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OTX 2011
THE HIGH NORTH
Major General Jean Fred Berger
French Army Commander
Joint Warfare Centre

As the end of the year approaches, it is time to ask how 2011 turned out and what 2012 holds for the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). As well as one of the busiest years in the history of the JWC, 2011 was also one of the most successful ones. Two ISAF Mission Rehearsal Exercises, two NRF certification events, two Iraqi Key Leader Training courses and two Individual Augmentee Pre-Deployment Training events were conducted under our Programme of Work. I also understand that the Change of Command carried its challenges.

In 2011, the JWC showed the high quality of its deliverables, which are reality-oriented, leading-edge, flexible, adaptable and above all, relevant to NATO’s operational needs and requirements. The JWC demonstrated:

• innovation and flexibility by supporting Unified Endeavour as the 1st US Corps pre-deployment training for ISAF;
• adaptability and flexibility by implementing the Commander’s priorities and demanding training requirements during the Steadfast Juncture execution phases to enable NRF certification;
• adaptability and relevance to NATO by collecting, identifying and implementing lessons learned from operations, to include ISAF and NATO’s Libyan Operation Unified Protector, and then delivering the most up-to-date exercises possible.

In my mind, this is the way, maybe the best way, to meet the operational requirements of the NATO force commands.

2011 is coming to a close and a new year will soon be upon us. 2012 will be challenging to meet for NATO in terms of operations, as well as internally. ISAF will continue to implement the transition to Afghan National Security Forces. NATO will conduct a large structural reform and begin to set up Smart Defence in May, during the Chicago Summit. SACEUR, with the support of the JWC, will play a key role in taking these new steps forward for NATO.

These issues, in addition to new threats, lessons learned from Operations Unified Protector and Unification, international financial constraints and unpredictable events occurring in this versatile world of ours will bring challenges to our community of trainers. Although I know the workload for all of us may be heavy, with the ISAF exercise at Grafenwoehr being the first of many, there are certainly exciting times ahead.

On behalf of the JWC staff, I want to assure you that the JWC will continue to support NATO and, not least, troops currently deployed or soon to deploy, while remaining faithful to our philosophy: ‘Train As You Fight.’ The path we took in 2011, through the conduct of our Programme of Work as described above, is clear. It is vital for NATO, as demonstrated by Unified Protector, to be constantly ready to conduct operations and to be ambitious in its objectives. The JWC is obviously not alone in delivering on this level of ambition, but I am convinced that we, the JWC, are a keystone for those objectives. The JWC obviously is not alone in delivering on this level of ambition, but I am convinced that we, the JWC, are a keystone for those objectives. The JWC obviously is not alone in delivering on this level of ambition, but I am convinced that we, the JWC, are a keystone for those objectives.

On behalf of the JWC staff I want to thank the Centre’s staff for their professional skills, experience, dedication and commitment. It is my honour to be in charge of, and command, this supportive community. All my best wishes for the upcoming year go out to the JWC staff, Host Nation Norway, NATO and Nations and, in particular, to troops currently deployed or getting ready to deploy.
A change in scenery

Skolkan is NATO’s new exercise setting being developed by the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). This new setting transforms our Partner Nations of Sweden and Finland into various countries of instability and/or concern. In addition, “North Island New Zealand” is added as a new country, off the coast of Norway, to add to the level of complexity in the maritime domain. Scandinavia is now transformed into a potential crisis area for NATO.

Since 2008, the Cerasia setting has successfully been the backdrop for training NATO forces. With the geographic setting based in the Horn of Africa, Cerasia has provided the perfect venue to focus NATO Response Force (NRF) out-of-area deployments in support of Crisis Response Operations (CRO), Peace Support Operations (PSO), humanitarian assistance, terrorism, and piracy missions. Despite its success and practical applicability, new threats, redefined missions, lessons learned, and expanded capabilities demand NATO training to evolve and progress.

With that mindset, a new setting and scenario was needed to replace Cerasia, which could provide training across the full spectrum of current and future operations. In 2009, the decision was made and the Skolkan region (Scandinavia) was chosen as the best candidate for the new setting.

Lessons learned from Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya only reinforced the need for a new setting to train NATO commands to a wider set of mission areas. Skolkan broadens NATO’s ability in how strategic, operational, and tactical commands are trained. Not only would exercises using Skolkan be able to support the same mission areas as previously used in Cerasia, it expands support to other missions such as Article V operations, protection of critical infrastructure, cyber defence, missile defence, and energy infrastructure security. In addition, Skolkan provides an opportunity to demonstrate “Visible Assurance” and its commitment to respond to threats against NATO Nations.

The task of creating Skolkan was given to the JWC in January 2010. Our mission is to deliver NATO’s newest setting and scenario that ensures the continued readiness of the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure (NFS).

Creating a fictitious world

So, who is responsible for creating Skolkan? A qualified team of six uniformed officers and 14 civilian contractors make up the JWC’s Scenario Section. The task of creating six countries from scratch relies upon the collective talent and creativity of this group. Each member of the Section has a specified role that encompasses different areas of responsibility such as geography, intelligence, and logistics. From the development of maps, railway timetables and biographies of influential individuals, to encyclopedic books that describe each country in areas such as politics, military, economy, and society – the Scenario Section creates it all.

Twenty-seven months. That will be the...
amount of time it takes to create the world of Skolkan when we kick off and execute STEADFAST JUNCTURE 12 (SFJ12a) in November 2012. The time and energy spent during these 27 months hopefully creates the most realistic environment for the Training Audience (TA) to operate in during the exercise. The scope of this project and level of detail required to create such a realistic environment is a testament to the dedication and commitment to training provided not only by the members of the Scenario Section, but the JWC as a whole.

Setting vs Scenario

What we are creating in the Scenario Section is both the setting and scenario for an exercise. These are two terms that are often confused and used incorrectly. In an effort to help clarify the difference, think of an exercise as a play on a stage. The setting is the stage itself: the props, the backdrop, etc. It puts our actors (the TA) in context. A scenario could be thought of as a plot of the play. It is “why” the actors are on the stage. The last piece of the play is the Main Events List/Main Incidents List (MEL/MIL), or, the script. The MEL/MIL defines what the actors will be doing during the play/exercise. It is a very simplistic way of looking at it, but hopefully this helps to explain and clarify the terms.

The School of Skolkan: The Setting

History 101

The term Skolkan is a reference to the former Skolkan Empire that once ruled the High North. Its history can be traced as far back as the late 14th and early 15th centuries. The former Empire that centred around Torrike, reached its pinnacle in the mid 19th century, also comprised of what are now the countries of Armland, Framland, Bothnia, Otso, and Lindsey as well as having overlordship of Norway.

The first nation to declare its independence was Lindsey in the late 18th century. Norway and Framland were next to declare independence in 1905. The remaining countries followed suit over the next 10 years to officially end the reign of the Skolkan Empire.

The transition to new found independence was not as smooth as they all might have hoped. Over the past decades, internal strife, political jockeying and two World Wars all contributed to the Skolkan nations having grown to be today. Each nation has made strides to globally establish itself and be recognised as contributors in the political and economic arena. However, elements of corruption, organised crime, paranoia, and expansionist ambitions also describe the nations of Skolkan.

Geography 101

The overall requirement for creating Skolkan was to develop six new countries that occupy the High North region of Europe. Three of the countries would represent potential aggressor states to act as the “adversaries” in the exercise scenario. A fourth country would be a non-member nation that is “friendly” to NATO, while another country would represent a failing state. To round out the countries, a sixth nation was developed as a buffer between the exercise area and Russia. The difficulty in this is that there is only so much territory in Europe to work with. So, Sweden and Finland had graciously agreed to let their countries be divided into five of those nations. To create the final country, North Island New Zealand was brought up from the South- ern Hemisphere and termed approximately 50 nm off the coast of Norway.

The countries of Skolkan

The following is a brief description of the countries Bothnia, Torrike, Lindsey, Armland, Framland, and Otso.

Bothnia:

Bothnia is one of the potential aggressor states in the setting. Located between Otso and the Baltic Sea, it dominates the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia. As a nation it is an unformed, old fashioned People's Republic, with an appearance of democratic representation. It is a country with significant military capabilities and the political will to consider the use of force to further its aims.

Torrike:

Torrike is the second potential aggressor in Skolkan. It represents the heartland of the former Skolkan Empire and has dreams of resurrecting it. Sandwiched between Norway, Framland, and Armland, it is ideally situated for a range of crises within the setting. Torrike is a highly authoritarian state. It has proven to be extremely successful in Europe economically and has developed a highly efficient defense sector.

Lindsey:

The last potential aggressor is Lindsey, an outsider in Skolkan, both geographically and psychologically. Situated off the coast of Norway, Lindsey is a nation state whose motivations and actions are not easily predictable. Although she presents herself as an active democracy with a number of established political parties, the reality is a single party has dominated the state for the last 50 years. Over time, the country has grown to be a somewhat paranoid society. There is a strong feeling that the rest of the world conspires to cheat Lindsey of its rightful place in the world and in particular deny it access to the wealth associated with the natural resources their location entitles them to.

Armland:

Located in a strategically significant chokepoint, it is both the gateway to and from mainland Europe and the Baltic. Armland is a highly dysfunctional nation that suffers from serious levels of corruption. Namely, a democracy, the winning party in any election has such significant leverage and powers as to be able to govern in a highly dictatorial fashion.

Arnland's role in Skolkan is twofold; firstly, it meets the requirement to have a regional failing state that provides both the opportunity for a future Humanitarian Assistance and CRO, and at the same time contributes to overall regional instability. Secondly, it also provides the main base of Novus Ordo Mundi (NOM), the terrorist organisation that will be active throughout the region for the setting.

Framland:

Framland is a pro-western, democratic, constitutional monarchy that occupies much of the Western seaboard of the Baltic Sea. Formerly a semi-independent Duchy in the Skolkan Empire, it has been independent since 1905. It has a long border with Torrike and a short border with Bothnia. Typically, Framland maintains a neutral position in the global arena, it is broadly pro-Western and pro-NATO and pro-EU. In the interests of maintaining good relations with its neighbours, it is not a member of either.

Arnland's role in Skolkan is to add complexity and provide a NATO-friendly country in the region that can be used to either influence its neighbours through negotiation, or provide a degree of support to NATO or potentially even operating bases.

Otso:

Otso is a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary democracy. The east-ernmost country within the Skolkan setting, it sits between Russia and Bothnia. Its broad political outlook is that of neutrality and it has built an enviable reputation as an arbitrator and interlocutor in international disputes. Neither especially wealthy nor particularly poor, it is a strong supporter of the UN and it has been a major contributor to UN military missions since the 1960s.

A common scenario

Skolkan provides a setting that enables harmonisation between various types of exercises. The design and development of Skolkan was set out with the aim of supporting NATO's strategic concept of creating a common setting for large three-level Command Post Exercises as well as small single component exercises and Key Leader Training Events. In essence, it becomes NATO's common scenario.

Skolkan also provides a suitable venue for NATO HQ Crisis Management Exercises (CMX) and Allied Command Operations (ACO) nuclear exercises. In theory, the results and decisions from the strategic planning of CMX could then be further used during the major joint exercises such as the STEADFAST series thereby providing some continuity of training effort.

Impact to JWC

Providing training at the operational level for the Joint Force Commands (JFCs) and their Joint Warfighting Commands remains the JWC's focus.

In the overall scheme of things, the use of Skolkan has been described as a stepping stone to the process and conduct of a STEADFAST exercise from the JWC point of view. The scenario and its supporting documentation are still developed, MEL/MIL, scripting still takes place, and the Exercise Control (EXCON) is still based in Stavanger, Norway. What does change, however, is the look and feel of each of those elements.

As already discussed, compared to Cerasia, Skolkan has shifted the intent of training from Humanitarian Assistance at strategic distances, to a perceived threat and potential conflict in NATO's backyard. Probably the least obvious, but rather important distinction between the two deployment scenarios is location. Due to its geography, a fictitious operation in Cerasia
gave a bit of leeway to the Scenario Section writers with regards to Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), UNSCRs, etc.

A deployment within the Skolkan setting, however, has a greater likelihood of occurring within the NATO territory, places where SOFAs and MOUs already exist. The use of real world documentation within an exercise environment will be an adjustment and consideration for both TA and scenario writers.

MELMIL will have to become more robust and possibly more dynamic. Our current exercises encompass roughly 900 or so injects over an eight day period. And that’s just for a Humanitarian Assistance operation. To support a scenario on the verge or in the midst of a conflict, potential requirements require a more complex storyline of events, much more scripting of injects, and an openness to fluidity in order to react to the TA’s actions.

Cerasia enabled NATO to fully exercise the Comprehensive Approach (CA) process. Interaction and coordination with local entities, International Organisations (IOs), and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) was critical for a successful operation in Cerasia. During the planning and execution phases of a STEADFAST exercise, JWC has been able to provide role players as part of EXCON to act on behalf of these organisations and interact with the TA. Not to say that CA disappears during an Article V or potential Article V scenario; it doesn’t. The CA and the planning considerations associated with it will still have to be taken into account by the TA. The difference being, the organisations represented by the actors may not be the same. Replicating Host Nation Support becomes a much more significant consideration when exercising a deployment into a NATO country vice the middle of the desert in Africa.

Train as You Fight
Over the last three years the Cerasia setting has served NATO well, training various levels of the organisation in the dynamics of out-of-area operations in east Africa. Specifically through the STEADFAST series of exercises, it has been the perfect venue for the NRF to exercise deployments in support of Humanitarian Assistance, counterinsurgency (COIN), and anti-piracy operations.

