



THE MAGAZINE OF THE JOINT WARFARE CENTRE

THE THREE SWORDS

STAVANGER – NORWAY



Schriever Wargame 2012 International



EXCLUSIVE

Security Challenges of the Future



Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan



Information Operations vs. Targeting



Norwegian Reflections on Arctic Issues



HEADLINE

The Royal Visit

His Majesty King Harald V of Norway gave NATO's Joint Warfare Centre a visit during STEADFAST JOIST 12



Joint Warfare Centre 2014 and Beyond



JWC Public Affairs Office
PO Box 8080, Eikesetveien
4068 Stavanger, Norway
Tel: +(47) 52 87 9130/9131/9132
Internet: www.jwc.nato.int 



Cover _ Design by
Brandon Chhoeun,
Assistant Technician,
Media Simulation Section,
Joint Exercise Division,
Joint Warfare Centre.



CONTENTS

January/July 2012

Listed in order of appearance: Will the New Security Challenges be NATO's Future? • JWC 2014 and Beyond • JWC Observer/Trainers – Helping the Commander's Staff Succeed • TE 12/01 - UE 12-2 • STEADFAST JOIST 12 • JWC Legal Office and its Operations • A Royal Visit – King Harald V of Norway visits JWC • Organisational Culture – Does it Matter? • Schriever Wargame 2012 International • The Arctic – A Norwegian Perspective • The Special Forces in Afghanistan • Information Operations vs. Targeting • JWC's New Live Broadcast Studio



Photo: Fredrik Refvem, Stavanger Aftenblad



The Three Swords

JWC PAO:

CDR (SG) Helene Langeland, RNOR N
Lt Col Markus Beck, DEU A
Inci Kucukaksoy, NATO Civilian
Bente Heill Kleven, NATO Civilian

Editors

Inci Kucukaksoy
Bente Heill Kleven

Layout

Inci Kucukaksoy

The Three Swords is the Joint Warfare Centre's authorized magazine published three times a year by the Public Affairs Office. It presents a compilation of articles, editorials, opinions, news and general information related to the Centre as well as a variety of key defence and security issues. Opinions expressed in this magazine are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the policies and points of view of NATO. The Editor reserves the right to edit or shorten submissions.

Thanks

Brigadier General Steven J.
DePalmer, US AF

Forsvarets Mediesenter

CPO Valerie Guyoton,
FRA N, JFC Lisbon

MSgt Herbert Berger,
DEU A, JWC





Major General Jean Fred Berger French Army Commander, Joint Warfare Centre

THIS NEW EDITION OF THE THREE SWORDS magazine is dedicated to NATO and the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) for 2014 and beyond. The intent is to draw some perspectives on how the JWC shall support the Alliance and the Nations on training and concept development by adapting its deliverables and own processes.

Reflecting on my first year in charge, I see this new Three Swords delivery as an opportunity to come back to what has been achieved, what the strengths of the JWC are and what the vision of its own future is.

First, as the future is always grounded in the past, I would like to remind everyone what the JWC has achieved over the last year.

- Although not directly involved in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP), the JWC did provide three staff officers to reinforce the various headquarters conducting the operation. Moreover and mainly, the JWC contributed to the OUP through the training provided to key staff three months before the operation started. Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard, who commanded the mission in Libya, acknowledged that he and his staff would have lost energy, time and quality in planning had they not been trained by the JWC in Stavanger.

- The JWC has successfully integrated the Afghan transition issues in its deliverables. The exercise conducted in Grafenwoehr last March boosted cooperation and mutual understanding with our U.S. counterparts and partners of the Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center (JCWC, Suffolk, VA). This can be seen as a major achievement that sets the conditions for the post-ISAF training deliveries.

- Finally, the JWC successfully contributed to the ACT and NATO transformational effort to implement the new NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure (NFS).

I want to pay a tribute to JWC personnel for their dedication, availability and professionalism. They can be legitimately proud of what has been achieved. We have no room, however, to sleep on our laurels. A lot is still to be done, and the Programme of Work for 2013, 2014 and beyond with the effective transfer of training to ACT will not lighten the load. I must say I am happy with this, as it shows that we are more than ever relevant to NATO, useful and appreciated by our customers.



The upcoming year will keep us on the stage and under the light. Three main events will sequence our track through 2012-2013:

- The JWC will co-direct, together with the JCWC, the ISAF 12-02 exercise to support ISAF and ISAF Joint Command (IJC) pre-deployment training.

- STEADFAST JUNCTURE, to be held in November in Estonia, will provide the opportunity to implement the new Skolkan scenario and to support JFC Naples' own Joint Task Force HQ concept development.

- STEADFAST JAZZ 13 will combine CPX, CAX and LIVEX in entering its actual building phase, and will for sure challenge both ACO and ACT.

In the longer term, the JWC, while complying with its mission to provide support to ACT, will also continue its efforts in other fields in order to prepare and shape the future. This contributes to its credibility and ability to deliver high quality training and integrate new capacities. The JWC is to support ACT in the transfer of training and in the design and implementation of a new training concept. This will lead us to go back to the basic MC 5-10 and maybe to draw a new delineation of responsibilities between ACT and ACO on the one hand and between the NCS and the NFS on the other.

- The JWC will maintain its contribution to the integration of new capacities through exercises and simulation.

- The JWC is also to feed ACT's effort to develop new concepts such as Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative, which are the framework of NATO's transformation. This is a permanent task for the JWC Strategic Advisory Group (SAG). This group has already identified what could make up the JWC training offer for 2014 and beyond. This continues to develop and will root ACT's training concept to be defined by the end of this year.

Together with JWC personnel, I am determined to and will carry the effort of adapting the JWC's deliverables, organization and processes to the new environment in order to meet the challenges of 2014 and beyond. The forthcoming period will be challenging for the Alliance and our Nations as we will continue to have a more and more dangerous world. The JWC will adapt to match the NATO Level of Ambition now and in the future.



Opposite: The glorious landscape of Norway – Brigadier General DePalmer at the Kjerag Boulder in Stavanger where the rocks drop 1,000 metres on both sides. **Below:** Brigadier General DePalmer with Lieutenant General Stoltz at the special VIP luncheon in honour of His Majesty King Harald V of Norway; the General participating the ISAF pre-deployment training event in Grafenwoehr, Germany; Mrs and Brigadier General DePalmer at a formal reception at JWC; the General playing football with the JWC football team.



A Farewell to JWC and Norway

IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE my family and I depart the JWC and beautiful Norway at the end of July. It seems like only yesterday I was learning the basics about ISAF events, STEADFAST exercises, and NATO's operational planning processes. I want to thank each JWC member for their contributions to our success over the past two years.

Under the leadership of Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte and Major General Jean Fred Berger we increased the already high reputation of the JWC by expanding the robustness of our STEADFAST exercises and ISAF events. We doubled the ISAF training throughout by forging partnerships with the Joint and Coalition Warfare Center in the United States and the Joint Force Training Centre in Poland. We increased the intensity for STEADFAST training audiences by improving our instruction and delivering the new SKOLKAN scenario, complete with cyber, space and missile defence challenges. We continued to define the leading edge of NATO's CAX capabilities, we launched NATO's first large-scale virtual network, and we led the way in new NATO concepts, to include the Comprehensive

Approach, by leveraging a variety of expert organizations. All of this was accomplished while transitioning from 286 billets to 250 and moving into our world-class training facility. As we review our Programme of Work over the past two years each of us can truly be proud of these results.

All of these accomplishments are due to the outstanding talents of our JWC team. Every day I appreciated working with our NATO civilian corps as well as officers and enlisted from 20 different Nations. It was humbling to lead and partner with JWC professionals who know and enjoy their jobs, who believe in their value to NATO, and who speak multiple languages. I have fond memories of finishing our many ISAF and STEADFAST events knowing we overcame huge challenges to help other NATO personnel prepare for their future missions. And I admit to feeling extreme pride for the JWC when senior leaders of Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR told me, face-to-face, how the JWC's training and expertise directly contributed to their success.

I am convinced NATO will continue to play a leading role in Europe, North America, and the entire world. And the JWC, as

NATO's focal point for full-spectrum joint operational level training, will contribute to the success of all future NATO operations. Future changes to the NATO Command Structure and the Chicago Summit initiatives suggest more challenges ahead. However the JWC's ability to deliver high quality exercises secures our reputation and feeds a growing list of NATO and national HQs requesting JWC expertise and assistance.

Finally, I want to acknowledge the outstanding support from our Host Nation. It is here in Norway that our family has soaked in the most glorious landscapes, breathed the freshest air and met the most charitable people on the planet. We have made lifelong friends here in Norway and look forward to returning to the High North and the JWC community again. *Until then best of luck and Godspeed. TUSEN TAKK.*

Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer
U.S. Air Force

**JWC Deputy Commander and
Chief of Staff**
12 August 2010-23 July 2012

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL




CHICAGO SUMMIT, 20-21 MAY 2012

«The future belongs to the agile,
not to the stolid.»

■ EXCLUSIVE

Will the new security challenges be NATO's future?

By Dr Jamie Shea
NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General of the
Emerging Security Challenges Division



■ **BIOGRAPHY:** Dr Jamie Shea is Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges. His former duties include Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, Public Diplomacy Division (2003-2005); Director of Information and Press (2000-2003); Spokesman of NATO and Deputy Director of Information and Press (1993-2000); Deputy Head and Senior Planning Officer, Policy Planning Unit and Multilateral Affairs Section of the Political Directorate (1991-1993). Some of Dr Shea's academic titles include, but not limited to, Professor Collège d'Europe, Bruges; Lecturer, Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent; Associate Professor of International Relations, American University, Washington D.C. He is a regular lecturer and conference speaker on NATO and European security affairs and on public diplomacy and political communication and lobbying. Dr Shea is also the Associate Editor of "Europe's World", a Brussels-based journal on international affairs. Jamie Shea was born on 11 September 1953 in London. (Photo by NATO – Strategic Concept Conference, 7 July 2009, Palais d'Egmont, Brussels.)

DURING THE PAST 25 YEARS, those analysts who have specialized in NATO have had to become experts in far away places that were rarely on NATO's radar screen during the Cold War: Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and the Gulf of Aden. This is because out-of-area operations have been the Alliance's primary, and certainly, most visible activity. Moreover, NATO's post Cold War transformation has been largely driven by the need to prepare for, carry out and then learn the lessons from large scale and very costly overseas deployments. NATO's new Strategic Concept largely reflects this evolution with its emphasis on multinational capabilities, deployable headquarters and command structures, civil-military coordination of effort, and giving global partners more participation in the planning and conduct of operations in exchange for their contribution of forces.

When NATO governments look at the relevance and added value of the Alliance today, they think largely in terms of a "force multiplier" (President Barack Obama) or of a multinational command structure, which can quickly bring together the mixture of multinational and national capabilities to conduct a land, sea or air campaign. Operations have certainly not been easy or uncontroversial for the Alliance. Just think of the criticism of NATO for its delay in intervening in Bosnia, or for not anticipating Milosevic's ethnic cleansing tactics in Kosovo, or for its shifting strategies and uneven burden sharing in Afghanistan. Moreover, operations are different from the Cold War scenarios of the past in that they do not result in total success or total failure, but rather something in between. Even if NATO's interventions have prevented worst case scenarios, as in Kosovo or Libya, they have equally not produced the lasting peace, stability and prosperity that Alliance planners were hoping





for. Yet, at the same time, operations have given NATO a mission and sense of purpose at a time when the prospect of an Article 5 collective defence mobilization in Europe — the traditional mission — has been at an all-time low.

AS THE ALLIANCE APPROACHES 2014, the date for the end of its ISAF operation in Afghanistan, and as it sees its other deployments in Kosovo, Iraq and the Mediterranean also wind down, the question is whether this current NATO business model based largely on military operations under NATO command and political direction will still be viable in the future.

In the past, when one operation came to an end, another was there to take over. Kosovo followed Bosnia, and Afghanistan followed Kosovo. But Libya is different in that an initial Allied air campaign has not been followed by a long-term stabilisation force on the ground. With declining public support for long term nation building commitments and rapidly falling NATO defence budgets, governments are increasingly turning to short term expedients like drones, Special Forces Operations and military assistance programmes to keep threats from

failed or failing states at bay. Consequently, if NATO will no longer be primarily defending its populations abroad in future, it will need to do it increasingly at home, and be more visible in what the U.S. has termed “Homeland Defence”.

This comes too from a recognition that attacks on NATO’s governments and their citizens are more likely these days to come in the form of electronic malware through fibre optic cables, or improvised explosive devices in mass transportation systems, or extreme weather conditions disrupting critical energy grids and infrastructure than in the form of tanks and infantry columns crossing NATO’s borders. Interestingly, last year was the highest recorded for insurance claims in response to natural disasters. According to the Financial Times, these disasters cost the global economy U.S. \$ 570 billion and made companies and government officials across the globe aware of their vulnerabilities to critical supply chains and production facilities often located in regions prone to earthquakes, tsunamis and major flooding.

These “weapons of mass disruption” are not only the most likely threats; they are also the ones that our citizens are most worried about, especially as they see how


easy it is in modern societies for criminals or merely disgruntled individuals to access software programmes free on the internet to steal our credit cards and personal data, or to build rudimentary explosives in their home kitchens. In short, if the vulnerability of the information technologies, energy grids and mass transportation systems on which we all increasingly depend is now the main security threat, NATO has to widen its remit to bring these new challenges under its traditional notion of collective defence and solidarity. Otherwise, there is the danger that when NATO’s ISAF mission ends in 2014, and if no new operation emerges in the near future to take its place, the Alliance will lack a significant transatlantic security project to maintain its recent high profile, and to mobilize the resources and political energy of its Member Nations. Certainly NATO will need to maintain interoperability among its forces and a minimal multinational planning and command structure to be able to generate an operation quickly, if required. But should this be NATO’s only future mission?

WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, it was not surprising that NATO’s





New and old threats to security



With the exception of ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction proliferation, the new challenges are largely civilian.

new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, also gave the new security challenges a central place. Terrorism, cyber attacks, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, energy vulnerabilities and environmental constraints were highlighted in particular. This was not because they cover all the new threats (for instance pandemics or organized crime were not mentioned) but because these are the areas where NATO's essentially military capabilities have some value to add to broader international efforts. In addition, the Strategic Concept also calls on NATO to monitor and analyze the international environment in order to anticipate crises as a first step to better preventing them.

Research by Brown University in the United States estimates that the U.S. has thus

far expended U.S. \$ 3.7 trillions in responding to the 9/11 attacks. Almost half of this sum has gone on the U.S. deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Overall, this expenditure represents no less than 25 percent of the U.S. national debt. Clearly, security is not going to be a "budget neutral" activity for a very long time, if ever again. So prevention and using more political instruments to manage crises, particularly in their early stages, will no longer be simply desirable but essential.

This said, in adopting the new security challenges, NATO was not just adding to its shopping list. It was also presenting itself with a number of cultural, organisational and conceptual challenges. First and foremost, this is because with the exception of ballistic missile and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation, the new challenges are largely civilian. Ninety percent of the internet is privately owned and there are no national jurisdictions or 200 mile territorial limits in cyber space. Equally, governments cannot mobilize computers, or bandwidth to address a crisis in the way they can mobilize tanks or aircraft; nor can they rely on adversaries giving up the fight because of exhaustion, depletion of resources,

geographical boundaries or lack of recruits. None of these traditional constraints apply in the cyber realm where a computer is not a weapon per se, but can have multiple uses for good or bad. So, the new challenges cannot be confronted through the mathematical definition of a set of military forces (such as the old 1:3 ratio in Central Europe during the Cold War) or by the threat of military retaliation. Moreover, these challenges may not engage collective NATO defence and solidarity as easily or as automatically as a Soviet tank thrust through the Fulda Gap. Only one ally may be affected by an energy cut-off, or a cyber or terrorist attack. What is the threshold for activating NATO's Article 5 if a country is paralyzed for days but

Above, clockwise (all photos are by NATO unless mentioned otherwise) – New and old security threats: Robots are used by Allied troops to help defeat IEDs in Afghanistan; a Royal Marine boarding team during OUP; vulnerabilities of the information systems; the alarming reality of homegrown terrorism: 52 people lost their lives in the London bombings of 7 July 2005; vulnerabilities of the energy infrastructure; ISAF: NATO's largest ground and nation-building operation – Spanish and U.S. soldiers prepare to board a CH-47 Chinook helicopter in Afghanistan.





With declining public support for long term nation building commitments and rapidly falling NATO defence budgets, governments are increasingly turning to short term expedients like drones, Special Forces Operations, and military assistance programmes to keep threats from failed or failing states at bay. Photo by ISAF.

Meeting the new security challenges will require NATO to adopt a new business model.

no equipment is permanently damaged and nobody is physically harmed? In this case, would NATO solidarity not apply more to helping that affected country to limit the damage and recover than to going to war on its behalf? Or, alternatively, would solidarity not apply more to trying to prevent these attacks in the first place, or denying the attacker any benefit, than to responding collectively and with massive force after the event?

In sum, meeting the new security challenges will require NATO to adopt a new business model. Rather than rely only on deterrence and defence to ward off threats from actors that will likely be more often than not non-state groups or lone individuals, NATO will have to operate on the principle that attacks by these non-state actors (many of them are anonymous) will inevitably happen. Security policy must therefore be to make them harder to carry out and

less successful — and with a higher degree of ability to attribute the sources of the attack via forensics and freezing of the evidence. So Allies have to develop a real understanding of how cyber space operates (as opposed to the more familiar notions of air, sea and land space): they must step up intelligence cooperation on these threats and identify the critical infrastructure (whether IT pipelines or grids) that need to be protected, given the impossibility of protecting everything. They must also better grasp the nature of hybrid threats. For instance, environmental decay and illegal industrial waste dumping off the coast of Somalia leads to a decline in fish stocks; Somali fishermen then resort to piracy which in turn drives up insurance premiums for international shipping and leads to an expensive deployment of counter-piracy warships; the ransoms for the pirated vessels are taxed by the local extremist organization, *Al Shabab*, which uses the proceeds to buy arms and plan attacks, including hostage taking in neighbouring Kenya; this leads to hostilities between Kenya and Somalia and to a Kenyan incursion into Somali territory, provoking regional tensions. NATO has to not only understand the threats individually, but also analyze how

they impact on each other and to identify the triggers that can turn a local threat into potentially a major international headache.

NATO'S NEW APPROACH must focus on prevention, recovery and overall resilience. Yet this involves a second cultural shift. The NATO of the past was an Alliance that had, generally speaking, an "all or nothing" approach. Either the Alliance owned the issue almost entirely, being by far the principal actor, or it stayed on the sidelines. Think of Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan or Libya. NATO's involvement and contribution were significantly greater than for any other actor, and for large portions of the campaigns. Missile Defence is another area where NATO is totally in the lead in what is exclusively a military programme. Yet the great majority of crises today involve a very broad spectrum of actors and assets (police, intelligence services, emergency rescue agencies, the private sector, citizen's action groups, Interior Ministries and other international organizations). There are currently over 30 different international agreements and codes of conduct in the area of cyber security — and many more in the pipeline. NATO can add valuable capabilities and





Smart Defence: The C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability is a multinational initiative delivering a vital capability to NATO. It allows the ten participating NATO Allies and two Partner Nations to collectively own assets that would be prohibitively expensive to purchase individually. Photo by NATO.

expertise in areas such as cyber, critical infrastructure protection or counter-terrorism detection technology but it cannot play the dominant role. It has to accept to be part of the chorus rather than the leading tenor or soprano. That means defining policies that not only support NATO's own requirements but support the efforts of others and fit into an established international framework of norms and cooperation (for instance making NATO's use of cyber defence or emerging technologies fit in with international humanitarian law or the laws of armed conflicts.) The Alliance also has to decide if it wants to be primarily a technical contributor, focussing on equipment, capabilities and technology, or whether it wants also to be a political actor, helping to define the new rules of the game; for instance confidence-building measures in cyber space or new forms of agreement to combat nuclear or other WMD proliferation. Moreover, if NATO is to develop its niche areas, it will need to interact more with the branches of government that have the main responsibility; for instance, Interior Ministries, cabinet offices, intelligence services, police and Interpol and Europol.

When NATO HQ organized a meeting of the national heads of cyber defence last year, a large number had never been to NATO before. So, NATO will need to be able to reach beyond its traditional stakeholders in the Foreign and Defence Ministries and create a new operational and consultative network. Will the Foreign and Defence Ministries agree to share NATO policymaking with their Interior Ministry



The city of New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. NATO airlifted food and supplies following the disaster. (Photo: FEMA)

or police counterparts? Will the latter see NATO, with its heavily military culture, as a visible interlocutor? Will NATO be able to run successful partnerships with industry in areas such as intelligent software, malware detection, internet identification smart grids or new counter-terrorism technologies so as to steer industry towards NATO's needs? In short, a permanent partnership is required rather than the occasional meeting when it is time to negotiate new contracts. Contractor support will increasingly be embedded in NATO's day-to-day activities and in its contingency planning for a surge of capability to manage crisis situations.

But no less important in these times of financial constraint will be to analyze the new challenges more systematically in order to determine the most rational and cost-effective approach to meeting them. This has to begin with an upgrade of NATO's political consultations and intelligence sharing. In recent times, those consultations have been too narrowly focused on the regions where the Alliance is leading an operation.

Indeed, the public often thinks that security threats only exist in places where NATO has troops (and some people even believe that the threats exist because NATO deployed the troops in the first place). But the end of ISAF in 2014 should reduce the demands on the North Atlantic Council to direct operations and free up time for more scanning of the horizon.


More time needs to be spent analyzing global trends and harmonizing Allied assessments. More time needs to be spent crafting common NATO positions and locking in partners where possible. The recent common NATO-Russia position at the Biological and Toxin Weapons Review conference in Geneva is an excellent example of such a proactive political initiative even between partners that have their differences in other areas.

Winston Churchill famously said, "*Gentlemen, we have run out of money. So now we must think.*" Similarly, NATO will have to track potential threats at a much earlier stage and achieve a more sophisticated



understanding of how hybrid threats are formed from the interconnection of trends such as terrorism, narcotics, or organized crime. Such an analysis in NATO can also help its Member States to identify the most cost-effective response to a given issue, which may not always be a military deployment. For instance, is piracy best solved at sea or on land? Are private guards on oil tankers more useful than warships in the Gulf of Aden? Is training Somali coastguard and customs personnel a better investment than financing pirate tribunals in Kenya or the Seychelles? Can improved maritime surveillance help to compensate for a small number of available ships? It is by having the capacity to do this kind of assessment and cost-benefit analysis that NATO will achieve better results, especially given that it is very difficult to reverse a military deployment once it has been committed.

The cost of military deployments can also outweigh the value of the strategic objective that is being pursued. For instance, in Afghanistan most of the counterinsurgency is carried out by a very small number of Special Forces rather than the bulk of the stabilization forces. Or take another example. Billions of dollars have been spent by the NATO militaries to deal with the few seconds when an improvised explosive device explodes in Afghanistan and with the resulting shockwaves against NATO troops and vehicles. But a different approach, such as the U.S. Operation GLOBAL SHIELD in which the U.S. military works with U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Pakistani Coast Guard to interdict the illicit maritime transport of chemicals, including ammonium nitrate and hydrogen peroxide, only costs hundreds of thousands of dollars and can be much more effective. This is what the military calls “moving to the left of the bang”: identifying the networks of organized crime, technology, middlemen, and terrorists that produce threats; and using the military, police, customs, intelligence services, and scientific laboratories to disrupt these networks at their vulnerable points. In sum, a networked threat requires an equally networked response; and one which can be adapted as quickly as the threat metamorphoses from one element (small arms) to another (terrorist groups).



Ultimately, NATO’s goal is to develop a missile defence capability to protect the Alliance’s European populations, territory and forces.



