent of the MEL/MIL for NRF exercises coming from a 50-strong Grey Cell. This consists of IO and NGO personnel, including former UN Ambassadors and retired three-star officers,

together with a host of role players, simulating functions as diverse as local Mayors and port authorities to Cerasia Union leaders, together with a Media Section with the look and feel of a major news channel.

7) Lower Control (LOCON) Response Cells. Going into any exercise, one of my main concerns was the numbers and skill sets in the LOCON Response Cells. These are staffs, provided by the exercise Component Commands, to replicate their subordinate formations and forces (i.e. receive and issue orders and reports). They also provide the 'atmospherics' of in-theatre activity, plan and implement the movement of the forces in the simulation systems, maintain the 'ground truth' through coordination with the Exercise Control Centre and coordinate with the other Response Cells. This is particularly important for injects such as Time Sensitive Targeting (TST). Less formally, they give the MEL/MIL injects their final





From left: Brigadier Gunnar E. Gustavsen, Advisor to the Commander JWC; Royal Air Force Air Marshal Christopher Harper, Deputy Commander Joint Force Command Brunssum; Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre and Lt Col Antonio Barone, JWC.

review to take account of daily changes and propose new injects to ensure their Components is achieving as much training from the exercise as possible. Having the whole LOCON based in Ulsnes is required to ensure a coherent exercise, but providing their LOCON Response Cell is a struggle for many Component headquarters. JWC knowledge of past structures, where risk (gaps!) can be taken and constant dialogue has proved invaluable.

8) Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). The original training facilities Capability Package saw JWC providing the Operational Level training, and the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) the Tactical Level. Unsurprisingly, given its size and tasking, JFTC is now dedicated to ISAF training, which has required JWC to provide SMEs to the Component Training Teams. This has been achieved to a large extent for most exercises, but required careful balancing



Laura Loflin DuBois of World News Today.

of personnel in the Exercise Centre and Training Teams, and reduced daily JWC activities in areas such as Concept and Doctrine Development and Experimentation across the whole JWC. Of note, the SMEs for ISAF MREs are provided by HQ ISAF, HQ IJC and personnel recently from theatre. This is a complicated task that is only achieved through constant dialogue and pays huge dividends for the incoming personnel.

— So to sum up, as a consequence of these changes, we have achieved better planned, more dynamic, more intense exercises involving more commands and use a high percentage of the whole JWC for each exercise.

Requirements

To quote the comic Bill Bailey *“I’m English, therefore I crave disappointment,”* and in the Introduction, I mentioned that, in my personal opinion, there are a number of significant demands yet to be achieved and adjustments that could ease the current bureaucratic processes. Before getting into details, I would highlight that JWC has limited resources but considerable enthusiasm, so my impression is that we can achieve ‘anything but not everything’, and for future exercise planners, including those involved in any future ETEE review, I would urge you to build your plans on ‘realities not dreams’ and consider all three elements of the ‘ends, ways and means’ triangle.

■ **NRF Exercise Cycle.** The introduction of SACEUR’s Annual Guidance on ETEE (SAGE) has been welcomed by the exercise community, but I believe that the exercise planning process would benefit from a careful study in order to create more room for clear direction, delineation of responsibilities and creative thinking. Some thoughts are:

MTEP: The utility of this document could be enhanced with the addition of the aim and scenario to each exercise. As an example, this would allow an incoming NRF Commander to have an oversight of where he is exercising the various types of operations he could be called upon to command, i.e. where is he exercising Crisis Response Operations and where is he exercising higher intensity conflict operations? It could also show the consistency of scenario use between NRF STEADFAST exercises and the associated Component certification exercises. Additionally, I would propose more detailed consideration, in the MTEP, of the MEL/MIL Scripting Events as these invariably create programming challenges during the HQ SACT-led Collective Training Support Programme of Work (CTS POW) discussions and subsequent revisions to the MTEP.

Documentation: Here, I believe that one exercise order that matures throughout the process, combining the current Exercise Specification, Exercise Planning Guidance and Exercise Plan would considerably reduce duplication and provide clearer direction. In any event there is a need for a reduction in the overlap between those documents and the removal of unnecessary information (e.g. repetition of HQ Operating Procedures).

Phases: The various phases of the STEADFAST exercise cycle could do with a little Standardization:

- Phase 1b (Academics)/1c (Key Leader Training). Phase 1b aims to conduct team building on current practices, new Doctrine and Concepts and Best Practices. It is oc-





ENDEX for STEADFAST Juncture 10, which was then followed by a Coin Ceremony.

asionally confused with 'refresher training' and would ideally be combined with Phase 1c.

- Phase 2 (Crisis Response Planning). The length and outputs from this Phase vary considerably from JFC to JFC. The DJSE concept would suggest a standardisation of this phase.

- MEL/MIL Development. JWC is not always able to support the JFC in Phase 1d (Battle Staff Training) due to overlapping events in the MTEP, but combining the development of the MEL/MIL for the Phase 1d, the Phase 3b (Execution) and the relatively new and successful 'Warm-Up' period at the start of Phase 3b appears to offer considerable advantages and best use of resources. It will be tricky to arrange, but nominated lead officers from the JFC for Phase 1d and the 'Warm-Up', embedded in the MEL/MIL planning, seems not unreasonable.

■ Personnel.

MTEP Programme. The reduction from three to two STEADFAST exercises per year in 2009 was a direct result of JWC's capacity to absorb increasing requirements and a reduced Peacetime Establishment (PE). Additional requirements, particularly those relating to support to current operations, or any further reduction in PE, will swing JWC in the same direction as JFTC, and re-

duce NATO Response Force activity.

24/7 Exercises. The well-known 'train as you fight' desire is mentioned for every exercise. The current compromise of long days for the Exercise Control staff matches available resources and does not prevent overnight Training Audience activity. Full 24/7 exercise activity would come with a manpower bill that is unknown and its availability is not readily apparent.

Scenario Information. Recent developments to NATO's functional services (or 'software') have meant that the delivery of Scenario Information to support effective Operational Level training requires greater Tactical Level information. This has been particularly noticeable in the Logistics and Intelligence communities, with the Knowledge Development (KD) concept waiting impatiently in the wings. I believe this is a classic case of 'realities' rather than 'dreams' as Cerasia is fictitious, there are no real forces, no actual country, no real people, no World Wide Web and it's down to the 15 people in the Scenario Section to write all the information for all JWC exercises each year. As I noted earlier, Cerasia has been adapted by many commands for their own uses and JWC does ask for the revised scenario information to be sent back. That helps, but there is a limit on what can be produced and that has limit has yet to be fully scoped.


Article 5 Exercises. I suspect that the scenario information dilemma will become clear during development of the Article 5 scenario "SKOLKAN" due in 2012. There is well known desire for increased kinetic activity in NRF exercises and that will drive the next step change in scenario information requirements. I suspect it will also drive a sharp increase in the size of the LOCON Response Cells, and there is the unexplored area of Joint Warfare Centre's role in any future Article 5 Live Exercise (LIVEX).

■ **Infrastructure Capacity.** There is a desire to increase the size of the Training Audience in ISAF MREs, in particular the number of Individual Augmentees deploying to both HQ ISAF and HQ IJC. There is an (as yet) unknown limit to the Training Audience size in JWC's new building, which will be in use for training from 2012/3, and any subsequent need for temporary exercise facilities.

■ **Grey Cell.** We still have a way to go to satisfy all desires for the Grey Cell in ISAF MREs as getting the right people from Afghanistan, outside NATO commands, is still a real challenge.

Conclusion

In the past, I've handed over staff jobs with the comment that "in six months you will not have the same job that I did". I'm sure that is still true and I wish my successor Col 'Pep' Jeffrey Devore, USAF, all the best. In conclusion, despite my theme that we should be looking for realities not dreams, I believe Joint Warfare Centre is set to continue to run exercises using the wealth of experience it has accumulated even as we all rotate to our next positions. This tour has been a fascinating insight into managing 'activities' and 'characters' and one that I have thoroughly enjoyed. I would like to thank all I have interacted with over the last three years for your leadership, support and camaraderie. I will not say farewell as I hope to take up a NATO civilian position in the office of the Joint Force Trainer in HQ SACT in the near future and to continue to work with you all in NATO's 'exercise' community. †



STEADFAST JUNCTURE 10



NRF 15: first revised NRF rotation

By Inci Kucukaksoy
JWC PAO

EXERCISE STEADFAST JUNCTURE 10 (a NATO joint decision-making and Command Post [CPX]/Computer Assisted [CAX] exercise), started on 3 May 2010 with the preparation phase and continued until 15 May 2010 simultaneously at seven locations. The exercise trained expeditionary forces of the NATO Response Force (NRF 15).

The exercise was sponsored by Allied Command Transformation (ACO) and tailored within the constraint of a Smaller Joint Operation as a result of the changes within the NRF concept. According to the revised NRF concept, effective from July 2009, a smaller-scale force structure has

been designed that is capable of providing a rapid demonstration of force and the early establishment of NATO military presence in support of an Article 5 or Crisis Response Operation. Lieutenant Colonel Andreas Heselschwert explained in EUROCORPS magazine (Issue No: 108) that the main NRF mission remains the same: fast demonstration of NATO presence and the provision of capabilities to support an Article 5 or a Crisis Response Operation. However, he added, the main features of the new concept as: — new Command and Control structure at the Operational Level with a Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE) designed to ensure the fast presence of an Opera-

tional Level command element in theatre that acts as an extended arm of the stationary headquarters in Europe; — reduced overall force size of 13,000 troops resulting from a restructured force and more differentiated unit readiness requirements.

The revised NRF construct is built on the operational Command and Control that includes: a DJSE, the Immediate Response Force (IRF) with pre-designated forces and the Response Forces Pool (RFP) which complements the basis. As mentioned, the IRF, which is the core of the revised NRF, may be comprised of up to 14,000 troops. Although the implementation plan is in progress, the NRF



15 rotation was the first to be run entirely within the revised concept.

Exercise STEADFAST Juncture 10 involved 2,500 military and civilian personnel from various headquarters and units assigned to or supporting the 15th rotation of the NATO Response Force, which covers the period from 1 July to 31 December 2010. The exercise was designed to train, validate and certify the Command and Control elements dedicated to the NRF 15 (NRF force activation, tailoring, force generation and deployment) in a joint environment as well as to train and evaluate the DJSE concept. It ultimately aimed to test NATO's expeditionary capabilities (from initial deployment of operational Command and Control, through deployment and expansion of forces in theatre) within the revised NRF concept to provide the Alliance with credible operational capabilities and a crisis management tool.

STEADFAST Juncture 10 was conducted by General Egon Ramms, German Army, the then Commander Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC Brunssum). JFC Brunssum currently leads NRF 15 and it is one of the three Operational Level NATO Headquarters that is capable of commanding one major and two small operations concurrently. The exercise was directed by Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, German Army, Commander Joint Warfare Centre. STEADFAST Juncture 10 was the fourth DJSE exercise with 'One HQ' concept. It was JFC Brunssum's first

DJSE exercise; FC Madrid's fourth time acting as the Forward Element. The exercise was conducted on all three main levels: Strategic, Operational and Tactical. The exercise locations were: Valdehion, France (main exercise location with over 1,000 participants); Joint Warfare Centre's Ulsnes Interim Training Facility, Stavanger, Norway (Exercise Centre with 300 participants); Brunssum, the Netherlands (Commander NRF 15); Mons, Belgium (SHAPE); Toulon, France (F.S. Mistral, French Navy); Izmir, Turkey (Joint Force Air Command) and Larissa, Greece (Combined Air Operations Centre).

As always, the exercise was based on Exercise Objectives. To test these, EXCON had 302 incidents with a total number of 1,061 injects. Some of the other supporting exercise objectives included planning and executing a Crisis Response Operation with support from Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Joint Assessment Team (CBRN-JAT); practicing NATO intelligence capabilities; exercising NATO Theatre Missile Defence; practicing multinational medical support and meteorological and oceanographic functions; exercising CIS linkages; integrating media planning within an operation in a complex asymmetric environment as well as improving relationships, interaction and practical cooperation with Partners, Nations and International and Non-Governmental Organizations.

Overall, the training and exercise events focused on the integration of the

NRF 15 FORCE COMPOSITION

- Joint Force Command Brunssum (Lead HQ) and Force Command Madrid (DJSE);
- Air Component Command Izmir (CC-Air Izmir);
- French High Readiness Force Maritime Headquarters (MCC);
- HQ EUROCORPS;
- Turkish Special Operations Component Command and other Augmentees;
- other joint enablers for CBRN and PSYOPS.

NRF-assigned headquarters and forces in a fictitious exercise scenario (CERASIA II) in which the NATO force is deployed in support of UN mandated peacekeeping operation in compliance with a UNSCR (an expeditionary NATO-led Crisis Response Operation conducted under a Chapter VII of the UN Charter beyond NATO's geographical area). The fictitious scenario is based on extensive challenges related to an asymmetric environment (including security and environmental threats, piracy, interaction with key leaders and contingency planning) as well as the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees. In summary, the ultimate aim of the exercise was to develop the capabilities and structures of the NATO Response Force as a catalyst for NATO's transformation and to ensure that the NRF 15 headquarters were well trained and certified to Command and Control missions. †




Meeting of NATO and Partner Chiefs of Defence, 6-7 May 2009. Photos by NATO.

BACKGROUND: REVISED NRF

Chiefs of Defence from more than 40 countries, together with NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Operations and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, attended the NATO Military Committee Spring Meetings in their various sessions over 6 and 7 May 2009, chaired by Admiral Di Paola, Chairman of NATO's Military Committee. Here, SACEUR updated the Military Committee on the ongoing revision of NATO Response Force (NRF). As such, the Military Committee analysed the options studied in order to make the NRF more deployable, sustainable, interoperable and, thus, more usable. The operational command of the NRF alternates among NATO's Joint (Force) Command Brunssum, Naples, and Lisbon. The participation in the NATO Response Force is preceded by a six-month training programme, which includes testing the units' capabilities in complex exercises.



WHAT THE OPRs SAY

Exercise planning is all about teamwork, driven by Core Planning Teams at various levels of the organization, each team with an Officer of Primary Responsibility (OPR) nominated.



STEADFAST Juncture 10 OPRs at Ulsnes (from left to right): JWC's Lt Col Fauskrud; ACO's Cdr Carmona and JFC Brunssum's Lt Col Jansen.



Lt Col Gunnar Fauskrud, NOR A, JWC

"With ENDEX declared 15 May, another STEADFAST exercise was completed and a new NRF rotation ready to start their standby period. For exercise planners, a one-year exercise cycle was over. Remaining is the all important Stage 4 (Post Exercise Analysis and Reporting), which provides a basis for lessons and improvements to feed into future exercises. The support of the NRF STEADFAST Series of Exercises (SFS) is a never ending story with the JWC supporting a rolling exercise and training programme and conducting a set of repeatable training and exercise events. Exercise planning is all about teamwork, driven by Core Planning Teams at various levels of the organization, each team with an

Officer of Primary Responsibility (OPR) nominated. The key is good coordination and communication. For the STEADFAST Series of Exercises, the most important planning teams/groups are:

- At the Strategic Level (Officer Scheduling the Exercise, OSE) at SHAPE, the Exercise Planning Group (EPG), which is responsible for developing the strategic specification and direction in the form of an Exercise Specification (EXSPEC);
- At the Operational Level (Officer Conducting the Exercise, OCE) at one of the JFC/JC HQ, the Core Planning Team (CPT), which is responsible for the process leading up to the development of the Exercise Plan (EXPLAN);
- At the JWC Level (Officer Directing the Exercise, ODE), the Exercise Planning Team (EPT), which is responsible for coordinating various defined exercise support and training aspects linked to the execution of the exercise.

As a process, exercise planning is not so complicated. The methodology to follow is well documented in the Exercise Directive Bi-SC 75-3. Although no exercise is

the same, the biggest challenges traditionally are proper expectation and time as well as resource and consequence management. These are the issues that have the highest level of organizational involvement and commitment throughout the exercise cycle.

Following an exercise cycle from cradle to grave as OPR is like riding a roller coaster: you have your fair share of ups and downs. So what is there to say about SFJE 10? The final exercise numbered 2,500 participants gathered at seven locations across Europe. This three-level (Strategic, Operational, Tactical) event involved a Training Audience of 1,750 from more than ten headquarters. The Exercise Control organization alone numbered 450. Prior to Phase 3-CPX in May, the Training Audience completed a Phase 1B 'Academic Seminar' in January, a Phase 2 'Crisis Response Planning' in February, and a Phase 1D 'Battle Staff Training' in March. In addition, all the Component Commands (CC) finalized their CC level certification exercises in March/April. SFJE 10 combined training with exercises, and evaluation with



certification in a package. From an exercise planner's perspective, there were a number of things that made this exercise special and challenging:

- SFJE 10 was the first time JFC HQ Brunssum trained the new Deployable Joint Staff Element concept in a Joint Headquarters structure, simultaneously exercising a major and a smaller Joint Operation (ISAF/NRF). With SFJE 10, all of the three operational headquarters gained experience with the new concepts.

- SFJE 10 was the first time the new Cooperative Operative Planning Directive was practised during Phase 2 in support of the three-level operational planning, using the new version of the TOPFAS planning tool. In addition, the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team concept was practised as part of Phase 2.

- SFJE 10 was on an extremely tight January-April timeline. As a result of the aim of the OSE, which was to replicate as many of the activities and processes leading up to a deployment as realistically as possible, the last four months prior to the CPX in May saw little or no headspace between individual deliverables and events. This posed a challenge both for the planners and the support.

Despite some limitations due to various operational limitations and priorities affecting the participation and augmentation of the exercise organization, my general impression is that SFJE 10 was a success, with most of the exercise and

training objectives achieved. I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to all planners and participants for the support they provided through the planning, preparation and execution in order to make this happen.

Now, as I am rotating out of the JWC after seven years, I leave with good feelings and the strong conviction that the JWC will be able to provide high quality training in the years to come. The key to success is to continuously refine the product to ensure it stays focused and remains relevant and sustainable. I believe achieving a better balance of ambitions and available resources and support will be a good start. When it comes to ambitions, focusing more on 'tailoring to the need' rather than on perfection may be helpful. I wish you good luck and all the best for the future."