With the introduction of Skolkan, the future of exercises in NATO will have a look it hasn’t had in previous years. The analysis and planning associated with the protection of NATO territory becomes the focal point. This is not to take away from the value of Cerasia and all the training it has provided. In all actuality, there is probably a higher likelihood future deployments of NATO forces will be in support of Humanitarian Assistance operations. However, as exemplified by Operation United Assistance, NATO still requires training opportunities to prepare its military forces for potential armed conflict.

In a world that we have seen drastically change within the last 24 months, NATO must be prepared to deploy its forces in any potential crisis. Skolkan is a move in the right direction and now NATO can once again Train as it would Fight.

The NATO Response Force
The NATO Response Force (NRF) provides a mechanism to generate a high readiness and technologically advanced force package made up of land, air, sea and special forces components that can be deployed quickly on operations whenever needed. The force package is capable of performing tasks across a wide spectrum of operations. Tasks could include providing an immediate response capability for conducting collective defence of Alliance members in the event of an Article V operation, as well as the initial force deployment as a precursor to deployment of a much larger force, whether that be for Article V or for any other operation, such as assisting civilian agencies to manage the consequences of natural disasters. In addition to the NRF mechanism providing the Alliance with a crisis management instrument, the NRF also serves as an engine for transformation of military capabilities through the cycle of building multinational force packages on a rotational basis, which then exercise together in order to integrate the operational and tactical levels of command and control and the joint forces. Key facts regarding the NRF are as follows:

- There are no limits to the numbers, which nations can contribute.
- The very high readiness element, the Immediate Response Force (IRF), consists of approximately 14,000 personnel.
- The remaining forces are held in a Response Forces Pool (RFP), the scale of which will depend upon what nations are willing to make available, dependent upon operational commitments at the time.

As the standards have to be very high, participation in the NRF is preceded by a two-month NATO exercise programme in order to integrate and standardise the various national contributions. Generally, nations carry out a pre-training period in preparation for the NATO exercises between 6-18 months. Once the overall preparation period of as much as 24-months has been accomplished, from 2012, the force will be held on stand-by to deploy on operations for 12-months as opposed to the current 6-months. (www.aco.nato.int)

The International Military Staff (IMS) Public Affairs and Strategic Communications Advisor supports the Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, the Alliance’s principal military spokesman for all military issues. The Military Committee is the Alliance’s most senior military body, providing consensus military advice to the North Atlantic Council. Working within NATO’s IMS, Brigadier General Panizzi is responsible for developing Public Affairs and Strategic Communications Policy and giving guidance on all Public Affairs and Strategic Communications issues. He also supports the NATO Spokesperson and gives guidance to Chief PAOs throughout the NATO chain of command. His Office is the main point of contact for the public and the media for military aspects of the Alliance’s role, arms, operations and missions.
outreach and support operational effective-
ness, while reducing the cost of doing busi-
ness through maximizing existing assets.

Historical background

Before the Kosovo Air campaign in 1999, NATO did not have an agreed Public Af-
fairs policy, much less a comprehensive STRATCOM Policy. The Cold War, with its emphasis on secrecy, was not conducive to openness and transparency, although the then NATO Office of Information and
Press (NATIP) was busy enough informing publics about the North Atlantic Treaty and the Alliance's collective defence objectives.

Overnight, however, all this was to change when NATO was literally catapulted into the public eye through the events in Kosovo. NATO HQ in Brussels opened its secure gates to a flood of journalists, TV camera teams and political journalists from across the world. It was a mutually educa-
tional experience. The journalists had to get
in grips with the intricacies of NATO's mul-
tinational political-military decision-mak-
ing process and operational jargon, while
the NATO Spokesperson and his small team had to maintain the highest possible level of credible information flow. This, coupled with what became known as the "CNN phe-
nomenon" – 24/7 TV coverage – posed a
substantial challenge in managing the mas-
sive coordination of information across such a wide set of Alliance stakeholders, without jeopardizing operational security.

NATIP had little experience in infor-
mation crisis management and few assets in place; one NATO Spokesperson, no Media Operation Centre and one Military Spokesman. With NATO HQ at the head and Military Public Affairs officers down the chain of command to the operation, co-
ordination, although crucial to coherency of
message, was cumbersome, and even er-
ratic. The first lesson identified was that we
needed to speed up, sharpen up and above
all keep ahead of the game. This also led to
the first policy for NATO Public Informa-
tion (PI).

After the Kosovo Campaign, events moved swiftly. The operational environ-
ment was changing rapidly in accordance with political and socio-economical up-
heaval, with each successive NATO-led op-
eration having its own specific geo-political
identity. In 2003 NATO's operation ISAF in
Afghanistan saw ground combat operations with global partners for the first time, and inevitably both military and civilian caus-
alties. Simultaneously, rapidly developing social media networks continued to revo-
lutionize global communications, with the arrival of the so-called "citizen journalist"
reporting first-hand to the world through the Internet by e-mail and blogs. Maintain-
ing public support for Alliance objectives and operations has always been central to
NATO's communication efforts. But with adversaries using the same technologies as
us, but without our rules and constraints, keeping pace had now become crucial to
mission success. This began a major re-
vision of MC Policy on PI to change it to
Public Affairs (PA); thus emphasizing the need for a wider understanding of the complexi-
ties of the new global information network, and reinforcing the need for well-trained
practitioners.

In SPITE OF all these changes, the Alli-
ance's core mission since 1949, "collective defence", has remained constant. Even so, for any organization to remain relevant, it
must adapt to such changes or swiftly be
outranked by events at the risk of losing all
credibility. NATO has responded by reviewing all its major policies, turning to
its Transformation Command to develop new concepts and training initiatives to keep the cutting edge and look to future
certainty challenges. In symbiosis with this
transformation, it has become increasingly
important for the Alliance to communicate its role, objectives and operations in an ap-
propriate, timely, accurate and coherent
manner. This requirement was at the basis of the birth of NATO Strategic Communi-
cations. Public Affairs became part of the
overall NATO Communication Strategy, and MC Policy for Military Public Affairs was updated accordingly.16

Reaching a common understanding

Although NATO had substantially up-
dated its military policy for Public Affairs, Information Operations, and PSYOPS, it
became obvious that an overarching policy
for NATO covering both political and milit-
ary functions and disciplines was required.

There is little use in each discipline working hard towards the same objectives without
having a means for mutual coordination and optimisation.

Coherency being the new battle cry, a
new STRATCOM Policy20, grouping Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and
PSYOPS, was born in September 2009, re-
flecting NATO's requirement to take a more
holistic approach. The aim of the policy is
to enhance NATO's communication efforts
in order to promote general public aware-
ness across multiple audiences, leading to
understanding and support of NATO's pol-
cies, operations, and other activities. This
is to be done in close and lasting coordi-
nation with NATO Member States, which
have their own national STRATCOM re-
sponsibilities and programmes with regard to NATO. It is necessary, therefore, to
define strategic, actionable goals, and an im-
plementation approach and plan, to guide communicators and others in designing,
preparing and executing STRATCOM. A
fundamental principle of NATO's Strategic Communication policy is to
respect existing military policy for the military communication and information
disciplines, and their different but comple-
mentary roles. The need for mutual coordi-
nation and interaction between military Public Affairs, Information Operations and
PSYOPS20 must not compromise the trust
relationship between NATO and media representatives. Any confusion of these dis-
ciplines would lead to an unhealthy mix of
"spit" and risk major damage to organiza-
tional credibility. The NATO STRATCOM Policy rightly seeks to guard against this.

From a military perspective20 two main elements were underlined: that STRAT-
COM is first and foremost a process and not an organization or function in itself, that it is a means to allow all information and communication functions to closely coordinate their planning, activities and messages, and to integrate the wider operational planning from the earliest stag-
es of any crisis.

In order to correctly implement the
spirit of the STRATCOM Policy, however, it
is necessary that all within the NATO STRATCOM community have a common understand-
ing of a term liberally used and sometimes
abused. Reluctance to correctly position STRATCOM within the traditional mili-
tary structures resides in an unequal compari-
on between the “might of the sword” and
the “power of the word.”

In fact, "Strategic Communication asks
the military to embrace as valuable a disci-
pline it has traditionally deemed either to
be strictly technological (as in "signals") or to be of secondary importance, and which it has
mostly been rather bad at: pro-active, long-
term, transparent communication. . . . Despite ample evidence to the contrary, militaries have persistently allowed a "battle-
field dominance than in the dominance of the information environment."23

It would be simple if policies led to in-
stances of the military experts. Experience
shows, however, that, whereas policies may set the boundaries and principles, true understanding comes from putting policy into practice. Only then can we match practicalities with philosophy. All this, of
course, requires a substantial change in mindset. Admiral Michael G. Muller, the former U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, commented as follows: "... beyond the term itself, I believe we have walked away from the original intent. By organizing to it
- creating whole structures around it - we have allowed Strategic Communication to become a thing instead of a process, an ab-
stract thought instead of a way of thinking."21

Admiral Muller's call to "get back to basics" in communication is to be taken seriously, especially when he refers to cred-
ibility and the need to remember that the essence of our communication is first of all a reflec-
tion of our actions. Building trust and relationships through our actions and learning to listen is also a fundamental part
of communication. Because "actions speak

16 "... Overnight, however, all this was to change when NATO was literally catapulted into the public eye through the events in Kosovo."
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leather than words, it is necessary for our words to correspond to our actions and vice versa. “To be successful, Strategic Communication must include the communicative content and signals of actions, images and policies.”

And it has to have clear policy goals, objectives, consistent core messages and explicit desired effect, implying measurable indicators of progress. This is a particular challenge in understanding and implementing STRATCOM. Principles, objectives, procedures and mechanisms of the efficient organizing of our STRATCOM efforts. However, if this means constructing and interposing another layer of coordination without any added values, then the exercise is useless — even counter-productive, especially in a period of financial constraints and reduction of manpower.

NATO STRATCOM has an additional complication in that it is both political (politically led) and military, and the two must be cohesive. Political priorities at NATO HQ may not quite be the same as those in military operations; nevertheless, they both must work towards the same Alliance objectives. This can sometimes result in a sense of disconnect, either from one side or the other. When this happens, NATO Commanders, perceiving a lack of guidance, may well resort to national policies to fill the gap. We have to remember that the communication function is a Commander’s personal responsibility. Since 2009, NATO HQ, together with the Allied Command Operations (ACO) HQ and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) HQ have been endeavouring to reach a common understanding and to find the procedures and mechanisms that will allow the optimization of the STRATCOM coordinating and planning process. The STRATCOM Policy is clear on roles and hierarchy. The North Atlantic Council provides overall guidance and direction to NATO Strategic Communications efforts, as well as mission specific strategic and political guidance for NATO information activities (Information Operations and PSYOPS). The Secretary General provides specific direction and guidance and the Assistant Secretary General for the Public Diplomacy Division (ASG/PDD) is responsible for overseeing the coordination of STRATCOM activities across all NATO civilian and military bodies and commands.

The Policy also calls for a high-level Standing Body encompassing all relevant STRATCOM stakeholders at NATO HQ, to include the International Military Staff (IMS) and representatives from ACO and ACT, to ensure STRATCOM management and long term planning. The STRATCOM Policy Board, (SCPB) as it is called, is chaired by the ASG/PDD, and meets at least three times per year. It soon became apparent, however, that there was a need for a working body at a staffing level to provide a more immediate oversight and guidance. The STRATCOM Standing Working Group meets as required to deal more specifically with crisis management and major promotional events, and to develop the SCPB agenda of focus topics. To assist the ASG/PDD and to provide daily support and coordination, a STRATCOM Cell has recently been set up within the Public Diplomacy Division. It is headed by a leading member of the PDD staff, with an Officer from Public Affairs and STRATCOM Advisor/ IMS in the Departure. These last two bodies have been put in place on the recommendation of various STRATCOM Conferences that identified a requirement to champion STRATCOM in a more persistent and practical manner. Public Affairs/IMS has also assumed the role of military STRATCOM Advisor at NATO HQ, illustrating the close relationship of the two. On their side, both ACO and ACT have established a STRATCOM Branch in their Command Group.

NATO-wide STRATCOM conferences provide a forum for troubleshooting STRATCOM issues specific to NATO, but also to allow a view over how organisations other than NATO understand and implement Strategic Communications. This has proved invaluable in stimulating debate and comparing best practices and considering new ideas and procedures. Tools for enhancing STRATCOM coordination rely on new media technology; both for simultaneous coordination with theatre, and in providing a wide dissemination of information to multiple audiences: a number of Video Teleconferences mainly devoted to the ACT/PSYOPS, linked meetings, Internet web sites, blogs, twitter and Facebook. Also the “IMS NATO Countries Public Affairs Community”, which links the Military Committee PA with Chief PAOs in the NATO Countries’ General Staffs, contributes to a better coordination and sharing of information.

Building STRATCOM Capabilities

Even before the STRATCOM Policy was developed, Public Affairs practitioners were working on enhancing their efforts. A major handicap, however, has been the lack of trained practitioners. A quick study carried out as early as 2007 showed that out of the 28 Member Nations, only eight provided dedicated and advanced military Public Affairs training. This has had a considerably negative effect in filling critical posts, not only on the Peacetime Establishment but also in mission. The Military Committee has a close watch on the implications of these shortfalls, and, as a follow on to the STRATCOM Policy, tasked ACT to develop an operational concept for STRATCOM specifically related to capability building. It identifies all the military components of STRATCOM and their specific areas of responsibility, with a comprehensive assessment of their specialist requirements in terms of manpower (therefore training), organization and assets.