1: The Arleigh Burke class, guided-missile destroyer USS “The Sullivans” arrives at Marathi NATO Pier facility for a routine port visit. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Chelsy Alamina). **2:** NATO Air HQ Ramstein, the operational headquarters for NATO’s future territorial ballistic missile defence capability, passed a significant technical test on 4-5 April 2012 as it conducted a series of simulated engagements using assets from across the Alliance. Picture shows the Dutch launch crew preparing the Patriot battery for firing. Photo by SHAPE PAO. **3:** NATO Chicago Summit Ballistic Missile Display by Sgt John Small.

THE CREATION OF A NEW DIVISION (Emerging Security Challenges) in the NATO International Staff in August 2010 has given this new area of NATO’s work a distinct focal point. The new Division has been able to bring the rather fragmented strands of NATO’s previous efforts together in a more coherent whole, and then increasingly join those efforts up to the work of other bodies such as the UN, OSCE, EU, and Council of Europe. It has also carried out a review of all its activities to cut down

on duplication of effort and to steer them towards NATO’s key priorities rather than as ends in themselves.

The Partner dimension has also become increasingly important. Last May, NATO Foreign Ministers in Berlin offered the Partners an upgraded relationship based on an expanded toolbox of cooperative activities and more “28+N” consultations with those Partners that have specialist expertise and resources to contribute. Many Partners share a common vulnerability and interest



The new security challenges will increasingly test NATO's posture and readiness, whether it is prepared and willing or not.

in dealing with the new challenges alongside the Allies (perhaps more than in contributing to out-of-area deployments). Consequently, outside interest in working with the Division is high and despite some political obstacles (such as the sharing of sensitive intelligence on cyber threats and methodologies); NATO must build new coalitions with Partners. It is also a way for Europe and North America to push their norms (for instance on a cyber code of conduct or confidence building measures) within the broader international community.

Over the past year NATO has chalked up some successes in expanding its role on the new security challenges. It has agreed a new cyber defence policy and related action plan. These will bring NATO's own networks under centralized, 24/7 cyber management, while allowing the Alliance to provide more immediate and longer-term assistance to its Members in areas such as training, education, systems configuration, intrusion detection and consequence management. Two rapid response teams are being established and the NATO Centre of Excellence on Cyber Defence in Tallinn, Estonia, is conducting exercises, pooling information and expertise and compiling a "Tallinn Manual" on the status of international law in regulating cyber space. Cyber defence is gradually being incorporated into NATO's defence planning and NATO exercises are rehearsing the procedures and decision making cycles for assessing and reacting to cyber attacks. NATO has also conducted an in-depth review of the political and military instruments to combat terrorism that it has employed since 9/11. It is also revising its Defence against Terrorism Programme of Work to look at training and process management as well as at hard core capabilities such as force protection against improvised explosive devices (which kill and maim more NATO soldiers than any other weapon at the moment) and helicopter and aircraft survivability.



The needs of Special Forces, especially in the area of forensics and dedicated airlift, are becoming more important. NATO's approach to energy and environmental security is also becoming more systematic, especially in the area of critical infrastructure protection where we can build on much previous work in the field of Civil Emergency Planning and established best practices exchanges between government and the private sector. At the same time, the Alliance's new strategic analysis capability has helped the NATO Ambassadors to consult on current or potential crisis areas, to improve their situational awareness and to identify how NATO's many tools (partnerships, training programmes, more integrated civilian/military planning, rapid response forces) can be better used for crisis prevention and management — rather than being mobilized only late in the day when the crisis has turned into a full-blown conflict.

So, the record after a year and a half is a respectable one: but it is not yet fully satisfactory. NATO will need to develop the high level political attention and the holistic approach needed to respond effectively to the emerging threats. It must define its Level of Ambition in these various areas, so that the practical work can move ahead without reopening the discussion at every corner. NATO cannot wait for the next energy crisis or Estonian-type cyber attack to get its act together. These challenges are the future of collective defence. Inevitably, over the past years dealing with NATO's operations has taken up the greater part of the Alliance's time, at the expense of discussing other equally pressing challenges, unless,

of course, they dovetail with operational requirements, such as the need to develop technology to counter the terrorist use of improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan. Also some Alliance countries have been sceptical of NATO's legitimate role or added value in dealing with these challenges believing that the response lies primarily with other bodies, such as the UN, the EU or Interpol, even though these bodies are often keen to cooperate with NATO and acknowledge its expertise in key niche areas. Such concerns can only be dispelled if the Allies devote more time to discussing the new challenges and to agreeing coherent NATO policies that allow the NATO military and civilian staff to work more freely and productively in areas where NATO's expertise and added value are proven.

Trotsky famously said: "You may not like war, but war likes you". Similarly the new security challenges will increasingly test NATO's posture and readiness, whether it is prepared and willing or not. These new threats are good at identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities and they adapt and reorganize very quickly. In the future, no defence will work statically for decades on end, as nuclear deterrence and flexible response worked for NATO during the Cold War years. The future belongs to the agile, not to the stolid. So the new emerging threats will force their way onto NATO's agenda. It is better that we be prepared to overcome them before they overcome us. †

Above: A NATO E3A AWACS aircraft; NATO's eyes in the sky. Photo by NATO.

PHOTOS VALERIE GUYOTON



JOINT WARFARE CENTRE
TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT

■ COVER STORY

JWC 2014 and BEYOND

By Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hickey, USA A
Joint Capability Integration Division, Joint Warfare Centre

JOINT WARFARE CENTRE (JWC) 2014+ IS OUR COLLECTIVE EFFORT to adapt what JWC does and how we do it in response to changes in our strategic environment. Major General Jean Fred Berger, Commander JWC, has established that our mission for 2014 and beyond is:

Joint Warfare Centre provides NATO's training focal point for full spectrum joint operational level warfare.

The JWC 2014+ planning effort is intended to optimize our contribution to the Alliance in terms of providing joint operational training and integrating new joint warfare capabilities into that training. It also recognizes that this needs to be done in an environment of constrained human resources and finances. JWC 2014+ began as an attempt to answer the Commander's questions about how the JWC should proceed on a number of specific issues, such as defining our Programme of Work, and reinvigorating efforts to integrate new joint capabilities, like cyber defence, into our exercises. As we did our analysis, we came to the conclusion that the issues were interrelated and the implications of them were so profound that our Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) needed to reassess JWC's strategic direction.

Because this was a question of institutional strategy, we took an interdisciplinary

approach. While we based our planning on traditional military planning processes, we removed or modified some of those steps. In the process, we were able to understand much more about our potential capabilities and capacities. Currently, we are developing a transformation campaign plan to allow the Centre to meet the Commander's vision for JWC 2014+.

Using 2014 as the time horizon was the result of several influences. Most importantly change of mission in Afghanistan will lead a NATO mission set that will be smaller in scale and different in scope than the current Comprehensive Approach. This may reduce our requirement to support the Afghan mission and allow us to rebalance the Centre in response to a variety of changes in the NATO environment. There are several internal and external issues that were important in starting us on the road to 2014+. While change of mission in Afghanistan was the most visible of those, it also is the source of the biggest variable that still exists in our plan because until decisions are made about NATO operations beyond 2014, it is difficult to plan our exercise commitments in any detail. To account for this and retain flexibility, we made reasonable assumptions. We also analyzed our capacity to respond to a variety of scenarios for our yearly work plan. This will allow us to inform strategic decision making at the appropriate time.

The second major factor that indicated a need for change is the Alliance's increased interest in operating within the context of Article 4 or Article 5 during joint warfare exercises. This changes the intensity and complexity of the exercise and requires adaptation of the bulk of our exercise techniques. The current series of exercises, both the Cerasian series used for NRF training and the real-world data driven ISAF mission rehearsal scenario, are set in a context of COIN and Crisis Response. This has led us to develop and perfect an exercise model that provides accuracy and depth through iterative development of scripts.

A shift to an Article 5 scenario will require dynamic play by a thinking enemy that seeks to get inside the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop of the NATO Commander and employ the full arsenal of a modern joint force. We realized early on in our analysis of this change that we would need to change the way we plan and run exercises and the way we structure our EXCON. It will also intensify the focus on joint warfare and on component operations while simultaneously changing the Joint Force's role in the Comprehensive Approach.

The third major factor was that our training audience changed. The reform of the NATO Command Structure and the NATO Force Structure (NCS/NFS) reduced the number of Joint Force Commands but





Former Commander of NATO's Libya Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, Canadian Air Force Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard and Major General Jean Fred Berger, Commander JWC, at the Forward Coordination Element (FCE) Seminar, 1 February 2012, Stavanger, Norway. Read more about FCE on pages 35 through 40. Photo by Lt Col Markus Beck, JWC PAO.

arguably has increased the number of headquarters that need joint warfare proficiency. NATO's Level of Ambition is to be able to simultaneously conduct two Major Joint Operations (MJOs) and six Smaller Joint Operations (SJOs). In theory, this would require the ability to generate eight headquarters or a smaller number of headquarters, which could oversee multiple, simultaneous operations. The training relationship between the JFCs and JWC is largely understood and is evolving along mutually agreed upon lines but the impact of other commands potentially having a joint role is still being determined.

The new requirement for Maritime Command to lead a naval-heavy SJO and Air Command to lead an air-heavy SJO, as well as the potential employment of NATO's NFS Corps headquarters for an SJO, creates a new need for training, and in some ways, it is a deeper need as these headquarters are not naturally joint in their staffing or in their day-to-day operations. It is not yet decided exactly what the exercise rotation to support this new structure is, but the current planning effort will allow us to inform this decision with a realistic estimate of JWC capacity.

The fourth issue driving JWC transformation is our need to get back to our full role as a warfare centre, which means that we contribute not just to joint training, but

also to joint transformation. In order to meet the pressing requirements of supporting the Afghan mission and because of the PE reductions, it has become very difficult to pursue transformational efforts such as integrating new capabilities into exercises, conducting experiments, and making a significant contribution to the NATO Lessons Learned process. With further manpower cuts coming to our JCID, we have been looking for ways to prioritize the use of our remaining resources in order to give NATO the highest payoff within the context of the JWC mission. NATO's progress on cyber defence and missile defence drive the urgency of reestablishing our transformational role.

Fifth, JWC and the government of Norway have been pooling and sharing key resources long before the Smart Defence initiative focused attention on such cooperation. Pooling and sharing requires synchronization of the use of shared resources, such as the lodging facilities at Madla. Dates for the JWC to use Madla to lodge training audiences must be agreed at least 18 months prior to execution to allow the Norwegian Ministry of Defence to integrate our needs into their capacities in an efficient way that does not compromise their own government's needs. This is not always conducive to providing a training headquarters with flexibility in scheduling events. At a time of

reduced defence resources across the Alliance we need to be predictable in what we ask of our host nation. Advance planning and coordination with the Norwegian Ministry of Defence is an important responsibility for us and for the training audience.

What is JWC 2014+?

JWC 2014+ began in January with the conduct of a mission analysis adapted to reflect the needs of an institutional rather than an operational headquarters. The JWC senior leadership dedicated considerable time to working to better understand our strategic environment, to define our own strengths and weaknesses, and to determine what opportunities and challenges we would face in the future. We also supported the Commander in developing his Vision for JWC.

In January 2012 we convened several dozen JWC members and conducted mission analysis. There were three major outcomes of the mission analysis. The first was a definition of the JWC key tasks, and the second was a new mission statement for the JWC in 2014. These allowed us to develop our third major outcome, which was objectives for transforming JWC to achieve our "2014 and Beyond" mission. We updated our tasks for 2014 to reflect how we could support NATO's needs within the means and capability of our likely future human, physical, and financial resources.

The updated tasks are:

- JWC provides operational level joint training in support of ongoing operations;
- JWC conducts and supports collective training of joint and combined staffs of the NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure for MJOs and SJOs, integrating NATO Members' national capacities, regional security organizations' initiatives and Partnership for Peace (PfP);
- JWC provides key leader training capability;
- JWC supports adherence to joint operational warfare doctrine and standards;
- JWC assists the developmental and experimental work of ACT on new concepts, technologies, modeling and simulation;
- JWC performs joint analysis, collects lessons learned and feeds them back



into the transformational network through the JALLC.

Our new tasks required new ways of doing business. In order to move us in the right direction, Major General Berger established an intermediate objective and an objective for 2014 and beyond. Our intermediate objective for 2012 and 2013 is:

Adapt from being largely a training centre to being NATO's joint warfare centre.

Our long term objective for 2014 is:

A powerful joint warfare centre efficiently delivering a training and transformation capability, meeting the NATO Level of Ambition and integrating emerging concepts.

A MAJOR CHANGE Major General Berger wanted to see in our tasks was a reinvigoration of our transformational tasks. As we drew down from a Concept Development Division to a smaller, concept-integration Division, we lost the capacity to drive the development of NATO concepts. This required a redefinition of our tasks from “developing concepts” to integrating mature concepts into our exercises, in order to help drive the evolution of NATO joint warfare. This means we need closer partnership with those elements of ACT and ACO that are actually developing new joint doctrine on everything from Missile Defence to Comprehensive Approach.

A related task was to support the maintenance of NATO's warfare doctrine and standards. This is a shift from our past focus and is important because NATO seems to be moving from a period of intense operational involvement across large areas of the globe, to a period of strategic reset and consolidation. JWC can help preserve the deep pool of operational knowledge that currently exists. Today's officer and senior NCO corps contains a group of leaders with broad and deep knowledge of how to conduct the kind of operations we are involved in Afghanistan, in counter-piracy, and in other operations such as Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP). The pool of leaders with first-hand experience in preparing for and conducting high intensity combat operations is much smaller. As the force structure of NATO militaries shrink and the operational tempo

decreases, JWC can provide a reservoir of knowledge that preserves this costly and valuable experience and transmits it to future generations of leaders.

Key Leader Training is a task that we had given a lot of attention to now that Iraqi Key Leader Training (IKLT) has successfully completed its mission. Having worked myself in NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), I have looked at options for Afghan Key Leader Training from a variety of perspectives. As much as I would like to see a JWC directly working with the Afghan leadership, our capabilities do not match up well with their needs. Our skill set does not align with areas where they would benefit from NATO training. Unlike in Iraq, the development of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) at the Ministry level is not a mission that NATO has agreed to take on.

The Afghans are building a Ground Forces Command, which is more akin to an enhanced Land Component Command rather than a fully joint headquarters. At the tactical level the Afghans have the Capital Division and five Corps Headquarters, as well as parallel structures for their police and border forces. The Corps Headquarters are comparable to the NATO division level and are involved in combat operations throughout the year. Their training needs can better be met by partnership with the Regional Command Headquarters. The one place we have identified where the JWC can make a significant Key Leader Training contribution is by becoming Officer Directing the Exercise (ODE) for PYRAMID and PINNACLE. We are currently considering options for becoming the ODE and looking into the implications.

The JWC's most visible and important task remains the conduct of joint exercises. It is important for decision makers in NATO to understand that JWC was purposely designed as a facilitator, rather than as a provider of joint exercises. The JWC requires a collaborative network of exercise partners. The quality and complexity of the exercise is directly related to early and robust involvement by the training audience headquarters in developing their objectives in the current exercise construct. This may seem counter-intuitive but the expertise on operations in Afghanistan is in Kabul, not in Stavanger, and the JWCs are conducting

The Joint Warfare Centre's most visible and important task remains the conduct of joint exercises.

real-world joint operations every day. They have the best view of the cutting-edge of joint operations and best practices. What they are doing today will not be written into doctrine for a considerable time. Leveraging their expertise through the use of a small number of trusted agents who develop exercise injects and events, in cooperation with JWC exercise designers, provide the greatest training benefit. Additionally, NATO headquarters support each other by providing Subject Matter Experts and EXCON members to make possible the training of their peers.

What can JWC deliver in 2014+?

One of the most important and difficult questions we have addressed in our efforts is what will JWC's capacity to conduct exercises and integrate capabilities be in 2014+? Based on our current analysis and our assumptions about the future, the answer is: three exercises and a key leader training event each year. The JWC will also be able to integrate two to three mature concepts each year into these exercises to maintain our transformational role in NATO as a warfare centre. Obviously, we are looking for ways to do more with what we have but until some change occurs this capacity estimate allows us to inform decision making.

Coming up with a capacity estimate has been complex because the greatest volume of work involved in an exercise is conducted outside of view of the training audience and includes highly technical issues that are often only understood by only a few key personnel who provide a service to the larger exercise community. One key take away of the process is that the PE was not designed to allow the JWC to deliver an exercise, but rather to facilitate the delivery of the exercise by drawing experts from across NATO including from the training audience HQs. While this structure allows JWC to provide an exercise larger than its PE could support, it also creates a bill for other parts of NATO.



«We contribute not just to joint training, but also to joint transformation.»



With this context we developed a series of capacity assumptions that are:

- Nations will support the JWC PoW with manning and funding;
- Sufficient external augmentation is available to support Scripting and Phase 3 Exercise Delivery (EXCON);
- Training requirements for a Command and Control HQs in Afghanistan in 2014 and beyond can be supported by the equivalent of two SJO events/year;
- Current JWC manning levels will remain consistent for the foreseeable future (80-85 percent manning targets);
- Sufficient funding accompanies assigned exercises;
- No substantive changes to the exercise planning process outlined in NATO Bi-SC 75-3; planning cycle for SJO exercises will be defined;
- High demand-low density expertise/Centre of Excellence augmentation is available to support PoW;
- Article 5 scenarios will reduce “cut and paste” ability and require more deliberate planning early in the exercise cycle;
- 50 percent of Phase 3 training occurs at the JWC; 100 percent of MEL/MIL at Scripting Conferences at the JWC.

Based on these assumptions, we built a number of models and used them to test our capacity in each area of JWC. Within Joint Exercise Division (JED) we found that theoretically, with perfectly deconflicted exercise planning and execution events, we could support four exercises a year if we

shifted manpower from Concept Integration to exercise planning. What we could not do was provide the scenario support for four exercises a year within the CAX team's capacity and continue to update scenarios. Since losing the ability to adapt the exercises to changes in NATO's needs makes little sense, we are limited by manning to three exercises a year within the JED.

The Joint Training Division (JTD) is the part of JWC that is most visible to the training audience and is on the road much of the year. They are structured to support one event at a time and also need to have significant preparation time to deliver the level of training the training audience has a right to expect. This limits them to about three exercises a year. The case of our Simulation, Modeling and Computer Division was more complex. Their primary limitation is driven by time required to arrange outside CIS support and the significant reset time needed between events to reconfigure computer networks and the exercise CAX system. This led to the conclusion that again about three exercises a year was their capacity. There is a significant unknown factor in that we are only using the new facility at Jättå for the first time now and need to better understand what it takes to reconfigure it between exercises. Additionally, the NATO agencies that are an essential part of the exercise team are undergoing reform. It is not yet clear what impact this will have on their future contribution to exercises.

Another key component of our capacity analysis was the Support Division. What we found was that because of our dependence on the Norwegian MoD, a key limitation is the need to schedule exercises at least 18 months out to ensure the Norwegian's can

schedule their military training around our exercises. JWC depends on access to the same facilities that Norway uses to house and support their forces. This provides a significant cost savings versus trying to compete with the oil industry for hotel space and contracted services but limits flexibility on the timing of events.

Finally, we determined that if we went much beyond three exercises a year we would have to pull manpower from the JCID to backfill other parts of the HQs. This would have the negative consequence of reducing or even eliminating JCID's ability to bring new capabilities into the exercises in an intelligent and meaningful way. Around the margins of the exercises and the integration mission we still appear to have the capability to conduct key leader training event that is less manpower and CAX intensive than a full exercise if we can very carefully deconflict the yearly schedule of events.

FROM NDMAA REPORT:

«In general, it is understood that JWC and JFTC cannot cover all existing areas that need to be trained within their PE. The training centres need to be looked at as facilitators for the training and will always depend on a number of SMEs from other NATO HQs, COEs or Nations on top of their own expertise.»

Capability Integration in JWC 2014+

Major General Jean Fred Berger was very clear in his planning guidance that it is not sufficient for the JWC to be merely a training centre, but that it has to reinvigorate its transformational role as a warfare centre. This wider utility will enable us to use our





exercises as vehicles that allow operational HQs to implement and build on new NATO capabilities in a sophisticated, controlled and low-risk manner. This is a challenge as ISAF training had subsumed a significant proportion of JCID manpower in exercise planning roles and the JCID itself continues to shrink as part of NATO's move to lower manning levels.

To resolve this dilemma JCID spent several months reviewing its internal processes in order to deliver its outputs in the most systematic and streamlined manner. This included the production of a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the JCID's Capability Integration Process, which provides a clear mechanism for the incorporation of new concepts and capabilities into the JWC's training events and exercises. Coupled with this was the introduction of a process to analyze emerging concepts and capabilities and prioritize them within the JCID's Programme of Work. This objective and integrated approach enables us to differentiate between a wide range of emerging and often high profile capabilities, some of which have not yet reached a level of maturity that justifies their inclusion in our exercises, so that the JWC can provide the operational-level training audience and NATO as a whole with the best return from the investment of our limited resources. In the near term, JCID will focus its capability integration efforts on European territorial Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), cyber defence and supporting the new Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre at SHAPE.

In line with this more structured approach, each capability integration project

or campaign will be supported by a detailed plan that provides a clearly articulated end state, and specifies, prioritizes and sequences the events necessary to achieve this, and maintains a clear audit trail of our activities. The first capability to be dealt with in this way is European territorial BMD, which builds on existing work done for Theatre BMD. This campaign has two main strands of activity, which are being developed in parallel. The first and more obvious is the introduction of BMD-related play to the STEADFAST series of exercises, starting with JUNCTURE 12. This is being achieved with extensive support from experts within the wider BMD community of interest, who are helping to develop the BMD-specific elements of our exercise scenarios and contributing to incident development and scripting workshops.

The second and arguably more important strand of work is the creation and sustainment of an appropriate level of BMD expertise within the JWC. This involves providing specified individuals with BMD training such that they can represent the JWC's interests within the BMD community and can contribute meaningfully to ongoing work in areas such as doctrine and training development. This enhanced level of involvement will bring a wide range of benefits. These include making us less dependent on external assistance, while at the same time making us better able to direct specific requests for assistance in areas such as doctrine, capability and simulation when required. Greater engagement within the BMD community also allows us to maintain accurate situational awareness of the BMD programme, which in turn provides

us with greater confidence that our exercise play is coherent with emerging doctrine and capability, and therefore of greatest value to the training audience. Furthermore, this approach is wholly in keeping with the Commander's intent to raise our profile and credibility as a warfare centre.

Conclusion

JWC 2014+ is an ongoing process and participation is sought from throughout the JWC and from our partners in the joint exercise community. All are invited to contribute to work currently getting underway, which includes:

- Refining the exercise life cycle;
- Cooperating with Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz on the future of exercises;
- Analyzing the sufficiency of exercise infrastructure;
- Developing a written Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for 2014+;
- Developing new ACT concepts to account for the transfer of many training and exercise roles from ACO to ACT.

Working together we will succeed at the mission of providing NATO's training focal point for full spectrum joint operational level warfare and maintain leadership in both training and transforming NATO's joint headquarters. ✦

(Above-from left): CAX operators during SFJT 12; Colonel Carl Giles, Chief Joint Exercise Division, speaking at a SITCEN wrap-up during exercise SFJT 12; JWC Auditorium during SFJT 12; JWC Observer/Trainers' meeting with Colonel Timothy Bishop, Chief Joint Training Division (JTD).

YOUR ROLE MAY APPEAR THANKLESS, BUT IF YOU ARE WILLING TO GIVE IT YOUR ALL, YOU JUST MIGHT BRING SUCCESS TO THOSE WHO OUTLAST YOU.



JWC OBSERVER/TRAINERS

HELPING THE COMMANDER'S STAFF SUCCEED

By Colonel Robert Hatcher, USA A
Chief Training Support Branch, Joint Training Division, Joint Warfare Centre

THE JOINT WARFARE CENTRE (JWC) deploys and employs dozens of military officers around NATO to conduct exercises on behalf of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and Allied Command Operations (ACO). These Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) come from all corners of our respective militaries, and the vast majority of them are assigned to the JWC. But, what is their exact purpose and how do they carry it out? What do they offer you, as the Training Audience (TA)? Perhaps it is best to sort out what JWC intends to do, before

we can explain why their “foot soldiers” are traipsing around Europe and asking for your valuable time and resources.

