



NATO  
OTAN

# THE THREE SWORDS

STAVANGER - NORWAY

The Magazine of the Joint War

Summer/Autumn 2011

OPERATIONAL REALITY:  
OPERATION  
**UNIFIED**  
PROTECTOR

COUNTERING  
**HYBRID**  
THREAT


CYBERSPACE  
IMPLICATIONS FOR  
**NATO** &  
THE JWC



JWC WELCOMES NEW COMMANDER

**MAJOR GENERAL**

**JEAN FRED BERGER**




**Front Cover** \_  
Major General Jean  
Fred Berger photo by  
MSgt **HERBERT BERGER**,  
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**BRANDON CHHOEUN**

**Back Cover** \_  
JWC's World News  
Today (WNT) photo by  
**INCI KUCUKAKSOY**



The Three Swords

# CONT



## 4 Flowers were Norway's first and immediate response to terror.

Flowers in front of the Oslo Cathedral in the aftermath of the Oslo and Utøya Island tragedies.

Photo by CDR (Sg) Helene Langeland, Royal Norwegian Navy, Chief PAO, Joint Warfare Centre.

Unless mentioned otherwise, all photos in this magazine are by JWC Public Affairs Office.

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## FROM THE EDITOR

WELCOME



### *Dear Reader,*

I am honoured and pleased to be back at the Joint Warfare Centre. It is a privilege to work with so many dedicated and highly skilled people to support NATO forces in their training and preparation for operations.

Ten years ago, the United States was struck by the most gruesome terrorist attack. Like most of you, I still remember watching in disbelief live footage of the surreal assaults and

their devastating results. The first questions that came into my mind were, "How could this happen?" and "Why would anybody want to attack America?" To think that somebody would consider launching an attack on the U.S. mainland was something totally unexpected to me, and probably to most other people as well. What happened served as an effective wakeup call, bringing into focus, among other things, the massive vulnerability of our open, multicultural democratic societies. Overnight average citizens started voicing concern about the safety and security of their society.

ON 22 JULY of this year, the unthinkable happened to Norway. All of a sudden, my small, peaceful country was shaken to its roots by a horrifying terrorist attack, and my and most other people's view of Norway as the incarnation of a safe and peaceful corner of the world was shattered forever. Again and again, we asked ourselves how this could happen. This time, however, that question quickly turned into: "Is it at all possible to defend our societies against terror? Or is terror the price we have to be willing to pay for living in open, multicultural democracies?"

I choose to think that there are things we can do to protect our democracies from acts of terror and I believe that what we are doing here at the Joint Warfare Centre continues to represent a small but important contribution towards responding to that challenge.

To our new readers, welcome!

To our returning readers, welcome back!

I hope this new issue of *The Three Swords*, the magazine of the Joint Warfare Centre, will be of interest to all.

***CDR (SG) Helene M. W. Langeland***  
***Royal Norwegian Navy***  
***JWC Chief PAO***



One minute's silence for Norwegian victims at NATO HQ, 25 July 2011. Photo by NATO.

## The Three Swords Magazine

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The Three Swords is the authorized unofficial publication produced by the JWC Public Affairs Office. It represents a compilation of articles, reports, news and general information related to JWC personnel and their families. The articles and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy of NATO. The Editor reserves the right to edit or shorten submissions.

**PUBLISHED THREE TIMES A YEAR**

### **Thanks**

MSgt Herbert Berger  
 CPO Wtr Garry A. Braddock  
 David Keane  
 Tudor Jelescu



## Major General Jean Fred Berger French Army Commander, Joint Warfare Centre

I am honoured and very pleased to assume the command of NATO's Joint Warfare Centre. When I succeeded Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte on 17 June 2011, I knew that I was taking over an experienced and motivated headquarters which is composed of thoroughly professional and efficient personnel from the distinguished Nations of our Alliance. The Joint Warfare Centre has an excellent reputation and being part of such an outstanding team and to be given the opportunity of leading that team makes me very proud. It is a privilege for me to be in command of this Centre, especially now that we are on track to assume new capabilities to enhance and complement our core mission. I know that together we will successfully manage the future challenges we will undoubtedly face and promote transformation within the NATO Alliance. I am looking forward to working with all of you and together we will see our reputation grow.

A significant contributor to our future impact is the current development of the new "Skolkan" setting for the NATO Response Force (NRF). In autumn 2012, the first NRF exercise with this new exercise scenario will be executed. With our new training facility in Jättå, the Joint Warfare Centre is well prepared to provide an efficiency enhancement for our training events and exercises. With NATO's most advanced IT platform and state-of-the-art facilities, as well as the best trainers available in NATO, the Centre is making sure



NATO's operational headquarters are well trained, highly capable and ready to successfully execute and win our battles as OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR HQ recently demonstrated.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank our Host Nation of Norway for her continuing commitment and devotion to NATO. As a NATO Commander, I am very keen to achieve a more sustained dialogue with our local partners in Stavanger and maintain this strategic relationship at a higher level. This relationship is a matter of major importance for me. I would like to thank Norway for the kindness and hospitality extended to us here in Stavanger.

With this foreword, I would like to express, once again, my deepest sympathies to the families, loved

ones and colleagues of the victims of the Oslo and Utøya tragedies. We honour the memory of those who died in the attacks. I know that the people of Norway stand united and will not let the acts of one individual harm the Nation's solidarity; we stand shoulder to shoulder with them.

We do have an ambitious agenda ahead of us training NATO headquarters and staff and one thing is guaranteed: the last quarter of this year will be the Joint Warfare Centre's busiest ever. However, I am sure the hard work and dedication of our team will surpass our responsibilities and obligations adding significant value as we collectively play our parts ensuring the continued success of the Joint Warfare Centre.




NATO Headquarters Brussels (© NATO) and the JWC Training Facility Norway.

# JWC WELCOMES NEW COMMANDER

The Joint Warfare Centre welcomed French Army Major General Jean Fred Berger as its new Commander and bid a fond farewell to outgoing Commander Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte during a Change of Command ceremony held on Friday 17 June 2011.

ARTICLE BY Inci Kucukaksoy, Public Affairs Office, Joint Warfare Centre  
PHOTOS MSgt Herbet Berger, German Army, Joint Exercise Division, Joint Warfare Centre



**Rooted in military tradition, the Change of Command ceremony is a celebration of continuity of command while commending the outgoing Commander for his professional excellence. (Clockwise from top right): Outgoing Commander Lt Gen Korte, Gen Bieniek and incoming Commander Maj Gen Berger; media interviews; Mrs Régina Berger; Brig Gen and Mrs DePalmer; Maj Gen Berger with Lt Gen Clément-Bollée; State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence Mr Ingebrigtsen and unveiling of JWC's work of art.**



ON 17 JUNE, Major General Jean Fred Berger, French Army, relieved Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, German Army, as Commander Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). The ceremony at Jättå represented the conclusion of four years' of hard work and achievements for Lieutenant General Korte, who officially retired on 31 July after a 42-year military career in the German Army. It warmly welcomed Major General Berger, whose previous assignment was as General Officer for International Relationships at the Chief of the Army Staff HQ, Paris.

Overall, the ceremony was flawless and definitely one to remember, bringing together many flag and general officers, high-ranking guests from the local community, the Joint Warfare Centre's international staff and family members and members of the local media.

General Mieczyslaw Bieniek, Polish Army, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation based at Norfolk, Virginia, USA, presided over the JWC's Change of Command ceremony. Mr Roger Ingebrigtsen, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, was the guest of honour, representing the Host Nation.

**Rain calls for Plan B.** Not to anyone's surprise, early in the morning, the decision was made to move the ceremony indoors due to persistent summer rain. This was Plan B for the JWC's Chief of Site Management, Commander Mark Irwin, Royal Navy, should the outdoor ceremony be rained off. He said: "Stavanger's weather is notoriously difficult to forecast. If it had been good, we would have had a parade outside. But we are prepared for capricious weather and the new auditorium is a great setting for an event like this."

The programme began with a reception in the New Building's Dining Facility. Ms Bjørg Tysdal Moe, Deputy Mayor of Stavanger, welcomed the new Commander and fondly thanked Lieutenant General Korte for his friendship and dedicated support. Guests then moved on to the Auditorium. The event started with welcoming remarks by the Master of Ceremonies for the Change of Command, Wing Commander Mark Watson, Royal Air Force, and then continued with inspiring music, *Marsch des Hannoverischen Cambridge Dragoner Regiments*, splendidly performed by the Royal Norwegian Navy Band. The audience rose as Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte entered. He was greeted by the JWC's Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer, U.S. Air Force and then took his place centre stage.

In keeping with the spirit of the ceremony, Brigadier Gunnar E. Gustavsen, Norwegian Army, Special Adviser to Commander JWC, presented a bouquet of summer flowers to Mrs Rosalia Korte and Mrs Régine Berger, respectively, who took their seats among the audience.

### **Don't rest on your laurels**

In his farewell speech, Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte said he was honoured and privileged for the opportunity to lead NATO's Joint Warfare Centre for a term he referred to as "the most exciting and stimulating years" of his military career. He expressed his gratitude to NATO's strategic and operational commanders, special friends and partners, the Joint Warfare Centre's international staff for their competence and loyalty, Host Nation Norway for the warm welcome extended to himself and his staff, and the local community of Stavanger

"Nothing is as volatile as success. New challenges keep emerging, asking for innovative ways to deliver innovative solutions."

for its gracious hospitality. Reflecting on setting conditions for success of the JWC's mission, such as training NATO commanders and their staffs for ISAF service, as well as ongoing efforts to develop the capabilities and structures of the NATO Response Force, the Lieutenant General said:

"We have always done our best to meet the expectations of our customers and the Training Audiences, which means we had to strike the right balance between our resources and deliverables. But, success is no reason to rest on our laurels. Nothing is as volatile as success. New challenges keep emerging, asking for innovative ways to deliver innovative solutions. With new challenges, new tasks appear and with new tasks, new training needs. New challenges and new concepts such as Comprehensive Approach, Cyber War, Space Operations and Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence, already impact our training. Our Allies rightfully request us to better cover collective defence and high intensity warfare in our exercises.

"Dear comrades and colleagues, I know you are aware of these challenges and stand ready to master them. And rest assured, as I am, that the Centre will continue to uphold its tradition of excellence with Major General Jean Fred Berger. Under his leadership, the Joint Warfare Centre will continue to set new standards for accomplishment well into the future."



“The JWC’s personnel all have different responsibilities but one common goal: to improve NATO’s combat effectiveness.”

The General’s speech was followed by an enthusiastic applause and a musical interlude: *Marsch der Finnischen Reiterei*. The ceremony continued with the arrival of Major General Jean Fred Berger, the incoming Commander, accompanied by the Presiding Officer, General Mieczysław Bieniek. The audience stood up as the Generals walked into the Auditorium and up to the stage, where they were welcomed by Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte. All three exchanged salutes before Major General Berger took a seat while General Bieniek walked over to the speaker’s stand to deliver his keynote speech.

### Past achievements and future ambitions

In his speech, General Bieniek thanked Lieutenant General Korte for his outstanding service to Allied Command Transformation and support to Allied Command Operations. He praised the Lieutenant General’s forward-looking leadership, spearheading the JWC as an essential force for transformation throughout NATO. This was demonstrated, the General said, by the JWC’s incredible effort and contributions in terms of meeting the operational requirements of the combatant commanders and their staffs by training them to operate in expeditionary environments now and in the future.

“The Joint Warfare Centre’s personnel all have different responsibilities, but one common goal – to improve NATO’s combat effectiveness. You have a crucial role with the ISAF mission as well as the NATO Response Force.”

General Bieniek then praised Lieutenant General Korte’s commitment to establish good relations with Norway.

Welcoming Major General Jean Fred Berger to take over the helm of the Joint Warfare Centre, General Bi-

eniek highlighted the Major General’s background, noting with certainty that the Centre will remain in very capable hands. “This level of experience and perspective will be an invaluable asset and I am confident you will find it very easy to engage on all issues from day one of your work as Commander of the Joint Warfare Centre. I look forward to working with you, Major General Berger, in this new and exciting professional challenge. And, I assure you that your appetite for challenges and eagerness to succeed will be well satisfied. Jean Fred, welcome aboard and congratulations!” the General said.

Thanking the Joint Warfare Centre for continually meeting the mission, General Bieniek also pointed out that under Major General Berger’s lead, the Centre’s mission will continue to expand and build new areas of expertise, in addition to its core mission. He identified those specialty areas as Space and Cyber Defence, Knowledge Development and Comprehensive Approach. The captivating tunes of *Der Große Kurfürst* provided a seamless transition between General Bieniek’s keynote speech and the Change of Command. Wing Commander Mark Watson requested all to rise and then pronounced the ceremonial phrase: “Effective Friday 17 June 2011 Lieutenant General Korte relinquishes command of the Joint Warfare Centre and Major General Berger assumes command of the Joint Warfare Centre.” The audience continued to stand respectfully as the National Anthems of Norway, Germany and France were performed by the band, ending one chapter and starting another in the history of the Joint Warfare Centre.

**IN HIS FIRST ADDRESS** as Commander of the Joint Warfare Centre, Major General Berger thanked Lieutenant General Korte for his leadership and the staff for their dedication, adding that it is an honour for him to be in charge of the Centre, which is recognized for its professionalism, efficiency and adaptability. The Major General said: “I know that training and preparing headquarters, teams and individuals for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, the most impor-

tant operation in NATO’s history, or to be set up as deployable headquarters on a high-readiness posture in the NATO Response Force framework are very challenging tasks, which require full and permanent involvement at individual as well as collective levels.”

The Major General further underlined that he was confident about the Centre’s ability to master the challenges that lay ahead. He said: “I look forward to meeting and working with you. Each of you is fully aware and conscious of the challenges that the Joint Warfare Centre faces for continued success and in preparing NATO’s future for years to come on behalf of the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.”

The General went on to say: “It is called ‘train as you fight’... preparing realistic exercises, conducting challenging scenarios, controlling, analysing, and mentoring objectively the Training Audiences from soldiers to high-ranking officers. In my mind, and history has proven, it is the best way, maybe the *only* way, to enable individuals, troops and headquarters to complete their Comprehensive Approach-based missions and finally to save the lives of soldiers and civilians alike.”


At the end of his speech, Major General Berger praised Norway’s exceptional support to the Joint Warfare Centre, recognizing the special bond that exists between the military, their families and the community of Stavanger. He said: “Thanks to Norway for providing support to the Joint Warfare Centre by way of outstanding facilities here at Jättå, Ulsnes or Madla, as well as personnel. Thanks for the hospitality extended to us, not only here in this working area, but also in our daily lives, and to our families. We already share more than the ‘three swords’ and I intend to further strengthen our friendship. This is such a fascinating place to work.”

Major General Jean Fred Berger’s speech received an enthusiastic round of applause, which concluded the Change of Command ceremony. The Norwegian Navy band performed the French military march *La Consulaire Part I* as guests and participants departed the Auditorium, heading off to another special





The event set the scene to reflect upon and take pride in the JWC's past achievements and future orientation. (Clockwise from top right): Lt Gen Korte greeted by Brig Gen DePalmer; Mr Ingebrigtsen presenting a plaque to Maj Gen Berger; Ms Bjørg Tysdal Moe thanking Lt Gen Korte for his friendship and services; Lt Gen Korte, who served as the Centre's Commander for four years from 13 July 2007, speaking at the ceremony; media interviews; media spot with Maj Gen Berger, the new Commander JWC.



Major General Berger, Commander JWC



ceremony: the handover of the Centre's new training facility from the Norwegian Government to NATO and unveiling a work of art devoted to peace.

### Looking ahead

Following the Change of Command ceremony, Mr Roger Ingebrigtsen, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, handed over the new training facility to the Joint Warfare Centre, calling the handover a crucial step in the coopera-

tion between NATO and Norway, and pointing to the continued relevance of NATO's ongoing training efforts, in which the Joint Warfare Centre is a major player. The building, expanding on an area of 13,390 square metres with five storeys, is a NATO-funded infrastructure project, approved in 2004. "Needless to say, perhaps, there is nothing like this building in all of Norway," the State Secretary noted. After welcoming Major General Jean Fred Berger as new Com-

mander of the Joint Warfare Centre, the State Secretary in his speech pointed out the need for more proactivity in responding to unique 21<sup>st</sup> century threats as well as the urgent need to invest in cyber security, citing the most dangerous weapon as "cyber". He saw NATO as a key international security actor, adding that, faced with new threats NATO's ability to reinvent itself makes the Alliance more relevant than 50 years ago.

"An attack on Norway will not be by hard power, rather, it will be by cyber," Mr Ingebrigtsen said, adding: "The number one way to stop our enemies is to handle cyber defence, and I am very glad that you are eager to put cyber defence into practice here, as I think it will be a very important part of Joint Warfare Centre's role."

Mr Ingebrigtsen on behalf of the Norwegian Prime Minister presented a plaque to the Norwegian Defence Estate Agency's Senior Advisor Mr Reidal Bringedal for his superior performance in handling the building project. He also presented a plaque to Major General Berger before the official handover.

The handover ceremony culminated with the unveiling of a 3.5 x 11 metres work of art named "PAX – Peace and the Art of War" by the Norwegian ceramicist Ole Lislerud, given to the Joint Warfare Centre as a token of congratulation by the Norwegian Government.

Major General Jean Fred Berger thanked the State Secretary, confirming that the state-of-the-art facility will give the JWC an opportunity to expand its crucial mission and offerings by "providing a training environment with superior information technology suitable for the wars of the present, which deeply depend on information management and information sharing."

The General noted with appreciation that Ole Lislerud's piece of art was unique. He said: "I see in this work of art a reference to peace as well as a tribute to military thoughts. I invite each of you to read the quotations written here, from Sun Tzu to General McArthur, Caesar, Napoleon Bonaparte, Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung... It reminds us that war is directed by principles rooted in history, even though the best plan



“The number one way to stop our enemies is to handle cyber defence and I am very glad that you are eager to put cyber defence into practice at the Joint Warfare Centre.”

never survives the first gunshot. And, this is our mission: to train commanders and headquarters, to collect and review lessons learned and, most importantly, not to fight the last battle, but the next one. The graffiti feeling of the piece reminds me of those written down on the trenches by the servicemen of the First World War, who were fighting and too often dying in the midst of mud and blood. We shall never forget that preparing their commanders is serving the soldiers, sailors and airmen. This piece of art conveys what NATO is established for: to prevent wars, or to win them decisively, for the purpose of peace. This is NATO's future and what could sum up the Joint Warfare Centre's mission better than that.”

### International Stavanger

The Change of Command ceremony was preceded by a reception where Ms Bjørg Tysdal Moe, Deputy Mayor of Stavanger, offered the Mayor's greetings to the new Commander and warmly thanked Lieutenant General Korte for his friendship and commitment to the community, reminding the audience of the constructive role he played, both in work and in deed.

The Deputy Mayor made special mention of the General's active support when Stavanger was chosen as a European Capital of Culture in 2008, hosting the biggest arts and culture event in Norway. She then talked about the vibrant, international identity of the City, home to many international entities, including the Joint Warfare Centre. She said many of those currently living in Stavanger are born outside of Norway and that this international community is mainly made up of international businesses and their employees. “We want to

strengthen our cultural and community partnerships so that each and every one of us can help building the international City of Stavanger. You have played a major role in doing just that and I am sure that, as an Ambassador of Stavanger, you will promote Stavanger in the future and help spread the word about this magnificent city and its neighbourhoods. Thank you,” she said, and presented Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte with a special gift of Norwegian wooden houses as a token of her appreciation.

### The guests

The impressive assembly of dignitaries gathered to observe the transfer of authority from NATO included Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck, HQ SACT Deputy Chief of Staff Joint Force Training; Lieutenant General Manuel Mestre Barea, Deputy Commander Joint Command Lisbon; Major General Pavel Macko, Commander Joint Force Training Centre, Bydgoszcz; Major General Werner Kullack, Deputy Commander 1 (German/Netherlands)



**Clockwise from top right: Gen Bieniek; Lt Gen Karlheinz Viereck; Maj Gen Kullack with Maj Gen Berger; Rear Admiral Bruun-Hansen greeted by Brig Gen DePalmer; Mr Hans Vik and Mr Harald Thune; Brig Gen Roy Hunstok and Brig Gen DePalmer.**



Corps, Münster, and Brigadier General Roy Hunstok, HQ SACT. Representing Norway, the honoured guests included Mr Roger Ingebrigtsen, State Secretary, Ministry of Defence; Mr Harald Thune, Acting County Governor of Rogaland; Mrs Bjørg Tysdal Moe, Deputy Mayor of Stavanger; Mr Hans Vik, Chief of Police of Rogaland; Ms Brigitte Augestad, representing the French Honorary Consul of Stavanger and Mr Jacky Morelet, representing Lycée Français de Stavanger. Among other honoured guests were Rear Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hansen, Commander Norwegian National Joint Headquarters; Rear Admiral Bernt Grimstvedt, Chief of the Naval Staff; Lieutenant General Bertrand Clément-Bollée, the Chief of Staff of the French Army; Major General Jean-Jacques Bart, representing the French Chief of Defence; Navy Captain Yves Cuny and Lt Col Rolf Becker, French and German Defence Attachés in Oslo, respectively. ✦

### Joint Warfare Centre

The Joint Warfare Centre, as directed by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), and through the direction and guidance of the Joint Force Trainer (JFT), plans, conducts and executes operational training in accordance with SACEUR's requirements, supports doctrine development and coordinates integration of experimentation and ca-



Royal Norwegian Navy Band

pability development, in order to maximize transformational efforts to improve NATO's interoperability, capability and operational effectiveness.

The Centre provides the best training support possible for the collective training and certification of NATO's joint operational and component level Headquarters. In doing so, the Joint Warfare Centre's priority is to support current operations.

**Major General Jean Fred Berger's** former assignments include Chief CJ5 at HQ ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan (April 2009-February 2010); Deputy Chief of Support at 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps, Münster, Germany; Auditor at the Centre for Advanced Military Studies (CHEM) and the Institute for Advanced Studies in National Defence (IHEDN), Paris, France; Head of

the Office for General Studies, Plans and Policies at the Army HQ in Paris, France; Chief Engineer at HQ EURO-CORPS, Strasbourg, France; J2/Chief Assessment at HQ SFOR, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Deputy Chief Engineer at HQ KFOR, Pristina, Kosovo; Commanding Officer of the 17 (FRA) Airborne Engineer Regiment; Military Assistant to the Chief of the Army Staff. In an earlier assignment, he was in Saudi Arabia, participating in "Opération Daguet" (1990-1991), also known as the Gulf War or "Operation Desert Storm".

The General's military awards and decorations include the title of Officer of the Legion of Honour (1998); Kuwait Defence Medal (1991); Saudi Defence Medal (1991); SFOR Medal (1998); KFOR Medal (2000); National Defence Medal (1984); and ISAF medal (2010).



JWC staff at the reception



Brigadier Gustavsen presenting a bouquet to Mrs Régina Berger

Silkscreen and calligraphy on porcelain slabs,  
3.5 x 11 m, site specific art project NATO,  
Joint Warfare Centre, Stavanger, Norway



**THE BASIC CONCEPT OF THE JWC ART PROJECT WAS TO CREATE A VISUAL INTERPRETATION OF THE DILEMMA AND CONTRADICTION OF WAR AND PEACE.** War in one form or the other appeared with the first man, and its morality was never questioned. It was simply a fact, the manner in which civilizations sought power and settled their differences.