As a concrete follow-up, ACT also developed a NATO STRATCOM Capabilities Implementation Plan (CIP), which serves as a roadmap to assist Nations in building a professional corps across the STRATCOM disciplines. This, of course, will take time, when time is of the essence. However, it constitutes a long-term initiative for building capabilities and through them, a better understanding of the STRATCOM process. The approval of this new fundamental step by the Nations demonstrates their understanding that their direct involvement is needed to establish a more robust STRATCOM.

STRATCOM is an evolving discipline across NATO. The challenge lies in correct implementation from NATO HQ down to theatre through sound processes that facilitate rather than hamper coordination of all the information and communications disciplines, giving effective support to the Alliance’s communications’ efforts. NATO is defined as both political and military, and processes are needed to bring together these two elements while recognizing that the differentstyleType of the Alliance’s ‘faces’ are separate but complementary. To this end, the CIP recommends a more detailed guidance to NATO Commanders to clarify any ambiguities and to assist them in the organization of the various STRATCOM components. With this in mind, NATO HQ, in concert with SHAPE and ACT, is currently drafting Joint Implementation Guidelines to supplement the NATO Policy.

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The STRATCOM Policy is clear on roles and hierarchy. The North Atlantic Council provides overall guidance and direction to NATO Strategic Communications efforts, as well as mission specific strategic and political guidance for NATO information activities (Information Operations and PSYOPS). The Secretary General provides specific direction and guidance and the Assistant Secretary General for the Public Diplomacy Division (ASG/PDD) is responsible for overseeing the coordination of STRATCOM activities across all NATO civilian and military bodies and commands.

The Policy also calls for a high-level Standing Body encompassing all relevant STRATCOM stakeholders at NATO HQ, to include the International Military Staff (IMS) and representatives from ACO and ACT, to ensure STRATCOM management and long term planning. The STRATCOM Policy Board, (SCPB) as it is called, is chaired by the ASG/PDD, and meets at least three times per year. It soon became apparent, however, that there was a need for a working body at a staffing level to provide a more immediate oversight and guidance. The STRATCOM Standing Working Group meets as required to deal more specifically with crisis management and major promotional events, and to develop the SCPB agenda of focus topics. To assist the ASG/PDD and to provide daily support and coordination, a STRATCOM Cell has recently been set up within the Public Diplomacy Division. It is headed by a leading member of the PDD staff, with an Officer from Public Affairs and STRATCOM Advisor/IMS in the Departure. These last two bodies have been put in place on the recommendation of various STRATCOM Conferences that identified a requirement to champion STRATCOM in a more persistent and practical manner. Public Affairs/IMS has also assumed the role of military STRATCOM Advisor at NATO HQ, illustrating the close relationship of the two. On their side, both ACO and ACT have established a STRATCOM Branch in their Command Group.

NATO-wide STRATCOM conferences provide a forum for troubleshooting STRATCOM issues specific to NATO, but also to allow a view over how organisations other than NATO understand and implement Strategic Communications. This has proved invaluable in stimulating debate and comparing best practices and considering new ideas and procedures. Tools for enhancing STRATCOM coordination rely on new media technology; both for simultaneous coordination with theatre, and in providing a wide dissemination of information to multiple audiences: a number of Video Teleconferences mainly devoted to the ACT/PSYOPS, linked meetings, Internet web sites, blogs, twitter and Facebook. Also the “IMS NATO Countries Public Affairs Community”, which links the Military Committee PA with Chief PAOs in the NATO Countries’ General Staffs, contributes to a better coordination and sharing of information.

Building STRATCOM Capabilities

Even before the STRATCOM Policy was developed, Public Affairs practitioners were working on enhancing their efforts. A major handicap, however, has been the lack of trained practitioners. A quick study carried out as early as 2007 showed that out of the 28 Member Nations, only eight provided dedicated and advanced military Public Affairs training. This has had a considerably negative effect in filling critical posts, not only on the Peacetime Establishment but also in mission. The Military Committee has a close watch on the implications of these shortfalls, and, as a follow on to the STRATCOM Policy, tasked ACT to develop an operational concept for STRATCOM specifically related to capability building. It identifies all the military components of STRATCOM and their specific areas of responsibility, with a comprehensive assessment of their specialist requirements in terms of manpower (therefore training), organization and assets. As a concrete follow-up, ACT also developed a NATO STRATCOM Capabilities Implementation Plan (CIP), which serves as a roadmap to assist Nations in building a professional corps across the STRATCOM disciplines. This, of course, will take time, when time is of the essence. However, it constitutes a long-term initiative for building capabilities and through them, a better understanding of the STRATCOM process. The approval of this new fundamental step by the Nations demonstrates their understanding that their direct involvement is needed to establish a more robust STRATCOM.

STRATCOM is an evolving discipline across NATO. The challenge lies in correct implementation from NATO HQ down to theatre through sound processes that facilitate rather than hamper coordination of all the information and communications disciplines, giving effective support to the Alliance’s communications’ efforts. NATO is defined as both political and military, and processes are needed to bring together these two elements while recognizing that the different ‘faces’ of the Alliance’s ‘faces’ are separate but complementary. To this end, the CIP recommends a more detailed guidance to NATO Commanders to clarify any ambiguities and to assist them in the organization of the various STRATCOM components. With this in mind, NATO HQ, in concert with SHAPE and ACT, is currently drafting Joint Implementation Guidelines to supplement the NATO Policy.

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Way forward
Despite the indisputable achievements, there is a long way to go before STRATCOM is inculcated into our way of thinking, and before it is considered a function as important as all the others. Coordination being the key word in the definition, STRATCOM is essentially about anticipation – thinking strategically, and long term. This will establish our priorities, helping us plan, not only for the event/crisis, but beyond in order to maintain a lasting effect. Synchronizing political and military activities and engagements is fundamental in bridging the “say-do” gap. Educating our leaders and commanders will be fundamental in how well we progress our STRATCOM efforts. Already we see that STRATCOM is increasingly addressed as a matter of importance at high-level political and military meetings, and this is encouraging. At staff level, we need to continue sharing knowledge and best practices, and converting lessons identified into lessons learned.

Finally, only in investing in the future through training professionals and devoting the right resources will we manage to meet NATO’s STRATCOM ambitions and objectives. An active role by NATO Nations is a condition sine qua non.

Introduction
When Googling the term Strategic Communication(s)\(^{(1)}\) and reading some of the literature\(^{(2)}\), the first thing that becomes clear is that there is no consensus on what Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) is or should be. Not even in the U.S., where most of the thinking and actual use of STRATCOM is happening, is there an official government-wide definition of STRATCOM. As long as there is no consensus and clarity, STRATCOM cannot really deliver. Unity of understanding can only help unity of effort. And if already a leading ally like the U.S. does not seem able to come up with one agreed definition, what does this mean for the debate and understanding of what STRATCOM is in the other NATO Nations? This is also why NATO as an organisation had difficulty in agreeing on a clear definition, and used rather wide and vague terms: “the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communication activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy (PD), Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and PSYOPS, as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims.”\(^{(3)}\)

This article will try to explain the origins of the STRATCOM concept in NATO, further doctrinal developments following the adoption of the NATO STRATCOM Policy, and the role of the recently created STRATCOM Cell in NATO’s Public Diplomacy (PDD).

STRATCOM in general
Before going into detail about NATO STRATCOM, I would like to make a number of general observations that also impact STRATCOM issues at NATO HQ.

(1) This article will stick to the terminology of the NATO STRATCOM policy, which uses the plural: “Strategic Communications.”

(2) Two recent excellent publications have informed this article substantially: Jan Tachó’s “What makes Communication Strategic?” NATO Defence College Research Paper, February 2011, and Christopher Paul’s RAND: “Getting Better at Strategic Communication.” Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, July 2011.

(3) NATO Strategic Communications Policy PO (2009) 014, 29 September 2009.
“Communication is still widely regarded as an enabling function to sell earlier agreed policies or implemented operations. Instead, communication is a task and responsibility for all our key leaders.”

on NATO’s STRATCOM efforts. First, although NATO’s STRATCOM Policy does not explicitly incorporate its actions and policies into the STRATCOM definition – it only says they support NATO’s actions and policies – it is absolutely clear that NATO’s actions (operations!) and policies speak louder than our words or pictures. So what we do matters, at least, as much (if not more than), as what we say, and this applies especially for our operations. This also means that STRATCOM cannot “fix” political problems or negative perceptions if they are caused by poor policies or bad actions. STRATCOM is not the panacea for all our ills. This is also why STRATCOM needs to be fully involved in policy and operational planning from the outset (see also third point below.)

Secondly, although NATO’s definition makes clear that STRATCOM is a political-military concept (in nations often described as a “whole of government” exercise) that is led from NATO HQ as the political hub, in practice STRATCOM is widely seen as dominated by and overwhelmingly applied by the military. “U.S. Public Diplomacy wears combat boots.”109 Partly this is logical as the military see a clear need to use communication as a strategic weapon. Without this, they view communication as a supportive function or even worse, a “communication is still a lot of confusion and many different interpretations and understandings about what STRATCOM is, all this shows that the further development of the STRATCOM concept is an issue that requires strategic patience and a dogged resolve to pursue this in the months and years to come. There is widespread consensus that in today’s globalised and omnipresent information age, every organisation has to do its utmost to communicate to the outside world in the most comprehensive, timely and effective way possible.”

Thirdly, perhaps the biggest challenge in improving STRATCOM in NATO is the need to change the mindset of our political and military leadership. Communication is still widely regarded as an enabling function to sell earlier agreed policies or implemented operations. Instead, communication is a task and responsibility for all our key leaders and STRATCOM advisors should be involved from the outset in all policy and operational planning in order to bring communication implications to the attention of their political or military masters.

Fourthly, STRATCOM’s new coordination role is not self-evident for old, well-established information disciplines like Public Affairs and Information Operations (itself a coordinating function?) who claim fundamental otherness and universal wisdom for themselves. Everybody is in favour of coordination, but to be coordinated is another thing. Binding them all together into one comprehensive communications apparatus, equipped with a shared understanding of the job ahead, is nevertheless indispensable if that communication aspires to be strategic. Not achieving this may even in the long term undermine the credibility of the organisation and those who communicate for it.

NATO STRATCOM Policy – doctrinal progress

The main reason to start developing a political-military policy on STRATCOM was NATO’s first-ever experience with major combat operations in Afghanistan. As soon as NATO took over responsibility for all ISAF operations in 2006, especially in the troubled South and East, with the inherent rise of combat operations and ensuing casualties, political attention to the ISAF operations and subsequently for the communications handling of the ISAF operation also increased. As NATO’s communications policies were only codified in military policy documents and the real life experience of ISAF had made clear how important it was to coordinate both the political and military sides of the ISAF operation, the need for a joint, political-military

Role of the STRATCOM Cell in PDD

The STRATCOM Policy gives a lead role to the Assistant Secretary General (ASG) PDD who “overserves the coordination of all Strategic Communications activities across all NATO civilian and military bodies and commands, and also directs all Public Diplomacy activities (except press and media, which are directed by the NATO Spokesperson on behalf of the SG).” The policy also called upon the ASG PDD to establish and chair “a standing body that brings together the relevant elements of the information community…” The STRATCOM Policy Board (SCPB), chaired by ASG PDD, was created as a high-level, political-military inter-staff body to address all NATO’s communications issues related to policy-making, decision-making, implementation and further areas of interest.

In June 2010, the SCPB decided to create a more operational STRATCOM Standing Working Group (SCSWG), co-chaired by ASG PDD and NATO’s Secretary General’s STRATCOM Advisor, that will meet more regularly to take stock, debate, and finally give (new) STRATCOM direction and guidance. Besides these two bodies, there are a number of additional, weekly or bi-weekly, STACTCOM VTCs to discuss more operational communications issues with all key staff involved.

As the volume of STRATCOM meetings and taskings grew over time, and as part of a structural reform of PDD, the ASG PDD decided early 2011 to create a small PDD STRATCOM Cell to support the ASG and her Deputy in all their STRATCOM responsibilities. In more detail, the STRATCOM Cell will be responsible for the coordination and synchronisation of NATO’s communications activities and capabilities by managing a Joint Planning Calendar and a STRATCOM matrix, provide advice on and track STRATCOM doctrinal and capability development, and act as the principal point of contact and as STRATCOM champion in NATO HQ and in close cooperation with the chain of command.

Conclusion

What this article has tried to highlight is that STRATCOM in NATO is still very new. A well-known military training metaphor is perhaps the best way to describe how NATO can make steady but guaranteed progress: the “craw, walk, run, progression.” Before you can walk, crawl; before you can run, walk.

As STRATCOM is a very complex coordination function with a wide-range of information disciplines who treasure their independence, as it is a concept that requires a new, different mindset from many of our political and military leaders, as there is still a lot of confusion and many different
Interview with Mark Laity, Chief of Strategic Communications, SHAPE

Mark Laity, who is at the head of Strategic Communications for SHAPE, talks about the globalization of information and the importance of strategic communications, and how these determine who is winning and who is losing in modern warfare.

By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

Sir, thank you indeed for this interview opportunity. How do you explain the success of the insurgency and what is the current narrative? There are a number of reasons. The insurgents have a strongly negative message, which is destructive rather than constructive. Making strategic narrative a lot easier to explain, as well as more immediate.