Cdr Pedro Carmona, ACO

"Planning a major joint exercise becomes a living process that lasts a little more than one year. An enormous effort is required to coordinate all the details for the achievement of the exercise objec-

tives defined by the Strategic Command, Allied Command Operations. On that, I could rely within SHAPE, with the excellent support of my Exercise Planning Group, as well as with the close cooperation and collaboration of the Operational Command (JFC Brunssum) and the Officer Directing the Exercise (JWC). Reaching the end of the exercise gives me a great satisfaction because you know that you contributed to the operational readiness of the NATO Response Force HQs and thus to strengthening NATO's preparedness for future operations."



Lt Col Frank J.T. Jansen, JFC BR

"During SFJE 10, JFC Brunssum had to do justice to the responsibility of leading two operations at the same time because the ISAF operation is an ongoing process in JFC Brunssum. SFJE 10 was the first time that JFC Brunssum could train with a Deployed Forward Element from FC Heidelberg. It takes more than planning to bring an exercise to a good end. In my opinion 'commitment' is the magic word. This commitment, together with the excellent support of the JWC resulted in a very good NRF certification exercise."



The best time to take a picture: ENDEX!

ISAF 10/01

Headquarters International Security Assistance Force (HQ ISAF) and ISAF Joint Command (HQ IJC) Mission Rehearsal Training Event (ISAF TE 10/01) took place at the Joint Warfare Centre's Ulsnes Interim Training Facility from 10-25 June 2010 with the participation of more than 800 service members from HQ Rapid Reaction Corps-France; Force Command HQ Heidelberg and United States Army V Corps. Following interviews were made during the exercise. *(Photos by Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO and HQ Rapid Reaction Corps-France PAO.)*



BACKGROUND: ISAF TE 10/01 was the last and most extensive training session of several conducted so far this year by the Allied forces for their July deployment to Afghanistan and it was designed to replicate the mission in theatre. The planning process started at the beginning of February in close coordination between Joint Force Command Brunssum, HQ ISAF and the Joint Warfare Centre. The exceptional training results were mostly due to the meticulous planning and coordination

with the Subject Matter Experts coming from the two theatre headquarters (HQ ISAF and HQ ISAF Joint Command). German Army Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre, said: "All training objectives are achieved during the Mission Rehearsal Training.

Our success was a direct result of four main factors: detailed planning between Joint Force Command Brunssum, Joint Warfare Centre, HQ ISAF and ISAF Joint Command Staff; stringent preparation by the French Rapid Reaction Corps, Force Command Heidelberg and United States Army V Corps; high participation rate of individual augmentees and invaluable mentoring by Flag and Field Grade officers who currently serve, or recently served, in Afghanistan."



Q&A

Elizabeth Mader

Economic Officer at the U.S.
Embassy in Kabul

What is your impression about ISAF 10/01 Training Event so far?

I'm honoured to be part of this training exercise, both to prepare the Training Audience and also as an opportunity to meet so many interesting people. I wish I could have done this earlier during my tour in Kabul, of course, then I wouldn't be as useful here! My role is to represent the diplomatic community, as well as other role-playing as required. As a regional Subject Matter Expert, I'm also pleased to have the chance to interact with the Training Audience on issues such as energy, roads, water, agriculture, and natural resources.

Any remarks for the soon-deploying staff?

If I could deliver only one message to the Training Audience, it would be to reach out to other organizations, including the Afghan Government, other countries' Embassies, and NGOs. Very often, someone else has been doing the same job, considering the same issue, or answering the same questions for years. You don't have to start from zero! Share information whenever you can. Maybe you have a new report and I have a useful contact: if we can pool our information, we both end up with better analysis. Learn from other people's mistakes so you don't have to make them yourself, and build on other people's successes for the good of the mission and Afghanistan.

What is the "Afghan First" initiative?

This is a particularly good time to discuss Afghan First, since the first anniversary of the policy is approaching. The Afghan First policy encourages local procurement of Afghan products to benefit and improve the well-being of the Afghan people. Greater local procurement by military and civilian programmes serves the mutual interests of both our countries. Afghan firms can often provide goods and services with comparable quality, at competitive prices. With a shorter supply chain, local procurement is often the best way for the buyer to maximize value and timely delivery of needed



Elizabeth Mader

goods and services. In many cases local products and services may already meet the standards of imported alternatives, or with focused and sustained effort they may be raised to world standards.

This policy enables procurement officers to favor Afghan vendors over other competitors. For smaller contracts they can reach out directly to Afghan suppliers to do business. For larger contracts they can limit the competition to Afghan firms or firms that employ a majority of Afghan citizens. Acquiring more goods and services from Afghan companies boosts employment, and fosters the competition and entrepreneurial spirit essential to a growing free market economy. Promoting and encouraging the purchase of Afghan products and development of the Afghan labour force directly contributes to our mutual goal of building long-term peace and prosperity in this country. Local procurement on the military side is booming with projects like those through the U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and its work with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) – which purchases 156,000 uniforms per month. Afghans perform the cutting, sewing and finishing on the products. Six Afghan local manufacturers share the contract, with 300 to 600 employees each. CSTC-A is now buying boots in country as well. These boots price at \$60-65/pair in Afghanistan compared to \$80-100 in the United States. Imported boots from Pakistan or China are

cheaper but lower in quality. In fact, a \$200 million tender for combat boots has just closed this week and will be awarded to two to four Afghan firms.

At the U.S. Embassy, we've also begun purchasing and commissioning as much as possible locally. For example we've worked with local woodworkers to produce office and residential furniture, helping these woodworkers hone their skills. With profits earned, their companies have invested in better equipment, positioning themselves to take on even bigger contracts in the future. USAID hires Afghans and contracts with Afghan firms in the roads, energy, vertical construction, and agriculture sectors. For example, USAID's Strategic Provincial Roads Programme employs 5,500 Afghans who are building nearly a thousand kilometres of roads. All design and construction contracts go to Afghan firms and include hands-on training in how to meet international quality standards. Construction contracts require that 70 percent of the workers be local, which spreads the employment and training benefits across the country.

Nearly one thousand Afghans have worked on the new 105 megawatt power plant in Tarakhil (Kabul) under the USAID Energy Programme. In addition, 28 Afghan operators, engineers and mechanics have been trained on plant operation and management. The power plant is now completed and ownership of the plant will be transferred to the Afghan government in a Handover Ceremony on June 27. The trainees, along with Afghans who have worked with the U.S. contractor to build and operate the plant, have become the core plant work force. In addition, USAID will link its procurement process to the United States Department of Defense tendering website, which will allow the two agencies to pool information and vet contractors using the same standard leading to a more transparent and effective procurement process.

An Afghan First website will also soon be launched. AfghanFirst.org will offer a consolidated 'how to' website that will include all available solicitations from the official United States contracting website FedBizOpps.gov. The new site will also be available in Dari and Pashto and contain available opportunities with a synopsis of solicitations to make the process easier for

prospective bidders, definitions of what constitutes an Afghan business, specifications on how to submit a proposal, and links to related websites.

Currently, we see more civilian-military cooperation. Do you think this is a result of a more cohesive approach in Afghanistan?

I definitely think we are benefiting from an increasingly cohesive and integrated approach in Afghanistan. There are challenges as we all work more closely, but the benefits outweigh the occasional growing-pains. To give insights into civilian-military cooperation, I'd like to provide a bit of [U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan], **Karl Eikenberry's** June 11 speech to the Command and General Staff College Graduation Ceremony (the entire speech can be found at <http://kabul.usembassy.gov>):

▶▶ Ambassador Eikenberry on Civil-Military Cooperation:

«In Afghanistan, we use a Dari language term to refer to the close, mutually supportive partnership that exists between ISAF and Afghan forces: 'Shohna ba Shohna,' or 'Shoulder to Shoulder.' I think that term, that commitment to support each other, also applies to the way our military and civilians must partner to bring enduring security – and the accountable governance and economic development that anchors it – to Afghanistan. Our military and civilian personnel do not and should not play identical roles in Afghanistan, but none of us can accomplish our mission there without our partners in the fight. Now in any partnership, there are bound to be differences in perspective, in outlook, and in approach. I'd like to share some of my thoughts about these differences with you – why they genuinely strengthen us.

*First, let's talk about differences in speed. While the military is ready to advance at mach speed, at times diplomats must take a more nuanced approach – **we move at the speed of trust.** So my first piece of advice to you is to understand and appreciate these differences in approach and perspective. Throttling back to consult fully with your civilian partners – not to mention our Afghan friends, upon whom success in Afghanistan must, of course, ultimately rest – will prove in the long run to be the faster way to lasting victory. Sooner*



or later the military will go home, but the civilian work will continue. Your job is to synchronize the military need for speed and the diplomat's and development expert's need for anchored, long-term impact. By the way: that is not to say that soldiers can't and don't use diplomatic tools as well. In Afghanistan, our military attend local Shuras with tribal and village elders, and listen to their grievances. These are valuable engagements and help establish trust. But an Afghan farmer who looks at a soldier sees the uniform, sees the weapon, and is understandably uncomfortable, no matter how adept that soldier may be at establishing rapport. The civilian in jeans and tennis shoes may well be able to set the tone for a less threatening, more productive engagement. And he or she can bring years of specific expertise to bear when speaking with Afghan interlocutors.

So, my second piece of advice is to see your civilian counterparts as empowered partners who complement your work, and welcome them as part of your engagement team. Take them with you, and provide the security they need to do their jobs. Another difference I'd like to talk about is language. Speaking from first hand experience there is a real civilian-military language barrier, and, trust me, it has nothing to do with Dari or Pashto. Use English, not professional jargon or acronyms, when speaking with your civilian counterparts.

My third piece of advice is build personal relationships. Talk often and communicate. Drink coffee with the civilians who share your battlespace, and remember they

work with you but not for you. Once you're in country, invite civilians to your meetings, and go to theirs. Remember that, like you, they are professionals far from home, applying their skills to build a safer world. I can tell you that the civilian-military partnership has definitely improved since 2007 when I was last in Afghanistan. Our closer collaboration is already having an impact, and I look for even greater results in the months ahead. Like the military, we are experiencing a tremendous civilian surge. By January 2011, we will have tripled the number of civilians we had on the ground as recently as August 2009. But, I understand that there are those who are wary of truly partnering with civilians in the battlespace. One reason is the misconception that civilians only get in the way when the going gets rough. Yet civilians share the dangers of indirect fire and IEDs. As the Ambassador, I make a point of calling our civilians when I hear they have been in a convoy under attack or on the receiving end of rocket fire. When I ask them how they're doing, the answer is always humbling, typically, 'Thanks for calling, Ambassador, but I'm just here doing my part.'

So, my fourth piece of advice is: don't worry that diplomats, or development or agriculture experts won't step up to the plate when you need them; they will. I believe that we now have the right pieces in place. We have the right strategy, we have the right balance of troops, and we have the right resources available or on the way. And we have the right partnership between our military and civilians, and with the Af-




ghan Government. As the military effort in Afghanistan ratchets down our civilian efforts will ratchet up. As our U.S., Afghan and Coalition Forces create stability, our civilians will expand the governance and development efforts that will allow lasting stability to take root.

Both the civilians and military must rely on each other — without one, the other can make no lasting headway. So, I advise you to embrace this partnership, because without it, you may be spending a lot more time away from home. In closing, please remember that we have a lot of work to do, but I believe that with commitment, with courage, shoulder to shoulder with all our partners and with civilian-military unity of effort, we will succeed in Afghanistan.»

One question interview with HQ ISAF CJ5 Plans

— Is there a unity of effort between counter narcotics and counterinsurgency?

The all-pervading influence of narcotics corrupts many aspects of Afghan life; undermining governance through corruption, funding the insurgency, fuelling instability and discouraging the transition to a licit economy. Counter Narcotics activities therefore present both challenge and opportunity in our COIN campaign. They can be used to counter corruption through a highly effective narcotics judicial process and simultaneously stress both the insurgencies funding and its links and legitimacy with the population. It equally provides ISAF with the opportunity to consolidate its security gains by connecting with the population through alternative livelihood programmes. ISAF's role is to support the Government of Afghanistan in the application of its comprehensive National Drugs Control Strategy. In doing this, ISAF seeks to ensure unity of effort between Counter Narcotics and COIN activities to ensure that they remain an accelerant rather than a hindrance to achieving our COIN campaign goals.



**Brigadier General Charles Estes, USA A
Chief of Staff US Army V Corps**

Many of the V Corps soldiers are combat experienced. Do you think that might challenge the realism of the training?

No, being combat trained and being trained to operate as staffs in combat are different skill sets. A lot of the soldiers here are combat trained; they have been on the ground and fighting the war. However, they still need the pre-deployment training as it provides deeper working knowledge of a stimulating headquarters environment. The soldiers will exercise and improve Command and Control, Electronic Working Practices, and execute Functional Area Training with Subject Matter Experts. Simultaneously, they are working to enhance their capabilities to respond to future tasks.

What are your expectations from ISAF 10/01 Training Event?

I expect that at the end of this training, all of the participants will have a good working knowledge of what is expected from them in theatre. The training brings together the soldiers from the French Rapid Reaction Corps, FC Heidelberg and the V Corps. It will allow them to enhance team building, communications, cooperation and leadership between them. When they deploy to Afghanistan the team will be able to concentrate solely on having a productive 'left seat/right seat' ride with the soldier they are replacing.



In your opinion how does COIN fit the problems we face in theatre?

I think we have always been fighting a counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan. ISAF's mission is to help Afghanistan defeat the insurgency threatening their country. It has gotten a new meaning today due to General McChrystal's change of mission. Protecting the Afghan people is the mission. Afghan people will decide



who wins the war and together with the Government of Afghanistan we are in a struggle for their support. We will not win the war by killing the insurgents. The aim is to make the people safe, promote good leadership within the Afghan Government that will provide Afghan people necessary things to live a good life and, when necessary, kill the Taliban. COIN has always been a kinetic fight. Now, it is more of a humanitarian fight with kinetics being a secondary or tertiary form of resolving the problem.

What is your message to the troops deploying to Afghanistan soon?

Be safe. Don't let your guard down just because you are in a headquarters environment. Do the job and get back safe.



Afghanistan: Battle of Media

Aziz Hakimi, Afghan journalist/Media Subject Matter Expert



Winning hearts and minds is the most crucial part of the new war strategy in Afghanistan. But, this can be difficult to achieve without rethinking the role of the media as another front in the battle. Media is an inseparable component of Strategic Communication and communicating with the Afghan people whose lives are directly affected by ISAF/NATO's presence in their country is part of Strategic Communication. It is estimated

that more than 400 print publications, (including at least 20 daily newspapers) 60 local radios and a dozen of TV stations are registered in Afghanistan. In fact, one can argue that press, as the fourth estate of democracy is one of the few most outstanding achievements in the past ten years of war. The local radio, TV stations and newspapers are the only sources of information for the Afghan population. And, Afghan mainstream media have a far greater influence over Afghan public opinion than international media.

Tactical and Strategic approaches

Similar to ISAF/NATO's press conferences and statements, the insurgents' sources too, have a crucial role in the news feeding process. The insurgents try to use the media as tactical means in their war of propaganda and they are not necessarily committed to the accuracy of their information nor they have complex procedures for speaking to the media. ISAF/NATO however, in order to ensure accuracy, is slower in disseminating information to the media and to the public. While accuracy is well appreciated, there is a growing need to develop mechanism for ISAF/NATO to ensure timely media-related reaction when it is required. Some Afghan analysts believe that ISAF/NATO and other international military players need to rethink the role of the media, particularly local media in the battle to win the hearts and minds.

Role of the Local Media

There are an increasing number of young Afghans who choose journalism and reporting as their career and pay attention to the details of well-known foreign media in an effort to ensure accuracy and impartiality of the media content they produce. It is important, however, to be observant of the fact that the mentality of Afghan local journalists about the current affairs in the country is totally different than those of foreign reporters. Their questions can be more about what affects their target audience, and answering such questions sometimes can be trickier, as it would require a degree of local knowledge. It is also crucial to ensure that the local media have a direct access to ISAF/NATO as a source of information. Publishing the press-related information on ISAF/NATO relevant websites with easy-to-remember links, more face-to-face interviews with local media, participation of ISAF media team members in debates and talking points can all be effective means of delivering basic but key messages to local population.

Media handling

Afghans are canny users of media and plain news does not satisfy them. They want to know what is behind the events. That is why analysis and opinion are perhaps the most important elements in Afghan media and it is also true that some local press might come up with controversial analysis about the events to attract more audience or readership. And it is in the absence of reliable and truthful information that conspiracy theories, welcomed and fuelled by insurgents are going to thrive. In addition, although Afghan press is inching forward towards professionalism and independence, many of the well-known newspapers, radios or TV stations, one way or another, are connected to different ethnic, religious or political groups. Thus, monitoring the local media provides a rich source of local knowledge that can serve as supplementary input for analyzing the overall situation in Afghanistan.

CDR Len Remias, USA N HQ ISAF COIN Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT)

Editorial: this interview was made when General McChrystal was Commander ISAF.

Please explain CAAT's mission.

The CAAT observes, assesses, and reports on counterinsurgency (COIN) activities; identifies best and worst practices; and advises and assists commanders at all levels to enable effective integrated COIN operations in Afghanistan.

What does COIN mean for ISAF?

It means everything. The way we think and act in a COIN fight will be critical to our success and the success of the Afghan Government and people. In one way COIN is an exercise in 'competitive governance'. It requires constant balancing of kinetic operations, key leader engagement, partnering and messaging. Insurgent shadow governments have proven effective and formidable, especially in providing justice. We have to both separate insurgents from the population and link that population to their government.

What are the principles behind the counterinsurgency strategy?

Our COIN campaign is about protecting the Afghan people and providing a secure environment allowing good government and economic development to undercut the causes and advocates of insurgency. General McChrystal has laid out eight key COIN imperatives for our success:

□Protect and Partner with the People. We are fighting for the Afghan people – not against them. Our focus on their welfare will build the trust and support necessary for success.

□Conduct a Comprehensive COIN Campaign. Insurgencies fail when root causes disappear. Security is essential; but I believe our ultimate success lies in partnering with the Afghan Government, Partner Nations, NGOs and others to build the foundations of good government and economic development.