Peace represents the basic dream of life where freedom, stability and a home are the cornerstones of existence. Through the depiction of the Latin word PAX as a mirror image, XAP, the word becomes a metaphor for the contradiction of using war to achieve peace. In between the three large characters, which are 3.5 metres high and 11 metres long, the composition consists of layers of texts and quotes from texts bearing on philosophy, war strategy and peace. The main idea, however, is to emphasize *peace*, which is the very basis of man's moral objectives.

The polarization between those aspects is based mainly on the quotes of the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu, au-

thor of *THE ART OF WAR* as well as Mahatma Gandhi and a number of other influential personalities crusading for peace. Sun Tzu claimed that "All warfare is based on deception" or, alternatively, "Never will those who wage war tire of deception."

A famous citation of Mahatma Gandhi reads: "An eye for an eye only ends up making the whole world blind." Quotes such as "Occasionally principles are more valuable than people" or "The best form of defence is to attack" are from Karl von Clausewitz. Other people quoted on the war/peace dilemma are Otto von Bismarck, Adolf Hitler, Mao Tse-tung, George S. Patton, Napoleon Bonaparte, Winston Churchill, Bob Dylan, John Lennon and Nelson Mandela.

In his address at the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize Award Ceremony, President Barack Obama made the following statement: "And so I come here with an acute sense of the cost of armed conflict filled with difficult questions about the relationship between war and peace, and

our effort to replace one with the other." My JWC mural *PAX – PEACE AND ART OF WAR* confronts this fundamental question of whether it is necessary to wage war in order to create peace. What is the justification of war?

The mural is a site-specific piece. It relates to NATO staff working in the facility and is directly linked to their mission in Afghanistan. The scale of the piece places the immediate emphasis on peace, but as one steps closer and details emerge, one discovers the complexity, including different layers of perception and understanding. *PAX* is painted in a dark red representing bloodshed and loss of life. Simultaneously, however, the red characters also denote peace. In some cultures red is a sign of good fortune and prosperity. Understood from this perspective, the piece holds a further set of contradictions and double meanings, as life itself.

**By** Professor Ole Lislrud  
Oslo National Academy of the Arts



# An Interview With **Major General Jean Fred Berger** *Commander JWC*



By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

**Sir, first we would like to thank you for giving us this interview today and the time you spend to answer our questions. Can we start out by having you tell us how you felt when you learnt that you were designated as the new Commander of the JWC?**

I felt blessed, very privileged, and at the same time quite confident, because I was familiar with Stavanger and the Joint Warfare Centre. I came to Stavanger for the first time in 2009 to receive training prior to my deployment to Afghanistan. Over the past three years, I have been in Stavanger three times, once as a Senior Mentor. On each occasion, I was very impressed by the mission-focused, highly realistic training environment provided by the JWC and the total professionalism of its staff. However, I never imagined that I one day would be designated to become its Commander. Due to the French reintegration into NATO's military structure in 2009, France has become more involved in 'Flags to Posts' and, as a result, I received this assignment. It is an honour to command the JWC, and the level of trust and responsibility placed in you is tremendous: NATO counts on you to successfully deliver its much required operational level training and help increase the capability of the war fighter to accomplish mission tasks. It is safe to say that our mission to increase the effectiveness of NATO's operational forces in coalition and joint environments is quite demanding. Training is the most vital

area of importance within NATO. The JWC plays a key role in this effort.

**Which career experiences do you believe will be most beneficial to you in your new assignment?**

What comes to mind is the hardships of war and the sacrifices made in the name of peace, freedom and democracy. The JWC carries in its name the word 'war' because it is committed to training NATO's operational level headquarters for the planning and execution of modern military operations. I believe that we are at the centre of NATO's transformational efforts to become more effective and efficient and counter the ever-changing 21<sup>st</sup> century threats. As we are dealing with NATO's current operations, we are expected to provide 'training as we fight', and to do just that, we need to understand what 'war' means for our soldiers, units and staffs. I have had the chance to participate at various levels in a variety of peacekeeping/coalition operations in the Balkans, in the Middle East and in Afghanistan, where I met not only French, but also foreign contingents. A key benefit of those experiences was the chance to learn and understand different military cultures and the interpersonal skills that come with them, all of them working towards the same goal of mission success. For me, in particular, the multinational aspect of the peacekeeping/coalition operations has been very important. Since then, we have also seen the need to train

for modern warfare, especially non-traditional challenges to security.

**What does NATO's transformation mean to you?**

I think that NATO's military transformation is always about modernizing NATO's capabilities. It is about seeking innovative solutions to existing and emerging challenges and modernizing the forces so that they are more flexible, technologically advanced and networked, more rapidly deployable and sustainable. It is also about the development of transformational capabilities and doctrine, training and education programmes. These are all interconnected. The world is changing minute by minute and so is NATO. We are now 28 member Nations and things are all so very different from when we were 16 Nations some years ago. We need to be in line with what is going on. Transformation, therefore, is a manifestation of NATO's relevance. The transatlantic Alliance is a key element to stability and peace in the world. The Afghan experience has shown us the importance of an equitable 'burden sharing' mechanism. Right now, we are witnessing the outcomes of the military campaign in Libya, which aims to protect civilians and establish a peaceful transition to democracy in Libya. At the November 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, Allies agreed to develop a more streamlined command structure, increase cyber security and develop its missile defence cooperation with



Russia. The acquisition of cyber defence assets is important in order to defend our populations and systems against cyber threats. This is very new and was not taken into account a few years ago. So, transformation is a process, a way of striving continuously to always become more efficient and effective and doing our utmost to integrate all Member and Partner Nations and help them to bring out their best qualities so that together we can learn and broaden our focus together. As part of this, in our training events, we will continue to implement any lessons learned and challenges identified with regards to the ongoing operations, whether in Afghanistan or Libya.

**What are your priorities for the coming months?**

My first priority will be continuity. I have the great chance and honour to be the successor of Lieutenant General (Ret.) Thorstein Skiaker, Major General (Ret.)

Photo by Solve Sundsbo



His Majesty King Harald V

James Short (OBE), Air Marshal (Ret.) Peter Walker (CB CBE FRaS) and Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, who all did an enormous job to cement the reputation of the JWC within NATO. My first priority will be to ensure the continuity of actions and provide further advancement by helping build on the achievements realized so far in terms of training NATO HQs and individuals for exercises or real-

world operations. My second priority is the level of ambition and realism. We have to help our Training Audiences understand the complexity of the modern operational environment. Our ability to deliver the best training possible for our operational forces is of vital importance because then they will feel confident and be successful in their first mission, winning their battles. To give you an example, NATO is currently carrying out OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR and implementing all the military aspects of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 to help establish freedom and

peace in Libya. The Commander of this extremely important operation, Canada's Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard and his staff came to Stavanger in 2010 to receive JWC training only a few months prior to deployment. The General has commented on how JWC training has helped him through this vital real-world operation. This shows our relevance and unparalleled importance when it comes to preparing for current operations. We need to be prepared for the 21<sup>st</sup> century's challenges by maximizing our capabilities to face changing conflicts and be more relevant in our handling of emerging threats. There is a clear awareness of that fact in NATO. We need to take into account a number of new unforeseen eventualities too, such as cyber security. My third priority is further developing our relationship with Norway. There is a new NATO base concept, which aims to ensure the best possible relations with host nations. Norway is a great nation, a great NATO member. I have just been north to Bodø, where we conducted our Battlefield Study. I want to emphasize that the JWC and Norway have very close ties and that this frank and loyal relationship brings benefits to both. I was received in audience by His Majesty King Harald V on 5 September 2011, and it was a great honour to meet the King. As a NATO commander, I have expressed my gratitude for the generous support provided



**Above:** Major General Berger paid a courtesy visit to the former Mayor of Stavanger, Mr Leif Johan Sevland, on 21 June 2011 where he paid tribute to the importance of the distinctive partnership between NATO and Norway. (Read the full articles on our website at [www.jwc.nato.int](http://www.jwc.nato.int))

**Below:** Identifying possible areas for improved cooperation between the JWC and the Rogaland Police District was the key topic for discussion during Major General Berger's first official meeting with Hans Vik, Rogaland's Chief of Police, on 20 September 2011.





Staff talks between the JWC and Norwegian National Joint Headquarters to further develop mutual support and awareness of cooperation (from left) Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Petit, Lieutenant Colonel Valerie Bertha, Colonel Timothy Bishop, Colonel Jeffrey Devore, Colonel Trond Hellebust, Brigadier General Steven DePalmer, Major General Morten Haga Lunde, Major General Jean Fred Berger, Major General Rune Jakobsen, Brigadier Gunnar Gustavsen. Photo by Captain Edouard de Catalogne.

by Norway to the JWC and also mentioned how I wanted to intensify relations with the City of Stavanger, as well as the Norwegian forces and society.

#### **Do we have an impact in theatre?**

Yes, absolutely. The JWC's Training Audiences are NATO's operational and highest tactical level headquarters. It is a fact that failure to provide adequate military training for ongoing operations as well as the NRF can be costly, and our soldiers will pay the price when deployed in harm's way. It is absolutely vital that the professional and highly realistic training of NATO's operational forces during the NRF exercises and ISAF mission rehearsals, with a clear vision of how the commander intends to accomplish his mission, brings confidence, thus paving the way for mission success. I think that no operation can be successful without a well-trained staff and that is exactly what we aim for here at the JWC: thoroughly trained staffs in all aspects of modern operational art and tactics. This team spirit is vital for the high quality training we shall have to deliver in the years to come. The teamwork spirit must transcend all

levels of the organization to help make soldiers strong and confident, while at the same time strengthening NATO's preparedness for future operations. I have the strong conviction that training provided by the JWC has a major impact in theatre and ultimately helps to save lives and costs and also helps forces optimize their efficiency.

#### **How did you feel about France's return back to NATO's integrated military command in 2009?**

The French reintegration came as a result of a decision taken by the Président de la République, Nicolas Sarkozy. Even though General de Gaulle, back in 1966, pulled France out of NATO's military structures, France continued to participate fully in the Alliance's political bodies and has worked actively to transform NATO in the post Cold-War environment. France is the oldest ally of the United States and one of NATO's largest Troop Contributing Nations. We share common values and views on most political, economic and security issues. France has always been closely integrated into all NATO operations

and has played a vital and influential role globally. So, since the announcement that France was to rejoin NATO's integrated military command, French Generals have been placed in various positions in NATO structures. We are just doing our job as best as we can, demonstrating great loyalty to NATO and the Nations that have been with us, in this Alliance, for more than 60 years now, to ensure peace and stability in the world. As a French General, it is an honour to serve my country within NATO, and I am also very happy, both as a citizen and officer, to work with a large number of counterparts of all NATO Nations. We develop a wealth of experience and personal relationships and gain a lot of confidence and knowledge also on how to do our job today and tomorrow.

#### **Do you have people that you look for guidance and inspiration?**

I very much admire General Charles de Gaulle. I named my son after him. I am certainly very inspired by his refusal to accept defeat during World War II; his determination to ensure a signifi-





cant French presence at all stages of the Second World War and his vision of a greater role for France in world affairs. He was also a great speaker whose statements were much celebrated. I admire many authors, too, particularly German ones, and I would say that all those endeavours that finally led to the German unification, as well as what has happened since then, have shown me once again how important it is to be able to understand what is going on in the world, stay informed, and get into the right position to respond and act. And, this is exactly what inspires me: the sense of purpose and effectiveness in resolving the toughest and most relevant issues facing us right now and in the future. This is pivotal to our political understanding, and there is a pressing need to develop such qualities in order to make a massive contribution to global peace.

#### **What can you tell us about your family?**

My wife Régina is of Corsican origin. She really likes Norway, especially the landscape, but kind of fears dark winters. My eldest daughter, Mathilde, is 25 and she studies hotel management in London. My son, Charles, is 21, and he is studying social and political science in Provence. He is particularly interested in Norwegian culture and its Viking heritage, as well as the landscape and modernity of life. My youngest daughter, Floriane, is 18 and she will graduate from high school in Paris this year. She will be very happy to visit us regularly.

#### **What hobbies do you have?**

I enjoy sports such as horse riding, running and hiking, but I also appreciate having the latitude to read broadly in a number of subject areas, history for instance. My favorite period is the 16<sup>th</sup> century France, as well as World Wars I and II. I have the intention to write a book on history in the future, the reason being that there is some interesting history on my family that I would like to shed light on in a book on the French resistance. I am very interested in history, as well as social issues, art and theology.



**Major General Jean Fred Berger**  
**French Army**  
**Commander**  
**Joint Warfare Centre**

**M**AJOR General Jean Fred Berger was born on 25 December 1957. His military career started at the Saint Cyr Coetquidan Military Academy in 1978.

Two years later, he was commissioned into the Engineer Branch and fulfilled command and staff appointments in the Engineer Branch and the Army Staff until 1990. He was stationed in Saudi Arabia 1990-1991 as part of Operation DAGUET and subsequently attended the General Staff Officers Course at the German Command and Staff College in Hamburg (1993-1995) and the French War College in Paris (1995-1996).

He was assigned to HQ EURO-CORPS as Chief Engineer (1996-2000), deploying to Bosnia and Herzegovina as J2/Chief Assessment at HQ SFOR in Sarajevo (1998) and to Kosovo as Deputy Chief Engineer at HQ KFOR in Pristina (2000).

In 2000, he became Commanding Officer of the 17 Airborne Engineer Regiment; an appointment he held

during his deployment to KFOR Novo Selo, Kosovo, in 2002. His next appointment was Military Assistant to the Inspector of the Army (2002-2004).

Auditor at the French Centre for Advanced Military Studies (CHEM) and the Institute for Advanced Studies in National Defence (IHEDN), Paris, (2004-2005), he subsequently became Head of the Office for General Studies, Plans and Policies, at the Army HQ in Paris (2005-2008).

In August 2008, the General was posted to 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps as Deputy Chief of Staff Support. In this position, he completed a tour of duty as Chief CJ5 to HQ ISAF (April 2009-February 2010) and was then assigned as General Officer for International Relationships at the Army Staff HQ in Paris. He was promoted to the rank of Major General on 1 June 2011.

Major General Jean Fred Berger became Commander of the Joint Warfare Centre on 17 June 2011. He is married and has three children.

# CYBERSPACE

## Implications for NATO Operations and the Joint Warfare Centre

By Lt Col H. Todd Waller, US Air Force,  
Space and Cyber SME  
Joint Training Division  
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***“Connectivity – the very thing that gives the Internet its power to create is also its power to disrupt, even destroy.”***

**T**

**he Dilemma:** Times are changing — and fast. In 1979, I visited the Space and Rocket Center in Huntsville, Alabama and wondered in amazement at a very captivating exhibit. Two futuristic looking phone booths were located on opposite ends of an exhibit hall. I picked up the phone and said hello to a person on the other end. What was so remarkable about the conversation that followed



# ANCE



is that we could see each other on two simple black and white monitors in real time. I was amazed and could not imagine something so advanced ever existing outside of a museum. I must admit, I feel a bit silly retelling the story. From today's perspective, it's so ordinary! So common, in fact, that we have added a verb to our lexicon to express the virtually free service, "I skyped my friend

yesterday who lives half way around the world!" Indeed, the speed of technological reinvention in our time is less incremental and more exponential, making leaps over the ancient technology of just 10 years ago.

One of the most significant enablers of this technology reinvention is the Internet. Originally crafted to facilitate communication between military research centres, the Internet was not created with the intent to provide global connectivity in military, civil, and private domains.<sup>(1)</sup> Accordingly, security was probably not a primary concern in the original internet design because there was no need to police government researchers. Researchers alone, however, did not fully exploit their new creation's capabilities. That task was best performed by competitors operating in a free market. Apple™ is an ideal example of such competitive excellence and creativity, regularly realizing its genius to create innovative products for which consumers happily part with their hard-earned means to possess. In this vein, the Internet has enabled many laudable successes: creation of a whole new genre of services and products; increased efficiency of information and industrial processes; and acceleration of world globalization. It also spawned and is constantly nurturing to greater maturity a very dangerous vulnerability — *connectivity*. That's right; connectivity. The very thing that gives the Internet its power to create is also its power to disrupt, even destroy.

Interestingly enough, the Internet is not the only means of connectivity in the cyber world and while highly wired societies have the most obvious vulnerabilities, they are not the only ones at risk. Even closed-networks (those not connected to the Internet) can be infiltrated using social engineering — the art of tricking humans to unknowingly compromise their system. For example, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) are simple systems comprised of computers and controllers used to run the infrastructure (such as water and energy) in both the most and least developed countries of the world. A USB device (thumb drive) plugged

into one of those computers can deliver a program specifically designed to take control and give potentially disruptive, even disastrous commands that override a system's safety limits.

Given the scope of the threat, it's no surprise leaders all over the world are waking up to the reality of modern society's dependence and consequent vulnerability in cyberspace. In particular, the NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, put NATO on an aggressive path to revise its cyber defence policy in June 2011 after identifying cyber as a key element in NATO's new Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. Recognizing cyber attacks as an emerging threat to national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability, NATO's push to prepare for such attacks has energized many organizations. In particular, the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) is leaning forward to meet the challenges created in cyberspace. I will discuss these efforts in a moment, but first let's take some time to understand the hype about cyber.

## The perfect weapon

Imagine for a moment what the ideal weapon system might look like. If you're an aviation enthusiast, you might suggest a stealthy B-2 bomber with its ability to invisibly ingress enemy territory and put destructive firepower on a very precise location. If you love the sea, perhaps an aircraft carrier or a nuclear-armed submarine comes to mind. How about a teenage hacker? It's hard to imagine a teenager competing with such advanced, not to mention expensive technology, especially when you think about how much it costs to hire one to cut the grass. But not so fast... let's examine some of the characteristics of the cyber weapon, and as we do so, think about what characteristics make the perfect weapon.

**Scalable:** On one end of the cyber weapons scale in terms of purely visible effects, you can steal information and no one will ever know. On the other end of the spectrum, you can cause the "most monumental





**Out of this world:** Effective cyber attacks could totally consume and redefine a NATO military operation. Cyber weaponry are scalable, controllable, precise, inexpensive and invisible. It is reported that over a five-year period 72 organizations, including the United Nations, were attacked. Cyber security today is viewed as a top priority by governments and corporations.

non-nuclear explosion and fire visible from space.”<sup>(2)</sup> How you ask? By introducing malware into the control system for the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline. This reportedly occurred in the 80’s when the former USSR was conducting technology espionage against a Canadian company. Aware of this, Canada and the U.S. conspired to introduce errors in the stolen software which operated normally at first, but then dramatically increased pump speeds to over-pressure the system and cause an enormous explosion.<sup>(2)</sup>

**Controllable:** At the height of the Cold War, nuclear missiles were a formidable part of nuclear deterrence, but once launched they could not be recalled. This undoubtedly weighed heavily on the minds of decision-makers. Unlike nuclear missiles, the effects of some cyber weapons, e.g. botnets, can be controlled. They can simply be turned on and off at the discretion of the cyber operator.

**Wide Array of Targets:** Cyber warriors can attack military command and control systems or a power

grid; a transportation or a banking system; and by doing so create a multitude of diverse and simultaneous effects. For example, terrorists could carry out kinetic attacks (perhaps a suicide bombing) then attack communications infrastructure to thwart emergency responders’ ability to react. Similarly, cyber attacks can be used as a force multiplier to contribute to mission success. During the raid against the Pakistani residence of Osama bin Laden, local residents reported electricity and telecommunication service outages. The international media speculated that the cyber domain may have been used to disrupt these services in support of the operation. Just think, if it’s connected to a computer or the Internet, it’s a potential target. The possibilities are limitless and growing by the day.

**Precise:** In 2010, a malware program called Stuxnet altered the rotating speeds of centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz nuclear enrichment facility. As a result, the centrifuges and the nuclear material they contained were reportedly destroyed. Amazingly enough,

scientists at the facility did not initially recognize the problem because Stuxnet caused the system to report that everything was operating normally even though it was not. Stuxnet targeted a very specific software control system used in Iran’s nuclear facility and used a number of holes in the Windows™ operating system to gain access. These holes, also known as zero-day exploits, allow someone to break into the “brain” of a computer network and take control.<sup>(3)</sup> The good news is once the holes are discovered, software patches can be issued to fix them. The bad news, by then the damage may already be done. Although Stuxnet was discovered on many control systems worldwide, it did not activate until it reached its intended destination. The very precise nature of the physical damage caused by Stuxnet gained worldwide attention and raised the profile of cyber attacks to a new level. Its success will undoubtedly inspire similar attacks in the future.

**Inexpensive:** Modern weapon systems take years of development and immense resources to create, but cyber weapons can be built inexpensively by comparison. For example, the zero-day exploits used by Stuxnet might cost as much as \$100,000 on the black market; that is nothing compared to the reported \$45B pricetag of the B-2 precision strike bomber.<sup>(4,5)</sup> While cyber and kinetic weapons offer considerably different options to decision makers for achieving political objectives, the advantages of a cyber weapon are less political risk and less cost. Stuxnet’s precision reduced collateral damage to a level that even the highly sophisticated B-2 bomber would find impossible to match.

**Inconspicuously Developed:** When a state decides to build a new military capability requiring significant industrial capacity (like an aircraft carrier) it is impossible to keep secret. Even commercial satellites can detect something like that. Cyber weapons, on the other hand, can be developed



undetected from anywhere; an Internet café or from a home office. Anywhere you can take a laptop is a place from which you can establish your very own cyber weapons production facility. Deploying your weapon is as easy as connecting to the Internet or preparing a scheme to get your payload to its intended destination, perhaps via USB device and social engineering.

**Freedom of Resources and Movement:** While the production of nuclear weapons requires sophisticated technology, rare elements, and lots of cash, cyber weapons only require the intellect and expertise of a few hackers; a commodity that is in ample supply now and for the foreseeable future. As well, there is no reason to risk life and limb on the battlefield when you can push a button to execute a cyber attack from anywhere there is network connectivity.

**Non-Attributable:** How much is a weapon worth that allows you to be invisible? Imagine having the ability to drastically reduce the technical superiority of your opponent on the battlefield. Imagine also being able to attack your opponent's banking systems and financial superiority. No need to worry about getting caught. If you've been careful to cover your tracks, it will be very difficult to trace the attacks back to you. In essence, you are an invisible operator on a cyber battlefield creating terrible consequences for your technology-dependent foe.

When you add up all these distinct characteristics of the cyber weapon, you get an ideal asymmetric weapon system, perfect for opposing a stronger enemy with virtually no risk.

## Who are the cyber players?

State actors are the most obvious winners and losers in cyberspace. They have the most resources to contribute to sophisticated cyber operations, but they also have the most to lose, especially

technology and Internet dependent free-market economies whose critical infrastructures are operated commercially. For example, 85% of America's critical infrastructure (which includes services like power, transportation, banking, and medicine) operates commercially.

