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THE THREE SWORDS

STAVANGER - NORWAY

The Magazine of the Joint Warfare Centre

Autumn/Winter 2011 - Issue No: 21

INCLUDING

- **STRATCOM** *exclusive*
- **CONTINUED COIN TRAINING**
- **CYBER DEFENCE TRAINING**

PLUS!
OTX 2011
THE HIGH NORTH

SKANLKAN

SCANDINAVIA'S ALTER EGO



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The Three Swords

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FOREWORD

Major General Jean Fred Berger French Army Commander Joint Warfare Centre



AS THE END OF THE YEAR APPROACHES, it is time to ask how 2011 turned out and what 2012 holds for the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). As well as one of the busiest years in the history of the JWC, 2011 was also one of the most successful ones. Two ISAF Mission Rehearsal Exercises, two NRF certification events, two Iraqi Key Leader Training courses and two Individual Augmentee Pre-Deployment Training events were conducted under our Programme of Work. I also understand that the Change of Command carried its challenges.

In 2011, the JWC showed the high quality of its deliverables, which are reality-oriented, leading-edge, flexible, adaptable and, above all, relevant to NATO's operational needs and requirements. The JWC demonstrated:

- innovation and flexibility by supporting *UNIFIED ENDEAVOUR* as the 1st U.S. Corps pre-deployment training for ISAF;
- flexibility and adaptability by implementing the Commander's priorities and demanding training requirements during the *STEADFAST* execution phases to enable NRF certification;
- adaptability and relevance to NATO by collecting, identifying and implementing lessons learned from operations, to include ISAF and NATO's Libyan *OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR*, and then delivering the most up-to-date exercises possible.

In my mind, this is the way, maybe the best way, to meet the operational requirements of the NATO force commands.

2011 is coming to a close and a new year will soon be upon us. 2012 will be challenging to meet for NATO in terms of operations, as well as internally. ISAF will continue to implement the transition to Afghan National Security Forces. NATO will conduct a large

structural reform and begin to set up *Smart Defence* in May, during the *Chicago Summit*. SACT, with the support of the JWC, will play a key role in taking these new steps forward for NATO.

These issues, in addition to new threats, lessons learned from *OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR*, national financial constraints and unpredictable events occurring in this versatile world of ours will bring challenges to our community of trainers. Although I know the workload for all of us may be heavy, with the ISAF exercise at Grafenwoehr being the first of many, there are certainly exciting times ahead.

On behalf of the JWC staff I want to assure you that the JWC will continue to support NATO and, not least, troops currently deployed or soon to deploy, while remaining faithful to our philosophy: *Train As You Fight*.

The path we took in 2011, through the conduct of our Programme of Work as described above, is clear. It is vital for NATO, as demonstrated by *UNIFIED PROTECTOR*, to be constantly ready to conduct operations and to be ambitious in its objectives. The JWC obviously is not alone in delivering on this level of ambition, but I am convinced that we, the JWC, are a keystone for the two Strategic Commands, as well as an important link connecting concepts to real-world missions for both the NATO Commands and the NATO Force Structure.

I am proud that the JWC provides world class training, and I want to thank the Centre's staff for their professional skills, experience, dedication and commitment. It is my honour to be in charge of, and command, this supportive community. All my best wishes for the upcoming year go out to the JWC staff, Host Nation Norway, NATO and Nations and, in particular, to troops currently deployed or getting ready to deploy.

Cover Story

SKOLKAN

Scandinavia's Alter Ego

By LCDR Ronel Reyes, USA N
Scenario Section, Joint Exercise Division, Joint Warfare Centre



Has your Saab or Nokia phone ever frustrated you? Are you tired of New Zealand's All Blacks beating up on your favorite rugby team? Have you ever thought to yourself, "Sweden, Finland, New Zealand... I am not going to take it anymore!" Well, starting in 2012, you and the rest of NATO will have an opportunity to show them who is boss... sort of.

A change in scenery

Skolkan is NATO's new exercise setting being developed by the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). This new setting transforms our Partner Nations of Sweden and Finland into various countries of instability and/or concern. In addition, "North Island New Zealand" is added as a new country, off the coast of Norway, to add to the level of complexity in the maritime domain. Scandinavia is now transformed into a potential crisis area for NATO.

Since 2008, the Cerasia setting has successfully been the backdrop for training NATO forces. With the geographic setting based in the Horn of Africa, Cerasia has provided the perfect venue to focus NATO Response Force (NRF) out-of-area deployments in support of Crisis Response Operations (CRO), Peace Support Operations (PSO), humanitarian assistance, terrorism, and piracy missions. Despite its success and practical applicability, new threats, re-defined missions, lessons learned, and expanded capabilities demand NATO training to evolve and progress.

With that mindset, a new setting and

scenario was needed to replace Cerasia, which could provide training across the full spectrum of current and future operations. In 2009, the decision was made and the Skolkan region (Scandinavia) was chosen as the best candidate for the new setting.

Lessons learned from *OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP)* in Libya only reinforced the need for a new setting to train NATO commands to a wider set of mission areas. Skolkan broadens NATO's ability in how strategic, operational, and tactical commands are trained. Not only would exercises using Skolkan be able to support the same mission areas as previously used in Cerasia, it expands support to other missions such as Article V operations, protection of critical infrastructure, cyber defence, missile defence, and energy infrastructure security. In addition, Skolkan provides an opportunity to demonstrate "Visible Assurance" and its commitment to respond to threats against NATO Nations.

The task of creating Skolkan was given to the JWC in January 2010. Our mission is to deliver NATO's newest setting and sce-

nario that ensures the continued readiness of the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure (NFS).

Creating a fictitious world

So, who is responsible for creating Skolkan? A qualified team of six uniformed officers and 14 civilian contractors make up the JWC's Scenario Section. The task of creating six countries from scratch relies upon the collective talent and creativity of this group. Each member of the Section has a specified role that encompasses different areas of responsibility such as geography, intelligence, and logistics. From the development of maps, railway timetables and biographies of influential individuals, to encyclopaedic books that describe each country in areas such as politics, military, economy, and society – the Scenario Section creates it all.

Twenty-seven months. That will be the

Below: JWC's key players at Scenario Section bring protection of NATO territory to focus with Skolkan.



Photo by Inca Kucakalsky



amount of time it takes to create the world of Skolkan when we kick off and execute *STEADFAST JUNCTURE 12 (SFJE12)* in November 2012. The time and energy spent during these 27 months hopefully creates the most realistic environment for the Training Audience (TA) to operate in during the exercise. The scope of this project and level of detail required to create such a realistic environment is a testament to the dedication and commitment to training provided not only by the members of the Scenario Section, but the JWC as a whole.

Setting vs Scenario

What we are creating in the Scenario Section is both the setting and scenario for an exercise. These are two terms that are often confused and used incorrectly. In an effort to help clarify the difference, think of an exercise as a play on a stage. The setting is the stage itself: the props, the backdrop, etc. It puts our actors (the TA) in context. The scenario could be thought of as the plot of the play. It is the “why” the actors are on the stage. The last piece of the play is the Main Events List/Main Incidents List

(MEL/MIL), or, the script. The MEL/MIL defines what the actors will be doing during the play/exercise. It is a very simplistic way of looking at it, but hopefully this helps to explain and clarify the terms.

The School of Skolkan: The Setting History 101

The term Skolkan is a reference to the former Skolkan Empire that once ruled the High North. Its history can be traced as far back as the late 14th and early 15th centuries. The former Empire that centred round Torrike, reached its pinnacle in the mid 19th century, also comprised of what are now the countries of Arnland, Framland, Bothnia, Otso, and Lindsey as well as having overlordship of Norway.

The first nation to declare its independence was Lindsey in the late 18th century. Norway and Framland were next to declare independence in 1905. The remaining countries followed suit over the next 10 years to officially end the reign of the Skolkan Empire.

The transition to new found independence was not as smooth as they all might have hoped. Over the past decades, internal strife, political jockeying and two World Wars all contributed to who the Skolkan nations have grown to be today. Each nation has made strides to globally establish itself and be recognised as contributors in the political and economic arena. However, elements of corruption, organised crime, paranoia, and expansionist ambitions also describe the nations of Skolkan.

Geography 101

The overall requirement for creating Skolkan was to develop six new countries that occupy the High North region of Europe. Three of the countries would represent potential aggressor states to act as the “adversaries” in the exercise scenario. A fourth country would be a non-member nation that is “friendly” to NATO, while another country would represent a failing state. To round out the countries, a sixth nation was developed as a buffer between the exercise

area and Russia. The difficulty in this is that there is only so much territory in Europe to work with. So, Sweden and Finland had graciously agreed to let their countries be divided into five of those nations. To create the final country, North Island New Zealand was brought up from the Southern Hemisphere and transplanted approximately 50 nm off the coast of Norway.

The countries of Skolkan

The following is a brief description of the countries Bothnia, Torrike, Lindsey, Arnland, Framland, and Otso.

Bothnia: Bothnia is one of the potential aggressors in the setting. Located between Otso and the Baltic Sea, it dominates the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia. As a nation it is an unreformed, old fashioned People’s Republic, with an appearance of democratic representation. It is a country with significant military capabilities and the political will to consider the use of force to further its aims.

Torrike: Torrike is the second potential aggressor in Skolkan. It represents the heartland of the former Skolkan Empire and has dreams of resurrecting it. Sandwiched between Norway, Framland, and Arnland, it is ideally situated for a range of crises within the setting. Torrike is a highly authoritarian democracy. It has grown to be extremely successful in Europe economically and has developed a highly efficient defence sector.

Lindsey: The last potential aggressor is Lindsey, an outsider in Skolkan, both geographically and psychologically. Situated off the coast of Norway, Lindsey is a nation state whose motivation and actions or reactions are not easily predictable. Although she presents herself as an active democracy with a number of established political parties, the reality is a single party has dominated the state for last 50 years. Over time, the country has grown to be a somewhat paranoid society. There is a strong feeling that the rest of the world conspires to cheat Lindsey of its rightful place in the world and

in particular deny it access to the wealth associated with the natural resources their location entitles them to.

Arnland: Located in a strategically significant chokepoint, it is both the gateway to and from mainland Europe and the Baltic. Arnland is a highly dysfunctional nation that suffers from serious levels of corruption. Nominally, a democracy, the winning party in any election has such significant levers and powers as to be able to govern in a highly dictatorial fashion.

Arnland’s role in Skolkan is twofold; firstly, it meets the requirement to have a regional failing state that provides both the opportunity for a future Humanitarian Assistance and CRO, and at the same time contributes to overall regional instability. Secondly, it also provides the main base of *Novus Ordo Mundi* (NOM), the terrorist organisation that will be active throughout the region for the setting.

Framland: Framland is a pro-western, democratic, constitutional monarchy that occupies much of the Western seaboard of the Baltic Sea. Formerly a semi-independent Duchy in the Skolkan Empire, it has been independent since 1905. It has a long border with Torrike and a short border with Bothnia. Typically, Framland maintains a neutral position in the global arena, it is broadly pro-NATO and pro-EU. However, in the interests of maintaining good relations with its neighbours, it is not a member of either.

Framland’s role in Skolkan is to add complexity and provide a NATO-friendly country in the region that can be used to either influence its neighbours through negotiation, or provide a degree of logistic support to NATO or potentially even operating bases.

Otso: Otso is a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary democracy. The easternmost country within the Skolkan setting, it sits between Russia and Bothnia. Its broad political outlook is that of neutrality and it has built an enviable reputation as an

arbitrator and interlocutor in international disputes. Neither especially wealthy nor particularly poor, it is a strong supporter of the UN and it has been a major contributor to UN military missions since the 1960s.

A common scenario

Skolkan provides a setting that enables harmonisation between various types of exercises. The design and development of Skolkan was set out with the aim of supporting NATO’s strategic concept of creating a common setting for large three-level Command Post Exercises as well as small single component exercises and Key Leader Training Events. In essence, it becomes NATO’s common scenario.

Skolkan also provides a suitable venue for NATO HQ Crisis Management Exercises (CMX) and Allied Command Operations (ACO) nuclear exercises. In theory, the results and decisions from the strategic planning of CMX could then be further used during the major joint exercises such as the *STEADFAST* series thereby providing some continuity of training effort.

Impact to JWC

Providing training at the operational level for the Joint Force Commands (JFCs) and their Component Commands remains the JWC’s focus.

In the overall scheme of things, the use of Skolkan causes no significant difference to the process and conduct of a *STEADFAST* exercise from the JWC point of view. The scenario and its supporting documentation are still developed, MEL/MIL scripting still takes place, and the Exercise Control (EXCON) is still based in Stavanger, Norway. What does change, however, is the look and feel of each of those elements.

As already discussed, compared to Cerasia, Skolkan has shifted the intent of training from Humanitarian Assistance at strategic distances, to a perceived threat and potential conflict in NATO’s backyard. Probably the least obvious, but rather important distinction between the two deployment scenarios is location. Due to its geography, a fictitious operation in Cerasia

Definitions:

Setting: A geographic and strategic situation designed to provide all the conditions required to support the achievement of high level exercise aims and objectives. The setting, which can be real world, fictionalised or synthetic, is the framework on which the scenario can be developed.

Scenario: The background story that describes the historical, political, military, economic, humanitarian and legal events and circumstances that have led to the current exercise crisis or conflict.



Photo by Inci Kucukaksey



“Skolkan broadens NATO’s ability in how strategic, operational and tactical commands are trained. It also provides a suitable venue for NATO HQ Crisis Management Exercises and ACO nuclear exercises.”

gave a bit of leeway to the Scenario Section writers with regards to Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), UNSCRs, etc.

A deployment within the Skolkan setting, however, has a greater likelihood of occurring within the NATO territory, places where SOFAs and MOUs already exist. The use of real world documentation within an exercise environment will be an adjustment and consideration for both TA and scenario writers.

MEL/MIL will have to become more robust and possibly more dynamic. Our current exercises encompass roughly 900 or so injects over an eight day period. And that’s just for a Humanitarian Assistance operation. To support a scenario on the verge or in the middle of a conflict, will potentially require a more complex storyline of events, much more scripting of injects, and an openness to fluidity in order to react to the TA’s actions.

Cerasia enabled NATO to fully exercise the Comprehensive Approach (CA) process. Interaction and coordination with local entities, International Organisations (IOs), and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) was critical for a successful operation in Cerasia. During the planning and execution phases of a *STEADFAST* exercise, JWC has been able to provide role players as part of EXCON to act on behalf of these organisations and interact with the TA. Not to say that CA disappears during an Article V or potential Article V scenario; it doesn’t. The CA and the planning considerations associated with it will still have to be taken into account by the TA. The differ-

ence being, the organisations represented by the actors may not be the same. Replicating Host Nation Support becomes a much more significant consideration when exercising a deployment into a NATO country vice the middle of the desert in Africa.

Train as You Fight

Over the last three years the Cerasia setting has served NATO well, training various levels of the organisation in the dynamics of out-of-area operations in east Africa. Specifically through the *STEADFAST* series of exercises, it has been the perfect venue for the NRF to exercise deployments in support of Humanitarian Assistance, counterinsurgency (COIN), and anti-piracy operations.

With the introduction of Skolkan, the future of exercises in NATO will have a look it hasn’t had in previous years. The analysis and planning associated with the protection of NATO territory becomes the focal point. This is not to take away from the value of Cerasia and all the training it has provided. In all actuality, there is probably a higher likelihood future deployments of NATO forces will be in support of Humanitarian Assistance operations. However, as exemplified by *OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR*, NATO still requires training opportunities to prepare its military forces for potential armed conflict.

In a world that we have seen drastically change within the last 24 months, NATO must be prepared to deploy its forces in any potential crisis. Skolkan is a move in the right direction and now NATO can once again *TRAIN* as it would *FIGHT*. †



The NATO Response Force

The NATO Response Force (NRF) provides a mechanism to generate a high readiness and technologically advanced force package made up of land, air, sea and special force components that can be deployed quickly on operations wherever needed. The force package is capable of performing tasks across a wide spectrum of operations. Tasks could include providing an immediate response capability for conducting collective defence of Alliance members in the event of an Article V operation, acting as the initial force deployment as a precursor to deployment of a much larger force, whether that be for Article V or for any other operation, such as assisting civilian agencies manage the consequences of natural disasters. In addition to the NRF mechanism providing the Alliance with a crisis management instrument, the NRF also serves as an engine for transformation of military capabilities through the cycle of building multinational force packages on a rotational basis, which then exercise together in order to integrate the operational and tactical levels of command and control and the joint forces. Key facts regarding the NRF are as follows:

- There are no limits to the numbers, which nations can contribute.
- The very high readiness element, the Immediate Response Force (IRF), consists of approximately 14,000 personnel.
- The remaining forces are held in a Response Forces Pool (RFP), the scale of which will depend upon what nations are willing to make available, dependent upon operational commitments at the time.

As the standards have to be very high, participation in the NRF is preceded by a six-month NATO exercise programme in order to integrate and standardise the various national contingents. Generally, nations carry out a pre-training period in preparation for the NATO exercises between 6-18 months. Once the overall preparation period of as much as 24-months has been accomplished, from 2012, the force will be held on stand-by to deploy on operations for 12-months as opposed to the current 6-months. (www.aco.nato.int)



Cover Story
STRATCOM
Exclusive

The Development of
NATO Strategic
Communications:
from Public Affairs
to a broader
Communications Policy

By Brigadier General Massimo Panizzi, ITA A Spokesperson, PA/STRATCOM Advisor to Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee

Introduction

It is said that the principal difference between management and leadership is communication. Effective communication requires the leaders of an organization to take an early and persistent role in deciding how ideas and decisions are shaped and delivered externally and internally. Certainly a leader can improve the effects of operational and policy planning by ensuring that the communication implications are considered as early as possible in the process. If planning is done in this fashion, then it is likely that the communications associated with it will indeed be strategic in their effects.