□Understand the Environment. We must understand in detail the situation, however complex, and be able to explain it to others. Our ability to act effectively demands a real appreciation for the positive

and negative impact of everything we do or fail to do. Understanding is a prerequisite for success.

□Ensure Values Underpin our Effort. We must demonstrate through our words and actions our commitment to fair play, our respect and sensitivity for the cultures and traditions of others, and understanding that rule of law and humanity don't end when fighting starts. Both our goals and conduct must be admired.

□Listen Closely – Speak Clearly. We must listen to understand and speak clearly to be understood. Communicating our intentions and accurately reflecting our actions to all audiences is a critical responsibility and necessity.

□Act as one team. We are an Alliance of Nations with different histories, cultures, and national objectives – united in support for Afghanistan. We must be unified in purpose, forthright in communication, and committed to each other.

□Constantly adapt. This war is unique,

and our ability to respond to even subtle changes in conditions will be decisive. I ask you to challenge conventional wisdom and abandon practices that are ingrained into many military cultures.

□Act with courage and resolve. Hard fighting, difficult decisions, and inevitable losses will mark the days ahead. Each of us, from our most junior personnel to our senior leaders, must display physical, mental and moral courage. Our partners must trust our commitment; enemies must not question our resolve.

What are your training expectations?

I expect JWC to provide deploying personnel with a baseline understanding of the COIN and ISAF/IJC staff planning and processes and how forces and personnel will contribute to the COIN fight in Afghanistan. However, the learning doesn't stop when you get to theatre and personnel and staff must remain flexible and be able to adapt to the dynamic conditions in theatre.





Brigadier General
Leo Beulen, NLD A
Director DJSE 2, FC Heidelberg

What is your role in ISAF 10/01?

My role is Senior Mentor for the HQ ISAF. We have a team of mentors coming from theatre, which includes 19 from HQ ISAF and 32 from ISAF Joint Command. We also have Subject Matter Experts coming from 1 GE/NL Corps; 20 of those that just recently redeployed who are still current on the issues they took care of. Our role is to bring reality into the exercise as best we can. We know exactly how things are being run in the HQ, and our main role is to explain that to the Training Audience (TA). Last December, I was a member of the TA myself. What is better this time than the last time, I note, is that you get teambuilding between the HQ and individual augmentees. They show up here, see each other for the first time and then start teambuilding to ensure they know each other when they meet again in theatre. This is actually the end of the training. So, next to the reality of Kabul, it is, I would say, the

best one to portray what they are going to meet over there. The only thing you cannot portray here, because of the sheer numbers, is the complexity and vastness of the staff over there. That is something you will have to experience once in theatre.

What are the current developments?

Our strategic main effort is the Afghan national security forces, which means that we build the Army and the Police so that they can create a security environment in which the Government can operate. The NTM-A was organized eight months ago and is doing a tremendous job to increase its capacity of training people. Other lines of operations include development and governance. So we also help build the governance capacity of the Government of Afghanistan. But that, more than anything else, is the primary focus of the international community. We provide support in those areas. The other development is that we encourage the Government of Afghanistan to take ownership of its problems and the means to pick up its role in the ongoing conflict, which is increasing more and more, especially over the last six months. Things are moving slowly but steadily in the right direction. It will take a while for us to see the final results though.

Hope Carr Media SME

What is the significance of media training?

The development of 24-hour news programming, citizen journalists, embedded media, and media cells of extremist



groups has allowed media and its role as the purveyor of public opinion and sentiment to become an integral part of modern warfare. Present day militaries must consider and prepare for the impact media will have on all aspects of their ability to achieve their operation mandate. These implications range from political and citizen support for troop deployment in their home countries to local understanding of their roles and mandates in their place of deployment. The evolving role of the media (public opinion domain) experienced by modern militaries requires a change in the way in which militaries prepare and train. Media and public opinion is no longer the sole domain of the Public Affairs/Information Officers. All elements of an HQ must consider and engage with the impact the media environment has on the success of the operation. As a result, the complexity of the environment should not be the driver for effective exercise media; rather, the ability of the exercise media environment to require the Training Audience to communicate internally, analyze and prioritize media impact and strategize methods (throughout the HQ) to manage the environment through multiple means should be the driver.



ENDEX - Combined Joint Ops Centre

NATO's new Strategic Concept: Inspired by the Masses?

By **Dr Stefanie Babst**,
NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy

Article published with permission from "Turkish Policy Quarterly"⁽¹⁾ journal, Spring 2010.

IN SEPTEMBER 2009, NATO's still-then-new Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, announced that the Transatlantic Alliance would develop its new Strategic Concept and that the process leading to the new Strategy would be "the most open and inclusive process ever in the history of the Alliance". He invited a group of 12 national experts to begin substantial discussions about NATO's future and called upon the public at large to participate in these and other discussions.

On Monday 17 May 2010 at NATO Headquarters, the Group of Experts, chaired by the former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, presented their report, "Analysis and Recommendations on a new Strategic Concept for NATO" to the Secretary General and NATO Ambassadors. This brought nine months of intensive discussions and consultations to an end and with it the so-called period of "inclusiveness and reflection."

Now that the work of the Group of Experts has come to a conclusion, it is time to assess the consultation process. Was the Secretary General's idea to initiate a broad-based public discourse about the Alliance's future a failure or a success? How public were the discussions? Who participated in them? Was the "inclusive period" only an attempt to create the illusion, as some NATO critics claim, that our publics had a say in this process? Should the public have a say at all? Or should such strategic reviews be left to the experts?

(1) Published since 2002 on a quarterly basis, TPQ can also be reached through the website at www.turkishpolicy.com.



Joint press conference with the NATO Secretary General and Madeleine Albright: presentation of the recommendations of the Group of Experts on NATO's New Strategic Concept, 17 May 2010. Photo by NATO.

INCLUSIVE CONSULTATIONS: Broad Audiences, Diverse Topics, One Central Message

Most of the experts' discussions took place in the public limelight and offered the opportunity for those who were interested to follow and join in the debates. Between September 2009 and May 2010, the experts conducted four international seminars (in Luxembourg, Slovenia, Norway and the United States) and engaged in an impressive number of consultations with civilian and military officials from all Allied and Partner countries, independent security experts, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), national and European Parliamentarians and representatives from other international organiza-

tions. Each of these seminars had parts open to the media, and all of them were accessible to the general public through different websites.

In addition to the official activities of the Group of Experts, NATO's Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) organized more than 140 outreach activities on the new Strategic Concept in member countries, including conferences, seminars, workshops, background briefings for journalists, essay competitions for students together with multiple digital discussions, with an aim of providing young people the opportunity to post their ideas and





Joint press point with the Honorable Madeleine Albright, Chair of the Group of Experts and Jonas Gahr Støre, Foreign Minister of Norway, 14 January 2010, at the "Opening of the third Seminar on NATO's Strategic Concept: NATO's Partnerships and Beyond", in Oslo. Photo by NATO.

comments about the Alliance's future roles on web platforms. As well as the four official seminars, there were numerous "unofficial" seminars held in Allied and Partner countries. Members of the Group of Experts participated in some of these events.

NATO organized, in close cooperation with local think-tanks, NGOs and respective governments, more than 42 public debates, including TV programmes, in Partner countries together with 17 special information programmes for journalists and interested public groups at NATO's Headquarters in Brussels. Interest was particular high in Russia, Georgia and the Ukraine but also other Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) countries as well as the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) countries. As regards to the ICI countries, PDD supported public seminars in Morocco, Egypt, Qatar and Mauritania – all of them open to the media.

Additionally, NATO invited several thousand visitors, many of them students, to discuss the key components of the new

Strategic Concept. Between late summer 2009 and spring 2010, NATO hosted more than 8,500 visitors from both Allied and Partner countries to explain why the Alliance wanted to elaborate a new strategy and why engagement with the public in this process was important to the Alliance. It goes without saying that the NATO Secretary General played a key role in the entire process. Since August 2009, Anders Fogh Rasmussen gave more than 100 interviews to leading newspapers, TV broadcasters and radio stations – underpinning every time the importance of developing NATO's new strategy with a process which was transparent and one which engaged with the public. He also used his blogs and public speeches to explain why a new Strategic Concept mattered and what he expected it to deliver.

In order to reach out to new audiences, the use of new media is paramount for NATO. On 3 August 2009, PDD launched a dedicated web module⁽²⁾ and discussion forum⁽³⁾. From its launch until early May 2010, the module received more than 122,000 visitors – which is mod-

est compared with Michael Jackson's facebook site – but impressive for an international defence organization. PDD published 48 web stories on the new Strategic Concept, covering background information, a bibliography, key events, speeches and visits of the Secretary General and the Group of Experts. The interested viewer could choose between 70 short videos featuring debates about NATO's future role in Afghanistan, the Allies' relations with Russia, the Comprehensive Approach, NATO's contribution towards the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and many more themes. The videos were regularly uploaded on YouTube, Daily motion, Live leak, Vimeo, Google Videos, Yahoo videos, mySpace TV, metacafe and others and thus reached thousands of primarily young people.

The discussion forum, a central element of NATO's offer to the public to

(2) www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html

(3) <http://natostratcon.info>



participate in live online discussions, was visited by almost 10,000 people. People from many corners of the world, including Australia, Russia and Pakistan participated in the online discussions, expressing often very detailed proposals and views on how NATO should cope with the new security challenges.

A special highlight of the Alliance's digital outreach was the 'Security Jam', an initiative jointly organized by NATO, the European Union and a Brussels think tank (Security and Defence Agenda). For six consecutive days, a quasi 'permanent online discussion' allowed 3,000 security and defence experts from around the globe to exchange their views about key international security issues, including the transatlantic Alliance's new strategy, with prominent policy-makers. In the consultation process on the new Strategic Concept, NATO engaged with over two hundred thousand people – thus reaching far beyond the community of transatlantic security and defence experts.

LIVING UP TO PUBLIC

EXPECTATIONS: Five Observations

The consultation process with the public, academia, experts, think tanks, NGOs, Partner Countries and other international organizations is over. Between now and the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the discussions about the Alliance's new strategic direction will take place in the political and diplomatic arenas of Allied capitals and NATO Headquarters. Over the coming months, using the report of the Group of Experts as a guiding document, NATO's Secretary General will write his own draft of the new Strategic Concept. In mid-September, the Secretary General's draft will be presented to the Allies for formal negotiations.

1. NATO, like any other international organization, relies on the political and public support of its Member countries. So, there is nothing wrong with engaging the public to contribute to the debates about the organization's future strategy. Their opinions matter to this organization which is charged with the responsibility of defending the territories in which they live in. In this regard, it is noteworthy to point out that neither the European Union when developing its European Se-

curity Strategy nor the United Nations has conducted their strategy discussions in public. NATO, in turn, can proud itself – and rightly so – that it has not simply talked about engaging the public but actually embarked on a dedicated process.

2. The consultation process on the new Strategic Concept provided a unique opportunity for further engagement with the public on this particular issue. Many factors influence how NATO is perceived. These include the leadership of the organization, success or failure in Afghanistan, the state of U.S.-European relations, enlargement or issues related to the immediate neighbourhood of a country. A guiding political document, which is important to the organization, may not be perceived as important by the public, in particular at a time when the organization is engaged in a major campaign. Therefore it was crucial that the public were involved in contributing to the debate which will shape the posture of the Alliance over the next decades. The emerging security challenges – such as cyber security and climate change – means that post-Afghanistan NATO must be ready and willing to act in the face of such challenges. In order to remain on the right side of public support, emerging security challenges must be explained to the public. This consultation process did just that.

3. The final product, which is the new Strategic Concept, must offer clear and compelling responses to the questions raised during public discourse about NATO's future strategic direction. What exactly is the Allies' strategy to effectively protect their citizens from external security threats? Which threats can NATO realistically cope with and which ones are out of reach? How will the Allies better connect to other international organizations and actors to deter potential enemies and tackle security risks before they arrive at our doorsteps? Given the hard realities of the current strategic environment, answering these and other key questions are mandatory. NATO is fighting terrorists six thousand kilometres away from Europe. It is confronted by a host of threats that come in multiple forms, ranging from the proliferation

of nuclear missiles and increasingly debilitating cyber attacks to energy security and religious extremism. In contrast to the Cold War, NATO's enemies cannot be deterred any longer by battalions of tanks and conventional forces taking position in well-defined geographical spots. Today's threats come in very different forms than only some ten years ago. The new challenges are not just looming on the horizon. They are already in our doorstep. Addressing them effectively is what NATO needs to do. Against this background, NATO's new Strategic Concept must offer more than diplomatic buzz words – otherwise, it will fade away only too quickly in the public's mind and the Allies risk to lose credibility.

4. National governments must continue to engage their publics on transatlantic issues and convincingly explain why it is important to forge a strong transatlantic partnership. It is not sufficient if only the Secretary General passes this message on. Both at home and towards foreign audiences Alliance leaders must demonstrate that they remain committed to the Alliance and ready and capable to lead NATO with resolve and determination into the next decade. The Lisbon Summit in November 2010 will be the ideal moment to convey this message to the public in Allied countries and beyond. However, a short historical moment that is captured in the traditional family portrait at the NATO Summit will not do the trick.

5. The new Strategic Concept must be translated into practice. NATO's "D-Day" starts on 21 November 2010 when the Heads of State and Government have approved the new strategy at their Summit meeting in Lisbon. The publics in Member and Partner countries will carefully watch how the Allies will implement what they have approved on a piece of paper.

THE GROUP OF EXPERTS, in their comprehensive and detailed report, have made some good proposals on how NATO's future strategy could look like. It is now up to the Allies do follow-up on these proposals in order to develop a strategy which will help the Alliance to navigate through the troubled waters of the 21st Century security environment. +



DEVELOPING COIN DOCTRINE IN CONTACT

SPECIAL FORCES TEAMS, DESPITE THEIR AGILITY AND FLEXIBILITY, ARE UNABLE TO OPERATE THE COIN MISSION ALONE.

By Dr Dave Sloggett
Intelligence and COIN Advisor

THE EXPERIENCES IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN have had a profound effect upon the approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare that has been developed by the United States Army and its NATO partners. The days when commentators could quote the British Army's experience in Malaya as the basis for developing a 'hearts and minds' campaign are over; their limitations are all too apparent as role models for contemporary COIN operations.

The obvious differences between the success story that was the British approach in Malaya to what was needed in

Iraq, for example, have been analysed and discussed in detail under the leadership of General David H. Petraeus, Commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, and resulted in the publication of Field Manual 3-24 on Counterinsurgency in December 2006. The Foreword to this document, co-written by General Petraeus states "*The Army and Marine Corps recognize that every insurgency is contextual and presents its own set of challenges*". It goes on to say "*You cannot fight the former Saddamists and Islamic extremists the same way you would have fought the Viet Cong, Moros,*

or Tupamaros; the application of principles and fundamentals to deal with each varies considerably". These are important insights that set the backdrop against which COIN doctrine is continuing to be developed.

The world moves on; sometimes at a frightening pace. The adage of Thomas Malthus that "necessity is the mother of invention" applies, and the team assembled by General Petraeus to develop a new COIN doctrine did so in record time

Above: Helicopter door gunner surveys the ground. Photo by U.S. Army Public Affairs Officer Sadie Bleistein.



and whilst 'in contact'. It is a wise man that does not underestimate the collective power of the United States military when they have been stirred into action. It is absolutely clear that the approach to COIN developed markedly in the course of the United States campaign in Iraq. The combination of the military surge led by General Petraeus and the actions of the tribes in Al Anbar province in Iraq was to dramatically alter the operational situation in that area. The local people reached a tipping point. The daily drum beat of indiscriminate violence perpetrated by the insurgents became an anathema to the local people. They decided to act and reject the strictures under which they had been placed.

Despite these developments the evolution of COIN doctrine has to be defined as work-in-progress. It is clear that some generic elements of a future Comprehensive Approach to COIN have been developed through the Iraq campaign. Some of those elements have been carried forward into Afghanistan. General McChrystal's (*the former ISAF Commander*) strategy builds upon the insights from the Iraq campaign in which he played a notable part leading the activities of the Special Forces teams employed in various task forces in Iraq. The tempo of operations of those elements of the military commitment was truly staggering as they disrupted the activities of the insurgents.

But Special Forces teams, despite their agility and flexibility, are unable to operate the COIN mission alone. In the 21st Century, to secure the support from the population requires a very different form of approach to those embraced by the British in Malaya. In fact, the first evolution of COIN from the jungles of Malaya to the deserts and high terrain of Oman provides a much better base for analysis as local factors increasingly were recognized as being important; within an overall strategic framework with changes in governance implemented from the centre by a progressive leader who recognised the needs of his people.

Arguably, it was in Oman that the Special Forces gained their spurs in creating the conditions where the hearts and minds of local populations could be secured. The role of the medic, apply-

ing treatments to reduce the impact of tsetse fly upon local cattle had an obvious and enduring impact upon the local population. Increased milk production mattered in the daily lives of tribesmen in Oman.

A symbiotic relationship between the Special Forces work targeting the irreconcilable elements of an insurgency has to sit alongside a wider series of shaping operations, conducted by regular forces, designed to secure the support of the wider population; some of whom have major disconnects with the ideas of democracy and the idea of centralized governance. The language is now of clear: *build and hold*; not of the kind of brigade sweeps that is now largely discredited as an approach to contemporary COIN operations. The idea of a permanent presence, where indigenous security forces help protect the local population in areas where security and stability foster a positive reaction from the local people towards ISAF, is based upon the notion of creating small centres of control (ink spots) from which governance and control can be spread.

The ink spot approach does have some of ideas based in the British approach to moving the population in Malaya into camps where they were physically disconnected from the insurgents by fences and barbed wire. Contemporary insurgents in Afghanistan react to such operations by melting back into the community, which complicates the process of separating the insurgents from the wider population. Social identity matters and people rely upon local tribal, clan and family connections and traditions to gain sanctuary.

Many people in Afghanistan, for example, are fractious and being deeply distrustful of the kind of mechanisms used by leaders of such states to exert their influence over what can often be a complicated societal landscape. Patronage is a method of governance well understood historically by the current leadership in Kabul and by previous administrations. These attitudes can often be quite parochial in their viewpoint and locally based with strong ethnic overtones. Insurgents also use marital ties to try and bind local people to their agendas. When faced by such an ethnically diverse societal land-

scape it is hardly surprising that tried and tested approaches from the past come to the fore. Rumours and allegations of corruption also play into this environment; undermining confidence in the governance structures. The situation is difficult and experiences from the campaign in Iraq need to be adapted and developed to create the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan where progress can be made; in effect setting the conditions for reconciliation of the grievances that exist within Afghan society. This is not a simple task.