Regarding state actors and the emergence of Stuxnet, many concluded the United States and Israel were responsible for Stuxnet, based on the level of sophistication and the motive for slowing Iran's nuclear ambitions<sup>(3)</sup>. But the fact remains, there is no conclusive evidence. Unlike a missile, which comes with a return address, you cannot know for sure from where a cyber attack originates. The 2007 attacks on Estonia were traced back to 178 countries, and although Russia was the prime suspect, there was insufficient evidence to prove culpability. And even if the attacks could be proven to have originated in Russia, it becomes very difficult to declare the state responsible when the state can pass the blame to its patriotic, but private citizens. This non-attribution environment makes it easier for state actors to leverage their cyber collateral without being caught. And since location is irrelevant, states with an interest in a particular conflict may use cyber to create a desired outcome without being visibly involved. Unlike the Cold War where mutually assured destruction deterred nuclear powers, cyber warfare, which also promises significant destruction and disruption, does so without the same powerful deterrent and could be a recipe for rapid escalation. Less developed countries might also look to creating their own cyber armies as a way to increase their international prestige without having to become nuclear states, which is a far more challenging task.

How about non-state actors? The main thing non-state actors gain in the cyber domain is an asymmetrical advantage. By using cyber weapons, they can by-pass the economic and military superiority of a developed state. These non-state actors might be terrorists, political activists, or organized criminals selling their cyber weapons to the highest bidder. Any organized group with a talent to exploit the technological weaknesses

inherent in cyberspace can be a player.

Individuals can also play in cyber, and some may do so unintentionally. Empowered by information technology, even single individuals can do significant damage. Consider the disgruntled Australian software programmer, Vitek Boden, who in 2004 used a cyber attack to cause the release of 264,000 gallons of raw sewage into local waterways because he did not get the city government job he wanted.<sup>(6)</sup> It doesn't take millions of dollars to create a cyber emergency, only an inquisitive mind and a computer connected to the Internet.

It is also important to realize that determining a motive for cyber attack can be complex, and the most obvious motive may not always point to the guilty party. National interests, ideology, greed, or prestige can inspire sophisticated and not-so-sophisticated cyber incidents. Deterring so many different actors with so many possible motives and so many targets available is daunting. Cyber deterrence will undoubtedly become one of the most challenging issues to face future world leaders. Creating an effective deterrence strategy will be extremely difficult if not impossible.

## What can cyber do to me?

It's not just computer users. If you use electricity, buy groceries, or drive a car then you are vulnerable to cyber attack. In fact, sustained independence from cyberspace would demand a very primitive way of life; one without phones, Facebook or modern military operations. These vulnerabilities are especially acute for NATO and Member Nations given their dependence on information technology. The Secretary General, recognizing these vulnerabilities, generated a new emphasis on cyber defence within the Alliance. Accordingly, the JWC is taking steps to ensure the operational level of command within NATO receives training aimed at preparing for cyber attacks.

Since the JWC is chartered to train the operational level headquarters for the planning and execution of military





operations, it makes sense to begin by asking from an operational planner's perspective, "what can a cyber attack do to me?" Since operational planners in the HQ spend much of their time using information technology, the most intuitive answer to this question is to identify those attacks that directly affect NATO military networks. We can analyze how networks are vulnerable to attack by understanding what they are expected to provide: *confidentiality* — data accessible by authorized personnel only; *availability* — data is there when you need it; and *integrity* — the data is correct. Let's examine what a potential attack against each of these elements might look like.

**Confidentiality:** By conducting cyber espionage, an adversary could gain access to a NATO network and obtain sensitive information such as operational plans or senior leader movements. The success of operations will be negatively impacted if the enemy knows the Alliance's next move. Likewise, senior leaders could be at risk if the enemy knows their detailed daily schedules.

**Availability:** Access to information systems enables the commander and his staff to communicate with higher headquarters, receive and prepare information relevant to operations, and issue orders to subordinates. Any attack on NATO's networks that denies timely access to information systems could inhibit the commander from fulfilling these basic duties.

**Integrity:** Decision making is only as good as the information supporting it. Cyber attacks aimed at altering the data used by the commander to plan and execute operations could degrade the decision-making process and negatively impact operational effectiveness. A clever enemy could alter data to precipitate decisions from NATO leadership consistent with his own objectives.

While a deliberate attack against NATO military networks can negatively impact military operations, attacks against partner networks can be equally disruptive to operations. Contemporary military operations are complex in nature involving close civil-military coordination

**"Extended attacks on multiple infrastructures could incite riots and possibly precipitate a humanitarian emergency or a complete collapse of governance."**





with many non-military elements of national governments, the United Nations, international and non-governmental organizations, and the media. Attacks on these organization's networks or interference with NATO's communication with these organizations can hamper military operations meant to improve regional stability or to support humanitarian assistance activities.

The final and most dramatic types of cyber attack I want to explore are those carried out against civilian infrastructure. Some military professionals argue that protecting cyberspace where civilian infrastructure operates is a civil matter, however, if an attack against infrastructure can affect the military operation, it has to be regarded in Operational Planning Process. In order to understand how attacks on civilian infrastructure can impact military operations, let's first define civilian infrastructure as those assets essential for the functioning of a society and economy. It includes the most basic services like electricity, telecommunications, transportation, medical, energy and banking. An attack on any one of these sectors can have significant impacts on a civilian

population. Even strong governments can appear weak and inept if they cannot deliver basic services. Extended periods without power, telephone service or the transportation systems necessary to stock grocery stores could lead to mass panic. Attacks on natural gas pipelines or nuclear power facilities could cause significant civilian casualties, and combined with attacks on medical infrastructure could impede efforts to care for the wounded. The ultimate catalyst for mass hysteria might be an attack on the banking sector that reduces electronically recorded bank accounts to nothing but zeros. The real power leveraged by cyber attacks on civilian infrastructure is the ability to simultaneously affect so many people; not much different from a weapon of mass destruction.

Given the capacity for mass disruption, it is easy to imagine how these attacks could affect a NATO operation to improve regional security and stability. Extended attacks on multiple infrastructures could incite riots and possibly precipitate a humanitarian emergency or a complete collapse of governance. Effective cyber attacks could totally consume and redefine a NATO military operation.

To summarize, the vulnerabilities of a NATO military operation in the cyber realm are wide and far reaching. While attacks on NATO networks are possible and the type for which military forces are most prepared, an attacker may choose something other than a hardened military network. Attacks against less secure civilian networks and infrastructure might be easier and offer more tangible results. This presents unique challenges for a traditional defence apparatus designed to achieve superiority in physical space, not cyberspace.

The resources necessary to secure civilian infrastructures are not well known, much less appropriated. Creating a more secure cyber environment is a daunting task requiring significant investment and achievement in technical, legal, and political spheres. The wheels of that process are turning as more world leaders energize government efforts to that end, but the process will be slow and likely involve many bureaucratic hurdles. In the meantime, the Joint Warfare Centre has begun to introduce the cyber threat into its training regime as a way to better prepare NATO's military operations for the present danger.



## A blueprint for Joint Warfare Centre support to NATO cyber defence

The Joint Warfare Centre vision is to provide the best training support possible for the collective training and certification of NATO's joint operational and component level Headquarters.<sup>(7)</sup> Now that cyber defence is becoming a more important aspect of operational readiness, the JWC is beginning to generate training consistent with this emerging requirement. Like any new requirement, especially one as broad and unique as conducting operations in a cyber-contested environment, multiple steps are necessary to achieve a robust capability. Before I identify those steps, I'd like to sketch out a few details reflecting the JWC's training boundaries.

First of all, it must be understood the JWC's Training Audience (TA) does not currently include the cadre of NATO's computer and network specialists providing communication and information systems for the Alliance. That cadre is known as the NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA), an organization responsible for the care and feeding of NATO's approximate 70,000 computers in 58 locations in 30 countries<sup>(8)</sup>. The NCSA supports, but does not "play" in JWC exercises. That means the JWC does not test NCSA cyber defence capabilities, rather the JWC uses NCSA-provided networks to test the commander and his staff's ability to execute operations in a cyber-contested environment. Granted, that leaves some holes in exercise realism that must be addressed by NATO in the future.

Another limitation is that the exercises usually last one to two weeks and include a robust list of training objectives (in addition to cyber defence) that must be met to satisfy the certification process. Since the exercise depends on a functioning network, cyber incidents attacking the network risk bogging down the exercise to the detriment of meeting other objectives.

Finally, NATO's current position on cyber is defensive only. That means no NATO personnel are going to become offensive cyber warriors, i.e. conducting computer network attacks or exploita-



The JWC provides an environment suitable for testing NATO's end-to-end cyber defence capability across strategic, operational and tactical lines.

tion of enemy networks. For now, cyber is not an arrow in the NATO quiver, however, kinetic attacks against known cyber adversaries are possible. The trick is knowing them, and that is a task for the NCSA's computer forensic experts. Now, let's look at those steps toward cyber defence training maturity, taking the crawl, walk, then run approach.

### **CRAWL: Academics and Story Lines**

The most immediate way to get the TA to think about the cyber threat is to clarify what the threat looks like and what their role is in responding to it. This can be initiated during academics and reinforced using story lines during the exercise. Academics occur before the exercise and serve as preparation for the certification. During the exercise, story lines are fed to the TA to provoke a response. For example, an attack on the Air Traffic Control system at a shared airport would impact civilian and military air operations. Such a story line might prompt the TA to take measures to restore lost operational capacity and engage with civilian leadership on air traffic limitations. The advantage of this first step is it doesn't touch the network or put other training objectives at risk. The downside is that while story lines can simulate a wide variety of attacks on outside networks (national, NGO and IO networks and civilian infrastructure), they don't

effectively simulate disruption of NATO networks. Since information-technology dependent decision-making under cyber duress is an important skill we want to develop, we must take another step.

### **WALK: Simulated Attack on Experimental Network**

An initial step and lower risk approach toward NATO network disruption, contamination or failure is to simulate it on a closed network. This could be done by establishing a small network running in parallel with the exercise. This allows maximum control on the simulated network and completely avoids the risk of bogging down the main network. Simulations could be very specific allowing a range of network attacks with varying effects. The simulation could also serve as a prototype and risk reduction for a more comprehensive effort involving the larger network. One difficulty with this step will be integrating the activities of those on the experimental network with the exercise, but even with this challenge, this step will enable progress toward exercise realism. The key is keeping focused to ensure the outcome of the experiment supports the JWC's charter to improve the operational HQ's ability to keep the operation going and to keep making quality decisions under varying levels of cyber attack.



## “The vulnerabilities of a NATO military operation in the cyber realm are wide and far reaching.”

### **RUN: Simulated Attack on Exercise Network**

The next step in achieving training maturity is one that involves 100% participation of the network in the exercise. This will require a robust NCSA planning and execution effort. The NCSA has the experts and knowledge to create realistic cyber attack effects on the network. And they are the most qualified to keep the effects of network manipulation under control. Control of the network will be of utmost importance. This control must be leveraged to balance cyber realism with overall exercise objectives. In other words, the “antidotes” for planned cyber attacks on the network need to be readily available to maintain a productive pace for the overall exercise.

The beauty of using this incremental approach to achieve training maturity is that it can be throttled up or down. Each exercise will produce data, and analysis of that data will enable decisions about what to do next. Proceed to the next step, grow more capability in the current step, or even leap frog to a more advanced step are all possibilities. Resources will also have to be considered as each step has unique requirements. Since there will be considerable learning for every exercise’s unique scenario, the crawl phase could keep the JWC busy for some time. Remember, there is no battlestaff playbook for recovering from cyber attack, especially when new types of attack occur in the

real world on a regular basis. Each battle staff will be challenged to find unique solutions for each unique attack scenario. During this process, the Joint Warfare Centre will acquire lessons learned data that can be analyzed and shared with the entire NATO community.

### **An aggressive model for realistic cyber defence training**

I’d like to conclude with an eye toward a very aggressive, if not idealistic, solution for NATO’s cyber defence preparation. In line with the mantra of “train as you fight,” the most realistic training scenario is one where the entire weapon system, the user and the network if you will, enter the ring and are tested as one. It may not sound very romantic against the backdrop of famous military duos: the viking and his battle axe, the cavalryman and his rifle, and yesteryear’s fighter pilot and his warbird... but today’s commander and his battlestaff are enabled by the IT network. Testing that network with its user is the most complete way to prepare for operations. As the ultimate step in the crawl, walk, and run construct, let’s call it a sprint.

### **SPRINT: Train as You Fight**

A sprint toward exercise realism will require NCSA “play” as part of the TA, with NCSA exercise control personnel preparing simulated attacks against the network and NCSA TA recovering it. Simulated cyber attacks will require a combined response from the commander, his staff, and NCSA’s computer and network specialists working together during exercise, just as a real fight will demand responses from the entire HQ staff to include NCSA players.

In addition to certifying the operational and component HQs and their supporting NCSA counterparts, this kind of exercise environment could prove quite useful to the Alliance in demonstrating a full spectrum of NATO cyber defence capabilities. For example, it could provide an opportunity to measure NCSA’s progress against NATO milestones such as

the establishment of a NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (Full Operational Capability) by 2012. As another example, the recently updated NATO Cyber Defence Policy calls for shortened acquisition timelines to procure cyber defence capabilities and this kind of exercise could help validate those new capabilities.

Also of interest are the Article 5 implications of cyber attack and how NATO should respond when a member state is attacked. Does collective defence apply? The JWC’s exercise environment could be adapted to include strategic players interested in exploring that dimension of the Article 5 process. Ultimately, the JWC provides an environment suitable for testing NATO’s end-to-end cyber defence capability across strategic, operational and tactical lines. Regardless of the how robust the exercise approach taken, the JWC must prepare NATO’s operational battlestaff to meet the rising challenges in cyberspace. While network difficulties during past exercises might have been a cue to suspend exercise play, the future environment cannot be so forgiving. NATO’s operational HQ’s must prepare now to keep operations going no matter what. The show must go on... lives are depending on it. ✦

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# HYBRID THREAT

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## Introduction

Hybrid threat has the potential to contribute to instability beyond NATO's borders, magnifying tensions and escalating crises, which can then threaten Alliance security. While this alone would be sufficient to generate concern within the Alliance, hybrid threat can also directly target NATO and the NATO Nations, possessing the ability to generate strategic effect at NATO and Allied Centres of Gravity, often for little cost and with little risk, perhaps, even with anonymity.

The understanding that such a threat exists, comprising manifold modes of action and with the potential ability to flex to threaten the Alliance at its weak points and "seams" has made hybrid threat a topic of high priority for the Alliance. In July 2009, NATO's International Military Staff (IMS) responded by directing development of an overarching concept for the NATO Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats (CHT).

The inherent diversity of hybrid threat presents a significant problem of definition. Firstly, a spectrum of belligerent capabilities could be considered ranging from classical conventional military forces, through irregulars, "kinetic" terrorists to cyber warriors. Each of these, depending on their commanding intent, may, singly or in combination, present a destabilising threat. A commonality

across this spectrum is a potentially hostile or belligerent intent either against the Alliance or a third party whom the Alliance may wish to support. However, the problem of definition is even more complex as there may be "threat" posed to the Alliance "collaterally" through non-belligerent intent and actions. Consider a nation or region outside the Alliance, but of concern to it; suffering ethnic, territorial, social and/or other destabilising tensions. Such an environment may be attractive to Organised Crime, which is apt to seep into the societal fissures that open up as a result of other pressures. Organised Crime may not be actively belligerent, rather being financially motivated, but, as it fills these fissures and grows, its activities may expand the cracks, further destabilising the nation or region, and thus, indirectly threatening the Alliance.

## Understanding the threat: NATO's Capstone CHT Concept

The Bi-Strategic Command Response <sup>(1)</sup> to the IMS tasking offered a fairly broad description of hybrid threat, which is now agreed by NATO: "Hybrid threats are those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ con-

ventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives."

This description captures some important ideas. *Adaptively* captures the above-mentioned "ability to flex"; *conventional and non-conventional* addresses the "spectrum of belligerent capability"; and the phrasing *with the ability to simultaneously employ* does not require the threat to simultaneously employ multiple capabilities but merely to possess the ability so to do. This is an important idea, as NATO needs to be able to plan against the threat's capability to act, whether or not it actually chooses to act. The phrase *in pursuit of their objectives* is also important for what it does not say: that is, it does not limit adversaries to military or political objectives; it does not preclude financial motivation.

One other connotation of the description is that single adversaries possess multiple modes of action. This is an interesting topic with subtle inferences and is discussed below (See "Opportunity for Collaboration").

Reference 1 recognised that many aspects of hybrid threat have existed for many years — in some cases millennia — with responses incorporated into modern military doctrine and practice. It was clear, however, that the phenomenon represented a new set of challenges





to the Alliance, permitting adversaries to achieve “a favourable outcome against a force that is superior both technologically and militarily” (Reference 1). It was thus necessary to break out those aspects of the current threat environment that together posed the problems that warranted the description “hybrid threat”. The four aspects identified as characterising hybrid threat were: the *Use of Misinformation in the Media for Strategic Effects*; the *Use of Diverse Means and Ways*; the *Increased Opportunity for Collaboration* and the *Ability to Exploit NATO and Nations’ Rules and Laws*. Also, the potential interconnectedness of individuals and groups exploiting these characteristics was further stressed.

To understand hybrid threat, and its implication for NATO, it is useful to explore what these characteristics may mean in practice; essentially to make them more tangible.

**Use of Misinformation<sup>(2)</sup> in the Media for Strategic Effect.** If a conflict will only end when the ability or will of one (or both) combatants to continue the conflict is sufficiently depleted, then each adversary must, of course, consider how to erode the other’s ability and/or will, whilst protecting its own. In asymmetric conflicts, it is likely impossible for the less militarily capable adversary to sufficiently denude the ability of its opponent. The consequence of this is that will rather than ability becomes the focus of the militarily weaker adversary’s strategy. Whilst that “will” is ultimately the will of the political decision-makers, particularly in democracies, their “will” must, to a significant extent, reflect the will of their populations, and it is this that is increasingly seen as the stronger adversary’s Centre of Gravity. The consequence of this is seen, for example, in Afghanistan, with the Taliban adopting — and becoming ever more adept in the use of — modern media tools. (See “NEO TALIBAN’S INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT” by Hope Carr, at Page 58 of this issue). It is essentially impossible for the Taliban to inflict substantial military damage to the Alliance military machine and if depleting NATO’s ability was the aim, attacks on NATO forces would be

illogical. However, record those attacks, broadcast them on social media, present its own interpretation and commentary and the Taliban has a powerful means of simultaneously targeting Alliance will and bolstering that of its followers. It may not be going too far to suggest that the attack itself is not the aim; but is an act required to support the media campaign. Carr quotes U.S. General David Petraeus, former Commander ISAF: “(...) this is a war of perceptions. This is not a physical war in terms of how many people you kill or how much ground you capture, how many bridges you blow up. This is all in the minds of the participants.” The Use of the Media for Strategic Effect is an aspect of the current threat environment that rebalances the scales in favour of hybrid actors.

#### Use of Diverse Means and Ways.

The diversity of threat components that may be deployed against the Alliance, simultaneously or otherwise, is a key characteristic of the current environment. The threat environment includes conventional weaponry, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials; conventionally used or by irregulars or terrorists. It includes cyber attack and cyber support operations and a diversity of criminal activity. It also may entail a fusion of aspects of these differing means, perhaps enabled and multiplied by the hybrid actors’ grasp of new technologies and their ability to innovatively use them. This is a characteristic exemplified by the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks particularly with regard to the terrorists’ use of technology to enable Command and Control (C2) (See Inset I, Page 28).



#### Opportunity for Collaboration.

The opportunities that the Internet, social media and advances in telephony present to hybrid actors in terms of effecting C2 or in communicating their messages to friends and foes alike have already been discussed. However, there is another characteristic of this global interconnectedness that needs to be considered: the increased opportunity for disparate actors to collaborate and work together. Such actors may have little in common; perhaps only some shreds of a common philosophy; perhaps nothing more than a shared animus to a third party. The closer the ideological linkage, the easier it may be to act in concert, but essentially all that may be necessary for collaboration is the assessment by each party that their cause is advanced by such collaboration.

One topic discussed during the Countering Hybrid Threat Experiment is the degree to which threats could coordinate and what this meant for those threatened by them (see Inset II, Pages 30, 31). For illustrative purposes, consider an operational theatre containing a number of different threats to the Alliance. A collaboration spectrum can be envisaged ranging from threats being almost entirely “stand-alone” and uncoordinated to those threats being unified under the Command and Control of a single entity, and thus potentially highly coordinated. Table I (Page 29) illustrates this theoretical spectrum.

THE LIKELIHOOD IS that future operational theatres will include a mix of these, with some actors able to employ different threat modes — that is, threats that are themselves “hybrid” — whilst others may possess single modes, which they may use alone, opportunistically or collaboratively. It is an interesting inference from this that even uncoordinated threats with single modes of action can be viewed as “hybrid” from their target’s standpoint. Moreover, if attacks occur simultaneously or synergistically, it may not matter whether that simultaneity or synergism is a result of design, opportunism or happenstance. The target, perhaps, the Alliance, still needs to be able to respond to all credible attack options.



## Inset I MUMBAI ATTACK

The horrific terrorist attack on multiple locations in India's business capital, Mumbai, in November 2008 exhibits many of the characteristics of a sophisticated military operation. Some of these had been seen before in terrorist attacks, but others represent a step change in *modus operandi*.

**Planning:** Perhaps the most striking aspect of the attack is the sophistication of the operational plan itself. The terrorist organisation, Lashkar-e-Taiba's, plan included attacks on multiple targets combined with diversionary incidents, with a clear intent of getting within the Indian authorities' OODA loop by saturating their C2, whilst maintaining unprecedented C2 for the terrorists themselves. Their *Preparation of the Operational Environment* involved the extended intelligence gathering necessary to support such a plan and the primary targets themselves, a prominent bar, two landmark hotels, a major train station and a Jewish Centre were selected both for the maximum media impact and for resonance with their constituency.

Indeed, during plan execution the terrorist controllers repeatedly emphasised the need to set fire to the top floor of the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower Hotel, clearly with a sense of the consequent iconic television image. Again the "messaging", though crude, primarily to generate fear in the minds of the population of what they considered an enemy state, was clear. The plan recognised that it would not be possible to provide sustainment to the terrorists during the attack and so they had to be self-sufficient, but their sustainment packages had to be balanced with their need for both mobility and to not arouse suspicion. In addition to firearms, ammunition and grenades, they included high-energy foodstuffs and supplies of cocaine and LSD, with syringes. These were included both to sustain energy levels and to enable the terrorists to remain awake and functional for an extended period (50 hours in some cases). This also indicates that the planners' assessment had given them con-

fidence that, despite the massive attention that the attacks would of course generate, the operation could extend for a significant period. Indeed, blood tests on the attackers confirmed traces of cocaine and LSD and also indicated the possible use of steroids.