Effective Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) uses institutional communication assets to inform public opinion and maintain public support for the institution’s missions, activities and objectives. Generally, the goal is to promote favorable public policy



outcome and support operational effectiveness, while reducing the cost of doing business through maximizing existing assets.

Historical background

Before the Kosovo Air campaign in 1999, NATO did not have an agreed Public Affairs policy, much less a comprehensive STRATCOM Policy. The Cold War, with its emphasis on secrecy, was not conducive to openness and transparency; although the then NATO Office of Information and Press (NATIP) was busy enough informing publics about the North Atlantic Treaty and the Alliance's collective defence objectives.

Overnight, however, all this was to change when NATO was literally catapulted into the public eye through the events in Kosovo. NATO HQ in Brussels opened its secure gates to a flood of journalists, TV camera teams and political journalists from across the world. It was a mutually educational experience. The journalists had to get to grips with the intricacies of NATO's multinational political-military decision-making process and operational jargon, while the NATO Spokesperson and his small team had to maintain the highest possible level of credible information flow. This, coupled with what became known as the "CNN phenomenon" – 24/7 TV coverage – posed a substantial challenge in managing the massive coordination of information across such a wide set of Alliance stakeholders, without jeopardizing operational security.

NATIP had little experience in information crisis management and few assets in place: one NATO Spokesperson, no Media Operation Centre and one Military Spokesman. With NATO HQ at the head and Military Public Affairs officers down the chain of command to the operation, coordination, although crucial to coherency of message, was cumbersome, and even erratic. The first lesson identified was that we needed to speed up, sharpen up and above all keep ahead of the game. This also led to the first policy for NATO Public Information (PI)⁽¹⁾.

After the Kosovo Campaign, events moved swiftly. The operational environ-

ment was changing rapidly in accordance with political and socio-economical upheaval, with each successive NATO-led operation having its own specific geo-political identity. In 2003 NATO's operation ISAF in Afghanistan saw ground combat operations with global partners for the first time, and inevitably both military and civilian casualties. Simultaneously, rapidly developing social media networks continued to revolutionize global communications, with the arrival of the so-called "citizen journalist" reporting first-hand to the world through the Internet by e-mail and blogs. Maintaining public support for Alliance objectives and operations has always been central to NATO's communication efforts. But with adversaries using the same technologies as us, but without our rules and constraints, keeping pace had now become crucial to mission success. This began a major revision of MC Policy on PI to change it to Public Affairs⁽²⁾, thus emphasizing the need for a wider understanding of the complexities of the new global information network,

and reinforcing the need for well-trained practitioners.

IN SPITE OF all these changes, the Alliance's core mission since 1949, "collective defence", has remained constant. Even so, for any organization to remain relevant, it must adapt to such changes or swiftly be overtaken by events at the risk of losing all credibility. NATO has responded by reviewing all its major policies, turning to its Transformation Command to develop new concepts and training initiatives to keep the cutting edge and look to future security challenges. In symbiosis with this transformation, it has become increasingly important for the Alliance to communicate its role, objectives and operations in an appropriate, timely, accurate and coherent manner. This requirement was at the basis of the birth of NATO Strategic Communications. Public Affairs became part of the overall NATO Communication Strategy, and MC Policy for Military Public Affairs was updated accordingly.⁽³⁾



"... Overnight, however, all this was to change when NATO was literally catapulted into the public eye through the events in Kosovo."

Photo by SGO Antonio DI RONZA, KFOR



Unveiling of the Chicago Summit logo in front of international media (left to right) Hillary Rodham Clinton (US Secretary of State) with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, 8 December 2011. Photo by NATO.

Reaching a common understanding

Although NATO had substantially updated its military policy for Public Affairs, Information Operations, and PSYOPS, it became obvious that an overarching policy for NATO covering both political and military functions and disciplines was required. There is little use in each discipline working hard towards the same objectives without having a means for mutual coordination and optimal synchronization.

Coherency being the new battle cry, a new STRATCOM Policy⁽⁴⁾, grouping Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and PSYOPS, was born in September 2009, reflecting NATO's requirement to take a more holistic approach. The aim of the policy is to enhance NATO's communication efforts in order to promote general public awareness across multiple audiences, leading to understanding and support of NATO's policies, operations, and other activities. This is to be done in close and lasting coordination with NATO Member States, which have their own national STRATCOM responsibilities and programmes with regard to NATO. It is necessary, therefore, to define strategic, actionable goals, and an implementation approach and plan, to guide communicators and others in designing, preparing and executing STRATCOM.

A fundamental principle of NATO's Strategic Communication policy is to

respect existing military policy for the military communication and information disciplines, and their different but complementary roles. The need for mutual coordination and interaction between military Public Affairs, Information Operations and PSYOPS⁽⁵⁾ must not compromise the trust relationship between NATO and media representatives. Any confusion of these disciplines would lead to an unhealthy mix of "spin" and risk major damage to organizational credibility. The NATO STRATCOM Policy rightly seeks to guard against this.

From a military perspective⁽⁶⁾ two main elements were underlined: that STRATCOM is first and foremost a process and not an organization or function in itself; that it is a means to allow all information and communication functions to closely coordinate their planning, activities and messages, and to integrate into the wider operational planning from the earliest stages of any crisis.

In order to correctly implement the spirit of the STRATCOM Policy, however, it is necessary that all within the NATO STRATCOM community have a common understanding of a term liberally used and abused. Reluctance to correctly position STRATCOM within the traditional military structures resides in an unequal comparison between the "might of the sword" and the "power of the word".

In fact, "Strategic Communication asks

the military to embrace as valuable a discipline it has traditionally deemed either to be strictly technological (as in "signals") or to be of secondary importance, and which it has mostly been rather bad at: pro-active, long-term, transparent communication....Despite ample evidence to the contrary, militaries have persistently shown more interest in battlefield dominance than in the dominance of the information environment."⁽⁷⁾

It would be simple if policies led to instant understanding of the concept. Experience shows, however, that, whereas policies may set the boundaries and principles, true understanding comes from putting policy into practice. Only then can we match practicalities with philosophy. All this, of course, requires a substantial change in mindset. Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the former U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commented as follows: "...beyond the term itself, I believe we have walked away from the original intent. By organizing to it – creating whole structures around it – we have allowed Strategic Communication to become a thing instead of a process, an abstract thought instead of a way of thinking."⁽⁸⁾

Admiral Mullen's call to "get back to basics" in communication is to be taken seriously, especially when he refers to credibility and the need to remember that the essence of our communication is first of all a reflection of our actions. Building trust and relationships through our actions and learning to listen is also a fundamental part of communication. Because "actions speak

(1) MC 457, June 2011
 (2) MC 457/1, September 2007
 (3) MC 457/2, December 2010
 (4) NATO Strategic Communications is defined as "the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities - Public Diplomacy, PA, Military PA, Info Ops, and PSYOPS, as appropriate - in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims."
 (5) MC Policy on Info Ops 422/3, July 2008 and MC Policy on PSYOPS 402/1, April 2003.
 (6) MCM-0164-2009, NATO STRATCOM Policy, 29 September 2009.
 (7) Jan Techau, Research Paper, NATO Defense College, Rome: "What Makes Communication Strategic?"
 (8) From the Chairman: "Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basic" in JFQ issue 55 (2009).

CLARIFICATIONS NEEDED

STRATCOM is:

- **Thinking** strategically
- **Integrated into planning** from the outset
- **Forward thinking**, anticipation
- **A coordinating process** (identifying coordination mechanisms)
- **Knowledge sharing** (with any other function that should be mutually supportive)
- **A Comprehensive Approach** to communication, the outcome of a frank and open brainstorming

and

- **Planning/Investing in the future** and making it happen through Training, Education and Resources (key!)
- Understanding where we are (**ACT and ACO database on available resources**)

COM coordinating and planning process. The STRATCOM Policy is clear on roles and hierarchy. The North Atlantic Council provides overall guidance and direction to NATO Strategic Communications efforts, as well as mission specific strategic and political guidance for NATO information activities (Information Operations and PSYOPS). The Secretary General provides specific direction and guidance and the Assistant Secretary General for the Public Diplomacy Division (ASG/PDD) is responsible for overseeing the coordination of STRATCOM activities across all NATO civilian and military bodies and commands.

The Policy also calls for a high-level Standing Body encompassing all relevant STRATCOM stakeholders at NATO HQ, to include the International Military Staff (IMS) and representatives from ACO and ACT, to ensure STRATCOM management and long term planning. The STRATCOM Policy Board, (SCPB) as it is called, is chaired by the ASG/PDD, and meets at least three times per year. It soon became apparent, however, that there was a need for a working body at a staffing level to provide a more immediate oversight and guidance. The STRATCOM Standing Working Group meets as required to deal more specifically with crisis management and major promotional events, and to develop the SCPB

Commanders, perceiving a lack of guidance, may well resort to national policies to fill the gap. We have to remember that the communication function is a Commander's personal responsibility.

Since 2009, NATO HQ, together with the Allied Command Operations (ACO) HQ and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) HQ have been endeavouring to reach a common understanding and to find the procedures and mechanisms that will allow the optimization of the STRAT-

louder than words", it is necessary for our words to correspond with our actions and vice versa: "To be successful, Strategic Communication must include the communicative content and signals of actions, images and policies".⁽⁹⁾

And it has to have clear policy goals, objectives, consistent core messages and explicit desired effect, implying measurable indicators of progress. This is a particular challenge in understanding and implementing STRATCOM. Principles, objectives, procedures and mechanisms are all necessary in the efficient organizing of our STRATCOM efforts. However, if this means constructing and interposing another layer of coordination without any added value, then the exercise is useless — even counter-productive, especially in a period of financial constraints and reduction of manpower.

NATO STRATCOM has an additional complication in that it is both political (politically led) and military, and the two must be cohesive. Political priorities at NATO HQ may not quite be the same as those in military operations; nevertheless, they both must work towards the same Alliance objectives. This can sometimes result in a sense of disconnect, either from one side or the other. When this happens, NATO



The North Atlantic Council provides overall guidance to STRATCOM.




agenda of focus topics. To assist the ASG/PDD and to provide daily support and coordination, a STRATCOM Cell has recently been set up within the Public Diplomacy Division. It is headed by a leading member of the PDD staff, with an Officer from Public Affairs and STRATCOM Advisor/IMS in the Deputy role. These last two bodies have been put in place on the recommendation of various STRATCOM Conferences that identified a requirement to champion STRATCOM in a more persistent and practical manner. Public Affairs/IMS has also assumed the role of military STRATCOM Advisor at NATO HQ, illustrating the close relationship of the two. On their side, both ACO and ACT have established a STRATCOM Branch in their Command Group.

NATO-wide STRATCOM conferences provide a forum for troubleshooting STRATCOM issues specific to NATO, but also to allow a view over how organizations other than NATO understand and implement Strategic Communications. This has proved invaluable in stimulating debate and comparing best practices and considering new ideas and procedures. Tools for enhancing STRATCOM coordination rely on new media technology, both for simultaneous coordination with theatre, and in providing a wide dissemination of information to multiple audiences: a number of Video Teleconferences mainly devoted to the NATO operations, linked meetings, Internet web sites, blogs, twitter and Facebook. Also the "IMS NATO Countries Public Affairs Community", which links the Military Committee PA with Chief PAOs in the NATO Countries' General Staffs, contributes to a better coordination and sharing of information.

Building STRATCOM Capabilities

Even before the STRATCOM Policy was developed, Public Affairs practitioners were working on enhancing their efforts. A major handicap, however, has been the lack of trained practitioners. A quick study carried out as early as 2007 showed that out of the 28 Member Nations, only eight provided dedicated and advanced military Public



Affairs training. This has had a considerably negative effect in filling critical posts, not only on the Peacetime Establishment but also in mission. The Military Committee has a close watch on the implications of these shortfalls, and, as a follow on to the STRATCOM Policy, tasked ACT to develop a military concept for STRATCOM⁽¹⁰⁾ specifically related to capability building. It identifies all the military components of STRATCOM and their specific areas of responsibility, with a comprehensive assessment of their specialist requirements in terms of manpower (therefore training), organization and assets.

As a concrete follow-up, ACT also developed a NATO STRATCOM Capabilities Implementation Plan (CIP)⁽¹¹⁾, which serves as a roadmap to assist Nations in building a professional corps across the STRATCOM disciplines. This, of course, will take time, when time is of the essence. However, it constitutes a long-term initiative for building capabilities and through them, a better understanding of the STRATCOM process. The approval of this new fundamental step by the Nations demonstrates their understanding that their direct involvement is needed to establish a more robust STRATCOM.

STRATCOM is an evolving discipline across NATO. The challenge lies in correct implementation from NATO HQ down to theatre through sound processes that facilitate rather than hamper coordination of all the information and communications disciplines, giving effective support to the Alliance's communications' efforts. NATO is defined as both political and military, and processes are needed to bring together these two elements while recognizing that the different STRATCOM disciplines are separate but complementary. To this end, the CIP recommends a more detailed guidance to NATO Commanders to clarify any ambiguities and to assist them in the organization of the various STRATCOM components. With this in mind, NATO HQ, in concert with SHAPE and ACT, is currently drafting Joint Implementation Guidelines to supplement the NATO Policy.

(9) RAND Corporation Testimony "Getting Better at Strategic Communication" by Christopher Paul, CT-366, July 12, 2011.
 (10) MCM-0085-2010, Military Concept for NATO STRATCOM, 11 August 2010.
 (11) MCM-0076-2011, NATO STRATCOM Military Capabilities Implementation Plan (CIP), 20 June 2011.



“Only in investing in the future through training professionals and devoting the right resources will we manage to meet NATO’s STRATCOM ambitions and objectives. An active role by NATO Nations is a condition sine qua non.”

Way forward

Despite the indisputable achievements, there is a long way to go before STRATCOM is inculcated into our way of thinking, and before it is considered a function as important as all the others. Coordination being the key word in the definition, STRATCOM is essentially about anticipation – thinking strategically, and long term. This will establish our priorities, helping us plan, not only for the event/crisis, but beyond in order to maintain a lasting effect. Synchronizing political and military activities and engagements is fundamental in bridging the “say-do” gap. Educating our leaders and commanders will be fundamental in how well we progress our STRATCOM efforts. Already we see that STRATCOM is increasingly addressed as a matter of importance at high-level political and military meetings, and this is encouraging. At staff level, we need to continue sharing knowledge and best practices, and converting lessons identified into lessons learned.

Finally, only in investing in the future through training professionals and devoting the right resources will we manage to meet NATO’s STRATCOM ambitions and objectives. An active role by NATO Nations is a “condition sine qua non”. NATO Commanders also have a huge responsibility in implementing Strategic Communications in an appropriate manner within their HQ Command Group. It is an opportunity that they cannot afford to miss, specifically in relation to the reform of NATO’s Command Structure. We must now make STRATCOM more than just a new word, but demonstrate its added value in a concrete manner. †



NATO Public Affairs Conference, September 2011, Bydgoszcz, Poland (clockwise): Mr Eric Povel (article page 15), Mr Roy Thorvaldsen, ACT Chief PAO, discussions about the way ahead and Cdr SG Helene Langeland, JWC Chief PAO.

Photos by Henry E. Plimack



MISUNDERSTANDINGS

STRATCOM is not:

- Public Diplomacy or Public Affairs alone
- Another name for INFO OPS

nor is it:

- A stronger and vigorous communication/statement getting headlines for short-term effect
- An over repetitive message
- Leaking internal information to the media (ethics)

And it cannot be “personality driven”



Strategic Communications in NATO

A Work in Progress

By Eric Povel
Strategic Communications Coordinator,
Public Diplomacy Division, NATO HQ

Introduction

When Googling the term Strategic Communication(s)⁽¹⁾ and reading some of the literature⁽²⁾, the first thing that becomes clear is that there is no consensus on what Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) is or should be. Not even in the U.S., where most of the thinking and actual use of STRATCOM is happening, is there an official government-wide definition of STRATCOM. As long as there is no consensus and clarity, STRATCOM cannot really deliver. Unity of understanding can only help unity of effort. And if already a leading ally like the U.S. does not seem able to come up with one agreed definition, what does this mean for the debate and understanding of what STRATCOM is in the other NATO Nations? This is also why NATO as an organisation had difficulty in agreeing on a clear definition, and used rather wide and vague terms: “the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communication activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy (PD), Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and PSYOPS, as ap-

propriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims”.⁽³⁾

This article will try to explain the origins of the STRATCOM concept in NATO, further doctrinal developments following the adoption of the NATO STRATCOM Policy, and the role of the recently created STRATCOM Cell in NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division (PDD).

STRATCOM in general

Before going into detail about NATO STRATCOM, I would like to make a number of general observations that also impact

(1) This article will stick to the terminology of the NATO STRATCOM policy, which uses the plural: “Strategic Communications.”
(2) Two recent excellent publications have informed this article substantially: Jan Techau’s “What makes Communication Strategic?”; NATO Defense College Research Paper, February 2011; and Christopher Paul’s (RAND) “Getting Better at Strategic Communication” Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, July 2011.
(3) NATO Strategic Communications Policy PO (2009) 0141, 29 September 2009.

Above: (left) Admiral James Stavridis, SACEUR, during an interview at ISAF HQ in Kabul. Photo by SGT Sebastian Kelm, DEU A. (right) Joint press point with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and General Stéphane Abrial, SACT. Photo by NATO.