JWC mission

The JWC is NATO's focal point for the full spectrum of joint operational level warfare. It is the Commander's directed mission to deliver both training and transformational capability according to the NATO Level of Ambition, including emerging requirements. To that end, the command must deliver joint operational training for all types of operations and simultaneously support

NATO's concept development and experimentation efforts. These SMEs aim to deliver quality training so that the HQs will reach their training objectives. Your success is our success. If that is the JWC mission, then it must have a strategy to carry it out and the means to implement that strategy.

I will state the strategy in its simplest terms: JWC will send an SME where you are located. Whether you come to the JWC's state-of-the-art training facility or set up a DJHQ in a deployed location, that is where we need to be. The primary focus of this paper is the means by which we prepare our-



selves to be there and what we offer the TA. So, who are the SMEs?

People are our greatest credential

JWC is similar to any other NATO Force Structure Organization in its Peacetime Establishment. Our officers are assigned to fill a job description written to specify our duties as members of the team. The primary mission of an SME assigned to JWC’s Joint Training Division (JTD) is to deliver and support training at the operational and component command level. The core competencies must be joint planning and execution processes and the provision of training, advice, and mentoring to headquarters, staff teams, and individuals. Additional roles could include exercise scripting, planning, support to concept and doctrine development, and identifying lessons learned from these experiences. Preferable experience before an assignment at JWC includes service in some or all of these duties, and better yet, while deployed in operations!

Obviously, very few officers have all the above, and more often, we find that the basic skills of tactical training, tactical skills, and tactical decision making are more prevalent in someone posted to the JWC than the high-end expectations written in our job descriptions. So, we must develop this corporate knowledge.

SME development

Fortunately, many SMEs posted to the JWC do come with some of these qualifications, including NATO and deployed experiences

“Competency Triad” of a JWC staff officer



that are very valuable to the organization and to the TA taking part in NATO exercises. The JWC therefore makes full use of this experience arriving in JTD, and across the entire command. The command employs a mix of modular training techniques to prepare an SME for an exercise. Individual training is conducted with NATO School Oberammergau (NSO), internally by SME sections, through self study, and through Advanced Distributive Learning (ADL). Collective training is carried out with the Observer/Trainers (O/Ts) assigned against an exercise through lectures and syndicate work on the same topics we emphasize through STEADFAST series exercises, and then rehearsals and final training in the warm-up period prior to an exercise. That series of events is designed to elevate the tactical oriented and experienced officer to a joint and operational level, imbue them with NATO doctrine in their particular subject matter, and give them the O/T skills to mentor and coach the individuals and teams they will be working with and feedback observations to the command for its use. This triad of knowledge forms the JWC SME into someone useful for assisting you.

O/T preparation

The real preparation of an O/T is more detailed than what I have already outlined. The O/T has to be an expert in the complete package of joint and operational processes for planning and decision making, and they have to be a NATO SME in a particular subject matter. But, in addition to bringing this knowledge to you as the TA, they have to be able to make their own analysis of what is

occurring and then communicate in a manner that is helpful. In order to make their final preparations in their assigned role as an O/T, the JWC has a defined set of pre-exercise preparations outlined in our internal exercise SOP and reiterated in a JWC published Training Team Handbook. One of the critical elements for an O/T is a personal contact with the team and individuals they will be working with in an exercise. This contact is made in advance of the exercise cycle and then enhanced through face-to-face contact during the exercise phases.

Training Team composition and organization

SMEs and O/Ts are not just members of JTD. JTD only has the capacity to staff roughly 70 percent of the Training Team (TT) that will participate in the exercise, so, obviously, the O/Ts must come from other places. Internally, we have SMEs assigned to other portions of the command who can use their functional skill such as CBRN, PAO, Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) to name a few, and they are tasked to join the team.

We also have a strategic partnership with the NATO Centres of Excellence (COEs) or other NATO Command Structure organizations and we recruit their help. Because the TTs are a temporary task force of experts assigned for a specific mission, it is not possible for the JWC to maintain the depth and breadth of all possible requirements.

Similar to a DJHQ, we must staff our TTs for the mission at hand. If the exercise became air component heavy, we would employ more air and targeting SMEs, and be able to reduce the size of another less involved component TT. Of course, we have a basic model for our TT and this would be a good time to discuss it.

JTD assigns a Colonel (OF5) as the Chief of the Training Teams. That Colonel is responsible for the preparation and synchronization of all the TTs assigned to the JHQ and subordinate components, most often including Air (ACC), Land (LCC), Maritime (MCC), Special Operations (SOC), Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG), and Psychological Operations Task Force (POTF). Each of those TTs is led by a Colonel or a Lieutenant Colonel (OF4) and provided with functional and processes experts; plus, at least one analyst to assist the TT Chief gather data from all the SMEs for

O/T Pre-Exercise Preparation

- Know the SOPs
- Know the scenario and STARTEX
- Know your team
- Know your TA — individually
- Know your Event Manager
- Know your Grey Cell Support
- Know your IM/CIS plan
- Coordinated travel plans with the team and TA
- Have academic training ready for your TA





«O/Ts have a unique ability to help you see the entire collaborative process from strategic to tactical...»

JWC Observer/Trainers during exercise STEADFAST JOIST 12.

collective observations on the achievement of training objectives.

Additionally, most TTs are assigned a Senior Mentor (SM) through the NATO SM programme. This provides support and mentorship to the TA Command Group from a similarly experienced retired Flag Officer. The SM also advises the TT on its conduct and observations. These retired Flag Officers are a significant enabler to the TT and JWC training program.

Training Team actions

So, what does that mean for NATO’s warriors assigned to NATO Command and Force Structure organizations? It means that O/T and TT Chiefs will make contact in advance of an exercise. They will research your specific Staff Operating Instructions (SOI) or any stand-alone Staff Operating Procedures (SOPs) they may not already be familiar with. During the Phase 1B Academic Phase of the exercise JWC will provide just a few relevant SMEs for your exercise preparation. There will always be a representative

group from JTD and so some face-to-face coordination can begin. During Phase 2B, Crises Response Planning will begin in earnest. The team will deploy to your location and join up with the staff counterparts. Operational Planning is an area that JWC maintains extensive and detailed knowledge and the O/Ts are a significant asset to assist your staff. Many of the observations are more than technical. O/Ts have a unique ability to help you see the entire collaborative process from strategic to tactical and their experience with Operational Planning, several times each year, keeps them fresh on the mechanics of planning and the Lessons Learned from previous exercises. In Phase 1D Battle Staff Training and Phase 3A Force Activation and Deployment, we again send a small team to assist and observe. Finally, in Phase 3B Operations the entire team returns as the command executes its mission from a predetermined start point.


Most headquarters are receptive to these intrusions because the O/Ts are committed to their success and offer assistance

to the TA. An O/T will never test, examine or evaluate your performance. O/T interaction with the TA is generally more targeted and active coaching in the earlier phases of an exercise and evolves to more observation and the recording of a successful completion of training objectives as we move to Phase 3B. A staff team is always well served if they take advantage of the O/Ts at the end of an exercise and they conduct a frank and open internal After Action Review.

Other actors in your headquarters

But who are all those other visitors in your coffee bar and creating longer queues at the dining facility? JWC is not the only entity interested in the success of NATO organizations conducting an exercise. Those COEs that were mentioned earlier also have their own research objectives in order to complete their mandates. There is also an Operations Preparation Directorate (OPD) whose job is to certify units assuming NATO Response Force duty. With so many units on your doorstep looking for information to insert





in a NATO report it could appear threatening to a staff. Frankly, we all want to put our best foot forward when we have a visitor and it is hard to work naturally and be receptive when meeting someone new. This is where the early contact and the blue lanyards come in. JWC wants to ensure they are viewed separately from the other agencies because of the confidence we want to keep with our TA counterparts. We work hard to join the training with you, so we pride ourselves on becoming part of the TA team. So how do they all work in the same vicinity and not unnecessarily duplicate effort or become disruptive to the training?

JWC appoints a Chief Analyst for each exercise, and as the Officer Directing the Exercise (ODE), the Chief Analyst coordinates these external agencies in planning confer-

ences. The relationship between OPD and JWC is significantly distinctive. OPD works with JWC in exercise development to ensure the TA will have opportunities to demonstrate the processes and procedures they must evaluate. During planning and execution OPD may share insights with JWC to ensure that the JWC has the opportunity to address a specific training requirement. As for all contact between JWC and these other external agencies, JWC O/Ts vet all of their professional observations through the Chief of the Training Team and never allow their opinion on personal matters make their way into conversations. JWC observations made to external agencies are focused on the achievement of the training objective and not the detailed discussion of how it was accomplished and what we did in concert with the TA to assist them.

The work never ends

An SME would like to think that he/she could go back to the JWC and put their feet up until the next exercise. Besides the fact that the next exercise is just around the corner, JWC SMEs are in high demand for other employment opportunities in NATO. Because of our vast network and current experience, the SMEs are involved in doctrinal and concept meetings held by SHAPE and ACT, conferences, NSO delivery of training, component level exercise assistance, experimentation, and staff work to provide input to all the above in the development of the myriad of documents governing NATO functional matters. The JWC has maintained an active role in shaping warfare competen-

“An O/T is humble, helpful and is continually learning.”

Brigadier General
Steven J. DePalmer

cies, many of which are contemporary topics that our NATO Nations and Partners would like to know more about. The JWC SMEs will continue to find themselves in high demand, constrained only by time and money considerations.

The training audience is our raison d'être

As a guiding rule, our mission sums up our activities: the JWC will provide NATO the training focal point for full spectrum joint operational level warfare. In order to do so we will continue to develop ourselves for service in exercises and transformational activities to ensure that NATO Command and Force Structure organizations are certified by meeting their training objectives. We will engage ourselves in NATO functional expertise and joint staff processes, with a pin point focus on comprehensive and collaborative planning at the operational level. The JWC will provide feedback to the force through training, exercises, conferences and official publications to ensure NATO remains fit for purpose in addressing 21st Century security challenges. †

- The main role is to assist the TA to meet their exercise Training Objectives.
- The specific roles of an O/T include:
 - ✓ Observation and assessment
 - ✓ Training and coaching
 - ✓ Providing feedback
 - ✓ Acting as a resource to help find solutions
 - ✓ Contributing to the success of the TA
 - ✓ Be available and be a resource



TE



12



01



UE



12

2



***ISAF TRAINING EVENT 12/01
UNIFIED ENDEAVOR 12-2***



By Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Robinson, USA MC
Joint Exercise Division, ISAF Planning Team, Joint Warfare Centre

Photos by Richard Bumgardner, U.S. Army Europe PAO
Lieutenant Colonel Markus Beck, DEU A, JWC PAO
SGT Joseph Patry, FRA A, EUROCORPS PAO



French Army Major General Jean Fred Berger (left), and U.S. Army Major General Frederick Rudesheim, Co-Directors of the Exercise UE 12-2 / TE 12/01, listen to a briefing held at Grafenwoehr Training Area at the U.S. Army Europe's Joint Multinational Training Command in Germany. Photo by Richard Bumgardner.

FROM 18 MARCH TO 05 APRIL 2012, U.S. AND NATO coalition partners participated in Unified Endeavor 12-2 / International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Training Event 12/01 (UE 12-2 / TE 12/01) at Camp Aachen in Grafenwoehr, Germany. The mission for ISAF pre-deployment training during UE 12-2 / TE 12/01 was to train, rehearse, foster team building, and contribute to the preparation of Standing HQs (SHQ), Troop Contributing Nation (TCN) personnel and units that will be assigned/attached to HQ ISAF, HQ ISAF Joint Command (IJC), Regional Command South (RC-S) and several subordinate brigade units.


A total of 1,576 personnel from four training commands (Joint Warfare Centre/JWC, Joint Force Training Centre/JFTC, Joint and Coalition Warfare/JCW, and Mission Command Training Program/MCTP), along with elements from the 505th Command and Control Wing came together to form the Combined Exercise Control Group (CECG). The CECG planned, delivered and managed the execution of the four tiers of ISAF pre-deployment training from the United States, Germany, Poland, and Norway.

For the first time, four training commands were involved in a highly complex,


four-tier, multi-national, and Computer Assisted/Command Post ISAF MRX. Each training command brought its own unique and distinctive flavor to the CECG and training provided. The following illustration on Page 26 reflects the individual and common capabilities and contributions that each command brought to the exercise. For future combined exercises, those common capabilities must be leveraged such that the best practices from all training commands are refined and synchronized to improve overall quality and efficiency.

A total of 1,590 Training Audience (TA) personnel participated in the exercise.

- HQ ISAF TA – HQ Force Command Madrid and TCN personnel;
- HQ IJC TA – HQs EUROCORPS, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Spain, V (U.S.) Corps, and TCN personnel;
- Regional Command South (RC-S) TA – 3rd Infantry Division;
- RC-S Subordinate Unit TA – 3rd Sustainment Brigade, 30th Medical Command, 89th Military Police Brigade, and 411th Engineer Brigade.



Exercise Control Framework



The major advantages gained by collocating and training HQ ISAF and HQ IJC TA together during UE 12-2 / TE 12/01 were team/relationship building, staff synergy while solving realistic and complex problems, and situational understanding of the dynamic and multifaceted ISAF environment.

The illustration below shows all various Training Audiences and Response Cells present during the MRX. The typical JWC ISAF TE Phase 2 Training Model (Crawl, Walk, Run), integrating both JWC and MCTP exercise constructs, were utilized for the exercise. Training commands and Subject Matter Experts all had various roles and responsibilities throughout Phase 2 (see right portion of the top illustration on Page 28).


Beginning with the JWC ISAF TE

model and then integrating both JWC and MCTP exercise constructs, the TA schedule, depicted also on Page 28, was developed.

THE EXERCISE'S OPERATIONAL environment and scenario storylines were developed for conditions projected for autumn 2012. NATO and U.S. training objectives from HQ ISAF down to the brigade level were synchronized to create four distinctive, but mutually supported battle rhythms.

Common training themes and storylines across all four tiers of TA HQs were created where possible. Transition was the overarching theme for the exercise, along with several sub-themes such as force draw down, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) development, ANSF in the lead, and enduring relationships post 2014. The example on Page 29 illustrates how the primary training theme of Transition and its associated storylines of ground logistics lines of communication, security, detainees, and re-integration ran through all echelons of command.

Training Audience Structure





1



2




3



4

1: The JWC Exercise Control Organization with Major General Jean Fred Berger. 2: The CECG planned, facilitated, delivered and managed execution of the exercise. 3: Lt Col Zirkelbach, JWC Info Ops Subject Matter Expert, during a briefing. 4: Major General Berger during an interview with the editors of The Marshall Center's "per Concordiam" magazine.

Training Module



The major advantages gained by collocating and training HQ ISAF and HQ IJC TA together during UE 12-2 / TE 12/01 were team/relationship building, staff synergy while solving realistic and complex problems, and situational understanding of the dynamic and multifaceted ISAF environment.

Bringing three separate training entities together in such an ambitious manner proved challenging, but through the challenges many learning points have been noted for possible future combined MRX endeavors. Based on the trusting relationships and mutual understanding of how each training organization (JWC, JCW, and MCTP) operates, we will be able to consoli-


WATCH EXERCISE MOVIE ON JWC's YOUTUBE SITE!




youtube.com/jointwarfarecentre

date and capitalize key aspects of the MRX training programme, and reduce the overall length of future UE/TE exercises. The areas that require further refinement and enhancement by the training commands are the development of a truly CECG and operational environment scenario/content, the combined assessment of injects within the Joint Exercise Management Module, combined use of Subject Matter Experts and Observer/Trainers, function of the Facilitated After Action Review, use of the replicated HQ ISAF and HQ IJC portals and associated HQ Electronic Working Practices, and the necessity of Battle Staff Training as a key enabler to transition from Phase 2a to 2b.

Training Audience Schedule



Exercise Design



The overall cost for NATO to support all the planning activities and MRX was higher than a normal ISAF TE held in Stavanger, Norway. This is especially true in the computer information systems, travel, and national per diem funding lines. However, in light of shrinking national and military budgets combined with global threats tied to common interests, the importance of NATO's Alliance in ISAF should not be discounted. Additionally, sharing training opportunities to capitalize on the strengths and best practices of all training commands

to increase the overall quality of ISAF pre-deployment training should not be overlooked. In this manner, economy of force is optimized in an austere budgetary climate while providing the best possible training environment to achieve training objectives.

The question, "Should we train together?" (NATO and U.S.) will always be answered with a "Yes." The five factors that will shape JWC's future involvement in combined UE / TE are as follows:

- I. NATO and national funding;
- II. Determine the will of training com-

The question, "Should we train together?" (NATO and U.S.) will always be answered with a "Yes."

- III. Determine if future combined training activities are suitable, feasible, and supportable;
- IV. Level of Ambition and support from ISAF HQs;
- V. Identifying Lessons Learned from UE 12-2 / TE 12/01 and applying corrective measures to improve future training.



JWC ISAF Planning Team

ULTIMATELY, THE DECISIONS TAKEN by NATO Heads of State and Governments during the Chicago Summit will shape the strategic direction for Alliance members and TCNs in Afghanistan. Overall, the sheer magnitude of combining three different training command training mythologies and seven different training audience HQs for UE 12-2 / TE 12/01 proved challenging. The overarching ISAF pre-deployment training mission to train, rehearse, foster team building, and contribute to the preparation of collective and individual training was satisfied. †



INTERVIEW Colonel John C. Valledor Exercise Controller, MCTP

By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

«It is all about saving lives...»

Can you tell us about your current mission and role in this exercise?

I am the Chief of Contemporary Operating Environment in the Operations Group of the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP). Here, our team trains U.S. Army commanders and staffs at the brigade level and above. I am responsible for exercise design, planning, and in partnership with the NATO and the Joint Staff – exercise control. In this exercise, I partner with two other exercise controllers: one from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and one from NATO's Joint Warfare Centre. Together, we leverage the skills and capacities of all our organizations to match the tempo of the Main Event/Main Incidents List that is going into this exercise. In a nutshell, we do three things at the Combined Exercise Control Group (CECG): we coordinate, we anticipate and we verify exercise activities amongst exercise stake holders. Our function is to coordinate the activities of disparate organizations that are part of this exercise. We make sure that the training scenario, which has been designed over the course of the nine months, is injected into the CAX simulation to achieve the Commander's training objectives. Lastly, we help the decision-makers to increase or change the tempo of the exercise based on guidance from our interactions with the training audience as well as with the Senior Mentors.

What makes this exercise unique?

I guess if you put one word to describe this exercise it would be holism, in that for the first time we are looking at the entire framework of the commands operating in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan. We are training soldiers and leaders from the tactical level through the intermediate level; the operational level; the ISAF Joint Command (IJC); all the way to the strategic level, where we have ISAF. So, again, unlike previ-

ous exercises, this exercise being a four-tier exercise has to harmonize the activities of all these entities in one cohesive event. In this fast-changing security environment, innovation has materialized by leveraging the skills, expertise and perspectives of the multiple players. Being a four-tiered exercise, we had to expand our knowledge base, look into how our partners perform complimentary functions, and then leverage best working practices. So one of the things we found interesting is how we might be able to thread the needle together with a core task list that affects the four commands at the same time. That is where we are seeing an innovation. The script writers and the event managers all leveraging each other's skills to ensure that a particular inject, which may start at the highest level of command, threads its way all the way through to the tactical level commanders in a seamless fashion. What we found out here is that if we remain open-minded, then we learn, and that leads us to become a true learning organization. It is refreshing to see other ideas, perspectives and views and then blend those ideas and perspectives into one cohesive approach. We have to look beyond our cultural differences and we have to guard against ethnocentrism and cultural biases that tend to become obstacles to any cooperation. I think about the fact that this is all about the maintenance of the Alliance. Someday the mission in Afghanistan will end, and what we do not know is what unforeseen crises are laying over the horizon. I like to leverage the effective partnership that exists in this exercise so that, when those unknown contingencies materialize, we can still support and strengthen each other.

What is the importance of media training?

What we learned over a decade of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan is that you have to ap-



preciate media as an actor in the battlefield. If you are not taking advantage of the training opportunities of an exercise like this to be adept in managing competing narratives, then you cannot really do your job to inform the public and the decision-makers back in our nation states about what it is that we are doing here and why it matters.

What is your message to the soon-deploying staff?

You have to listen carefully to the team mates that are currently operating in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan. Take heed and value from their experience. Once you get into the theatre, you have to gain situational understanding rather quickly. You have to master the electronic information environment. Do not forget that military service is about leadership. And if you find yourself as a member of a staff, you are still a leader. And lastly, at the end of the day, this is all about saving lives: whether it is the life of a soldier on patrol or the lives of innocent Afghans who find themselves in the middle of this conflict, it is all about saving lives. So, if you can take heed, step back, and reflect on these points, then I think you will do OK. †

CONNECTED FORCES through COLLECTIVE TRAINING

By Colonel Clayton Goya, US AF,
Joint Capability Integration Division, Joint Warfare Centre
Published first in ACT's Transformer Magazine

THE ABILITY TO MEET FUTURE CHALLENGES in an unpredictable global environment can be achieved with the skilled coordination of long-term initiatives and strengthening of a collective training framework. NATO's Level of Ambition (LOA) is to cope with two Major Joint Operations (MJO) and six Smaller Joint Operations (SJO) concurrently outside the area of responsibility. This is on paper. To make it become reality, the Joint Warfare Centre is in a unique position to observe Joint Force Command (JFC) and Component Command headquarters capacities and capabilities. It is one of the objectives of the STEADFAST series exercises and we observed that the most successful HQs have been the ones that could quickly integrate staff augmentees into their organisation.

Success may teach a lot

Despite NATO's recent success in Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP), where staff augmentees comprised a significant percentage of the HQ staffs, it appears that there is still a gap between the observed capabilities of our component-level HQs in the current NATO Command Structure and those estimated necessary to fully support the ambition quoted above.

OUP provides a good basis for illustration. The air component responsible for the campaign, manned with personnel drawn from a large standing staff and heavily augmented, was challenged to conduct 24/7 operations and execute approximately 120 sorties a day – which is about a third of the maximum production of a SJO (defined as 350 sorties per day).

As another example, in the most recent STEADFAST JUNCTURE 2011 exercise, the NFS air component was supplemented by augmentees outnumbering the core staff to support a sortie generation rate less than half that of OUP. This manning level is rep-

resentative of the majority of NFS air components who may become responsible to execute NATO's MJO LOA of 1,000 sorties a day. This implies an expected level of required augmentation of fully trained personnel that would dwarf the standing staff it was intended to complement.

In addition, the current fiscal environment creates definite challenges for NATO to maintain the expertise and infrastructure to ensure the Joint Force and component HQs receive the proper level of collective training and exercises.

Improve realism of training

For NATO to be more credible and effective, robust collective training and exercises challenging the Joint Force and Component HQs are required. This training must stress both the internal and external HQ interactions expected during both Article 5 and non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. Therefore, NATO must build a collective training framework dedicated to warfare integration as the foundation to accomplish its robust LOA.

To achieve this vision of robust collective training and exercises, NATO must improve its capabilities to match its LOA. A single organisation at the Joint Force level as well as warfare-specific organisations (land, air and maritime) at the component-level will be tasked to work cooperatively to achieve vertical and horizontal integration at the component level and above.


Currently, the Joint Warfare Centre executes the collective training and exercise requirements at the Joint Force level. However NATO should consider building domain-specific warfare or integration centres, either internal to, or partnered with, NCS Component Commands to ensure



proper training and integration in NATO's collective training arena.

Given a Peacetime Establishment that limits the ability for Components of the NCS to internally form an embryonic warfare centre to execute their collective training, exercise and warfare integration is difficult. An alternative is for a Nation to specialise in a domain-specific (land, air or maritime) warfare centre by converting an existing national centre and partnering with a specific component. Other Nations, as well as the NATO-accredited Centres of Excellence (COEs), could then cooperate with the lead Nation to provide expertise and benefit from these domain-specific capabilities. These ideas are definitely long-term initiatives requiring further refinement. However, by strengthening its collective training framework NATO can match its robust LOA to meet the future challenges of an unpredictable global environment. †

For NATO to be more credible and effective, robust collective training and exercises challenging the Joint Force and Component HQs are required.