**Execution:** Another feature of the plan was that, while sophisticated in design, it was not complex to execute. The terrorists arrived by sea, inserting them directly into the target area. Distraction was achieved through planting bombs in taxis to detonate at a later time, wherever subsequent passengers happened to travel: planting these was one of the first actions of the terrorists after landing. The plan on reaching the targets, essentially to murder indiscriminately in each location and to take hostages in the hotels, was straight-forward to execute. A novel feature of execution, though, was the real-time C2 exercised by the terrorist controllers in Pakistan. The terrorists were equipped with phones and Blackberrys and were in frequent communication with their controllers. Amongst other benefits, this provided them with much enhanced Situational Awareness, as the terrorist controllers were monitoring international media and were able to provide information to the terrorists about activity near them, together with some assessment of the Situational Understanding of the Indian Security Forces. Indirectly, they also benefitted from the use of other social media including Twitter and Flickr, together with the activities of numerous bloggers, as these were cited by various media channels, thus providing relatively accurate information to the terrorists in near real-time.

**Strategic Aim:** The strategic aims of Lashkar-e-Taiba in undertaking the Mumbai attack have been much discussed. One well-argued, though unproven<sup>(1)</sup>, assessment is that the primary strategic aim was to provoke the Indian Government to deploy significantly more troops to its border with Pakistan, as it did in 2002 in *Operation Parakram*, its response to the December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament. Such troop deployments are usually matched by the other nation and it would be reasonable to expect Pakistan to also move troops to its side of the border. To do this, Pakistan would have to pull troops away from its tribal areas where they had been engaged in fighting the Pakistani Taliban since 2004. That is, the strategic aim was to weaken the Pakistani military campaign against the Pakistani Taliban.

**A Hybrid Act:** The 2008 Mumbai attack, therefore, was a terrorist attack, but one which included elements more usually associated with a conventional military. It was also one whose exploitation of technology and understanding of various media elements typifies hybrid threat. Moreover, if the assessment of Lashkar-e-Taiba's strategic aim is correct, then the events of November 2008 can be seen almost as the embodiment of hybridity: **a terrorist act** designed to affect **conventional forces** in their operations against **irregulars** in a location over a thousand kilometres away.

<sup>(1)</sup> Evidence includes reference to this in an intercepted call to the Control Room in Pakistan.





Descriptor	Meaning	Implication
Uncoordinated	There are a number of threats to the Alliance but they do not work cohesively. They may, by chance, act simultaneously, but again, they may not.	The Alliance needs to be able to respond to any threat. It may need to counter more than one at a time.
Uncoordinated but opportunistic	There are a number of threats to the Alliance but they do not work cohesively. However, some of all monitor the environment and may seek to act when the Alliance is most stretched dealing with other actors. There is an increased risk of near-simultaneous attack.	The Alliance needs to be able to respond to any threat. It should expect to have to counter more than one at a time.
Collaborative	There are a number of threats to the Alliance that seek to work cohesively.	The Alliance should expect to have to deal with coordinated action against it. Those actions may also be synergistic. There may be dividends to be yielded by attacking the threat network.
Unified	The threats are essentially weapons in the armoury of a single actor. That actor will deploy them to best advantage.	The Alliance should expect to have to deal with coordinated and cohesive action. Overall, threat C2 may be a fruitful target.

Table 1: Collaboration, Coordination and Cohesion Models

**Ability to exploit NATO and Nations’ Rules and Laws.** It is a truism that there is often benefit to be gained from attacking an enemy at its weak points. In conventional warfare, “seams” may exist at Division or Corps boundaries; for a hybrid adversary targeting the Alliance, they may be associated with different nations’ interpretations of what the actions of hybrid threat actor actually constitute and/or what responses are possible, legally supported and appropriate. It may be that hybrid actors can “pick at the seams” within the Alliance across many of their possible modes of operation, but it is in the new threat areas that this may present the greatest problem. Cyber is one such area. The Alliance may be confronted with having to judge what constitutes a cyber attack; what constitutes a cyber attack that requires a response (perhaps cyber, perhaps diplomatic); what would constitute an Article 5 attack and what would the response options then be. Also, as Lt Col Todd Waller lays out in *CYBERSPACE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO OPERATIONS AND THE JOINT WARFARE CENTRE* (Page 18, this issue), a

cyber attack may be location-independent and may allow hybrid threats to operate invisibly. NATO may know that an attack has taken place, but in practice may know little more than that. Moreover, even if the location of the attacker can be determined and even if an attack can be seen to correlate with the general aims and posture of the state from which the attack was launched, that may not be sufficient to tie the state to the deed with the certainty needed to ensure cohesive legal and political opinion across the Alliance.

Similar problems are likely to exist with respect to Organised Crime. Historically not a focus of Alliance concern, it is a potential source of instability, as recent operations have shown. Operations may require action to counter Organised Crime, and, while the main effort would be expected to come from other Instruments of Power (typically policing within the “Civil” Instrument), there may be a desire to employ the Military Instrument in a supporting role. It is likely that different nations, with their different histories, cultures and legal systems may assess that military actions

must occur within differing constraints, again potentially exposing seams within the Alliance.

The above discussion highlights the issues for the Alliance as a whole. Whilst the diversity of an Alliance acts to multiply the seams, it would be wrong to think that such seams are only a function of being an Alliance: that they do not exist within an individual nation. It is likely that the novel problems presented by hybrid threats — with cyber the most obvious exemplar — will find weaknesses and ambiguities within national systems and jurisprudences. Legal systems, developed over centuries to deal with the problems of those times, are apt to become stressed under the challenge of new crimes and new technologies until judgements satisfactorily extend the legal base or legislatures intervene to re-define aspects of law.

## A response framework for NATO

Having characterised hybrid threat, the concept articulated the areas that the Alliance needs to address if it is to provide an effective military response. The Key Challenge Areas were identified as *Environmental Understanding, Communication of Action, Increasing Access to High-end Technology* and *CBRN Material for Non-state Actors* and *Adaptability and Agility of Actors*. A theme common to all these challenge areas is that a military contribution is likely necessary but insufficient. For example, with respect to *Adaptability and Agility of Actors*, as a threat flexes between a terrorist mode and criminal activity (perhaps for finance motives or as another means of destabilising a government it opposes), a policing contribution may be required or the knowledge of economic or political experts may need to be harnessed to analyse impacts. As new technologies become available, specialist technical expertise may be needed to predict their use in the hands of threat actors and, perhaps, to organise a response. The assessment of these Key Challenge Areas, therefore, screams for the Alliance to engage with other actors in adopting a Comprehensive Approach to tackling hybrid threat. Building on this, four



## **Inset II**

# **COUNTERING HYBRID THREAT EXPERIMENT**

### **– May 2011**

**Background:** To consolidate, refine and improve the Concept, the developers recognised a need to test aspects of it, and to focus upon it the scrutiny of those, across all Instruments of Power, whose organisations might anticipate operating in hybrid threat environments and who might provide elements of the solution to stability and other problems. An experiment was therefore designed to “investigate the utility and feasibility of the Military Contribution to the Countering Hybrid Threat (CHT) Concept”. The CHT Concept had highlighted Key Challenge Areas of Environmental Understanding, Communication of Action, Increasing Access to High-End Technology and CBRN Material for Non-State Actors and Adaptability and Agility of Actors and had identified potential approaches to deal with them. The experiment thus also set out to “develop with both military and civilian actors an understanding of potential NATO approaches in addressing the identified Key Challenge Areas”.

**Experiment Design:** It was recognised that, if the insights required were to be provided, the scope and construct of the experiment would be very demanding, requiring a team with the breadth of knowledge and size necessary to undertake this significant planning effort. The experiment was designed by HQ SACT and ACO with substantial input from the NATO International Staff and International Military Staff, U.S. JFCOM and U.S. National Defense University. As development progressed, Subject Matter Expertise was pulled in from National Representatives, Centres of Excellences and Joint Warfare Centre, as required.

To meet the complex requirements of the experiment, a unique design was developed. While in some ways similar to a seminar war-game, it did not utilise the usual “blue move - red move - blue move format”. Instead of this, more classical “temporal evolution”, the

experiment was divided into sessions that stepped through aspects of hybrid threat, and of the concept, where the input of the participants was required; with each aspect debated and discussed in the panels, before being presented back in plenary and further discussed under the stewardship of a highly experienced Plenary Facilitator and with the guidance and insight provided by a panel of Senior Advisers.

**Senior Advisers Panel:** Senior Advisers had two main roles: to provide their analysis and guidance during the plenaries and to shape and guide the panel sessions, as they judged necessary. An extremely strong team of four advisers was assembled for the Experiment: The Honorable Ms Mary-Beth Long, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Lt. Gen. (retired) Yves de Kermabon, currently EU representative responsible for the rule of law in Kosovo; Gen. (retired) Sverre Diesen, former CHOD NOR; and Sir Michael Aaronson, former Director General of Save the Children. All four Senior Advisers were able to deploy their knowledge, experience and understanding built on their roles as senior decision-makers. Additionally, Sir Michael Aaronson provided civil sector balance to an otherwise defence-centred team. Each of the three Senior Advisers with a defence background was allocated to guide a particular panel, whilst Sir Aaronson was in a “free floating” role, to ensure that his unique perspectives were available to all.

**Devil’s Advocates:** Though the normal “blue move - red move - blue move” mechanism needed to be sacrificed to enable essential information to be generated, the designers recognised that there is considerable benefit in understanding possible adversary responses as these can probe at any weaknesses in the thinking of the panels, and so were reluctant to surrender this option en-

tirely. Instead two other mechanisms were adopted. Firstly panel facilitators and other control staff could interject to seek clarity and to investigate implications of actions proposed by panel members. Secondly, within each panel, a participant (carefully selected based on their background) was given the Devil’s Advocate role — essentially licence to probe for weaknesses that a hybrid threat actor might identify and exploit. The Devil’s Advocate was in all other respects a normal panel member and could switch freely between these modes. The Devil’s Advocate construct worked well, though, as it turned out, the calibre of the panel participants was such that they proved more than adept at scrutinising and challenging the ideas emerging from within their own panels.

**The panels and the panellists:** The experiment design called for three panels: Cyber, Technology and Economic Threats; Stabilisation, Conflict Prevention and Partnership and Global Commons and Resource Security. Each of these required panellists with a diversity of skill sets, usually with deep technical knowledge.<sup>(1)</sup> Moreover, approximately two thirds of the 75 participants were required from the civil sector: IOs, NGOs, police, private industry and academia. NATO can find it challenging enough even to identify people suited to such roles let alone persuade them to attend a NATO event. However, the experiment execution subsequently demonstrated the outstanding quality and diversity of the panellists brought together for the event.

**The Scenario:** After considering the possible modification of existing NATO scenarios, it was determined to develop a new scenario. The resultant **Silver and Ivory Seas** Scenario was a non-crisis scenario set in 2016 in a fictional region bordering NATO. The scenario was extremely rich with tensions and problems, including ethnic tensions




**Silver and Ivory Seas Scenario: a non-crisis scenario set in 2016 in a fictional region bordering NATO.**

and unresolved border disputes, democratic deficits, Organised Crime, piracy, unsecured CBRN material, cyber criminality, external influences and resource imbalances.

This “steady-state” non-crisis scenario enabled the participants to study and assess a region with complex tensions and instabilities, where hybrid threat actions had the ability to increase the fissures within the region with potential direct or indirect effect on the Alliance. This included the risk of disruptions to trade, increased criminality such as drug-related and/or cyber (including trans-border), displaced citizens, and the many implications that flow from the existence of an “economic gradient” between neighbouring regions. Moreover, the scenario, whilst providing data, including economic and social data commensurate with the level of analysis that could be managed in a short event, was not overly prescriptive, providing the participants with enough “meat” to explore the issues surrounding hybrid threat, without imposing an “exam solution”.

**Execution and Results:** The experiment was executed from 9 to 13 May 2011 in Tallinn, Estonia. The format worked extremely well, stimulating exactly the calibre of discussion intended. A number of senior decision makers attended the experiment, including Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, General Stéphane Abrial and Deputy Assistant Secretary General of NATO HQ’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, Dr Jamie Shea, who spoke to plenary about the security challenges posed by hybrid threat. General Abrial, having assessed the progress made during the experiment, directed further effort to develop solutions for the Alliance.

A very large amount of data was gathered and, although an initial synthesis was achieved during the event, a substantial



post-exercise processing requirement remained. The First Impressions Experiment Report (Reference 2) covered a diversity of topics, stretching from the need to develop an approach to collecting and sharing early warning indicators between non-military and military organisations to “encouraging stakeholder effort to create policy and legal structures for currently unregulated spaces where non-conventional threats thrive”, to NATO assessing where its principle vulnerabilities to hybrid threat lie in order to identify how to improve to address the key challenges identified. It also assessed that the concept had proven to be a very useful intellectual model, though requiring refinement.

There was much commonality across the panels, but panels also identified issues specific to their own interests. For example, the Stabilisation, Conflict Prevention and Partnership Panel identified the importance of developing relationships between NATO and the various IOs and NGOs who are likely to operate in the same environment when a crisis erupts, and that the relationship-building

should extend to training together. The ability to work well in the same environment requires that all parties understand each other, their needs, intents and *modi operandi*. It is far better to establish such relationships before crises erupt than to seek to form them in the heat of an evolving crisis.

<sup>(1)</sup> “Technical” in the sense intended here includes, for example, understanding of NGO strategic planning or of the functioning of the World Bank, as well as more connotatively “technical” such as Cyber Defence.



Framework Elements of a NATO response were identified. The first of these is ***Building Partnership and Knowledge***. Recognising that both conflict prevention and stabilisation require multiparty “comprehensive” engagement, this framework element seeks to work with those other, non-military actors to develop a shared understanding of crises and to establish working relationships, which can then be expanded and reinforced as required to best meet the challenges that emerge as a crisis evolves. It recognises the value of NATO’s Knowledge Development process in forming an appropriate System of Systems Analysis of the crises environment.

The second Framework Element identified is ***Deterrence***. Whilst this is a more traditionally “military” element, the Concept also highlights the importance of comprehensiveness in this case, so that an appropriately balanced set of deterrence messages are transmitted. Based on the comprehensive understanding discussed above, there is a need to understand the various messages that need to be communicated to the differing target audiences and to identify the means of doing so. Deterrent approaches may be quite wide ranging, including, for example, disruption to hybrid threat financing and defence of information networks alongside the more familiar deterrent activities such as economic blockade and shows of force designed to coerce the threat.

The third framework element is to ***Engage the Threat***, where NATO seeks militarily to force a solution. This would still be undertaken in tandem with diplomatic, political and other actions and must be harmonised with them. This framework element allows for a wide spectrum of NATO options up to and including employment of full combat capable forces, depending of the particularities of the problem to be addressed.

***Stabilisation*** is the fourth Framework Element. This includes, inter alia, reconstruction and stability operations, partnering and increased co-operation with regional authorities, agencies and IOs. It emphasises a comprehensive military and political approach based on “continuous cooperation with the UN

and other non-NATO civilian actors.” (Reference 1)

## Validating the Concept

The Bi-SC input to the Capstone Concept can be seen to have developed a reasoned basis for thinking about hybrid threat, imposing a logical structure on a problem that may seem somewhat amorphous and difficult to bound. The next logical step was to test this to determine both whether it was correct and whether it was useful. In May 2011, an Experiment was executed in Tallinn, Estonia, to provide information to help assess this and to help refine the concept if so required (Inset 2, pages 30-31). The experiment indeed confirmed the utility of the concept and supported its basic premises, whilst indicating areas where further work is required.

## Next steps for NATO

The concept is not yet mature and further work has been initiated to put into place the findings from the Tallinn experiment. The immediate focus is to consolidate the results, analysis and conclusions from Tallinn. The sheer amount of data collected, the breadth and diversity of material covered, the newness of the NATO – non-NATO relationships formed for the experiment and the novelty of much of the subject matter together means that there is a requirement to reconstitute an albeit reduced forum of those from Tallinn, to collectively investigate the outputs from the experiment. A short workshop is planned to accomplish this, with the specific aims of studying what the non-military stakeholder community can specifically undertake to address hybrid threat, what NATO needs to do and how the two groups should partner.

## Implications for JWC

SACEUR’s Annual Guidance to JWC has mandated that “hybrid threat” be incorporated into JWC exercises. At present however, the concept is not mature enough to provide clarity to JWC on specific actions to take, though that

clarity is expected to develop within the next year. Much focus remains at the grand strategic and strategic levels and engagement with IOs and NGOs will likely focus at these levels this year, before expanding to the operational level. This said, though, the hybrid threat information base continues to expand with, for example, the Silver and Ivory Seas Scenario available for study, along with reports and data from the Tallinn experiment that will assist the JWC to prepare to meet the challenges SACEUR laid out in his Annual Guidance.

In addition to the intended experimentation results from Tallinn, that event has also succeeded in opening communication channels with non-NATO actors. As the work develops and the operational level starts to gain more focus, the enthusiasm of many IOs and NGOs to work with NATO to counter hybrid threat engenders the attractive possibility for JWC of collaboration with these IOs and NGOs in exercise design, planning and execution. Discussions at Tallinn indicate that there is even a strong possibility that they might wish to be incorporated into the Training Audiences for STEADFAST Phase 2s and Phase 3s, with considerable consequent benefit to those exercises. ✦

### References:

<sup>(1)</sup> Bi-SC Input to a new NATO Capstone Concept for the Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threat, July 2010. Reference 1: This reference, whilst technically only the “Bi-SC” input to the Concept, is the most complete embodiment of the concept and, until such time as it is superseded, can reasonably be viewed as being the Concept. It is referred to as such throughout this article.

<sup>(2)</sup> Assessing Emerging Security Challenges in the Globalised Environment: The Countering Hybrid Threat (CHT) Experiment First Impression Experiment Report, 20 June 2011.



## Countering Hybrid Threat (CHT) Experiment

Photos by Estonian Ministry of Defence



**(Clockwise)** Leendert Nijssen of ACT in animated discussion. Gen Stéphane Abrial (middle), Dr Mart Laar, Estonian Minister of Defence and Lt Gen Ants Laanots, Estonian Chief of Defence are updated on the progress of the experiment in the presence of national observers. Maj Gen David A Morris, Director of USJFCOM's Joint Irregular Warfare Centre, in discussion with Col Richard Lakin (FRAA) of the IMS (P&P Branch): the JIWC provided vital support to the experiment. Mr Sugio Takahashi, the Japanese National Ministry of Defence Representative and SME on Civil Protection. The author (fourth from left) analyses the debate in the Stabilisation, Conflict Prevention and Partnership Panel against the formal Research Questions. Stabilisation, Conflict Prevention and Partnership Subject Matter Experts listen as the debate unfolds.

# OPERATIONAL REALITY

## Observations from

## ➤ ➤ Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR

By Maj Martijn van der Meijs, NLD A  
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Joint Training Division, Joint Warfare Centre



**T**HE JOINT WARFARE CENTRE (JWC) is a NATO training facility that provides operational level collective training for NATO headquarters before they assume responsibility as a NATO Response Force (NRF) headquarters, or before deploying on an ISAF mission. To that purpose, the JWC conducts two major STEADFAST Series exercises and two to four ISAF-related exercises a year, in addition to some smaller exercises. For ISAF-exercises, JWC largely depends on Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from theatre to provide relevant and current expertise when training a new headquarters. For NRF exercises, JWC depends on in-house expertise. Unfortunately, the JWC often does not have the luxury to relate that to real life operations since there are NRF-standby headquarters on a continuous and rotational basis, but they are not deployed regularly. In March 2011, however, NATO called upon Joint Force Command Naples (JFCNP) to lead OPERA-

TION UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP); the NATO operation over and around Libya. Since JFCNP had just participated in STEADFAST JUNO 2010 and (the planning phase of) STEADFAST JOIST 2011, this offered a unique opportunity to make a comparison between their training and their operational experience. In fact, Commander JFCNP Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, III specifically invited the JWC to send a team to do that. Although his invitation letter clearly stated the current training program prepared JFCNP well for the challenges they met in OUP, there would most certainly be some areas where the JWC could further improve exercises for future NRF headquarters.

There have been several other NATO organizations that have identified lessons from the planning and execution of OUP. A SHAPE Strategic Assessment Team and a team from the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) have done the same, and JFCNP has also accomplished an internal collection of observations. This article only covers

the observations from the small JWC team that travelled to Naples in June 2011 to determine ways to improve the NRF exercises.

### JWC definitely made an impression

One of the first things the JWC team noticed was that STEADFAST exercises make an impression. In the first Commander's Update Brief, also attended by the JWC team, the POLAD briefed on an agreement to send 4,000 Ethiopian Peacekeepers to Sudan, "to – for those who are familiar with the Cerasia Scenario – the area known as the Tori Pocket." This was an almost exact copy of the Cerasian Union Security Force (CUSFOR) in the fictitious Cerasia Scenario, and it was quite interesting to see how reality followed scenario scripting. At the time of the visit, there was even a standing joke in the OUP HQ that the JWC should stop coaching Gaddafi, which is exactly what we would be doing with our Role Players in the Grey Cell during an exercise.





The structure of the OUP Headquarters is significantly different from how JFCNP trained in previous STEADFAST exercises. Previously, JFCNP followed the DJSE concept and trained with their standing Peace Establishment, together with their assigned Forward Element (DJSE from Force Command Madrid), Component Commands and Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG). For UNIFIED PROTECTOR, there was no Land Component Command involved and no theatre for deployment of a Forward Element. There was also no JLSG to support logistic operations, but only a Maritime Component Command and an Air Component Command. The OUP HQ was collocated with JFCNP, and largely manned by it. Two observations regarding this set-up: first, collocating the HQ with the operational level JFC caused some difficulties in

**Above, from left:** Dutch Detachment, photos by Dutch Armed Forces; Canadian forces participating the operation. Photo by Canadian forces combat camera.

maintaining a long term or operational focus, which is always an area of particular attention during an exercise. Secondly, OUP HQ drew personnel from the JFC so it became fairly large. Combining this with running an operation 24/7 in due course resulted in a struggle for manpower for which there is no standard NATO-solution other than ad hoc Force Generation.

An additional lesson that was identified at a later stage was that JWC NRF exercises generally train with standing PEs. Our exercises do not offer opportunities to train Command and Control (C2) planners to design and employ headquarters based on different missions and C2 requirements; something JFCNP certainly would have benefited from when they set up a mission-tailored headquarters on very short notice.

### **“The speed of planning was frightening...”**

Phase II of a STEADFAST exercise focuses on Operational Planning. In this phase, a JFC practices planning a Crisis

Response Operation based on a given scenario setting, in conjunction with a Strategic Operations Planning Group (SOPG) from SHAPE and the subordinate Component Commands’ participation. During this phase, Crisis Response Planning is exercised using the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). In an exercise setting, this phase takes roughly six weeks or so, from the issuance of a North-Atlantic Council Initiating Directive (NAC ID) to the time the JFC sends its Operational Plan (OPLAN) to SHAPE for approval. When planning for OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR in March 2011, this phase was significantly shorter. JFCNP (with SHAPE’s SOPG) had to simultaneously plan an Arms Embargo Operation and a No-Fly-Zone operation. The No-Fly-Zone planning was made more complicated by the fact that half-way through the process the NAC issued a new NAC ID focusing more on protecting the civilian population in Libya. In fact, there was even a concurrent third planning process concerning Human-





Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR overview given at a press conference held by Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard, Commander UNIFIED PROTECTOR, Naples May 27, 2011. Photo by JFC Naples PAO.

tarian Assistance Support, although that plan has until now not taken effect. Thus, two plans became four, and execution of the mission was jumpstarted by taking over OPERATION ODYSSEY DAWN, a coalition mission in place over Libya up until then. All of this coordination took place in a time frame of about two to three weeks, which caused the lead planner in Naples to state that “the speed of planning was frightening.”