As of May 1995, Eric Povel works in NATO’s International Staff; his first assignment here was as the Netherlands Information Officer in the Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) at NATO HQ. During NATO’s enlargement process in the late 90s, he was also responsible for NATO’s information activities in some of the new and candidate member states. After NATO’s Kosovo air campaign in 1999, Eric Povel became the media planner for NATO’s yearly Crisis Management Exercise. As of 1 July 2006, he started working in the NATO Press and Media Section as a press officer to set up the Media Operations Centre dealing with Afghanistan. As of January 2010, he dealt with all media aspects related to major NATO operations, missile defence and many other defence-related issues. Since July 2011, Eric Povel is the STRATCOM Coordinator, heading the PDD STRATCOM Cell in support of the Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, responsible for all operational and doctrinal STRATCOM issues at NATO HQ.



“Communication is still widely regarded as an enabling function to sell earlier agreed policies or implemented operations. Instead, communication is a task and responsibility for all our key leaders.”

on NATO’s STRATCOM efforts.

First, although NATO’s STRATCOM Policy does not explicitly incorporate its actions and policies into the STRATCOM definition – it only says they *support* NATO’s actions and policies – it is absolutely clear that NATO’s actions (operations!) and policies speak louder than our words or pictures. So what we *do* matters, at least, as much (if not more than), as what we *say*, and this applies especially for our operations. This also means that STRATCOM cannot “fix” political problems or negative perceptions if they are caused by poor policies or bad actions. STRATCOM is not the panacea for all our ills. This is also why STRATCOM needs to be fully involved in policy and operational planning from the outset (see also third point below.)

Secondly, although NATO’s definition makes clear that STRATCOM is a political-military concept (in nations often described as a “whole-of-government” exercise) that is led from NATO HQ as the political hub, in practice STRATCOM is widely seen as dominated by and overwhelmingly applied by the military: “*U.S. Public Diplomacy wears combat boots*.”⁽⁴⁾ Partly this is logical as the military see a clear need to use all information disciplines as an indispensable tool in operations, especially by using Information Operations. And on the civilian/diplomatic side, STRATCOM is often shunned in favour of Public Diplomacy (PD), and PD takes a backseat to traditional state-to-state or multilateral diplomacy. This is why leadership from the [political] top is often mentioned as the key and necessary condition for successful STRATCOM in any organisation.

Thirdly, perhaps the biggest challenge in improving STRATCOM in NATO is the need to change the mindset of our political and military leadership. Communication is still widely regarded as an enabling function to sell earlier agreed policies or implemented operations. Instead, communication is a task and responsibility for all our key leaders and STRATCOM advisors should be involved from the outset in all policy and operational planning in order to bring communication implications to the attention of their political or military masters.

Fourthly, STRATCOM’s new coordination role is not self-evident for old, well-established information disciplines like Public Affairs and Information Operations (itself a coordinating function!) who claim fundamental otherness and universal wisdom for themselves. Everybody is in favour of coordination, but *to be coordinated* is another thing. Binding them all together into one comprehensive communications apparatus, equipped with a shared understanding of the job ahead, is nevertheless indispensable if that communication aspires to be strategic. Not achieving this may even in the long term undermine the credibility of the organisation and those who communicate for it.

NATO STRATCOM Policy – doctrinal progress

The main reason to start developing a political-military policy on STRATCOM was NATO’s first-ever experience with major combat operations in Afghanistan. As soon as NATO took over responsibility for all ISAF operations in 2006, especially in the troubled South and East, with the inherent rise of combat operations and ensuing casualties, political attention amongst Allies for the ISAF operations and subsequently for the communications handling of the ISAF operation also increased. As NATO’s communications policies were only codified in military policy documents and the real life experience of ISAF had made clear how important it was to coordinate both the political and military sides of the ISAF operation, the need for a joint, political-military

STRATCOM Policy was clearly identified. The NAC approved the NATO STRATCOM Policy on 29 September 2009.

The next doctrinal step was the approval of the NATO Military Concept for STRATCOM in August 2010, which is the military implementation document of the policy, enabling the development of STRATCOM capabilities within NATO’s military forces and structures. The Concept tasked Allied Command Operations (ACO), in concert with Allied Command Transformation (ACT), to begin a capability development programme.

In June 2011, the Military Committee approved the NATO STRATCOM Military Capability Implementation Plan (CIP), which serves to identify areas of expertise and to act as a programme planning and management document for long-term STRATCOM capability development. By then, the real-life experience of *OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR* (OUP) and NATO’s annual Crisis Management Exercises (CMX) again showed the urgent need for clear STRATCOM Policy Joint Implementation Guidelines (JIGs), that should be incorporated as an Annex to the STRATCOM Policy document of 2009. In September 2011, the Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group agreed to start developing such JIG’s. A first outline for the JIGs is about to be finalised and will drive the drafting work in the next few weeks and months.

Role of the STRATCOM Cell in PDD

The STRATCOM Policy gives a lead role to the Assistant Secretary General (ASG) PDD who “*oversees the coordination of all Strategic Communications activities across all NATO civilian and military bodies and commands, and also directs all Public Diplomacy activities (except press and media, which are directed by the NATO Spokesperson on behalf of the SG)*”. The policy also

(4) Armstrong, Matthew “Operationalizing Public Diplomacy” in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, NY, 2009.

NATO Channel interview with ISAF Commander, General John R. Allen



“In today’s globalised and omnipresent information age, every organisation has to do its utmost to communicate to the outside world in the most comprehensive, timely and effective way possible.”

Photo by NATO

called upon the ASG PDD to establish and chair “*a standing body that brings together the relevant elements of the information community...*” The STRATCOM Policy Board (SCPB), chaired by ASG PDD, was created as a high-level, political-military inter-staff body to address all STRATCOM issues related to policy-making, decision-making, implementation and further areas of interest.

In June 2010, the SCPB decided to create a more operational STRATCOM Standing Working Group (SCSWG), co-chaired by ASG PDD and NATO Secretary General’s STRATCOM Advisor, that will meet more regularly to take stock, debate, and finally give (new) STRATCOM direction and guidance. Besides these two bodies, there are a number of topical and weekly PA/STRATCOM VTCs to discuss more operational communications issues with all key staffs involved.

As the volume of STRATCOM meetings and taskings grew over time, and as part of a structural reform of PDD, the ASG PDD decided early 2011 to create a small PDD STRATCOM Cell to support the ASG and her Deputy in all their STRATCOM

responsibilities. In more detail, the STRATCOM Cell will be responsible for the coordination and synchronisation of NATO’s communications activities and capabilities by managing a Joint Planning Calendar and a STRATCOM matrix, provide advice on and track STRATCOM doctrinal and capability development, and act as the principal Point of Contact and as STRATCOM champion in NATO HQ and in close cooperation with the chain of command.

Conclusion

What this article has tried to highlight is that STRATCOM in NATO is still very new. A well-known military training metaphor is perhaps the best way to describe how NATO can make steady but guaranteed progress: the “crawl, walk, run progression”. Before you can walk, crawl; before you can run, walk.

As STRATCOM is a very complex coordination function with a wide-range of information disciplines who treasure their independence, as it is a concept that requires a new, different mindset from many of our political and military leaders, as there is still a lot of confusion and many different

interpretations and understandings about what STRATCOM is, all this shows that the further development of the STRATCOM concept is an issue that requires strategic patience and a dogged resolve to pursue this in the months and years to come. There is widespread consensus that in today’s globalised and omnipresent information age, every organisation has to do its utmost to communicate to the outside world in the most comprehensive, timely and effective way possible. But in order to be able to do that, first NATO itself needs to determine how it intends to organise and implement its own STRATCOM efforts. The drafting of the Implementation Guidelines is meant to fill just that gap. Once NATO has done that homework, it should lead to a better understanding of what STRATCOM is all about, and ultimately lead to a better unity of all our communications efforts, “*in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims.*”⁽⁵⁾ †

(5) NATO Strategic Communications Policy, PO (2009) 0141, 29 September 2009.



Interview with Mark Laity, Chief of Strategic Communications, SHAPE

Mark Laity, who is at the head of Strategic Communications for SHAPE, talks about the globalization of information and the importance of strategic communications, and how these determine who is winning and who is losing in modern warfare.

By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

Power of Information

Sir, thank you indeed for this interview opportunity. How do you explain the success of the insurgency narrative despite its deep flaws?

There are a number of reasons. The insurgents have a strongly negative message, which is destructive rather than constructive, making their narrative a lot easier to explain, as well as more immediate. The second point is that they see clearly that, unless they are good with information, they will fail. For them, “information” is the main effort, while for us it is a supporting discipline. They understand the importance of the role of a strategic narrative. They put a substantial amount of focus and effort into it because they recognize that a successful information campaign is inherent to a successful insurgency. Also, read their articles: they are always telling a simple story with a simple message. Also to note is that they are

much quicker in their messaging and significantly more sustained in their themes. You will see that essentially the Al-Qa’ida/Taliban narrative has not changed over the years. They have just one message, and they use it again and again. They project the same narrative worldwide, unhindered by truth, time, or a chain of command. If you look at the ISAF mission, we are a 48-Nation Alliance, rotating people every six months. Despite our unity and solidarity, each Nation has its own information priorities and competing narratives. So, our message is much more diffused in narrative terms.

Can we shape news and information environments despite our existing narrative problems?

Quite frankly, we are better than we were, but we can still do a lot better in explaining to the wider public the aims and objectives

of NATO’s roles, missions and campaigns. To achieve a successful narrative I always propose what I call the “Five Ss”. They are Simplify, Shorten, Share, Sustain and Staff. We need to structurally simplify our narrative for clarity and sharpness because if we cannot explain it simply, it means we do not understand it well enough. Also, if you want to make readers more attracted to your work and not lose them, then you need to shorten your narrative. Mark Twain said, “I didn’t have time to write a short letter, so I wrote a long one instead.” That is quite self-explanatory. The next issue is that we need to share, not fight over working boundaries and territory. Thinking that knowledge is power and, therefore, should not be shared with internal rivals or other areas is the wrong approach. Then we need to sustain. If you look at our strategy, we should be having pretty much the same core narrative now as we had when we started our campaign in Afghanistan. But actually it is often very hard to distinguish the narrative at all. The same goes for staffing. Clearly identify who does what, and follow up. Never forget that people matter more than structures, so structures matter but it is people first. So the question is: could we do better? Yes, absolutely. With soft power we live in a world of greys and probabilities with no monopoly on power – we are competing in an information marketplace. We must abandon the delusion of control for the reality of influence and adapt our systems and mindsets accordingly. Shaping the information battlefield, a kind of new frontline, depends on matching actions and words; recognizing that every action sends message; developing a capacity to manage information campaign and, finally, getting the commanders to value and use information as naturally as they value and use airpower.

Picking up on that, what is NATO’s current narrative?

When you get professional surveys done by people at PR organizations, you will find that there is a generally positive view of NATO. So, although it is not explicitly

delineated, NATO has a positive image, but perhaps no strong current narrative. For me it is contained within our Allied Command Operations (ACO) Directive 95-2, which sums it up as a democratic multinational Alliance uniting across borders to guard, with courage and competence against threats to our homes. Now, that actually is quite a good narrative because that is what NATO is. It is a security organization, and it is a team of people who are doing together something that can only be achieved by doing it together, simply because separately, we are not strong. Unfortunately, we tend to lose that core, meaningful narrative because we are extremely busy with all the missions surrounding us. It is almost as if NATO is no longer associated with its own missions and campaigns: IFOR, KFOR, ISAF, OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR ... These are all NATO missions, but somehow they look distanced from NATO and, as a result, just how busy and how effective NATO is has been lost to the wider public. This paints a concise picture of our own narrative problems. But our issues over narrative are also because security, overall, is a low priority for a lot of nations right now, although the dangers we face are unprecedented in their complexity. If defence spending and security are not seen as a big deal, then NATO will not be seen as a big deal. When people say that NATO has a problem, it is not just that NATO has a problem, but rather, there is a problem about defence and explaining why we still need to invest in security. Once people understand there is a need to invest in security, then NATO very quickly becomes the right, obvious answer. How can we persuade the nations that the very modest, necessary investment in security is much needed at a time when everyone saves money? This is a very important question. So the problem, in effect, is a problem of security, not NATO.

What is the current state of NATO’s STRATCOM policy?

We have a NATO policy, which is at the NATO HQ level. That policy, however, is very broad-brush. It lays out some essential

facts and gives a definition, but it does not go much further than that. Therefore, the implementation of STRATCOM is not really clarified yet. Underneath that, at the ACO level, we have SHAPE’s ACO Directive 95-2, which was created by my Section. This goes much further than the policy, but it is, at the same time, nested within it, and recognized as such. It has undergone one revision already, and it is having another one now. It is meant to be revised every one or two years in order to evolve the situation. The revised Directive should be out in a few months. It tries to move the debate forward a little bit and do a little bit more on how we organize ourselves and manage STRATCOM. Currently, there are a lot of discussions going on about the relationship between STRATCOM, PA, Public Diplomacy, Information Operations and PSYOPS, and there is no consistent synergy between them because the situation remains unresolved. Obviously, I am a STRATCOM advocate, and I find this continuing debate and the drawbacks irritating because behind it, frankly, often lies what I call turf fights. Obviously there are genuine issues as well, but it is sometimes people who are using doctrine to guard their own territory. Doctrine should not be confused with dogma. Doctrine is guidance on principles. But I see in NATO a lot of doctrine, which is treated like it is dogma. And dogma is an article of faith. I am irritated by some people trying to turn doctrine into some kind of iron-clad, unchangeable article of faith. That is wrong and it is a waste of time. Things do change – that’s progress. STRATCOM is trying to move things forward, and we need this progress. It is vital in order to achieve tangible effects on the battlefield.

Would you say that STRATCOM is helping Public Affairs, Information Operations and PSYOPS to succeed in new media platforms as well as knowledge management operations?

Well working to succeed in new media is everyone’s responsibility, and we shouldn’t see STRATCOM as some separate pillar of information – to quote part of our defini-

“Shaping the information battlefield, which I call the new frontline, depends on matching actions and words; recognizing that every action sends message; developing a capacity to manage information campaign and, finally, getting the commanders to value and use information as naturally as they value and use airpower.”

tion of STRATCOM, as it states in our mission statement, STRATCOM combines all information disciplines, military Public Affairs, Information Operations and PSYOPS, in concert with other military actions in order to ensure mission success. So it is over and above. It is not separate; it is not another pillar. Rather, STRATCOM as a whole is an essential pillar of the wider political and military strategy. When it comes to making STRATCOM work there is still some lack of clarity about the distinctions between coordinating responsibility and authority – sometimes we can be given responsibility, but lack the authority to make it happen. So we are still moving on this one. There are also still people who are wondering how low STRATCOM should go; whether it is also an operational function, so operating at the Corp or theatre level, which I believe it certainly is, or whether it is an entirely political and military strategy just used at the NATO and SHAPE level. The point about STRATCOM is that it is a response to the fact that the existing information disciplines have not delivered enough. I do not say they failed, but they are challenged by the new information age, and they are in the view of our commanders and politicians not doing what needs to be done. So let us find the best way to make the information disciplines combine to deliver a successful narrative and all the other things

that will make a real contribution to mission success. That is what STRATCOM is all about and I think our leadership is certainly recognizing its importance.

Are we reacting well to the major changes brought about by social media?

The rise of social media is just another product of the information technology revolution, which caused a huge transformation in society and culture. The information revolution is one of the reasons why we have STRATCOM. Today, information is more and more critical, and nobody has a monopoly on it. Social media have created a platform where anyone can engage, thus representing a fundamental change in the relationships between rulers and ruled, between authorities and non-authorities. Before this revolution, our existing information disciplines were able to handle information environments, because we had the monopoly on information and its means of transmission. Today, everyone can get information, and everyone can get hold of means of transmission, sharing images, videos and tweets or texting Facebook. So the whole point about social media is the democratization of the means of information. Right now, we are just another player in the field, we do not dominate it anymore. That means that handling information has become more complex and more important, involving profoundly transformative and unique processes and experiences, which is one of the reasons why STRATCOM exists.

Does good communication have a direct relation to winning battles?

Communication is fundamental, especially in counterinsurgency and Peace Support Operations, because it has a part to play on perceptions and will. If you think you will win, it's far more likely that you will. Henry Ford said, “Whether you think that you can, or that you can't, you are usually right.”



Photo by Henry E. Plimack

So keep recognizing that human beings' perceptions hugely affect the outcome. At SHAPE we have a motto that says 'Perception becomes Reality', which is a straightforward statement. If people believe themselves to be capable, they will be ambitious, and they will strive for great goals. And if they think they are capable of reaching great goals, they will maximize their potential, and they will achieve more. If they thought they were incapable and useless, then they would not achieve a lot. If you have a campaign where the target audience believes you are honest, on their side, and capable, then they will tend to support you. So information is fundamental in managing perceptions. That does not mean you should lie, but the way people perceive and understand a fact can vary a lot. Whether you are an optimist or a pessimist will be important for how you act. So facts do not need to be distorted. Facts could be interpreted in many different ways, quite legitimately. Every military man knows the importance of morale. What is morale? It is persuading people that they are the best, and that they can win. So their perception becomes reality, whether they realize it or not. A lot of this is a matter of opinion. A lot of how you see the world is open to interpretation. You are entitled to present that interpretation in a way that is most favorable to your cause. Everybody does this every day in every way in their own lives. All I am talking about is honestly but persuasively putting ourselves in the best possible light. Why not? †

A key element in operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach

Photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Joseph Swafford, JSAF

ENHANCING NATO'S TRAINING LOCAL FORCES CAPABILITY

Worth the cost?

By CDR Michael Hallett, USA N, HQ SACT Strategic Plans and Policy

Commander Michael Hallett is a staff officer at NATO's Supreme Allied Command Transformation. His duties include strategic policy development and supporting NATO and Partner Nations with defence transformation through enhancing military lessons learned capabilities. His previous assignments have included tours with the International Security Assistance Force Headquarters CJ9 in Kabul, with COMNAVEUR-Commander Sixth Fleet Operational Net Assessment Directorate as an Africa and Black Sea region analyst, and with the Civil-Military Interaction Core Team at Allied Command Transformation.