EDITOR'S NOTE: After this article was written NATO changed the Deployed Joint Headquarters (DJHQ) concept to be called the Joint Task Force (JTF) concept.



JFC Lisbon, DJHQ Concept and Exercise STEADFAST JOIST 12

By Major Mesut Yurtdan, TUR A,
JFC Lisbon Deputy Chief PAO

«If NATO did not exist, it would have to be invented, because countries with shared values and a shared history of close cooperation can best address [these] problems together.»¹

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General

AS A RESULT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENTS in communications and technology, we are living in a very dynamic and changing environment. In line with this continuous change and global economic challenges, the definitions of both “threat” and “security” began to be rewritten. Nations and organizations try to appreciate the new security environment and transform related processes and institutions accordingly. All the way back since its foundation, NATO has been aware of the necessity to evolve, viewing transformation as a continuous process in order to stay relevant in an ever-changing world.

The latest milestone for transformation of NATO is the new Strategic Concept declared at the Lisbon Summit in 2010. While maintaining commitment to collective defence, NATO’s response to the new security environment is twofold.

First, “broadening NATO’s thinking on crisis management” will include NATO involvement at all stages of a crisis. Second, introducing cooperative security as a new core task will not only “bring a proactive stand towards achieving increased international harmony and cooperation and synchronizing efforts to deal with the new multidimensional threats” but also provide a better understanding of common problems. In addition to broadening the core tasks, the new Strategic Concept highlighted the need for a more effective, leaner and affordable Alliance Command Structure as a must, given the reality of economic challenges.

The new flavours of the new Strategic Concept require a change of mindset, especially at the military level. Answering new threats while cooperating with other actors in a more comprehensive way will require flexible and deployable military functions and constructs from head to toe. The constructs

designed to meet previous requirements need to be revised, not to say re-configured.

Real life experiences, like Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP), proved that the new Strategic Concept should reflect in the military as soon as possible. If the new strategic concept was not ready, “it would have to be invented” under the pressure of the ever-evolving and intertwining characteristics of the crisis.

The main action undertaken at NATO’s military level under the Strategic Concept is the Allied Command Operations (ACO) Reform Process. With the ACO Reform Process, which will end up with only two operational level deployable Joint Headquarters, the Alliance is looking to use the

(1) “A New NATO for a New World”, Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, November 2010, <http://huffingtonpost.com>. Above: Operation Unified Protector, Canadian Air Force.



entire spectrum of its capabilities to create an effective, leaner and affordable Command Structure. The need for a new model for deployment detailing how to respond to a crisis came to light during the planning for the aftermath of the ACO Reform Process. In practical, the closure of the Force Commands Madrid and Heidelberg is tantamount to crippling the Deployed Joint Staff Element (DJSE) Concept. The DJSE concept can be used only with the ready-to-deploy staff resourced from out of the operational level headquarters. After the closure of the Force Commands, their functions must be passed on to operational level headquarters.

Keeping this in mind, with a leaner and affordable Command Structure, it is clear that NATO's involvement in a crisis will require flexibility, adaptability, effectiveness, readiness and responsiveness. This should be the key driver of the new deployability model. To fill this conceptual gap, JFC Lisbon was tasked to work on a deployability model, namely the Deployed Joint Headquarters (DJHQ) model, to be used in the new command structure, and utilize the already planned STEADFAST JOIST 2012 (SFTT12) as a test bed to gauge some of the elements of this model.

DJHQ Concept

Since each crisis may differ, flexibility and adaptability will be key in understanding the security environment and generating a proper, balanced response at the necessary time, avoiding undesired developments. This will only be possible with a Command and Control structure standing ready-to deploy and respond together with the tactical level elements. From an operational perspective, an early understanding of the operational environment and building situational awareness are required to make preparations relevant. An early visible NATO footprint will provide an opportunity to demonstrate NATO resolve and commitment. Early influence in-theatre irrespective of the location of the main command and control functions and the operational level commander, will make it possible to shape the environment and set conditions.

The ability to react promptly and effectively to a potential crisis, demonstrate a visible NATO presence and exert early influence will provide the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee and SA-

CEUR with more options in pursuit of early success. The DJHQ model is, therefore, designed to be responsive and is built upon realistic and achievable readiness criteria to ensure sustainability while taking account of possible national constraints.

The DJHQ concept is based upon a stepped and scalable model that provides options for progressive deployment of capability "blocks", each of which combines the qualities of operational functions that can be tailored to the mission and situation. Each capability block of the DJHQ will require a pool of trained personnel from which to draw the operational functions required by the mission and situation. The capability blocks will provide different functions to address evolving needs. These functions will vary from creating the first operational footprint in-theatre or creating situational awareness to providing the full suite of capabilities required to support the Commander's Decision Cycle, thus allowing the designated Commander to exercise command and control from in-theatre.

Forming a seamless, functional headquarters despite distributed and changing locations will be possible only with a robust Command and Control interface. The flexibility of the DJHQ lies in the adaptability of the employed reach-back and reach-forward capabilities at each stage of the DJHQ deployment depending on the nature and scale of the operations. As the Commander's Decision Cycle is projected into theatre, the robustness of the interaction systematically increases, growing from an initial footprint to full Command and Control capability in theatre. The DJHQ concept places several challenges on Joint Force Headquarters that will implement a deployable model resourced from within their own staff. The Commander's Decision Cycle and how it is executed were reviewed and updated in order to accommodate the new challenges.

The JFC Lisbon concept development team reviewed not only the NATO documents on the Commander's Decision Cycle, but also the exercise reports and Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) reports from the STEADFAST series of exercises. Several changes were made to the Commander's Decision Cycle in order to ensure: (1) Integration of Strategic Communications, making sure that actions will be aligned with messages; (2) An adequate

balance of kinetic and non-kinetic actions; (3) Efficient performance by the entire HQ staff as a team, regardless of location.

New Deployability Concept requires change of mindset

The new deployability concept contains many challenges. First of all, a change of mindset within NATO and its Member Nations is required regarding training and personnel's perspectives. The requirement for Joint Force Headquarters personnel to be prepared and held at various states of readiness, available to form each mission-tailored capability block, lies at the heart of the DJHQ concept. Without this change of mindset, the new deployability model will be difficult to apply. Training will enable personnel to be ready to deploy. But, on the other hand, nations should be aware of the requirements of the deployability, that is, national caveats should not preclude the applicability of the model.

Second, as compared to the limited and predefined stages of deployment in the DJSE concept, the new deployability model brings in several options of deployment, making gradual deployment possible. On the other hand, gradual deployment brings additional challenges together with the flexibility provided to the operational level commander. The configuration of the processes and the decision cycle during the gradual deployment phases will require efficiency, fine adjustment and featured Communication and Information Systems (CIS) infrastructure starting from the very early stages, even before the Deployment Order. The equipment required to support such a deployability scheme needs to be scalable and easily reconfigurable.

In addition to these, a robust and resilient Information Management framework will underpin the success of the operation. Starting from the planning phase, Information Management will play an important role. During deployment, the information environment needs to be uniform and without fragmentation to enable shared knowledge.

In addition to the in-service certification mechanisms, another important point is timely evaluation mechanisms to allow for the provision of up-to-date readiness levels with respect to different specialties, which may be necessary to enable realistic political decisions and military end states.

And last but not least, real life support





"Since each crisis may differ, flexibility and adaptability will be key in understanding the security environment and generating a proper, balanced response at the necessary time..."

for deployed forces from early stages onwards takes careful planning. Depending on the level of host nation support, real life support may require a case-by-case precise assessment during the planning phase.

It is worth to note that early involvement of all JFCs under SHAPE's leadership clarifies concerns about the main challenge: Implementation. With all the arguments given, concept implementation will be no easier than concept development and testing. Since the DJHQ concept takes into account Lessons Learned taken from real life operations and based on a realistic approach, it will provide the operational level Commanders with the mechanisms they need to be ready for real challenges.

Preparing for SFJT12

Preparing SFJT12 was a challenging task as it happened in a period of upcoming changes to the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and effects of real-life operations. The Initial Exercise Planning process for SFJT12 started early 2011. According to the initial plan, SFJT12 was at that point of time still scheduled as an exercise based on the DJSE concept, with JFC Lisbon providing the main HQ and Force Command Heidelberg providing the main body of the Forward Element (FE). However, the execution of SFJT 11, some months later, showed that the availability of a Forward Element was not a given fact. As the outline of a new NCS started to become clear, the aim of the exercise started to focus on the DJHQ; not as a concept, though, but based on the ad hoc solution, already introduced for SFJT11, given the unavailability of the Force Com-

The Forward Coordination Element (FCE) Seminar from 1 to 3 February 2012, brought together in Stavanger NATO's top echelon military officers and a distinguished team of military/civilian Subject Matter Experts. The idea was to provide a venue that allowed for high-level discussions on the roles and responsibilities of the FCE, as the deployed element of the Joint Force Commander. The function of FCE was tested for the first time during exercise SFJT 12.

mands due to OUP. From the very outset, JFC Lisbon was aware of the challenges. Its agility and flexibility characteristics, which were observed during SFJT 11 upon the withdrawal of major partners due to the Libya crisis were in place due to the very limited time allowed for the preparations.

In June 2011 the Exercise Planning Process started to move forward with the DJHQ, as the main aim of the exercise. However, for most of the involved parties, SFJT12 became a challenge due to their involvement in OUP or their future role in the new NCS. Having only JFC Lisbon and 1 GE-NL Corps to form a training audience produced quite a lot of uncertainties.

In summer 2011, JFC Lisbon received additional SHAPE tasking that initiated the development of the DJHQ concept. At the SACEUR Commanders' Conference in summer 2010, it was agreed to use SFJT12 as a partial test bed focusing on the initial deployment stages as outlined in the new deployability concept. Both the DJHQ concept development and SFJT12 exercise preparations were then linked, with SFJT12 being an initial test bed, all fully supported by SACEUR. It was guaranteed that support

would be provided not only by the JWC, and JFCs Brunssum and Naples, but also the by the Component Commands.

In a very short period from September to December 2011, the DJHQ concept was further developed with the help of exercise and training events (Planning Conferences, Academics, etc.). The development of the Concept together with preparations for the exercise ended up with a very dynamic period. As JFCs Brunssum and Naples will be the two remaining JFCs in the new NCS, embedding them into the exercise became necessary. This challenge was overcome with the substantial augmentation provided for the exercise. Planning conferences and finally the Battle Staff Training (BST) in Lisbon enabled a successful integration.

The Planning Conferences of SFJT12 were all fruitful, not only for the SFJT12 exercise itself but also for the development and maturation of the DJHQ model.

First, the idea of having the Forward Coordination Element (FCE) was developed during the Planning Conferences of SFJT12. The FCE seminar, organized by the JWC, resulted in a better understanding of this concept and contributed to further de-



The JFC Lisbon team is proud of the contributions to the future NATO JFCs and their missions. The cooperation with other NATO Headquarters, including SHAPE and JFCs Naples and Brunssum, made it possible to achieve a realistic and relevant model for future deployability needs.

velopment of the SFJT12 training events. Since the FCE was one of the elements tested during SFJT12, the observations and Lessons Learned from the FCE Trainings enlightened the future developments of this element. Second, starting from the Initial Planning Conference, the Intelligence Syndicate was working on the planning of the knowledge development processes for SFJT12. They identified the need for a common interface to enable users to share, search and request information or knowledge after realizing that having more than one database for different functions or areas causes the “knowledge users” to replicate information from one system to the next. The efforts of JFC Lisbon Knowledge Centre personnel supported by all staff resulted in the Shared Knowledge Repository (SKR). SKR is web-based software, still under development, which provides an easy and simple passage to knowledge by consolidating the main functions related to knowledge development. SKR shows the light to be the first step of the comprehensive knowledge development effort to be undertaken together with the other stake holders in theatre.

Testing the elements of the Concept: SFJT12

Crisis Response Planning (CRP) was conducted with the support of SHAPE (Mons, Belgium), Joint Warfare Centre (Stavanger, Norway), JFCs Naples (Italy) and Brunssum (Netherlands), ACC Izmir (Turkey), 1 GENL Corps Münster (Germany), MC Northwood (UK), FC Heidelberg (Germany), Multinational CIMIC Group (Motta di Liv-

enza, Italy) and civilian contractors. From the civilian perspective, both Mr Victor Angelo and Mr Paul LaRose-Edwards, who brought in the expertise of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations, were happy to witness the progress at hand, in cooperation with civilians and understanding of the civilian aspects, which enabled comprehensive products.

SFJT12 introduced Gender Advisor support for CRP. This support raised the level of awareness of gender issues, thus contributing to cultural awareness, as well. During the CRP, close cooperation between the Strategic Operation Planning Group (SOPG) at SHAPE and the Joint Operation Planning Group (JOPG) at JFC Lisbon improved the quality of the products. In addition, prior to deployment, the Joint Operation Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (JOLRT) joined the JOPG and maintained the level of cooperation after deployment so as to enable efficient and to-the-point engagements, with the JOLRT providing effective contribution to the planning process.

Guaranteeing the continuity of efforts since the beginning of CRP, the FCE will merge with the JOLRT in theatre. The JOLRT Team Leader will become the Deputy of the FCE Commander, and an adequate number of JOLRT members will continue to work within the FCE to help maintain the level of awareness together with contacts and enable a smooth transition from the JOLRT to the FCE. The BST was a great opportunity for the first trial of JFC Lisbon’s proposal “How to do business” in the DJHQ mode. With more than a hundred augmentees, the BST served as an excellent platform to identify lessons and build up the team for the execu-

tion. The level of attendance and willingness of the augmentees supported the positive expectations concerning the future of the DJHQ Concept after the SFJT12 exercise.

After the high-level seminar mentioned above, FCE training conducted prior to execution in JFC Lisbon provided a technical training opportunity to properly analyze and refine the structure before testing and interaction with the DJHQ structure during the execution phase. NATO used the NATO Response Force (NRF) certification mechanism to test the new deployability concept. STEADFAST JOIST 2012 provided one of the platforms to test some elements of this new concept. Because of the aim of testing, some elements of the DJHQ concept, observations and identification of lessons throughout the exercise are critical to the future work on the concept. So, SFJT12 participants concentrated at the same time on Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned processes. This effort will be managed by a group of specialists from JFC Lisbon, JALLC and OPD.

JFC LISBON, which will find a place in the historical records of NATO in accordance with the ACO Reform Process, consolidated its expertise and experience on new threats and comprehensive solutions, and contributed to the development and testing of the DJHQ concept. The JFC Lisbon team is proud of the contributions to the future NATO JFCs and their missions. The cooperation with other NATO Headquarters, including SHAPE and JFCs Naples and Brunssum, made it possible to achieve a realistic and relevant model for future deployability needs. †



The Grey Cell during during exercise STEADFAST JOIST 12, whose members also took part in the FCE Seminar.

STEADFASTJOIST 12

JOINT WARFARE CENTRE, STAVANGER, NORWAY

PHOTOS VALERIE GUYOTON







Exercise **STEADFAST JOIST 12**

By Wing Commander Mark Attrill,
Royal Air Force
SFJT 12 Lead Planner
Joint Warfare Centre

With over 800 personnel spread across the Training Audience and EXCON, coming from at least 12 different NATO organisations, the new training facility was put to the test and delivered, providing an effective and efficient venue to successfully assess and analyse the NATO Command Structure."

THE REQUIREMENT FOR A NEW NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE (NCS), to better reflect the ongoing changes and challenges to the World's security and military landscape, was ratified during the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon. In a somewhat cruel and ironic twist, the new structure confirmed the reduction of NATO's operational Joint Force Headquarters capabilities from three to two with the announcement that Joint Force Command Lisbon would be closed by 2013. Shortly after this news, it was announced the next NATO Response Force Exercise, STEADFAST JOIST 12 (SFJT 12), would be used primarily as a conceptual exercise to develop, assess and analyse key elements of the new NCS and in particular the deployable Command and Control capability.

To their immense credit and notwithstanding the future of their own Headquarters, Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz, Commander Joint Force Command Lisbon (JFC Lisbon), supported by his Staff, agreed to be the "lead" agency for the concept development and undertake the role of Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE). As always, the Commander Joint Warfare Centre was cast in the role of Officer Directing the Exer-

cise (ODE) with responsibility for designing the exercise and providing a suitable vehicle to support the concept development, on behalf of both the Allied Commands and the Joint Force Commands, who would ultimately inherit the concept.

This placed the JWC in a unique position to be at the core of early discussions regarding the development work of the new concept. At the same time, the freedom of movement, in exercise design terms, allowed the JWC to examine the empirical and anecdotal evidence gathered on previous NRF exercises with a view to influencing and assisting with the new NCS development work. We were further helped by the fact that neither the nominated Joint Force Command nor any of the supporting Component Commands required NRF certification or formal training during SFJT 12.

Unlike previous NRF exercises, much of the time spent at the early Exercise Planning Conferences involved gaining an understanding of the NCS development work and how to support it through the exercise design. Early challenges included a requirement to gain individuals' understanding that SFJT 12 would be a very different exercise to previous STEADFAST exercises, a phrase that would come back to haunt the





The FCE Seminar participants at JWC with Major General Berger, Lieutenant General Stoltz, General (Ret.) Ramms, General (Ret.) Dr Olshausen, Rear Admiral Bauza, Rear Admiral Gilday, Rear Admiral Ruehle, Major General Reynes Jr, Brigadier General Weighill, Brigadier General Beulen, former Ambassador Peggy Mason and Mr. Victor Angelo. The Seminar provided a venue allowing for high level discussions on the roles and responsibilities of the FCE.

Officer with Primary Responsibility (OPR) throughout the next 15 months! A second challenge was to determine where in the exercise planning cycle to converge with the NCS development work and take the exercise design forward without detriment to either the concept development or the exercise. The NCS development work, of course, would continue throughout 2012 and the exercise design was adjusted when possible.

The early NCS concept development discussions and workshops determined that much of the existing structure could be retained in one form or another albeit with different terminology in true NATO fashion. There was, however, one new piece of the construct that attracted considerable attention and enthused many to think we could collectively make a real difference to NATO's ability to provide an even more ef-

fective deployable Command and Control capability. The so-called Forward Coordination Element (FCE) emerged from this early work. The problem was determining precisely where this new element would fit in the new NCS and its principle roles and responsibilities.

The questions posed by the creation of this "new" element provided the JWC with a natural culminating point to conclude the early part of the exercise design and planning process. An FCE Seminar was subsequently hosted by the JWC in early February 2012 to provide a venue allowing for high level discussions on the roles and responsibilities of the FCE, as the deployed element of the Joint Force Commander. A secondary aim of the Seminar confirmed the exercise design and optimized the opportunity to use SFJT 12 as an effective assessment and analysis tool for the new NCS concept.

The Seminar brought together a distinguished group of senior NATO Commanders and military/civilian Subject Matter Experts, including General (Ret.) Sir John Reith, a former DSACEUR, Lieutenant General Bouchard, former Commander Operation Unified Protector (Libya), UN Special Representatives and Ambassadors. As Commander JWC stated in his opening remarks the seminar allowed "the JWC to become an enabler in the concept development of the Deployed Joint HQ (DJHQ) model and the FCE. It is our mission to fully

support both ACT and ACO in this transformation effort and it is a privilege to be at the core of this effort to develop the new NATO Command Structure".

The FCE seminar thus provided us with the opportunity to work closely with representatives from SHAPE, SACT and the three Joint Force Commands and allowed the SFJT12 Exercise Planning Team to have a sound basis to further plan and execute the remainder of the exercise.

Having overcome the early challenges associated with exercise design and adapting to changes in terms of concept development, the Planning Team were now presented with further potential challenges. Exercise SFJT12 would be the first major exercise, of any type, to be hosted and run from the new JWC Training Facility at Jättå, following the closure of our more familiar training site at Ulsnes Naval Base north of Stavanger. In addition, JWC learned that the JFC Lisbon core staff, augmented from elsewhere within the NATO JFC structure, would deploy in entirety to Norway to exercise the early transition from the FCE to the full deployed Joint Force Headquarters.

As one can imagine the three month period between the FCE Seminar and the culminating Execution Phase of SFJT 12 passed very quickly. To accentuate the short timeline even more, the JWC supported two additional exercise events in Lisbon although these ultimately did much to pro-



Sir John Reith



vide the entire training audience and Exercise Control (EXCON) staff with a useful introduction to the final phase of the exercise. Mindful of the administrative challenges that we were anticipating with a first use of the new training facility, it certainly helped to have an “away team” that were able to complete a highly efficient bed-in at Jättå at the beginning of May in preparation for the all important test of concept.

The new deployable HQ concept is based upon a stepped, scalable and flexible Command and Control model providing for a progressive deployment of Command and Control capability “blocks” each maintaining key operational functions tailored to the mission and situation. In order to facilitate this stepped approach, the FCE and DJHQ were physically separated upon their arrival in Jättå with the FCE staff housed in a former bunker facility, to simulate their “deployed” status with the remainder of the Deployed JHQ staff accommodated in the new JWC training facility. The first four days of the execution phase focused on providing the FCE Commander and staff with the environment and issues that they would most likely encounter in the early days of a Crisis Response Operation. The JWC remit was to deliver a scenario that would assess the effectiveness of the FCE to prepare an environment for the deployment of a more robust Command and Control infrastructure and a Joint Force.

On the fifth day of the exercise, the FCE was subsumed into the full DJHQ, which then worked through the early challenges associated with the initial arrival of a Joint Force Commander into a Theatre of Operations. There was a particular emphasis placed on the management of the transfer of authority from what was effectively a coordinating function, to that of commanding an operation through the deployment and employment of a Deployed Joint Headquarters.

Another new element to SFJT12, and key to its success as a conceptual exercise, was the so-called A2R Community. This group of analysts, drawn from the Operational Preparation Directorate (OPD), Joint Analysis and Lessons



Lieutenant General Stoltz receiving media training from JWC’s media team

Learned Centre (JALLC), and JFC Lisbon’s and JWC’s respective Analysis Sections, provided broad coverage throughout the execution phase, assessing and analyzing a wide range of processes and activities associated with the new Command and Control concept. Their collective efforts will prove invaluable as ACO and the remaining JFCs

look to further development of the new concept. The execution phase of Exercise SFJT 12 appears to have been a success judging from an early assessment from Lieutenant General Stoltz who was quoted as saying “From my perspective, the Forward Coordination Element achieved great results with a highly trained small core of staff working in a simulated environment. During SFJT 12 we were able to fully test the FCE’s ability to ‘connect’ and ‘understand’ whilst beginning to look into the ‘preparation’ of the Initial Command Element, as part of the scalable C2 option”.

From a JWC perspective, with over 800 personnel spread across the training audience and EXCON, coming from at least 12 different NATO organisations, the new training facility was put to the test and delivered, providing an effective and efficient venue to successfully assess and analyse the NCS, neatly summed up by Lieutenant General Stoltz as JFC Lisbon’s “lasting legacy to the Alliance”. †



The visit of His Majesty King Harald V of Norway occurred while the exercise was running at the JWC with 631 personnel. (Read about the visit on page 48). Photo shows the author with His Majesty and Major General Berger, prior to the tour of the training facility. Photo by MSgt Berger.

■ EXCLUSIVE


SFJT 12: Commander's Takeaways

By Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz, FRA A
Commander of Joint Force Command Lisbon

IN STEPPING AWAY FROM THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE (NRF) certification process normally associated with the STEADFAST JOIST series, the Alliance has invested greatly in this particular exercise to test portions of the new Deployability Concept. The main premise of the new concept is that commanders have better flexibility in tailoring the structure of a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ) deploying forward to meet a particular mission.