The next question that comes to mind is whether this level of “opera-

tional reality” would be useful to introduce in JWC exercises as well. This has been considered, but it is probably unwise to do so. The graph below portrays the planning level of performance of JFCNP during the past two STEADFAST exercises and OUP. It is not based on objective measurements, but merely a visualisation of different observations. It shows how JFCNP started STEADFAST JUNO 10 (SFJO10) at a good, but relatively low level of performance. SFJO10 raised JFCNP’s level of performance

considerably, and it provided them with a higher level of experience and comfort leading into STEADFAST JOIST 11 (SFJT11). During SFJT11, the level was raised again, giving JFCNP a good starting position for OUP.

The point here is that if the JWC were to introduce OUP’s level of complexity and time constraints at the beginning of a STEADFAST exercise, it would likely overwhelm a JFC and seriously affect their self-confidence. The JWC should stick to teaching the basics and exercising the foundations of operational planning, thus giving a JFC the necessary experience and expertise to build upon when called to plan a mission.

One of the planners in JFCNP stated that, when it came to planning for OUP, “the first thing we did was to throw the COPD out the window.” It would have been a major concern if the COPD, when used for the first time in a real operation, had been discarded like that. Fortunately, when the JWC team examined this a little further, it actually turned out not to be a true statement. True, the time constraints of the planning did not allow JFCNP to follow the process to the





letter, but it was their intimate knowledge of the COPD and their familiarity with the process gained in previous STEADFAST exercises that allowed them to focus their time and effort on crucial aspects, such as developing and defining Decisive Conditions and Effects. Planning with the same Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) at JFCNP and SOPG at SHAPE as during a previous exercise also was critical, as the groups knew each other well and knew what to expect from each other in the planning process. If SHAPE were to designate an SOPG for each NRF rotation and train with the subsequent JFC during the preparation for that tasking, both headquarters would benefit significantly from their common experience.

## Knowledge Development and Targeting

In an operation like UNIFIED PROTECTOR, Knowledge Development and Targeting are crucial aspects in planning and execution of the mission. This is also where the most interesting observations have been made, not in the least because of the major differences in these areas when comparing OUP with the non-kinetic nature of the Cerasia Scenario employed for the past few years in STEADFAST exercises. One of the most fundamental observations is that, while the targeting process is practiced and understood during exercises, no NATO-specific entity exists to physically develop approved targets (i.e. coordinate mensuration, target folder generation, etc). Instead, NATO depends heavily on national contributions for Knowledge Development and intelligence support. STEADFAST exercises take place in an unclassified environment to enhance involvement of civilian expertise and role players, and only with NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure. Therefore, these are aspects that a Training Audience does not get exposed to during an exercise, but it is an area the JWC must carefully consider in an Article 5 scenario. Involving national contributions, or replicating them during an exercise, would certainly improve the level of reality.

Another observation from one of the staff officers was that “information from nations can be very unreliable.” To anyone that has been in a real operation before, this probably seems like an open door. Exercise reality sometimes proves to be different, though. Very often, in our scenarios, the intelligence that is provided is true and actionable, otherwise it would not have been scripted that way. It serves a purpose, but it is not as realistic as possible. To improve this, the JWC could introduce more intelligence that is unreliable, or unconfirmed, or just background noise allowing a Training Audience to understand this reality. We incorporated this to a larger extent for STEADFAST JUNCTURE 11, which will take place in November 2011.

## “At the end of the day, it is PEOPLE that make it work...”

Although there is certainly room for improvement in some areas, there seems to be a general consensus that STEADFAST JUNO 10 and STEADFAST JOIST 11 prepared JFC Naples well for leading Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. Several staff officers involved in planning for OUP stated that just having gone through the process twice helped immensely, especially given the time restraints they faced. Even Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard, Commander OUP, lauded on several occasions the experience gained through his direct participation in STEADFAST JUNO 10. But apart from training structures, staff processes, and Standing Operating Pro-

cedures, STEADFAST exercises play an important role in building the team, and we tend to forget that. This team building aspect turned out to be crucial during the rapid preparation and planning for OUP, as well as the execution of the mission. Because, as one general officer put it, “at the end of the day, it is PEOPLE that make it work.”

## So what?

There have been quite a few interesting observations made when comparing Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR with the training provided for NRF headquarters. Some of those observations described above highlighted deficiencies in structures and policies; some will have direct implications on how the JWC conducts its exercises. There should always be a drive to improve our exercises as best as possible, based on experiences from previous exercises and real world operations. At the same time though, we must realize that every mission is unique, and it is an illusion to think that one exercise will prepare a headquarters perfectly for every conceivable mission. An Article 5 Collective Self-Defense operation, an out-of-area Crisis Response Operation, an anti-piracy mission, a police training mission, or Natural Disaster Relief: they all have unique aspects. The JWC should continue to try to incorporate all these different aspects in its exercises, but for any headquarters it is better to be prepared “well enough” in many aspects than “perfectly” in only one or two. The ultimate value is in maintaining the right balance. †



Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard (right) during JWC-run Exercise STEADFAST JUNO 10 in Stavanger.

# INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEE PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

By Robert Scheider  
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**D**uring the March iteration of the ISAF Individual Augmentee Pre-Deployment Training (IAPDT), an officer provided a “back brief” on his syndicate’s excellent efforts to understand the insurgency in Afghanistan from the peoples’ perspectives. He was followed by syndicates who explored the insurgents’ and counterinsurgents’ perspectives respectively. They had just completed the first of three blocks of Cross-Functional Training, which were built upon principles of counterinsurgency (COIN).

The IAPDT is more than a course, as it involves hands-on reinforcement of concepts in a realistic operational environment. While the Joint Warfare Centre’s (JWC) primary training event for personnel deploying to HQ ISAF and ISAF Joint Command (HQ IJC) is our twice-annual Mission Rehearsal Training (MRT), not everyone deploying to these headquarters is able to make the training. For a variety of reasons, including late notification of deployment or conflicting national training requirements, many Individual Augmentees are unable to attend any NATO-sponsored pre-deployment training.

In a report entitled “ISAF Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) in the New ISAF Command and Control Structure” (31 August 2010), the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) stated “Both HQ ISAF and IJC staff who had attended NATO PDT felt ready to start in their job within a few days. In contrast, personnel who had not completed NATO PDT reported that they took several weeks to months before they were able to execute their duties fully after arrival in theatre.”

IN THE FIRST TRAINING to address the needs of those who could not attend an MRT, Joint Warfare Centre conducted a special training event designed solely for Individual Augmentees in February 2007 and the NATO School Oberammergau continued this training as the Individual Augmentee Pre-Deployment Course from 2007 to 2010. In order to synchronize this training with JWC’s MRTs and to provide a realistic operational environment (including hands-on work using replicated computer systems and recent data from theatre), NATO moved the training back to the JWC. The Centre was able to use the same data and much of the same content on the MRT and IAPDT.

Another advantage to hosting the training at the JWC was the opportunity to use many of the same Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) for IAPDT and the Training Development Conference for the upcoming MRT. We conducted a pilot IAPDT from 8 to 13 September 2010. The pilot IAPDT had 36 participants who were deploying to HQ ISAF, IJC, NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan, and other commands.

Although the number of participants was not large, the pilot programme offered an excellent venue to test and validate the content and methods for IAPDT. JWC, JFC Brunssum, and JALLC analysts observed the training and collected feedback from trainees and facilitators. Based upon this feedback, the JWC revised the programme for IAPDT 11/01, which was conducted from 24 to 29 March 2011 for a Training Audience of 110, representing 16 Nations.

By far the most important aspect of IAPDT is the interaction between trainees and SMEs. Most of the SMEs had

just returned from theatre within the two months prior to IAPDT. They were able to impart the most recent knowledge and experience from positions very similar to what the trainees would soon be filling. These SMEs facilitated the vast majority of the training, ranging from broad topic briefings to the entire audience to small group or one-on-one “left seat/right seat” training related to specific functions. Many of these SMEs were also “dual-hatted” to develop content for the 27 June to 8 July 2011 ISAF MRT 11/01 and for JWC’s participation in EXERCISE UNIFIED ENDEAVOR 11/03 (5 to 20 June 2011). Their dedication and willingness to share their experience and knowledge with the next group of personnel deploying to staff positions in ISAF was invaluable.

The content was built around one prerequisite – Joint Advanced Distance Learning – and four main blocks (Mission Specific Training, Electronic Working Practices, ISAF Working Practices, and Cross-Functional Training). Prior to arriving at IAPDT, all participants were required to complete Joint Advanced Distance Learning. This consists of on-line modules to enable participants to learn about a variety of topics ranging from the ISAF Mission to Afghan Culture to Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices. Anyone preparing for deployment to ISAF can enroll in and access these modules at [jadl.act.nato.int](http://jadl.act.nato.int).

Mission Specific Training (MST) was the first block actually conducted as part of IAPDT and consisted of 21 briefings developed around the following themes: The Mission and Campaign, Current Issues, Working with Afghan Partners, and Force Multipliers. These briefings provided updated (and usually classified) information to build upon the unclassified distance learning modules. They also provided foundational knowledge, which would be further developed in subsequent blocks.

Electronic Working Practices (EWP) enabled the trainees to learn about and use HQ ISAF and IJC information management policies and common electronic systems, including the Document Handling System, SharePoint, JOCWatch (used to log events at Joint Operations





Prior to arriving at IAPDT, all participants are required to complete Joint Advanced Distance Learning

[jadl.act.nato.int](http://jadl.act.nato.int)



Centres in ISAF), JChat (a joint operational chat tool), iGeoSIT (a mapping and geographical data tool), and Adobe Connect (used for online meetings). After learning about each system, students completed practical applications using recent data from theatre. They also drew upon this knowledge during hands-on sessions in the ISAF Working Practices and Cross-Functional Training blocks.

ISAF Working Practices (IWP) is related to, but different from, the Functional Area Training in JWC's MRTs. In the MRT, we are normally able to provide an SME for each functional area present in the Training Audience. However, due to the uncertainty of positions, which will be filled by participants and the relatively small size of the IAPDT Training Audience, the IWP training is aimed at more broad-level knowledge. It consists of a mix of Directorate and Cross Functional Team-Level Training and more individualized left seat/right seat or small group training.

Finally, the Cross-Functional Training allowed the participants to apply their knowledge from each of the other blocks to specific tasks similar to those they are likely to encounter in theatre.

Besides applying the concepts learned in MST, EWP, and IWP, Cross-Functional Training was also designed to reinforce COIN training at the operational level.


Cross-Functional Training consisted of three parts and included brief lectures, access to SMEs and civilian experts, and vignettes. We conducted the first two parts, "Understanding the Insurgency" and "Shape, Clear, Hold, Build" immediately after MST to allow the participants to apply the topics to a COIN scenario. They analyzed the district of Maiwand from the perspectives of the population, the insurgents, and the counterinsurgents to understand the root causes of the insurgency, specific grievances of the population, and potential actions to mitigate the grievances and root causes. They then looked at specific actions that could be applied in the Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build stages of operations in the district. In each case, they focused on what actions and support were needed from IJC and HQ ISAF, as well as other actors, such as international and non-governmental organizations. In the final part of Cross-Functional Training, which was conducted after they learned about their broad functional areas dur-

ing IWP, the participants applied specific concepts to operations in the district. They dealt with topics such as Civilian Casualty Allegations, Incident Assessment Teams, the District Delivery Program, Reintegration and Reconciliation of former Taliban fighters, Logistics Support and COIN contracting issues. After each period of syndicate work, they gathered in plenary sessions to teach the other groups about their specific topics and solutions.

As with the pilot program, the Joint Warfare Centre learned a great deal from the Training Audience and SMEs and will incorporate these lessons into the next IAPDT, scheduled for 22 to 28 September 2011. Anyone who will be deploying to HQ ISAF or IJC who will not be able to attend one of the MRTs should plan on attending. †

***"IAPDT is more than a 'course' as it involves hands-on reinforcement of concepts in a realistic operational environment."***

# ISAF TE 11/01 MISSION REHEARSAL TRAINING



“The focus was training HQ ISAF, as HQ IJC was being trained as part of the Unified Endeavor 11/3 in the U.S.”

**Headquarters International Security Assistance Force (HQ ISAF) Mission Rehearsal Training Event (ISAF TE 11/01)** took place at the Joint Warfare Centre’s Ulsnes Training Facility, Stavanger, Norway, from 26 June to 07 July 2011. Together with the total Exercise Control (EXCON) organization, the training involved 412 service members and civilians from ISAF HQ, NATO’s Allied Force Command Heidelberg, the Joint Warfare Centre, NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA) and other agencies, as well as the national Individual Augmentees.

The training aimed to prepare personnel for the cross-functional nature of the ISAF HQ in advance of their July/August deployment to Afghanistan.

Designed as a command post exercise, ISAF TE 11/01 was based on most current data and real world challenges from theatre. The Mission Rehearsal Training included Mission Specific Training (MST), Functional Systems Training (FST), Electronic Working Practices (EWP), Functional Area Training (FAT) and Battle Staff Interaction Training (BSI). Having only ISAF HQ as the Training Audience, the exercise focused on the battle rhythm of HQ ISAF and

how the campaign is managed on behalf of the Commander of ISAF and Coalition troops in Afghanistan.

Key topics briefed and discussed in detail included Afghan Culture and Traditions, Stability Operations, Strategic Partnering, Force Reintegration

**Above:** Major General Jean Fred Berger and Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer at the After Action Review, 7 July 2011.

**Next page:** (from left) Col Nasir Roghbat, ANA; Col Ghulam Ranjbar, MoI; Brigadier General Ghulam Sakih Asifi, ANA; Lt Johan Flad, USA A; Col Habiburrahman Afzal, ANA; Capt Obadullah Kheradmand, ANP; Col Andy Stewart, USA A; Mr Abdullah Nezami; Mr Abdullah Rohullah.





Capability, Strategic Communications and Public Affairs, Governance, and “Shafafiyat” (which means transparency in Dari and Pashtu) to enable personnel to contribute fully to the mission from the first day of their deployment. Overall, the training curriculum was “Afghan-Centric” based on current theatre necessities, including the development and reconstruction mission. It also showcased the spirit of transitioning from a NATO/Coalition lead to an Afghan lead.

“We took the most current focus areas at ISAF Joint Command and ISAF HQ and we applied it to the training

curriculum to ensure that the Training Audience receives the most updated sense of what is priority in Afghanistan,” said U.S. Army Colonel Tom Quintero, ISAF Joint Command (HQ IJC) Subject Matter Expert. He said that it was vital that trained personnel add value from the day they arrive in theatre.

ISAF TE 11/01 Senior Mentor, French Army Brigadier General Olivier Rittimann, HQ ISAF Chief CJ3, underlined the changing environment that the Training Audience would face when they arrive in Kabul. During an interview on June 29, he said that in addition to an impending troop withdrawal

and the process of final transition to Afghan security control in 2014, a new Commander, U.S. Marine Corps General John R. Allen, was set to take over command of the Afghanistan mission in July. The General said: “That’s why this training is very important. The Training Audience here will invest in team building, acquire a sound knowledge of ISAF HQ procedures and battle rhythm as well as functional area and cross-functional area competency. The Joint Warfare Centre is the best environment for providing all these components to the Training Audience.”

**Text, Interviews** Inci Kucukaksoy.





## Colonel Tom Quintero (USA A)

ISAF TE 11/01 SME

### Can you describe your daily job?

I am Lieutenant General David Rodriguez's Liaison Officer to General David Petraeus<sup>(1)</sup>. However, I cross all directorates and functional areas when and where I must. Day to day, I cover all the standard mandatory meetings and I also shadow General Petraeus in most events and meetings unless they are restricted. What I try to do is pull operational information and possible deliverables from the strategic discussions and turn them in an Executive Summary (EXSUM) to General Rodriguez and the IJC staff; so they are informed.

### What's your role in this training?

I am the HQ IJC Subject Matter Expert (SME) augmentee. I am not earmarked to any specific functional training; I just provide insights on how IJC would respond to ISAF staff operations/requirements. Here, I move from directorate to directorate and try to cover all battle rhythm training events that are going on. I make myself available for any and all questions or for clarity about ISAF operations and functions as they apply to HQ IJC.

### What's your definition of a successful pre-deployment training?

For ISAF and the ISAF staff augmentees who are here currently, as long as they get an understanding of what we are doing right now and why, feel some of the operational tempo and how much it takes

<sup>(1)</sup> At the time of this interview, General Petraeus was Commander ISAF.

to actually complete a day's work, that's successful training. At HQ IJC, we see the ISAF staff as an enabling headquarters, working to conduct those engagements with the Afghan Government that assists us with the operational fight. We look to ISAF to filter those requests for information from other commands, military and non-military organizations outside ISAF, and protect us from unnecessary staff actions that add to our already complicated day. I attempt to qualify timelines and deliverables; to showcase how decisions made at this level affect HQ IJC and try to highlight the importance of the 1/3 – 2/3 timing rule to give HQ IJC as much time as possible to produce quality staff products and deliverables.

### What are the main focus areas for the exercise?

At ISAF I cover the Command Group, but I hang my hat in Operations. That said, I also cover down on Stability Operations, Strategic Partnering, Force Reintegration Capability, Shafafiyat, etc., when and where needed. Within this exercise I am trying to replicate an IJC presence in all the Directorates, staff functions and associated battle rhythms' in place for the Training Audience (TA). I attempt to apply realism on how they would work with IJC and how the Directorates interact from ISAF staff to IJC staff. We take the most current focus areas at IJC and ISAF and we apply it to the training curriculum to ensure that Training Audience receives the most updated sense of what is priority in Afghanistan.

### What are your expectations from the Training Audience?

That they get a sense of the operation tempo that HQ IJC has and how the decisions they make affect us. One of the things I mentioned my second day here was within your functional lanes you have a counterpart at HQ IJC. You should make contact with that counterpart as soon as possible. I stress making a phone call rather than just sending an e-mail. An e-mail may not get the visibility you need if the individual is not at his desk, where a phone call will usually be answered by someone. The more you communicate the better it is going to be.

### We only trained HQ ISAF this time. What difference does that bring?

You lose the demand and stress HQ IJC would bring to the TA. Here too, with every major HQ and subordinate HQ working relationships are impacted by personalities. Each personality is unique and your ability to work with that person is critical to success of the overall mission in any facet. Without the HQ IJC audience here, you lose some of that friction.

### Which area, in your view, requires further attention?

They are all important. I think more engagement and understanding as to how the embassies, UNAMA, USAID and others engage with ISAF and IJC staffs should be given more attention. I sat through some of the briefings but they do not capture the unique working relationships and expectations we have of each other with respect to Security, Governance and Development. It is far more complicated than briefed; here again, relationships being key to success.

### How do you assess the personnel ready for deployment?

I think it is about how they engage with questions and how they smile. They are looking to the SMEs and the instructors to gain a better understanding of how things work within both headquarters. I think all the egos have been left outside and there is humility with every question. They want to do well and be value added; to me that's the important thing. You can get all the training needed, but if you bring an agenda with you, you are not going to be value added. Every person I have come in contact so far seems to be a player.

### What is your message?

If you are worth your salt, stay engaged and work and coordinate to try to get things done now — don't wait until tomorrow. Work smart, keep others in the loop and be humble. If you have not been in theater the last six to nine months, don't talk about your last time so much. Relevance is presence. You being there now will be your credentials, not what you did the last time. Here are some points:



**1)** Do not duplicate work; you do not have the staff hours. Take time to ask around and make some calls before going down a road that may have already been travelled.

**2)** Make yourself available to as many people as possible. Support your boss and his deliverables and do quality work, but realize perfect is the enemy of "good enough".

**3)** Be professional. If you are assigned a specific function, know as much as possible about that area of responsibility. Do your data-mining early and often. Look at historical documents and become familiar with the rationale for the current thinking/way ahead. Somebody will always ask the "why" question, so be ready.

**4)** Know the ISAF mission and the lines of effort. Leave what you heard from your last job, organization or command at home; this is here and now.

**5)** Try to be as transparent as possible and make sure that your counterparts in HQ IJC have the same understanding as you do. You do not have to be in complete agreement. You can agree to disagree so long as you are informed and stay professional. Flag Officers will work out the finer points.

**6)** Get a good personal battle rhythm. It is important that you stay healthy and fit, both mentally and physically. Try to have a good work-out plan and get at

least an hour a day. Do not over indulge, this is not a vacation.

**7)** Try to be courteous to your mates within your building.

**8)** Skype when your roommate is awake, not asleep. Keep a clean room and a clean person.

**9)** Do some professional reading while you are there. Any book that talks about Afghanistan and its history, the insurgency, the Taliban and Al-Qaida are a good

start. Ask around, everyone will have their favorites. Some include: Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, Fixing Failed States, Descent into Chaos and Taliban.

**10)** Stay connected with your significant others. No matter how bad your day gets, don't take it out on your family. Remember, you are not going to get everything done. Be as good as you can be for the time you are there.



JWC Exercise Planners with Col Jeffrey Devore (first row, left), Chief Joint Exercise Division, and Lt Col Randulff, (first row, right) Exercise OPR.

## Lt Col Thor Randulff (NOR A) ISAF TE 11/01 OPR, JWC

"I am the Officer of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for this ISAF Training Event (ISAF TE). Even though the Training Audience is rather small compared to that of a 'standard ISAF Training Event', there are scores of details to be taken care of. The JWC and NCSA are fortunate enough to have a very competent crew to handle them, making my job as OPR an easy one during event execution. As OPR, I am also the Chief of the Situation Centre, from where we keep track of the overall execution of the exercise.

"There are several highlights throughout the preparation phase of a training operation like the ISAF TE. For me what has been the most valuable is working

with the Exercise Planning Team nominated for the event, dealing with anything from Real Life Support, finances, security, CIS, floor-plans, manning, programmes, exercise content, visits, information management, etc. Without the professionalism and pro-activeness of all the officers, NCOs and civilians involved, the OPR job would have been almost a 'mission impossible task'.

"In the final planning stage leading up to the execution of ISAF TE 11/01, the JWC also supported the U.S. exercise Unified Endeavour 11/3 (UE 11/3) in the U.S. Most of the UE 11/3 planning and coordination meetings took place there, and there were quite a few of them. Some



Brigadier General Olivier Rittmann, HQ ISAF Chief CJ3



key members of the ISAF TE 11/01 planning team were also involved in supporting UE 11/3 planning activities, thus making the final planning of ISAF TE 11/01 one notch more challenging.