THE provision of security is a core function of the state: the absence of security indicates state failure. In situations where external actors are engaged in helping local actors recover from conditions of state failure or fragility, the ability of local actors to provide full spectrum security is the single most important marker of transition to full sovereignty. When emerging from post-conflict or other stressful conditions, security force capability is the most important capability of the nascent state – without it, the additional state building activities, even when the new government structures have been legitimated through elections, will fail to generate sustainable improvements in the state's capability to establish and enforce the rule of law.

This article argues that, even in our extremely constrained financial environment, NATO enhancement of its Training Local Forces (TLF) capability will significantly contribute to achieving NATO aims. We will proceed as follows: first, we review the recent high level guidance on TLF. This is followed by a discussion of the TLF capability in terms of the Allied Commander Transformation capability development paradigm, modified in accordance with the Comprehensive Approach. The article concludes with a discussion of the utility of the TLF capability from the NATO perspective.

Guidance

Based on its own extensive expertise in force generation and training created in response to the need to train and develop



“The overall aim of NATO’s involvement is to enhance the ability of the nation that has requested the training support to execute its own endogenous training programs. Only the nation interacting with NATO can make the specific decisions on the training capability composition, in light of its overall political-security goals and vision of its national future.”

its personnel to undertake a wide variety of tasks in complex and dangerous environments, NATO has expanded its training and force generation capabilities to include training and developing forces of other nations and organizations. NATO Nations have long been involved in training local security force actors, and NATO itself is now reinvigorating its thinking on how to more effectively and efficiently train local security force actors in the future, based on direction from the Lisbon Summit 2010 and the ensuing Political Guidance, lessons identified and best practices from providing training support to the African Union, NATO Training Missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and other training experiences.⁽¹⁾

At the Lisbon Summit 2010, NATO re-emphasized the importance of local security force capability development. The Strategic Concept from the Summit directs NATO to “develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance.”⁽²⁾ The Political Guidance, based on the Strategic Concept, first repeats that “the Alliance will further develop and use as required the capability to train and develop local security forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance.” It then goes on to offer specific implementing direction: “Allies and NATO civilian and military structures, therefore, need

to develop this capability, which needs to be planned in advance and sufficiently resourced, with a view to assisting local authorities, promoting lasting stability, and facilitating the achievement of the Alliance’s end-state.”⁽³⁾ In light of this guidance, NATO’s Training Local Forces (TLF) capability is a key element in operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach (CA), and an essential ingredient in improving NATO’s overall conflict management capability.

The Comprehensive Approach Capability Development Paradigm

The CA, as we will use it here, can be defined as “... a design process to align incentives among international and local actors to increase local resilience in the engagement space while reducing the transaction costs associated with multiple actor interaction in complex operations.”⁽⁴⁾ The incentive creation and transaction cost reduction process requires a slightly different emphasis in the capability development process than the traditional Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability (DOTMLPFI) provides. Therefore, for CA related capability development, we shift the capability development component order of emphasis from DOTMLPFI to ITOPLFDM.⁽⁵⁾ Using the CA configuration of the capability development paradigm, we will now provide a brief snapshot of some ideas on how NATO can enhance its training local forces capability, followed by a brief justification of the utility of the TLF capability in light of NATO’s larger missions.

Interoperability

Within the CA, thick and frequent interactions with other organizations are accepted as not just nice to have, but as essential for mission accomplishment. Interoperability refers to the mechanisms that facilitate this interaction. In TLF two dimensions of interoperability stand out. First, the national integration of capabilities developed and second, the interoperability among those providing training support, including NATO, Nations, and other international organizations.

I. Enabling Integrated National Capability Development

The overall aim of NATO’s involvement is to enhance the ability of the nation that has requested the training support capability to execute its own endogenous training programs. Only the nation interacting with NATO can make the specific decisions on capabilities composition, in light of its overall political-security goals, and vision of its national future. Therefore the training program must be integrated into the overarching national security strategy, be designed and executed to support that strategy, and ensure interoperability among its component parts. This is the case for nations emerging from fragility as well as those engaging with NATO simply as a way to enrich their own training experiences. The focus on interoperability is essential to ensure that the local forces trained are able to operate as national institutions. In some cases this will mean that, for example, police and military training is included in a single training continuum, in others police and military training will be entirely separate programs, and in still others the short term training process may include blended basic training for police and military personnel, with mid and long term creation of separate facilities and training programs.

2. Training support interoperability

Nations receiving training assistance seldom engage with only one nation or organization. When offers of help are received, it is difficult to say “No” and when others are funding the program extremely hard to dictate the specific details. Training by many different organizations, if not interoperable, imposes larger than necessary coordination costs on the recipient nation.

(1) See Dr Florence Gaub, “Building a New Military? The Training Mission in Iraq” Research Paper, No. 67, NATO Defense College, April 2011.
 (2) PO (2010) 0169, Strategic Concept.
 (3) C-M (2011) 0022, Political Guidance, 14 March 2011.
 (4) See M. Hallett and Oke Thorngren, “Attempting a CA Definition and its Implications for Reconceptualizing Capability Development” in press, National Defense University.
 (5) For a discussion of the need and utility of this shift see Hallett and Thorngren 2011.



The importance of this interoperability is especially evident in curriculum generation. A standardized NATO curriculum, developed in close cooperation with the receiving nations in each of the various functional areas will facilitate interoperability with both NATO and more importantly, within the local organization (such as a national institution or regional organization) receiving the training.

In the absence of a standardized curriculum two problems can arise. One, each nation providing training will provide instruction with their own national flavour. Organizations and personnel operate as they have been trained; as a result some units will work in the Nation X way, others in the Nation Y way, and none operate completely in the way they should – their own national way.

This engenders the second problem: different groups within a given country will be trained in different ways, depending on the NATO country providing the training. Lessons identified from the NATO ascension process and the experience of Partnership for Peace members indicates that this is a not insignificant challenge for nations and organizations receiving training. A nation may be happy to get the training, but the training, if not based on a common, interoperable curriculum, can create additional coordination challenges each with its own set of transaction costs.

In the absence of the curriculum interoperability, the nation or organization is forced to develop a methodology through which to integrate the various flavours of training they have received into their own national way of operating. For example, they may have received helicopter operations training from one nation, and infantry training from another and thus have to spend scarce doctrine, training and exercise resources reconcile the differences in order to develop their infantry air mobility capabilities. NATO focus on the interoperability component of the capability development paradigm can help meet this challenge.



Training² – Training on Training

In a discussion of enhancing a training capability, the training capability element focuses on training on training or T². The T² in the TLF capability will function on three different levels – strategic level training institution building, operational level training of local trainers, and supporting the tactical level delivery of training. We will now further describe the training activities on each level.

A. Training² Levels

I. Strategic level – Institution Building

Training is perishable – in the absence of sufficient institutional support training completed at the tactical and operational levels will prove useful for only as long as it is retained in the minds of the training audience. Therefore, the first priority from the NATO perspective will be the enhancement of the national security sector institutional training capabilities so that they can establish and maintain a training continuum. This entails supporting the local national and regional level government officials and security related organizations to develop effective and efficient training institutions that will be able to provide the support and resources necessary for the instructors to

train the training audience. Enhancement or creation of training facilities for the various functional and professional areas of expertise (corrections officers, prison administrators, non-commissioned officers, officers, judges, prosecutors, defence attorney and other judicial system staffers, border and custom agents, oil pipeline guards, cultural property guards, etc.) and developing links with educational institutions is therefore necessary. Only when the supporting administrative and funding mechanisms are in place at a national level will the nation be able to, independent of external advisors and resources, sustain its training capability. This does not mean that subnational training should wait for the central training support institutions to reach full operational capability, only that external actors must focus on the long term institutional development, even at the cost of slower operational and tactical level training program production.

II. Operational level – Training Instructors

At the operational level, increasing training effectiveness requires two types of training programs. First, a training program for NATO member instructors who will train local trainers is necessary to educate



instructors on teaching techniques and specific ways to enhance the learning experience for the students they are going to train. NATO development of a general curriculum for this training, based on existing NATO instructor training programs will facilitate NATO instructor training and reduce the instructor development costs for each member nation. However, each training program will have to be tailored for each region and supported organization, to ensure that it takes into account cultural differences in instruction delivery and receipt, and will have to be supplemented with rich cultural awareness training. Simply delivering the same sort of training in the same way that training is delivered in NATO Nations will not prove as effective as training created through trainer development programs designed for each region.

Two, in consultation with local forces, NATO will help nations develop endogenous programs to train local instructors. Instruction delivery to local students, training the trainers in training itself, as well as the specific functional areas in which they will instruct students will constitute the main activity of this process.

III. Tactical Level – Supporting Training Delivery

Due to NATO's emphasis on the first two training support areas, even in situations where NATO expertise is required to communicate the knowledge and skills to the local training audience in the short term, (to fill local training expertise gaps) this training will be structured as a way to provide the instructors being trained with the guidance they need to eventually run the training program themselves. In other words, the actual knowledge and skill delivery to the training audience will occur as a beneficial by-product, or positive externality, of efforts to train the local instructors. This means that local instructors must be included in the entire training development and delivery process, including course design, providing lectures, leading syndicates, directing in class practical exercises, writing exercise scenarios, etc.

In terms of actually training students, NATO's involvement should focus primarily on enabling students to attend NATO courses, access NATO Advanced Distributed Learning and participate in NATO exercises. Indeed, as local training capabilities become more advanced, visits of mobile training teams and participation in NATO and PFP exercises should be incorporated into the local training program. Participating in these NATO events can provide a "forcing function" – the chance to leverage NATO resources for local training can not only evoke additional attention for the training activities by the leadership but also motivate leaders to make resources available. NATO will bring the resources necessary to add additional value to the training, while the local authority maintains overall activity ownership. For example, participation in a NATO exercise or an Africa Partnership Station visit could be included as a major event in the local nation training schedule.

B. Training enablers

We will now discuss in more detail TLF enablers necessary to enhance training effectiveness: a basic TLF curriculum; specialized Training on Training (T²) for NATO instructors; national regional specialization in local actor training; and broadening the set, through partnership, of training provided. We begin with examining how a common curriculum for various functional areas will enhance both local actor learning and the ability of NATO to cultivate a rapidly self-sustaining local training the trainers program.

I. Common Basic Curriculum

Each region has a very different contextual environment in which training capability development will take place. While fully aware that each country will have different requirements, a NATO standardized curriculum for each of the functional areas to serve as a baseline from which the program can be tailored in light of local demands will accelerate training program delivery.⁽⁶⁾

II. Training on Training: T²

NATO instructors require training on how to more effectively support local forces as they develop their own training capabilities. In addition to the primary method of teaching instructional procedures through modelling effective instructional techniques, a standardized curriculum should be developed to train NATO instructors on how to effectively train local instructors. This training the trainer curriculum will include specific training on topics such as those in Figure 1. Such training is required in order to increase understanding of how to best communicate (not just transmit information) to the training audience.

III. Regional specialization

Effective training requires in-depth knowledge of the local culture – not only the basics of local history and customs, but how they learn, the level of literacy, the nature of previous training, if the culture is high or low context, conceptions of time, etc. Understanding when, for example, instruction is taking place in an intellectual environment less dominated by the visual (including literacy) than are NATO Nation environments will dramatically improve training delivery. The failure to take these local factors into account can result in training failure. In light of this requirement, NATO Nations may elect to specialize in different regions, based on their preferences or historical experience, to facilitate development of their own instructors. This specialization will enable more efficient cultural awareness and language training.

IV. Widening the scope of subject matter

In terms of developing national capabilities, security forces are not only a tool for enforcing the rule of law, but a mechanism for spreading knowledge throughout local communities. Therefore, military and police force personnel can play a useful role in development activities and as engines of broader education and development. (The

(6) This has been discussed in more detailed in the section on Interoperability above.

TRAINING ON TRAINING TOPICS

- Awareness of the role of human factors in training interactions
- Intercultural awareness to mitigate culture shock and increase interaction effectiveness
- Intercultural communication techniques
- Training on how to provide individual training
- Training on how to provide collective training
- Training on performing training needs analysis

Figure 1

U.S. experience with organizations like the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Navy's general military training on topics like financial literacy, health and summer-time safety provides just two examples of military organization and training serving broader developmental and educational goals). Therefore, as part of a Comprehensive Approach, NATO training, though focused on security functions as the first priority, (police evidence gathering procedures, correctional facility operations, small unit tactics, etc.) could also include, for example, topics on animal husbandry, basic veterinary care, soil management techniques, enhanced local construction methods, gardening tips, family health, and financial literacy.

This widening the scope of subject matter requires a commensurate widening of the trainer pool. Therefore, the trainers from NATO Nations need not only be military service members. Through a variety of partnerships, NATO will be able to access trainers with a wide range of functional

expertise. This accessing of other organizations instructional expertise, and involving the private sector to ensure training provides skills useful in the local economy will be central to the success of the overall training effort.

Organization

Organization refers to the institutional and human resource structures created to facilitate the training process. As mentioned above, capability development of the local security forces, just as it does for NATO Nations, will take place on three different organizational levels: institutional level (the defense ministry or department), the training of the trainers, and the actual student training. See Figure 2.

Nations are already involved in each of these areas, and have been for a very long time, as described in our discussion of training above. In order to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of its resource expenditures and speak to its comparative advantages as an intergovernmental orga-

Level	Host Nation component	Activity	Primary Actors
Strategic	Local national security institutions (justice, police and military)	Local national organizational training design and enhancement	Local nation, NATO, and other International Community Partners
Operational	Security organizations	Training the Trainers	NATO training Member Nation trainers, nationally sourced trainers, local future trainers
Tactical	Training Audience	Training and evaluating students. Providing access to ADL, out of country courses and in country training	Host Nation trainers supported by national trainers and NATO provided reach-back support

Figure 2

nization with extensive experience helping Member and Partner Nations enhance their security capabilities, NATO should focus on the two upper levels, while the nations devote the preponderance of their training resources to the two lower levels. See Figure 3 (next page) for a representation of the relative areas of effort.

NATO support at the operational level, as it has in NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) and NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), will take the form of providing the organizational backbone or structure into which the nations can contribute trainers. By developing a standardized, interoperable instructor training, equipping and deploying process and a baseline curriculum, NATO can help ensure that the training provided to the national forces is consistent across the entire nation and at all levels to facilitate interoperability.

NATO will add the most value (and most effectively and efficiently apply its scarce resources) by focusing on the defense institutional development level. Supporting nations as they work through the organizational design issues necessary to transform and enhance their forces will require training specialists in high level institution focused interaction to advise local forces on the organizational design process necessary to enhance local institutions.⁽⁷⁾

Personnel

Personnel involved in this process will require not only expertise in their functional area (correctional facility management,

infantry tactics, organizational design for military training, etc.) but also expertise in training. These personnel will need to be cultivated by their home organizations – it will not, in many cases, be possible to simply take a tactical expert and assign her to train a local nation force. Adjustments to career progressions may be necessary to appropriately develop a cadre of expert local force trainers. Tours spent in a TLF mission, if not viewed favorably by promotion boards, will fail to attract the necessary high caliber officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Some degree of specialization in both training and a region will likely be required in order to create an effective training the trainer and focused interaction (mentoring) cadre.

Leadership

Within the nation receiving the training, local leaders will have to decide training policy, provide the training direction and guidance for the strategic, operational and tactical levels of training, cultivate relationships with other organizations within the nation and with external actors (including regional actors) and determine the overall organizational design for the training process. Therefore, they will need a deep understanding of their current capabilities (based on unflinching, honest appraisal) the intention and vision of their political leaders, and the NATO and other actor capabilities available for them to leverage as they enhance their own capabilities in order to meet their national objectives. They must also articulate a vision for future training, institutionalize the incentive structure necessary to make the training process self-sustaining and clearly communicate the nature and aims of the new structure necessary to support the long term human resources development for which they are receiving NATO assistance. Lessons identified, lessons learned and best practices from NATO’s Partnership for Peace and the experiences of Members as they joined the Alliance will be especially useful as national leaders work to shape their own visions and understand the challenges of the

RELATIVE AREAS OF FOCUS Figure 3



transformation process and NATO works to effectively and efficiently support them. Leaders in NATO organizations must both understand local needs and wants and flexibly support the local leaders as these leaders develop the way ahead.

Facilities

NATO facilities of importance for training local forces include training facilities in NATO Member Countries, (like the NATO School and the NATO Defense College), local exercise facilities, live fire ranges and places like the Joint Warfare Center (JWC) and Joint Force Training Center (JFTC). Including local security force members in courses and programs at these existing facilities could be done for minimal cost, as the infrastructure is already in place. Use of these facilities would free the nations from developing the courses available there on their own, enabling them to focus their limited resources on training facilities back home. The Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) infrastructure (servers, etc.) also falls under this capability element. ADL, when appropriately supported by face to face programs, can accomplish three types of training: one, it can provide the basic understanding of a subject in preparation for a face to face course; two, it can provide the knowledge necessary to do a specific task, and three, it can refresh knowledge gained in a previous course.

In the nations receiving support, training facilities like schools and exercise sites may need to be rehabilitated or created

from the ground up. Modeling and simulation facilities should also be considered in some cases, as they can provide a low cost (after the initial investment) way to train for a wide variety of situations.

In addition, given resource constraints, attention should be paid to the possibility of creating multi-use facilities, for example, training areas for both police and military trainers, or new buildings on existing university campuses instead of creating totally separate military education facilities. Of course, each nation will have to decide on the exact nature of the facilities they require. NATO can only provide advice based on lessons identified and best practices from Member and Partner experiences.