As both Allied Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum and JFC Naples agreed on employing a headquarters based on a two-pillared structure, JFC Lisbon re-organized to implement their proposal. This structure included an invisible pillar with the Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) Advisor coordinating the “influence tools” of the Headquarters. Given the importance of STRATCOM, I see two viable headquarters structure options available to the commanders. The two-pillared structure has the STRATCOM Advisor serving as a Deputy to the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, synchronizing the Headquarters’ influence assets. The second option organizes the Headquarters into three pillars: Operations, Influence and Support.

The choice of one structure over another should be based on the nature of the operation, and its kinetic or non-kinetic dimension, the capabilities of personnel, as well as the Commander’s personal preference. From my perspective, the Forward Coordination Element (FCE) achieved great results



■ **BIOGRAPHY:** Lieutenant General Philippe Stoltz was born on 16 November 1955 in France. He is a graduate of the École Spéciale Militaire at Saint-Cyr (the French Military Academy) and the French War College. He graduated with distinction from the French War College, which he attended from 1989 to 1991. His former duties include Chief of Staff, Djibouti French Combined Headquarters (1998-2000); Chief of Operations and Chief of Staff, Special Operations Command (2000-2003); Commander Special Land Forces Brigade in Pau (2003-2005). Lieutenant General Stoltz also served as Deputy Commander Land Forces Command in Lille before being transferred to Marseille to take command of Land Force Headquarters N°3 from 2007 to 2009. In August 2008 he was assigned as deputy Commander KFOR, bringing him back for a tour of duty to Kosovo, where he had already had served as the Commander of Multinational Task Force North in 2005. In July 2009, Lieutenant General Stoltz was assigned Commander of Allied Joint Force Command Lisbon. General Stoltz has been awarded the Legion d’Honneur, the National Merit Order, the Military Valor Cross with five citations and the Overseas Medal.

with a highly trained small core of select individuals. During SFJT12 we were able to fully test the FCE’s ability to “connect” and “understand”. In the next exercise, the “prepare” task should receive more focus. For this purpose, the FCE needs Component Command Advanced Party counterparts to test its ability to prepare for the arrival of the main body and component forces.

Turning to the JTF HQ, my impression is that Concept’s modified decision cycle proved most promising. It was amended to implement a balanced approach to managing kinetic and non-kinetic operational effects and to provide more relevant and consistent recommendations to the Commander at the Joint Coordination Board.

Although we initially faced some difficulties caused by lack of understanding on the detailed inputs required to make the process work efficiently, the end products were sound. The initial uncertainty in implementing the decision cycle underlined the need to refine various supporting processes needed in order to implement it. The outputs of each step, especially the Joint Coordination Working Group Director’s Session and the Integrated Effects Board must be fully understood by the staff. Comprehensive training preparing the staff to execute the complete cycle is therefore of utmost importance. To this end, the importance of Academics cannot be stressed enough: it is critical. In the following weeks, JFC Lisbon will provide some proposals to pass on to JFCs Naples and Brunssum as they transition to the new Peacetime Estab-



As JFC Lisbon is nearing the end of its operational life, the torch this headquarters has helped to carry in this concept development will be passed to the remaining Joint Force Commands and to pertinent headquarters in the NATO Command Structure.

ishment structure. The two remaining JFCs must ensure each individual understands the Deployability Concept, understands how the decision cycle works, and his or her role in driving the cycle forward.

For me, this training necessity reinforces the importance of building a certified, agile and responsive team in each future JFC consisting of qualified and trained personnel. I assess that maintaining an appropriate level of skill and readiness for this selected group will be a challenge for NATO. Fortunately, in the run up and execution of the exercise, Lisbon was able to pull talent from across NATO to both fill the required billets and to make observations. This will ultimately benefit the contributing headquarters as the tremendous task of gathering observations and deriving lessons identified and lessons learned is just beginning. We have to scrupulously follow this process, which will feed the Deployability Concept's further refinement. Together with the Exercise participants, the A2R Community from the Operational Preparation Directorate (OPD), Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) and the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) will play an instrumental role in this process. This is truly a NATO team effort!

Now, as JFC Lisbon is nearing the end of its operational life, the torch this Headquarters has helped carry in this Concept Development will be passed to the remaining JFCs and to pertinent headquarters in the NATO Command Structure. †

FURTHER READING


For these related stories, visit www.jfclb.nato.int

* The Commander's Vision - 2012

* STEADFAST JOIST 2012



Lieutenant General Stoltz (left) and Major General Berger



Personnel gathering together for an exercise icebreaker before the training starts.



“There are few better opportunities than a JWC exercise or training event to learn about Alliance operations and processes at the operational level.”

JWC Office of the Legal Advisor

A Voluntary National Contribution's Perspective of an Alliance Legal Office and its Operations

By Colonel Brian H. Brady, USA A ⁽¹⁾
U.S. Army Staff Judge Advocate CJIATF 435

Introduction

For the past two years, I have been privileged to serve as a United States Voluntary National Contribution (VNC) to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) Office of the Legal Advisor (LEGAD). An assignment to JWC is unique and demands knowledge that may not be possessed even by the most experienced military personnel. The purpose of this article is to provide references to some key NATO texts in the context of my service at JWC. As a LEGAD, I will illustrate some of the common issues that are addressed by LEGADs serving in NATO headquarters. I will discuss aspects of an assignment to Stavanger to illustrate a national perspective on NATO. Finally, I will illustrate JWC's mission with reference to the roles and function of a LEGAD.

Assignment Stavanger – NATO Posts

Assignment to a NATO staff post in a NATO headquarters (known as a Peacetime Establishment/PE post) is a national manpower decision, which in the case of the United States, after service hurdles have been met, involves a staff element located at the U.S. European Command⁽²⁾. The process is slightly different for personnel assigned to operational posts known as Crisis Establishment (CE) posts such as those found at HQ Inter-

national Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or the HQ ISAF Joint Command (IJC)⁽³⁾. Units or specific military capabilities that have been offered to NATO are accepted under a separate NATO operational regime known as Transfer of Authority (TOA). If you have served in Afghanistan, you may have heard the term RIPTOA (Relief in Place — TOA) as part of a unit's transition to NATO control. For the United States reader, when a Troop Contributing Nation (TCN) proffers capability (personnel or a unit) to NATO, it is the equivalent of a service providing organized, trained and equipped forces for a combatant commander. For those personnel going to NATO CE posts at the operational level (e.g., HQ ISAF, IJC), they may have to receive training mandated by the operational Allied Joint Force Command (JFC). This is where JWC earns its money.

Life in Stavanger

Many Americans of my generation served in Germany and BENELUX countries as part of Cold War commitments to the NATO Alliance. We grew accustomed to living in *kasernes* or U.S. military communities that were in effect “Little Americas.” Since 1990, the United States and its Allies have significantly reduced or altered their military footprint and visibility to the local population

on Alliance territory. While national force structure appears to be reducing, there are opportunities for Alliance and Partner Nation personnel to serve outside of national units in NATO Command Structure or NATO Force Structure affiliated entities. Most of my contemporaries have no idea that the U.S. Army has personnel stationed in, amongst other places, Madrid, Valencia, Milan, Muenster, Stettin and Stavanger. These assignments create administrative and logistical challenges to all nations

(1) Currently assigned as Staff Judge Advocate, Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435, U.S. Forces Afghanistan. Formerly assigned to the Office of the Legal Advisor (LEGAD), JWC, Stavanger, Norway. The opinions and conclusions herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of either, the JWC LEGAD, the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Department of Defense, or NATO.

(2) U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1600.01A, Charter For United States European Command NATO Manning Division, 10 December 2010. Para. 6a(2)(b).1 indicates that this division, inter alia, “Manages manpower requirements and sourcing strategies for U.S. contributions to NATO, to include Voluntary National Contributions, dualhat, rotational and non-quota post allocations, and U.S. joint requirements.”

(3) Allied Command Operations (ACO) Directive 45-3, Allied Command Operations Crisis Establishment (CE) Management, 10 March 2011. Para. 1-4a defines a CE billet as follows: “A CE is a table setting out the authorized posts for a CRO [Crisis Response Operation] unit, formation or headquarters.”





who have to support dispersed clusters of personnel who may be assigned to a commander located in a different country. For an American, therefore, the robust military-sponsored life support that is a feature of military life in Germany does not exist in Norway. Americans living in Norway have to adjust to purchasing goods and services on the local economy rather than relying on the Post or Base Exchange (PX/BX) or Commissary.

One peculiarity of assignment to Stavanger for Americans is use of local banks, rather than a U.S.-based community bank. This has potential tax consequences (such as informing tax authorities of the existence of foreign assets) and requires additional steps to get money into the local account (the U.S. does not have a compatible banking system that allows conventional transfers of cash beyond its borders). The plus side of using the local banking regime is that local credit/debit cards work whereas European or Scandinavian vendors often reject U.S.-based cards for lack of a microchip. For all nations, service in Stavanger is particularly hard, because it is the fourth most expensive city in the world⁽⁴⁾. Once sticker-shock has worn off, life in Stavanger turns out to be pretty good ... at least when the sun shines.

Life in Stavanger is a throwback to an earlier era. Crime is almost nonexistent; you can leave doors unlocked and your valuables

will still be safe. People are friendly, and for Americans (perhaps thanks to an expatriate population working in North Sea oil-related professions), more importantly, most locals speak English. The local population is fit and has direct access to breathtaking natural wonders such as fjords, and a network of trails. During operational pauses (block leave) between major training events, there are tremendous opportunities to experience Scandinavia and its outlying area.

Both the weather and seasons take getting used to: you can get all four seasons in one day. The oft quoted saying “there is no such thing as bad weather, just bad clothes” resonates in Stavanger where the wind and rain and “fall” sideways or just on the opposite side of the street while the sun shines on your side of the street.

So what “real life support” lessons have I drawn from two years in Stavanger? Save money for the assignment; enjoy the natural scenery; get involved in the local community; be prepared to conduct more transactions subject to local bureaucracy (e.g., registering your vehicle; getting a bank account; getting a cell phone); be patient with local authorities who may be unfamiliar with Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) privileges; use public transport; and NEVER, NEVER drink and drive⁽⁵⁾.

The most important thing a sponsor can do for their replacement is to ensure that the newcomer receives a “D-Number”

(a temporary national identity number that facilitates all life support activity in Norway—what an American might refer to as a “Green Card”). The D-Number triggers the ability to set up a bank account, obtain a cell phone, register a vehicle and a host of other life support matters. Other countries have similar quasi-residential requirements for NATO personnel stationed on their soil (such as a residence permit) so this is not unique to Norway. The most important piece of plastic I have, apart from my NATO access card, is my local debit card, which reflects my D-Number and photograph and therefore serves as a de facto ID card. I hardly ever use any other identification.

(4) In 2010, when the author arrived at JWC, Stavanger was only the sixth most expensive city in the world (source: Yahoo). The author’s economic measure of sticker shock is much simpler: one pint of Guinness at a Stavanger watering hole costs about 83 Norwegian Krone which is about €18 or \$14; a comparable beer in Grafenwoehr costs €2.5 or \$3.25 (as of April 2012).

(5) Norway’s blood alcohol limit is 0.02% and even one drink registering below the limit could create a presumption that you are driving impaired. Penalties are severe and include potential detention for 30 days, loss of one month’s salary (include housing allowance, cost of living and other amounts that make up your national compensation), and loss of driving privileges. Incredibly one of my first national disciplinary legal issues dealt with this subject – Norway is not used to the standard “release of jurisdiction” regime practiced in other NATO countries under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), therefore it takes longer to for the JWC LEGAD or national authorities to gain jurisdiction.



JWC LEGAD organization

The JWC LEGAD organization and function is derived from NATO's Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) Directive 15-23, which governs the delivery of legal advice within NATO's two Strategic Commands⁽⁶⁾. The JWC LEGAD, as is standard throughout NATO, is part of the Command Group. The JWC LEGAD is comprised of four lawyers, three of whom appear on JWC's manning document as Peacetime Establishment (PE) posts. The fourth position, originally carved out from an HQ ACT LEGAD post in Norfolk, is now a Voluntary National Contribution (VNC) and filled by the United States.

The office is comprised of a chief LEGAD (currently a Norwegian Naval Captain/NATO grade OF5); two staff legal officers (one VNC U.S. Army Colonel/OF5; one French Army Lieutenant Colonel/OF4); and one NATO International Civilian (NIC). The NIC position was recently vacated by JWC's longest serving lawyer, Ms. Lone Kjelgaard, who is now serving at HQ NATO's LEGAD. This summer a new NIC will assume duties at JWC. Unlike other LEGADs, this office does not have a paralegal staff, but they do rely upon Command Group NCOs to accomplish administrative tasks. JWC lawyers are all members of their respective nations' legal professions, have law degrees, and are licensed to practice law. JWC lawyers service the diverse range of legal issues, which arise from JWC's mission and can be broken down into: JWC International Military Headquarters (IMHQ) support; NATO Exercise and Training support; NATO Concepts, Doctrine and Integration support.

Tools available to LEGADs

Few LEGADs gain NATO experience while practicing law in their national posts. Opportunities to access NATO collective legal training opportunities may also be limited⁽⁷⁾. LEGADs filling NATO posts as augmentees face a significant challenge preparing for their NATO duties. Compounding the lack of exposure to NATO experience and training opportunities is limited access to NATO documents. NATO's document handling systems exclude access to personnel who are not part of NATO Command Structure or Force Structure posts. Fortunately there are several ways to get access to relevant information.

The NATO home page provides links to

its official texts⁽⁸⁾. Upon request, prospective LEGADs can obtain a copy of the NATO Legal Deskbook, which provides a superb overview of key legal issues and NATO processes. The NATO Legal Gazette (first published in 2006) provides NATO LEGAD practitioners' insights to current NATO issues⁽⁹⁾. Once in-processed to a NATO post, NATO LEGADs will have access to Comprehensive Legal Overview Virtual Information System (CLOVIS), which is an online community of interest sponsored by the legal element of ACT's Staff Element Europe⁽¹⁰⁾. These tools serve as a lifeline until the newcomer can get access to more comprehensive document handling systems.

JWC International Military Headquarters support — JWC's legal status

JWC is subordinate to Allied Command Transformation (ACT) located in Norfolk, Virginia. Consequently, JWC derives authority from the juridical (legal) personality vested by international agreement in ACT and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT)⁽¹¹⁾. JWC therefore enjoys specific privileges and immunities in conducting its mission as a result of its Paris Protocol [to the North Atlantic Treaty] status as an Allied Headquarters or IMHQ. Outside of Norway, other NATO entities such as NATO Agencies and NATO Committees (properly known as "subsidiary bodies" under Article IX to the North Atlantic Treaty), and the International Staff at NATO Headquarters are conferred privileges and immunities under the Ottawa Convention of 1951. Within Norway, one of the key roles of the JWC LEGAD is to provide interpretation of JWC's privileges and immunities under the Paris Protocol.

Host nation relations

Norway is a model host acting as a receiving State for a NATO IMHQ. JWC is an Allied Headquarters or IMHQ established pursuant to the 1952 Paris Protocol to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty (also known as the Washington Treaty), which established NATO. JWC's IMHQ status is further defined by a Supplementary Agreement to the NATO SOFA with Norway, a Memorandum of Agreement, and some local agreements⁽¹²⁾. Additionally, internal directives and policy further implement the intent of



"Life in Stavanger turns out to be pretty good ... at least when the sun shines." The author participated in the 2011 Tall Ships Race between the Shetland Islands and Stavanger.

(6) Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) Directive 15-23, Policy on Legal Support, 23 July 2009.
 (7) In addition to JWC-hosted exercises and training, NATO personnel may attend training at the following: NATO School Oberammergau, Germany; numerous specialized NATO Centres of Excellence; the Joint Force Training Centre, Bydgoszcz, Poland. For LEGADs, the NATO School offers the NATO LEGAD Course and more advanced operational law and targeting courses.
 (8) <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts.htm> (Last accessed on 23 April 2012).
 (9) See e.g., Mr. Richard Pregent, Cyber Defense and Counterintelligence, NATO LEGAL GAZETTE, No. 26, pp. 13-18 (29 September 2011).
 (10) <<https://clovis.nshq.nato.int/>> (Last accessed on 23 April 2012).
 (11) The acronyms ACT and SACT seem to be used interchangeably but the institution is properly referred to as ACT while its commander is SACT.
 (12) The following have profound effect on JWC's legal status, privileges and immunities:
 A. Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces, dated 19 June 1951 (The NATO SOFA).
 B. Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters Set Up Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, dated 28 August 1952 (Paris Protocol).
 C. Memorandum of Agreement between the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway and Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation as represented by Joint Warfare Centre, concerning "The closure of Joint Headquarters North", the establishment of the NATO Joint Warfare Centre at Stavanger, Norway, and support of the NATO Joint Warfare Centre at Stavanger, Norway, dated 21 June 2006 (MOA).
 D. Supplementary Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, subject: On the Special Conditions applicable to the establishment and operation on Norwegian Territory of International Military Headquarters, dated 6 August 2008.
 E. Local Agreement between Norwegian Defence Estate Agency [NDEA] and Joint Warfare Centre for The Support of the NATO Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway, dated 5 May 2009.
 F. Local Agreement between Norwegian Defence Logistic Agency [NDLO] and Joint Warfare Centre for The Support of the NATO Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway, dated 20 December 2006.



NEWCOMERS

these agreements. This type of cascading authority (manifested by Supplementary Agreements, MOAs, and local implementation arrangements) is a common to other NATO IMHQ Receiving States but what works in one Receiving State does not always work in another. The role of the LEGAD is to interpret the application of these treaties and agreements to minimize friction points thus permitting JWC to accomplish its mission within Norway. NATO's new Host Nation Support (HNS) policy is one area that the LEGAD earns its money.

NATO is in the process of implementing new HNS policy⁽¹³⁾. This policy has effects upon existing agreements with nations that host IMHQ. As host to JWC, Norway is not immune to the new NATO HNS policy. As the headquarters vested with "juridical personality," ACT authorizes its personnel or subordinate headquarters to negotiate and conclude international agreements: ACT LEGADs working with JWC staff and the JWC LEGAD are currently working implementation details of the new HNS policy. Prior to ACT's action, the JWC LEGAD had to analyze all the implications of the new HNS policy by comparing it to current requirements under existing agreements. This new policy will eventually result in a new standard NATO format known as a Garrison Support Agreement (GSA).

JWC's relationship with Norway creates a reciprocal relationship that the LEGAD is often requested to review under existing



legal obligations. A key lesson learned under the international agreements regime is that staff should always ask for legal review before approaching the Host Nation with requirements. Absent approval by ACT, or otherwise facilitated by terms of local agreements, JWC has limited authority to act unilaterally. Staffing with the LEGAD will prevent embarrassment or misunderstandings from occurring.



If you are a new staff officer at JWC, you will want to become familiar with the Supplementary Agreement and MOA between ACT/JWC and Norway. The issues are diverse and, amongst others, include the following: special privileges afforded to General/Flag Officers assigned to NATO duty in Norway; review of Norwegian extension of privileges and immunities to family members when the service member is deployed for extended periods; review of policy concerning provision and rationing of alcoholic beverages and other tax-free items to entitled NATO personnel; review and reinforcement of JWC privileges to import and export free of duty and taxes, NATO-related goods and services; review of new agreements to extend Norwegian logistics or real estate facilities and services to JWC personnel. As a result of these issues, all JWC LEGADs gain more than passing familiarity with the key international agreements governing JWC's IMHQ status in Norway.


NATO acquisition and contracting

JWC has its own contracting authority, which is derived from delegation from ACT under the Paris Protocol. This treaty-based authority is implemented within both ACO and ACT by Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) Directive, 60-70. This policy also contains standards of conduct and improper business practices guidance that is essentially based on ACO rules. For an American lawyer who



JWC LEGADs (from left): Captain (N) Audun Westgaard, Colonel Brian Brady, Lieutenant Colonel Eric Aguera, June 2012. Inset: Colonel Brady with Brigadier General DePalmer at his Farewell Breakfast.





View of Lifjell Mountain and Gandsfjord from JWC. Photo by Valerie Guyoton.

has practiced U.S. Government contract law, I derive much comfort knowing that the terminology and methodology used in NATO practice mirrors national methodology.

Contracting Officers have broad discretion when it comes to seeking legal advice. Unlike national practice, “[n]either ACO/ACT has not established a mandatory (e.g., monetary) threshold above which legal review must be sought.”⁽¹⁴⁾ The guidance admonishes Contracting Officers to seek legal counsel “[e]specially when unusual, complex and sensitive matters are at hand.”⁽¹⁵⁾ This discretion is mitigated by local SOP, which in the case of JWC makes the LEGAD part of the JWC Requirements Board ensuring legal oversight at the initiation phase of a requirement. JWC’s contracting policy also establishes Established Financial Limits for competition purposes for the procurement of “basic, noncomplex supplies and services.”⁽¹⁶⁾

Civilian personnel

NATO employs its own permanent workforce known as NATO International Civilians (NIC). NICs are governed by NATO personnel rules set forth in the NATO Civilian Personnel Regulations commonly referred to as the “Red Book.” For the purposes of receiving certain privileges and immunities (e.g., no taxation), under terms of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), civilian personnel are part of the “civilian component” of a sending State’s deployed force present in the receiving State⁽¹⁷⁾. Since NICs are hired by NATO or its IMHQs, they are included as members of the “civilian component” by the Paris Protocol⁽¹⁸⁾. The NATO SOFA and Paris Protocol

precludes extension of privileges and immunities to Norwegians or other persons who are considered “ordinarily resident” in Norway (e.g., a lawful resident of Stavanger in the oil industry who then applies for a NATO position).

Understanding the legal nature of NICs is important, because it impacts their operational use. JWC deploys its personnel to NATO operations as part of its exercise preparations⁽¹⁹⁾. For example, JWC will deploy a team to Kabul as part of its Training Refinement Conference and Data Capture for ISAF Training Events. While deployed, NICs may find themselves in the unusual situation of being excluded from the support of their nation’s Deployed National Support Element. For NATO civilians deployed in support of ISAF, the ISAF Civilian Human Resources Management Office provides the equivalent services that a deployed soldier would find at an NSE⁽²⁰⁾. The JWC LEGAD must therefore have a working knowledge of NATO civilian personnel rules and international agreements governing their status wherever they are utilized⁽²¹⁾.

Continued on Page 72.

(13) NATO Command Structure Host Nation Support (HNS) – Policy and Standards (PO (2011)0020, 8 Feb. 2011[effective 14 February 2011]).

(14) Bi-SC Dir. 60-70, Bi-Strategic Command Procurement Directive (22 December 2004) – At para. 1-2d, Legal Advisors

(15) Id.

(16) JWC SOP 602, JWC Standing Operating Procedures – Purchasing and Contracting Execution (15 March 2007).

(17) Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces, dated 19 June 1951 (The NATO SOFA). Article 1b states: “ ‘Civilian component’ means the civilian personnel accompanying a force of a Contracting Party who are in the employ of an armed service or that Contracting Party, and who are not stateless persons, nor nationals of any State which is not a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, nor nationals of, nor ordinarily resident in, the State in which the force is located.”

(18) Paris Protocol, Article III, para. 1.b: “ ‘civilian component’ means civilian personnel who are not stateless persons, nor nationals of any State which is not a Party to the Treaty, nor nationals of, nor ordinarily resident in the receiving State, and who are (i) attached to the Allied Headquarters and in the employ of an armed service of a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty or (ii) in such categories of civilian personnel in the employ of the Allied Headquarters as the North Atlantic Council shall decide.”

(19) ACT Dir. 45-4, Personnel Selection and Deployment Guide for NATO Missions, 15 April 2010; see also ACO Dir. 50-11, Deployment of Civilians, 30 June 2010.

(20) ISAF Civilian Human Resources Policy and Regulations (CHRPRs), 16 March 2011 govern the employment of civilians and their general support (including provision of body armor and helmets). Note that ISAF possesses unique recruitment authority for civilians who are not classified as NICs which is found not only in ISAF CHRPRs but also ISAF Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 119 subject: HQ ISAF Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 119, Recruitment of International Civilian Consultants (ICC) and Local Civilian Hire (LCH) In Support Of the ISAF Mission, 22 February 2011; ; for general NATO policy on theatre authority to establish ICC and LCH, see para. 1-7, ACO Directive (AD) 45-3, Allied Command Operations Crisis Establishment (CE) Management (10 March 2011).