The second point is that they see clearly that, unless they are good with information, they will fail. For them, "information" is the main effort, while for us it is a supporting discipline. They understand the importance of the role of a strategic narrative. They put a substantial amount of focus and effort into it because they recognize that a successful information campaign is inherent to a successful insurgency. Also, read their articles: they are always telling a simple story with a simple message. Also to note is that they are much quicker in their messaging and significantly more sustained in their themes. You will see that essentially the Al-Qa’ida/Taliban narrative has not changed over the years. They have just one message, and they use it again and again. They project the same narrative worldwide, unhindered by truth, time, or a chain of command.

If you look at the ISAF mission, we are a 48-Nation Alliance, rotating people every six months. Despite our unity and solidarity, each Nation has its own information priorities and competing narratives. So, our message is much more diffused in narrative terms.

Can we shape news and information environments despite our existing narrative problems? Picking up on that, what is NATO’s current narrative? When you get professional surveys done by people at PR organizations, you will find that there is a generally positive view of NATO. So, although it is not explicitly delineated, NATO has a positive image, but perhaps no strong current narrative. For me it is contained within our Allied Command Operations (ACO) Directive 95-2, which sums it up as a democratic multinational Alliance uniting across borders to guard, with courage and competence against threats to our homes. Now, that actually is quite a good narrative because that is what NATO is. It is a security organization, and it is a team of people who are doing together something that can only be achieved by doing it together, simply because separately, we are not strong. Unfortunately, we tend to lose that core, meaningful narrative because we are extremely busy with all the missions surrounding us. It is almost as if NATO is no longer associated with its own missions and campaigns: IFOR, KFOR, ISAF, Operation Unified Protector. These are all NATO missions, but somehow they look distant from NATO and, as a result, just how busy and how effective NATO is has been lost to the wider public.

This paints a concise picture of our own narrative problems. But our issues over narrative are also because security, overall, is a low priority for a lot of nations right now, although the dangers we face are unprecedented in their complexity. If defence spending and security are not seen as a big deal, then NATO will not be seen as a big deal. When people say that NATO has a problem, it is not just the people who are using doctrine, it is a problem about defence and explaining why we still need to invest in security. Once people understand there is a need to invest in security, then NATO very quickly becomes the right, obvious answer. How can we persuade the nations that the very modest, necessary investment in security is much needed at a time when everyone says money is scarce? This is a very important question. So the problem, in effect, is a problem of security, not NATO.

What is the current state of NATO’s STRATCOM policy? We have a NATO policy, which is at the NATO HQ level. That policy, however, is very broad-brush. It lays out some essential facts and gives a definition, but it does not go much further than that. Therefore, the implementation of STRATCOM is not really clarified yet. Underneath that, at the ACO level, we have SHAPE’s ACO Directive 95-2, which was created by my Section. This goes much further than the policy, but it is, at the same time, nested within it and recognized as such. It has undergone one revision already, and it is having another one now. It is meant to be revised every one or two years in order to evolve the situation. The revised Directive should be out in a few months. It tries to move the debate forward a little bit and do a little bit more on how we organize ourselves and manage STRATCOM.

Currently, there are a lot of discussions going on about the relationship between STRATCOM, PA, Diplomatic Information Operations and PSYOPS, and there is no consistent synergy between them because the situation remains unresolved. Obviously, I am a STRATCOM advocate, and I find this continuing debate and the drawbacks irritating because it limits, often; it limits what I call turf fights. Obviously there are genuine issues as well, but it is sometimes people who are using doctrine to guard their own territory. Doctrine should not be confused with dogma. Doctrine is not seen as a big deal, then NATO will not be seen as a big deal. When people say that NATO has a problem, it is not just about the people who are using doctrine, it is a problem about defence and explaining why we need to invest in security. Once people understand there is a need to invest in security, then NATO very quickly becomes the right, obvious answer. How can we persuade the nations that the very modest, necessary investment in security is much needed at a time when everyone says money is scarce? This is a very important question. So the problem, in effect, is a problem of security, not NATO.

Would you say that STRATCOM is helping Public Affairs, Information Operations and PSYOPS to succeed in new media platforms as well as knowledge management operations? Well working to succeed in new media is everyone’s responsibility, and we shouldn’t see STRATCOM as some separate pillar of information – to quote part of our defined
"Shaping the information battlefield, which I call the new front line, depends on matching actions and words; recognizing that every action sends a message; developing a capacity to manage information campaigns and, finally, getting the commanders to value and use information as naturally as they value and use airpower."

So keep recognizing that human beings’ perceptions hugely affect the outcome. At SHAPE we have a motto that says ‘Perception becomes Reality’, which is a straightforward statement. If people believe themselves to be capable, they will be ambitious, and they will strive for great goals. And if they think they are capable of reaching great goals, they will maximize their potential, and they will achieve more. If they thought they were incapable and useless, then they would not achieve a lot. If you have a campaign where the target audience believes you are honest, on their side, and capable, then they will tend to support you. So information is fundamental in managing perceptions. That does not mean you should lie, but the way people perceive and understand a fact can vary a lot. Whether you are an optimist or a pessimist will be important for how you act. So facts do not need to be distorted. Facts could be interpreted in many different ways, quite legitimately. Every military man knows the importance of morale. What is morale? It is persuading people that they are the best, and that they can win. So their perception becomes reality, whether they realize it or not. A lot of this is a matter of opinion. A lot of how you see the world is open to interpretation. You are entitled to present that interpretation in a way that is most favorable to your cause. Everybody does this every day in every way in their own lives. All I am talking about is honestly but persuasively putting ourselves in the best possible light. Why not?

A key element in operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach

By CDR Michael Hallett, USA N, HQ SACT
Strategic Plans and Policy

Commander Michael Hallett is a staff officer at NATO’s Supreme Allied Command Transformation. His duties include strategic policy development and supporting NATO and Partner Nations with defence transformation through enhancing military lessons learned capabilities. His previous assignments have included tours with the International Security Assistance Force Headquarters, Kabul, with COMNAVUEUR-Commander Sixth Fleet Operational-NAT Assessment Directør as an Africa and Black Sea region analyst, and with the Civil-Military Interaction Core Team at Allied Command Transformation.

The provision of security is a core function of the state. The absence of security indicates state failure. In situations where external actors are engaged in helping local actors recover from conditions of state failure or fragility, the ability of local actors to provide full spectrum security is the single most important marker of transition to full sovereignty. When emerging from post-conflict or other stressful conditions, security force capability is the most important capability of the nascent state – without it, the additional state building activities, even when the new government structures have been legitimated through elections, will fail to generate sustainable improvements in the state’s capability to establish and enforce the rule of law.

This article argues that, even in our extremely constrained financial environment, NATO enhancement of its Training Local Forces (TLF) capability will significantly contribute to achieving NATO aims. We will proceed as follows: first, we review the recent high level guidance on TLF. This is followed by a discussion of the TLF capability in terms of the Allied Commander Transformation capability development paradigm, modified in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach. The article concludes with a discussion of the utility of the TLF capability from the NATO perspective.

Guidance
Based on its own extensive expertise in force generation and training created in response to the need to train and develop
The overall aim of NATO’s involvement is to enhance the ability of the nation that has requested the training support to execute its own endogenous training programs. Only the nation interacting with NATO can make the specific decisions on capabilities composition, in light of its overall political-security goals and vision of its national future.

The Comprehensive Approach Capability Development Paradigm

The CA, as we will use it here, can be defined as “… a design process to align incentives among international and local actors to increase local resilience in the engagement space while reducing the transaction costs associated with multiple actor interaction in complex operations.”12 The incentive creation and transaction cost reduction process requires a slightly different emphasis in the capability development process than the traditional Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability (DOTMLPF) provides. Therefore, for CA related capability development, we shift the capability development component of emphasis from DOTMLPF to TLPMLF. Using the CA configuration of the capability development paradigm, we will now provide a brief snapshot of some ideas on how NATO can enhance its training local forces capability, followed by a brief justification of the utility of the TLP capability in light of NATO’s larger missions.

Interoperability

Within the CA, thick and frequent interconnections with other organizations are accepted as not just nice to have, but as essential for mission accomplishment. Interoperability refers to the mechanisms that facilitate this interaction. In TLF two dimensions of interoperability stand out. First, the national integration of capabilities developed and second, the interoperability among those providing training support, including NATO’s Nations, and other international organizations.

1. Enabling Integrated National Capability Development

The overall aim of NATO's involvement is to enhance the ability of nations that have requested the training support capability to execute its own endogenous training programs. Only the nation interacting with NATO can make the specific decisions on capabilities composition, in light of its overall political-security goals, and vision of its national future. Therefore the training program must be integrated into the overarching national security strategy, be designed and executed to support that strategy, and ensure interoperability among its component parts. This is the case for nations emerging from fragility as well as those engaging with NATO simply as a way to enrich their own training experiences. The focus on interoperability is essential to ensure that the local forces trained are able to operate as national institutions. In some cases this will mean that, for example, police and military training is included in a single training continuum, in others police and military training will be entirely separate programs, and in still others the short term training process may include blended basic training for police and military personnel, with mid and long term creation of separate facilities and training programs. The importance of this interoperability is evident even in curriculum two problems can arise. One, each nation receiving training will provide instruction with its own national flavour. Organizations and personnel operate as they have been trained, as a result some units will work in the Nation X way, others in the Nation Y way, and none operate completely in the way they should - their own national way.

Training’ – Training on Training

In a discussion of enhancing a training capability, the training capability element focuses on training on training or T2. The T2 in the TLP capability will function on three different levels – strategic level training institution building, operational level training of local soldiers, and supporting the tactical level delivery of training. We will now further describe the training activities on each level.

A. Training’ Levels

1. Strategic level - Institution Building

Training is perishable – in the absence of sufficient institutional support training completed at the tactical and operational level will prove useful for only as long as it is retained in the minds of the training audience. Therefore, the first priority from the NATO perspective will be the enhancement of the national security sector institutional training capabilities so that they can establish and maintain a training continuum.

II. Operational level - Training Instructors

At the operational level, increasing training effectiveness requires two types of training programs. First, a training program for NATO member instructors who will train local trainers is necessary to educate its personnel to undertake a wide variety of tasks in complex and dangerous environments, NATO has expanded its training and force generation capabilities to include training and developing forces of other nations and organizations. NATO Nations have long been involved in training local security force actors, and NATO itself is now reinvestigating its thinking on how to more effectively and efficiently train local security force actors. The initial direction from the Lisbon Summit 2010 and the ensuing Political Guidance, lessons identified and best practices from providing training support, including NATO, Nations, and other international organizations.

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instructors on teaching techniques and specific ways to enhance the learning experience for the students they are training. NATO development of a general curriculum for this training, based on existing NATO instructor training programs will facilitate NATO instructor training and reduce the instructors’ development costs for each member nation. However, each training program will have to be tailored for each region and supported organization, to ensure that it takes into account cultural differences in instruction delivery and receipt, and will have to be supplemented with rich cultural awareness training. Simply delivering the same sort of training in the same way that training is delivered in NATO Nations will not prove as effective as training developed through trainer development programs designed for each region.

Two, in consultation with local forces, NATO will help nations develop endogenous programs to train local instructors. Instruction delivery to local students, training the trainers in training itself, as well as the specific functional areas in which they will instruct students will constitute the main activity of this process.

III. Tactical Level – Supporting Training Needs

Due to NATO’s emphasis on the first two training support areas, even in situations where NATO expertise is required to communicate the knowledge and skills to the local training audience in the short term, to fill local training expertise gaps, this training will be structured as a way to provide the instructors being trained with the guidance they need to eventually run the training programs themselves. In other words, the actual knowledge and skill delivery to the training audience will occur as a beneficial by-product, or positive externality, of efforts to train the local instructors. This means that local instructors must be included in the entire training development and delivery process, including course design, providing lectures, leading syndicates, directing in class practical exercises, writing exercise scenarios, etc.

In terms of actually training students, NATO’s involvement should focus primarily on enabling students to attend NATO courses, access NATO Advanced Distributed Learning and participate in NATO exercises. Indeed, as local training capabilities become more advanced, visits of mobile training teams and participation in NATO and PFP exercises should be incorporated into the local training program. Participating in these NATO events can provide a “launching function” – the chance to leverage NATO resources for local training can not only evoke additional attention for the training activities by the leadership but also motivate leaders to make resources available. NATO will bring the resources necessary to add additional value to the training, while the local authorities maintain overall activity ownership. For example, participation in a NATO exercise or an Africa Partnership Station visit could be included as a major event in the local nation training schedule.

B. Training enablers

We will now discuss in more detail TLF enablers necessary to enhance training effectiveness: a basic TLF curriculum; specialized training on Teaching (T’ for NATO instructors; national regional specialization for local instructor training; and broadening the set, through partnership, of training provided.

We begin with examining how a common curriculum for various functional areas will enhance both local actor learning and the ability of NATO to cultivate a rapidly self-sustaining local training the trainees program.

I. Common Basic Curriculum

Each region has a very different contextual environment in which training capability development will take place. While fully aware that each country will have different requirements, a NATO standardized curriculum for each of the functional areas to serve as a baseline from which the program can be tailored in light of local demands will accelerate training program delivery. (6) NATO instructors require training on how to more effectively support local forces as they develop their own training capabilities. In addition to the primary method of teaching instructional procedures through modelling effective instructional techniques, a standardized curriculum should be developed to train NATO instructors on how to effectively train local instructors. This training the trainer curriculum will include specific training on topics such as those in Figure 1. Such training is required in order to increase understanding of how to best communicate (not just transmit information) to the training audience.