Doctrine

Doctrine provides the high-level direction and guidance for an activity. As a capability element, doctrine refers to all the textual guidance for an activity, including, in the NATO case, policy. This policy will provide the highest level guidance for NATO concerning training local security forces. But these texts will in themselves be insufficient to serve as the doctrinal component of the capability. Therefore, once this highest level NATO guidance is promulgated, the strategic commands will have to develop their own guidance. Allied Commander Transformation’s (ACT) Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) process can make valuable contributions to this activity. Together this guidance will constitute a NATO way for engaging in the training

local forces process, based on principles derived from lessons identified, lessons learned and best practices from the long experience of the nations and NATO’s own involvement in TLF.

Material

Equipment for training will be required – including information technology, transportation, books, weapons, and ammunition. This equipment, and activities using the equipment, requires funding. Lessons identified from NTM-I and NTM-A indicate that the current system of funding, in which nations and other organization provide different and unpredictable amounts of funds on an annual basis adds to the difficulty of developing a training capability. Less money, provided more predictably, is often more useful than promises of more money that fail to materialize or materialize suddenly and must be spent before the end of the fiscal year. The most important issue, however, is ensuring that well-meaning donations from external actors do not create unsustainable burdens for the receiving nation. The receiving nation must decide if the material offered fits in with their overall training objectives – material that does not should be rejected. International provision of an “iron mountain” does nothing to increase local security capabilities.

With our snapshot of the capability elements for the CA perspective complete, we can now examine the utility of the TLF capability from the NATO perspective. In a severely constrained financial environment, why should NATO devote resources to developing such a capability?

Utility of the Training Local Forces Capability

The TLF capability is a meta-capability: it is capability that improves both local actor’s own capabilities and more importantly, their ability to continuously enhance their own capabilities. Therefore, NATO should develop its capability to train local forces in three ways.

First, it should provide training support before a crisis as part of normal interaction

with other organizations and states in order to increase local resilience to future crises. Not only will the training help local actors shape outcomes in positive ways (from the NATO perspective) but developing the baseline knowledge, and networks of interaction necessary for training support, can provide NATO with the local understanding necessary to support those actors predisposed to act in ways congruent with NATO values.

Second, after a crisis, as part of a broader Stabilization and Reconstruction activity set, NATO should be able to rapidly deploy, in conjunction with other organizations, training resources, (in money and personnel) to restore or regrow local security force training capabilities. Early investment in capability building will reduce the costs of support made necessary by a major crisis. This training and development support is thus a cost-effective contribution to fulfilling Alliance crisis management tasks.

Third, by taking steps to enhance its TLF capability to train and develop local forces over years, additional development of the ability to rapidly deploy a critical mass of the TLF instructors will further enhance NATO’s crisis management effectiveness. This rapid reaction TLF team could deploy to quickly provide training support necessary for local security sector personnel to improve their capabilities to prevent imminent state failure or to reconstitute and establish the basic security architecture necessary for recovery from state failure brought about by conflict or natural disaster. This surge capability, by addressing force capability issues in the often narrow window of opportunity between state fragility and total collapse in failure, could generate dramatic positive outcomes for local people at a much lower cost to NATO Nations than helping to rebuild such a capability after it has been entirely disbanded.

Conclusion

Training local forces is a vital enabler for improving local resilience to future shocks and to recover from crisis. It is a key component of several NATO focus areas, in-

cluding NATO’s operationalization of the Comprehensive Approach, defence and security sector reform, COIN, and Stabilization and Reconstruction activity.

NATO need not, and should not, attempt to offer nations complete solutions to the training dilemmas they face or undertake the full range of local actor training. Instead, NATO can through its TLF capability assist other nations and organizations develop the tools, techniques and procedures those local actors believe are appropriate to meet their own needs. NATO, by focusing on institutional development and instructor training, will help local actors reconstitute or enhance their own organic training capabilities. Therefore, training of students in the various areas of expertise by NATO trainers will be a by-product of training local trainers, not the primary objective of NATO training activities. Though this functional training may be necessary in the early stages of involvement, NATO should shift from direct training provision to training the trainers as rapidly as possible.

In addition, NATO, by building its own organic TLF capability, will be able to coordinate multinational TLF surge efforts. This coordination capability will provide NATO with the ability to quickly aggregate and deploy more instructors as an Alliance than any single nation could alone, and thus quickly generate positive security effects. In addition, through partnerships, NATO can help local actors quickly and efficiently create train the trainer training programmes on a wide variety of essential subjects. This speed of training support is important, especially in post-crisis situations, to demonstrate to local people that supporting the emerging NATO affiliated security architecture will bring gains to themselves and their families in both the short and long terms. †

(7) See Hallett, “New Potentials for Provincial Reconstruction Teams” Small Wars Journal. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jml/art/new-potentials-for-provincial-reconstruction-teams>.



Cover Story

Continued Counterinsurgency Training and Mindset

Photo by U.S. Army Spc Kelly Fox, ISAF

“If Inteqal/Transition is a living process, then continued COIN training and mindset is the lifeblood of the process.”

nated by transnational, unconventional, and asymmetric threats. From that perspective, here are several ideas regarding NATO/ISAF COIN efforts in Afghanistan and what they mean for the future.

Discussion

1) Recognizing and preparing for the *complexity of the operational environment in Afghanistan remains mission essential*, not mission enhancing, for all of our deploying forces. This complexity includes the interwoven, multi-dimensional complexities of Afghan/regional history, geography, culture, religion, tribe, language, and other factors; but just as important, how those factors intersect daily and over time with our own NATO/ISAF organizational (“tribal”) culture, language, politics, rotational turbulence and other factors. No amount of training, study and preparation will fully prepare our forces for this complex environment; but without such training and preparation we cannot effectively support ISAF transition to ANSF security lead. Continued leader emphasis on individual/

organizational pre-deployment training is required at all levels, focused on complexity of the operational environment and how we understand and prepare for it.

2) We must continue efforts to overcome a collective COIN training deficit *and improve COIN training and mindset amongst all nations and NATO* at the institutional/organizational level, for both individual and collective training. Current guidance directs three phases of ISAF pre-deployment training [Phase I: national pre-deployment training; Phase II: NATO collective training events; Phase III: in-theatre induction training] however the quality/depth of COIN training remains arguably insufficient to meet the known complexities of the operational environment. Significant disparity in Phase I national pre-deployment COIN training quality and content amongst all Troop Contributing Nations remains clearly observable. Efforts to improve the content and amount of Phase II COIN training cannot make up existing deficits in Phase I – the time/task balance is already overloaded. Despite NATO and ISAF efforts over the last two years, we are still deploying personnel to Afghanistan who have inadequate COIN pre-deployment training. Over time our focus on pre-deployment COIN training for ISAF

Vital for effective ISAF transition process in Afghanistan and future NATO operations

By Col (Ret.) Benjamin Clark

Introduction

The Dari/Pashto word “Inteqal” (“Transition” in English) should be familiar to most military and civilian members of the NATO/ISAF team by now; it is the process for strengthening peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region. Extensive collaborative discussions between NATO/ISAF, the international community, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) over the last three years produced a formal agreement for Inteqal/Transition within a joint framework of Afghan sovereignty and supported by a process coordinated through the Joint Afghan NATO Inteqal Board, or JANIB. The JANIB plays a key role in the process for Inteqal/Transition planning, coordination,

and handover of lead security responsibility from ISAF to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by December 2014. Inteqal/Transition does not signify ISAF withdrawal, but a gradual shift to ANSF lead for security as their capabilities develop over time. NATO/ISAF and the international community are committed to long term engagement and an “Enduring Partnership” in Afghanistan past 2014 and the ISAF mission. In July 2011, the Government of Afghanistan conducted ceremonies to formally mark the implementation of Tranche One of Inteqal/Transition with turnover of lead security responsibility from ISAF to ANSF in seven provinces and cities in Afghanistan (provinces of Bamiyan, Pan-

The Bottom Line, Up Front

With the developments noted above and the beginning of Inteqal/Transition the need for continued counterinsurgency (COIN) training and operations focus by ISAF has been questioned by some. But, in fact, the relevance and importance of COIN training and mindset for all ISAF personnel, organizations and operations has never been greater as the process of Inteqal/Transition moves forward over the next three years. If Inteqal/Transition is a living process, then continued COIN training and mindset is the lifeblood of the process. Continued COIN training, mindset and operations are critical enablers of effective transition from ISAF to Afghan lead in all areas of security, governance, development and rule of law. COIN training and mindset will also remain relevant and in fact, vital, to future NATO operations in an increasingly complex emerging security environment.

Background

The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger and the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland play key roles supporting ISAF pre-deployment training, among their many other responsibilities. From 2009-2011, I have been privileged to support NATO/ISAF COIN training requirements at JWC, JFTC, and several courses conducted by the NATO School Oberammergau. Concurrently, I supported the ISAF COIN Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) in Afghanistan. This was preceded by military service in Afghanistan during several tours of duty 2002-2009. These experiences provided the opportunity to observe and support first-hand the critical importance of COIN training and mindset for ISAF. COIN training and mindset remain vital to effective ISAF operations both in Afghanistan and to future NATO operations in an increasingly complex emerging security environment domi-



The author at JWC's Ulsnes Training Facility.

Photo by Inci Kucukaksy

Photo by ISAF



"No amount of training, study and preparation will fully prepare our forces for this complex environment."

needs to evolve to focus training for COIN operations outside the Afghan theatre of operations. One reflection of this evolving requirement is seen in Allied Command Transformation (ACT) efforts to produce an Advanced Distributed Learning (online) training module for COIN operations outside Afghanistan.

3) *We need to institutionalize COIN mindset and training in NATO using a DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities) approach.* The February 2011 publication of AJP- 3.4.4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, addressed the longstanding lack of NATO doctrine for COIN. The new COIN doctrine and its related training standards (it seems that a supporting COIN ATP is now being considered) are required to be educated and exercised from 2013 on. As with this first-ever publication of NATO COIN doctrine, so too, are efforts needed across the other domains of DOTMLPF for COIN, especially in the realm of training, education and professional development. In a larger sense we need to institutionalize COIN across all nations and NATO organizations and processes. Ultimately there is a strong case

to be made for NATO to consider a COIN Centre of Excellence however, that's the subject of a future article. The emerging security environment facing NATO is complex, uncertain, and likely outside the realm of conventional military operations; we need to build on, and not lose, our hard won, still evolving, and perishable COIN experience from Afghanistan.

4) *Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are nothing new* – history provides many compelling examples of complex decades-long insurgencies and counterinsurgency efforts; lessons identified are many and obvious. While not every historical example applies to Afghanistan, there are numerous COIN lessons (many derived from British and Soviet experience) which we could have more effectively considered and applied to individual and collective ISAF preparation and training in recent years. Perhaps the most compelling historical lesson of COIN is the frequent failure of nations and armies to learn from past COIN operations in applying lessons to better train, equip, and employ forces in future COIN operations. American military experiences and lessons with COIN in Vietnam were not widely nor effectively retained by Army institutions

other than in the Special Forces community; the rapid effort to write and publish U.S. COIN doctrine in 2006 partially reflected that loss of continuity and institutional COIN memory following Vietnam. NATO strategic planners and the Emerging Security Challenges Division forecast increasingly less conventional, more irregular and asymmetric, hybrid, and transnational threats, which will very likely bypass conventional NATO military strengths; counterinsurgency operations are likely to remain in NATO's future. Let's hope we don't repeat the oft-demonstrated and very predictable political/military mistake of forgetting COIN lessons and scrapping NATO and national COIN training/capability in future years. See *Number 3* above.

5) *NATO/ISAF understanding of the Taliban threat and subsequent ISAF COIN operations evolved slowly* from 2003-2009 with gradual awareness of a growing insurgency but limited resources, guidance, and authorities available in response. It was not until then COMISAF General Stanley McChrystal's Initial Assessment was published in September of 2009 that ISAF began a major overhaul of COIN operations and mindset. Wartime organizational

change with 48 Troop Contributing Nations is a daunting challenge from the grand Political-Military (POL-MIL) NATO perspective as well as the ISAF strategic/operational/tactical level; change does not occur rapidly. We have arguably not completed the necessary adjustments in COIN DOTMLPF for current ISAF operations, much less future NATO operations, but we are beginning to move in the right direction with NATO's Comprehensive Approach. Our understanding and response to insurgency must not be static and linear while re-learning old lessons; and our NATO COIN doctrine and capabilities must evolve and improve over time.

6) *ISAF COIN efforts are strengthened by and should remain multinational.* Unity of effort under the umbrella of a COIN campaign has improved over time even as the challenges of unity of command remain. The complexities of training, interoperability, planning, coordination, and execution of effective COIN operations by each Troop Contributing Nation are exacerbated by time, distance, resources, geography, rotational schedules, and other factors. Each nation's history, policies, politics and caveats while operating in the complex operational environment of Afghanistan are by nature different – this is challenging but it remains a fundamental demonstration of the strength of the NATO Alliance and Coalition partnership. In as much as ISAF trains to understand Afghan tribal/political complexity, our own NATO/ISAF tribal complexity demands clarity and candid talk with our Afghan partners during all operations but especially as we begin Inteqal/Transition; it is essential to our credibility.

7) *COIN operations by ISAF reflect NATO's evolving Comprehensive Approach to operations; the two are complementary.* Much of what is doctrinal, necessary, and intuitive in planning and executing effective COIN operations blends seamlessly with NATO's Comprehensive Approach to planning — COIN planning, operations, and mindset apply a Comprehensive Approach naturally. The inclusion of COIN

discussions within the Comprehensive Operations Planning Course by NSO reflects the growing awareness of how COIN operations, training and mindset complement the Comprehensive Approach to operations, even as doctrine evolves. Increased teamwork, training, planning and operations with non-military partners across a full range of activities will enhance effective transition in Afghanistan and improve long term efforts at stability. We have a long way to go to more fully understand, integrate, train and partner with many non-military actors and various civilian organizations, which are so vital to effective COIN operations and a Comprehensive Approach, but progress is undeniable and the way ahead is promising.

8) *Effective COIN training cannot be squeezed into sound bites or simple clichés.* The complexity of COIN operations requires increased time and resources at all levels to more effectively train units and individuals. Current JFC-B guidance for three phase training, the COIN T3C, consideration of an ATP to supplement COIN AJP-3.4.4, and similar efforts are improvements to the overall need for COIN training; still, the observed lack of standardized COIN training by the nations remains a training gap. The limited time available during Phase II and Phase III training cannot substitute

for vital national pre-deployment training on COIN fundamentals. As noted above, although it is a discussion for a later article, this relates to consideration of a COIN Centre of Excellence.

9) Even as the process of Inteqal/Transition has begun, the *consistent themes and enduring need for a COIN mindset in planning and executing operations remains vital.* These themes have been addressed by ISAF Campaign Strategy and Guidance, IJC direction and orders, Regional Command plans and directives, and ISAF operations throughout Afghanistan. COMISAF COIN Guidance dated 01 August 2010 provides 24 key points (below), each of which merits lengthy discussion at all levels. They are worth noting again.

10) *Supporting discussions to amplify each point of COMISAF COIN Guidance are vital for leaders and units at all levels.* Additional information and guidance is readily available in the form of ISAF Joint Command and Regional Command direction and policy guidance, FRAGOs, SOPs, soldier information cards, and other supplementary guidance with the appropriate level of detail. Professional reading lists, web resources, and key references are plentiful. Here are just a few of many examples of key discussion points for COIN:

COMISAF 01 August 2010 COIN Guidance



- Secure and serve the population
- Live among the people
- Help confront the culture of impunity
- Help Afghans build accountable governance
- Pursue the enemy relentlessly
- Fight hard and fight with discipline
- Identify corrupt officials
- Hold what we secure
- Foster lasting solutions
- Employ money as ammunition
- Be a good guest
- Consult and build relationships
- Walk. Stop by, don't drive by
- Act as one team
- Partner with the ANSF
- Promote local reintegration
- Be first with the truth
- Fight the information war aggressively
- Manage expectations
- Live our values
- Maintain continuity through unit transitions
- Empower subordinates
- Win the battle of wits
- Exercise initiative

- a. The benefits of *embedded partnering*, working “Shona Ba Shona” or “shoulder to shoulder” with ANSF. Lessons learned and best practices, partnering vignettes, practical tips, and how partnering helps prevent and mitigate effects of Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) as well as supporting Transition/Inteqal.
- b. The importance of *relationships and trust building with Afghans* – a baseline skill for effective partnership and COIN efforts. What does that look like and how is it best accomplished?
- c. *CIVCAS avoidance, awareness, and prevention*; now more than ever. Understand the difference between Rules of Engagement vs Escalation of Force SOP 373, the strategic impacts of CIVCAS, the Taliban’s ruthless exploitation of ISAF mistakes, real or not. Review CIVCAS incidents and discuss the key lessons from each.
- d. Preventing *loss of continuity during handover/takeover* and relief in place/transfer of authority operations; best practices and lessons learned. How to prevent “fighting the war six months at a time.”
- e. *COIN self-study and references* available through ISAF, CTC-A, Ronna websites and numerous on-line resources to share COIN best practices.
- f. *Understanding the Afghan Peace and*

- Reconciliation Program (APRP)* and the key historical role of reintegration and reconciliation in ending insurgencies. Understand and share ISAF’s role in “inform, find, protect, support.”
- g. *The challenges of widespread corruption and its corrosive impacts on the legitimate Government of Afghanistan and ISAF COIN efforts*; ISAF counter corruption Task Force efforts by TF Shafafiyat.
- h. *COMISAF COIN Contracting Guidance* and the pitfalls of misplaced, inappropriate, or poorly managed contracting processes, which degrade COIN efforts and ISAF credibility. Understand why contracting is a weapons system, which must be properly aimed and fired.
- i. *The key role each of us plays in Inteqal/Transition* to know, share, and support the process of Inteqal/Transition.
- j. *Working more effectively in a Comprehensive Approach with our civilian partners*. This is something we frequently overlook – the need to include non-military actors in our COIN efforts. Do we know our IO/NGO/UNAMA neighbours and what capability they may have? Are they routinely part of our information-sharing, partnership, and planning?
- k. *The hugely negative impact of opium* on the fight against corruption, the health

of the people of Afghanistan, and ISAF COIN efforts. Funding/support of the insurgency through the opium trade and increasingly powerful and inextricably linked network of Taliban insurgency, narcotics, crime, smuggling and terrorism.