“One of the recurring challenges for the JWC while planning any ISAF TE, is that neither the size nor the composition of the Training Audience are known until very close to the actual execution dates. Invitation letters to Contributing Nations, also known as ‘quarterly letters’, are sent by Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCBS) to the National Military Representatives (NMRs). However, what happens to those letters once they reach the NMRs is beyond the control of the JWC (and, for that matter, the JFCBS). And with close to 50 Contributing Nations in ISAF, each of them nominating personnel to serve in HQ ISAF or ISAF Joint Command (IJC) in their own specific manner, there are challenges in identifying the characteristics of the Training Audience. As to ISAF TE 11/01, the focus was training HQ ISAF, as IJC was being trained as part of the UE 11/3 in the U.S. Developing the content of our exercise was a huge challenge to my Chief MEL/MIL, or Chief Content if you like. Lieutenant Colonel Rob van Putten and his team did a great job developing the exercise content, which was specifically tailored to match the requirements of HQ ISAF. For future training events, exercising both HQ ISAF and IJC, the lessons identified from TE 11/01 will add value and hopefully contribute to even further improvement in the training value delivered to HQ ISAF Training Audiences.

“In all ISAF training events we conduct Mission Specific Training, Electronic Working Practices and Functional Area Training. When it comes to ‘content’ for this specific exercise, ‘transition’ was very much at the forefront of the discussions. In December 2011, the JWC will again host a two-tier exercise to train a combined HQ ISAF and IJC Training Audience. One of the benefits of training both HQs together is that the Training Audience gets a chance to meet and discuss with opposite numbers of the other HQ. The TE 11/01 Training Audience did



not experience this networking opportunity, as IJC did not attend the event.

“The Joint Warfare Centre retains a strong reputation in NATO for delivering pre-deployment training to individuals and Standing Headquarters deploying to HQ ISAF or IJC in Afghanistan. Over the last years, we have continuously sought to improve the way we deliver training, taking into consideration all the changes that are occurring in theatre. All feedback from personnel trained by us prior to deployment has, without exception, been positive. Once in Kabul, they need far less time to get up to speed than personnel without a similar training. The challenge for NATO’s training entity is

to have all Contributing Nations nominate larger numbers of Individual Augmentees for training at the JWC, which would, without doubt, make life easier for those deploying.

“It has been a pleasure to take on the role of OPR for ISAF TE 11/01 and work with a very competent team from both the Joint Warfare Centre and external sources. It would have been impossible, entirely and completely, to deliver such a high quality pre-deployment training at the Joint Warfare Centre without the extensive support of ISAF HQ and IJC, as well as recently redeployed personnel and experts provided by Nations and NATO HQs.”



**Colonel Andy Stewart  
(USA A)**  
Senior Escort Officer  
ISAF TE 11/01

"I look at the Coalition Training Objectives and I constantly try to push or incorporate Afghans in every facet of the training here. One of the things I noticed in my year in Afghanistan is that while we all understand the COIN doctrine, the way that we apply it is very different from the Afghan way. We in the coalition are very information centric. The Afghans are just the opposite. They just want to have a meeting with you. They are about people; we are about data. I want the Training Audience here to be able to ask questions to the Afghans and be able to get the face-to-face interaction, which I think is very important to help the overall Afghan-centric, 'Afghan-First' transition plan. It adds to the realism of the exercise because, as I said, Afghans do not process the data like us.

"During the exercise, we had lunch with Major General Jean Fred Berger, Commander JWC; Lieutenant General John W. Morgan III, Commander JFC Heidelberg; Lieutenant General Olivier de Bavinchove, the incoming ISAF Chief of Staff. Afghan Brigadier General Assafi thanked the assembled group for their hospitality and allowing them to be a part of it. He is highly complimentary of General Berger and the JWC staff, and made it very clear that he valued the programme and it is very important for the JWC to continue inviting representatives from the Afghan Government. Transition, intelligence, police, and more importantly cultural awareness are key elements here. We spend a lot of effort trying to culturally sensitize people deploying to Afghanistan but what you really need to do is to make them culturally effective. Learn the Afghan culture, learn the Afghan ways, but be empowered, do not be submissive. We have great cultural advisors here, and it is really great to have all the Afghans in one place sharing some nuances that will be helpful to Coalition transition planning in the spirit of building Afghan capacity. My expecta-



tions for Training Audiences are that they ask a lot of questions. The more questions they ask, the more demands they put on the Afghans, and the better they will be prepared for their tour in Afghanistan. I also expect them to be open-minded. Right now the mission is changing towards more capacity building and transition, and it is very important, as General Berger and the assembled Generals at the lunch earlier said, that there will be an Afghan-centric approach.

"You cannot afford not to train. The training here is very good because it exposes you to internal HQ battle rhythm and staff processes, and it allows you to have a chance to re-orient your mind

from wherever you came from. Afghanistan is a very difficult place; very few people have succeeded there. There is a reason for that. Afghanistan is very different from all its neighbours. It has been able to protect its identity and preserve its cultural integrity by being impervious to foreign information. Coming to a training centre like this and getting quality briefings from the Afghans better allows you to transition your mind and tailor whatever it is you are doing to an Afghan-centric 'Afghan-First' solution."

**Above:** Afghan officers proudly displaying their certificates; Brigadier General DePalmer and Brigadier General Assafi (photo by Ludo Semper); Lt Gen Bavinchove at media training and JWC After Action Review.

## 2011 JWC Information Day and Welcome BBQ

By Gordon Ramsay, JWC Chief Community Support

JWC's annual Information Day and Welcome BBQ were held at Jättå on Saturday, August 13, 2011. The aim of the day was to allow members of the JWC community to meet newcomers to JWC and to "catch up" with each other after the summer leave period. The special day also aimed to give the chance to see some activities and services available in the local area. This year 59 different companies, organizations, groups and associations from the Rogaland area came to the JWC to display what they had to offer and inform how members of JWC could take advantage of the great opportunities that abound in the region. The information given was extremely useful and helpful to, both, the approximately 60 new families who have arrived at JWC this past year as well as to those who have been here longer. With over 700 burgers and 300 hotdogs served to the families and our invited exhibitors, over 500 people participated during the day, getting to know each other a bit better and being exposed to the welcoming and fantastic region in which the JWC members live.



# From Steadfast JOIST to Steadfast Change

*JWC fully lives up to*

## TRANSFORMATION IN ACTION

By Lt Col Heiko Hermanns, DEU AF,  
OPR SFJT 11, Exercise Planning Team A  
Joint Warfare Centre

**I**t was supposed to be the most complex STEADFAST series exercise ever conducted, executing a transfer of command from an Initial Entry Force to a follow on force within a smaller joint operation beyond SACEUR's regular area of responsibility. Instead, by the time most of the preliminary phases were completed, real life events intervened and, with only a couple of weeks left to go before the start of Phase 3B, a new exercise had to be designed. The JWC's capabilities to deliver "Transformation in Action" were once more in the spotlight.

Exercise STEADFAST JOIST 2011 (SFJT 11) was run by Joint Force Command Lisbon (JFC Lisbon) from 23 May to 2 June at the JWC Ulsnes Training Facility, Norway, as well as at the locations of the subordinate Component Commands. The other locations were Istanbul, Turkey for the Turkish NATO Rapid Reaction Deployable Corps (NRDC TUR) as Land Component Command and the Czech Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) Battalion; Lyon, France for the French Joint Forces Air Component Command (FRA JFACC) and offshore on board the MS Castillia, a command and control ship of the Spanish Maritime Force (SPMARFOR), which was plying the waters of the Mediterranean from Rota, Spain to Lisbon, Portugal. Overall, ap-

proximately 1,350 people participated in the exercise, including a Training Audience of 872. In a compressed time scale of six days, the audience had to address a total of 1,025 injects grouped into three events, each dealing with a specific topic: threats, logistics or political/humanitarian affairs. As a result, there were hardly any days with less than 100 injects being fired into the various cells and elements of the Joint Headquarters and its subordinate Component Commands.

The planning process for the event began in April 2010, the idea then being to run SFJT 11 as the first exercise of the STEADFAST series to see a transfer of command between two Joint Force Commands and two major Component Commands (Air and Maritime) conducted "for real" during exercise execution. Hence, an exercise design with a twelve day execution phase was chosen.

The decision to include a transfer of command impacted hugely on the Joint and Component levels, let alone how to develop Operational Plans. During the Operational Planning Phase in February 2011, a combined Operation Liaison Recce Team (OLRT), manned by personnel from Allied Force Command Madrid as Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE) and the Component Commands, was dispatched into Unakos, the capital of Tytan, in the fictitious exercise crisis region of Cerasia. Once more, the JWC Ulsnes Training Facility

was used to simulate Unakos and allow the OLRT to feed the Training Audience, which was developing its plans based on information directly from theatre. As the task required all entities involved in the exercise to work together closely and have a deep understanding of the subject, it was decided to set up one single Joint Operational Planning Group per level or Component during the Operational Planning Process. The Operational Plans were developed based on NATO's new Comprehensive Operation Planning Directive of December 2010.

When NATO took control of the Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR at the end of March, JFC Naples was tasked to take the lead on the operational level. Given this task, JFC Naples asked SACEUR to be released from participation in SFJT 11. The request was granted early April, and JFC Lisbon took over the very challenging task of conducting SFJT 11 with no fully capable DJSE to support them. By doing so, they not only enabled NATO to finalize the certification of the three Component Commands – NRDC TUR, FRA JFACC and SP MARFOR for their NRF 17 rotation, but also seized the opportunity to become a certified Joint Headquarters themselves for NRF 17.

At the same time, this gave them the opportunity to conduct an ad-hoc trial of a possible future command and




**“The successful NRF 17 certification of JFC Lisbon, NRDC TUR, FRA JFACC, and SP MARFOR made all the hard work and worry over the last minute adjustments become worthwhile.”**

control structure for deployed NATO Joint Command Headquarters. Since the Force Commands, currently responsible for providing Deployable Staffs for the Joint Force Commands, will no longer be available in the new NATO Command Structure, this will be one of the major issues that NATO will have to address in a near future. As Exercise Director the then Commander JWC Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte (DEU A) challenged the JWC Exercise Planning Team led by OPR Lieutenant Colonel Heiko Hermanns (DEU AF), in particular Chief MEL/MIL, Wg Cdr Mark Attrill (GBR AF) and Chief Scenario Lieutenant Colonel Alfio Guercio (ITA A), to adjust the exercise to fit with the circumstances at hand, whilst still allowing for NRF certification of JFC Lisbon and the remaining Component Commands. At the same time, the entire SFJT team made sure that all the necessary details and limitations were immediately communicated to the commanding levels of the participating headquarters so as to facilitate rapid and effective decisions on the way ahead. Ultimately, the successful NRF 17 certification of JFC Lisbon, NRDC TUR, FRA JFACC and SP MARFOR made all the hard work and worry over the last minute adjustments become worthwhile. By the end of Phase 3B, a number of valuable lessons had been identified to underpin the emerging NATO concept of operating in a Deployed Operational Joint Headquarters. Once again, even under such tough conditions as described above, the JWC successfully supported the training and exercise efforts of the Operational Headquarters, thus proving that it fully lives up to its motto of “Transformation in Action”. †







# GENDER DIMENSION

By Lone Kjelgaard  
Deputy Chief LEGAD  
Joint Warfare Centre

■ In the 1950s, French writer and philosopher Simone de Beauvoir challenged traditional ideas about gender roles with her epoch-making "The Second Sex", which was to form the basis for current understandings of the social construction of gender and widely influence scholars of literature, philosophy, history, sociology, and gender studies.

■ Sixty years later, her analysis of women's cultural status still largely seems to hold. In modern warfare, gender dimensions are an important component of a Comprehensive Approach.

**"All oppression creates a state of war"**  
- Simone de Beauvoir, 1908-1986

On 27 January 2010, NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated: *"We need to not only integrate gender issues into our planning and our operations, but we must work proactively to develop our capabilities in this field. (...) Greater empowerment and more effective protections of women against the specific dangers they face in armed conflict is of benefit not only to women, but to all of us. It is a crucial component of a comprehensive approach to*

*security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century."*

In gender studies the term *gender* is used to refer to proposed social and cultural constructions of masculinities and femininities, and taken in this context, gender excludes reference to biological differences to focus on cultural differences. So what is gender and how does it influence military operations at the various levels, if at all? Do we have to dramatically change the way we conduct training,

education and operations to fulfil our obligations both to the United Nations Security Council and to the North Atlantic Council or are we already incorporating gender into our way of thinking?

From dictionaries, two definitions stand out to help us answer the questions above: gender and sex. Sex is bio-

**Above:** Simone de Beauvoir in Paris, 1955.  
Hulton Archive/Getty Images



logical differences associated with being male or female, whereas gender refers to social differences taken to exist between males and females. What is the difference between gender and sex? Using the definitions above, the difference is quite clear. Gender is learned, changeable and varied; the sex of a person is not. Gender is based on socially constructed differences that are learned. These differences are deeply rooted in every culture. As the culture they are rooted in, they too change over time. Because the differences are culture-bound, they have so very many variations within and between cultures.

It is gender along with other aspects of social identity that determines the roles, power, and access to resources for people in any culture. Gender roles and gendered power relations directly influence who has access to, and control over, which resources and opportunities, and, who makes decisions at the end of the day. In many countries of today's world, the distribution and control of resources and opportunities is not equally shared between men and women. As a result of this, men and women do not enjoy equal rights, opportunities, access to resources, and rewards. Women typically hold less power and fewer resources. This unequal gender structure is often embedded not only in the household but throughout the community and the State. Some typical examples are that often women have little control over their most private matters such as marital choices or fertility and even less over their mobility and potential public participation.

However, gender is not just about women. Men also have gender-specific vulnerabilities. It is important to pay equal attention to these, even though men are rarely faced with gender-based discrimination. This places a responsibility on everyone to ensure that all men and women equally enjoy rights, opportunities and life chances. But, it does not mean that women and men are the same.

What it does place upon the military and our political leaders is the obligation to conduct a gender analysis of a potential mission area. The following questions should be addressed all the

way from the political level through the strategic assessment to the daily CIMIC brief at the sub-tactical level:

- **Which men and which women hold the power in this community?**
- **Who owns and controls the resources?**
- **Who makes the decisions?**
- **Who sets the agenda?**
- **Who gains and who loses from processes of development?**

By answering those questions we will be able to identify the vulnerable groups and identify the factors that make them vulnerable, and understand how they are affected. Through that, we have already begun to assess their needs and capabilities, shaping our own force generation to facilitate and enhance the empowerment of these groups. It will also ensure that our local projects on the ground, our region-specific programmes and our political and diplomatic interactions are targeted in a way so as to prevent or mitigate potential adverse impact on those vulnerable groups. In other words, it enables the military to adapt a Comprehensive Approach. For example, in Afghanistan it is of interest to identify if poverty affects women and men differently, so that our projects target their respective needs and priorities.

Other gender-related factors influencing NATO and UN operations are women's status in the local culture and their ability to exercise leadership and power in public life. Successful local engagement often depends on our ability to understand and interpret the different skills, capacities and aspirations of women and men in the society.

Unfortunately, gender-based violence often is a reality in a conflict or post-conflict area. Gender-based violence is defined as *physical, mental, psychological, or social abuse, committed on the basis of the victim's gender and against their will*. Although the majority of gender-based violence is aimed at women and girls, it does include violence aimed at men and boys. It is important to be aware of this in an operations area, where our presence might enforce gender inequality despite our best efforts. In planning a military

operation, we need to mitigate for the potential abuse of power at all levels of government and administration in host nations to the best of our ability. When we choose our partners on the ground, attention must be given to potential adverse effects on the local power balance. Gender-based violence is common during armed conflicts, and is sometimes employed as a means of warfare. This, in itself, raises a multitude of issues for the later development in the area.

A prior analysis of this area will help measure both effectiveness and performance in development: Is our presence or projects influencing social structures the way we want? Is the level of gender inequality diminishing, and how is the level of interaction between various groups improving? The analysis will have to focus on people, and their constraints and opportunities, because then it will not differentiate between women and men. Such an analysis can be extended to cover aspects of sustainable livelihoods, vulnerabilities, human capital, institution building, just to mention a few, for a true Comprehensive Approach. This is Knowledge Development, establishing existing networks, relationships and influences together with basic infrastructure and producers of goods and related natural resources. This allows us to address the root causes of the issues in our operations area and develop lines of operation to reduce the pressure on vulnerable groups and thereby gain their trust. This in turn leads to achieving the military end-state of creating key conditions for sustainable development.

In other words the military has a most important role to play in gender-mainstreaming, which is a process of ensuring that all of our work, and the way we do it, contribute to gender equality by appropriately influencing the balance of power between women and men. In practice that means ensuring that the different concerns and priorities of both women and men are addressed in, and shape, our engagement projects — from diplomatic talks and initiatives to daily contact by engagement teams.

It is important to remember that gender mainstreaming starts at government level. Institutional frameworks, policies



and legislation, at all levels, need to uphold women's rights and contribute to gender equality. This is not only true of a potential host nation, but indeed also for the sending states. Even though gender mainstreaming aims to support women's ability to exercise their human rights, it is also about the concerns of men and, in particular, about the root causes of imbalance of power. Where possible, it needs to be ensured that women and men from marginalized groups are represented and participate actively in planning. Military projects need to address this by working with the men who typically hold a higher degree of power, to get their support for the specific project and to facilitate women's participation in, and influence on, a given project. It is at the same time paramount to identify partner organizations whose core business is, or who has great experience in gender mainstreaming and cooperate with them.

Having an in-depth understanding of the different needs, priorities and potentials of women and men in a particular country should ultimately lead to better-informed decisions and more effective implantation of the mission mandate. In practical terms, that means that the commander on the ground must identify gender vulnerabilities and categorise them into physical/material, social/organisation and attitudinal/motivational. Furthermore, he needs to identify vulnerabilities related to fear of or experience of gender-based violence. For the complete picture, he then needs to identify gender capabilities in the same categories. After that, he can ask the "so what" and make the necessary adjustment to his plan or project. This ensures the mission does not make matters worse for the local population or reinforces past discrimination.

## United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325

On 31 October 2000, when the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325, it was the very first time the UNSC addressed the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women, and stressed

the importance of women's equal and full participation as active members in the process of establishing peace and security. UNSCR 1325 is binding on all UN Member States. The adoption of the Resolution marked an important international political recognition that gender is relevant to international peace and stability. The key provisions of UNSCR 1325 demands that the Member States:

- Increase the participation and representation of women at all levels of decision-making;
- Pay special attention to specify protection needs of women and girls in conflict areas;
- Include gender perspectives in post-conflict processes;
- Include gender perspectives in UN programming, reporting and Security Council sanctioned missions;
- Include gender perspectives and gender awareness training in UN Peace Support Operations.

This means that "attention needs to be given to gender perspectives in all phases of the Peace Support Operations, beginning with needs assessment in mission through post-conflict peacebuilding. Gender perspectives should be considered in analysis, policy and strategy development and planning of Peace Support Operations, as well as training programmes and instruments developed to support effective implementation of those operations, such as guidelines, handbooks and codes of conduct. All aspects and all levels of Peace Support Operations require attention to gender perspectives, including political analysis, military operations, civilian police activities, electoral assistance, human rights support, humanitarian assistance, including for refugees and displaced persons, development and reconstruction activities and public information. Training of troops and civilian police on gender issues is critical. In the context of complex missions where interim governments will be established, gender balance in interim bodies and development of capacity within those important bodies to work with gender perspectives

need to be considered. Experience has shown that it is important to ensure attention to gender perspectives form the very outset of peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions, including thorough incorporation in the initial mandates. All reports of the individual mission to the Security Council should include explicit routine reporting on progress in integrating gender perspectives as well as information on the number and level of women involved in all aspects of the mission." (Extract from the Secretary-General's report on resource requirements for the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 27 October, 2000, A/55/507/Add.1)

## NATO's perspective

NATO thrives to implement UNSCR 1325 to the full extent, which is done through Bi-SC Directive 40-1. All NATO Member States are members of the UN, so they have an obligation within their national systems. Bi-SC 40-1 extends this to the whole of NATO's structures. The Directive is applicable to all International Military Headquarters, or any other organisations operating within the ACO or ACT Chain of Command. The Directive consists of guidance on the implementation of UNSCR 1325, as well as NATO's Standards of Behaviour for operations and missions and a list of measures for the protection of women and girls in armed conflict.

Realizing that gender dimensions are an important component of a Comprehensive Approach, the Directive seeks to mainstream gender issues in all phases of NATO's military activities, ensuring gender awareness throughout the chain of command, integrating gender dimensions in an operational context will be seen as a force multiplier.

To facilitate this, the Directive addresses the measures NATO forces will undertake in the planning and conduct of NATO-led operations to protect women and girls. One thing to note is that the Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (ACO COPD) currently does





KABUL, Afghanistan – Women from the first graduating class of the Afghan National Army Female Officer Candidate School stand for the playing of the National Anthem during their graduation ceremony, 23 September 2010. Twenty-nine Afghan women completed 20 weeks of training, which included eight weeks of basic training and 12 weeks of advanced training in logistics and finance. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Laura R. McFarlane.)

not reflect this guidance. These measures are applicable during and after conflicts as part of NATO's wider policy objectives of enhancing security and stability.

**THE KEY CONCEPTS** list a number of actions to be taken; e.g. increasing female representation throughout the NCS and Crisis Establishments and providing training supplementary to national gender awareness training as well as NATO's Standards of Behaviour. The Directive emphasises that pre-deployment training is a national responsibility, yet at the same time it accentuates the requirement for integrating UNSCR in all of NATO training events, both so-called garrison training, exercises and pre-deployment training. The selection and utilisation of Gender Advisors are also highlighted as a most important part of the implementation. It is foreseen that a dual-hatted Gender Advisor will be designated to all static Headquarters, and those HQs involved in NATO ar-

reas of operations, missions and exercises. The responsibilities of the Gender Advisor will be to directly support the Commander in planning, conducting and evaluating operations from a gender perspective. This includes providing advice on information and guidelines related to UNSCR 1325. The Gender Advisor will work closely not only with manpower to maintain an overview of the number of women employed and deployed, but also with other staff elements such as Intelligence and Knowledge Development, Civilian Military Cooperation and Operations Directorate for support to operational planning to include logistical aspects, and will of course provide guidance on gender awareness scenarios for exercises.

Particularly in cases of breach of NATO Standards of Behaviour, the Gender Advisor will work closely with the Legal Office and the Commander's Office. The Gender Advisor may offer

advice to the relevant national authorities during an investigation. It can be argued that the NATO Standards of Behaviour are self-explanatory but still they provide the Commander with the means to consistently enforce good order and discipline, and are therefore closely linked to command responsibility.

Finally, the Directive offers a number of measures for the protection of women and girls in armed conflict, and lists a number of responsibilities that operators and planners must focus on during all stages of NATO operations from the strategic planning to the re-deployment of forces. One example is the Rules of Engagement (ROE) development. The ROE need to provide the troops with the ability to not only use force for mission accomplishment, but also to use force to shield civilians, in particular women and girls, from violence, rape and other serious crimes.

The reports and returns describing



the mission progress now must contain statements on the level of integration of gender perspectives. The NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives in 2009 introduced the idea of gender awareness training to the Military Committee (MC). The MC endorsed the proposal as it agrees that gender mainstreaming is an indispensable part of operations and daily work. Following that, a gender training template was developed, which now provides the common principles as a basis for gender training both within the nations and in NATO training. The training template consists of a number of Topics to Learn, Learning Objectives and Targeted Public. On 18 July 2011, ACO released its Gender Action Plan, which is a consolidated plan with JFCs' input to facilitate the implementation of UNSCR 1325. The implementation will take place through a number of tasks to be achieved predominantly before the end of 2011.