II. Teaching on Training T’

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III. Regional specialization

Effective training requires in-depth knowledge of the local culture – not only the basics of local history and customs, but how they learn, the level of literacy, the nature of previous training, if the culture is high or low context, conceptions of time, etc. Understanding when, for example, instruction is taking place in an intellectual environment less dominated by the visual (including literacy) than are NATO Nation environments will dramatically improve training delivery. The failure to take these local factors into consideration results in training failure. In light of this requirement, NATO Nations may elect to specialize in different regions, based on their preferences or historical experience, to facilitate development of their own instructors. This specialization will enable more efficient cultural awareness and language training.

IV. Widening the scope of subject matter

In terms of developing national capabilities, security forces are not only a tool for enforcing the rule of law, but a mechanism for spreading knowledge throughout local communities. Therefore, military and police force personnel can play a useful role in development activities and as engines of broader education and development. (The

(6) This has been discussed in more detailed in the section on Interoperability above.

TRAINING ON TRAINING TOPICS

- Awareness of the role of human factors in training interactions
- Interpersonal awareness to mitigate culture shock and increase interaction effectiveness
- Inter-cultural communication techniques
- Training on how to provide individual training
- Training on how to provide collective training
- Training on performing needs analysis

Figure 1

U.S. experience with organizations like the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Navy’s general military training on topics like financial literacy, health and summer-time safety provides just two examples of military organization and training serving broader developmental and educational goals. Therefore, as part of a Comprehensive Approach, NATO training, though focused on security functions as the first priority, (police evidence gathering procedures, correctional facility operations, small unit tactics, etc.) could also include, for example, topics on animal husbandry, basic veterinary care, soil management techniques, enhanced local construction methods, gardening tips, family health, and financial literacy.

This widening the scope of subject matter requires a commensurate widening of the trainer pool. Therefore, the trainers from NATO Nations need not only be military service members. Through a variety of partnerships, NATO will be able to access trainers with a wide range of functional expertise. This accessing of other organizations instructional expertise, and involving the private sector to ensure training provides skills useful in the local economy will be central to the success of the overall training effort.

Organization

Organization refers to the institutional and human resource structures created to facilitate the training process. As mentioned above, capability development of the local security forces, just as it does for NATO Nations, will take place on three different organizational levels: institutional level (the defense ministry or department), the training of the trainers, and the actual student training. See Figure 2. Abilities are already involved in each of these areas, and have been for a very long time, as described in our discussion of training above. In order to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of its resource expenditures and speak to its comparative advantages as an intergovernmental organization with extensive experience helping Member and Partner Nations enhance their security capabilities, NATO should focus on the two upper levels, while the nations devote the preponderance of their training resources to the two lower levels. See Figure 3 (next page) for a representation of the relative areas of effort.

NATO support at the operational level, as it has in NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), will take the form of providing the organizational backbone or structure into which the nations can contribute trainers. By developing a standardized, interoperable instructor training, equipping and deploying process and a baseline curriculum, NATO can help ensure that the training provided to the national forces is consistent across the entire nation and at all levels to facilitate interoperability.

NATO will add the most value (and most effectively and efficiently apply its scarce resources) by focusing on the defense institutional development level. Supporting nations as they work through the organizational design issues necessary to transform and enhance their forces will require training specialists in high level institution focused interaction to advise local forces on the organizational design process necessary to enhance local institutions. (7)

Personnel

Personnel involved in this process will require not only expertise in their functional area (correctional facility management,
Leadership

Within the nation receiving the training, local leaders will have to decide training policy, provide the training direction and guidance for the strategic, operational and tactical levels of training, cultivate relationships with other organizations within the nation and with external actors (including regional actors) and determine the overall organizational design for the training process. Therefore, they will need a deep understanding of the current capabilities (based on unflinching, honest appraisal) the intention and vision of their political leaders, and the NATO and other actor capabilities available for them to leverage as they enhance their own capabilities in order to meet their national objectives. They must also articulate a vision for future training, institutionalize the incentive structure necessary to make the training process self-sustaining and commonly understand the importance of owning and operating the necessary infrastructure and facilities necessary to support the long term human resources development for which they are receiving NATO assistance. Lessons identified, learned and best practices from NATO’s Partnership for Peace and the experiences of Members as they join the Alliance will be especially useful as national leaders work to shape their own visions and understand the challenges of the transformation process and NATO works to effectively and efficiently support them. Leaders in NATO organizations must both understand local needs and wants and flexibly support the local leaders as these leaders develop the way ahead.

Facilities

NATO facilities of importance for training local forces include training facilities in NATO Member Countries, (like the NATO School and the NATO Defense College), local exercise facilities, live fire ranges and places like the Joint Warfare Center (JWC) and Joint Force Training Center (JFTC). Including local security force members in courses and programs at these existing facilities could be done for minimal cost, as the infrastructure is already in place. Use of these facilities would free the nations from developing the courses available there on their own, enabling them to focus their limited resources on training facilities back home. The Adult Distance Learning (ADL) infrastructure (servers, etc.) also falls under this capability element. ADL, when appropriately supported by face to face interaction necessary to serve as the doctrinal component of the training; one can provide the basic understanding of a subject in preparation for a face to face course; two, it can provide the knowledge necessary to do a specific task, and three, it can refresh knowledge gained in a previous course.

In the nations receiving support, training facilities like schools and exercise sites may need to be rehabilitated or created from the ground up. Modeling and simulation facilities should also be considered in some cases, as they can provide a low cost (after the initial investment) way to train for a wide variety of situations.

In addition, given resource constraints, attention should be paid to the possibility of creating multi-use facilities, for example, training areas for both police and military trainers, or new buildings on existing university campuses instead of creating totally separate military education facilities. Of course, each nation will have to decide on the exact nature of the facilities they require. NATO can only provide advice based on lessons identified and best practices from Member and Partner experiences.

Doctrine

Doctrine provides the high-level direction and guidance for an activity. As a capability element, doctrine refers to all the textual guidance for an activity, including, in the NATO case, policy. This policy will provide the highest level guidance for NATO concerning training local security forces. But these texts will in themselves be insufficient to serve as the doctrinal component of the capability. Therefore, once this highest level NATO guidance is promulgated, the strategic commands will have to develop their own guidance. Allied Commander Transformation (ACT) Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) process can make valuable contributions to this activity. Together this guidance will constitute NATO’s way for engaging in the training with other organizations and states in order to increase local resilience to future crises. Not only will the training help local actors shape outcomes in positive ways (from the NATO perspective) but developing the baseline knowledge, and networks of interaction necessary for training support, can provide NATO with the local leadership standing necessary to support those actors predisposed to act in ways congruent with NATO values.

Second, after a crisis, as part of a broader stabilization and reconstruction activity, NATO should be able to rapidly deploy, in conjunction with other organizations, training resources, (in money and personnel) to restore or regrow local security force training capabilities. Early investment in capability building will reduce the costs of support made necessary by a major crisis. This training and development support is thus a cost-effective contribution to fulfilling Alliance crisis management tasks.

Third, by taking steps to enhance its TLF capability to train and develop local forces over years, additional development of the ability to rapidly deploy a critical mass of the TLF instructors will further enhance NATO’s crisis management effectiveness. This rapid reaction TLF team could deploy alongside other training support (especially in post-crisis situations, to demonstrate to local people that supporting the emerging NATO affiliated security architectures is not just empty words, but that NATO is here to stay) and could also provide additional, on the ground support to local authorities, as the training area forms. This TLF team could also help local actors quickly and efficiently create the train the trainer programmes necessary in the early stages of involvement, which nations and other organizations believe are appropriate to meet their own needs. NATO, by focusing on institutional development and instructor training, will help local actors reconstitute or enhance their own organic training capabilities. Therefore, training of students in the various areas of expertise by NATO trainers will be a by-product of training local trainers, not the primary objective of NATO training activities. Though this functional training may be necessary in the early stages of involvement, NATO should shift from direct training provision to training the trainers as rapidly as possible.

In addition, NATO, by building its own organic TLF capability, will be able to coor- dinate multinational TLF surge efforts. This coordination capability will provide NATO with the ability to quickly aggregate and deploy training support from any single nation could alone, and thus quickly generate positive security effects. In addition, NATO can use this coordination capability to help local actors quickly and efficiently create the trainer training programmes on a wide variety of essential subjects. This speed of training support is important, especially in post-crisis situations, to demonstrate to local people that supporting the emerging NATO affiliated security architectures is not just empty words, but that NATO is here to stay. This TLF capability is a meta-capability: it is capability that improves both local actor’s own capabilities and more importantly, their ability to continuously enhance their own capabilities. Therefore, NATO should develop its capability to train local forces in three ways.

First, it should provide training support before a crisis as part of normal interaction...
Continued Counterinsurgency Training and Mindset

Vital for effective ISAF transition process in Afghanistan and future NATO operations

By Col (Ret.) Benjamin Clark

The author served in the U.S. Army 1979-2009 in Infantry, Special Forces, and Joint Special Operations assignments. He retired in 2009 and now works as a Defense contractor supporting irregular Warfare and counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. From 2009-2011, he supported the COMSDF Counterinsurgency Advisor and Assistance Team (CAAT) in Afghanistan as well as supporting numerous NATO COIN training, exercises, and related COIN events. Contact information: bclark@pentagonstrategy.com

The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the official positions or policy of the Joint Warfare Center, NATO, ISAF, or the U.S. Department of Defense.

Introduction
The Date/Pashto word “Inteqal” (“Transition” in English) should be familiar to most military and civilian members of the NATO/ISAF team by now, it is the process for strengthening peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region. Extensive collaborative discussions between NATO/ISAF, the international community, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) over the last three years produced a formal agreement for Inteqal/Transition within a joint framework of Afghan sovereignty and supported by a process coordinated through the Joint Afghan NATO Inteqal Board, or JINAB. The JINAB plays a key role in the process for Inteqal/Transition planning, coordination, and handover of lead security responsibility from ISAF to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by December 2014. Inteqal/Transition does not signify ISAF withdrawal, but a gradual shift to ANSF lead for security as their capabilities develop over time. NATO/ISAF and the international community are committed to long term engagement and an “Enduring Partnership” in Afghanistan past 2014 and the ISAF mission. In July 2011, the Government of Afghanistan conducted ceremonies to formally mark the implementation of Tranche One of Inteqal/Transition with surrender of lead security responsibility from ISAF to ANSF in seven provinces and cities in Afghanistan (provinces of Bamyan, Panjshir, Kabul, cities of Lashkhar Gah, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Mehtar Lam). Tranche Two transition locations were announced the last week of November 2011.

The Bottom Line, Up Front
With the developments noted above and the beginning of Inteqal/Transition the need for continued counterinsurgency (COIN) training and operations focus by ISAF has been questioned by some. But, in fact, the relevance and importance of COIN training and mindset for all ISAF personnel, organizations and operations has never been greater as the process of Inteqal/Transition moves forward over the next three years. If Inteqal/Transition is a living process, then continued COIN training and mindset is the lifeblood of the process. Continued COIN training, mindset and operations are critical enablers of effective transition from ISAF to Afghan lead in all areas of security, governance, development and rule of law. COIN training and mindset will also remain relevant and in fact, vital, to future NATO operations in an increasingly complex emerging security environment.

Background

The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavenisse and the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland play key roles supporting ISAF pre-deployment training, among their many other responsibilities. From 2009-2011, I have been privileged to support NATO/ISAF COIN training requirements at JWC, JFTC, and several courses conducted by the NATO School Oberammergau. Concurrently, I supported the ISAF COIN Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) in Afghanistan. This was preceded by military service in Afghanistan during several tours of duty 2002-2009. These experiences provided the opportunity to observe and support first-hand the critical importance of COIN training and mindset for ISAF COIN training and mindset remain vital to effective ISAF operations both in Afghanistan and to future NATO operations in an increasingly complex emerging security environment dominated by transnational, unconventional, and asymmetric threats. From that perspective, here are several ideas regarding NATO/ISAF COIN efforts in Afghanistan and what they mean for the future.

Discussion

1) Recognizing and preparing for the complexity of the operational environment in Afghanistan remains mission essential, not mission enhancing, for all of our deployed forces. This complexity includes the interwoven, multi-dimensional complexities of Afghan/regional history, geography, culture, religion, tribe, language, and other factors; but just as important, how those factors intersect daily and over time with our own NATO/ISAF organizational (“tribal”) culture, language, politics, rotational turbulence and other factors. No amount of training, study and preparation will fully prepare our forces for this complex environment; but without such training and preparation we cannot effectively support ISAF transition to ANSF security lead. Continued leader emphasis on individual/organizational pre-deployment training is required at all levels, focused on complexity of the operational environment and how we understand and prepare for it.

2) We must continue efforts to overcome a collective COIN training deficit and improve COIN training and mindset amongst all nations and NATO at the institutional/organizational level, for both individual and collective training. Current guidance directs three phases of ISAF pre-deployment training: Phase I: national pre-deployment training; Phase II: NATO collective training events, Phase III: in-theater induction training) however the quality/depth of COIN training remains arguably insufficient to meet the known complexities of the operational environment. Significant disparity in Phase I national pre-deployment COIN training quality and content amongst all Troop Contributing Nations remains clearly observable. Efforts to improve the content and amount of Phase II COIN training cannot make up existing deficits in Phase I – the time/task balance is already overloaded. Despite NATO and ISAF efforts over the last two years, we are still deploying personnel to Afghanistan who have inadequate COIN pre-deployment training. Over time our focus on pre-deployment COIN training for ISAF...
processes. Ultimately there is a strong case in the realm of training, education and from 2013 on. As with this first-ever pub-

equipped forces to operate in Afghanistan.