11) COIN does not get easier with the beginning of Tranche 1 transition in July 2011. *Each of us must ensure we understand and can effectively discuss Inteqal/Transition process with our Afghan partners*, both military and civilian. Our security gains over the last year are fragile and the Taliban exploit every opportunity to attack, physically and otherwise, the credibility of the coalition. Our ANSF partners and the Afghan people must know that Inteqal/Transition does not mean NATO abandonment of Afghanistan and that NATO has an enduring Partnership with Afghanistan.

Summary

The complexity of COIN in Afghanistan will continue to require time, resources, sacrifice, and leader emphasis across all levels. ISAF started late with comprehensive COIN efforts in Afghanistan but progress across all lines of operations is clear and growing, even as it remains challenging and fragile. Despite many hurdles, past and future ISAF COIN efforts have improved the chances for a stable and secure Afghanistan. During the next three years ISAF personnel must understand and support the Inteqal/Transition process and reinforce the successes and best practices of the COIN campaign as we transition security lead to the Government of Afghanistan in 2014. We must also work to retain, refine, and institutionalize ISAF COIN lessons and experiences for NATO application in the emerging security environment. JWC, JFTC, NSO and numerous other NATO organizations and national elements play key roles in supporting training for ISAF current operations requirements as well as developing future COIN training and institutional dialog and processes. †

Article continues on Page 50 with “COIN Training Improvements”.



Swedish PRT assistance following 2009 flooding in Afghanistan. Photo by Swedish PRT.



Bodø Main Air Station, Norway

**OTX 2011
The High North**

Challenges in the Northern Region linked to the Comprehensive Approach ▶▶

By Kurt Andreas Skog, NOR A, and Gordon Ramsay

Photo by Henry E. Plimack



IN SEPTEMBER THIS YEAR, 76 members of the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) successfully completed the JWC Operational Training Exercise (OTX) to Northern Norway. The JWC OTX concept is employed to provide an interesting and high quality professional learning and training venue to the JWC staff in order to broaden the understanding of selected national and international history, NATO professional development topics, and cultural learning.

The theme for this year's OTX was "*The High North – Challenges in the Northern Region linked to the Comprehensive Approach.*" To put this theme into a context and to cover all levels from tactical to strategic, the training audience was given a strategic introduction to the topic through an academic phase at the JWC prior to the visit to the Norwegian Operational Joint

Headquarters at Bodø, and the Garrison in South Varanger, Kirkenes. A planning team consisting of Lieutenant Colonel Kurt Andreas Skog (OPR), Maj Trudi Skjelde, CPO Gary Braddock and Mr Gordon Ramsay was put together. Jet Time, a Danish charter airline, was booked to provide lift for the exercise and two representatives from NDLO's M&T section supported the OTX in the coordination of all transportation throughout.

Academics at JWC

To introduce the audience to the area to be visited, two high level briefers were invited to set the scene and give the strategic view to the High North.

Brief 1: by Professor Ove Tobias Gudmestad, University of Stavanger, and entitled

"Engineering activities in the High North". Professor Gudmestad provided an excellent historical overview of the Barents region as well as a depiction of the climatic and geographical challenges faced by industry and residents alike. His superlative focus on providing us with illustrations of the infrastructure, economic activity and future possibilities for all northern Norway states and Russian provinces served to impart upon all participants the importance of the region. His discussion of the recently agreed upon delimitation line, the vast natural resource deposits, opening of the Arctic Sea ice and cross border cooperative ventures set an outstanding background for the OTX.

Brief 2: by Mr. Tom Holter, MoD Norway Department of Security Policy. Mr. Holter

noted that Norway defines the Northern Areas, the High North, as its most important adjacent area. This is today evident both politically and military and there is a growing international interest in the changes taking place in the Arctic.

This interest is seen in Allies, in Russia and in Asia. The possibility of new sea routes and the potential for oil and gas extraction gives rise to expectation and optimism. At the same time, increases in maritime traffic and petroleum production could lead to serious adverse consequences for fisheries and for the environment. Key, he noted, was that the opening of the High North to shipping and resource exploration must form a cornerstone of Norwegian security policy and international consultation and cooperation.

Visit to NJHQ

On Tuesday, 13 September 2011, OTX participants flew from Stavanger Sola to Bodø and were met and welcomed by the commanding officer of the 123 Wing Brigadier Per-Egil Rygg and Ms Mette Stolz Dahl from the Protocol Office of the Main Air Station at Bodø (MAS) before proceeding to Norwegian National Joint HQ (NJHQ) facilities at Reitan. After lunch with NJHQ staff, the group was provided with two high-level briefers: 1) an NJHQ Command Briefing by CDR Arne Morten Grønning-sætre, Chief J3 NJHQ; and, 2) a discussion on "*Challenges on the Northern Region*" by Mr Jonny Didriksen, Senior Advisor to COM NJHQ. These were followed by environmental-specific presentations on each of the Norwegian Coast Guard, Maritime Situational Awareness, Quick Reaction

Air Alerts and Border Control operations. Lastly, participants were given a tour of the NJHQ Joint Operations Center (JOC). A stop at the "Saltstraumen", the world's most powerful maelstrom just outside of Bodø was enjoyable and a great site for photos!

The exceptional information and background provided to OTX participants at Reitan reinforced our understanding of issues in the High North and the need for a true consideration of all relational aspects in security planning and liaison.

Visit to the Bodø Main Air Station

The next morning saw the OTX visit the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF) MAS in Bodø. After briefings on the structure and roles of the RNoAF, a capability brief on its frontline fighter, the F-16, and a detailed description of its Quick Reaction

HIGH NORTH

composition and procedures. This was followed by a tour of an F-16 maintenance hangar and static display of Ground Based Air Defence systems. All in all, an excellent morning that linked the tactical and operational levels of the RNoAF to the High North for our group.

Visit to GSV

After the terrific hospitality at Bodø, the OTX proceeded to Kirkenes by charter flight and were met at Høybuktmoen Airport, Kirkenes, by representatives of Garnisonen i Sør-Varanger (GSV). Briefings to our group were provided by Mr Rune Rafaelsen of the Barents Secretariat, Ms Ellen Katrine Hætta, Chief of the East Finnmark Police District, and Colonel Ivar Sakserud, Senior Norwegian Border Commissioner. These briefings served to illustrate the day to day and

“on-ground” aspects of the Comprehensive Approach to security matters. The day was concluded by a group dinner in the GSV officer’s Mess, hosted by the Commander GSV, Lieutenant Colonel Jan Østbø.

On the final day of the OTX, Thursday, 15 September 2011, our group was transported to the GSV border station at Svanvik where we were given a Command Brief, visit to the restored old border station and a static display of the Company’s patrol vehicles and equipment. It was extremely interesting to meet and chat with the young men and women who patrol the 196 kilometre border with Russia. After lunch at the Svanvik Folkehøgskole, our group was treated to a fantastic historical lecture with numerous photos that depicted military operations during the Second World War in Kirkenes and the surrounding areas of both Norway

and Russia. A stop at the border along the Pasvik River allowed us to see the patrol boats used by GSV, gaze across the border and have photo opportunities at border marking posts!

Final remarks

This year’s OTX was deemed to be a great success. It truly allowed our participants to garner a first-hand understanding of the challenges faced in the High North and revealed the magnitude of inter-jurisdictional cooperation, training and information sharing necessary to ensure that national and local security concerns are met. It was also a fantastic opportunity for the Joint Warfare Centre staff members to get to know each other just a little bit better, contributing to shared understanding and enhancing our own capabilities. †

Photos by Lt Col Markus Beck, DEU A, and Maj Marny Skindrud, USA A



Photo by Henry E. Plimack



N 70° 21' 14"
E 31° 06' 39"

A TOP PLACE TO VISIT *“Cedant tenebrae soli”*



At 2,644 kilometres northeast of the JWC...

By Maj Elisabeth Eikeland, NOR AF
Commandant Vardøhus Fortress

IN A PREVIOUS ISSUE of The Three Swords magazine, as then Chief PAO, I shared with you some of Norwegian scientist and explorer Fridtjof Nansen's thoughts on making new choices in life; *“... we are all explorers in life, whichever path we follow.”* After four years at the JWC, I was looking to do something different. So, exactly 20 years since I last departed Finnmark – I have been feeling nostalgic for the place ever since – I am back, this time in the easternmost point of Norway, as Commandant of Vardøhus Fortress, which has traditions dating back to early 14th century. Completed in 1737 and therefore a unique piece of history, today's fortress is the sole remaining one of the three fortresses built here over the years.

Vardøhus Fortress at present is primarily a “flag-and-salute” fortress. The flag is raised every day and, as the only North Norway military site with an obligation to fire gun salutes, the fortress salutes on Norway's Constitution Day (17 May), dissolution of the Union with Sweden Day (7 June) and on all royal birthdays, as it does on the day that the entire disc of the sun is visible again after the winter darkness period. The motto in Vardø's coat-of-arms is most suggestive: *Cedant tenebrae soli – Darkness shall give way to the sun!*

During WWII, in 1940, the Norwegian flag flew over Vardøhus for much longer than anywhere else in what came to be known as the “flag war”, with the Commandant continuing to fly the flag all the way

until 6 November 1940. As the liberation of Finnmark County began in the autumn 1944, Vardøhus was the first military site nationwide to hoist the Norwegian flag again.

The last facet of a 700-year old fortress tradition in Vardø, Vardøhus still serves as a sovereignty marker in the High North. An oasis in an inhospitable land, about as far away as could be from the centre of gravity of the Danish-Norwegian Crown, the fortress manifested a strong ambition to demonstrate Denmark-Norway's sovereignty in the important Far North already in the 1700s. It still remains under military command, standing guard at a time when the Armed Forces generally are busy focusing on their core business, which bears testimony to its emblematic value. As its



46th Commandant and the first female ever to hold this position, it is my duty to uphold its proud traditions. More details on Vardøhus Fortress are available at: www.forsvarsbygg.no.

Reinøya Nature Reserve

My duties include supervising the Island of Reinøya, a protected nature reserve full of birdlife: puffins, razorbills, common guillemots, Brünnich's guillemots, black-legged kittiwakes and enormous amounts of seagulls all nest here. The islands of Reinøya and Hornøya rank among the world's top 100 bird spotting places. A statutory provision of 1854 grants the Commandant of Vardøhus exclusive right to gather seagull's eggs on the island, and s/he may, in liaison with the City of Vardø, allow civilians to pick eggs as well. Between them, Hornøya and Reinøya used to provide 120,000 to 130,000 eggs. More recently, as the levels of contaminants have increased in sea bird eggs, seagull's eggs are less in demand. Reinøya is also my “secret” cloud-berry place or, rather, one of the best places to pick your own cloudberries in Norway. Berry and egg rights were granted to the Commandant in the old days to help him live rich on a meagre salary. Fortunately, today, “the rights” are a curiosity, more than anything else, and the Commandant's salary has reached adequacy for his living. Still, much to my joy, I have on several occasions found strawberry-size cloudberries on “my” island. Where else does this kind of magic occur? ↗



NEED TO KNOW

Witchcraft Trials

In the 1600s, Vardø saw the highest number of convictions and executions for witchcraft throughout Norway. Indeed, a total of 91 people were unjustly burnt for heresy or collusion with the devil in Finnmark County over the period 1600-1692. “Steilneset is a symbol of the intolerance of the time, but can also serve to remind us of the prejudices, injustices and persecution that exist today,” said H.M. Queen Sonja when she inaugurated the Steilneset Memorial, dedicated to witch-hunt victims, on 23 June 2011. The memorial is the fruit of a cooperative project between Swiss architect Peter Zumthor and the late French-American artist and sculptor Louise Bourgeois. The art installation is a gift from Bourgeois, arising from her long-standing unflinching commitment to fighting injustice.

A Vardø landmark: Globus II

This Vardø-based radar system aims:

- To track “space junk” and satellites that orbit around the earth
- To provide coastal surveillance
- To help monitor territorial borders

However, due to, among other reasons, the site's proximity to Russia (Vardø lies 40 kilometres away from the border), Globus II was at the time subject to much controversy, which is reflected in a press release issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence in 2002: “Issues concerning the Globus II radar have been discussed on several occasions between Norway and Russia, both at the political and working level. Norway has stressed that the radar is not to be part of any eventual future U.S. missile defence. The radar is technically unsuited for such a role, and the agreement between Norway and the United States specifies totally different tasks for the radar. The radar at Vardø fully complies with the ABM Treaty.”



Photo by Guri Dahl





IAPDT 11-02

INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES BOUND FOR AFGHANISTAN TRAINED AT JOINT WARFARE CENTRE

This year's second Individual Augmentee Pre-Deployment Training (IAPDT 11-02) for Headquarters International Security Assistance Force (HQ ISAF) and ISAF Joint Command (HQ IJC) was held at the Joint Warfare Centre's Ulsnes Training Facility from 22-28 September 2011. The participants included 87 individual augmentees coming from different military establishments and organizations, the biggest group being the U.S. V Corps.

Built on actual on-the-ground experience incorporated into the training scenario, the JWC-run IAPDT programme includes Mission Specific Training, Electronic Working Processes, Functional Sys-

tems Training, ISAF Working Practices and vignette-based Cross Functional Training. During the IAPDT 11-02, the Training Audience (TA) received state-of-the-art training from a team of 48 personnel, including 30 recently re-deployed Subject Matter Experts who brought the most current knowledge and a fresh perspective from theatre.

Subject Matter Experts aim to pull out the most significant topics that staff bound for Afghanistan need to learn in order to excel at their respective duties in theatre. IAPDT 11-02 Content Manager Dutch Army Lt Col Rob Van Putten said: "At the JWC we minimize the time it takes for each augmentee to become a full contributor to the ISAF mission as soon as they deploy. Following our training, they feel ready to start their duties within just a few days. The JWC's train-

ing is very extensive and provides a great overview of the entire mission both at the HQ ISAF and the HQ IJC level, as well as the complexities of the environment and the staff processes. However, I think the most important thing is that they get to meet their ISAF/coalition counterparts here in Ulsnes for the first time and put names to faces. In the future, we want to increase the number of Subject Matter Experts at the Grey Cell because the Training Audience appreciates the generosity of all Afghan Subject Matter Experts and their counterparts from international and non-governmental organizations (IOs/NGOs) in supporting this training."

The IAPDT 11-02, like its predecessors, focused on staff processes and interactions between different divisions and branches in HQ ISAF and HQ IJC. The Mission Specific



Photo by Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO



Training included themes such as: the ISAF mission, counterinsurgency (COIN) and reintegration, campaign assessment, ISAF air operations, Strategic Communications, Strategic/National/International Partnering, training of the Afghan National Security Forces, understanding of the legal basis for the mission (Rules of Engagement), counter-narcotics, anti-corruption challenges, C-IED campaign, Afghan life and culture, Afghan governance and development, life

in HQ ISAF and HQ IJC, interaction with IOs/NGOs as well as with the Afghan Government and ISAF Regional Commands, media handling and gender issues. In addition, a COIN scenario was used during the Cross-Functional Training, as COIN serves as the foundation of the overall training effort. Participants applied the information they learned earlier to specific planning, stability and current operations issues within their syndicates, each supported by a

Subject Matter Expert for guidance. During the training event, video-conferences were conducted allowing the Training Audience to interact real-time with the HQ ISAF and HQ IJC leadership, such as Major General T. P. Evans, DSO, MBE, Chief of Staff HQ IJC, who talked about the design and operation of his headquarters, the comprehensive COIN campaign as well as his expectations and recommendations for the soon-deploying staff. †

MEET THE SMES



The ISAF HQ Gender Subject Matter Expert Norwegian Air Force Lt Col Lars Hjerpested and his successor in December, Norwegian Army Major Kirsten Hovde, met at the IAPDT 11-02 in Ulsnes. As the Subject Matter Expert on Gender, Lt Col Hjerpested's aim was to make the Training Audience understand ISAF's mandate in accordance with UNSCR 1325, which was adopted in 2000, as well as the security concerns of women, children and other

vulnerable groups in Afghanistan.

NATO's implementation of UNSCR 1325 oversees "full and equal participation of women at all levels in issues ranging from early conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction, peace and security." According to the NATO website, the policy is reviewed every two years. It is stated that "the Guidelines for the integration of UNSCR 1325 into the NATO Command Structure were issued by NATO's Strategic Commands in 2009." Appointment of Gender Advisers in "both field and at several Allied Commands" is considered as a key achievement. It is further stated that "an overall implementation report was produced for the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, marking the tenth anniversary of the adoption of UNSCR 1325."

"There are currently two Gender Advisers in HQ ISAF, my colleague from Iceland and myself, and we divide the duties between us," Lt Col Hjerpested points out. "My colleague focuses on the Ministry of Women's Affairs, as well as interaction with IOs/NGOs. I focus on internal staff processes and advise HQ ISAF staff how they can include the gender

perspective in their operational planning and development projects. Gender awareness is vital in understanding the environment we operate in. Women are especially key in understanding the social fabric of a given district. We need to ask the question whether a specific action of ours will affect men and women differently. By incorporating a gender perspective into our work, we are able to detect if and when our operations affect men and women differently, which in turn allows us to adjust our efforts accordingly in order to ensure successful outcomes. This is nested very closely in the COIN mission, which states clearly that we need to engage with the entire population. If you talk to half of Afghan population only, you are not doing it right. Gender perspective considerations are also part of our cultural awareness programmes."