(21) See e.g., Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Assistance Force and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (4 January 2002). Annex A sets forth the status of forces arrangement; see also the Exchange of Letters between the NATO Secretary General and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (22 November 2004) clarifying that “ ‘NATO Personnel’ means the military and civilian personnel assigned or attached to or employed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its member States, and non-NATO Troop Contributing States that are operating under NATO command and control arrangements or in support of the International Security Assistance Force.”



THE ROYAL VISIT

Of King Harald V of Norway

To the Joint Warfare Centre and Naval Basic Training Centre Harald Haarfagre





From left: King Harald V of Norway, Brigadier General DePalmer, Major General Berger and Brigadier Gustavsen, 14 May 2012. Below: Children waving flags at the JWC Main Gate.



By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC
 Photos by MSgt Herbert Berger, DEU A, JWC
 CPO Valerie Guyoton, FRA N, JFC Lisbon

HIS MAJESTY KING HARALD V paid a visit to Norway's Naval Basic Training Centre Harald Haarfagre, commonly known as Camp Madla, and NATO's Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger on Monday 14 May 2012. The visit was a response to an invitation offered by French Army Major General Jean Fred Berger, Commander JWC, at an audience with His Majesty at the Royal Palace in Oslo on 5 September 2011.

This was His Majesty's first visit to the two Stavanger-based entities, although he visited the Norwegian National Joint Headquarters together with the former President of the Republic of Bulgaria, Mr Georgi Parvanov, in 2006, when the Norwegian HQ was co-located with the JWC. His Majesty's arrival at Stavanger Airport Sola reflected a joyous spectacle as second graders from Sola and Klepp waved flags and held up flowers to greet him. Two students, Emma Kristina Keane and Miriam Skjelde, both wearing a *bunad*, the Norwegian national costume, extended a bouquet of spring flowers to the visiting monarch, who was dressed in Admiral's uniform. After the joyous greet with the children in crisp, windy Stavanger weather, the motorcade carrying

His Majesty proceeded to Camp Madla. Crowds lined the streets to catch a glimpse of King Harald as the royal cortege rolled past. Waving flags and applauding, they made the mood in Stavanger one of joy and excitement.



Upon arrival at Camp Madla, His Majesty was received by the Chief of the Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Bernt Grimstvedt and Commander Naval Basic Training Centre Harald Haarfagre, Commander SG Per Jan Skjegstad. He then inspected a guard of honour, received a briefing on Camp Madla and its history, attended a parade ceremony, met and greeted conscripts and staff members, and attended a pass in review.

The royal motorcade vehicles then made their way to Jättå, where JWC staff family members waving Norwegian flags welcomed the monarch at the main gate of the base. Up the hill, at the entrance of the JWC E-Block, Norwegian conscripts stood stiffly at attention and JWC military personnel saluted as Major General Berger greeted and officially welcomed His Majesty. After a brief photo opportunity, the royal party proceeded inside the building for another photo opportunity by the flags of Norway and the NATO Alliance. Next came the signing of the visitor's book, a briefing session on the JWC's mission and activities and a lunch at the JWC's VIP Dining Room.

As part of the visit programme, His Majesty was walked around the JWC's new training facilities and observed first-hand a computer assisted/command post military exercise, STEADFAST JOIST 12. By chance, the royal visit occurred while the exercise was running at the JWC with 631 personnel from NATO's Joint Force Command Lisbon and Force Command Heidelberg as well as other organizations assembled in Stavanger to train in the full spectrum of joint operational level warfare and benefit from state-



“NATO has the ability to make things work across Nations and cultures; this is something that has always been NATO’s strength.”

King Harald V

of-the-art military expertise in a NATO-led Crisis Response Operation. STEADFAST JOIST 12 was the first training event ever to be conducted in the new facility. His Majesty walked through various exercise organizations, including the Situation Centre, the Grey Cell and the Joint Operations Centre, where he received briefings and met with the staff members and mentors. He also watched a short movie about NATO’s Comprehensive Approach. Produced by the JWC Media Section, the movie highlighted the importance of political, civilian and military interaction in Crisis Management Planning to help tackle the complex challenges of international security.

At the end of the visit, His Majesty and Major General Berger stood in front of Ole Lislerud’s ceramic artwork “Peace and the

Art of War”, given to the JWC as a token of congratulation by the Norwegian Government. Following Major General Berger’s brief explanation of the artwork, His Majesty then allowed a short interview session with the members of the local media and said he found great joy and interest in the visit. The monarch stressed that he regards NATO’s presence in Stavanger as important for Norway. “NATO has the ability to make things work across Nations and cultures; this is something that has always been NATO’s strength,” he went on to say.

Major General Berger acknowledged that he was honoured to host King Harald at the JWC and added: “His Majesty’s visit is an occasion to celebrate the warm and enduring friendship between Norway and the NATO Alliance.”

The General said: “His Majesty visited us during an exercise involving 900 people, with approximately 600 of them working side by side in Stavanger. As NATO’s footprint in Norway, the JWC sincerely welcomes the visit of the King of Norway. It holds significant importance in that it will go a long way in further strengthening the bond of friendship with Norway. The support of His Majesty in uniform – he is the chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces – was very impressive and I feel very proud of it.”

BORN ON 21 FEBRUARY 1937, His Majesty King Harald V is Commander-in-Chief of Norway’s Armed Forces, and holds the rank of General in the Army and Air Force, and Admiral in the Navy. †



Pass in review at Camp Madla



Briefing at SITCEN



A visit to the Grey Cell



His Majesty’s arrival in Stavanger



NORDIC FOREIGN MINISTERS MAKE FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO JWC

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Iceland and Norway together with the Finnish Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Swedish Director General for Political Affairs Ministry visited the JWC on Friday 4 May 2012. This was the first official visit paid by the respective Nordic Ministers to the Centre. Their Excellencies Mr Villy Søvndal (Denmark), Mr Össur Skarphéðinsson (Iceland), Mr Jonas Gahr Støre (Norway) as well as Mr Pertti Torstila (Finland) and Mr Björn Lyrvall (Sweden) were warmly welcomed by Major General Jean Fred Berger and senior officials at the JWC premises in Jåttå, Stavanger. The official programme concluded with the Ministers meeting with JWC staff members from the Nordic countries.




▲ SIGNATURE OF A JOINT DECLARATION BETWEEN THE JWC AND THE CITY OF STAVANGER

The Honorable Mayor of Stavanger, Christine Sagen Helgø and the Commander of NATO's Joint Warfare Centre, French Army Major General Jean Fred Berger, signed on 18 January a Declaration of Cooperation that aims to enhance the strong ties, good communication and partnership between the Joint Warfare Centre and the City, as well as to establish a framework to examine the possibilities of constructive and collaborative activities for mutual benefit.



SUPPORT OUR FIGHT AGAINST CHILDHOOD CANCER

Royal Dutch Navy Commander (Cdr) Robbert Jurriansen who is currently employed at NATO's Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway, is raising money for the Dutch charity foundation KiKa (Kinderen Kankervrij, or, Children Cancer-Free) to support research in the fight against childhood cancer. As part of the charity fundraiser, he organized a rubber duck race, which was held on Saturday, June 16th, in the historic fjord of Hafrsfjord. In order to urge charity donations, Cdr Jurriansen is running the Stavanger Marathon on 1 September and the New York Marathon on 4 November this year. For more information on the fundraising activity, e-mail Cdr Jurriansen directly at robjurriansen@hotmail.com



«All organisations have cultures and those cultures can be a force multiplier when aligned to the visions and goals of the organisation. Understanding how organisational culture contributes to, or hinders, **CHANGE** and **EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE** is something we should all be aware of here at the Joint Warfare Centre.»

Brigadier General Steven J. DePalmer

ORGANISATIONAL

CULTURE

DOES IT MATTER



By Garry Hargreaves
SMC4 Division, Joint Warfare Centre

ILLUSTRATIONS GRY HEGE RINALDO

OFTEN DISREGARDED, OR CONSIDERED LATE in any strategic redirection, organisational culture is the critical part of what makes an organisation tick. Sometimes described as the *feel* of an organisation, or portrayed as “how things get done around here”, cultures are the intangible but powerful effects of senior staff’s behaviour combined with the policies, procedures and practices that create the operational environment. This influences our actions and determines behavioural norms. Organisational culture describes the subconscious, subtle psychology of the workplace. Not only do all organisations have cultures, most have subcultures silently operating within the overarching organisational culture. If the organisation is to be highly effective then these cultures need to be consistent.

Organisational researchers tell us that businesses ignore organisational cultures at their peril. Cultures are highly robust and

enduring; having the ability to provide sustenance to organisational effectiveness or conversely accommodate and nurture resistance to change, leading to an inevitable reduction in organisational effectiveness. Consequently, it is critical for an organisation to understand its organisational culture and be able to relate and synchronise its evolution with the organisation’s visions and goals.

Where do they come from and what do they do?

An organisational culture derives from the deeply embedded beliefs and values of the organisation’s members, especially the leadership. It resides at a psychologically deeper level than policies and procedures ever could. Over time, the organisational culture becomes the DNA of the organisation and to make things even more challenging, whilst an organisation’s policies, procedures and practices are readily observable and au-

ditable, the shared beliefs and values of an organisation are not so easily observed; yet they have the potential to be far more potent and resilient.

Organisational cultures influence what people say, and what people do, when they are not being watched. That potency may be revealed in alarming ways: the current U.S. Defense Secretary, Leon Panetta, commenting on a recent event in Afghanistan, said: “this incident absolutely violates both our regulations and, more importantly, our core values.” He is clearly saying that core values trump regulations; he is not alone in this assessment of the influence that organisational cultures can have.


An organisational culture has the attributes of permanence and resilience and when the culture is appropriately aligned, it can be a real asset for a business that is eager to evolve or transform.

Conversely this can become a serious issue for an organisation that wants to adapt,



but is subject to significant levels of staff churn and rotational leadership, as is the case for the JWC and many other Commands. How do we maintain direction and drive on the journey towards a new vision when the person at the helm, and the senior managers, disappear before we ever get near it?

- Deeply understanding “intent” will go a long way to ensuring that a vision becomes a reality.
- Use the fact that the more persistent staff, civilians and Norwegians in our case, will have significantly more influence on the organisational culture than their position in the organisation might lead you to believe.
- Start your cultural awareness campaign early.



Cultural transformations cannot be achieved through a rapid or superficial approach; they take time and the engagement of the right people. The problem is that in many organisations, transformation of the culture starts long after new visions have been embarked upon, leading to an inevitable lag that diminishes organisational effectiveness. Let me provide you with a tangible example. In 2003, we were an operational HQ with a well-understood mission and


values along with beliefs that supported the mission. Ten years had allowed us to develop supporting cultural norms that aligned what we thought, said, and did, to the role of the JHQ North and the Vision of the Commander. People sat tight, they knew their roles, the work was stable and involved little travel.

Then we became, almost overnight, the NATO Joint Warfare Centre (JWC). People that were previously running plans to combat invasions from the North-East

(serious Article 5 missions) were suddenly OPRs planning the integration of experiments into NRF events with out-of-area and non-military actors. They were asked to lead multinational planning syndicates and were exposed to operational uncertainty and highly volatile travel demands. You can appreciate the culture that resided in JHQ North was not the one that fit best with the new mission of the JWC. Luckily, we were able to start slowly and evolve gently into the new culture; since the first events were modest (approximately 15 percent) compared with the scale of the events that JWC delivers today.

Evolving the organization culture was perhaps even more challenging for ACT. A staff officer sat at a desk worried about shipping corridors in the maritime world of SACLANT was suddenly responsible for considering global security challenges twenty years ahead. Might that require a very different mind-set and behavioural norms? Of course it would, yet we often leave the cultural alignment until after the organisational change.

One side effect of organisational strategy conflicting with personal values and beliefs is the psychological distancing of the staff from their business environment. This results in compliant rather than committed behaviours. Organisational ambivalence can result; and whilst the team may look like it is performing from the outside, it is highly unlikely to be operating at peak potential. If we do not, or cannot, identify the support-




ing organisational culture, we will not be able to translate the visions of the leadership into our day-to-day behaviours in order to reach new levels of operational effectiveness. Given JWC's current and emerging role in NATO, I wonder if we will have the time to get our cultural act together like we did in 2003. Like a boat dragging its anchor along the bottom of the sea, organisational culture can certainly slow you down, perhaps even snag and halt any progress at all. A misaligned organisational culture can apply a significant braking effect to any change or development initiative.

Why consider this now?

Our Commander, Major General Jean Fred Berger, is re-aligning the JWC Vision for post-2014. Do we wait until then to start to re-adjust the reinforcing processes and identify congruent behavioural norms? Or, do we begin to consider what we might need to introduce or revitalise now? Before focusing on the benefits of getting the culture aligned with the business, I want to explore briefly the "so what" of getting it wrong.

IN A MILITARY ENVIRONMENT, toxic, inflexible, energy draining cultures are supposed to be unlikely. Compliance can be demanded and disharmonious behaviours rapidly and conclusively stamped out. However, as "NATO's training focal point for full




spectrum joint operational warfare" is compliant ambivalence enough? Of course not; but if we don't do something to first identify and then align behaviours and processes to the vision, then maybe compliant ambivalence will be as good as it gets.

A lack of coherence and congruency regarding organisational cultures can be debilitating. Let's say that the vision is "to be the best", but the procedures force you to pick the cheapest possible solution to any

given issue. If the vision requires "staff flexibility" but the personnel regulations don't support that, or when policies and processes are not supportive of, and congruent with, the organisational visions then people will be unable to identify the required behavioural norms. On the other hand, when you get the vision, policies and procedures aligned, the silent, invisible wind of culture will propel the organisation effortlessly towards the goals.

THE JAWS OF CULTURE



Adapting the diagram that Boris Diekmann (Senn-Delaney) showed us back in October 2011, you can visualise how real opportunities for increased effectiveness and change can be stifled through an inappropriate organisational culture. No matter how many great ideas are fed into the system they will be degraded, deformed or digested altogether unless the organisational culture supports their existence. (© 1994-2010 Senn-Delaney Leadership Consulting Group)



Attribute	How can we know if we have an effective organisational culture?
Relationships and Communications	Does the organisation create and sustain friendships and out-of-office loyalties? Does it care about the people outside of the work domain? Is there evidence of cross divisional pan national friendships evolving? Do people listen to others in order to understand their viewpoint or do they listen for a gap in order to force home their own point? Is there evidence of positive corridor/canteen discussions taking place?
Trust and Commitment	Is the staff encouraged and supported in order to stretch their role? Is there evidence of risk tolerance or are witch-hunts prevalent? Is there evidence of unnecessary micro-management? Do the staff work harder/longer to get something finished? Are they proud of their efforts? Do they understand that what they do is important? Do they understand how they personally contribute to the overall goals of the JWC?
Recognition and Empowerment	Do all levels celebrate and share in successes? Is the JWC somewhere that others aspire to be employed? Is the staff told (meaningfully and specifically) that what they do is important? Do we allocate "special" assignments to the high performers? Do the ideas coming from the bottom manage to percolate to the top? Before making decisions do managers consult with subordinates? Is there evidence of a "my way or the highway" state of mind?
Credibility and Humility	Is there evidence of all levels of "walking the talk"? Are diversions from cultural norms dealt with swiftly and consistently? Do peers provide feedback to ensure that standards are maintained without the need for the heavy hand of management? Do others consider the organisation smug? Does it rely overly on its current reputation? Is there evidence of "tribal" sub cultures emerging? Does the organisation tolerate over inflated personal egos or indulge those engaged in self-promotion?
Flexibility and Accountability	Are individuals encouraged to operate outside of job descriptions in order to come to the aid of others? Do the policies and procedures mirror the flexibility desired? Is an attitude of "what more can I do to assist" evident in the workplace? Do people raise their hands to state "I can do this"?
Respect and Tolerance	Do the staff communicate respectfully between themselves and others? Do they talk respectfully about our customers and sponsors? Are they tolerant of minority views and mindful/respectful of national cultural differences? Do they say "in my nation we do it this way" or do they say "in JWC we do it this way"?
Enjoyment and Learning	Are people bright eyed, energetic and engaged in their roles? Do we leach our best people to other organisations? Are they going off to do the same job for someone else? Do they look forward to coming to work? Is transformation and evolution within the mind-sets of the staff? Is there a commitment to innovation? Are failures seen as an opportunity to learn and grow?
Organizational "Oneness" and a Shared Sense of Purpose	Do the staff refer to management activities as "they are doing, they are planning, etc." or do the staff talk about "we are doing, we are planning, etc"? Is there evidence of shared values and committed staff? Do the staff understand what our Vision means to the organisation and themselves? Does what is important to us as individuals, compliment the organisation's Vision? Is it the Commander's Vision, the JWC Vision or is it our Vision?



Aligning words and deeds

I have often heard organisations claim, "people are the most important resource we have", but is that claim borne out in practice?

I remember thinking about that as I, and many other JWC staff, were brought home during the infamous Icelandic volcanic ash incident. The Commander at that time, Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, said to his staff "get my people home" and they did, working around the clock and

in spite of the extant policies and procedures. There were JWC staff on buses from Romania, leaving rental cars at borders, flying indescribable routes into Norway but, the leadership was "walking the talk", demonstrating that their people were indeed most important to them. That incident changed my beliefs, affected my values and influenced my future behaviour.


Components of organisation cultures

Shared values and beliefs are what drive our corporate identity and influence our personal behaviours, not just at work, but in every aspect of our lives. Highly effective teams somehow "know" what other mem-

bers of that team will do. Take as an example a professional soccer team where the players know instinctively where the other players in their team will be. This is not just training; it is made possible because of a shared awareness of common goals and acceptance of behavioural norms. Professional teams do not like surprises — they develop a game plan matched to the vision of the coach and the abilities of the team. The shared values provide a sense of order enabling other team members to understand intent and expectation and yet these shared attributes operate for the most part outside of our awareness. So what are some attributes of highly effective organisational cultures?



Clockwise: Briefer Mr Boris Diekmann (Senn Delaney) with the author (right); JWC training facility; JWC NATO civilians discussing, inter alia, how our values and beliefs transform our behaviours at the annual Civilian Development Integration Course; a slide presented at the CDI Course.



Values and Beliefs in the Workplace

Imagine that the COM has given you the chance to take a 6 month sabbatical – all expenses paid. But, you will not be able to communicate with ANYONE at your office while you are away.

The only condition set is that the work must go on, effectively, and someone will be provided to carry on your work.

Write a memo to the person that will be taking over your responsibilities. They need to know what is *important* to you, what *principles* should guide their decisions and actions in your absence. They need to know the *values and beliefs* that you think should steer their behaviour while you are away.

POWERFUL ORGANISATIONS ARE transformational, adaptable and able to refine their practices and outputs to meet the changing Levels of Ambition and integrate the very latest concepts. I trust that some of those words are familiar to the JWC readers. If we are to become powerful, transformational, adaptable and integrative, might we need to have a culture that fosters some of these attributes? Sure, but don't we have enough to do without trying to keep yet another plate spinning in the air?

Look again at the first sketch in the article (Page 52): what do you now notice? Sometimes we get so engrossed in keeping certain plates spinning that we do not realise that others may be about to drop off. The easiest one to neglect is the one that does not normally thrust itself into our consciousness; that which represents our corporate values and beliefs and determines behavioural norms — the organisational culture.

An effective organisational culture provides and nurtures the environment where self-motivation and commitment to organisational improvement is the norm. It is likely to exhibit a high tolerance of ambiguity that will enable it to cope with the

messy, unpredictable process of change. Cultures remain effective by adapting and constantly re-aligning themselves to the business. Just as poor cultures sap moral and drain engagement; effective cultures have a contagious element that allows staff to soak up organisational challenges and remain motivated through difficult periods of uncertainty.

What can I do?

Know your organisation's Vision. That does not mean being able to repeat it or know where it can be found in the Tasker Tracker. It means translating it into something that is meaningful for you, something that resonates with your core values and beliefs. It means seeking clarification to give meaning to the lofty aims of the leadership so that in your daily work you know, specifically, how you are contributing and why it is important for you to continue to do so.

Highly effective organisations consist of people who believe in what they do and who value the contribution their organisation makes; these people are able to connect their contributions directly to higher-level visions of the leadership. People in organisations

with effective organisational cultures do not just comply with the visions, they commit to them; with their hearts and minds.

The well-respected management guru Peter Drucker is often quoted as saying "Culture eats strategy for breakfast". It is a position that I have seen borne out in practice. As we move towards 2014, adjust to emerging realities and start to re-look at our spinning plates, we should ensure that we do so through an organisational culture that does not lag the JWC Vision. The culture needs to walk hand-in-hand with the Vision so that we can be effective through change thereby avoiding the requirement to play catch up post change. †

About the artist

Contemporary artist **GRY HEGE RINALDO** was born on 27 January 1974 in Stavanger, Norway. Her collections include The University College London Art Collection, London/England; Haugesund Billedgalleri, Permanent Collection, Haugesund/Norway; Stavanger Art Museum, Stavanger, Norway (with six pieces of oil paintings); The Danish Bank, Copenhagen, Denmark. View more of the artist's work at: www.kunstgalleriet.no; www.gallerinb.com. Rinaldo's website, www.gryrinaldo.com is currently being re-designed.

THE YEAR IS 2029



■ COVER STORY

SCHRIEVER WARGAME 2012 INTERNATIONAL

By Lieutenant Colonel Todd Waller, US AF
Space and Cyber SME, Joint Training Division, Joint Warfare Centre

Space: What is it good for?

To some it is the final frontier. To others it is the ultimate high ground from which to shape the outcome of terrestrial battles. To most though, it is out of sight, out of mind. Ironically, the same people who are not especially cognizant of space are probably some of the most avid consumers of space services without even realizing it. Ever made a phone call to someone on another continent? When visiting a new place, do you use an old fashioned map to get around, or do you use a *Garmin* or *TomTom*? Do you enjoy cable TV? Perhaps you didn't know, but all of these activities are enabled by satellites operating in space. The fact is,

everyday life in the modern world depends on a host of satellites. As an example, a menagerie of digital devices have evolved up around the free position and timing data provided by GPS (a.k.a. Global Positioning System). GPS supports everything under the sun from the safe passage of air and sea traffic to the operation of electricity and telecommunications grids to the execution of financial transactions. However, it is not just regular folks that depend on space. Military operations are equally, if not more dependent, on the services satellites provide. Command and control, accurate weather forecasts, detailed imagery of the battlefield, exact position data for the

precise delivery of munitions, and warning that ballistic missiles might be coming your way are just a few of the space services that enable modern military operations. Within the Alliance, a number of nations have their own space capabilities and are planning investments for future capabilities. However, unlike soldiers, tanks and airplanes that can be assigned by Alliance Members to support a NATO operation, satellites are sovereign assets. In the spirit of NATO's new emphasis on Smart Defence, how then can a Joint Force Command (JFC) Headquarters effectively leverage the combined (and sovereignly controlled) space resources of the Alliance to support an operation? Earlier



Clockwise: AFSPC Commander, General William Shelton, addresses wargame participants. Radiotelescopes in New Mexico. JFCBS staff members Brigadier General Eddie Staes and Lt Col Chris Parent play roles as the JFC COM and COS. Brigadier General DePalmer, COS JWC (sitting at the front) played role as SACEUR. (All photos, except the radiotelescopes are by AFSPC PAO.)



this year, the United States Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) explored that possibility with NATO and Coalition Partners.

Operation JOLLY ROGER

A United Nations-sanctioned NATO counter-piracy mission, known as Operation JOLLY ROGER, has commenced in the Horn of Africa: the year is 2023. *Al Shabaab*, an Al Qaeda affiliate in Africa, is supporting piracy operations and the space and cyber environments in the Joint Operations Area are contested. The space situation is also more complex since a 2023 setting naturally implies a higher concentration of space objects and debris in orbit.