3) We need to institutionalize COIN mind-
set and training in NATO using a DOT-
MLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Lead-
ership, Personnel, Facilities) approach. The February 2011 publi-
cation of AJP-3.4.4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, addressed the long-

4) Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are nothing new – history provides many compelling examples of complex decades-
long insurgencies and counterinsurgency efforts; lessons identified are many and ob-

5) NATO/ISAF understanding of the Tal-
iban threat and subsequent ISAF COIN opera-
tions evolved slowly from 2003-2009 with gradual awareness of a growing in-
surgency but limited resources, guidance, and authorities available in response. It was un-

6) ISAF COIN efforts are strengthened by

7) COIN operations by ISAF reflect NA-
TO’s evolving Comprehensive Approach to op-
erations; the two are complementary. Much of what is doctrinal, necessary, and intuitive in planning and executing effec-
tive COIN operations blends seamlessly with NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to planning — COIN planning, operations, and mindset apply a Comprehensive Ap-

change with 4th Troop Contributing Nations is a daunting challenge from the grand Po-

critical in planning and executing ef-
must evolve to focus training for COIN op-
erations outside the Afghan theatre of

needs to evolve to focus training for COIN op-
erations outside Afghanistan. The Three Swords Magazine • 21/2011 • 31
TRAINING

a. The benefits of embedded partnering, working “Shona Ba Shona” or “shoulder to shoulder” with ANSF. Lessons learned and best practices, partnering vignettes, practical tips, and how partnering helps prevent and mitigate effects of Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) as well as supporting Transition/Integrity.

b. The importance of relationships and trust building with Afghans – a baseline skill for effective partnership and COIN efforts. What does that look like and how is it best accomplished?

c. CIVCAS avoidance, awareness, and prevention: now more than ever: Understand the difference between Rules of Engagement vs Escalation of Force and how CIVCAS, the Taliban’s ruthless exploitation of ISAF mistakes, real or not. Review CIVCAS incidents and discuss the key lessons from each.

d. Preventing loss of continuity during handover/takeover operations; best practices, partnering vignettes, practical tips, and how partnering helps prevent and mitigate effects of Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) as well as support the Inteqal/Transition process.

e. Understanding the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program (APRP) and the key historical role of reintegation and reconciliation in ending insurgencies. Understand and share ISAF’s role in “un- form, find, protect, support.”

f. The challenges of widespread corruption and its corrosive impacts on the legitimacy of Government of Afghanistan and ISAF COIN efforts. ISAF counter corruption Task Force efforts by TF Shafafiyat.

g. COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance and the pitfalls of misplaced, inappropriate, or poorly managed contracting processes, which degrade COIN efforts and ISAF credibility. Understand why contracting is a weapon system, which must be properly aimed and fired.

h. The key role each of us plays in Inteqal/Transition to know, share, and support the process of Inteqal/Transition.

i. Working more effectively in a Comprehensive Approach with our civilian partners. This is something we frequently overlook – the need to include non-military actors in our COIN efforts. Do we know our IO/NGO/UNAMA neighbours and what capability they may have? Are they routinely part of our information-sharing, partnership, and planning?

j. The hugely negative impact of opium on the fight against corruption, the health of the people of Afghanistan, and ISAF COIN efforts. Funding/support of the insurgency through the opium trade and increasingly powerful and inextricably linked network of Taliban insurgency narcotics, crime, smuggling and terrorism.

11) COIN does not get easier with the beginning of Tranche 1 transition in July 2011. Each of us must ensure we understand and can effectively discuss Inteqal/Transition process with our Afghan partners, both military and civilian. Our security gains over the last year are fragile and the Taliban exploit every opportunity to attack, physically and otherwise, the credibility of the coalition. Our ISAF partners and the Afghan people must know that Inteqal/Transition does not mean NATO abandonment of Afghanistan and that NATO has an enduring Partnership with Afghanistan.

Summary

The complexity of COIN in Afghanistan will continue to require time, resources, sacrifice, and leader emphasis across all levels. ISAF started late with comprehensive COIN efforts in Afghanistan but progress across all lines of operations is clear and growing, even as it remains challenging and fragile. Despite many hurdles, past and future ISAF COIN efforts have improved the chances for a stable and secure Afghanistan. During the next three years ISAF personnel must understand and support the Inteqal/Transition process and reinforce the successes and best practices of the COIN campaign as we transition security lead to the Government of Afghanistan in 2014. We must also work to retain, refine, and institutionalize ISAF COIN lessons and experiences for NATO application in the emerging security environment. JWC, JFTC, NSO and numerous other NATO organizations and national elements play key roles in supporting training for ISAF current operations requirements as well as developing future COIN training and institutional dialog and processes.

Article continues on Page 50 with "COIN Training Improvements".
IN SEPTEMBER THIS YEAR, 76 members of the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) successfully completed the JWC Operational Training Exercise (OTX) to Northern Norway. The JWC OTX concept is employed to provide an interesting and high quality professional learning and training venue to the JWC staff in order to broaden the understanding of selected national and international history, NATO professional development topics, and cultural learning.

The theme for this year’s OTX was “The High North – Challenges in the Northern Region linked to the Comprehensive Approach.” To put this theme into a context and to cover all levels from tactical to strategic, the training audience was given a strategic introduction to the topic through an academic phase at the JWC prior to the visit to the Norwegian Operational Joint Headquarters at Bodø, and the Garrison in South Varanger, Kirkenes. A planning team consisting of Lieutenant Colonel Kurt Andreas Skog (OPR), Maj Trudi Skjelde, CPO Gary Braddock and Mr Gordon Ramsay was put together. Jet Time, a Danish charter airline, was booked to provide lift for the exercise and two representatives from NDLO’s M&T section supported the OTX in the coordination of all transportation throughout.

Academics at JWC
To introduce the audience to the area to be visited, two high level briefers were invited to set the scene and give the strategic view to the High North.

Brief 1: by Professor Ove Tobias Gudmestad, University of Stavanger, and entitled “Engineering activities in the High North”. Professor Gudmestad provided an excellent historical overview of the Barents region as well as a depiction of the climatic and geographical challenges faced by industry and residents alike. His superlative focus on providing us with illustrations of the infrastructure, economic activity and future possibilities for all northern Norway states and Russian provinces served to impress upon all participants the importance of the region. His discussion of the recently agreed upon delimitation line, the vast natural resource deposits, opening of the Arctic Sea ice and cross border cooperative ventures set an outstanding background for the OTX.

Brief 2: by Mr Tom Holter, MoD Norway Department of Security Policy. Mr. Holter noted that Norway defines the Northern Areas, the High North, as its most important adjacent area. This is today evident both politically and militarily and there is a growing international interest in the changes taking place in the Arctic. This interest is seen in Allies, in Russia and in Asia. The possibility of new sea routes and the potential for oil and gas extraction gives rise to expectation and optimism. At the same time, increases in maritime traffic and petroleum production could lead to serious adverse consequences for fisheries and for the environment. Key, he noted, was that the opening of the High North to shipping and resource exploration must form a cornerstone of Norwegian security policy and international consultation and cooperation.

Visit to NJHQ
On Tuesday, 13 September 2011, OTX participants flew from Stavanger Sola to Bodø and were met and welcomed by the commanding officer of the 123 Wing Brigadier Per-Egil Rygg and Ms Mette Stolz Dahl from the Protocol Office of the Main Air Station at Bodø (MAS) before proceeding to Norwegian National Joint HQ (NHQ) facilities at Reitan. After lunch with NHQ staff, the group was provided with two high level briefers: 1) an NHQ Command Briefing by CDR Arne Morten Grønsgård, Chief J3 NHQ, and, 2) a discussion on “Challenges on the Northern Region” by Mr Jonny Didriksen, Senior Advisor to COM NHQ. These were followed by environmental-specific presentations on each of the Norwegian Coast Guard, Maritime Situational Awareness, Quick Reaction Air Alerts and Border Control operations. Lastly, participants were given a tour of the NHQ Joint Operations Center (JOC). A stop at the “Saltstraumen”, the world’s most powerful maelstrom just outside of Bodø was enjoyable and a great site for photos!

The exceptional information and background provided to OTX participants at Reitan reinforced our understanding of issues in the High North and the need for a true consideration of all relational aspects in security planning and liaison.

Visit to the Bodø Main Air Station
The next morning saw the OTX visit the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF) MAS in Bodø. After briefings on the structure and roles of the RNoAF, a capability brief on its frontline fighter, the F-16, and a detailed description of its Quick Reaction
composition and procedures. This was followed by a tour of an F-16 maintenance hangar and static display of Ground Based Air Defence systems. All in all, an excellent morning that linked the tactical and operational levels of the RNoAF to the High North for our group.

Visit to GSV

After the terrific hospitality at Bodø, the OTX proceeded to Kirkenes by charter flight and were met at Høybuktmoen Airport, Kirkenes, by representatives of Garnisonen i Sør-Varanger (GSV). Briefings to our group were provided by Mr Rune Rafaelsen of the Barents Secretariat, Ms Ellen Katrine Hætta, Chief of the Est Finnmark Police District, and Colonel Ivar Sakserud, Senior Norwegian Border Commissioner. These briefings served to illustrate the day to day and "on-ground" aspects of the Comprehensive Approach to security matters. The day was concluded by a group dinner in the GSV officer's Mess hosted by the Commander GSV, Lieutenant Colonel Jan Østbo.

On the final day of the OTX, Thursday, 15 September 2011, our group was transported to the GSV border station at Svanvik where we were given a Command Brief, visit to the restored old border station and a static display of the Company's patrol vehicles and equipment. It was extremely interesting to meet and chat with the young men and women who patrol the 196 kilometre border with Russia. After lunch at the Svanvik Folkehøgskole, our group was treated to a fantastic historical lecture with numerous photos that depicted military operations during the Second World War in Kirkenes and the surrounding areas of both Norway and Russia. A stop at the border along the Pasvik River allowed us to see the patrol boats used by GSV, gaze across the border and have photo opportunities at border marking posts!

Final remarks

This year's OTX was deemed to be a great success. It truly allowed our participants to garner a first-hand understanding of the challenges faced in the High North and revealed the magnitude of inter-jurisdictional cooperation, training and information sharing necessary to ensure that national and local security concerns are met. It was also a fantastic opportunity for the Joint Warfare Centre staff members to get to know each other just a little bit better, contributing to shared understanding and enhancing our own capabilities.

Photos by Lt Col Markus Beck, DEU A, and Maj Marny Sundt, USA A
At 2,644 kilometres northeast of the JWC...

By Maj Elisabeth Eikeland, NOR AF Commandant Vardøhus Fortress

IN A PREVIOUS ISSUE of The Three Swords magazine, as then Chief PAO, I shared with you some of my Norwegian scientist and explorer Fridtjof Nansen’s thoughts on making new choices in life. “... we are all explorers in life, whichever path we follow.” After four years at the JWC, I was looking to do something different. So, exactly 20 years since I last departed Finnmark – I have been feeling nostalgic for the last facet of a 700-year old fortress...

Vardøhus Fortress at present is primarily a “flag-and-salute” fortress. The flag is raised every day and, as the only North Norway military site with an obligation to fire gun salutes, the fortress salutes on Norway’s Constitution Day (17 May), dissolution of the Union with Sweden Day (7 June) and on all royal birthdays, as it does on the day that the entire disc of the sun is visible again after the winter darkness period. The motto in Vardo’s coat-of-arms is most suggestive: Cedant tenebrae soli – Darkness shall give way to the sun!

During WWII, in 1940, the Norwegian flag flew over Vardøhus for much longer than anywhere else in what came to be known as the “flag war”, with the Commandant continuing to fly the flag all the way until 6 November 1940. As the liberation of Finnmark County began in the autumn 1944, Vardøhus was the first military site nationwide to hoist the Norwegian flag again.

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The fortress manifested a strong ambition to demonstrate Denmark-Norway’s sovereignty in the High North already in the 1700s. It still remains under military command, standing guard at a time when the Armed Forces generally are busy focusing on their core business, which bears testimony to its emblematic value. As its 46th Commandant and the first female ever to hold this position, it is my duty to uphold its proud traditions. More details on Vardøhus Fortress are available at: www.forsvarsbygg.no.

Reinøya Nature Reserve

My duties include supervising the island of Reinøya, a protected nature reserve full of birdlife: puffins, razorbills, common guillemots, Brünnich’s guillemots, black-legged kittiwakes and enormous amounts of seagulls all nest here. The islands of Reinøya and Hornøya rank among the world’s top 100 bird spotting places. A statutory provision of 1854 grants the Commandant of Vardøhus exclusive right to gather seagull’s eggs on the island, and s/he may, in liaison with the City of Vardø, allow civilians to pick eggs as well. Between them, Hornøya and Reinøya used to provide 120,000 to 130,000 eggs. More recently, as the levels of contaminants have increased in sea bird eggs, seagull’s eggs are less in demand. Reinøya is also my “secret” cloudberry place or, rather, one of the best places to pick your own cloudberries in Norway. Berry and egg rights were granted to the Commandant in the old days to help him live rich on a meagre salary. Fortunately, today, “the rights” are a curiosity, more than anything else, and the Commandant’s salary has reached adequacy for his living. Still, much to my joy, I have on several occasions found strawberry-size cloudberries of magic occur?