Major Hovde says she is excited about her new mission. She says: "However, I don't expect to see major changes in the women's position or life style soon. Small steps, too, can get us in the right direction. We shouldn't compare or impose western standards on Afghanistan. We are not trying to change their values. Making our forces gender-aware and how this could enhance mission success is our focus. Gender is an important tool for gaining better situational awareness because how populations behave is very important."

Lt Col Lars Hjerpested also talks about the Female Engagement Teams in Afghanistan, which is ISAF's primary tool on the tactical level in interacting with the Afghan women. "Especially in rural communities they do a great job at the Regional Command level. They foster trust, talk about Afghan women's concerns, especially health concerns, and also they gather information." He then adds: "We are trying to prepare the Training Audience for their mission and the culture of Afghanistan. But much depends on them, as the training here builds on itself. I am sure they will all give their best effort." **-By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO**

What constitutes a warfare centre versus an exercise centre?

DOCTRINE — the baseline for operations

By Lt Col Mário José Vieira Pereira, PRT A
JCID, Joint Warfare Centre



THE CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY⁽¹⁾ defines doctrine as "a set of beliefs or principles held and taught by a Church, political party, or other group."⁽²⁾ Obviously, the military comes under "other group." Military doctrine is, of course, doctrine for military operations.⁽³⁾ When it comes to operations, history tells us that people [military organizations], when facing a conflict or crisis, quite often have prepared themselves by acting, and getting ready to act, according to lessons drawn from the last situation they successfully emerged from, on the understandable grounds that what has brought success must be assimilated and taught. History, however, also demonstrates that operations conducted on the basis of past successes alone may easily end up being unsuccessful. The contradiction is apparent. How do we address it, then? That really is what matters, what to give attention to.

"DOCTRINE: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES BY WHICH MILITARY FORCES GUIDE THEIR ACTIONS."

AAP-6

Past and Future

In order for our beliefs and principles to be sound, they must be based on what we can study and learn from. Studying and learning about operations is something that can only be based on past operations, for that last operation, the last action, however recent it may be, will always be a past operation, a past action. No matter how many times we wish for it to happen, no one can learn from the future. So, how can we prepare for a future operation, an operation other than the last one we know and have learned from? This is not only the quintessence of doctrine, but also *the heart of the warfare centre concept*.

Sources of doctrine and JWC role

It was not without reason that the Joint Warfare Centre includes the Joint Capability Integration Division (JCID) to take charge of areas such as doctrine, lessons learned, and concept development and experimentation. In fact, these – concept experimentation, in particular – are what constitutes a warfare centre versus an exercise centre. Why concept experimentation?

To trial new concepts or newly devised ways of having things done, and conclude on whether they work as intended or not, and, consequently, whether they should be widely taught or not, e.g. whether they should be incorporated into the doctrine or not.

But we do not improve through formal experimentation only. While acting, we should use the entire spectrum of capacities, information and knowledge at hand, including, of course, what we have been formally taught, and apply them intelligently to situations we have to deal with. This use of our intelligence should enable us to find solutions for problems not considered in the teaching, in the doctrine. These solutions, when confirmed as adequate ones for the type of situations they were applied to, are the other source of improvement – lessons learned. And these are many times a bigger source of improvement than formal concept development and experimentation.

Baseline

Here, one thing is paramount: the baseline from where to start. Is it possible to think of



Photo by ISAF

processes and procedures to be followed, which absorb people's mental availability, thus precluding the "getting back to basics."

To Summarize

Experience from the past tells us that NATO forces should not expect to find itself in repeated circumstances and conditions, at least not in all aspects. Conducting operations under this given requires a posture of foresight. This posture, nevertheless, can only be grounded in what we can learn from the past – there is no way to learn from the future.

From looking at the past we know that in the context of a certain activity, people have used the fundamental principles underlying the activity of their concern to develop solutions for problems and situations they could not study or prepare for beforehand. And of course, they learn from the failures that have occurred. This is how we learn to prepare for future operations.

Whatever circumstances and conditions NATO faces in the future, the fundamental principles of doctrine help prepare us to determine the right actions to take. These fundamental principles, along with the experiences gained from applying doctrine to specific situations, constitutes the baseline for preparation. This baseline of knowledge is the key to avoiding past mistakes and ensuring NATO's success in future operations. †

(1) "... NATO Agreed terminology shall be based on the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (COED) and Le Petit Robert in English and French respectively. Specific NATO Agreed terminology shall be developed only where terminology in those dictionaries is inadequate for NATO purposes. ..." (C M(2003)37 NATO Policy for Standardization of Terminology, paragraph 9.2)

(2) Origin in Middle English: from Old French, from Latin doctrina 'teaching, learning', from doctor 'teacher', from docere 'teach' (COED).

(3) "Doctrine: Fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application." (AAP-6, based on AJP-01). Three short notes on this definition: (1) Despite not stated as such, this is a definition of doctrine on military operations. (2) In this context, "in support of" is an expression that may raise some issues, since objectives must be attained rather than supported. (3) The second sentence is just an add-on to the definition. It should not be part of the definition, since it does not contribute to the explanation of what doctrine actually is.

development and experimentation of new concepts, or of lessons learned from action without considering a baseline? Hardly, to say the least. So, what is the baseline, then? The baseline is what we (as an organization) already have learned – **doctrine**.

Having reached this point, another question should be asked: What should receive the highest attention, the sources of learning or the baseline? The answer is not straight forward. Yet one thing is certain. If one does not master all of what has already been learned, all of what is already incorporated in the baseline, the likelihood of one "discovering on the spot" what one could and should already know beforehand is not negligible; besides, such "discoveries" may very well be different from the adequate ones, and lead to failure.

The idea of course is to keep the baseline as up-to-date as possible, since personnel deployed on operations, in order to be efficient, need to know how things are done. On the other hand, we already know that the next operation will almost certainly be conducted under different circumstances and conditions, and hence will be different from the previous ones and may require solutions not considered in the baseline. How to reconcile this contradiction?

Doctrine can be seen as twofold

Even though not reflected in current NATO doctrine, at least not formally, doctrine may be considered twofold and be referred to as fundamental doctrine and applied doc-

trine. Fundamental doctrine refers to the fundamental principles: those that underlie the observation and understanding of the area of activity addressed, and the rationale for the courses of action to be considered for each particular situation within it. Applied doctrine, on the other hand, refers to the practical ways of doing things, based on experience from the past and on beforehand application of fundamental principles to known conditions.

Solution

The key to resolve the contradiction mentioned above is the fundamental doctrine – the fundamental principles that underlie the activity itself (not any particular, specific conditions) and only need to be properly and intelligently applied to whichever circumstances and conditions one may encounter. This application of principles is the rationale for doctrine.

Constraints

However, given the fact that personnel deployed on operations have their daily focus on applied, practical doctrine, the fundamental principles often end up being overlooked, since they are already versed in the applied doctrine, without this being always apparent to those who do not entirely master the doctrine. Time constraints further reinforce people's tendency not to consider the fundamental doctrine, since in an operational environment there are normally lots of things to be done, as well as rules,

"The process of improving NATO's NRF readiness for operations in a cyber-threatened environment has begun."

The Joint Warfare Centre launches cyber defence training with STEADFAST JUNCTURE 2011

By Lt Col H. Todd Waller, USA AF
Space and Cyber SME, JTD, Joint Warfare Centre

THE Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) took its first steps towards fulfilling the vision of NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept and its new emphasis on cyber defence. Recognized by NATO leadership as an emerging threat to national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability, cyber threats and attacks will now become a regular part of the JWC's exercises. NATO operations are increasingly vulnerable to disruptions caused in cyberspace and the JWC must help to prepare the NATO Response Force

(NRF) to meet those challenges. The outcome is increased operational readiness at both NATO's operational and component level headquarters.

Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCBS) and its supporting component HQs in Italy, Greece, Germany, Spain and Lithuania were the first to experience JWC's new cyber defence emphasis during *STEADFAST JUNCTURE 2011* (SFJE11) conducted in November 2011. Cyber defence is a new focus for the Alliance and it will take some time for both the JWC and the Joint Force Com-

mands to refine their respective methods for creating the most realistic and meaningful exercise scenarios, and for carrying out the most effective preparations and responses. An "out-of-the-box" way of thinking will contribute greatly to the discussion of how best to prepare for emerging threats in cyberspace and one should not be too surprised by resistance to innovative strategies that don't fit neatly within traditional lanes. As with any new idea that demands change, it will be accompanied by some growth pains. One change in particular will



**EXCON
STEADFAST JUNCTURE 11**
Ulsnes, Stavanger, Norway
Photo by Inci Kucukaksoy

**Interview with Major General Berger,
Commander JWC**
Pabrade Training Area, Lithuania
Photos below by Lt Col Markus Beck



Lithuanian Minister of National Defence Rasa Jukneviene (second from left), General Wolf Langheld Commander JFC Brunssum.



be developing across NATO's battlestaffs a comprehensive understanding of the far reaching impacts of cyber attack.

Most everyone realizes cyber threats exist for NATO command and control systems. The NATO Communication and Information Systems (CIS) Services Agency (NCSA) is steadily increasing its capabilities to defend NATO networks against such attacks. The more potent cyber threats to NATO operations, however, may not be as intuitive and yet more likely during a conflict. SFJE11 gave NATO's battlestaffs an opportunity to begin experiencing the vastness of the cyber threat. To better grasp that vastness, let's put vulnerabilities to cyber threats in three categories:

- 1) Threats to NATO command and control,
- 2) Threats to NATO operations,
- 3) Threats to the NATO mission.

During SFJE11, cyber attacks against vulnerabilities in all three spheres were injected and the Training Audience was very responsive to all. To the credit of JFCBS, senior leadership took the cyber threat seri-

ously, instructed their staffs to do likewise, and established the organizational entities necessary to respond to attacks.

Consequently, the battlestaff responded to a number of cyber injects that were both direct and subtle, and also began to ask some very good questions about how cyber threats could be treated more thoroughly in the planning process to either mitigate or

avoid their effects. The battlestaff also had the opportunity to experience how cyber attacks against host nation critical infrastructures could impact operations and the stability of the government. With this understanding came new insights into how the command might assess its vulnerabili-

Below: Vulnerabilities to Cyber Attack



ties during the planning phase for a future contingency operation or exercise.

Overall, the JWC's introduction of cyber defence into the *STEADFAST* series of NRF exercises is off to a good start. JFCBS' experience during the exercise will undoubtedly inform and shape its progress towards cyber defence maturity and the JWC is already working to refine its "cyber play" for future NRF exercises. The process of improving NATO's NRF readiness for operations in a cyber-threatened environment has begun in earnest. †



Press conference with Lithuanian media.

Brigadier Gustavsen (left) and the OPR during the last IKLT course in Norway.
Photo by Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO



In total, 256 Iraqi security officials have participated in the courses since 2004

Final Iraqi Key Leader Training in Norway

By CDR W.A. Barten, NLD A
OPR IKLT, JWC

Inci Kucukaksoy
JWC PAO

THE Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) concluded its final Iraqi Key Leader Training (IKLT) course on Wednesday, 19 October 2011, with an official closing ceremony held at the JWC's Interim Training Facility at Ulsnes. The JWC has delivered this training since it was selected to host NATO's first out-of-country course for Iraqi security leaders in November 2004 as part of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). Since the first course, the Centre has provided fifteen IKLTs to assist Iraqi Security Forces in the restoration of sustainable security institutions and processes in order to establish, take over and maintain security in Iraq.

IKLT started out as part of the NTM-I, which has been running since 2004 when NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to support a request from the former Iraqi Interim Government to help Iraqi Security Forces in accordance with UN Security Resolution 1546. Since then, NTM-I has offered specialized, strategic-level training inside and outside Iraq to selected members of the Iraqi Security Forces. Through its important mission, the NTM-I has made a tangible contribution not only to the rebuilding of military leadership in Iraq, but also to the development of the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and the Iraqi security. The NTM-I is financed via a trust fund, which is

entirely funded by voluntary contributions provided by individual NATO Member and Partner Nations.

"This course has helped Iraqi Key Leaders operate more jointly and has given them an inspirational insight into international relations. We must remember that Iraq has been isolated from the outside world for many years. Here, we have been teaching an extremely relevant multi-disciplinary training programme with top-notch security specialists from both within and outside NATO providing first-hand knowledge in the operational context and leadership disciplines," said Norwegian Army Brigadier Gunnar E. Gustavsen, IKLT Director and



Special Advisor to Commander JWC.

The last IKLT was attended by sixteen Iraqi security officials including two Major Generals, nine Brigadier Generals, three Colonels, one Lieutenant Colonel and one civilian coming from the Iraqi Prime Minister's Office and Ministries of Defence and the Interior. From 8 to 20 October 2011 they gained competence in areas such as operational Command and Control, staff planning and decision-making, provision of effective and efficient inter-agency leadership, communication skills, practice of operational law and Security Sector Reform, management and use of information, as well as Strategic Communications in a counterinsurgency campaign. Also to note was a facilitated discussion on the topic of "Iraq: Beyond Counterinsurgency to Reconciliation." Major activities further included briefings to promote a greater understanding of NATO, its Member and Partner Nations and their armed forces, as well as practical workshops on interacting with the

media. Visits to the Stavanger Police headquarters and the City Hall were also part of the programme.

The JWC Commander, French Army Major General Jean Fred Berger said during his welcome speech: "We take great pride here at the JWC in being recognized as NATO's premier operational training centre. We take no less pride in the confidence that the Iraqi Government has placed in our ability to provide the same quality training to the Iraqi key leaders all the way since 2004."

This final IKLT course in Stavanger is the culmination of a seven-year old training curriculum that has been assiduously developed using feedback from participants at all iterations of this training, which had simultaneous interpretation for both English to Arabic and Arabic to English.

"Every time, after an IKLT iteration, we think that the training audience rates among the most professional and academically and socially active groups that JWC has hosted.

This is due to the fact that the IKLT participants are more positive and proactive with each iteration," said the Netherlands Navy Commander W.A. Barten, IKLT Officer of Primary Responsibility (OPR).

Since the start of the programme in 2004, the JWC has planned sixteen courses and conducted fifteen courses; one course was cancelled because of the Iceland volcanic eruption in 2010. In total, 256 Iraqi security officials have participated in the courses since 2004.

An Iraqi Army Major General who participated in the last IKLT in Ulsnes, said: "I found the course to be extremely relevant and successful. We received expert training and instruction on a broad range of topics, as well as an insight into the training, equipment and organizational structures of the armed forces of various NATO Nations. The course also was a chance for us to engage with our counterparts across NATO Member and Partner Nations. I believe it is very important for the Iraqi military to establish contact with western militaries and participate in their training and exercises. The IKLT helps bring us up to the level of western militaries."

Starting from 2012, the IKLT will be hosted and conducted by the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany. The decision to this effect was made taking into account JWC's Programme of Work, which aims to support current NATO operations as well as continue to provide NATO's operational level training.

The NTM-I has since 2004 helped to build a strategic and enduring partnership between Iraq and NATO. Reflecting on the NTM-I's out-of-country training efforts for the Iraqi Security Forces, the former Commander NTM-I, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Michael Barbero said: "Out-of-country courses are important not just because of their content, but also because they provide an unparalleled opportunity to expose Iraqi security professionals to NATO best practices and allow Iraqi officers to network with NATO counterparts and develop lasting partnerships both on a personal and a professional level." †



Photo by Inci Kucukaksoy

Since the first course in 2004, the Joint Warfare Centre has provided bi-annual Iraqi Key Leader Training at Ulsnes to assist Iraqi Security Forces in the restoration of sustainable security institutions and processes in order to establish, take over and maintain security in Iraq.

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COIN Training Improvements By Col (Ret.) Benjamin Clark

DESPITE THE CHALLENGES AND DEFICITS OF CURRENT COIN pre-deployment training for ISAF, there is a growing informal network or NATO COIN Community of Interest (COI), which recognizes and responds to the need for continued collaborative efforts to improve how we train and prepare our forces to deploy. Increased time, facilities, instructors, funding, and focus on COIN training come slowly, often in small increments, but progress comes about because leaders, staff, and trainers at the JWC, JFTC, the COIN Training Center Afghanistan, NSO, and national COIN centres recognize the wartime operational and training imperative to build and improve our NATO COIN capabilities.

Supportive staff officers, NCO's, and civilians at ACT, ACO, JFC Brunssum, and SHAPE help to identify and pursue solutions to gaps in training, doctrine, guidance, and other areas for improvement.

Much of this, like COIN, happens not based on the complex hierarchy of organizational direction, but rather based on knowledge of the human terrain, informal partnerships, trust, and collaborative outreach among different organizations and tribes throughout our Alliance. Without this informal network, this collaborative COIN COI, we simply would not be where we are – it does take a network, it seems.

As an example, the writing, coordination, and publication of the February 2011 COIN AJP Doctrine provided the key development, which undergirds and enables almost all future progress to institutionalize COIN in a DOTMLPF approach. Without NATO doctrine for COIN, little real progress in building a NATO institutional approach to COIN would be possible; it was a crucial first step. The Doctrine writing team deserves great credit for having broken through considerable staffing challenges

over the course of many months. The contributions and efforts of TF COIN are also significant – they provided vital thought, writing, and much-needed published guidance prior to the approval of the COIN Doctrine; without TF COIN interim efforts, ISAF pre-deployment training would not be where it is. ACT staffers continue to work on COIN ADL content for ISAF and future COIN ADL training, and both JWC and JFTC continue to allocate increased time and training focus for COIN Phase II training such as Leader Roundtables, Panel Discussions on Partnering, Civilian Casualties and Transition and increased ANSF support for JWC and JFTC training requirements – all these and other developments reflect growing recognition and reaction to the need for improving our COIN mindset and training.