This includes a revision of Bi-SC Dir 40-1 and an update of the COPD. The ACO Gender Action Plan also requires a higher degree of involvement of the nations, especially when it comes to improving the gender balance in operations to include deploying Gender Advisors. Special tasks are given to the deployed commanders, particularly in ISAF and KFOR, where numbers prescribing the desired number of female personnel in the security forces provides an ambitious challenge.

All these initiatives will in turn become a mandatory part of the JWC's training mission. Already periodic mission reviews are required to describe the progress on implementing UNSCR 1325. This requires the JFCs to develop measures of effectiveness in this regard, and have gender perspectives as an integral part of the on-going assessment. Therefore, the JWC needs to continue to develop our own knowledge in this area.

Gender perspectives are already a part of our MEL/MIL, where various incidents have a clear bearing on gender and culture awareness. We can, however, expect greater focus on this in the future. ✦

**"One is not born a woman,  
one becomes one"**  
- Simone de Beauvoir



Anyone wishing further guidance on gender is invited to contact the author by email on: lone.kjelgaard@jwc.nato.int

## GENDER DEFINITIONS IN NATO



**Gender:** The term "gender" refers to the social differences and social relations between women and men. It therefore refers not to women or men, but to the relationship between them, and the way this is socially constructed. A person's gender is learned through socialization and is heavily influenced by the culture of the society concerned.

**Gender equality:** This means equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities for women and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same; it means that women's and men's rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female.


**Gender mainstreaming:** Gender mainstreaming refers to the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes

in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women and men an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres to that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated.

**Gender analysis:** Gender analysis means looking at the different roles and activities that women, men, girls and boys have in a particular society and the social relationship between them. It asks "Who does what?" "Who makes the decisions?" "Who derives the benefits?" "Who uses resources such as land or credit?" "Who controls these resources?" and "What other factors influence relationships." Examining these aspects of a society reveals the differences in experiences of women, men, girls and boys.

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- [www.undp.org/women/mainstreaming](http://www.undp.org/women/mainstreaming)
- [www.unifem-eseasia.org](http://www.unifem-eseasia.org)
- [www.unwomen.org](http://www.unwomen.org)



**If you really want your audience to remember your message, then you have to make them want it.**



# **MAKING YOUR IDEA STICK**

## **Being heard in a world of information overload**



**By Paul Sewell**  
Lessons Learned Analyst, JCID, Joint Warfare Centre

*THIS is the third article* on the use (and abuse) of PowerPoint. The first article explored how to remedy some of the common mistakes we make with PowerPoint and the second offered some useful and user-friendly design principles to make our slides more interesting and effective for our audiences. This final article will focus on the most important element of any presentation: **the content**. You will be introduced to ways to give your content relevance and real impact, regardless of whether your audience are your work colleagues, a room full of generals, or the football team you coach on the weekend.

### **Information overload**

It is no secret that we are constantly bombarded with information both in our personal and professional lives. This overabundance of choice is harmful to both the sender and the receiver. The receiver is overwhelmed, trying earnestly to make sense of the flood of information, while the sender also suffers as their message is drowned out by countless other voices. We constantly switch between these two roles in our professional lives, so for the benefit of both we need to ensure that **what** we're talking about is understood. This article specifi-

cally focuses on how we can present and deliver our knowledge with real impact, regardless of the situation. However, we need to first tackle the biggest obstacle: the "curse of knowledge".

### **Curse of knowledge**

The most common barrier to communicating clearly, and with impact, is the "curse of knowledge". It's something we all suffer from, but are mostly unaware of. Take the following example. We all know of the person who is very intelligent but can't get his/her point across. They speak in jargon, and use acronyms,



concepts and processes only known to others from that specific area of expertise. Wait, does this sound familiar? YES! This occurs all over NATO! Every day, in every HQ! People are constantly giving presentations to people who have no idea about the topic and yet little is done to transform the content into terms that the audience can understand.

Simply put, once we know something, it's hard to put ourselves back in the mindset of *not* knowing it, which is often the knowledge level of our audience. We are "cursed" by our knowledge, so to speak, and cannot help but use specific terminology. Once you become aware of it, you will find it everywhere. No headquarters in NATO is immune!

Unfortunately, being able to adapt our communication so our audience understands, is taken for granted but seldom done: we all have thoughts, we can all talk, so what's the problem? The problem is clear: miscommunication has negative, and sometimes grave, consequences.

For example, your audience resents you because they fail to see the relevance of your presentation; a leader's uninspiring direction and guidance are incorrectly interpreted; you receive no support for your project because no one believes or understands it; staff ignore important safety and security issues simply because the information is not engaging.

This need not be the case and our personal histories tell us so. Think for a moment of an inspiring speech you once heard, a memorable scene from a film, or a story you read when you were young that has remained with you ever since. These moments stick so clearly in our minds even years after the event, but have you ever wondered why? What is the secret that makes one speech worthy of a standing ovation and another justification for capital punishment? How does one story stick in our minds amidst countless others?

Thankfully, the "curse of knowledge" has an antidote and can be found in the book, *MADE TO STICK* by Chip and Dan Heath. This immensely readable book is a result of their research into all of these things which "stick" in our minds, including stories, urban myths, speeches, advertising campaigns and so on. From

their research they uncovered **six principles**, which are presented below. They found that by using one or more of these principles, any idea could become more interesting, memorable, and ultimately more impacting on your audience; whoever they may be.

## The six principles

**SIMPLE**  
**UNEXPECTED**  
**CONCRETE**  
**CREDIBLE**  
**EMOTION**  
**STORY**

In line with NATO culture, they can be summarized in an easy to remember (but inaccurately spelled) acronym: **SUCCE**!

You probably already recognize some of them and have used them. However the **SUCCE** acronym serves as a simple reminder for these six important principles for you to use in future. There is enough explanation in this article for you to start, but those wishing to learn more are invited to read the book. Short examples will also be given to help demonstrate the principle.

### SIMPLE

This seems so obvious, but think how truly uncommon it is in NATO. The Alliance is so large and diverse that it is no wonder we come into contact with topics we have little knowledge about, many of which are overly technical, theoretical, or abstract. The first step is to determine your core message. If there was only one thing your audience would remember what would it be? One core message is much easier to remember than ten core messages. Can you simplify your topic with an analogy?

### UNEXPECTED

There are two main ways to get people's attention. The first is to capture it with surprise. This is also why jokes are so popular at the beginning of presentations because they contain the element of *surprise*. Is there something about

your topic that may surprise them? What preconceived ideas does your audience have that are wrong? Secondly, you can then hold their attention with *suspense*. Crime fiction is excellent at this. The reader is constantly kept guessing. This can be achieved by *asking questions*, which highlights gaps in their knowledge, such as, "Can anyone guess the most important skill to have in an operational headquarters?" or "Where do you think most of our intelligence comes from in theatre?" If you really want your audience to remember your message then you have to make them want it. These two elements of the unexpected principle pull people in and keep them captivated.

### CONCRETE

One of the biggest stumbling blocks to presenting is that the topic is too abstract. NATO, with its transformational focus, has many examples: CA, EBAO, DJSE, Future Capabilities, and so on. They have all suffered from the label of being "out there" and too abstract. To change this you need to give your audience common points of reference so they can find meaning. You can use physical descriptions: describing a hole that is big enough to fit an SUV gives your audience a better idea of its size, rather than just saying, "It's a big hole". You can use a metaphor: CIS infrastructure is like plumbing, putting in "pipes" to optimize the flow of information and remove blockages. You could also use a real world example rather than relying on theory.

### CREDIBLE

An idea with credibility can be taken a lot further. Advertisers have been using this since the very beginning and more importantly, strong leaders exude this principle. However, credibility can come in many forms, and it pays to think about where you can pull credibility from to bolster your message. Do you have credibility in your area of expertise? If not, who does and can you use them?



# ENGAGING YOUR AUDIENCE WITH SIX PRINCIPLES



## EMOTION

Slides full of graphs do little to inspire. Without doubt, audiences are more interested in people than numbers. Consider where you can bring the people factor into your data or area of knowledge. Engaging your audience means invoking some kind of emotion in them. For your content to be relevant, you have to answer the question they are all asking, "What's in it for me?" What does the data mean for them? Speak to their identity and their values, how they can contribute to your common goals.

## STORY

Our whole lives are made up of stories. It is no surprise that fables, biblical stories and urban myths have always had such a strong pull on us as humans. Stories are such a rich and compressed format

to distribute knowledge. They are easy to visualize and thus remember and infinitely more engaging than any SOP or directive. What stories can you tell about your topic? Can you tell them the origin of the concept, the people who invented it, what challenges they faced? Like the other principles, using story pulls people into your topic and gets them engaged.

## Using the principles

Like the advice given in the two previous articles, to get the best effect from these principles, start small. It's certainly not important that all six are used all the time, in fact many of the "stickiest" ideas we have in our history have used one or two at the most. Begin with one or two and expand as your confidence grows in the material. The main point is to use

these tools to strengthen your message. For an excellent example of these principles in use, check out a speech by the famous educator, *Sir Ken Robinson*<sup>(1)</sup>. He is proof that you can captivate an audience without a single PowerPoint slide. These skills can be used in any arena of life; not just work presentations.

In actual fact, you can use these six principles in any situation where you need to communicate with others and want to make an impact. This can be in any role: as a parent, a leader, colleague, friend, and so on.

As a final note, what got NATO where it is today will not get it to where we need to be tomorrow. Therefore in this age of information overload we each need two vital skills: to be able to communicate clearly and with impact, otherwise your message will be ignored or misunderstood at your peril. ✦



## SIMPLE

(BEFORE): "New network-enabled infrastructure providing seamless connectivity amongst end users."  
(AFTER): "The New CIS structure makes it easier for NATO staff to work together."



## UNEXPECTED

(BEFORE): "The following presentation will be on the security procedures in the HQ."  
(AFTER): "Did you know that I could extract all of your personal details on your phone with a device that costs no more than \$5?" [surprise] or "The last attack on the HQ occurred earlier this year; can you guess how it happened?" [suspense]



## STORY

(BEFORE): "I will now continue with Chapter 9, on Key Stakeholders in Comprehensive Approach."  
(AFTER): "When we started to look into working with IO/NGOs, we found that they each had completely different aims. We learned this the hard way. There once was a..."



## CREDIBLE

(BEFORE): "Lessons Learned is important because it helps headquarters improve."  
(AFTER): "There is no reason to send troops into the fight and get them killed when a lesson learned the month before could have been used for training," General James Mattis, former SACT.



## EMOTION

(BEFORE): "Welcome to the annual PAO Conference, which aims to contribute to NATO's transformational aims."  
(AFTER): "Right now, there is a military driver waiting to drive from ISAF HQ to Kabul International Airport. Every day he deals with the fact that his vehicle could be bombed and that he could be his last day on earth. Ladies and gentlemen, during this week's conference at this luxurious hotel, we must do our utmost to make sure the output of this week supports our troops on the ground."



## CONCRETE

(BEFORE): "The budget for the next exercise has been reduced by 15%."  
(AFTER): "The budget cuts will mean that we are unable to hire more contractors for the new exercise meaning that we will have no scenario support."

(1) [http://www.ted.com/talks/ken\\_robinson\\_says\\_schools\\_kill\\_creativity](http://www.ted.com/talks/ken_robinson_says_schools_kill_creativity)



# Neo-Taliban's Information Environment

By Hope Carr  
Media Subject Matter Expert  
Consultant

“Through the extensive use of **social media tools** the neo-Taliban has shifted the centre of gravity of conflict from the **kinetic battlefield** to the **information battlespace.**”



WAR is a compilation of moments in time that are thread together under the umbrella of strategic objectives, operational planning and tactical gains. Modern technological and industrial advancements have not only changed the experience of war but the skills required by those who fight them. The conflict in Afghanistan and the neo-Taliban have been instrumental in refocusing global attention on transitioning modern warfare, the evolution of our enemies and the impact of technology on the changing modern battlespace. As Jarrett Brachman, a recognized terrorist expert, states in his article HIGH-TECH TERROR: AL-QAEDA'S USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY: “For the United States to defeat the broader jihadi movement,

it must first gain a better appreciation of the ways in which the movement is successfully fuelling itself by harnessing new technologies.”

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (2001) introduced the term “netwar” a decade ago to describe a newly developing form of conflict that is played out in the information society. The term “netwar” is defined as: (...) an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms of organisation and related doctrines, strategies and technologies attuned to the information age. This early and accurate assessment has evolved during a decade of battle in Afghanistan and is now widely referred to as the “information battlespace”. As Jonathan Marcus, a BBC news diplomatic corre-



spondent effectively described in 2010: “It is called shaping the battlespace. It is not the traditional air onslaught or artillery barrage designed to weaken the intended enemy (...) it is now about shaping the information battlespace, because in Afghanistan – and in modern warfare in general – information has become the new front line.”

The neo-Taliban’s strength in this transition has been their ability to effectively embrace an approach of understanding the effect of media operations on both local and international populations. At the heart of this transition is the neo-Taliban’s evolution and adaption of their media environment to include the use of social media as both an internal and global force multiplier. As a result, the adoption of social media by the neo-Taliban has redefined the impact of the information environment allowing them to engage in a global war of words.

## Who is Neo-Taliban?

The neo-Taliban, a term first introduced by the Economist magazine in 2003, refers to militants in Afghanistan who fought against coalition and government forces and aid workers after the Taliban government was overthrown by the U.S. backed Northern Alliance in 2001. The distinction between the neo-Taliban (2003-present) and the paleo-Taliban (1994-2001) is defined by their resurgence following the fall of the Taliban government and their inclusion of “tribal malcontents, drug traffickers, and other ‘ill-educated chancers’”.

The label has come to include top leaders who were never captured, including Mullah Mohammed Omar, who founded the movement. Also included are Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hizb-e-Islami party, the main recipients of U.S. funded weapons that Pakistan funneled to the mujahidin groups that fought the 1979-89 Soviet occupation, Pakistani Islamic extremists, foreign jihadist and Al-Qaeda fighters from Chechnya, Uzbekistan, and Arab countries, Afghan drug merchants, lumber and gem smugglers, and criminal gangs who cover their activities by portraying themselves as defending Afghanistan

from non-native Muslims. While the new Taliban force is about a quarter the size of the original Taliban, the resurgent organization has the ability to replenish its ranks even after numerous confrontations with NATO and Afghan government forces. As Dr. Seth Jones, a senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation argues, the idea of the neo-Taliban has grudgingly evolved from a derisive label to a concession that the enemy is actually more organized and strategic than the U.S. or other NATO forces first assumed (2007).

## Neo-Taliban’s information environment

Following the U.S.-led OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, the Taliban began to regroup. By 2003, rearmed groups of neo-Taliban, from in and outside of Afghanistan, re-emerged as a strong resistance to U.S. forces. Initial successes led to the insurgents’ evolutionary step of initiating media and information campaigns in the hopes of reasserting the message of Taliban strength (Maloney, 2008).

The Taliban’s approach to the media was built on more than a decade of evolution in contemporary insurgent media. As Dr. Adam Exum, a former U.S. Army officer and a Fellow of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), outlines in 2008, the neo-Taliban followed in the successes of Hizbullah and Iraq and immersed themselves in media in an attempt to win local support, maintain power through fear and elicit anger, frustration, and backlash in the international community.

This transition was challenging for the neo-Taliban in consideration of their previous stance on the perils of western technology. But, like other insurgencies before them, they balanced the need to defeat their enemies with modified considerations of the impact on their ideologies. As James Forest illustrates, effective armed groups adapt to “attract new recruits and to avoid stagnation and complacency of the group’s members. They also recognize the need to learn and adapt in order to be successful against their more powerful government adversaries.” (2008) This adaption

has proved to be a successful risk for the neo-Taliban. “Once notorious for their ultra-orthodox interpretation of Islam, which prescribed a complete aversion to all manifestations of modernity, the Taliban now appear to have mastered innovations in technology and put them to optimal use in their insurgency against Hamid Karzai’s government and ISAF troops” (Brahimi, 2010).

Both the paleo and neo-Taliban originally focused internal information campaigns through Shabnamah or night letters, a traditional means of communication in Afghanistan that deliver threats or direction to individuals, villages or even whole provinces. This system of communication expanded in 2003 to include neo-Taliban publications in the form of pamphlets and magazines that supported Taliban ideas and activities. DVDs followed, which provided savage images of beheadings and attacks to punctuate the literature and night letters that the Taliban had relied on in the past. The use of DVDs also transcended high illiteracy rates in Afghanistan by relying on imagery to spread the message of the neo-Taliban.

The real transition in modern neo-Taliban media began in 2005 when the neo-Taliban began their Internet presence. Building on the success of Iraqi insurgent media’s use of the Internet, the Taliban perfected Hizbullah’s model of attack, tape and disseminate in an attempt to reach an international audience. While originally fairly basic, the site has evolved since 2005. As outlined in the article TALIBAN USES SOCIAL MEDIA TO USHER IN A NEW ERA OF JIHAD (2011): “More than just an amateur-made Taliban home page, the ‘Voice of Jihad’ is a full-service, well-managed, multi-media tool that is seemingly well-funded and poised for growth, which includes the use of an official spokesperson whose role is to promulgate these stories to other Internet mediums and sources.” The site is now updated up to 50 times daily and most battlefield accounts are presented in ticker tape format making them easy to transition to modern media mediums. This transition has allowed the neo-Taliban’s media environment to effectively challenge both the U.S. and





The impact of the neo-Taliban's **continued advancement** of their **media environment** and their **immersion into social and interactive media tools** has resulted in a **streamlined, modern and prolific media and public relations cells.**

NATO in their own traditional media outlets at home and internationally, and to effectively redefine insurgent online media as mainstream news. In a 2009 interview in *Foreign Policy*, Michael Doran, the former American Deputy Secretary of Defense, said: "The Taliban have great skill in directing their media activities and are very quick to publish news. If any attack is conducted against our forces, news is being published 26 minutes later on the global satellite networks, taking its place in the breaking news tickers for most of the global satellite networks like Al-Jazeera, BBC and CNN."

## Social media and the neo-Taliban

The announcements of the neo-Taliban's appearance on Twitter merely highlighted the fact that the neo-Taliban had already included social and interactive media tools into almost every component of their media campaign. As Jarrett Brachman accurately points out: "widespread misconceptions about the movement's use of technology have served to focus too much public (and thus policy) attention on the more sensational features of jihadi Internet activ-

ity, such as the online deluge of attack videos, and not enough on its more mundane aspects, such as jihadi web forums." The neo-Taliban's use of Twitter and other high profile social media tools has severely challenged the perception within the international community that the neo-Taliban's grasp of modern media has reached its limit and is challenging international forces to once again rise to the evolving information challenge driven by the neo-Taliban.

The neo-Taliban's inclusion of social and interactive media may best be explained by their desire to remove the middle man to allow them to communicate directly with their communities, networks and global audiences. The expansion of their media environment to include social and interactive media tools has not only had an external but also an internal impact on the insurgency. According to Brachman, they have "used the Internet to replace their dismantled training camps, reconnect their weakened organization, and reconstitute their leadership." And while he does not argue that the use of the Internet renders the physical training classrooms obsolete, Brachman does think that "information technologies do change the nature of education, indoctrination, and participation," (2006).

Key to this transition has been the ability of the neo-Taliban to understand the power that social media has in providing a voice and a presence to an organization that would otherwise be invisible to the global audience.

"The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan joined Twitter months ago," Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid told AFP, using the group's name from its time in power. "We did it because we know Twitter is a popular social network in the West, and we want to make our voice heard. They used to hear only one-sided news about us from the invaders, but now they can know the reality." Mujahid said that an official Taliban page on Facebook had been shut down by the company earlier this year, but supporters still host personal pages passing on news and information.

"We regard modern technology including the Internet as a blessing of God," he said, declining to explain the

Taliban's change of attitude since they were toppled for sheltering Al-Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks.

The most obvious social media tool that the neo-Taliban has used is Twitter. But, another example is their use of Google's Orkut, a popular, worldwide Internet service, which provides a useful tool for accessible communication with others who have a similar affinity for jihad. This online community has helped rally support for the movement and facilitated the sharing of jihadi videos as well as communication among non-Arab jihad sympathizers. These two social media tools do not even begin to address the inclusion of Facebook groups and discussion groups/interactive components on their "Voice of Jihad" website that serve audiences in five languages.

The impact of the neo-Taliban's continued advancement of their media environment and their immersion into social and interactive media tools has resulted in a streamlined, modern and prolific media and public relations cells. Further, the transition from a singular to a comprehensive insurgent media environment has happened at lightning speed. The result has been an unprepared military and public consumer. As outlined in the article *TALIBAN USES SOCIAL MEDIA TO USHER IN A NEW ERA OF JIHAD* the neo-Taliban's exploitation of social media is moving at an unprecedented pace allowing them to disseminate orders, post information on attacks and link with international media at a break-neck pace through various social media tools. "A new war has been building; a cyber war of words, challenging the West to be better and faster at viral messaging — emailing, texting, Twittering, YouTubeing, blogging, and Facebooking. It's pervasive, sweeping across terrorist breeding grounds in the Middle East and taking root right here among us. Seemingly overnight, the rules of war have gotten less literal and more virtual."

## The new information battlespace

As an insurgency, this expansion has enabled the neo-Taliban to expand beyond their territorial boundaries and



engage in a global conversation, recruiting a fear campaign that all serve an end goal of ridding Afghanistan of western forces. As Angela Crack has described, engaging in the public sphere allows for expansions previously limited by territorial space. “New Information and Communication Technologies have increased dialogic opportunities between geographically disparate actors, thus opening up the prospect of extending public spheres beyond the state.” (2007)

While the neo-Taliban may never have considered their transition in terms of entering the public sphere, they always understood the necessity of combining the military and information battlespace if they were to succeed in Afghanistan. We see this in al-Zawahiri’s quotation when he said, “We must get our message across to the masses of the nation and break the media siege imposed on the jihad movement. This is an independent battle that we must launch side by side with the military battle” (2001). As a result of this aggressive insurgent media campaign, international forces have had to acknowledge and engage in a new information battlespace. NATO’s former top commander in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, best summarized the conflict in Afghanistan when he stated in an interview with the BBC in 2010 that “this is all a war of perceptions. This is not a physical war in terms of how many people you kill or how much ground you capture, how many bridges you blow up. This is all in the minds of the participants.”

This statement by ISAF’s highest ranking soldier highlights the realities of the changing modern battlespace and the fact that it is now a reality, rather than an annoyance, of war. The concept of the information battlespace is now also taking hold in driving our approach to war and is at the heart of achieving successful outcome in Afghanistan by winning the battle of perceptions. As accurately described in the article *TALIBAN USES SOCIAL MEDIA TO USHER IN A NEW ERA OF JIHAD* (2011) the driver behind that new information battlespace is the neo-Taliban who has survived more than a decade of international military presence while advancing their media

environment capabilities. The article says: “Like an army of ants that surround their host and then simultaneously attack as one synchronized unit, the Taliban is now able to instantly disseminate orders across cyberspace to targeted audiences using every available technology.”