At 2,644 kilometres northeast of the JWC...
Individual Augmentees Bound for Afghanistan Trained at Joint Warfare Centre

This year’s second Individual Augmentee Pre-Deployment Training (IAPDT 11-02) for Headquarters International Security Assistance Force (HQ ISAF) and ISAF Joint Command (HQ IJC) was held at the Joint Warfare Centre’s Ulsnes Training Facility from 22-28 September 2011. The participants included 87 individual augmentees coming from different military establishments and organizations, the biggest group being the U.S. V Corps.


During the IAPDT 11-02, the Training Audience (TA) received state-of-the-art training from a team of 48 personnel, including 30 recently re-deployed Subject Matter Experts who brought the most current knowledge and a fresh perspective from theatre.

Subject Matter Experts aim to pull out the most significant topics that staff bound for Afghanistan need to learn in order to excel at their respective duties in theatre. IAPDT 11-02 Content Manager Dutch Army Lt Col Rob Van Putten said: “At the JWC we minimize the time it takes for each augmentee to become a full contributor to the ISAF mission as soon as they deploy. Following our training, they feel ready to start their duties within just a few days. The JWC’s training is very extensive and provides a great overview of the entire mission both at the HQ ISAF and the HQ IJC level, as well as the complexities of the environment and the staff processes. However, I think the most important thing is that they get to meet their ISAF/coalition counterparts here in Ulsnes for the first time and put names to faces. In the future, we want to increase the number of Subject Matter Experts at the Grey Cell because the Training Audience appreciates the generosity of all Afghan Subject Matter Experts and their counterparts from international and non-governmental organizations (IOs/NGOs) in supporting this training.”

The IAPDT 11-02, like its predecessors, focused on staff processes and interactions between different divisions and branches in HQ ISAF and HQ IJC. The Mission Specific Training is very extensive and provides a great overview of the entire mission both at the HQ ISAF and the HQ IJC level, as well as the complexities of the environment and the staff processes. However, I think the most important thing is that they get to meet their ISAF/coalition counterparts here in Ulsnes for the first time and put names to faces. In the future, we want to increase the number of Subject Matter Experts at the Grey Cell because the Training Audience appreciates the generosity of all Afghan Subject Matter Experts and their counterparts from international and non-governmental organizations (IOs/NGOs) in supporting this training.”
Training included themes such as: the ISAF mission, counterinsurgency (COIN) and reintegration, campaign assessment, ISAF air operations, Strategic Communications, Strategic/National/International Partnering, training of the Afghan National Security Forces, understanding of the legal basis for the mission (Rules of Engagement), counter-narcotics, anti-corruption challenges, C-IED campaign, Afghan life and culture, Afghan governance and development, life in Afghanistan. But much depends on them, as the training pare the Training Audience for their mission and the culture they learned earlier to specific planning, stability and current operations issues within their syndicates, each supported by a Subject Matter Expert for guidance. During the training event, video-teleconferences were conducted allowing the Training Audience to interact real-time with the HQ ISAF and HQ IJC leadership, such as Maj. General T. P. Evans, DS0, MBE, Chief of Staff HQ IJC, who talked about the design and operation of his headquarters, the comprehensive COIN campaign as well as his expectations and recommendations for the soon-deploying staff.

What constitutes a warfare centre versus an exercise centre?

DOCTRINE — the baseline for operations

By Lt Col Mário José Vieira Pereira, PRT A/JCID, Joint Warfare Centre

Past and Future

In order for our beliefs and principles to be sound, they must be based on what we can study and learn from. Studying and learning about operations is something that can only be based on past operations, for that last operation, the last action, however recent it may be, will always be a past operation, a past action. No matter how many times we wish for it to happen, no one can learn from the future. So, how can we prepare for a future operation, an operation other than the last one we know and have learned from? This is not only the quintessence of doctrine, but also the heart of the warfare centre concept.

Sources of doctrine and JWC role

It was not without reason that the Joint Warfare Centre includes the Joint Capability Integration Division (JCID) to take charge of areas such as doctrine, lessons learned, and concept development and experimentation. In fact, these — concept experimentation, in particular — are what constitutes a warfare centre versus an exercise centre. Why concept experimentation?

To trial new concepts or newly devised ways of having things done, and conclude on whether they work as intended or not, and, consequently, whether they should be widely taught or not, e.g. whether they should be incorporated into the doctrine or not.

But we do not improve through formal experimentation only. While acting, we should use the entire spectrum of capacities, information and knowledge at hand, including, of course, what we have been formally taught; and ask them intelligently to situations we have to deal with. This use of our intelligence should enable us to find solutions for problems not considered in the teaching, in the doctrine. These solutions, when confirmed as adequate ones for the type of situations they were applied to, are the other source of improvement — lessons learned. And these are many times a bigger source of improvement than formal concept development and experimentation.

Baseline

Here, one thing is paramount: the baseline from where to start. Is it possible to think of...
development and experimentation of new concepts, or of lessons learned from action without considering a baseline? Hardly, to say the least. So, what is the baseline, then? The baseline is what we (as an organization) already have learned – doctrine.

Having reached this point, another question should be asked: What should reinforce the highest attention, the sources of learning or the baseline? The answer is not straightforward. Yet one thing is certain. If one does not master all of what has already been learned, all of what is already incorporated in the baseline, the likelihood of one "discovering on the spot" what one could and should already know beforehand is not negligible; besides, such "discoveries" may very well be different from the adequate ones, and lead to failure.

The idea of course is to keep the baseline as up-to-date as possible, since personnel deployed on operations, in order to be efficient, need to know how things are done.

On the other hand, we already know that the next operation will almost certainly be conducted under different circumstances and conditions, and hence will be different from the previous ones and may require solutions not considered in the baseline. How to reconcile this contradiction?

Doctrine can be seen as twofold

Even though not reflected in current NATO doctrine, at least not formally, doctrine may be considered twofold and referred to as fundamental doctrine and applied doctrine. Fundamental doctrine refers to the fundamental principles those that underlie the observation and understanding of the area of activity addressed, and the rationale for the courses of action to be considered for each particular situation within it. Applied doctrine, on the other hand, refers to the practical ways of doing things, based on experience from the past and on beforehand application of fundamental principles to known conditions.

The key to resolve the contradiction mentioned above is the fundamental doctrine – the fundamental principles that underlie the activity itself (not any particular, specific conditions) and only need to be properly and intelligently applied to whichever circumstances and conditions one may encounter. This application of principles is the rationale for doctrine.

Constraints

However, given the fact that personnel deployed on operations have their daily focus on applied, practical doctrine, the fundamental principles often end up being overlooked, since they are already versed in the applied doctrine, without this being always apparent to those who do not entirely master the doctrine. Time constraints further reinforce people’s tendency not to consider the fundamental doctrine, since in an operational environment there are normally lots of things to be done, as well as rules, processes and procedures to be followed, which absorb people’s mental availability, thus precluding the “getting back to basics.”

To Summarize

Experience from the past tells us that NATO forces should not expect to find itself in repeated circumstances and conditions, at least not in all aspects. Conducting operations under this given requires a posture of foresight. This posture, nevertheless, can only be grounded in what we can learn from the past – there is no way to learn from the future.

From looking at the past we know that in the context of a certain activity, people have used the fundamental principles underlying the activity of their concern to develop solutions for problems and situations they could not study or prepare for beforehand. And of course, they learn from the failures that have occurred. This is how we learn to prepare for future operations.

Whatever circumstances and conditions NATO faces in the future, the fundamental principles of doctrine help prepare us to determine the right actions to take. These fundamental principles, along with the experiences gained from applying doctrine to specific situations, constitutes the baseline for preparation. This baseline of knowledge is the key to avoiding past mistakes and ensuring NATO’s success in future operations.

The Joint Warfare Centre launches cyber defence training with STEADFAST JUNCTURE 2011

By Lt Col H. Todd Waller, USA AF

Space and Cyber SME, JTD, Joint Warfare Centre

The process of improving NATO’s NRF readiness for operations in a cyber-threatened environment has begun.

“... NATO Agreement shall be based on the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (COED) and Le Petit Robert in English and French respectively. Specific NATO Agreement terminology shall be developed only where terminology in those dictionaries is inadequate for NATO purposes...” (C 192003/17 NATO Policy for Standardization of Terminology, paragraph 5.2).

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(2) Origin in Middle English, from Old French, from Latin doctrine 'teaching, learning,' from docere 'teach.'

(3) “Doctrine: Fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application.” (NATO-AR 6, based on AR 601). These short notes on this definition: (1) Despite not stated as such, this is a definition of doctrine on military operations. (2) In this context, “in support of” is an expression that may raise some issues, since objectives must be attained rather than supported. (2) The second sentence is just an add-on to the definition. It should not be part of the definition, since it does not contribute to the explanation of what doctrine actually is.
be developing across NATO’s battlestaffs a comprehensive understanding of the far reaching impacts of cyber attack.

Most everyone realizes cyber threats exist for NATO command and control systems. The NATO Communication and Information Systems (CIS) Services Agency (NCIS) is steadily increasing its capabilities to defend NATO networks against such attacks. The more potent cyber threats to NATO operations, however, may not be as intuitive and yet more likely during a conflict. SFJE11 gave NATO’s battlestaffs an opportunity to begin experiencing the vastness of the cyber threat. To better grasp that vastness, let’s put vulnerabilities to cyber threats in three categories:

1) Threats to NATO command and control,
2) Threats to NATO operations,
3) Threats to the NATO mission.

During SFJE11, cyber attacks against vulnerabilities in all three spheres were injected and the Training Audience was very responsive to all. To the credit of JFCBS, senior leadership took the cyber threat seriously, instructed their staffs to do likewise, and established the organizational entities necessary to respond to attacks.

Consequently, the battlestaff responded to a number of cyber injects that were both direct and subtle, and also began to ask some very good questions about how cyber threats could be treated more thoroughly in the planning process to either mitigate or avoid their effects. The battlestaff also had the opportunity to experience how cyber attacks against host nation critical infrastructures could impact operations and the stability of the government. With this understanding came new insights into how the command might assess its vulnerabilities during the planning phase for a future contingency operation or exercise.

Overall, the JWC’s introduction of cyber defence into the Steadfast series of NRF exercises is off to a good start. JFCBS’ experience during the exercise will undoubtedly inform and shape its progress towards cyber defence maturity and the JWC is already working to refine its “cyber play” for future NRF exercises. The process of improving NATO’s NRF readiness for operations in a cyber-threatened environment has begun in earnest.
In total, 256 Iraqi security officials have participated in the courses since 2004

Final Iraqi Key Leader Training in Norway

By CDR W.A. Barten, NLD A
Inci Kucukaksoy
OPR IKLT, JWC
JWC PAO

The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) concluded its final Iraqi Key Leader Training (IKLT) course on Wednesday, 19 October 2011, with an official closing ceremony held at the JWC’s Interim Training Facility at Ullens. The JWC has delivered this training since it was selected to host NATO’s first out-of-country course for Iraqi security leaders in November 2004 as part of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). Since the first course, the Centre has provided fifteen IKLTs to assist Iraqi Security Forces in the restoration of sustainable security institutions and processes in order to establish, take over and maintain security in Iraq.

IKLT started out as part of the NTM-I, which has been running since 2004 when NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to support a request from the former Iraqi Interim Government to help Iraqi Security Forces in accordance with UN Security Resolution 1546. Since then, NTM-I has offered specialized, strategic-level training inside and outside Iraq to selected members of the Iraqi Security Forces. Through its important mission, the NTM-I has made a tangible contribution not only to the rebuilding of military leadership in Iraq, but also to the development of the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and the Iraqi security. The NTM-I is financed via a trust fund, which is entirely funded by voluntary contributions provided by individual NATO Member and Partner Nations.

“This course has helped Iraqi Key Leaders operate more jointly and has given them an inspirational insight into international relations. We must remember that Iraq has been isolated from the outside world for many years. Here, we have been teaching an extremely relevant multi-disciplinary training programme with top-notch security specialists from both within and outside NATO providing first-hand knowledge in the operational context and leadership disciplines,” said Norwegian Army Brigadier Gunnar E. Gustavsen, IKLT Director and Special Advisor to Commander JWC.

The last IKLT was attended by sixteen Iraqi security officials including two Major Generals, nine Brigadier Generals, three Colonels, one Lieutenant Colonel and one civilian coming from the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office and Ministries of Defence and the Interior. From 8 to 20 October 2011 they gained competence in areas such as operational Command and Control, staff planning and decision-making, provision of effective and efficient inter-agency leadership, communication skills, practice of operational law and Security Sector Reform, management and use of information, as well as Strategic Communications in a counterinsurgency campaign. Also to note was a facilitated discussion on the topic of “Iraq: Beyond Counterinsurgency to Reconciliation.”

Major activities further included briefings to promote a greater understanding of NATO, its Member and Partner Nations and their armed forces, as well as practical workshops on interacting with the media. Visits to the Stavanger Police headquarters and the City Hall were also part of the programme.

The JWC Commander, French Army Major General Jean Fred Berger said during his welcome speech: “We take great pride here at the JWC in being recognized as NATO’s premier operational training centre. We take no less pride in the confidence that the Iraqi Government has placed in our ability to provide the same quality training to the Iraqi key leaders all the way since 2004.”