In the next issue we will explore the idea of a NATO COIN Centre of Excellence. †



Q&A *Gordon Ramsay*
Chief Community Support Branch

JWC's Community Support Chief tells how his Branch is the excellent information and assistance point for the JWC staff, and their high-impact activities.

Community Support: A focus on “us”



What is the role of Community Support at the Joint Warfare Centre?

I see Community Support as having four prime roles: firstly, serving as an initial information point and source for those personnel and their families who are coming to JWC and Stavanger. I believe that our aim should be to provide current and useful information and assistance as best as we can. Secondly, I believe that we should serve as an assistance point for our community during their stay here. That goes from perhaps offering translation services for any letter, email or document that people

receive to actually calling local suppliers, agencies or shops to ensure mutual understanding or to address any concerns. I also feel that we should serve as a focal point for our multi-national community to get to know each other better. We do this by organizing and conducting our Information Day BBQs, community boat and bus trips and other outings, activities for our youth and overseeing our sports and recreation clubs. Lastly, I feel that we also serve as a conduit for our community to become engaged with other expats and our host Norwegian community. Information sharing is

vital and the more that we know about the fantastic opportunities available to us, the more we will enjoy our stay, make lasting relationships and look back at our time here as pleasant and memorable.

What type of community activities do you organize and why?

We attempt to organize what we call “high impact” activities. That means that we plan and conduct events in which we can expect high numbers of folks to participate with their families. Hence our focus on bus and boat trips, visits to local attractions and our



JWC Ball 2011

Photos by MSgt Herbert Berger, DEU A, JED, JWC



Information Day BBQ. Unfortunately, we do not have the resources to do such things for what we expect could be relatively smaller groups or for specialty interest areas. The sole exception is in our youth events where we believe that this portion of our community should be able to get together a few times per year for activities aimed at their interests. We also look at introducing people to different things or areas. A trip to, say, Utstein Kloster, or, the ancient village of Landa could tweak folks' interest in the myriad of local history available to us to explore. Participating in local events such as a football match or the Julebyen in Egersund also allows us a glimpse of local culture. We also rely upon mechanisms such as our membership in the International Network of Norway (INN) and inviting exhibitors to our Information Day to expose our folks to local attractions or opportunities.

Where do the funds come from for these activities?

Almost all of the funds that we use for our Community Support programs, including the Library and funding grants to our sports and recreation clubs, come from the profits of the Central Cellar. That said, we have a close working relationship with 426 Services who do provide us some funding support and substantial assistance with equipment loan and facility usage. It is critical that, for the benefit of the Community, we work as a team with national elements, Norwegian military authorities and our partners in the local area to offer as many and as varied opportunities to our community as possible.

Where do the ideas come from?

Most of our ideas come from within the Community Support team. These are generally based upon our experiences or successes of the past and trying to enhance

them. We invite ideas from the community and frequently get suggestions from the Community Council. The Council consists of all Senior National Representatives (SNRs) and is the community's voice for morale and welfare issues. Lastly, our partners in the Rogaland area also make suggestions of things that may appeal to us, an example being our last boat trip to the island of Norda Hidle.

What about sports facilities?

We are very fortunate to have the Elixia membership program provided to us by our Host Nation Ministry of Defence. With these, we can take full advantage of all of the classes, programs, and facilities at any of the five Elixia centers in Rogaland. We also have access to local military facilities and sports fields such as at Madla Camp and Sola Flystasjon. Our on-post facilities are relatively spartan due to resource availability.

Do you have any closing remarks?

Only that I would fully encourage all community members to take full advantage of our facilities as well as opportunities in the area. Our Library is truly a hidden gem, our Host Nation Support Office has a wealth of local activity information and the Central Cellar directly gives back to our community. Participating in either International Network of Norway (INN) or Petroleum Wives Club (PWC)-Stavanger, for example, outings can broaden our experience here and nothing immerses you into your local community more than participating in local festivals or having your children play football or handball or join a riding club or scouting group. Bring us your thoughts or experiences on something that you tried so that we can share it with others. In the end, the more that you attempt, the more that you will learn about this fantastic part of Norway. †



NEED TO KNOW

Plans for 2012: Our highlight Community trip this year will be a visit to the **Kristiansand Zoo**, returning through Kvinsedal and Sirdal, from 26 to 28 May. We will also be taking our second annual trip by the ski boat to **Sauda** for a full day of skiing and boarding on Saturday, 3 March 2012. Our two large community boat trips are planned for early June and early September to **Sjernarøy** and **Lysebotn**, respectively. We will also have our youth bowling and reball events and possibly day fishing outings and trips to **Landa**, **Utstein Kloster** and the **Jaermuseet**. Our **Information Day and BBQ** is planned for Saturday, 11 August 2012!

FESTIVE FOODS THE NORWEGIAN CHRISTMAS ESSENTIALS



Christmas time in Norway is one time of year that really shines as far as Norwegian culture and tradition are concerned. If you are attending a Christmas dinner in a Norwegian home, consider yourself in for a special treat. If not, don't be intimidated to treat yourself and try preparing some of Norway's Christmas dishes. Norwegian Christmas food varies by geography and by family. To simplify for clarity: In Eastern Norway, where there are more pig farms, *ribbe* and meat balls are more common. In Western Norway, where there are more sheep farms, *pinnekjøtt*, or leg of lamb, is more common. In northern Norway, where fishing is a larger industry, you will probably find *lutefisk* on the table. *Lutefisk*, however, is highly appreciated all over Norway.

– By Bente Heill Kleven, JWC PAO

Lutefisk

So what is lutefisk? The name literally means “lye fish”, which is a traditional dish of the Nordic countries and, surprisingly, parts of the Midwest United States. It is gelatinous in texture, and has an extremely strong, pungent odour. Indeed, a novelty American folksong, sung to the tune of “O Tannen-

baum”, goes like this: *O lutefisk, O lutefisk, how pungent your aroma / O lutefisk, O lutefisk, you put me in a coma!*

Preparation

Lutefisk is traditionally made from aged stockfish (in this particular case *skrei* of the Lofoten Islands) prepared with lye in a sequence of particular treatments. The first treatment is to soak the stockfish in cold water for five to six days (with the water changed daily). The saturated stockfish is then soaked in an unchanged solution of cold water and lye for an additional two days. The fish swells during this soaking, and its protein content decreases by more than 50 percent, producing a jelly-like consistency. When this treatment is finished, the fish, which is by then saturated with lye, has a pH value of 11–12 and is therefore caustic. To make it edible, a final treatment of yet another four to six days of soaking in cold water (also changed daily) is needed. Eventually, the lutefisk is ready to be cooked.

Cooking

After the preparation, the lutefisk is saturated with water and must be cooked carefully so that it does not fall into pieces. To create a firm consistency in lutefisk, it is common to spread a layer of salt over the fish half an hour before it is cooked. This will “release” some of the water in the fish meat. The salt should be rinsed off before cooking unless you go for a small quantity of salt, in which case there is no need to rinse it off. Lute-



“Lutefisk is not food: it is a weapon of mass destruction.” Photo source: www.aperitif.no.

fisk does not need additional water for the cooking; it is sufficient to place it in a pan, cover with foil, and let it steam cook at 200 °C for 30 minutes or so or until fish flakes. Carefully remove fish from water and serve immediately. When cooking and eating lutefisk, it is important to clean the lutefisk and its residue off pans, plates, and utensils immediately. Lutefisk left overnight becomes nearly impossible to remove. Stainless steel or glass utensils are recommended.

Eating

Lutefisk is usually served with a variety of side dishes, including, but not limited to, bacon cut in dices, green peas or green pea stew, potatoes, *lefse*, melted or clarified butter, and grated brown goat cheese. Side dishes vary greatly from family-to-family and region-to-region. Today, aquavit and beer often accompany the meal due to its use at festive and ceremonial occasions.

Humour

Lutefisk eaters thrive on quotes and jokes from skeptics of lutefisk comparing it to everything from rat poison, which has a hint of truth to it because of the traces of nonstandard amino acid lysinoalanine found in lutefisk due to the reaction with lye, to weapons of mass destruction. A few examples are:

- Quote from Garrison Keillor's book *Lake Wobegon Days*: “Every Advent we entered the purgatory of lutefisk, a repulsive gelati-

nous fishlike dish that tasted of soap and gave off an odour that would gag a goat. We did this in honour of Norwegian ancestors, much as if survivors of a famine might celebrate their deliverance by feasting on elm bark. I always felt the cold creeps as Advent approached, knowing that this dread delicacy would be put before me and I'd be told, ‘Just have a little.’ Eating a little was like vomiting a little, just as bad as a lot.”

- Quote from Garrison Keillor's book *Pontoon*: “Lutefisk is cod that has been dried in a lye solution. It looks like the desiccated cadavers of squirrels run over by trucks, but after it is soaked and reconstituted and the lye is washed out and it's cooked, it looks more fish-related, though with lutefisk, the window of success is small. It can be tasty, but the statistics aren't on your side. It is the hereditary delicacy of Swedes and Norwegians who serve it around the holidays, in memory of their ancestors, who ate it because they were poor. Most lutefisk is not edible by normal people. It is reminiscent of the afterbirth of a dog or the world's largest chunk of phlegm.”

- Interview with Jeffrey Steingarten, author of *The Man Who Ate Everything* (translated quote from a 1999 article in Norwegian newspaper *DAGBLADET*):

“Lutefisk is not food: it is a weapon of mass destruction. It is currently the only exception for the man who ate everything. Otherwise, I am fairly liberal, I gladly eat worms and insects, but I draw the line on lutefisk.

What is special with lutefisk?

Lutefisk is the Norwegians' attempt at conquering the world. When they discovered that Viking raids didn't give world supremacy, they invented a meal so terrifying, so cruel, that they could scare people to become one's subordinates. And if I'm not terribly wrong, you will be able to do it as well.

But some people say that they like lutefisk. Do you think they tell the truth?

I do not know. Of all food, lutefisk is the only one that I don't take any stand on. I simply cannot decide whether it is nice or disgusting, if the taste is interesting or commonplace.

The only thing I know is that I like bacon, mustard and lefse. Lutefisk is an example of food that almost doesn't taste like anything, but is so full of emotions that the taste buds get knocked out.

Pinnekjøtt

Pinnekjøtt is originally from Norway's west coast, but is now popular all over. 31 percent of Norwegians say they eat *pinnekjøtt* for their family Christmas dinner. *Pinnekjøtt* is racks of lamb or mutton that cured in brine or with salt. They are then hung to dry. Sometimes the racks are smoked prior to curing (traditionally this was done to better preserve the meat for the drying process). Before cooking, the racks are cut between the bone and soaked in water to rinse out the salt and rehydrate the meat. After soaking the meat is steamed with a small amount of water. A layer of birch twigs are placed in the bottom of the pan. *Pinnekjøtt* literally means “stick meat” in reference to these birch twigs.



Pinnekjøtt, stick meat, photo by Trygve Indrelid.

Ribbe

Ribbe, Norwegian pork ribs, are distinct because of the way the rind is prepared. The rind is scored to make a tiny grid pattern, and rubbed with salt and pepper before the meat is cooked. The ribs are then roasted in a pan with a rack, wrapped in tin foil. The pan is filled with water to help steam and soften the rind. *Ribbe* is served with pork sausage patties, or Christmas sausages, Norwegian *surkål* (kind of sauerkraut), *rødkål* (red cabbage) and boiled potatoes. †



CAMP MADLA

**Training young Norwegian recruits.
Billeting NATO's front-line personnel.**

Article and photos
by Inci Kucukaksoy
JWC PAO

17 November 2011 ---- Just after noon at KNM Harald Hårfagre, more commonly known to us as “Camp Madla”, which lies deep in the historic fjord of Hafrsfjord⁽¹⁾, a chilling breeze washes over the hundreds of Norwegian Navy and Air Force recruits on their graduation ceremony after eight weeks of basic military training here.

THE ceremony was presided over by the Norwegian Chief of the Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Bernt Grimstvedt. He later distributed awards to the recruits who have demonstrated high professional performance, and reviewed the passing-out parade with pride along with COS for the Air Force Training Centre Colonel Laila Kvammen Lie.

These latest graduates, coming from all over Norway, may choose to start out as security guards, some at the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), or based on their skills and wishes, they may advance their career on Norwegian naval ships. They may also translate their military skills to non-military jobs in the civilian sector. The choices are extensive for the young recruits but whatever career path they choose to follow, each one of them has gained unrivaled



**Above: Rear Admiral Grimstvedt.
Below: CDR Skjegstad.**

experience at Camp Madla, which helped them to increase their skills and enhance their potential for personal and professional growth in the near future.

Norway is one of the few countries that maintains a conscription system, the mandatory national military service for young men (and voluntary for young women) of a given age, usually 19, for a specified period of time. The Chief of Madla Camp, Cdr SG Per Skjegstad, who took over this position in September, expresses complete satisfaction with the performance of his recruits.

“At Camp Madla we provide basic training for approximately 1,000 recruits, each time for a period of eight weeks. In total, we have four training events every year. Madla is what the Americans call a ‘boot camp’. After graduating from high schools, young men and women come here next, blissfully



⁽¹⁾ Hafrsfjord was the scene of a battle, presumably fought in the year 872, in which western Norway, for the first time was unified under one monarch.



Arrival of JWC's Training Audience at Camp Madla.

ignorant about the military and the military way of life. They learn that the military is not just about haircuts and firearms. They learn about discipline, endurance and motivation as well as fundamental military values such as loyalty, self-discipline, respect, sacrifice and obedience. They also develop some military muscle through their physical training. They have a great opportunity to examine the essential nature of military tasks where teamwork is a key factor. They are all very motivated and disciplined. I like working with young people and I expect the best from them. I am also happy to see that about 20 percent of our latest graduates were young women. I hope that number will increase in the future."

HOWEVER, THERE IS MORE to Camp Madla's role in Stavanger, which is also home to the Joint Warfare Centre. Used for military purposes since 1871 and named "Camp Madla" in 1934, the camp today offers the most cost-effective accommodation for NATO's operational staffs coming to Stavanger to receive training at the JWC.

"The important thing here is that staffs

who will stay at Camp Madla should know that this is a military camp before they arrive in Stavanger. We are eager to do our best to offer them the best accommodation during their stay here, but they must know that this is not a luxury hotel," Cdr SG Skjegstad says. Yet, Camp Madla offers all the facilities needed for a comfortable stay such as a medical facility that also includes a dentist, as well as a 3D cinema, a big cafeteria and a chapel. Also, needless to say, it offers vast areas of outdoor space for various outdoor sports activities, maybe more for the Training Audiences who arrive in spring and late summer, but there are also indoor sports facilities for November and December teams. "I think it will be very interesting to see the camp filled by the NATO officers coming from all over Europe and the United States in December," Cdr SG Skjegstad adds.

Before his current assignment as Chief of Camp Madla, Cdr SG Skjegstad served at SHAPE HQ as Section Head of Protocol for five years. He knows how NATO plans out every detail before any major event, so he highlights the importance of their inclusion into the JWC's Exercise and Training planning process.

"Our main goal is to provide you with the best service possible at Camp Madla. Our main challenge is when your training events and exercises overlap with our own recruit training. As I said earlier, we train approximately 1,000 recruits each time; so when the JWC runs a training event at the same time, we may have a challenge to accommodate both groups here. We have just concluded our last training this year, so in December we will only accommodate NATO. But we do have a challenge next year in May because you will come before we finish our training. Luckily, the recruit training in May will be the less demanding of next year's four training events. During summer the pressure is harder," Cdr SG Skjegstad says adding:

"Our Programme of Work is very predictable and although there may be changes, I know what will occupy our time until 2015. Early planning and cooperation is essential between us and the JWC: at the end of the day, this is a cooperative effort. We must candidly discuss potential issues early in the exercise planning phase, so that we can make Camp Madla available when needed, as much as we can." †

CITY & COMMUNITY NEWS

Major General Jean Fred Berger paid courtesy visit to the Mayor of Stavanger, Christine Sagen Helgø



Photo by Lt Col Markus Beck



Photo by Francisco Borbalan Santisteban

French Army Major General Jean Fred Berger, Commander Joint Warfare Centre, and his Special Advisor Norwegian Army Brigadier Gunnar E. Gustavsen, on Wednesday 30 November 2011 paid a courtesy visit to Mayor Christine Sagen Helgø at the City Hall. This was Major General Berger's first official visit since Ms Sagen Helgø was formally elected new Mayor of Stavanger at the new City Council's first meeting on 17 October 2011. The goodwill visit aimed at enhancing the strong ties and partnership between the City of Stavanger and the Joint Warfare Centre, NATO's footprint in Stavanger.

Following Major General Berger's visit, Christine Sagen Helgø, visited Joint Warfare Centre's Ulsnes Interim Training Facility on 15 December to meet with the Commander JWC as well as the staff and observe the execution of this year's final International Security Assistance Force Headquarters Training Event (ISAF TE 11-02). "I am very glad I got the opportunity to visit the Joint Warfare Centre at Ulsnes; it has been interesting and useful. The Joint Warfare Centre is a very important part of the international city Stavanger. I look forward to future cooperation," said Mayor Christine Sagen Helgø.



JWC hosts Christmas concert: VIVA, the Sandnes Culture School's Choir, who is also the winner of Grieg International Choir Festival this year, presented one of the most beloved compositions dedicated to the Christmas season, George Frederic Handel's inspiring oratorio "Messiah", at the Joint Warfare Centre's auditorium in Jättå. Photo by Lt Col Markus Beck, DEU A, JWC PAO.

Born in Stavanger



GOD JUL OG GODT NYTT ÅR

Merry Christmas and Happy New Year
Joyeux Noël et Bonne Année