## Conclusion

For centuries the word “war” has been synonymous with physical battle. The war in Afghanistan and the neo-Taliban insurgency have changed the way that modern militaries fight wars. Through the extensive use of social media tools the neo-Taliban has shifted the centre of gravity of conflict from the kinetic battlefield to the information battlespace. With the advancements of digital technology the neo-Taliban have effectively transitioned the battlespace and evened the playing field by creating a war where they do not have to meet the enemy soldier for soldier; allowing them to not only survive but also expand and evolve.

As highlighted by the Crisis Group in Asia: “At the heart of this development and transition is the neo-Taliban’s adaption of and evolution to social media mediums for the purpose of depicting themselves as unflagging and their ultimate victory as inevitable in order to secure a strategic advantage. The neo-Taliban as an assertive insurgency is seeking to project its power to both domestic and international audiences”.

As Stephanie Maier contends, “the pervasiveness of the Taliban’s use of social media and technology is a sure sign that there is more to come,” (2011). To sum up, this is a battlespace that is still growing and is challenging modern militaries to catch up. †

References for this article are listed on page 66.

**Right:** Information battlespace is constantly growing and challenging modern physical battlespace. **Above:** ISAF photo by Royal Army Sergeant Andy Cole.

## Physical Battlespace VS Information Battlespace





# JWC Media Staff Prepares to Debut New Multimedia Capabilities

By Pete DuBois and Laura Loflin DuBois  
World News Today (WNT) Producers, Joint Exercise Division  
Joint Warfare Centre

## The mission

Since its inception in 2005, the Joint Exercise Division (JED) Media Section has been operating from studio and office space at the Ulsnes Training Facility. The location was not chosen for its prime fishing spot or waterfront view but rather out of necessity. The original Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) facilities at Jättå, including the former temporary buildings, did not provide adequate space for the media operation, and with JWC exercises held at Ulsnes, it made sense for the exercise media team to base its operations there.

In 2006, the media staff quickly converted the Ulsnes Boathouse into a space that would accommodate the staff

of six and the cameras, lights and other equipment that go with the mission. Five years and many exercises later, the JED media team is on the cusp of beginning a new chapter in media simulation and training with their state-of-the-art studio in the new JWC headquarters building in Jättå. The staff began formal training on the equipment early this year and current plans call for the studio and related distribution system to be fully operational in 2012.

The mission of the JED Media Section is unique within NATO as it is the only full-time media training and simulation entity in the 28 country Alliance. NATO's investment into this mul-

timillion Euro capability reflects how important the media environment is to Alliance training and mission rehearsals. Media training has evolved from a nice-to-have offering into an essential training objective and the JWC has been at the forefront of this movement, providing practical training to NATO's key leaders and their staffs.

## The studio

The studio was integrated into the design of the new headquarters building and the equipment was carefully selected in order to meet the mission of providing timely, realistic and effective



media products to JWC Training Audiences. At the heart of these capabilities lies the studio and master control room on the 2<sup>nd</sup> level. This will be the home of future World News Today (WNT) productions – the flagship product of the JED media simulation mission. As its name implies, the master control room is the nerve center for live and taped productions. All of the elements going into a newscast converge here and are either remotely or manually inserted into the final product. A variety of components allow for complete control of audio, video, graphics and even lighting.

The studio is simple yet impressive. Gone are the days when a TV news set required props, windows, plants, monitors or even camera operators. The new studio uses a virtual set comprised of a blue background, lights, two cameras and news desk. Virtual sets allow the crew to digitally create a variety of looks depending on the scenario. The studio cameras provide different perspectives of the subjects and are totally operated via remote control.

## The process

The new studio and master control components will certainly provide new capabilities to the mission; however, that does not mean the media equipment at Ulsnes will be mothballed, sold or given away at the next JWC yard sale. Many of the components currently in use at Ulsnes will be integrated into the production process at Jättå. This is necessary in order to meet the complex demands of the JWC's exercises and mission rehearsals. The media simulation team will still be fully kitted out and prepared to deploy to Training Audiences outside of Norway. Many of the elements used in WNT newscasts and other productions are created by the media staff at their workstations using a variety of multimedia software. These pieces are then inserted into the show being produced in the studio. Graphics, animations, standalone reports and audio clips are created and/or manipulated on separate computers and then transferred to master control.

World News Today is known for being realistic, dynamic and effective when it comes to creating television news during exercises. To unsuspecting viewers WNT newscasts are often mistaken for real-world news programs seen on CNN or BBC. The WNT staff looks to take that realism even further with a few more capabilities in the new facility. The two most exciting features are the ability to produce a live newscast and the media distribution system.

Currently, a WNT newscast takes most of the day to produce in order to be ready for an 18:00 viewing by the Training Audience. The product might look "live" however it actually takes hours to produce. Scripts and interviews are conducted by mid-day and the afternoon is spent shooting, editing and creating the many other elements needed. The lead-time of this process forces the team to cutoff the news information flow in the early afternoon. Any major events happening in the exercise after that time cannot be included in that evening's

## SPOTLIGHT WNT multimedia artists' perspectives:



**Yrjan Johansen**  
"I've worked at other TV studios before and what we have now at Jättå is definitely the best and most modern I've worked with. The thing that stands out the most is how automated a lot of things are in the studio."



**Chris Hill**  
"Perhaps the biggest improvement that customers can expect is the immediacy that the new facility provides. Newscasts no longer need to be limited to a 6 pm viewing time. I really think we have only just begun to scratch the surface of what's possible."



**Brandon Chhoeun**  
"A commander's channel, news about events in the Joint Warfare Centre, and even Community Support news bulletins are just some ideas that can also be possible with the new studio."



**Tudor Jelescu**  
"Staff going through our media training sessions will now experience a full-blown TV studio and feel the pressure of the cameras and lights exactly as if they were interviewed on the BBC or CNN. These new capabilities will help increase the perception about the JWC as being the premiere training facility for NATO."



newscast. This will all change in the new training facility.

## The way ahead

With the stand-up of the new studio and control room, live newscasts to the Training Audience in Jättå will now be possible. It's a capability offered nowhere else in the military exercise community and will provide the Training Audience a media environment that will mirror the reality of the modern 24/7 news cycle.

Future WNT newscasts will not only be able to report on a larger number of events but be flexible enough to react to late breaking changes in the scenario, which can often happen. For example, there might be a mass casualty event scheduled for the afternoon. Previously, WNT would have had to pre-produce the report in order to have it ready for broadcast. If there were last minute changes to the story then the report would have to be cut or delayed.

With the new capability, WNT will be able to report the mass casualty event soon after it happens, in real-time and with the latest, relevant information from Exercise Control. The "live" element of the new facility also introduces

an added media training opportunity. WNT will be able to conduct "live" interviews during an exercise with selected staff from the Training Audience. Live interviews are a fact of life in today's media environment and NATO military personnel have increasingly taken part in these interviews from Afghanistan and other locations.

Currently, WNT interviews are conducted early in the day in order to be ready for the post-production process. Sometimes interviews are simulated "live" but in reality they are usually a few hours old by the time the program is produced and aired. Now, the Training Audience will have the opportunity to take part in true, live interviews and be able to respond to whatever the situation might be. The only simulated elements in the live interviews are the locations of the participants. For example, the interviewer can be "in London" in the WNT studio on the 2<sup>nd</sup> level, while the interviewee can be "in-theatre" on the 1<sup>st</sup> level. Video monitors throughout Exercise Control and the Training Audience will be able to show the interview as it is happening. It is an excellent chance for senior leaders to hone their messaging skills in a live setting.

Distributing the WNT programs and other media products will follow a two-pronged approach. In addition to loading the products onto WISE, they will also be pushed out through the JWC's internal distribution system. The widescreen monitors mounted throughout the headquarters can now be used to broadcast news products in real time. The staff has the capability to determine what programming goes to what monitors. This will be a breakthrough that gives Exercise Control the ability to control when certain information is pushed to the Training Audience and it provides a more realistic avenue to deliver media products.

## The evolution of media simulation

Ultimately, the mission of the JWC media simulation team will not change. The team will still provide media simulation and training to NATO's commanders and their staffs. The new studio and equipment will simply allow them to take their training to another level, providing a more realistic media environment, reflective of what commanders will actually face on the front lines. ✦



Laura and Pete DuBois, WNT Producers

# A PRESS DESK WITHIN THE JOINT OPERATIONS CENTRE

By Public Affairs Office  
HQ Rapid Reaction Corps — France

**T**AKING ADVANTAGE of its recent operational theatre experience in ISAF Joint Command, Rapid Reaction Corps — France Public Affairs Office (RRC-FR PAO) experimented with the implementation of a new Public Affairs structure in the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) at EXERCISE COMMON TENACITY 2011, held in Camp Wildflecken, Germany.

Like in most NATO JOC layouts for high readiness forces, a PA officer is part of the JOC team and serves as a Liaison Officer (LNO) to PAO, keeping it updated on the latest events, incidents and facts of a nature to trigger a PA response. However, due to the latest developments on the battlefield, combined with a spectacular evolution in use of new media in conflict areas, PA assets on the ground are required to provide thorough responses to ensure new challenges are properly addressed. To be able to do so, HQ RRC-FR put to test, for the first time, a “quick reaction” tool called “Press Desk” as it is currently employed by the ISAF Joint Command Current Operations Cross Functional Team.

## Answering media queries efficiently: a permanent challenge

Events on the battlefield, such as own troop or civilian casualties, plane crashes, or, in a different register, successful development projects, greatly influence people’s perception of the conflict, be it internationally or locally. Raw, first-hand accounts of events become available very fast through use of modern communication technology. Reporters worldwide, including local media, adjust accordingly and expect the Land Component

Command (LCC) to provide quicker confirmation of facts at hand. Therefore, it is very important once reporters have queries related to their stories, that an extensive effort is undertaken to provide adequate answers. Reporters will normally send their queries to the PA Office. Determining the relevant facts and executing the subsequent chain of approval process may slow down information delivery time and even information accuracy. Even though everyone works fast, answers cannot be given on the spot. A time delay is imposed and reporters may fear they will not be first with the information, especially if they have it first-hand. So, they may decide to publish an unverified story. This is one of the reasons why *referring media queries directly to the JOC* could significantly help to speed up the military’s response time. All branches have representatives in the JOC, which allows the JOC Press Desk team to cut down on information verification time and present verbal confirmation to reporters within minutes.

## Issuing press releases: first to tell the story

Press releases must be issued fast in order to inform the public and counteract the enemy’s media misinformation spree, regardless of the subject. In this way, the military can be the first with the information to the public, so that the enemy’s unrealistic or exaggerated message can be balanced with the military’s story. The longer the delay in publishing truthful information, the more credibility for the enemy’s story! Since all LCC branches have specialists acting as LNOs in the JOC, it becomes easier for a JOC Press Desk representative to get information fast, *craft a press release and issue it directly from the JOC*. This could be seen as a major shift in PA procedures as Chief Press Desk needs to hold release authority for each specific release. If the regular chain of approval is followed, however, the “time window” for providing correct information first may be lost, and additional (in most cases useless) effort is expended to rectify a story already reported in the news.

## Creating media updates: raised awareness across staff

Since most of the operational effort is concentrated around the JOC and JOC members, together with LCC leadership, media awareness briefings should be given at least twice a day. Major events may trigger more in-depth media analyses, which can be run by the PA Office, but firsthand media awareness, together with relevant news verifications (also done in the JOC), should be available in the JOC. Given the mounds of information on the table (latest news, their confirmation, and other details),



HQ Rapid Reaction Corps France





creating media updates at the JOC Press Desk can bring great advantage.

### JOC Press Desk: part of the staff

All LCC members play a role in the proper functioning of a JOC Press Desk, the key here being the release authority given to Press Desk members with regard to press releases, media queries and statements, as well as any other actions to be taken by the desk. Release authority is required in order for the Press Desk to be first with the information, seize and keep the initiative and gain the media momentum. Crisis communication

needs in conflict zones, however, cannot be met by the Press Desk alone since the desk normally has a narrower area of responsibilities, mainly dealing with short-term issues. Therefore, in terms of events that could impact heavily on the LCC, a sustained coordinated effort led by Chief PAO will be required, as will a set of predefined criterion for triggering required actions. In respect to manning, given the new tasks and responsibilities of the JOC Press Desk, a minimum of three PA officers are required to man a robust cell, subject to variations in media pressure.

### Conclusion

The experimental use of a JOC Press Desk in the RRC-FR exercise delivered superior results in terms of gaining media momentum, as well as boosting news delivery and saving information verification time, thus reflecting the HQ's constant efforts to improve its operational procedures. The JOC Press Desk is a quicker alternative to the traditional media relations process as conducted in an operational environment. The Rapid Reaction Corps – France will continue to refine all aspects of this structure, as well as its procedures so as to more closely identify benefits and potential improvements. †

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U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 1st Class Stephen Hickok.



# Adventurous Training

## BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY

By Wg Cdr Mark Watson, Royal Air Force  
Joint Warfare Centre



The United Kingdom's Joint Service Adventurous Training (AT) scheme is designed to test and develop the qualities of fitness, self-reliance, physical and moral courage, powers of endurance and interdependence. A secondary aim of the training is to provide a nucleus of instructors whose task it will be to lead expeditions and pass on their learning. AT is conducted through the medium of sporting activity, including parachuting, sub-aqua diving (and caving), mountaineering and offshore sailing. Regardless of rank, age or experience all UK servicemen are encouraged to participate, with many younger servicemen sent on AT as part of their early training. It is recognized that the emotions experienced on AT are akin to those experienced on operations, and it thus plays a vital role in preparing individuals for deployment.

The Kiel Training Centre is located in northern Germany. The Centre provides AT through offshore sailing and sub-aqua diving courses; the offshore sailing element comprises ten 34 foot

(10 meters) yachts. These yachts are replaced every three years, the boats being delivered by sea from Ellos, Sweden (north of Gothenburg) to Kiel.

Exercise Diamond Viking was organised by the Kiel Training Centre and served a dual purpose: to deliver 10 yachts and conduct AT during the delivery passage. UK service personnel from the JWC formed one of the crews. Colonel Colin Nobbs, Lieutenant Colonel Ian Stanton, Wing Commander Mark Watson and WO2 (FofS) Bob James have all gained much from the scheme. This was an opportunity for them to profit from the scheme and reinvest time and effort for the benefit of future servicemen; they did so during the 2011 delivery, which took place over the pre-equinox period 4-17 March.

A mixed bag of experience marked the crews and skippers: from nil to Ocean Yachtmaster. Some skippers had brought complete novices, with the intent of bringing them to the Royal Yachting Association's Competent Crew

standard. The JWC crew were vastly more experienced but, never expecting the journey from Sweden to Germany to be easy, was surprised by the harshness of the passage: brand new boats and their attendant teething problems, foul weather and fog, storm force winds and sea sickness all contributed their part. Taking over brand new boats, checking inventories and ensuring everybody had a firm grasp of safety procedures, from working on the foredeck to man overboard drills, was a time consuming process. This process is nevertheless essential before undertaking the lengthy and arduous passages expected, and helps mitigate the risks of offshore sailing. The two days spent alongside in Ellos was vital for what was to come.

Although further south than Stavanger, the weather was far more severe and the boatyard team had to break up the 10-15 cm of ice that threatened the fleet's departure. Once clear of the harbour, the forecast southerly wind soon freshened and was gusting to 30



# “ The fleet had endured gale force 10 winds and 11 to 12 foot seas, sea sickness, freezing temperatures and tough living conditions.

knots. Sail size was reduced but it was quickly apparent that to make progress we would need to proceed under engine. The rough seas and strong winds persisted for the next 30 hours — and the sleet and snow during the midnight hours only made the sea sickness feel worse, a condition much of the fleet was to suffer. After some 34 hours since departing Ellos, skirting around the ice-bound harbour on Anholm, and a passage of 150 nm; we arrived in Grenaa, Denmark.

While most had found some form of “sea legs” during the earlier passage, the next passage was to experience more severe weather, with winds peaking at 57 knots, and steeper seas. Changing sails in such conditions at night is a major challenge and tests the crew to the maximum; leaving the cockpit tests communication, needs teamwork and no small measure of courage. Going below to navigate becomes a physical challenge as crew are thrown around the cabin while trying to chart position, correct the course and call out waypoints to the helmsman. We were forced again to resort to the engine to battle the mounting seas and head winds, cooking was nigh on impossible and we survived, those that could face food, on biscuits and water. Our crew all suffered multiple bruises as we were flung across the cabin,

and it was after this leg, two members of another crew were hospitalised, suffering head and back injuries. As one of our crew was to experience, after a particularly gruelling stint on the helm, it was easier to stay on the floor and sleep than try to get into a berth.

After 25 hours on passage we found our mooring in Fredericia, Denmark — and tucked into the curry we had scraped up from behind the galley stove where it had been deposited after one particularly violent wave. During the next three sailing days, both Ian and Bob planned and executed complex passages culminating in night entrances into unfamiliar harbours. Our passage to Sonderborg, Denmark was marked by light winds, forcing the use again of the engine. Picking up the navigation lights at night against the backdrop of a major town was problematical and saw the speed kept to a minimum. Nonetheless, we were alongside the town quay by 22:00, albeit on the wrong side of the swing bridge for any of the amenities, and ready for hot food. We now discovered a loose hose had allowed all our cooking gas to vent overboard; fortunately, we were able to borrow a bottle from another of the fleet.

Our departure the next day from Sonderborg in 400m visibility was aborted when the next buoy was spotted

in less than 50m visibility; with only a rudimentary radar reflector (and no radar of our own) and the necessity to cross the Flensburg–Kiel shipping channel the decision was made to turn back for the visiting yacht marina. This sounds grand, and in the summer months it is, when these harbours are thronging with other yachts and the facilities available; we, however, were the only yachts on the water and these havens offered nothing more than somewhere to moor up. Water and electricity had to be husbanded and the careful victualing conducted before we left Kiel now paid dividends.

The final day’s passage to Kiel was again marked by strong gusts but the wind, no longer on the nose, meant we were able to sail rather than having to rely on engine power. After 345 nautical miles, over some 84 hours of sailing (one third, which was at night) and at an average speed of four knots, we tied up alongside at Kiel. The fleet had endured gale force 10 winds and 11 to 12 foot seas, sea sickness, freezing temperatures and tough living conditions. Did we achieve the aims of the exercise? Categorically, yes. We delivered 10 yachts (now in less than showroom condition) and fulfilled every aspect of Adventurous Training. Beyond the call of duty? No... *Duty Carried Out.*





## JWC Battlefield Studies



PHOTOS Lt Col Markus Beck, DEU A PAO, Joint Warfare Centre



OTX

## HIGH NORTH

will be featured on the upcoming December issue of **The Three Swords**

## NASA ASTRONAUTS VISITED JWC

Two astronauts with NASA's STS 129 Mission, U.S. Navy Captain Barry Wilmore (pilot) and Mike Foreman (mission specialist), visited the Joint Warfare Centre on 21 September 2011, to give a presentation about the STS 129 Mission aboard space shuttle Atlantis in November 2009. The presentation at Jättå consisted of a demonstration of pictures that the STS 129 crew took from outer space as well as a spectacular movie, showing Atlantis' launch at 700 frames per second, films taken inside the International Space Station at zero gravity and ultimately Atlantis' successful landing after the completion of its 11-day mission. (Read the full article on JWC website at [www.jwc.nato.int](http://www.jwc.nato.int))



## JWC TENNIS TOURNAMENT

The JWC Tennis Club held its first international tournament in May and June, just between the French Open and the Wimbledon championships. A total of 16 players competed and played 15 matches. On 6 July 2011, with the participation of Col Nobbs, the winners, Lt Col Siegfried Eisenreich (men's singles), Mr Simon Dewing (doubles); and Ms Anne Gaelle Ferrandi (ladies' singles), were rewarded and warmly congratulated. (From left: Lt Col Bottee de Toulmon, Col Nobbs, Lt Col Aguera, Mr Dewing, Mr Francesco, Lt Col Hammerer, Col Eisenreich, Ms Ferrandi, PO Ferrandi, Ms Drezigue, MSgt Dieguez, Lt Drezigue, Lt Col Ozcelik.)





## In Memoriam

### *The solemn Remembrance Ceremony in Jättå marks the 10th Anniversary of September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks*

On Friday, 9 September 2011, U.S. Air Force Major Peter F. Olsen, Commander 426th Air Base Squadron, Stavanger, Norway, held a Commemoration and Remembrance Ceremony at the Squadron's Community Activity Centre, to mark the 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attacks on America as well as to honour and celebrate the resilience of individuals, families, and communities across the world.

French Army Major General Jean Fred Berger, Commander of the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC); U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer, JWC Chief of Staff; Norwegian Army Brigadier Gunnar E. Gustavsen, Adviser to Commander JWC, as well as many other staff attended the solemn ceremony in Jättå. The sequence of events started with a short prayer, which was then followed by remarks from Major Olsen.

"The 10<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of September 11 is a milestone for the United States; a moment to reflect on the events that took place ten years ago," Major Olsen said in his opening speech.

"Having spent five of the last ten years living in Europe, I know that September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks not only affected my Nation, but changed the world and our relationships in it. Citizens of 90 countries were among the 2,993 souls lost that day. The attacks united us with our fellow democratic nations against an ideology of radical extremism. As we reflect on the horrific day that marked the beginning of our struggle to better secure the world from these threats, we honour those that died in the attack, the heroic efforts of emergency response personnel, and the resilience of the survivors."

The ceremony highlighted that September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States were not a uniquely American event; as in their aftermath the world has witnessed at least a dozen large scale and brutally efficient attacks by extremists throughout Europe and Asia.

**Left:** (Above) Light beams are lit at the site in memory of World Trade Center destroyed on September 11. Photo by Songquan Deng. Below: Maj Olsen.



Brig. Gen. Steven J. DePalmer,  
U.S. Air Force, JWC Chief of Staff

Most recently, on 22 July 2011, our Host Nation of Norway was attacked by an extremist. The ceremony underlined that as we confront such senseless and horrific attacks, our commitment to promote and defend the shared values of tolerance, understanding and mutual respect quickly emerge as a common sentiment.

Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer also provided remarks during the ceremony where he expressed his compassion and solidarity for the victims of the terrorist acts. He also paid tribute to the soldiers in harm's way dealing with active conflicts, adding that we must also remember and honour those who died in the fighting that has followed. Brigadier General DePalmer also challenged the audience to think ahead another 10 years and decide what they can do to help prevent similar attacks.

#### *Recollections of the 9/11 attacks*

At the end of the ceremony there was a special presentation about the biggest attacks on American soil a decade ago, which demonstrated extraordinary images as well as the unique memories of some of the Jättå community members on that day. Each slide highlighted how September 11 marked our collective memory and changed the world; reminding us, as vivid as yesterday, our profound state of horror and disbelief, while uniting us all in remembrance and reflection once again. †

Text Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

**WNT**  
WORLD NEWS TODAY



# JWC Media Staff Prepares to Debut New Multimedia Capabilities

▶ Article Page 62.

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WORLD NEWS TODAY