This was the scenario behind AFSPC's seventh Schriever Wargame conducted this April at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. Known as Schriever Wargame 2012 International (SW12I), this year's wargame explored the operational level challenges of coalition space operations.

A notional NATO JFC was the game's centrepiece and numerous entities such as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), U.S. European Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, the U.S. Interagency

Community, industry and Alliance Member Nations played interactive supporting roles as the JFC executed its mission in the midst of various space and cyber challenges.

Approximately, 270 military and civilian experts from the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, United Kingdom, Turkey and Australia participated.

Institutionalizing Space in NATO

The good thing about a wargame set in 2023 is that you can make things up. Accordingly, several fictitious organizational elements were created to facilitate the coordination of Allied space capabilities in support of the operation. Within SHAPE, a prototype "Space Awareness Cell" operated from within the Comprehensive Crisis Operations Management Cell (CCOMC). Its role was to provide space awareness to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), facilitate national space support to the JFC's operation and communicate with NATO HQ and other strategic level entities as required to support the operation.

Space Coordinating Authority (SCA), as currently defined by Allied Joint Publication 3.3 (A) Air and Space Operations,

resided with the JFC. One way the JFC exercised SCA was by directly liaising with the nations to request space support for the operation in accordance with predefined agreements. A Space Coordinating Working Group, led by JFC J3, also emerged as a prototype for identifying and prioritizing JFC space requirements and synchronizing their fulfillment using coalition space resources. These "prototypes" were an excellent way to explore how NATO might organize itself to support coalition space operations. There is no doubt current NATO operations depend extensively on space (SATCOM, GPS, and imagery to name a few), but if a JFC-directed operation is to fully exploit Alliance space resources, it needs an institutionalized framework that includes space organization, doctrine, and trained professionals. This will enable the deliberate synchronization of space effects with other operational effects (such as those created by air, land, sea, special forces, and information operations) in both the planning and execution of operations to achieve military objectives. At a time when resources are constrained, and space is a significant national investment, it makes sense to share resources... that is Smart Defence.





Photos by AFSPC PAO

The Wargame’s Most Valuable Players

The nations were the Most Valuable Players of SW12I. National contributions of personnel and space capabilities (those identified in a notional 2023 space order of battle) were the quintessential currency of the wargame enabling meaningful interactions between all the major players. At the risk of oversimplifying the wargame, a primary JFC role was to identify operational space requirements, or more specifically *space effects* requirements, and the role of the nations was to fulfill those requirements using their sovereign space assets.

“There is no doubt current NATO operations depend extensively on space, but if a JFC-directed operation is to fully exploit Alliance space resources, it needs an institutionalized framework that includes space organization, doctrine, and trained professionals.”

Broad Alliance participation in SW12I was a positive sign of NATO and Alliance-Member interest in coalition space operations. National willingness to make space resources available to Operation JOLLY ROGER was the key to SW12I success and it will be the same for any *real* NATO operation in the future. That’s why any serious NATO space transformation must be undergirded by national support.

Making Space a part of STEADFAST Exercises

From the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) perspective, one of the most useful aspects of SW12I was its exploration of space at the operational level. Since the JWC produces training for NATO’s operational level headquarters, the JWC’s senior leadership followed SW12I with great interest. The JWC Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Steven DePalmer, played the role of SACEUR when necessary and the author of this article participated on the JFC staff. This gave JWC clear insight into the elements that would most likely fit into its own

series of STEADFAST exercises. However, there are limitations. An exercise is a full dress rehearsal of real forces. A wargame is an exploration of concepts, processes and decision making. A wargame might allow assumptions to be made in places, where an exercise demands details. SW12I allowed NATO players to create the elements they needed to make the game work. A STEADFAST exercise must replicate the real world to be of value to the participants. In the absence of a NATO space cadre at the operational level, mechanisms to support the identification and prioritization of operational space effects requirements, and a timely way to connect those requirements to Alliance space capabilities, the JWC’s introduction of space to STEADFAST exercises will be limited. If, on the other hand, NATO elects to mature its organic space capabilities through the development of policy, training, organizational structures, and the necessary linkages to national space capabilities, then the JWC will have a considerable opportunity to improve NATO’s coalition space operations competence during STEADFAST series exercises. †

THE ARCTIC

A Norwegian Perspective

«THE OBSERVED INCREASE IN ACTIVITY IN THE ARCTIC OVER THE LAST YEARS PROVIDES CLEAR EVIDENCE OF ONGOING CHANGES IN, AND GROWING INTEREST FOR, THE REGION.»



By Brigadier Tor Rune Raabye, NOR A
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff/Operations
Defence Staff Norway

Introduction

The Laws of Nature still apply. There is a reason why populations have evolved and established themselves around the equator rather than in the Arctic. People and infrastructure are scarce in polar regions. Warm Gulf Stream waters, however, have helped create the necessary conditions for human life in parts of the Arctic. Winter open ports, for both civilian and military purposes, have been, and continue to be, important. The economy and wealth of some of the Arctic states rely heavily on the ocean, for food and prosperity.

We have been hearing about global warming for the last 30 years. Over the last decade, and all over the world, people have started believing in it. The Arctic, more than any other location on earth, has responded directly to global warming. Climate changes are not the only reason for the renewed interest in this region, though. Future outlooks and their economic, social and political implications are potentially more important, not to mention newly discovered natural resources (oil and gas) and the perspective of a possible secure ice





refers to the area located beneath the Polaris or Pole Star, also known as the North Star, to be found in the constellation Ursa Minor, and consisting of the northernmost portion of the world, sea and land.

The Arctic is a polar region located around the North Pole. It consists of vast ice-covered ocean surrounded by treeless permafrost land. The Arctic covers approximately one sixth of the earth's land masses. The northernmost point on the earth's surface is the geographic North Pole, at 90 degrees North latitude. The North Pole is located about 725 kilometres north of Greenland in the middle of the Arctic Ocean, where the sea has a depth of around 4 087 metres.

There are several definitions of the Arctic, one being the land and sea north of the Arctic Circle (66° 33' North), which is also the approximate southern limit of the Midnight Sun and the Polar Nights. Another is the line above which the average daily temperature of the warmest month (July) does not rise above 10 °C. The area north of the tree line, or permafrost area, is also used to determine the Arctic, permafrost being perennially frozen ground that remains at or below zero °C (32 °F) for two or more years. In this article, the Arctic shall mean the area north of the Arctic Circle.

free passage across the Arctic, and the opening of new cost-effective shipping routes between Europe/North America and Asia. So no wonder why the Arctic region is on the legal and political agenda of many Arctic and other states.

This article intends to shed some light on what is happening in the Arctic. It will, however, only take a look at some topics and only scratch the surface. Hopefully, though, this will be sufficient to inspire readers to learn more on their own.

Definition of the Arctic

The word "Arctic" is thought to come from the Greek word *arketos*, meaning "bear". It



Source: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), 2004, Impacts of a Warming Arctic.

The retreating ice-shelf: "The Arctic is warming nearly twice as fast as the rest of the earth."

Arctic Climate

We know that the earth's temperature fluctuates naturally, and, that the earth currently is in an interglacial period (in between ice-ages). Solar variability and volcanic aerosols are well known to have an impact on the climate. Snow and ice reflect solar energy, and less ice and snow will cause more energy to be received and assimilated by the sea/soil. We further know that Arctic shrinkage leads to captured methane being released from the ice and the permafrost. A rise in greenhouse gas and aerosol emissions driven by human activity leads to a warming in the atmosphere of the earth. Human-created changes to the climate result in uncertain predictions for the future. Scientists agree that the climate of the Arctic region is changing. Evidence of the rise in temperature is provided by hard data gathered from the last 40 years of recording and research.

The climate in the Arctic is harsh and strong winds appear frequently. Precipitation is low and mainly in the form of snow. The weather is known for its unpredictability and rapid changes. Storms may intensify due to increased temperature. Polar cyclones occur, caused by low depression, and are likely to move further north in the future, thus providing safer weather conditions south in the Arctic basin. Air temperatures vary from year to year, and there are local differences. At present, at some locations in the Arctic, the air temperature has risen by up to 6 °C during the last 30 years. In Norway, the average temperature for March 2012 was recorded as the warmest March ever since weather data started being tracked back in the 19th century.

We also know that the oceans conveyor belts, especially the Gulf Stream, have had a large impact on the Arctic climate. Warm water from the Pacific Equatorial Current is brought past the coast of the United States as well as up north along the European west coast before flowing into the Arctic Ocean. This has given a hospitable climate and ice-free ports on both the east and west coasts of the United States, Canada, and Iceland, as well as along the Norwegian coast and that of Northwest Russia. After the water is cooled in the Arctic, it sinks and then travels back to the equator to be warmed up again. Scientific research has proved that the Gulf Stream temperature off the coast of Svalbard (Fram Strait at 1 500 metres depth, 79 degrees North) has remained remarkably stable over



Helicopter view of U.S. and Canadian Coast Guard ships in the Arctic Ocean. Photo by Jessica Robertson, U.S. Geological Survey © USGC.

the last 2 000 years (average of 3-5 °C). The last 30 years have seen a radical and disturbing change, though with a rise in temperature of 2 °C. The Gulf Stream not only has an effect on the climate, but is also affected by changes to the climate. There are several scenarios for us to consider that threaten the Gulf Stream as it exists today, while also reinforcing the effects of an increase in temperature.

Arctic sea ice fields show enormous differences between summer (September -low) and winter (March -high). Indeed, they likely reached their maximum extent for the year on 18 March 2012 covering 15.24 million square kilometres, while the average minima over the last years have varied between 4 million and 7 million square kilometres and show declining trend. Research has shown that the multi-year ice in the Arctic is slowly declining compared to first year ice. Permafrost loss per year has been steadily increasing and the mean Arctic sea ice thickness is in decline.

Current estimates are that the Arctic is warming nearly twice as fast as the rest of the earth. The Arctic area is very sensitive to climate change and whether defined by the tree-line, the temperature line or the permafrost line, is likely to continue to shrink. Because of the different factors with second and third order reinforcing effects, it is hard to provide solid predictions of how fast the Arctic is actually shrinking and when it will eventually stop doing so.

Social aspects

Today eight nations see themselves as Arctic states. These are (population in brackets): the United States (313 million), Canada (35 million), Denmark (5.7 million) and Greenland (57 000), Finland (5.4 million), Iceland (320 000), Norway (5 million), Russia (143 million), Sweden (9.4 million). Approximately 4 million of these live in the Arctic, mainly holding jobs in sectors such as natural resources exploitation, security, research and provision of support services to people living and operating in the area.

History

After the establishment of NATO in 1949, the militarization of the Arctic continued throughout the Cold War. As a result of America's polar strategy, radar early warning systems and airbases were set up from Alaska to Greenland. Inside the Soviet Union, the Kola Peninsula became a core area for nuclear submarines, strategic bombers, and home base for the Northern Fleet. In 1958, the U.S. nuclear submarine Nautilus accomplished the first undersea voyage to the geographic North Pole.

NATO focused on collective defence and how to best defend its members from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Alliance (WP). In North Norway defence infrastructure was established as part of NATO's strategy for allied reinforcements. Detailed





THE NAUTILUS: the world's first Arctic submarine, 21 January 1954, in the Thames River shortly after a christening ceremony. Photo by U.S. Navy

planning and exercises to prepare forces and headquarters for a possible war against the WP were undertaken on an annual basis. Between 1950 and 1990, around 132 nuclear weapons tests were conducted on the island of Novaya Zemlja in the Soviet Union part of the Arctic. Military intelligence gathering and capability development were extreme on both sides. The Russian Federation was founded in 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Legal aspects

A legal framework, accepted by all states present in the region is paramount to cooperation and security. The five nations bordering the Arctic Ocean (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States) have agreed that the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) is to form the legal basis for all activities in the region. The states all want secure access and their share of available natural resources to foster economic activity and prosperity. Nations strongly anticipate oil and gas extraction, mining, fishing and shipping within their territorial waters (12 nautical miles), and Exclusive Economic Zone (200 nautical miles). All the littoral states pursue Extended Continental Shelf recognition. In 2008, Arctic littoral states committed to apply the existing legal framework to delimitation in the Arctic.

Policy

Arctic region policies have some commonalities across the five littoral states, even if their focus and priorities inevitably vary to a certain degree. All the Arctic states are preoccupied with sovereignty (and the means to defend it, such as coastguard and defence forces), their right to exploit natural resources, commercial development, maritime shipping, increase in human activity, scientific research for future usage, and protection of the environment. Research has been an international effort through a collaborative network. The nations' governmental and non-governmental organizations all contribute to the common interests. Information is shared, but does information sharing include sharing all types of information and, if so, to what extent?

TODAY THE EIGHT NATIONS that see themselves as Arctic states are all members of the [Arctic Council](#). Six indigenous people are also represented on the Arctic Council through the following organizations: Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East, and the Sami Council. Established in 1996, the Arctic Council serves as a high-level intergovernmental forum for political and scientific discussions on common issues. Observers are permitted and can be permanent or

temporary. One of the achievements is the 2010 Search and Rescue Agreement: Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, which is the first legally binding instrument negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council.

All Arctic states are concerned about sustainable development of the environment. The key words here are protecting indigenous peoples and their way of life, as well as the existing biodiversity. This effort will be valuable for many generations to come.

The energy security risk is assessed as very low for the Arctic littoral states. Their energy requirements are met and supplied, and there are adequate agreements and some cross-border transmission capacity. The necessary infrastructure to support new exploitation sites is not in place, though. Sustainability and security will need to be built into the plans to this effect.

There are still nuclear waste, weapons and reactors in the Russian part of the region. The states involved share a common interest to control these facilities and find adequate solutions for storage and safeguarding.

Constant surveillance and assessments of the climate and the human activity in the Arctic are essential for a nation's ability to respond to a given situation and develop good strategies. The requirement for control of existing legislation and judicial matters within their own areas of responsibility, as well as the other states' willingness and capability to do the same, are also essential to confidence building and trust between states.

Non-Arctic states mainly pursue economic interests in the Arctic like natural resources (oil and gas), shipping routes, tourism and fisheries. They are always on the watch for new strategic realignments. Naval presence in the Arctic has so far been limited to vessels from European states.

Economy

The Arctic states already have a significant economic interest in the Arctic. Indeed the Arctic contribution to their Gross Domestic Products (GDP) is today approximately twelve percent for Russia, six percent for Norway, and less than one percent for Canada, Denmark (Greenland) and the USA. This is a clear indication of the Arctic's importance to some nations, and hence, their increased political and economic focus on



future development and exploitation of its assets. Fish has been the silver of the Arctic for a long time. Also the whales, seals and other species used to be important as prey by humans. Arctic waters hold large quantities of fish. Typical species caught include cod, char, flounder, capelin, sucker, trout and whitefish only to mention a few. Fisheries have increased steadily in recent years, mostly due to the warmer climate and the large amount of resources. Vessels tend to go to Arctic seas for longer and longer periods of time each year. Fisheries are seasonal, rather than year-round, with the highest fishing effort occurring around autumn and winter.

Norway is the Arctic state that benefits the most. This includes ownership of around half of the number of fishing vessels,



while Russia profiles as a good number two. Fisheries are concentrated in the Norwegian and Barents Seas. No fishing activities are observed in the Arctic basin – north of 82 degrees North latitude. A rigid monitoring, control and surveillance system has been established in Norwegian as well as Russian national waters to crack down on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing so as to help sustain fisheries and saving species for future generations.

A harsh winter climate and the absence of major population centres, and any extensive commerce and cooperation have led to the Arctic having a very minimal supporting shore side infrastructure, the only exception being the infrastructure found along the Norwegian and Russian coastlines. For each littoral state, the marine infrastructure currently includes about 50 ports, of which the largest is Murmansk (330 000 inhabitants) located in Northwest Russia. The largest U.S. port is Kodiak (6 273), while for Canada it is Iqaluit (6 200), for Norway Tromsø (68



200) and for Greenland Nuuk, also known as Godthaab (15 047). These ports are where the population exists. The states all see emphasis on developing the infrastructure as a foundation for economic and social growth. Recent years have seen a small increase in overall marine shipping activity, always expected to peak in September. The cargo and

tanker traffic is mainly resupply of smaller settlements and extraction of industrial goods and materials. Most activity is observed along the Norwegian coast and the Northwest coast of Russia.

Tourism so far is not very common, except for polar expeditions. The last 10-15 years, however, have seen growing awareness of the Arctic and tourism is up, ranging from private polar expeditions to Northern Light (Aurora Borealis) or polar bear (*Ursus Maritimus*) viewing trips.

Tourists arrive by boat (passenger vessels, ferries) or air to one of the few civilian airfields or ports that exist. The ferry activity is almost year-round, while passenger vessels come mainly during the summer season. Cruise ships tend to focus on Svalbard,



Greenland and the Canadian archipelago. There is also some activity in U.S. and Russian waters. Recent predictions about natural resources such as gas, oil and minerals look promising for some Arctic states. Most of the known petroleum deposits are within Exclusive Economic Zones.

Today, petroleum activity and development are conducted gradually at a controlled pace. Most offshore activity is performed by combinations of consortiums from multiple

Photo by Torbjørn Kjosvold



In addition to Norwegian newspapers and media, for more background information see the further reading below:

<http://www.arcticportal.org>
<http://www.arctic-council.org>
<http://www.grida.no>
<http://nsidc.org>

Maps with overlays

<http://www.arcticpeoples.org>
<http://www.kystverket.no/en/>
<http://en.wikipedia.org>
<http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/>
<http://www.mapmatters.org>
<http://natolibguides.info/arcticsecurity>

The Norwegian Naval Home Guard vessel Olav Trygvasson during the exercise Cold Response 2012. Photo by Nils Bernt Rinde



countries. The only offshore field currently in production in the Arctic is the Snøhvit (Snow White) gas field off North Norway. Located some 600 kilometres north of the Kola Peninsula, the Russian-controlled Shtokman gas development is thought to be one of the world's largest natural gas fields with reserves estimated at 3.8 trillion cubic metres of natural gas and more than 37 million tonnes of gas condensate.

Sea lines of communications across the Arctic have been a human dream for almost half a millennium. Increased temperatures and ice melting make this project more likely to succeed today than ever before. Depending on the ice state, the route could be north westerly or north easterly or a combination of the two. Current experience and short-term predictions favour the north easterly route, the Northern Sea Route (NSR), sometimes referred to as the North East Passage. To get an idea of the distance savings available from a transit through the Arctic, a ship will have to travel 12 200 kilometres only to get from New York to Yokohama, Japan while the distance via the Panama Canal is 15 800 kilometres. Today, the amount of shipping across Arctic waters is low, with all the activity being seen on the Russian side. About 20 ships made the passage last year, mostly in late summer.

Maritime research has grown in interest and importance over the last decade, involving not only the Arctic states, but also na-

tions and organizations from across Europe and Asia. Observed mostly in the summer season, maritime research activities have increased by more than 100 percent over the last five years. Offshore research is undertaken by a small number of ships and organizations. Russia and Norway own most of the research ships, while others come from the United States, the UK, Germany, Sweden, Iceland, Denmark, and China, just to mention the most important ones. Maritime research ships have focused on the Norwegian and Barents Seas and tend to sail to different locations from year to year. On land, Svalbard has become a centre for Arctic research. Around 20 countries were engaged in research work in or from Svalbard in 2011.

Military presence and role

All Arctic States use their military means and coast guard in support of their national interests. Iceland, however, has a coast guard but no defence forces. The military ambitions among the Arctic states differ. Some of them use military forces to support civilian tasks, others not. Command, Control and Communications vary, as do responsibilities and missions. None of the Arctic states can be said to have an aggressive military stance although the actual presence of military personnel may, at times, be interpreted and perceived as if they do. The threshold for using military force is thought to dif-

fer. Defence forces stationed in the Arctic are equipped and trained primarily for cold weather operations. In respect of other units belonging to the Arctic states, but located outside of the Arctic region itself, capabilities and skills vary. How many they are and how often they train also depend on their mission. Some smaller units have high skills in winter war fighting, while others have situational awareness only.

Military tasks in the Arctic may typically be: provision of assistance in support of civilian security tasks; development of situational awareness through surveillance and reconnaissance; search and rescue operations; regional security cooperation; disaster response; maritime security; border control; air, sea and land control; power projection; establishment of operational or logistical bases; deterrence; air and missile defence – to mention only a few. This includes the protection of certain military capabilities and continuous intelligence operations.

Today, for most of the Arctic states, long-term political and economic interests are the main factors driving their Arctic military development. With the Arctic NATO member countries for the last ten years focused on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (desert), Arctic and maritime high intensity war fighting has been reduced in priority to a manageable level.



Information

The Arctic states share information through a variety of means. These range from organizational meetings, bilateral talks, press conferences, media events, internet sites, exchange of scientific reports and findings, etc. The Arctic states all utilize media to disseminate information in line with their public relations strategies. Strategic communication is one thing that one cannot afford to neglect in our time. It is utilized to share opinions, try out opinions, affect opinions or show ability to enforce decisions as a “player”. A free media sector must be able to cover all of the Arctic and its peoples. Small interest groups must be heard and all aspects of knowledge must be shared. Today, Arctic governmental and non-governmental organizations utilize the internet to share information and documents and for communication. Social media allow for fast communication with huge masses of people simultaneously. Arctic universities and colleges linked in a network is another positive way of sharing knowledge, products and opinions in order to build confidence and reinforce knowledge and understanding.

Future challenges

Arctic states have many **political interests** in common. Their priorities, however, may not always be the same, and this may cause conflict of interests. Several boundary issues have been resolved lately, one proof of which is the maritime delimitation agreement between the Russian Federation and Norway, which is a genuine example of an important step forward. Removing potential sources of future conflict is a continuous effort for all.

The Arctic's biodiversity is vast and its **ecosystems are vulnerable**. Climate changes will impact the survival of species, the migration of some species and human utilization of species for prosperity and economic growth. The various policies and agreements governing fish catches and landings, marine fisheries minimum sizes, legal fishing gear, etc. require special attention to prevent nations from damaging an already very vulnerable ecosystem. Discord is likely to occur in the event of failure not only to share information and data, but also to adopt tough decisions binding on all. Knowledge is key to success but should be coupled with a strict control regime and a wide data collection focus. And of course, such an effort



Infrastructure in the Arctic: Map by UNEP/GRID-Arendal.

Sources: United States Geological Survey (USGS); AMAP 1997, 1998 and 2002; CAFF, 2001; UNEP/ World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC); United States Energy Information Administration (EIA); International Energy Agency (IEA); Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC); Comité professionnel du pétrole (CPDP), Paris; Institut français du pétrole (IFP), Paris; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); The World Bank; Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, Division of Spill Prevention and Response; United States Coast Guard (USCG); ESRI Data & Maps 2000.

has to be followed by an analysis and sharing of information on a regional basis to ensure that trends and/or serious implications are spotted at an early stage.

Natural resources are considered to be sufficient for the near future, but are not evenly distributed among the Arctic states. These export quite substantial amounts of energy such as fossil fuels, hydropower and nuclear energy. A more challenging factor, however, is the outside world's requirements for energy. Energy can be utilized as a political tool to promote national interests. Approximately 80 percent of the gas supplies from Russia to Europe flow through pipelines across Ukraine. This situation has caused rows that have grown into transnational political issues. Also the Arctic region may come under influence, and face pressure, from countries short of energy resources.

Nuclear weapons reduction and **nuclear waste** reduction are a priority for smaller states as part of their focus on non-proliferation and nuclear free zones in an effort to eliminate potential risks of environmental disasters and sources of conflicts, as well

as to prevent undesired effects at some later stage. The long-term effect of the Chernobyl nuclear accident (Ukraine, 1986), for instance, is still felt in the Arctic. The sheer presence of nuclear weapons and waste can be perceived as a threat. A reduction of nuclear capabilities in the Arctic will likely be looked upon as a confidence measure.