Contemporary social psychology, inter alia the ideas emerging from Social Dominance Theory, provide some insights that may provide levers that enable those communities that are reluctant to cooperate with ISAF within the broader Afghan society to become more engaged. Social Dominance Theory posits that people who are subjected to structural change within their societies feel afraid and vulnerable if their previous apparent position in society becomes threatened. In Afghanistan it has been generally accepted that since the creation of what can be thought of as the state of Afghanistan that its leaders have mainly been derived from the Pashtun tribal confederation. The Muhammadzai Clan is regarded by many to have provided traditional leadership of the country. In contrast the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazara population has often been thought of as having a lesser standing in society. Old enmities do not fade away easily. To understand and try and change attitudes and behaviours in Afghanistan today it is vital to understand the cultural history of the country.

Equally it is important to also comprehend the ways in which tribal customs and creeds modulate the day-to-day lives of the people of Afghanistan. In a society dominated by oral traditions, parables, fables and stories are used to define the morality and social behaviour that is acceptable within societies; some of which can be quite small and set against a very rural backdrop. Jirgas in Afghanistan, that set out to arbitrate between people in dispute over a subject, often commence with several elders speaking of parables and fables that provide prov-





BUILD and HOLD: General Petraeus, COMISAF, visits Shahdarak Market. He walked from the ISAF Headquarters to the market, where he met with local businessmen, purchased and shared bread with the locals, and even found time for a little football match with a few local Afghan children. Photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Bradley A. Lail.

enance from past judgements on similar cases. Customary Law in Afghanistan is based upon a restorative justice system; not the retributive form practised in the West. Revenge is a key element of the ways in which the people of Afghanistan settle feuds and past enmities. A Pashtun proverb suggests that a Pashtun that is able to take revenge for a crime committed against his family within 100 years is a "person in a hurry".

Feuds and grievances that last for several generations are commonplace within Afghan society. Understanding this backdrop is crucial to making any sort of progress and inevitably requires deep insights to be developed at a local level. From these insights state-building can start from a bottom up approach. The ink-spot strategy can try to develop positive movements of individual communities from which the kind of tidal effect seen in Al Anbat province in Iraq can develop. Social psychology shows how populations can reach tipping points; the question for commanders is how can the conditions be created for such a movement that has a positive outcome for ISAF? Social Movement Theory is an important source of insights in this regard.

Some commentators suggested in the weeks running up to the Second Gulf War that we would see the results of the central ideas expounded in Social Movement Theory in the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Iraq. Images

of the population out on the streets welcoming the coalition forces into Iraq as liberators, which were so reminiscent of the pictures of the populations of France, the Netherlands and Belgium welcoming the Allies in 1944, quickly faded as the situation in Iraq descended into turmoil. The optimism of those that suggested the Iraqis would wish to throw off the shackles of the regime of Saddam Hussein was rapidly shown to be misplaced. New approaches to COIN had to be developed.

Central to the overall problem of creating a truly generic approach to COIN, i.e. one that will survive the test of time and be applicable in a much wider set of circumstances, is to understand how best to create a balance between initiatives at the local level, designed to build support from the population in small villages, hamlets and towns, into the kind of momentum that enables progress to be made at the district and eventually province levels of government.

With all of this focus upon building the state from the local level, it is important to question the role of the central government in creating a stable and secure Afghanistan. There is little doubt that few people in Afghanistan see the central government in a particularly positive light. Tribal and clan overlays do modulate opinion but the overall view seems to be of a distant government that has little power, or capabilities, to do things that have a positive local effect. Considering

this situation, where a major disconnect exists between the central government and people on the ground, what can be done to help create the conditions for progress in Afghanistan?

One part of the solution is for ISAF to become more adept at selling its message of hope for the future. Where the central government fails ISAF must try and offer its view of the future in a more coherent way. Strategic Communications has traditionally not been a strong area for ISAF. The fragmented nature of the coalition has not helped. An overall narrative has not been created that resonates with the wider public in Afghanistan. The rather fragmented nature of coalition strategic messaging creates inconsistencies that our adversaries seem able to exploit. They conduct operations that target coalition countries where reservations are expressed in public opinion. The globalised world in which we operate today is so very different from the restricted environment that characterised the backdrop to military operations in Malaya and Oman.

Different government's within the coalition all have their own national publics to keep onside. Political drivers have impacted ISAF's ability to create a coherent approach to communications. This has been especially telling when it comes to the fall out that often occurs in the case of civilian casualties who are caught in the cross-fire of warfare. Whilst it is clear statistically that since General McChrystal assumed command of the military operations in Afghanistan far fewer civilians have died as a result of NATO military activities, the perceptions already created in the mindset of the population is a legacy that is hard to move. How can a tipping point be created that moves many reluctant people from opposing ISAF to being wholeheartedly in support? How can we create the conditions to secure the hearts and minds of the population?

Before answering the question it is important to probe the ideas of the phrase 'hearts and minds' in a little more detail. For people motivated by religious beliefs it is possible to suggest that in practice the heart guards the mind; implying that the emotional aspects of the conflict plays more on a persons behaviour and



attitudes. If this is indeed the situation then ISAF needs to recognize that any approach to Strategic Communications that is based upon the kind of classic logic that derives from messaging and narratives that work in western culture needs to be tempered. We need to develop culturally resonant messaging; communications that can reach beyond the emotional barriers that exist in our target audiences.

With language playing such an important part in Afghan culture and the ideas and visions expressed in parables and fables are instrumental to the ways in which Afghan society operates it is important to reach into Afghan customs, creeds and traditions for clues as to how this might be achieved. Poetry is a key part of Afghan culture. In the early part of 2010 the Taliban specifically sent out messages for Afghan poets to write poetry in support of Jihad. It is possible to view this as a direct attempt to shore-up or reinforce the emotional barriers to any ISAF messaging or narrative. Poetry can be evocative and create powerful images in the minds of those that not only listen to what is being said but hear the subtle messages being delivered. This is culturally resonant messaging. Often it will use the hidden power of some key words in

the dialect in which it has been created. Arabic is a hugely evocative language that allows ideas to be expressed in ways that create emotional responses. Insurgents understand these subtle levers and the ways in which they operate.

To counter these arguments ISAF needs to change its approach to Strategic Communications. It must find ways of leveraging the emotional levers that can reach out and appeal to local populations in ways that western society does not readily utilize. Western societies tend to be more homogeneous and therefore subject to messaging that does not require too many cultural insights. The heterogeneity of the societal landscape in Afghanistan requires the development of messages that operate at a local level whilst fitting within an overall strategic narrative. Culturally resonant messaging has to work at the local level and appeal to specific ethnic populations whilst being consistent within a broader national narrative that is inevitably simplistic. Al Qaeda's single narrative, citing the obligation to fight jihad against those who wish to destroy Islam, is an example of such a simple narrative.

In countries such as Afghanistan, and other potential future theatres of operation, the emphasis upon reducing the



T.S. Eliot

Photo by the estate of T.S. Eliot

footprint of military forces and achieving more through Strategic Communications, at the national, regional and local levels, will become the imperative. The art of creating culturally resonant messaging is therefore a crucial element of the continuing evolution of COIN doctrine. The ideas of exploring how to create emotional connections with an audience were, arguably, first explored by the American painter Washington Allston when he referred to the idea of the "objective correlative" in 1840. The concept was taken forward by the writer T.S. Eliot in 1919 when he wrote in an essay on Shakespeare's play *Hamlet* the following: "*The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 'objective correlative'; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which can be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when external facts, which must terminate in a sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked*".

For those, such as the insurgents in Afghanistan, who readily draw upon their own insights into the culture, customs and traditions of their countrymen, this is natural territory. For ISAF, seeking ways of breaking through the barriers of the heart and reasoning with the logic of the mind, the sense of this concept so carefully outlined by T.S. Eliot is one that we need to understand and implement. Through developing Strategic Communications based upon this form of thinking we may well elevate Strategic Communications to new levels of importance in COIN campaigns and gain new ways of influencing those really important target audiences. †



In countries such as Afghanistan, the emphasis upon reducing the footprint of military forces and achieving more through Strategic Communications, at the national, regional and local levels, will become the imperative. ISAF Spokesman media roundtable: German Army Gen. Joseph Blotz, answers questions from Afghan and international media during a roundtable discussion on 13 July 2010. Photo by ISAF PAO SFC Matthew Chlosta, U.S. Army.



By Dr Dave Sloggett
Intelligence and COIN Advisor

A perspective on the continuing Iraqi COIN operations

Who paints the landscapes of war in the 21st Century?

HISTORY shows us that the main association between the military and art occurs in the depiction of major scenes of battles that adorn Officers' Messes illustrating the heroic deeds of our military forefathers, highlighting the locations where victories were secured and wars won and lost. This stilted relationship may, however, be about to change. Today, it is becoming increasingly difficult to win wars. Conflicts mutate from conventional symmetrical warfare to asymmetric forms of warfare as people disenfranchised by the victory of one side decide to embark upon an insurgency campaign to wear down forces that become labelled as occupiers; when in practice their role is to

stabilize and rebuild a country and put into place effective governance structures. Iraq went through this transition at the end of 2004 as an insurgency gained traction with disaffected groups of people left on the margins of society as new political processes shaped the immediate destiny of the country.

As the insurgency developed so it fractured and split; sometimes along ethnic lines and on other occasions building upon established family and tribal connections and past loyalties. In this fluid and difficult situation, current social networking technologies were rapidly found to be inadequate; failing to provide ways of describing the complicated societal landscapes that lay underneath the shifting alliances and power structures.

These inadequacies endure in Afghanistan with its subtle differences from the tribal and societal structures and customs in Iraq. Highlighting that progress, in the representation and depiction of these landscapes, has not been made. Art, with its ability to provide a very different perspective on things, may also provide important insights into ways of presenting from a culturally sensitive viewpoint what are increasingly complex societal landscapes that are likely to form the backdrop to future stabilization operations.

The appreciation of art in its many forms has been a central part of Iraqi culture for centuries. Baghdad is famed for its role as a crucible in the creation of new sciences, technologies and expres-




sions of art forms. Iraq was, after all, the cradle of civilization and home to the Sumerians, Assyrians and the Abbasids. Today, the streets of Al-Asfar District in Baghdad are home to the latest generations of Iraqi artists seeking to ply their trade and paint pictures that celebrate their history and traditions.

The evolution of the insurgency in Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the Second Gulf War in 2003 surprised many analysts. The multi-nodal structure of the insurgency, which has been likened to a Hydra, was difficult to understand. It appeared to be able to withstand the kind of pressures placed upon it by the actions of the Iraqi Security Forces and their coalition colleagues. Developing insights into the structures underlying the insurgency, to identify specific courses of action to disrupt its activities, was complicated. Many paradoxes existed in the intelligence material that was collected. The pictures that were formed often had large parts missing and that which was visible was also on occasions allegorical. It was the *Duke of Wellington* that opined *“All the business of war, and indeed all the business of life, is to endeavour to find out what you don’t know from what you do.”* This quotation seems to sum up really well the situation faced by the intelligence teams deployed into Iraq to work alongside the Iraqi Security Forces after the initial combat operations had been completed.

The Iraqi insurgency was able to grow in strength at a time when the counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine being applied by the coalition forces was ill prepared for the evolving and protean nature of the conflict. It needed to evolve. In particular the approach to situational awareness needed to develop; harnessing HUMINT and other sources of intelligence material to build pictures of the insurgency and its many links within Iraq and to organizations in border areas that were involved in supporting the insurgency and smuggling suicide bombers into Iraq through a series of safe houses located along major communications routes. Developing a granular picture of the nature of these supply routes in order that measures could be taken to disrupt their activities took time. As Iraqi

Below: Head of Lion. Neo-Assyrian. 8th Century B.C. (Iraq Museum in Baghdad - Traveling Exhibition Photo Archive).



«Art, with its ability to provide a very different perspective on things, may also provide important insights into increasingly complex societal landscapes.»

and coalition forces mounted military operations designed to disrupt these networks, the people involved in the insurgency showed agility in reconstructing the links allowing them to maintain the tempo of their operations. The COIN doctrine that is now being applied in Iraq by the Iraqi Security Forces has had to evolve in contact as their adversaries make use of asymmetric tactics to try and foster civil war; targeting Iraqi public opinion through the use of indiscriminate and sectarian bombings.

VBIED: weapon of choice

Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) are an established and effective element of the tactics employed by insurgents. The Counter-IED battle is complex and multifaceted with no single solution providing a Comprehensive Approach. Insurgents enjoy a great deal of manoeuvre room in which to employ the devices and their means of activation; often choosing to explode several devices over a short period of time to create additional pressures on the emergency services and their partners in the security forces. The Vehicle Borne IED is a particularly effective weapon combining mobility and surprise with a greater killing power than a single suicide vest. It is now the weapon of choice in Baghdad for the insurgents.

In the early part of 2010 the Iraqi Security forces, working in concert with their American counterparts, succeeded in arresting or killing over 34 of the 42 key leaders of the insurgency. Despite these successes and the obvious impact they have had on the rate of attacks in Baghdad, the insurgents have managed to still mount several spectacular attacks where large numbers of people have been killed and injured. The death of two of the key leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq [ISI] in May 2010 led to a number of retaliatory attacks being conducted across Baghdad.

Defeating the VBIED is a key priority for commanders in the campaign. One element of the approach is to map the social networks that support IED emplacement. But this has limited utility. Currently, existing social networking tools do not provide a sufficiently nuanced approach to portraying these networks and the tribal and clan networks upon which they rely, allowing bomb makers and their associates to be protected and to hide within the civilian population.

Defeating the VBIED threat will only come about through a combined approach that creates the conditions in which local people decide to oppose the development and emplacement of these devices. The key to the C-IED campaign is to find and understand the levers that will shape the relationships between local people and the insurgents; marginalizing the insurgents and alienating them from an increasingly small part of the population, often in highly localized areas, from which they currently gain support.

To create the conditions where this separation of the local people from the insurgents can occur, military commanders must gain greater insights into the underlying societal landscape to find potential fault lines that they can exploit to shape the battlefield. This was how the Awakening Councils developed in Al Anbar province in Iraq; local tensions between tribal leaders and the extremists operating in the area boiled over, resulting in the Al Qaeda factions in the area being ejected by the tribes. This was a significant moment in the development of the whole approach to COIN; where the local population took matters into



their own hands and rejected the extremist's ideology. At this point, in the Iraq campaign Al Qaeda was displaced to the north of Al Anbar, creating safe havens in places like Baaquba, Diyala and al-Kut. Recent operations conducted by Iraqi Security Forces and their American partners have continued to constrain the operational manoeuvre room originally experienced by the insurgent groups.

In the run up to the tipping point that happened in Al Anbar intelligence material from a variety of sources was providing insights as to the changing nature of the relationships between the insurgents and the tribal leaders. Hindsight is always a wonderful thing, but getting ahead of the fractures appearing in the insurgency and creating the conditions for these disagreements to develop is crucial to the ways in which COIN operations need to be conducted in the future. In many ways the Lessons Learned from Iraq need to be interpreted and carefully understood so that future stabilization operations, wherever they may be conducted on the international stage, can avoid the pitfalls and difficulties that plagued the initial part of the COIN campaign in Iraq. In many ways NATO must learn lessons from the early part of the Iraqi campaign as these can assist in planning and executing future missions to stabilize other states where terrorists have occupied the vacuum left when governance structures fail.

New toolkits for intelligence analysts

Understanding the intelligence material, and creating visual representations of the various interactions between the actors involved, requires new ideas to be developed that challenge existing ways of representing the societal landscape. A renaissance is therefore required in the current capabilities of social networking toolkits and it is to the world of art, and its depiction of images, to which we might turn to develop culturally sensitive representations of the societal landscape. In making the point about being culturally sensitive it is vital to acknowledge that the Iraqi Security Forces need to be equipped with toolkits that respect their values and beliefs based on their Islamic traditions. The depiction of specific elements within scenes needs to be achieved without crossing culturally

sensitive red lines. A common theme to emerge from the Brigade debriefs on their return from contemporary theatres of war is the criticism of the intelligence collection and analysis processes. It is a common complaint that current intelligence operations are based more on reporting than analysis and assessment. At the heart of this problem is the need for commanders to give direction. Doctrinally the intelligence cycle starts with command direction. It is the first stage in the process and is crucial as it sets the framework for subsequent activities in collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence information; before the cycle repeats.

It is possible to liken the role of an intelligence analyst to that of an artist. They paint pictures for commanders through their reports and briefings. Commanders, however, struggle to interpret these pictures. Current social networking toolkits are simply not able to provide the degree of resolution and nuanced understanding required by commanders in contemporary ethnically-complex theatres such as Afghanistan for them to apply the correct balance of hard and soft power in the campaign. Getting this balance right is crucial. Too often kinetic attacks have resulted in civilian casualties that have caused setbacks in the campaign to secure the hearts and minds of local people.

It is now widely accepted that our military forces cannot fight their way to a victory in the classical sense when fighting an asymmetric war against an agile adversary; the incursion into Somalia by American forces to try and assist a failing state proved that beyond doubt. Military forces must be part of a wider range of measures that draw upon economic and political instruments in a combined effort to create the conditions for progress to be made. At the heart of this problem is gaining an understanding just how and why the population behave in the way they do and what motivates their actions.

Developments in social psychology, such as Social Dominance Theory, show that when long-standing communities face structural change they can be resentful and wary of the changes; it can threaten established societal structures. This is an acute problem in Afghanistan where patronage often plays a key role in

securing positions of responsibility and influence in governance structures. Understanding how these attitudes and beliefs percolate through local societies is crucial to developing options for the applications of soft and hard military power.