This final IKLT course in Stavanger is the culmination of a seven-year old training curriculum that has been assiduously developed using feedback from participants at all iterations of this training, which had simultaneous interpretation for both English to Arabic and Arabic to English. “Every time, after an IKLT iteration, we think that the training audience rates among the most professional and academically and socially active groups that JWC has hosted,” the JWC Commander said.

Since the start of the programme in 2004, the JWC has planned sixteen courses and conducted fifteen courses; one course was cancelled because of the Iceland volcanic eruption in 2010. In total, 256 Iraqi security officials have participated in the courses since 2004.

An Iraqi Army Major General who participated in the last IKLT in Ulens, said: “I found the course to be extremely relevant and successful. We received expert training and instruction on a broad range of topics, as well as an insight into the training, equipment and organizational structures of the armed forces of various NATO Nations. The course also was a chance for us to engage with our counterparts across NATO Member and Partner Nations. I believe it is very important for the Iraqi military to establish contact with western militaries and participate in their training and exercises. The IKLT helps bring us up to the level of western militaries.”

Starting from 2012, the IKLT will be hosted and conducted by the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. The decision to this effect was made taking into account JWC’s Programme of Work, which aims to support current NATO operations as well as continue to provide NATO’s operational level training.

The NTM-I has since 2004 helped to build a strong and enduring partnership between Iraq and NATO. Reflecting on the NTM-I’s out-of-country training efforts for the Iraqi Security Forces, the former Commander NTM-I, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Michael Barbero said: “Out-of-country courses are important not just because of their content, but also because they provide an unparalleled opportunity to expose Iraqi security professionals to NATO best practices and allow Iraqi officers to network with NATO counterparts and develop lasting partnerships both on a personal and a professional level.”
COIN Training Improvements  

By Col (Ret.) Benjamin Clark

Despite the challenges and deficits of current COIN pre-deployment training for ISAF, there is a growing informal network or NATO COIN Community of Interest (COI), which recognizes and responds to the need for continued collaborative efforts to improve how we train and prepare our forces to deploy. Increased time, facilities, instructors, funding, and focus on COIN training come slowly, often in small increments, but progress comes about because leaders, staff, and trainers at the JWC, JFTC, the COIN Training Center Afghanistan, NSO, and national COIN centers recognize the wartime operational and training imperative to build and improve our NATO COIN capabilities.

Supportive staff officers, NCO’s, and civilians at ACT, ACO, JFC Brunssum, and SHAPE help to identify and pursue solutions to gaps in training, doctrine, guidance, and other areas for improvement. Much of this, like COIN, happens not based on the complex hierarchy of organizational direction, but rather based on knowledge of the human terrain, informal partnerships, trust, and collaborative outreach among different organizations and tribes throughout our Alliance. Without this informal network, this collaborative COIN COI, we simply would not be where we are – it does take a network, it seems.

As an example, the writing, coordination, and publication of the February 2011 COIN AJP Doctrine provided the key development, which undergirds and enables almost all future progress to institutionalize COIN in a DOTMLPF approach. Without NATO doctrine for COIN, little real progress in building a NATO institutional approach to COIN would be possible; it was a crucial first step. The Doctrine writing team deserves great credit for having broken through considerable staffing challenges over the course of many months. The contributions and efforts of TF COIN are also significant – they provided vital thought, writing, and much-needed published guidance prior to the approval of the COIN Doctrine; without TF COIN interim efforts, ISAF pre-deployment training would not be where it is. ACT staffers continue to work on COIN ADL content for ISAF and future COIN ADL training, and both JWC and JFTC continue to allocate increased time and training focus for COIN Phase II training such as Leader Roundtables, Panel Discussions on Partnering, Civilian Casualties and Transition and increased ANSF support for JWC and JFTC training requirements – all these and other developments reflect growing recognition and action to the need for improving our COIN mindset and training.

In the next issue we will explore the idea of a NATO COIN Centre of Excellence. +

What is the role of Community Support at the Joint Warfare Centre? I see Community Support as having four prime roles: firstly, serving as an initial information point and source for those personnel and their families who are coming to JW Centre and Stavanger. I believe that our aim should be to provide current and useful information and assistance as best as we can. Secondly, I believe that we should serve as an assistance point for the JWC staff, and their families. Hence our focus on bus and boat trips, visits to local attractions and our high-impact activities. We attempt to organize what we call “high-impact” activities. That means that we plan and conduct events in which we can expect fantastic opportunities available to us, the more we will enjoy our stay, make lasting relationships and look back at our time here as pleasant and memorable.

What type of community activities do you organize and why? We attempt to organize what we call “high impact” activities. That means that we plan and conduct events in which we can expect high numbers of folks to participate with their families. Hence our focus on bus and boat trips, visits to local attractions and our
COMMUNITY

Information Day BBQ. Unfortunately, we do not have the resources to do such things for what we expect could be relatively smaller groups or for specialty interest areas. The sole exception is our youth events where we believe that this portion of our community should be able to get together a few times per year for activities aimed at their interests. We also look at introducing people to different things or areas. A trip to, say, Utstein Kloster, or, the ancient village of Landa could tweak folks’ interest in the myriad of local history available to us to explore. Participating in local events such as a football match or the feile in Egersund also allows us a glimpse of local culture. We also rely upon mechanisms such as our membership in the International Network of Norway (INN) and inviting exhibitors to our Information Day to expose our folks to local attractions or opportunities.

Where do the funds come from for these activities? Almost all of the funds that we use for our Community Support programs, including the Library and funding grants to our sports and recreation clubs, come from the profits of the Central Cellar. That said, we have a close working relationship with 426 Services who do provide us some funding support and substantial assistance with equipment loan and facility usage. It is critical that, for the benefit of the Community, we work as a team with national elements, Norwegian military authorities and our partners in the local area to offer as many and as varied opportunities to our community as possible.

Where do the ideas come from? Most of our ideas come from within the Community Support team. These are generally based upon our experiences or successes of the past and trying to enhance them. We invite ideas from the community and frequently get suggestions from the Community Council. The Council consists of all Senior National Representatives (SNRs) and is the community’s voice for morale and welfare issues. Lastly, our partners in the Rogaland area also make suggestions of things that may appeal to us, an example being our last boat trip to the island of Noe Hidle.

What about sports facilities? We are very fortunate to have the Elixia membership program provided to us by our Host Nation Ministry of Defence. With these, we can take full advantage of all of the classes, programs, and facilities at any of the five Elixia centers in Rogaland. We also have access to local military facilities and sports fields such as at Madla Camp and Sola Fly-stasjon. Our on-post facilities are relatively spartan due to resource availability.

Do you have any closing remarks? Only that I would fully encourage all community members to take full advantage of our facilities as well as opportunities in the area. Our Library is truly a hidden gem, our Host Nation Support Office has a wealth of local activity information and the Central Cellar directly gives back to our community. Participating in either International Network of Norway (INN) or Petroleum Wives Club (PWC)-Stavanger, for example, outings can broaden our experience here and nothing immerses you into your local community more than participating in local festivals or having your children play football or handball or join a riding club or scouting group. Bring us your thoughts or experiences on something that you tried so that we can share it with others. In the end, the more that you attempt, the more that you will learn about this fantastic part of Norway.
December 2011

FESTIVE FOODS

The Norwegian Christmas Essentials

Christmas time in Norway is one time of year that really shines as far as Norwegian culture and tradition are concerned. If you are attending a Christmas dinner in a Norwegian home, consider yourself in for a special treat. If not, don’t be intimidated to treat yourself and try preparing some of Norway’s Christmas dishes. Norwegian Christmas food varies by geography and by family. To simplify for clarity: In Eastern Norway, where there are more pig farms, röstad and meatballs are more common. In Western Norway, where fishing is a larger industry, you will probably find lutefisk on the table. Lutefisk, however, is highly appreciated all over Norway.

Lutefisk
So what is lutefisk? The name literally means “lye fish”, which is a traditional dish of the Nordic countries and, surprisingly, parts of the Midwest United States. It is gelatinous in texture, and has an extremely strong, pungent odor. Indeed, a novelty American in texture, and has an extremely strong, pungent odor. Indeed, a novelty American

pungent odor. Indeed, a novelty American

in texture, and has an extremely strong,

12

Lutefisk eaters thrive on quotes and jokes about their family Christmas dinner. 

Pinnekjøtt
Pinnekjøtt is originally from Norway’s west coast, but is now popular all over. 31 percent of Norwegians say they eat pinnekjøtt for their family Christmas dinner. Pinnekjøtt is racks of lamb or mutton that cured in brine or with salt. They are then hung to dry. Sometimes the racks are smoked prior to curing (traditionally this was done to better preserve the meat for the drying process). Before cooking, the racks are cut between the bone and soaked in water to rinse out the salt and rehydrate the meat. After soaking the meat is steamed with a small amount of water. A layer of birch twigs is placed in the bottom of the pan. Pinnekjøtt literally means “stick meat” in reference to these birch twigs.

Ribbe
Ribbe, Norwegian pork ribs, are distinct because of the way the rib is prepared. The end is scored to make a tiny grid pattern, and rubbed with salt and pepper before the meat is cooked. The ribs are then roasted in a pan with a rack, wrapped in tin foil. The pan is filled with water to help steam and soften the rib. Ribbe is served with pork sausage patties, or Christmas sausages, Norwegian surkløk (kind of unskrunken), red kill (red cabbage) and boiled potatoes.

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The ceremony was presided over by the Norwegian Chief of the Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Bernt Grimstvedt. He later distributed awards to the recruits who have demonstrated high professional performance, and reviewed the passing-out parade with pride along with COS for the Air Force Training Centre Colonel Laila Kvammen Lie.

These latest graduates, coming from all over Norway, may choose to start out as security guards, some at the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), or based on their skills and wishes, they may advance their career on Norwegian naval ships. They may also translate their military skills to non-military jobs in the civilian sector. The choices are extensive for the young recruits but whatever career path they choose to follow, each one of them has gained unrivalled experience at Camp Madla, which helped them to increase their skills and enhance their potential for personal and professional growth in the near future.

Norway is one of the few countries that maintains a conscription system, the mandatory national military service for young men (and voluntary for young women) of a given age, usually 19, for a specified period of time. The Chief of Madla Camp, Cdr SG Per Skjegstad, who took over this position in September, expresses complete satisfaction with the performance of his recruits.

“At Camp Madla we provide basic training for approximately 1,000 recruits, each time for a period of eight weeks. In total, we have four training events every year. Madla is what the Americans call a 'boot camp'. After graduating from high schools, young men and women come here next, blissfully

Hafsfjord was the scene of a battle, presumably fought in the year 872, in which western Norway, for the first time was unified under one monarch.
ignorant about the military and the military way of life. They learn that the military is not just about haircuts and firearms. They learn about discipline, endurance and motivation as well as fundamental military values such as loyalty, self-discipline, respect, sacrifice and obedience. They also develop some military muscle through their physical training. They have a great opportunity to examine the essential nature of military tasks where teamwork is a key factor. They are all very motivated and disciplined. I like working with young people and I expect that about 20 percent of our latest graduates will stay at Camp Madla should know that this is a military camp before they arrive in Stavanger. We are eager to do our best to offer them the best accommodation during their stay here, but they must know that this is not a luxury hotel,” Cdr SG Skjegstad says.

“Camp Madla offers all the facilities needed for a comfortable stay such as a medical facility that also includes a dentist, as well as a 3D cinema, a big cafeteria and a chapel. Also, needless to say, it offers vast areas of outdoor space for various outdoor sports activities, maybe more for the Training Audiences who arrive in spring and late summer, but there are also indoor sports facilities for November and December teams. "I think it will be very interesting to see the camp filled by the NATO officers coming from all over Europe and the United States in December," Cdr SG Skjegstad adds.

Before his current assignment as Chief Camp Madla, Cdr SG Skjegstad served at SHAPE HQ as Section Head of Protocol for five years. He knows how NATO plans out its training events and exercises overlap with our own recruit training. As I said earlier, we train approximately 1,000 recruits each time, so when the JWC runs a training event at the same time, we may have a challenge to accommodate both groups here. We have just concluded our last training this year, so in December we will only accommodate NATO. But we do have a challenge next year in May because you will come before we finish our training. Luckily, the recruit training in May will be the less demanding of next year’s four training events. During summer the pressure is harder,” Cdr SG Skjegstad says adding, “Our Programme of Work is very predictable and although there may be changes, I know what will occupy our time until 2015. Early planning and cooperation is essential between us and the JWC. At the end of the day, this is a cooperative effort. We must candidly discuss potential issues early in the exercise planning phase, so that we can make Camp Madla available when needed, as much as we can."

"Our main goal is to provide you with the best service possible at Camp Madla. Our main challenge is when your training events and exercises overlap with our own recruit training. As I said earlier, we train approximately 1,000 recruits each time, so when the JWC runs a training event at the same time, we may have a challenge to accommodate both groups here. We have just concluded our last training this year, so in December we will only accommodate NATO. But we do have a challenge next year in May because you will come before we finish our training. Luckily, the recruit training in May will be the less demanding of next year’s four training events. During summer the pressure is harder,” Cdr SG Skjegstad says adding, “Our Programme of Work is very predictable and although there may be changes, I know what will occupy our time until 2015. Early planning and cooperation is essential between us and the JWC. At the end of the day, this is a cooperative effort. We must candidly discuss potential issues early in the exercise planning phase, so that we can make Camp Madla available when needed, as much as we can."
GOD JUL OG GODT NYTT ÅR

Merry Christmas and Happy New Year

Joyeux Noël et Bonne Année