As NATO COIN doctrine has emerged using lessons from operations in Malaya, Oman, Northern Ireland, through Iraq and into Afghanistan the need to map the societal landscapes in greater detail has become apparent; commanders, at all levels, need to understand the emotional undercurrents that exist at the local levels. Intelligence material is the *sine qua non* of developing the required insights, with particular emphasis placed upon the value of HUMINT in its contribution to mapping social networks and its ability to provide insights into the prevailing atmospherics in an area. Much of the material collected in the intelligence process is, however, uncertain. Clausewitz noted of intelligence that "*A great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false and by far the greatest part is of doubtful character.*" It can also be complex, equivocal and ambiguous.

Our adversaries also attempt to deceive; which adds further complexities to building the overall picture. The jigsaw puzzles that should be pieced together from the individual sources of intelligence material do not integrate into smooth pictures. Fault lines appear between pieces of the puzzle where inconsistencies emerge between sources of intelligence material; highlighting contradictions and creating paradoxes for intelligence analysts. These are areas of concern where intelligence collection assets need to be deployed to help resolve these contradictions. Through this approach, and from the 'informed' direction of the commander, the rough edges and inconsistencies can be smoothed into a more coherent picture.

Using the artistic metaphor some intelligence pictures resemble that of a piece of art work painted by an Impressionist, such as Monet or Cézanne. In some situations it is possible to think of the picture that emerges as being highly complicated and difficult to appreciate; with some of the material used being allegorical. These pictures can be likened to the work of the Surrealists, such as




Picasso and more recently Salvador Dali. In practical situations the pictures that are painted for commanders are often a mosaic of different forms of art, blending the Impressionist school with that of Surrealists and those with a more scientific representation of the real world, like Canaletto, Michelangelo and Leonardo Da Vinci. In such situations it is not difficult to appreciate why commanders sometimes find it difficult to gain sufficient situational awareness to give direction. The current intelligence doctrine is therefore flawed. This is a point accepted by many working in the intelligence field. New approaches to training are being developed for intelligence staff across NATO to equip them with insights in psychology, sociology and anthropology. This will allow intelligence officers, and their teams, to create value-added briefings that can help commanders to shape and apply soft skills on the battlefield; the key to influence and to changing behaviour of those either directly involved in the insurgency or tacitly supporting them from the sidelines. Key to gaining a greater understanding of these complex societal landscapes, and their day-to-day dynamics, is to access new methods of visualising their structures.

Since the Renaissance the world of art has seen a number of major developments as artists sought to render perspective and light with greater accuracy. More recently developments in anamorphic art pioneered by Kurt Wenner in his 3-D depictions have added new insights into the use of perspective. Artists, such as Masaccio, also strove to represent the human form in greater detail. Turner is one artist that paid specific attention to the use of light and colour to depict scenes. Canaletto, in contrast, is noted for his accuracy and detail – with many of pieces of art based upon studies of architecture.

Leonardo Da Vinci is widely regarded as one of the leaders of the Renaissance movement. His personal contribution to the development of linear perspective is noted by historians as being at the heart of new developments in the field of art. Leonardo Da Vinci is also perhaps best known also for his attention to detail and the ways in which he sought to bridge the gap between the artistic representations of human forms and the developing

«It is possible to liken the role of an intelligence analyst to that of an artist.»

Clockwise: Picasso's Girl with Red Beret; Kurt Wenner's Fishing in Old Shanghai; sketch of Da Vinci's Flying Machine and an impressionist depiction of the landscape, which is very difficult to define.



scientific knowledge of the skeleton and muscle formation. His fusion of studies into science, engineering and biology was innovative. It sets the trend for the kind of multi-disciplinary approach now required in theatre to create the levels of understanding required for commanders to apply soft power in ways that mitigate the risks to the local people. Insights drawn from the world of art will allow new toolkits to be specified and developed. These will allow the complex soci-

etal landscapes to be drawn and painted in ways where the underlying points of tension, emotion, fear and resentment that fuels the insurgency can be better understood. Through gaining these insights Iraqi Security Forces commanders and their opposite numbers operating against equally complicated societal landscapes can develop greater insights and understanding and deliver the kind of balanced approach to conflict that secures the support of the population. †



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By Lt Col Matthew Skuse, GBR Royal Marines

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Photo by ARRC PAO (ISAF 9).



THOUGHTS ON MODERN COUNTERINSURGENCY

IN JULY 2010, I FLEW TO AFGHANISTAN on a fact finding tour in preparation for my role in November's ISAF Training Event. This was not the first time I had flown into Kabul on a commercial flight, but the last occasion was well over a year ago and this felt different. Previously, I had been surrounded by UN officials, journalists and security contractors – the background noise had been loud American. Today, I was one of about 20 Westerners, including two relaxed looking German policemen in uniform. The rest of the seats were occupied by Afghans; I could pick out only the odd Dari or Pashtu word but the noisecape, both in the departure lounge and in the aircraft, was distinctly Afghan. I sat next to

an eighteen year old Afghan. He spoke immaculate English. His family had fled Kabul when he was two and had chosen now to return to visit relatives and friends. He was worried about understanding the language but expressed no concerns about security. He and his sisters were clearly looking forward to an adventure. We approached Kabul from the South, the rugged red mountains below enthralled him, he pressed his face tight into the port hole, awkward because it was me that sat in the window seat – “we live in Holland” he explained. We swapped seats.

I spent my first week of the trip in Camp Julien just outside Kabul, attending the first part of the Training The Trainer Course (T3C) run at the Counter-

insurgency Training Centre–Afghanistan (CTC–A). The Camp is mostly Afghan National Army with a couple of small enclaves of ISAF. It is overlooked on one side by the now ruined King's Palace (*as seen in the picture above*) and on the other by the equally broken Queen's Palace. Built in the 1920s both buildings survived the Soviet occupation only to be destroyed during the ethnic infighting that preceded the fall of the city to Mullah Omar's Taliban in September 1996. They are both massive palaces, dominating the sky line and still potent symbols of an almost forgotten golden period in Kabul's history, more of which later. But equally dramatic was the message being sent out at the CTC–A. We were under a hundred students, a few were Colonels,





U.S. Army General David H. Petraeus, Commander, International Security Assistance Force, speaks to U.S. and NATO forces at the Counterinsurgency Training Centre – Afghanistan, at Camp Julien, 13 July 2010. U.S. Air Force photos by Sgt. Bradley Lail.

most were Captains and Sergeants. The course aims to orientate you to the new counterinsurgency thinking, so that we could return to our training jobs in the ISAF donor nations and spread the word – I was expecting lectures on culture and doctrine from a well drilled American-led training team. Instead, General Petraeus came to talk to us for an hour, fresh from his confirmation hearing in Washington. He was humane, self effacing, utterly clear and completely uplifting.

Then came General Rodriguez, the Commander of ISAF's three-star International Joint Command HQ. Then there were Generals Flynn, Mayville and Lington, and the charismatic Dr Kim of the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan. The stream of top players from ISAF, the Afghan Security Forces and the Afghan Government kept coming. Clearly, they wanted us to get the message – *this is a counterinsurgency campaign*.

Some were shocked to hear General Petraeus put the insurgency in third place on his list of threats to the ISAF mission.

He explained his logic. We got the message. To beat the insurgency the Government of Afghanistan needs to be a more attractive proposition than the alternative – this is a political struggle. ISAF will succeed when the Afghan people believe their interests are best served by the national government in Kabul – any military activity that makes them suspect otherwise, however effective it is at attriting the insurgency, is counterproductive.

Such open and determined talk of counterinsurgency is relatively new in ISAF. Western troops have been on the ground in Afghanistan since October 2001, but it was several years before a coherent insurgency began to show itself. I argue that it was not until the autumn of 2009 that ISAF as a whole really started pursuing a counterinsurgency or COIN strategy.

ISAF's approach to driving on Afghan roads is a good example. I did a tour of Southern Afghanistan in 2008–2009; General McKiernan was COMISAF. Those who worked closely with him, and I did

not, say that General McKiernan understood the nature of COIN and was starting to turn ISAF in a new direction. But during this period, in the name of force protection, ISAF vehicles drove in the middle of two lane roads and demanded the Afghan drivers push off the road as ISAF passed, and keep at least 200m away if they were following. ISAF drivers were ordered to glue and tape meter square red warning signs to our vehicles and soldiers on top cover fired warnings, with pen flares and tracer rounds at any Afghans they felt were encroaching on their space. ISAF vehicles were an annoyance, if not a danger, to commercial and private Afghan road users. General McCrystal took over from General McKiernan in June 2009. A couple of months after taking over, General McCrystal started pushing out letters and directives that changed the nature of the ISAF effort. Under McCrystal, ISAF got a Driving Directive: ISAF was to share the road and move at the pace of the local civilian traffic; the signs came off. Other Direc-





COIN briefing at the Joint Warfare Centre by the author, 1 July 2010.

tives followed, as well as statements, visits and all imaginable forms of personal appearance.

In November 2009, ISAF published the ISAF Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance; it listed General McCrystal's five themes of COIN, which included the observation that "the conventional warfare culture is part of the problem." The change was very tangible. He also sent his message back to Washington and to his NATO masters. COIN was already a few years into a new renaissance. Operations in Iraq had brought the subject to the fore and the U.S. Army had published its new COIN Doctrine, FM 3-34, in 2006. The UK also published its own work, AFM Vol 1 Part 10, in 2007. But it was the pace of events in NATO, following the arrival of General McCrystal in Kabul, that I find striking.

The new NATO COIN Doctrine for example; NATO called for the formation of a Counterinsurgency Task Force (COIN TF) in January 2010. They assembled a writing team for the new COIN doctrine in February and the draft went forward for ratification by the member Nations in April. Keen to get the word onto the street NATO even published it in a pre-ratification Joint Operational Guidance or JOG format, in May 2010. AJP 3-4-4, as it will come to be known once ratified, is actually a very good read. Like the U.S.

and UK doctrines, it is not Afghanistan specific but, in my opinion, it gets across the key COIN message better than the UK's AFM Vol 1 and is simpler and more digestible than the US FM 3-34. It explains the nature of counterinsurgency and goes on to give guidance on how to structure a force for COIN. Notably, it outlines some dramatic changes in the way we should think about intelligence. But most importantly it will be a NATO product – endorsed by the donor Nations – it will be a tool for pushing for a common approach to counterinsurgency amongst 28 militaries with distinctly dif-

ferent cultures and traditions. This is important, because when confronting an insurgency, campaign discipline is key. Of course, in what is actually a political struggle, this discipline needs to go beyond the military, the civil and security plans need to be coherent. So these various institutions need to communicate with each other, which brings me nicely to the next feature of AJP 3-4-4.

AJP 3-4-4 will be classified NON SENSITIVE INFORMATION RELEASABLE TO THE PUBLIC. I could hand out copies of it at a meeting with the host nation, or indeed publish sections of it in the newspaper. This sort of transparency is another COIN innovation that requires the militaries of NATO and ISAF Contributing Nations to embrace a cultural change, and it's a remarkably hard change to make. That balance between transparency and security, or perhaps better described as transparency and discretion, is very hard to find. As COMISAF, General McCrystal was known to be a determined sharer of information, ruthlessly declassifying briefs and documents so that they could be shared with other agencies that needed to be in step with ISAF. Ultimately, of course, he shared a little too much with Rolling Stone magazine – which brings me back to where I came in. General Petraeus had been COMISAF just over a week when he took a helicopter to the outskirts of Kabul to talk to the students on the Train the Trainer Course. For an officer who had been rushed into



The Queen's Palace in Kabul – prior to its destruction during interethnic fighting in the 1990s.



a job with no handover, and no lead in, he was remarkably comfortable with his portfolio; and using some good old fashioned 'General magic', without ever making the challenge seem less than overwhelming, he made us feel it was within our grasp. But then he was the man that, some claim, turned the tide in Iraq single handed; the man that reinvented COIN for the modern world. Indeed, General Petraeus himself made some favourable comparisons between Iraq at its low point and Afghanistan as it is today and by a number of metrics, including civilian death rates, Iraq appears to have been a much harder challenge. That said, Afghanistan's darkness has a great deal more momentum than Iraq's.

IN THE 1950, KABUL had an extensive tram and bus system, district nurses and midwives visited outlying villages and the central government worked in some form of harmony with the traditional conflict resolution systems. Then in 1973 Mohammed Daoud Khan ousted the Zahir Shah and one of the region's most liberal and reforming regimes was replaced by what one US diplomat famously called a "police state." Then, following another coup in 1978, the Red Army rolled into Afghanistan on December 24th 1979, signalling the start of 10 years of almost constant fighting.

Worse still was the interethnic fighting that followed the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Thousands of refugees fled into Pakistan and Iran, following those that had fled a decade earlier. Ninety percent of the houses in Kabul were destroyed. Then the Taliban took control of the country in 1996, first in Kandahar and the South, then in Kabul; only to be removed five years later by a combination of Afghan resistance and British and American troops. By 2010, the country had been in a state of almost perpetual conflict for 31 years; 36 if you count the repressive but largely stable period under Daoud. That means that in many areas there have been three decades of little or no investment in infrastructure, no national medical programs, or inoculations, or dental care and little or no education. Anyone under 40 has probably never been to a regular school.



Kabul in the 1950s.

A group of women board a tram. The city had a well developed public transport system.

For the last 30 years an appendicitis has been a fatal medical condition. People have grown up learning to depend on family, village and tribe; not state, health service or police. In some areas I have visited, no one had paid any government tax in living memory.

No surprise then that the Karzai administration is facing some challenges getting accepted – even in areas with little or no insurgent activity. Worse still, poppy and hashish cultivation has recently taken root in several of the country's more troubled provinces, bestowing money and power on sections of the society that would traditionally have had little of either. When these young narco traffickers and middle men challenge the traditional authority of the local elders, the damage to communities can be profound. With an average life expectancy of 44 years, most people do not even know what it feels like to live without the threat of violence; the path back to normality will be a long one for the Afghan people. But for me, the most worrying problem is illiteracy. With so few men and women able to read, it is incredibly difficult to build the institutions needed to deliver effective local government and rule of law to the provinces.

Afghanistan has a centrally controlled government system; policy and budgets are held centrally and pushed down to the provinces and districts. Even so, local government offices need staff to be able to read letters and fill out ledgers – police officers need to be able to fill out forms and submit reports. It will take half a generation to grow through educated young candidates for these jobs

– until then the recruiting pool for these important posts will be dangerously small. I think it's no exaggeration to say that illiteracy is limiting the rate of real development in Afghanistan, and will continue to do so for another decade. General Petraeus had made it very clear – the problems here are vast, but there is lots that is good here – we can do it, but we have to do it right. To that end the rapid production of AJP 3-4-4 is an encouraging sign, its evidence of a sense of urgency. It means we are starting to understand not just the scale of change required of us, but the pressure of time we are under.

At the end of my trip Karzai closed the airport over security concerns surrounding a big diplomatic visit. Then there were some road closures and a half hearted attempt to rocket the base I was staying at. Six e-mails and 24 hours later, a new ticket in my hand, I went back to the airport. The security at the international airport is a very Afghan affair; the lines are long, the checks are very thoroughly carried out (by Afghans) and the few women travellers are screened discreetly, out of sight in a side room. The in flight staff were polite and professional; the flight left exactly on time and the food was good (by airplane standards). I looked about for my Afghan/Dutch friend but could not see him. I exchanged pleasantries with the man beside me, who appeared to be with a family group of 20 scattered over the full length of the aircraft. A few rows away there was a passionate, but good natured, argument over seating – it seemed the man's wife could not read her ticket. †

How enhancing the **Lessons Learned** pillar can promote your **Centre of Excellence (COE)**

By **CDR Michael Hallett, USA N,**
HQ SACT, Lessons Learned Course Director

A robust Lessons Learned capability will help you demonstrate the excellence of your Centre of Excellence. There are four main components of the Centre of Excellence Lessons Learned pillar.



While the utility of the Lessons Learned capability for Nations and NATO is obvious, the value of the Lessons Learned pillar to a Centre Of Excellence (COE) is not always as clear. This article offers an answer to the question: "What is in the NATO Lessons Learned capability for me?" In short, the NATO Lessons Learned capability provides the COE with an optimal means through which to demonstrate the 'Excellence' or *E* in COE. In some ways, demonstrating COE excellence is like developing a brand. A brand provides information to potential customers by doing two things. First, a brand tells customers what to expect from a product or service. Second, it provides a quick indication that they will like what they get from interacting with the branded product or services because they have previously had good experi-

ences with the brand. The brand thus simplifies customer decision-making, enabling them to make the best use of one of their scarcest resources: attention. As applied to the COEs, this brand signifies functional area Subject Matter Expertise – **knowledge based excellence**. With brand development in mind, we can distinguish three basic forms of COE customer interaction: as a Dot, Partner, or Leader.

Dot on a map. When the COE is, in the mind of the customer, as 'dot on a map', people know where to go when they have a question in the COE's area of expertise. In this form of relationship, the COE is resource like a library – Nations, NATO HQ and commands, and analysis organizations turn to the COE for advice provided by credible Subject Matter Experts. However, if the customer does not actively request specific input from the COE, the COE will seldom contribute to the customer's process.

Partner. As a partner, the COE will work closely with customers on customer initiated projects, providing customers with an extra set of expert hands. The intensity of the partnership and the relative contribution of each partner (NATO command, other NATO organization, national Lessons Learned organization or national command) will vary with each project. However, the partnership means that the COE is considered for inclusion in these activities as a normal part of the work process – not as an occasional contributor or afterthought.

Leader. As a leader, the COE will provide the project guidance, engagement and promotion necessary to initiate and complete Lessons Learned related contributions in the functional area. This constitutes the most robust form of interaction.

Customers and users: All three forms






Figure 1

Figures by Roger Snell and Michael Hallett.




Figure 2

of interaction appropriate at times and the COE will relate in one way to different customers. Who are these customers? Most directly, Allied Command Operations (ACO) and the operational forces under its control and the nations participating in the COE are critical customers. Indirectly, NATO as a whole is a customer. The COE Lessons Learned capability will enable you to help these customers collect, analyze, support implementation, and share Lessons Learned related information. We will now clarify the content of these relationships in three parts. First, we will describe the NATO Lessons Learned environment and the COE role within it. Second, we will explain the components of the COE Lessons Learned pillar. We will conclude by describing the assistance available to the COEs to enhance their Lessons Learned pillar capability.

The Lessons Learned Environment and the COE place within it: We now will briefly discuss the Lessons Learned environment. The Lessons Learned environment is populated by the nations, the NATO Command Structure, and other interested actors (United Nations, European Union, private voluntary organizations, businesses, NGOs, etc.).

The capability improvements the Lessons Learned process generate are valuable to each organization. In the case of NATO, Lessons Learned are applied immediately and with the greatest effect

in lives saved by the NATO operational commanders and the Nations who provide the forces. Therefore, as shown in **Figure 1** above, ACO and its subordinate commands, operations, and the nations are the primary actors within the NATO Lessons Learned capability. These actors both generate the bulk of the observations, Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned and benefit most directly from the implementation of Lessons Identified into Lessons Learned.

In addition to the NATO Command Structure under ACO, Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and its subordinate commands are Lessons Learned consumers as well. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) and Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) incorporate Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned into the pre-deployment training they provide. ACT uses Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned to inform the longer-term capability development on which it's focused and to enhance its various training activities. The Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) helps support the NATO Lessons Learned infrastructure, primary through the management of the NATO Lessons Learned Database and performing joint operational level analysis, generating approximately 12–15 Analysis reports annually. The JALLC also provides analysis training, in the form of a week-long analysis course, and offers advice to Member and Partner Nations on enhancing their analysis capabilities.

The environmental gap: As indicated in **Figure 1** above, most of the observations emanate from operations. Though many of these observations and Lessons Identified make their way from the field to the Lessons Learned bodies within the ACO structure and to the national Lessons Learned organizations, there is considerable room for improvement in the Information and Knowledge Management (IKM) associated with these observations. The primary problem is that many observations, Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned from operational forces are sent back to the national Lessons Learned organizations via the deployed national IKM systems. Subsequently, these Lessons Learned related products are not shared with the NATO Lessons Learned system and therefore do not contribute to the NATO knowledge base. This sub-optimal sharing prevents national forces from benefiting from the experience of other nations, leading to repeated re-learning of mistakes and failure to benefit from good practices as forces rotate in and out of theatre.

COEs can help fill this LI and LL related IKM Gap: Increasing the robustness of the COE Lessons Learned pillar can help fill the IKM gaps created by sub-optimal National LL sharing.⁽¹⁾ The functional area focus of the COEs, and

(1) The causes of the sub-optimal National LL sharing are beyond the scope of this article.



their intimate connection with the nations, enables them to serve as a bridge between the national and NATO knowledge bases within their areas of expertise, and thus dramatically improve Lessons Learned related information and knowledge sharing, as seen in **Figure 2**. We will now explain how COEs can help fill this gap through a detailed discussion of COE LL pillar composition.

The COE LL Pillar: The Lessons Learned capability is, at its most basic, a structured way to acquire feedback about an organizations' activities, the effects those activities generate (both intended and unintended) and make the changes necessary to close the feedback revealed gaps between desired and actual outcomes. The aim of the Lessons Learned capability is to use knowledge gained through experience, (and importantly the shared experience of others) to improve capabilities across the full range of organizational activities. From a Comprehensive Approach perspective, this means improvement to capabilities like interaction with development agencies, training local police, fires, manoeuvre, logistics, etc. The aim of the Lessons Learned capability is not to create a library – the Lessons Learned related effort is intended to generate practical improvements. The COE pillar includes all elements of the NATO Lessons Learned process, (identify, analyze, commit, implement and share). However, this article focuses on the COE Lessons Learned pillar elements of Analysis, Remedial Action (RA) Formulation, Implementation Support and Sharing.

I. Analysis

Although COEs will, of course, generate their own observations, the majority of their observations will come "second hand" from national forces in the field and from other Lessons Learned organizations requiring analysis support from the COE's functional area experts. According to NATO, Analysis is "the study of a whole by examining its parts and their interactions." (AAP-6). Two key outputs are generated by the analysis process: Root Cause(s) Articulation and Remedial Actions Recommendations.

Root Cause Articulation. This is most important part of the analysis process. Remedial Actions that fail to address the root causes are worse than useless – not only will they fail to solve the problem, they will divert resources from activities that could actually result in an improved capability. If the root cause is clearly articulated, and the designation of the root cause(s) follows clearly and logically from the analysis, then the stage will be set for agreement on recommended Remedial Actions. From the COE perspective, cultivating a consensus that you have properly articulated the root causes is the most important aspect of the Analysis process. If the COE analysis team is able to achieve customer 'buy in' of the COE root cause(s) articulation, customers will embrace the recommended Remedial Actions. If this buy in is not achieved, then the Remedial Actions, recommendations, and the implementation activities that follow from them are doomed to failure. COE analysis activity can be divided into three main types: direct support to customers, Subject Matter Expert provision to other analysis organizations, and analysis project coordination.

Direct Analysis Support to Customers and Users. Much of the COE analysis activity will be initiated by customer request for analysis expertise from within the functional domain. For example, a Regional Command Lessons Learned staff in ISAF, faced with several observations in need of further analysis within the COE functional area could ask the COE to gather the information from the RC (and other RCs for comparative purposes) LI databases for further analysis. The COE would perform the analysis and could then recommend to the RC LL organization if the OBS are worth investing additional resources to push through the entire LL process. As part of this effort, the COE would add value by discussing the issue with the Nations to determine if the national LL organizations are seeing similar observations, and use this knowledge to inform their recommendation to the RCs. This sort of analysis

support within the COE functional area is a potential 'quick win' for both ISAF and the COEs.

Subject Matter Expert Provision. Providing experts to augment other organizations analysis teams is another way for COEs to support the analysis component of the LL process. For example, NATO or a Nation could request SME support from the COE on a research trip to ISAF, or for an external peer review of a national LL publication. This could include collaborating on analysis projects as a member of a distributed analysis team.

Analysis Project Coordinator and Broker. While the JALLC may provide the high-level Analysis Project Coordination, the COE may in some cases serve as a central coordination point within its functional area for analysis projects. This has three dimensions: (1) the COE, as project coordinator, could organize and manage a team of analysts, composed of analysts from several organizations, as a distributed analytical network; (2) the COE could provide the team with meeting facilities at the COE for face-to-face collaboration and report production; (3) the COE could serve as an analysis project broker, providing visibility on the various NATO and national analysis projects. The increased visibility on the various projects, by enabling collaboration, has the potential to reduce costs and increase the speed of project completion for all actors involved.

II. Remedial Action Formulation

The bundle of root cause and recommended Remedial Action (RA) constitute a Lesson Identified. The success of later implementation activities requires that these RA speak directly and clearly to the root cause, and are formulated in a way that will evoke consensus about the implementation way ahead. Whereas a regionally or nationally based LL generalist may have some insight into the issue, based on the analysis they perform, their RA formulation will result from a perspective more like that provided by looking through a straw than the syn-



optic vision of the whole functional area that the COE staff can provide. The COE perspective on the functional area enables them to offer high quality RAs that are both precise and can evoke the consensus required for implementation.

Precision. The COEs, given their Subject Matter Expertise have the ability to make not just general recommendations (for example “improve pre-deployment training in this area”) but extremely precise suggestions for change. For example, if the doctrine requires modification, the COE can submit the recommended text, (“Change paragraph 6.1 to read”) not simply point out in the recommended Remedial Action that someone needs to do the work to make the changes to the doctrine or training plan or curriculum in light of the root cause. By enabling the Action Bodies to expend their scarce time and manpower resources on endorsement and implementation of recommended Remedial Actions, not Remedial Action formulation, the increased recommendation precision provided by the COE will accelerate implementation.

Consensus. The perspective from which the COE staff perceive the observations within their area of expertise will enable the COE to make recommendations that not only speak to the root causes, but that incorporate the best thinking on the subject from within the NATO Command Structure and the nations. In addition, the multi-national nature of the COEs entails that if a recommendation, constituting the expert military advice, is submitted by the COE, it is already the product of multinational review. Therefore, when submitted to a NATO working group or other approval mechanism, it will arrive not as the suggestion of a single nation or body, but as the result of a collaborative effort of experts. This will in effect ‘grease the skids’ for approval, reducing approval burden on the part of those actually responsible for implementing the change. The approval authorities will be able to say with confidence, “This is a recommendation from

the COE: I trust their judgement, and will focus on the potential unintended consequences that the COE may have been unaware of at their level” instead of doubting the RA validity. This is a not insignificant advantage; easing the approval process will facilitate increasing capability improvement velocity – more capability improvement will occur in less time. Thus the efficiency and effectiveness of the Alliance will be significantly improved as a result of the COE efforts in this area.

III. Implementation support

Implementation is the most difficult part of the Lessons Learned process. Although the COE will seldom have the lead in planning or doing the actual implementation work, they are extremely well placed to provide implementation support to the responsible action bodies. The COE could provide implementation support in two ways: as a delegated action body or as an assistant to a national or NATO action body.

Delegated Action Body. For example, the COE, upon agreeing to a request from the primary action body, could serve as an additional action body and help update doctrine, develop training programmes, provide training or send experts to support components of larger training programmes, like the pre-deployment training taking place at the Joint Warfare Centre or the Joint Force Training Centre. This is already occurring in some cases. For example, the CIMIC COE has been tasked to update the AJP 9.

Assisting NATO and National Action Bodies. In other situations, the COE could serve as an assistant to NATO or national action bodies. COE assistance to NATO and national implementation activities would both accelerate national implementation and contribute to interoperability of implemented solutions and thus Alliance interoperability as a whole. This assistance could include the provision of SMEs, similar to the analysis support as discussed above.

IV. Sharing through Lessons Learned Aggregation, Sanitization and Dissemination

The COEs, due to their functional specialization and close working relationships with the nations are especially well suited to support the sharing component of the LL process. This sharing provides an ideal venue for COE excellence demonstration. Sharing has three components: Aggregation of LI and LL from various sources; sanitization of those inputs, in accordance with the appropriate security policies; and disseminating those products both by pushing information out to customers and making it possible for interested units to pull the information when desired. We will now look at each of these in more detail.

Aggregation. National actors in the field constantly generate Observations, Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned. However, these bits of information remain scattered – as a result collaborative trend analysis, pattern discernment and implementation, where several actors work together to improve capabilities, reducing the capability improvement cost for all, occurs infrequently. In other words, inadequate information and knowledge management systems hinder Lessons Learned related sharing. The COEs could help ameliorate this problem by aggregating the OBS, LI and LL in their functional area and making them accessible via their own LL database (capable of interacting with the NATO Lessons Learned database). How could this be done? National representatives in the COE could mine national LL databases, perform post-deployment interviews with forces returning to their home countries, and review national LL products (like newsletters and academic papers) and then enter those items of broader interest into the COE LL Database. This aggregation would provide several benefits, in addition to the general benefits provided by a LL capability, including the creation of a larger set of inputs through which to distinguish trends with the COEs functional focus, illumination of cooperative opportunities and reduced time for





LESSONS LEARNED PILLAR

A VALUABLE TOOL TO INCREASE COE VISIBILITY WHILE HELPING YOU:

- accomplish your unique work
- accelerate NATO transformation

solution development by exposing action officers to pre-existing solutions.

Sanitization. A question immediately arises: What about security? Currently, sharing is limited not only by the lack of IKM systems, but also by the very appropriate limitations placed on information sharing by security concerns. Yet, the COEs could use their connections to national Lessons Learned organizations to encourage nations to re-write Observations, LI and LL within the COE functional area, so that they can be shared with NATO. In its most advanced form, sanitization could come to mean working with the national LL organization foreign disclosure officers to remove the data within the Observation, LI or LL that makes it classified. For example, instead of saying "Person X in unit Y on Monday, 28 September 2008, 10 kilometres outside Herat observed..." the shared LL could read "A soldier in western Afghanistan...". Modifications of these types, in addition to other steps, would facilitate information sharing. Of course, some national LL will remain unshared. However, the COE could discern trends or patterns among them that could provide useful insight for defence planners. For example, the failure rates of specific pieces of gear may not be sharable, but the fact that the lack of air conditioning in communication vehicles led

to system failure would be a sharable insight of great value, especially to forces unaccustomed to deploy into the region, or who are deploying with certain types of equipment for the first time. The LL from the COE could provide the needed impetus or justification for spending the money to weatherize the gear before the unit got into theatre instead of the country sending forces there and learning that the NATO standard for air conditioning is inadequate for operations in, for example, Western Africa.

Dissemination. If the COEs did nothing else but aggregate and sanitize National LI and LL in their functional area, they would add significant value to the NATO LL capability. However, the final sharing component, dissemination, provides an optimal method for both COE brand development and providing the most value to the warfighter. The heart of Lessons Learned – benefiting from the painful experience of others to make changes necessary to improve capabilities instead of paying the costs in terms of inadequate capabilities – requires effective dissemination. As a key disseminator, the COE will showcase its expertise with each LL related product provided to customers.

Sharing tools. Below is a partial list of Lessons Learned sharing tools COEs can use in brand development:

- Standard location on the COE webpage for the link to the COE's LL database;
- A format for COE LL Database entries compatible with the NATO LL Database to increase the interoperability of the sharing system;
- Publishing newsletters, annuals (eg. Top 10 COE X LL 2010, Top LL from RC South 2010), and reports (e.g. talking to local government officials in Afghanistan: LI 2010);
- Training material production. For example, a COE could pull information from an ISAF regional command, apply COE Subject Matter Expertise, and then push out a training manual based on the material into the national and NATO training systems;
- Sponsor conferences. Holding confer-

ences for the sharing of LI and LL and publishing proceedings will help both aggregate and distribute LL related knowledge. Their primary advantage will be to use the motivation to publish to encourage the effort necessary to formulate operational insights and share them with others.

- Contributing to the UNCLAS NATO LL Database available on the Internet.
- Contributing to the NS WAN version of the NATO LL Database.


Conclusion

The narrow, but deep, functional area COE focus supplies the preconditions for robust Information and Knowledge Management necessary to effectively support execution of a Lessons Learned capability. The passion of the COE functional area experts provides them with the necessary incentives to create and share knowledge products that will save lives and improve operational efficiency in the near term; and over the longer term, generate improved National and Alliance capabilities. The Centre Of Excellence Lessons Learned pillar refers to the capability to perform Analysis, recommend Remedial Actions, support Implementation, and share the Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned that result within the COE functional area. An effective LL pillar will both enable the COE to perform its own work more effectively and efficiently and enable it to better accelerate NATO transformation. Several forms of assistance are available. The JALLC has an excellent analyst course available, and ACT, in close cooperation with the JALLC, JWC, and several National LL organizations, offers a week-long Lessons Learned Staff Officer course. Upon request, ACT can also provide mobile training teams on enhancing a COE LL capability. Utilization of these training opportunities will enable the COEs to quickly improve their own mission accomplishment and add even more value to the Alliance and nations while demonstrating their excellence. †

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POWERPOINT

Friend or foe?



Is the slide mightier than the sword?

By Paul Sewell
Lessons Learned Analyst,
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Introduction

In this article you will find how surprisingly simple it is to turn your presentation into something that is engaging and enjoyable both for you and your audience. With these in place, learning becomes ultimately richer. This is the first in a series of articles offering you new ways to use PowerPoint. They will present you with recent research and different approaches, which you can apply immediately to make your presen-

tations more engaging, interesting and therefore more valuable.

PowerPoint is used everywhere, not only by the military but also governments, major corporations and even our children's schools. NATO is no exception and this popular piece of software has been used to give direction and guidance, launch new concepts, maintain situational awareness, as well as advertise the local base barbeque. All of which

are infected with the same slides full of funny cats, cheesy motivational posters and Super Bowl videos. Some may argue that PowerPoint is the Alliance's Centre of Gravity. Take away PowerPoint and you take away one of our main ways of communicating with each other! Despite being the 'weapon of choice' in our world of knowledge management, there is still no sufficient NATO training in this method of presentation. We've made the mis-





Example of a 'good' slide: simple, precise and the pictures speak 1,000 words as the old saying goes. The author (right) stresses that we should no longer accept lifeless presenting.

take of assuming that because the tool is so common that no training is required. However, you only need to endure a full day of PowerPoint briefings to realize that such training is sadly lacking.

While PowerPoint definitely serves a purpose, its gimmicks and visual tricks take us away from its original function: *to help support a presentation that engages the audience, allowing them to learn, understand and/or appreciate the material.* The key word here is *engage*: the ability to get the audience involved and interested in the material you are presenting. Without this engagement, your audiences will not be open to learning anything. If we are honest, the majority of presentations we both give and receive are far from engaging. Instead we are forced to sit through slide after slide, hour after hour, without really remembering or absorbing any of the content! For some, the aim of their briefing is just to finish it without the Commander asking questions. And the more we see videos of herding cats or linebacker Terry Tate tackling an unethical staff member, the less potent they become in helping us achieve our aim.

Few would argue that this powerful tool is not being used as well as it could be. If the Alliance's main strength is its unity, it makes sense to at least try to improve how we use PowerPoint, arguably one of our main tools of commu-

nication. Ideally, we are all knowledge workers and PowerPoint should be seen as a useful tool to allow us to communicate more effectively, rather than a blunt object to bludgeon our audience to sleep. We should no longer accept the traditional method of static, lifeless presenting. Rather we need to adopt new techniques and better still, new benchmarks to use when developing our presentations. The remainder of the article will be spent tackling some of the worst habits in presentations, why they are so counterproductive to our communication, and what you can do immediately to improve them.

Common Issues

Any one of us can list countless examples of bad presentations. Too many words on the slide, an overuse of acronyms, inappropriate clip art, confusing animations and so on. They all share the same core bad habit: they take attention away from learning the real content the presenter wants to communicate.

Significant research has been conducted on what effects peoples' attention which deals specifically with PowerPoint is Cognitive Overload Theory⁽²⁾. Despite the title it is actually simple to explain and its principles can be easily applied to your own presentations. In essence, the theory says that we each have a limited

amount of mental energy in our head to use to pay attention to the world around us. As soon as we become overloaded then our attention span drops and so does our ability to learn. The principles of this theory have direct consequences for PowerPoint. How we typically use PowerPoint quickly overloads people with all of its different features. Take a typical slide with too much text, full of animations, and clip art with a presenter reading out loud every single word. Now imagine each of these elements as separate people all talking to you at once, competing for your attention. How much would you be able to pay attention to? This is exactly the same with PowerPoint. Therefore it's our responsibility as presenters to make the material as simple and engaging as possible to help your audience learn.



According to the Cognitive Overload Theory, if you **read** the text on the slide to your audience, they must then now focus **on the text and your voice** which quickly **reduces** their ability to understand the material.


Reading out the text on the slide

One big mistake which is made all the time is when the presenter reads the text on the slide out loud. If we step back and consider it, this is ludicrous. The text is already there for the audience to read, so why read it to them? Reading the text is actually worse for learning. According to the Cognitive Overload Theory, if you read the text on the slide to your audience, they must then now focus on the

(1) "Researcher points finger at PowerPoint" (2007) Sydney Morning Herald.

(2) www.tip.psychology.org





The New York Times columnist Elisabeth Bumiller titled her article as “We Have Met the Enemy and He Is PowerPoint” referring to the slide shown to General McChrystal (above), which was “meant to portray the complexity of American military strategy, but looked more like a bowl of spaghetti”.

text and your voice (in effect, now ‘two separate voices’) which quickly reduces their ability to understand the material. This is even more difficult when the majority of the audience are non-native English speakers who are using even more of their mental energy to comprehend the material. Consider some of the worst PowerPoint presentations you’ve seen in your careers, and you will understand what it means to be overloaded. A perfect example is a slide which was shown to General McChrystal, the former ISAF Commander in Afghanistan last year. NATO presentations are full of examples of these kinds of diagrams.

The six principles of Cognitive Overload Theory

The research shows that some of the most common approaches to building and presenting slides are actually doing all things that overload our audiences. Cognitive Overload Theory gives us six main principles to take away. Despite their titles, at the core of each is a simple guideline you can use when making and delivering your presentations. While reading these you may wish to consider how you could apply them to the presentations you need to make.

1) The principle of Multimedia: *people learn better from words and pictures than words alone.* Using a visual format like PowerPoint, your audience will learn better when you use a combination of words

and pictures rather than just words. The pictures serve as visual reference points to help the audience understand what you are trying to communicate.

TAKE AWAY: *Try to reduce the number of words in your slides. Don’t use full sentences, just phrases as support for what you are speaking out loud. Use an image only if it supports the text.*

2) The principle of Coherence: *people learn better when extraneous material is removed rather than included.* The main thrust of this principle is that simple is better and should be the mantra of anyone making slides. Try to remember that our brains can only pay attention to a limited amount of information. When we fill a slide with extra clip art or side bars or even our logos, our audience must then struggle to attend to all of these things on the slide. The more clutter on the slide means more chatter you have to deal with in your mind and therefore more difficult to concentrate.

TAKE AWAY: *Only use what you need in the slide to communicate your idea. Anything extra is acting against your effectiveness. Consider the words of Antoine de Saint-Exupéry: “A designer knows he has achieved perfection not when there is nothing left to add, but when there is nothing left to take away”. Consider using your HQ’s logo on just the first slide then omit it from the rest.*

3) The principle of Contiguity: *peo-*

ple learn better when words and pictures are presented at the same time or next to each other on the screen. Following from the first principle, if you do choose to use pictures in your slides, make sure they relate to the text. That is, your audience will be more open to your message if the pictures and text you use correspond. For example, maps are often used in slides to convey situational awareness.

TAKE AWAY: *To increase the learning, consider annotating the map with text highlighting the areas you wish to talk about. This will help focus the audience on what they need to know.*

4) The principle of Modality: *people learn much better from animation with spoken text than printed text.* PowerPoint is famous (or infamous) for its ability to animate slides. We have all seen slides with blocks and boxes spinning, sliding and disappearing off the page. The presenter is tricked into thinking that this helps the audience stay engaged or, at very least, awake. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case as animation in slides is often annoying. When there is also text on the slide it then becomes only more confusing and difficult to concentrate on.

TAKE AWAY: *If your slide requires animation (really?) then it is more effective to use the spoken word rather than having text on the slide with the animation.*

5. The principle of Signaling: *people learn better when the material is organized with clear outlines and headings.* This would appear to be an obvious principle but in practice it’s rarely used. A common offender of bad PowerPoint is the effort to cram as much material as possible onto the slide assuming that we all have photographic memories and can absorb all the words and diagrams WHILE the presenter is reading the text at the same time.

TAKE AWAY: *When building a slide with a number of elements, consider your audience: where will their eyes go first? If you’re showing a process, does it flow logically on the slide? What is the general language ability of the audience? Are they all native English speakers or is English their third, fourth or fifth language?*



6. The principle of Personalization: *people learn better from conversational style than formal style.* Some would say that our approach to PowerPoint as a learning tool hasn't evolved much since the days of the overhead projector with those old acetate slides. In some ways this is true. However, just because the technology has improved it doesn't mean that our approach to giving presentations has. In some regards, the habit of formal presentations remains. Research shows that people learn better when the person delivers their presentation in conversational tones rather than using the bleak formal method. The more conversational you are in your approach, the easier it is for your audience to move between what you are saying and what your slides are showing. *(The next article explores this more deeply).*

☑ TAKE AWAY: *Learn your material well enough that you don't have to read from your notes or your slides. Although this can be difficult, particularly for non-English speakers, this improves with practice.*

Summary

The sleep-inducing effects of PowerPoint are well known. How many of us have left a day's worth of briefings, dragging our feet out the door and sapped of all strength? Unfortunately PowerPoint's numbing effect is worldwide. Worse still, PowerPoint is now being taught to our children at increasingly younger ages!

With PowerPoint being used as widely as it is, it is critical that we start taking responsibility for the output of our presentations. Our audiences have given us their time and attention and so we should respect them by creating and



PowerPoint Shortcuts

Here are simple keyboard shortcuts which are useful to use when you're in the middle of a presentation:

F5 - starts your presentation from the first slide.

Shift + F5 - starts your presentation from the current slide.

B - blacks out your presentation. This is helpful when you want your audience to temporarily focus on just you and not the slide. Press B again to bring it back.

W - whites out your presentation. For the same reason as above.

Number Followed by Enter - takes you directly to that numbered slide.

Ctrl + T - brings up the taskbar. This is useful if you want to switch to another open programme.

Ctrl + S - brings up the list of slides. This can help you quickly locate the slide you are looking for without stopping the whole presentation.

delivering presentations that they can understand and appreciate, otherwise that time is wasted for all involved. The positive side is that this is relatively easy to fix, and applying even simple changes can bring real tangible effects. In fact, if you only use the six principles in this article you will find your audience is more able to understand the content of your presentations which makes them more valuable.

This, however, is only the beginning. The next two articles will take you further and show you how you can make your PowerPoint presentations more impacting and memorable. The next article will describe some simple design principles, looking at how you make slides (the design) to keep your audiences engaged and interested in your slides rather than playing Sudoku or falling asleep. The final article will then focus on what you put in your slides (the content) and how to transform it in such a way that it becomes engaging for both you and your audiences. Finally, we must remember that PowerPoint is just a tool. And like any tool it can be used to either help or hinder what you are trying to communicate. By considering the content in these three articles you will be able to ultimately make better presentations and create more engaged audiences. ✦

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PowerPoint is a tool

- PowerPoint helps us communicate
- It's easy to use
- It's got lots of great functions
- Anyone can do it
- It helps people learn
- It's an easy way to teach
- Everyone loves PowerPoint!!
- and here's a picture of a rabbit...

Which path will you take?



Powerpoint is a tool



How do you want to use it?

Kabul, Afghanistan -- ISAF patrol photo by U.S. Air Force Tech Sgt Laura K. Smith.



Environmental Protection During NATO-led Military Operations

**By Col Kevin Luster, USA A,
Former Staff Legal Advisor,
Joint Warfare Centre**

I. Introduction

Environmental issues confront NATO commanders and their staff at all levels of operations.⁽¹⁾ NATO legal advisors and environmental specialists serve critical roles advising their commanders and staff on environmental protection laws, regulations, and standards. This article will provide a basic understanding of NATO's doctrine for environmental protection during NATO-led military operations, identify important environmental protection requirements that deployed NATO forces are expected to follow, and briefly describe international treaties concerning environmental protection that NATO commanders and their staff should know of.

The North Atlantic Treaty, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and the Paris Protocol do not address environmental protection; however, within

its general principles, the North Atlantic Treaty seeks to promote stability and well-being through international peace, security, justice, and the rule of law.⁽²⁾ Additionally, the NATO SOFA recognizes the duty of a force to respect the laws of a receiving state.⁽³⁾ Since the 1960s, NATO member nations, as well as many other states, have adopted a growing body of domestic and international laws and agreements to protect the environment. On 26 February 2008, recognizing the need to provide environmental planning guidance for NATO military activities, NATO promulgated its doctrine for environmental protection in Standardized Agreement (STANAG) 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection During NATO-Led Military Activities.⁽⁴⁾

II. The NATO Environmental Protection Doctrine

In establishing NATO's environmental doctrine, STANAG 7141 provides environmental planning guidelines for military activities, recognizes the need for environmental risk management, establishes environmental responsibilities of NATO commanders, announces environmental training requirements, and lists national military points of contact for environmental matters. The doctrine acknowledges that operational requirements have priority; however, to minimize adverse effects of military activities without compromising military readiness or mission accomplishment, it states that NATO commanders should consider the potential environmental impacts of military activities as early as possible in the planning process while less damaging alternatives are still available.⁽⁵⁾ Ad-



ditionally, a full understanding of environmental conditions and of applicable environmental laws and regulations enables commanders and their staff to plan effectively and act appropriately. Further, NATO commanders are expected to integrate environmental risk management into the overall planning for military activities to balance environmental protection against the risks to the force and mission accomplishment.⁽⁶⁾

Planning Guidelines for Military Activities⁽⁷⁾: When planning military activities, STANAG 7141 provides the following guidelines for NATO commanders and their staffs:

(1) Identify activities that could impact the environment and consider alternatives and contingencies. For example, consider the potential consequences of handling petroleum products, solid waste, hazardous waste, waste water, and emissions into the air. Also, consider where the NATO force will draw its potable water and how that activity could impact the local population and environment. Determine whether there are reliable contractors available to properly handle solid waste, including hazardous and medical waste, in accordance with host nation and international standards. If not, identify suitable alternatives.

(2) Determine the environmental characteristics of the area of operation and identify those aspects that could impact NATO operations or be impacted by military activities, such as the area's climate, water quality, air quality, natural and cultural resources, wetlands, birds and their migration routes, endangered and exploited species and their critical habitat. Additionally, though not specifically mentioned in STANAG 7141, it is important to identify man-made objects such as dams, dykes, nuclear power generating facilities, chemical plants, and other facilities or sites that if damaged or destroyed could cause catastrophic consequences to the local civilian population.

(3) Identify potential impacts on air, water, soil and ground water from military activities such as vehicle emissions,

open air burning, disposal of wastewater, oil and petroleum product spills, disposal of solid waste, hazardous waste, medical and infectious wastes, use of pesticides and herbicides, noise, and activities that affect wetlands and other environmental or culturally sensitive areas.

(4) At the beginning of the operation, prepare an Environmental Baseline Study (EBS) for any NATO occupied or used site and, at the end of the operation or when handing over the site, prepare a closure or handover EBS to document the condition of the site. This will enable the headquarters to properly resolve disputes or claims for any environmental damage resulting from the NATO-led operation.

(5) Identify reasonable mitigation measures to reduce the risk to the environment, human health and safety presented by NATO-led activities. This may include selecting alternative locations, activities, methods or procedures that will enable the force to accomplish its mission with less risk to the environment or human health.

(6) STANAG 7141 provides six strategies to prevent pollution and conserve resources. These are:

- a. Source reduction – reduce or eliminate the use of hazardous materials;
- b. Preventative measures – take precautions such as placing drip pans under vehicles to prevent oil and fuel spillage;
- c. Re-use – when practical, use the same product over again;
- d. Recycle;
- e. Treatment – treat hazardous waste to make it non-hazardous;
- f. Disposal – as a last resort, ensure that waste is properly disposed of.

(7) Identify the national and international environmental laws that apply to NATO-led activities in the area of operation. As early as possible when planning for the operation, identify operational limits or restrictions imposed by applicable environmental regulations and/or policies. It is especially important to identify host nation laws and requirements, as well international laws and obligations that

may limit the force's activities. This of course is an important role for the commander's legal advisor and environmental specialist. Ignorance is rarely, if ever a defence to violation of environmental laws and regulations. Therefore, it is essential that the commander has readily available professionals who are knowledgeable about environmental protection requirements.

Environmental Risk Management:

Under NATO's doctrine for Environmental Protection during NATO-led military activities, commanders and their staff should thoroughly plan both exercises and operations to minimize unnecessary risks to the environment and human health. They should conduct exercises under peacetime conditions in a manner consistent with applicable environmental rules and regulations. During military operations, commanders may balance environmental protection with mission objectives; however, early planning will enable commanders to avoid conflicts between environmental protection and their mission. According to STANAG 7141,⁽⁸⁾ the key elements of risk management are:

Commander's Environmental Policy. The commander should provide clear guidance and stated objectives for environmental protection as early as possible in the planning process.

Environmental Planning. In line with the commander's policy or guidance, develop an environmental plan and include it as an Annex to the Operational Plan (OP-LAN). The Annex should address contingencies, identify risks, and prescribe mitigation measures.

Implementation. Ensure that all personnel are trained, aware of the environmental issues, and understand their responsibilities. Commanders should also assign responsibilities and resources for environmental protection, and work with local authorities to address problems and concerns.

Checking and Correcting Actions. Continuously monitor activities to ensure compliance and consistency with the commander's environmental protection policy and objectives. Conduct periodic



inspections of sites, monitor for changes, and use periodic inspection reports for baseline studies.

After Action Review. Identify and report Lessons Learned in order to improve future planning.

Commander's Environmental Responsibilities: The principle responsibility for all NATO commanders is to achieve their mission; nevertheless, to the extent possible, under STANAG 7141, NATO commanders should: promote environmental protection and awareness; assign responsibilities and resources to achieve environmental protection objectives; consider environmental impacts when making decisions; comply with environmental laws and agreements; responsibly use the natural resources under their control; address environmental problems when they arise, and promote pollution prevention and resource conservation.⁽⁹⁾ Additionally, commanders should plan and specify guidelines for waste management, including agreements for waste disposal, and ensure that any transboundary movements of waste comply with international and national laws.

Environmental Training and Education: Environmental training is a national responsibility and each nation is expected to analyze the training needs for its forces and establish its own guidelines for environmental training.⁽¹⁰⁾ Environmental training and education should develop military personnel's understanding of environmental protection requirements and increase commanders' awareness of their environmental protection responsibilities. Environmental protection education should address protection of water resources, air quality, vegetation and soil, landscape quality (e.g. litter prevention), natural resources such as wildlife and habitat, and natural and man-made heritage. It should also address pollution prevention, noise abatement, energy conservation, waste minimization and recycling.⁽¹¹⁾ Finally, it should address domestic (sending state) and host nation environmental laws and policies, as well as NATO's environmental doctrine and policies and international laws on



Full understanding of environmental conditions is necessary in the planning process of military activities. ISAF photo by U.S. Air Force TSgt Laura Smith.

environmental protection. Finally, of particular concern to commanders and their staff, NATO commands should develop environmental specialists to ensure that they are readily available to advise commanders and their staff on environmental issues, applicable requirements, and methods for managing risk.

III. International Treaties

— The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal⁽¹²⁾: The Basel Convention and its subsequent amendments, restricts the movement of hazardous waste across international boundaries.⁽¹³⁾ It prohibits export of hazardous wastes to certain countries, particularly developing countries which have prohibited the import of hazardous wastes or are not capable of managing the waste in an environmentally sound manner. Additionally, transboundary movements of hazardous wastes must have prior written consent of competent authorities from the countries of export, transit, and import, and detailed movement documents must accompany each shipment of hazardous waste. The Basel Convention also promotes sound environmental management practices, including waste reduction and improved technology. Proper transboundary movement of hazardous waste requires early planning, specialized advice, and detailed documentation. Competent authorities at the

points of origin, transit, and destination should receive prior detailed notice of the hazardous waste shipment.

— The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants⁽¹⁴⁾: Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) are organic chemicals, including pesticides, herbicides, industrial chemicals and their by-products, which can remain throughout the environment, accumulate in the fatty tissues of animals, and may cause health problems such as cancer and damage to the nervous system. The purpose of the Stockholm Convention is to promote environmentally sound management of POPs, to include limiting their production, preventing unintentional releases of POPs into the environment, and restricting their transboundary movement. NATO forces using these chemicals or engaging contractors who use them should ensure that individuals using POPs understand and comply with the restrictions for their use.

— The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora⁽¹⁵⁾: NATO forces deploying to areas where there are endangered or exploited species should know that the headquarters and the members of the force may not ship endangered or exploited species or their specimens without proper authority; otherwise, the headquarters may suffer serious embarrassment and individuals could face severe criminal sanctions. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES) restricts international trade in species threatened with extinction or over-exploitation through a system of export and import permits based on varying degrees of protection. For instance, species listed in Appendix I of the Convention, which are species identified as threatened with extinction, may only be imported when the scientific authority of the State of import determines that the import of the species or its specimen is for purposes which are not detrimental to the survival of the species, the recipient of a living species is suitably equipped to house and care for it, and the management authority of the State of import is satisfied that the



recipient will not use the species for "primarily commercial purposes."⁽¹⁶⁾

— **Armed Conflict and the Environment:** In addition to the basic principles of the law of armed conflict: distinction, military necessity, proportionality, and humanity, there are international treaties that attempt to limit the impact of armed conflict on the environment.

— **Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,** requires care "in warfare to protect the environment against widespread, long-term severe damage," and prohibits "methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population."⁽¹⁷⁾ It also prohibits attacks, destruction or removal of objects indispensable to the survival of a civilian population, such as food, livestock, drinking water facilities, and irrigation works.⁽¹⁸⁾ Additionally, Protocol I prohibits attacks against works and installations containing dangerous forces, such as dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations, if such attacks may cause the release of dangerous forces resulting in severe losses among civilian populations. However, this special protection may not apply if the facility provides regular, significant and direct support to military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate the facility's support to military operations.⁽¹⁹⁾ Of course, the attacking force must take all reasonable precautions to avoid release of the dangerous force. It must also apply the principle of proportionality and not use force where the expected incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or civilian objects is excessive in relation to the direct military advantage anticipated.⁽²⁰⁾

— **The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (EMMOD Convention)** prohibits the hostile use of environmental modification techniques against the environment as a means of warfare. Article I of the

Convention states that each party to the Convention "undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party." Article II defines "environmental modification techniques" as "any techniques for changing – through deliberate manipulation of natural processes – the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or outer space."⁽²¹⁾

IV. Conclusion

NATO's Environmental Protection Doctrine requires commanders and their staff to consider environmental impacts of military activities as early as possible in the planning process. A deploying command should identify the environmental conditions of the host nation, potential environmental impacts of its military activities, host nation environmental laws and standards, and the capabilities of the force and the host nation to properly address environmental issues. Through early and continuous liaison with the host nation, the deploying command can properly plan for environmental protection and avoid unnecessary and costly environmental damage. Additionally, in conducting military operations, it is important to recognize that the law of armed conflict prohibits the disproportionate use of force, especially as it may impact civilian populations. Consequently, it is unlawful to use a method of warfare likely to release dangerous forces upon a civilian population, result in widespread, long-term damage to the environment, or otherwise cause severe hardship or jeopardize the population's survival. NATO commanders and their staff therefore rely upon their legal advisors and environmental specialists to know the applicable environment protection laws and standards, to understand environmental issues, and recommend appropriate solutions. †

Footnotes

1. Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 7141, Subject: Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection during NATO Led Military Activities, 28 February 2008, Annex A, Environmental Doctrine, Footnote 1 defines "environment" as "[t]he surroundings in which an organism operates, including air, water, land, natural resources, flora, fauna, humans and their interrelation."

2. The North Atlantic Treaty (1949), Preamble, Articles I and II.

3. NATO SOFA Article II.

4. STANAG is defined as "[a] normative document, recording an agreement among several or all NATO member nations, that has been ratified at the authorized national level, to implement a standard, in whole or in part, with or without reservation. Note: NATO member nations may ratify a STANAG without implementation in their own country, if the prerequisites for the implementation are not met." North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Standardization Agency, Allied Administrative Publication No. 42 (AAP-42) Edition 1, 2007, NATO Glossary of Standardization Terms and Definitions, at pages 2-6 & 2-7.

5. STANAG 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection During NATO-led Military Activities, dated 28 February 2008, at page Annex A, page A-1.

6. "Environmental risk management is the process of detecting, assessing and controlling risks arising from operational factors together with balancing risk with mission benefits." See page A-1, Annex A to STANAG 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection During NATO LED Military Activities, dated 28 February 2008.

7. STANAG 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection During NATO Led Military Activities, dated 28 February 2008, at pages A-2 thru A-4.

8. STANAG 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection During NATO led Military Activities, dated 28 February 2008, page A-4.

9. See page B-1, Annex B to STANAG 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection During NATO LED Military Activities, dated 28 February 2008.

10. See page C-1, Annex C to STANAG 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection During NATO LED Military Activities, dated 28 February 2008.

11. See page C-2, Annex C to STANAG 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection During NATO LED Military Activities, dated 28 February 2008.

12. The Basel Convention was signed on 22 March 1989 and entered into force on 5 May 1992. There are presently 172 parties to the Basel Convention. See Secretariat of the Basel Convention International Environmental House website at <http://www.basel.int>.

13. The Basel Convention defines "hazardous wastes" as wastes considered hazardous by the country of export, transit, or import, or are listed in Annex I of the Convention and possess one or more of the characteristics listed in Annex III, such as explosive, flammable, corrosive, toxic, infectious, etc. See the Basel Convention Article I, Annexes I and III.

14. The Stockholm Convention was signed on 22 May 2001 and entered into force on 17 May 2004. See the Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention website at: <http://www.chm.pops.int>.

15. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES) was signed on 3 March 1973 and entered into force 90 days later. CITES currently has 175 participants. See the CITES website at: <http://www.cites.org>.

16. See CITES, Article III, Regulation of Trade in Specimens Included in Appendix I.

17. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 9 June 1977, Article 55.

18. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 9 June 1977, Article 54.

19. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 9 June 1977, Article 56. With respect to Non-International Armed Conflicts, see Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 9 June 1977. Articles 14 and 15 of Protocol II prohibit attacks, destruction or removal of objects indispensable to the survival of civilian population (Article 14), and also prohibit attacks against works and installations containing dangerous forces, such as dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations, if such attacks may cause the release of dangerous forces resulting in severe losses among civilian populations (Article 15).

20. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 9 June 1977, Article 51.

21. The EMMOD Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1976, and entered into force on 5 October 1978. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, dated 01/2003.

Visit of HMS Cossack Association



Photos by
Sgt Lars Lenvik, NOR A,
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Chaired by Admiral (Ret.) Sir James Eberle, the HMS Cossack Association visited the Joint Warfare Centre on 31st May 2010 as part of a four-day familiarization visit to commemorate the "Altmark Incident", which took place on 16 February 1940 in Jøssingfjord, Norway. The Mayor of Sokndal, Mr Dag Sorensen, accompanied the party. At Jättå, the visitors were greeted by Brigadier Gunnar E. Gustavsen, who also hosted a lunch for them.

The visit to Sokndal took place earlier, on 29 May 2010. Capt (N) Stuart Furness, the then Chief Joint Exercise Division, accompanied Association members on their programme at sea; a veteran fishing vessel took them from Sogndalstrand to Jøssingfjord in order for them to get an impression of the waters where the British Tribal Class Destroyer, HMS Cossack, operated in the hunt for the German Support Vessel Altmark. Follow-

ing this, Association members attended a service at the memorial monument in Jøssingfjord on the subject "The War's Human Sacrifice". During a lunch held at Jättå on 31st May, Admiral Sir James Eberle said: "The people of Sokndal welcomed our Association with open arms and laid out a memorial event that will be forever remembered in my mind as well as my colleagues'. I was rather moved with visiting Jøssingfjord where historic events took place. It is also very interesting and informative to visit the Joint Warfare Centre. We thank you for your hospitality." Mr Dag Sorensen, the Mayor of Sokndal, said: "I am very impressed by this visit. The most important thing in life is companionship and community. Indeed, a lot of people from Sokndal attended the memorial event in Jøssingfjord. That was brilliant. I also invite the JWC community to come and visit Sokndal." (Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO)



Per Erik Sørgaard (white helmet) in Bryne.

JWC Bicycle Club participation in Nordsjørittet

On 12 June 2010, 19 brave men and two women from the JWC Bicycle Club headed down to Egersund for the start of Nordsjørittet – a 91km bike race to Sandnes along the beautiful coastline of Rogaland. Little did they know what was waiting for them when they signed up for the race in January: A lot of rain, wind and cold! The weather couldn't get any worse. Among almost 9,000 others, JWC cyclists were getting ready to fight the elements and put their willpower to a test. What normally

could be a 4-5 hour nice ride in the Norwegian summer sun turned out to be a 6-9 hour fight in the mud; against the strong northwest wind in the open landscape. The finish line in Sandnes seemed to be infinitely far away! The JWC team even witnessed another cyclist literally being blown off the road. But what a feeling it was when they finally crossed the finish line as true champions – they have beaten the rain, beaten the wind and beaten the inner voice that told them to stop in every five minutes! One thing is certain: Next year can only be better and hopefully the JWC team will be able to participate with even more cyclists! Thanks to the JWC Transportation Branch for providing transport and the JWC Bicycle Club for sponsoring parts of the entry fee! Results, pictures and other info on Nordsjørittet can be found at www.nordsjorittet.no.

CAX SUPPORT @ JOINT WARFARE CENTRE

By Dr Erdal Cayirci, CAX Support Branch Chief
SMC4 Division, Joint Warfare Centre

IN A COMPUTER ASSISTED EXERCISE (CAX), electronic means are used for the following purposes:

- To immerse the Training Audience in a realistic situation and environment;
- To help the Exercise Planning Group and the Exercise Control staff steer the Exercise Process (EP) so that the defined exercise objectives are achieved.

A CAX, therefore, can be any type of exercise (Live Exercise, Command Post Exercise, etc.), and CAX support tools are not limited to military simulations only. CAX support tools are involved in all stages of an EP to automate processes, reduce duplication of work, enhance the exercise environment and ensure that the EP flows towards the objectives. In this perspective, CAX tools can be categorized into four classes:

1) Exercise Planning Tools: These tools can be used for the automation of processes, information management and information exchange throughout an exercise process. They can help the preparation and management of the scenario as well as the Main Events and Main Incident Lists (MEL/MIL). They can also have interfaces for CAX tools that fall in the other categories. Through these interfaces, the data collected during the specification and planning stages can be directly fed into simulation as well as Command and Control (C2) software.

2) Constructive Simulation Systems and Ancillary Tools: These are the simulation systems and the software needed to prepare the simulation systems, e.g., database preparation tools, user interfaces, etc.

3) Interfaces to C2 and Operational Planning Tools: Simulation systems should be transparent to Training Audience, who should use C2 systems that can be available during an operation. For this reason, mediation ware between the simulation software and C2 systems are needed.

4) Experimentation and Analysis Tools: Tools are needed also for designing and

managing experiments by using CAX data and for compiling and presenting the data collected by the simulation system as well as deriving information from these data.

The JWC conducts CAX events mainly for NATO Response Force exercises. Limited CAX support is also provided to ISAF Training Events and Standalone Experimentations. The JWC Simulation, Modelling and C4 (SMC4) Division includes a CAX Support Branch, which is responsible for providing CAX support to JWC events. The Branch was set up in 2006 to provide the following functions:

- ✓ Maintain current expertise on NATO and national CAX support capabilities;
- ✓ Interact closely with NATO and national simulation centres and NC3A to improve JWC capabilities;
- ✓ Provide planning support to event project teams;
- ✓ Provide all in-house coordination for model/database upgrade requirements;
- ✓ Support the operation of CAX support tools during the execution phase of training event;
- ✓ Provide event CAX support requirements that cannot be fulfilled by JWC in-house capabilities into action items for NC3A and coordinate and facilitate NC3A support to the JWC.

— To fulfil these functions the the Branch organizes and runs the following events:

NATO Joint CAX Forum: The JWC started the NATO Joint CAX Forum in 2006 to maintain JWC expertise and to interact closely with NATO and national training centres. The CAX Forum focuses on technical issues and operating procedures related to simulation-based exercise and training support; participants represent simulation/training centre staffs actually involved in managing CAX events. The Forum's primary goal is to promote the exchange of information and Best Practices among staffs of NATO and national simulation/exercise centres. The CAX Forum has, ever since the first Forum, been a major event for the training and simulation centres. Training centres at the operational level from almost all NATO and some PfP nations regularly attend the CAX Forums. Five CAX Forums have been organized so far, in Stavanger (two), Bydgoszcz, The Hague and Munich. 130 participants from 22 nations registered for the last Forum, held in Ottobrunn, Munich. The JWC plans to transfer planning responsibilities for the Forum to the NATO Modelling and Simulation Centre of Excellence (M&S CoE), Italy, starting 2011. The JWC CAX Support Branch will continue to support M&S CoE efforts to prepare and execute the programme.



NATO CAX Operator Certification Course:

The JWC CAX Support Branch has organized and conducted three NATO CAX Operator Certification Courses since 2008. The first course was given in the French Simulation Centre in Paris (2008). The following one was held in the Ataturk Wargaming and Convention Centre in Istanbul (2009). The most recent one took place in the Hellenic Modelling and Simulation Centre in Athens (2010). In these courses, the JWC certified 117 CAX operators from more than 20 national simulation centres. At Exercise Loyal Jewel 2009 (LJ09), all CAX operator posts that could not be filled by the JWC CAX Support Branch were augmented from this pool of certified NATO CAX operators from national simulation centres, which reduced the CAX support cost of LJ09 by more than 80%. That also contributed significantly not only to the interoperability efforts, but also to information exchange among national training centres. Starting 2011, the responsibility for organizing the course will be handed over to M&S CoE. The JWC CAX Support Branch will continue to provide the course content and instructors.

JEMM, JEST and NTF Configuration Control Boards:

The Joint Exercise Management Module (JEMM), the Joint Exercise Scenario Tool (JEST) and the NATO Training Federation (NTF), which includes Joint Theater Level Simulation (JTLS), Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) and Virtual Battle Space (VBS2), are the CAX support tools used in JWC exercises. Since 2008, the JWC has been organizing Configuration Control Boards (CCB) for JEMM and JEST twice a year. In these CCBs, the software modification requirements (SMR) are determined, validated and prioritized by the users. The CAX Support Branch uses this information to determine the required budget and to start purchasing and contracting procedures accordingly. JEMM and JEST are NC3A developed tools. Therefore, the SMRs are implemented by the NC3A, after which the CAX Support Branch tests and accepts the results before the new versions of these tools are used in JWC exercises. The CCB responsibility for the NTF was delegated to the JWC by HQ SACT in 2010. Starting 2011, a CCB for the NTF will also be conducted every year. The vendors of NTF components are companies and agencies

from the nations. They will be contracted for the SMRs validated in the NTF CCBs. Also the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) participates in those CCBs. Starting 2011, we expect to run JEMM and JEST CCBs once in each organization (i.e. JWC and JFTC in turn) every year.

CAX Support to JWC Training Events:

Supporting JWC CAX events is the main responsibility of the JWC CAX Support Branch. This responsibility includes the following tasks:

- To support the exercise planning teams;
- To support the scenario preparation efforts;
- To prepare the simulation databases;
- To support the MEL/MIL Scripting Conference and STARTEX validation;
- To initialize the C2 system databases;
- To configure, prepare and test the CAX support hardware and software for the execution phase;
- To support the MEL/MIL and scenario teams during the execution phase;
- To manage and run CAX support tools during the execution phase;
- To stimulate C2 systems during the execution phase;
- To store, backup and manage the data collected during the execution phase.

— Since 2009, the JWC CAX Support Branch can perform all those functions by using in-house capabilities. The JWC CAX Support PE cannot provide support to fill all CAX operator posts during the execution phase of a CAX event. Those posts can be augmented either by the NC3A or national simulation centres (i.e. from among CAX operators certified in the NATO CAX Operator Certification Courses). The CAX Support Branch PE currently is able to support the database preparation of two NRF CAX events.

MSG-068 NETN Technical Activity:

The JWC CAX Support Branch is also responsible to keep JWC CAX support capabilities up to date. Moreover, according to the JWC mission statement, the JWC is to assist the development work of HQ SACT on new technologies, modelling and simulation. The Branch, therefore, actively attends modelling and simulation events. Since 2006, the Branch has presented papers and provided tutorials at Summer and Winter Simulation Conferences and supported ACT demonstrations at I/ITSEC and

ITEC events, which are the largest training and simulation exhibitions and conferences in the U.S. and Europe, respectively. The JWC CAX Support Branch also supports NATO Modelling and Simulation Group (NMSG) activities. For example, the Modelling and Simulation Group's (MSG) technical activity MSG-068 NATO Education and Training Network (NETN) has been chaired by the Branch since 2007. The MSG-068, which will end in April 2011, is recognized as a major technical activity by a large international community. It created and contributed to both de facto and formal international standards. A final experiment and demonstration of the MSG-068 NETN will be conducted in November 2010. Twelve nations and NATO organizations will participate from eight remote locations. The MSG-068 will deliver a persistent network, a large reference federation of simulation tools from nations, including Australia, France, Germany, Hungary, Spain, Sweden, and a set of CAX tools for scenario management. Again, this means flexibility and cost savings for the JWC in short and medium terms.

NC3A Support Provision to JWC:

The JWC CAX Support Branch also manages the NC3A support provision to the JWC. For this purpose, it prepares a statement of requirements (SOR) every year in October. The SOR is coordinated with HQ SACT and all JWC divisions. Once the comments from the divisions have been incorporated into the SOR, a programme review meeting is conducted and attended by the JWC FINCON and the NC3A. A preliminary agreement is reached after a consideration of available resources, and then JWC procurement procedures for NC3A services start. The Branch controls the delivery of services, and estimates the amount of resources required to procure NC3A services the following year. ↗



Dr Erdal Cayirci,
CAX Support
Branch Chief.



THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: CIOR Symposium explored the Role of Reservists

Extracted from the [CIOR website](#) and an article by Lt Col Ann P. Knabe (U.S.)
Photos (above) are by Captain (Ret.) Henry E. Plimack, USCGR;
Photos (below) are by Sgt Lars Lenvik, NOR A, Joint Warfare Centre

Inter-Allied Confederation of Reserve Officers (CIOR) held a one-day symposium in Stavanger, on 11 August 2010, with the participation of reservists, officers, politicians, government officials and NGO representatives from 30 NATO and Partnership for Peace countries. The theme of the CIOR Stavanger 2010 Symposium was "NATO's Comprehensive Approach and The Role of Reservists".

Comprehensive Approach is a leading framework within NATO, and in this context, reservists are crucial in building bridges between military and non-military actors in the operations. Other topics of the symposium included Planning and Conduct of Operations, Lessons Learned, Enhancing Cooperation with External Actors, Public Messaging, and Stabilization and Reconstruction. "The CIOR Stavanger 2010 Symposium aims to facilitate dynamic exchange of knowledge, ideas and perspectives about NATO's Comprehensive Approach; an emerging, evolving and sometimes controversial doctrine that will shape the future joint operations in the new era of asymmetric warfare. The symposium will place special empha-



sis on the current and future roles that reservists might play within this doctrine, given the civilian-military aspect of Comprehensive Approach," said Lieutenant Colonel Willem Verheijen, Royal Netherlands Army, International CIOR President 2008-2010. CIOR members also paid a visit to the Joint Warfare Centre on 10 August, where they received a briefing by Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, Commander Joint Warfare Centre.

In the first of a series of five articles published on the CIOR website (www.cior.net).

[net](#) after the symposium, Royal Netherlands Army Lt Colonel G. Dijk wrote the following: "The Comprehensive Approach is not yet well defined, since actors and nations have different opinions about what it is. [However] From the standpoint of the NATO military, through Lessons Learned, it is now generally agreed that military operations executed in host countries cannot reach the end state of that operation by military means alone."

The full article can be read at [www.cior.net/News/2010/comprehensive approach](http://www.cior.net/News/2010/comprehensive_approach). †



17. mai Stavanger 2010