A major concern across the Arctic is how to maintain and secure future generations' possibilities of exploiting the living resources of the ocean such as **fish**. So far, there are few documented adverse effects of a warmer Arctic. What is certain, though, is that fishing fleets will migrate where the fish is, travelling farther from ports and staying longer at sea. Illegal fishing is likely to occur at the same locations as legal fishing. If this trend continues, increased surveillance, control measures, security forces and search and rescue capabilities will be required. Solid agreements on legal issues and regulations, adequate communications and ability to communicate in the same language at the appropriate level will become all the more important in the future due to increased activity.



Development in general and extraction of natural resources in the Arctic will lead to increased **shipping traffic**. New population centres may be established and existing ones will grow, thus requiring more transportation of goods and materials. There are relatively few aids for navigation, and communication relays have poor coverage except along the year-round ice-free coastline. New routes offer few major ports or safe havens. Search and rescue capabilities are limited. Navigating the Arctic is not risk-free. Sailors of the region are aware of the challenges, outsiders sometimes not so much. With a potentially increasing shipping sector, the authorities together with the sector will have to improve climate predictability and develop common regulations, as well as basic infrastructure and support to help sustain continued operations.

Tourism will most likely increase. The Arctic is still seen as quite an exotic destination, and warmer climate and a recent increase in civilian air and shipping traffic will draw attention as long as rates are kept low enough. No doubt there will be incidents in the future, which again demands adequate and reliable search and rescue capabilities.

There is minimal risk of conflict being caused by disagreement over ownership of **petroleum** resources. There are, however, other challenges to consider and overcome. Exploitation of oil and gas is not easy given the harsh environment. A lot of appropriate technology is being developed and goes hand in hand with the commercial requirements and prosperity outlook of the states involved. Building oil or gas installations, whether fixed or mobile, and rugged enough to withstand the climate conditions, including massive amounts of drifting pack ice, is a challenge. Huge distances, scarce population and little infrastructure only add to the complexity. Sustaining an operation will require heavy support infrastructure.

Given the fragility of the eco-system, large blowouts could pose a significant threat to the biodiversity and long-lasting survival of sea life. How to contain pollution, were a blowout or oil spill to occur, is challenging. Today, equipment exists for open water handling, and progress is made on how to tackle blowouts and oil spills in waters with ice conditions. Experiments are being conducted to better understand a variety of clean-up options, from containing

the oil to burning it. Oil trapped in pockets under the ice presents the most intricate challenge for which there are currently no solutions. A blowout or oil spill from a tanker could have very negative effects across borders and impact relations across the whole region. So it is essential to ensure that exploitation of oil and gas is tightly balanced with the need to preserve and protect the environment. Response equipment for handling oil spills on water need to be developed to allow for a robust response should a contingency arise. This will also reduce the risk of environmental activists making high profile protests, which may turn violent and, if they materialize, may not only impact decisions on exploitation and strategic planning, but also tarnish public image and international relations.

New and stable **transportation lines** across the Arctic would make it easier and more cost-effective for trade between the Western world and Asia. Distances from production sites to markets may be shortened by as much as 7 000 kilometres. This could lead to renewed interest in, and renewed prospects for, cooperation between the nations involved. However, weather conditions on the Arctic route will remain harsher than on other existing routes. Pack ice and ice-covered waters are chokepoints, as are drifting icebergs and ice, which will continue to pose a challenge. Pack ice may be as deep as 40 metres. Other challenges include lack of predictability, rapid changes to weather and ice conditions, icing of ships, darkness (winter time), fog (summer) and high seas. For the foreseeable future, conventional shipping routes are likely to continue to be used as they offer the advantage of being more secure. Also inland logistics and transshipment infrastructure need considerable development to favour a maritime route across Arctic waters. Increased shipping would result in security challenges, and the Bering Strait could become a new maritime chokepoint.


Knowledge, more transparency and more cooperation in terms of **military** activities are essential in reducing the perceived tension in the Arctic. Today, we see a rise in training events, especially on the Canadian, Norwegian and Russian side. It is important for the common interest to include Russia and other Arctic states in common exercises as it allows building trust

and the ability to solve future challenges together. NATO's future regional focus will need some creative thinking. An adequate NATO comprehensive approach in respect of the Arctic is required. The know-how and the ability to operate military formations in cold weather conditions need to be sustained. This requires frequent training and exercises. More military cooperation and transparency among the Arctic States, including Russia, will most likely contribute to the further development of the NATO-Partnership for Peace programme.

Summary

There are many future challenges to cope with in the Arctic, some already known, some yet to be known. The increased activity in the region brings demands that we act as responsible stewards of the fragile Arctic environment for the good of all, in particular future generations. More commercial, maritime and tourist activity will increase the risk of accidents, disasters and illegal activities. Such negative impacts must be planned for, and due account must be taken of the need to protect and preserve the environment. Revitalizing or expanding Arctic military capabilities is something that is driven by national strategic interests. More transparency should be the norm for information on military activities in the Arctic in order to reduce the risk of incidents and political spill-over but should not hinder good cooperation and future development since all have a common interest in solving Arctic challenges.

It is important that nations have a long-term perspective on the development of the Arctic. Building trust and confidence among the Arctic states is paramount to success. As are the acceptance of legal frameworks and the willingness to solve future disputes and issues jointly, in existing or new arenas. In respect of countries outside the Arctic, the Arctic states need to share more information and knowledge in order to instill confidence and gain support, which is important in order to help foster constructive development and good cooperation in the future. The observed increase in activity in the Arctic over the last years provides clear evidence of ongoing changes in, and growing interest for, the region. This is unique in that it creates not only new challenges, but also, and more importantly, new opportunities. †



AFGHANISTAN

ISAF TE 11/02 INTERVIEW

Special Operations Forces to become more in demand beyond 2014

By Inci Kucukaksoy
PAO, Joint Warfare Centre

THE COMMANDER OF U.S. SPECIAL FORCES, Admiral William H. McRaven, who commanded the Special Operations team that captured and killed Osama bin Laden, summarized principles of the special operations as: Simplicity, Security, Repetition, Surprise, Speed and Purpose. In Afghanistan linking with the population and firepower solutions go hand in hand for the Special Operations Forces. However, it is their unconventional warfare capabilities that receive more attention than their mentorship and training role in the counter-insurgency (COIN) fight, which seeks to bring security and stability to the Afghan people. In Afghanistan, while hunting terrorists, killing and capturing their leaders and discouraging any counter-attacks, the Special Operations Forces have also been

working alongside local communities in selected rural villages, helping build and train local police forces to defeat the insurgency, engaging in tactical firefights with the enemy and improving the population's perception of the central government and ISAF/Coalition troops.

Helping build trust in a peaceful future is an exceptionally daring and demanding task. Known as "Village Stability Operations", the strategic goal of this four-stage programme (Shape, Hold, Build and Transition) is to strengthen local institutions at the village/district level, which ultimately connects to the national-level governance efforts, in order to stabilize the country. This effort also supports the end of the combat mission in Afghanistan, which has already begun.

Village Stability Operations are the primary effort of the Special Operations Forces due to the fact that turning over security responsibility to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), even though they are well-trained and properly equipped, also necessitates the mobilization of the rural villages that are outside the Afghan Government's range of security in order to protect and serve the country.

The training of ANSF is critical for Afghanistan's future. Commander of ISAF and U.S. troops in Afghanistan, U.S. Marine Corps General John R. Allen, said the

Above (left): A village elder talks at a local Shura. U.S. Army photo by Sgt Ben Watson. (Right): Special Forces anti-insurgent operations, photo by U.S. DoD.



ISAF TE 11/02: Special Operations Forces training at Ulsnes Training Facility, December 2011. Photo by Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO.



The final Phase of the training on their “road to Kabul” for personnel from Force Command Madrid (FCMD), NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Spain (NRDC-SP) and US V Corps, as well as Individual Augmentees (IAs), deploying to HQ ISAF or IJC in the first few months of 2012 was held at the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), Stavanger 2–15 December 2011. Over the past four years the Training Audience has grown from 175 per event to a peak of 383 personnel in December. The break down of personnel is very interesting and shows that personnel are coming from, not just within NATO, but also across the Globe. There were 105 from EUROCORPS, 83 from NRDC-SP, 64 from FCMD, 25 from US V Corps and 106 IAs from the ISAF Troop Contributing Nations. Non NATO personnel travelled from as far as Australia and New Zealand, as well as from the Ukraine and Ireland to attend the training.

— Extracted from an article by Squadron Leader Dean Gibson, Royal Air Force, JFC Brunssum in Northern Star magazine.

following words in his COMISAF Letter to the Troops, dated 18 July 2011: *“In the field, Afghan National Security Forces’ formations are growing in size and in confidence. Afghans are fighting for their country, and we must facilitate this everywhere we can, seeking opportunities for Afghan leadership to step forward in their institutions and in the field. Moving the ANSF to the lead, at every level, is crucial to success. We know our recruiting, development, and fielding plans remain sound; and in the field, the ANSF want to fight for their Afghanistan. The requirement for trainers and advisors will continue to grow in importance and evolve over time.”*

IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN the role of the Special Operations Forces within the overall campaign in Afghanistan and give an insight into the Village Stability Operations initiative, Colonel Stuart Goldsmith, the Operations Officer of U.S. Special Operations Command – Joint Capabilities (SOC-JC) HQ, and his team came to Stavanger, Norway, to participate in the ISAF pre-deployment Training Event 11/02 (ISAF TE 11/02) run by the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) from 2 to 15 December 2011. Goldsmith explained the purpose of the training event:

“As part of ISAF’s comprehensive COIN campaign, the Village Stability Operations programme has achieved considerable success in selected villages across Afghanistan, and with full consent of the locals, in undermining the insurgency’s influence, reinforcing the village elders and gaining trust of the population for stabilization and reconciliation activities. Both in theory and practice we are changing the overall relationship with the Afghans. We are treating the local population as the primary solution in their own security. Each individual is the main player and they understand that. Lasting peace and stability depends on full integration of all national elements in Afghanistan. We aim to create conditions for good governance, security and development, which are the three tightly-woven pillars of the Village Security Operations. We are working hard to enable a responsible and effective transition to Afghan security lead in 2014.”

Many nations serving in Afghanistan, under the banner of NATO/ISAF, has their elite special operations troops there conducting joint special operations for the overall mission success. Colonel Goldsmith underlined the importance of unity of effort: “We cannot save the day alone,” he

said, adding: “To conduct successful special operations, we rely on logistics support and other specialties, such as medical expertise and intelligence units. Without the support of HQ ISAF Joint Command and the Coalition, special operations troops in Afghanistan cannot do what they do on the front lines. We are a small rapid team in combat and we heavily depend on everything that the larger force like HQ ISAF Joint Command can provide.”

“In general, the SOC-JC HQ mission involves working with our Allies as well as working with the General Purpose Forces to help them understand how to execute joint special operations. Particularly for Afghanistan our aim is to explain how Special Operations Forces can support the Joint Force Commander’s Concept of Operations, and how they can complement the mission. Here at the JWC, we explain what the U.S. Special Operations in Afghanistan are doing, and what ISAF Special Operations Forces are doing, and how these together complement NATO operations in country. This is especially invaluable for prospective staffs getting ready to deploy that may not have a lot of experience with the Special Operations Forces,” the Colonel further said.



"Because of the extraordinary courage and skill of our ISAF Coalition Partners, and the Afghan National Security Force's fighting men and women, this spring and summer, the insurgents have come back to find that many of their caches are empty; their former strongholds are untenable; and a good many of their foot soldiers absent or unwilling to join the fight. And, most importantly, insurgents are facing a battle-tested and increasingly capable Afghan National Security Force that is also serving as a source of pride to the Afghan people and a symbol of unity for this country. During the last 12 months, the Afghan security forces have expanded from 276,000 to 340,000. They will reach their full surge strength ahead of the scheduled deadline in October."

— **General John R. Allen**, COMISAF, Chicago Summit, 21 May 2012. Photo by Christian Valverde, French Navy, ISAF PAO.



A Special Operations officer on the SOC-JC team noted that the JWC training reflected the current and future security environment very realistically, especially preparing the Training Audience for unconventional threats. He said: "Through the Village Stability Operations across the country, we establish relationships with many village elders, who are the main decision-makers. Following the invitation of the elders, we embed ourselves in *Jirgas* and *Shuras* to fully assess their individual security and development needs. These remote villages have either no or limited civil and security services of the Afghan Government. If elders need increased security and have the will to degrade insurgent influence and control, we help them establish a local police force, also known as the 'Afghan Local Police'. We oversee that the right people are selected to make up the Afghan Local Police. We train them, we live with them, fully embedded, and we fight with them and gain their trust and confidence. This is an extremely complex environment as it also supports the nationwide Afghan-owned and Afghan-led model of operations."

According to the SOC-JC team, stabilisation, achieved by dynamic interaction with the locals, is the most effective instrument in support of the Afghan government. Does the future of Afghanistan depend on villages resolved to battling insurgency? The Special Operations officer responds: "This is a bottom-up COIN methodology where the tribal leaders and village-level

governance connect to district/province-level governance, development and security. The district/province level then connects to the Afghan Government, which will ultimately support the rule of law in the country and build capacity for enduring stability. What we have so far achieved through the Village Stability Operations programme is an extremely important investment for the future of Afghanistan."

"The Training Audience in Stavanger is very receptive," added Colonel Goldsmith. "We identify their training needs, share best practices and lessons learned in tactics, techniques and procedures and help improve interoperability. The training at the Joint Warfare Centre improves the efficiency and effectiveness of modern warfighters and adjusts their mindset about the mission of Special Operations Forces today and in the future. It will have a direct impact on the ground. This is a real education."

According to Colonel Goldsmith, there will be a growing role for Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan, once the majority of conventional forces leave Afghanistan, to help prevent a potential return to chaos and insurgency.

"We will be engaged in a pretty robust role in counter-terrorism and training, both belonging to the realm of Special Operations. Special Operations Forces have the best trainers and the toughest fighters. We will continue developing the capacity of Afghanistan's national security forces to operate effectively. We are very encouraged by

the growth and development we have seen through the Village Stability Operations initiative. The centre of gravity for the Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan is the population and winning their support. COIN aims to defeat the insurgency but the priority is given to keeping the population safe. However, we are not trained to hold a country without enough conventional forces to support us for airpower, supplies and medical aid, so we are not without challenges." ✦

Extracts from ISAF Commander's Enduring Priorities, May 2012

"We want the ANSF to be in the lead. We think that is the right thing to do. It is the ultimate symbol of sovereignty of Afghanistan."

— General John R. Allen
Commander of ISAF and U.S. troops in Afghanistan

- The Coalition will continue to support Afghanistan through 2014 and the "decade of transformation" that will follow.
- Transition is a reality; it is the Afghans assuming the lead responsibility for security with the international community in close support and partnership.
- The ANSF's combat effectiveness has begun to fracture the insurgency and persuade its commanders and fighters to reintegrate and return home.

JWC Office of the Legal Advisor

NATO Training and Exercise Support

By Colonel Brian H. Brady, USA A
U.S. Army Staff Judge Advocate CJIAF 435

■ Continued from Page 47.

NATO collective training and exercises

JWC's Programme of Work (POW) is weighted heavily in favor of Allied Command Transformation's exercise and training mission. JWC is not just a training platform, however, since it also works transformation projects, which will be discussed in the final section of this article. From my perch, JWC's biggest focus is upon ISAF Training Events, ISAF Predeployment Training (IAPDT), and STEADFAST (NATO Response Force/NRF) exercises and training. These exercise and training events require significant build up and participation from the commands that JWC supports. Key NATO training guidance comes from Bi-SC 75-3, which not only outlines the collective training process but also key roles played by commanders in ACT and ACO.

The commander (e.g., SACEUR or COM JFC Brunssum) requiring an exercise is designated the Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE) who places the requirement on NATO's master exercise calendar and establishes command training objectives. The OSE may designate an Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE) who may command a NATO Force Structure entity (e.g., COM NRDC Italy). In turn the OSE will designate an Officer Directing the Exercise (ODE). The ODE "supports the OCE for the detailed planning and overall execution of the exercise by creating the conditions, which allow the achievement of the exercise aim and objectives." JWC is normally the ODE and supports exercises and training through scenario development, Lessons Learned capture, analysis, and execution of the script system known as the Joint Exercise Management Module, JEMM.

The ISAF exercise construct

The JWC lead LEGAD officer for ISAF training must have some experience or knowledge of the ISAF mandate in order to be effective. The JWC lead LEGAD is expected to serve, *inter alia*, in the following roles: LEGAD Subject Matter Expert (SME); Functional Area Training (FAT)/Battle Staff Training (BST) moderator for the LEGAD training audience; instructor on legal topics during Mission Specific Training (MST) and Cross-FAT; and role player during the exercise.

During my tour at JWC, I was fortunate to have deployed to Afghanistan twice. JWC may send its personnel to Kabul during the ISAF Training Refinement Conference or Data Capture. While travel to theater is challenging, it pays off by giving JWC personnel personal knowledge of the latest command arrangements and processes. As a LEGAD it gave me key insights to theater LEGADs at not only HQ ISAF and the IJC but also NTM-A, and a handful of other legal offices, (such as RC-North's LEGAD, and Norway's Contingency Command Legal Office both located in Marz-e-Sharif).

ISAF training events depend in large part upon SMEs from theatre. During the past two ISAF training events, JWC-sponsored SMEs have included not only HQ ISAF and IJC LEGADs but also NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) LEGADs who bring a critical perspective for the transition phase of the ISAF mission. The prospective JWC LEGAD cannot rely on SMEs alone and must possess rudimentary knowledge of the ISAF mission. Consequently, this portfolio demands a lawyer who is deployable and equipped for missions down range to obtain currency in ISAF operations.

The NRF exercise construct

NRF training takes a different tack from ISAF exercises and uses a phased approach to develop an operational level staff. The JWC lead LEGAD has several additional

duties requiring creativity, and include the following: scenario development including "preparing United Nations Security Council Resolutions, Status of Forces Agreements;" prepare EXPLAN Annex, Rules of Engagement; assist with scripting for legal realism; serve as Observer/Trainer during Phases 1, 2, and 3; prepare briefs or point papers on legal issues (ROE, LOAC, legal basis for the mission). The Observer/Trainer role may include travel to a JFC to assist the LEGAD staff in their roles or present the legal scenario to the training audience. Knowledge of NATO doctrine, Command and Control structures and operational processes (such as ROE and joint targeting) are critical skills.

Exercise logistics

Exercise logistical support and host nation support are identified up to five years in advance of a NATO exercise under the Military Training and Exercise Program (MTEP). As part of the MTEP process, the Strategic Commands identify the host nation for the exercise. Templates for requesting and developing HNs agreements are found in Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 4.5A. For logisticians and LEGADs alike, AJP 4.5A provides a useful template, which is useful not just for exercises but also other operational logistical support requirements. Note that some nations may require substantial staffing to accept HNS MOUs, Technical Arrangements. Other processes exist to obtain support within NATO outside of normal acquisition channels. These rules developed as a result of NATO experience during United States' Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises in the 1970s when Host Nations declined to be bound by U.S. contracting clauses and the Department of Defense found its operations to be impeded by foreign military sales and offshore procurement legal regimes.⁽²²⁾

As an outgrowth of this experience, many NATO Nations and entities (such as SHAPE)



have what are now known as Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) with the United States, enabled under the successor law to the NATO Mutual Support Act of 1979. During a recent exercise in Germany it was necessary to remind both parties (NATO and a HN) that a Standard NATO Agreement (STANAG) existed to provide equipment to NATO and that no basis existed to subject NATO personnel to a HN property accountability regime. One lesson learned is that for an ACSA to work, an official designated as an ACSA Officer must be present during Initial Planning Conferences to determine NATO or other sending nation's support requirements. Note also that the definition of HN may include another sending state that has a facility location on a receiving states' soil. Finally, remember that entering into agreements with a nation requires appropriate authority to negotiate and conclude an international agreement.

Alliance/Integrated Command Structure operations

"[W]hen a group of countries wants to launch a joint intervention as a coalition – which confers political legitimacy – only NATO can provide the common command structure and capabilities necessary to plan and execute complex operations."⁽²³⁾

JWC has a critical role preparing the staff of NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure entities for their operational-level roles. There are few better opportunities than a JWC exercise or training event to learn about Alliance operations and processes at the operational level. Just as importantly, JWC collective exercises and training provides a unique opportunity to network with other LEGADs who will likely collaborate in real world operations where the luxury of the "crawl-walk-run" approach to training, including ice breakers, will be long past. JWC must constantly advertise opportunities for LEGADs. In order to do this, the JWC LEGAD must network with Troop Contributing Nations' (TCN) legal staff, their assignments offices and training departments. For LEGADs whose commanders are dual-hatted as a leader of a NATO command or force, JWC collective training puts the legal issues into perspective. The mix of national and NATO authorities is

a force multiplier and provides TCN commanders with additional operational tools in their legal kitbags.

In an Alliance operation, Alliance rules provide both the political and military framework for unity of effort. Under NATO doctrine, there are three types of multinational command structures: Fully Integrated; Lead Nation; Framework Nation. NATO is the prime example of an Integrated Command Structure, which provides a common umbrella of ROE, staff procedures and political aims. ISAF is NATO-led but is complemented by Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), which is a Lead-Nation Command and Control structure characterized by ad hoc bilateral arrangements. During ISAF pre-deployment exercises, the LEGAD must make distinctions between NATO authorities and Lead-Nation authorities since many commanders are dual-hatted depending on mission type or national caveat. During ISAF exercises it is common to hear the term "coalition forces" used to describe NATO TCNs. Strictly speaking under ISAF's Military Technical Agreement (MTA) with Afghanistan, only forces assigned to or partnered with the US-led OEF are defined as "coalition forces": in practice all players in-theatre, ISAF or OEF, are referred to as coalition forces despite the technical distinction under the MTA. While the mission in Afghanistan is a team effort demanding complementary capabilities of all ranges of command and control structures, non-military entities, under the Comprehensive Approach, NATO LEGADs must make accurate use of terminology to ensure their commanders can leverage all the appropriate legal tools available to them while wearing the right "hat."

Build NATO legal capacity for future operations

However successful, NATO's intervention in Libya suggested that the organization must strengthen its basic infrastructure if it hopes to increase its role in global security . . . Within the command structure, for example, the Alliance has failed to devote the necessary resources to developing key skills, including the capacity to find and engage the types of mobile targets common in contemporary operations, plan joint operations in parallel with fast-paced political decision-making, support the targeting process with legal advice . . .⁽²⁴⁾

Upon review of Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP – the NATO-led mission to enforce the UNSCR mandate in Libya) SA-CEUR declared that NATO must train more lawyers, amongst other personnel, to assist with Targeting. JWC assists with that goal during its two annual ISAF Training Events, and two NATO Response Force (NRF)/STEADFAST series exercises. Three months before Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples executed OUP it had participated in NRF exercise STEADFAST JUNO 10. As a LEGAD Observer/Trainer, I had the unique opportunity of working with the JFC Naples LEGAD as they refined their operational capabilities. The following sections outline some common issue areas that are exercised at JWC.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

NATO has its own Rules of Engagement as part of its integrated Alliance Command and Control structure. The LEGAD who advises a commander on operational matters needs to be versed in the general menu of NATO ROE. ANNEX E of NATO OPLANs will contain operationally tailored ROE, which are approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The key guidance is issued via ROE Implementation message (ROE-IMPL – pronounced "Row-impull"), which give detailed rules tailored to the mission. Additional legal definitions and guidance will be contained in the OPLAN's legal ANNEX AA. NATO does not issue ROE on self defence, because NATO considers self defence to be a matter of national law. NATO exercises give plenty of opportunity to test sufficiency of ROE and use of force.

(22) For the seminal discussion of this history see Captain Fred T. Pribble (now Colonel retired and General Counsel for the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency), A Comprehensive Look at the NATO Mutual Support Act of 1979, Military Law Review, July 89, pp.187-255.

(23 & 24) Daadler, Ivo H. and Stavridis James S. Admiral U.S. Navy [Supreme Allied Commander Europe and U.S. European Command], NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an Intervention, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March-April 2012, p. 4. The authors go further by comparing NATO Alliance operations to multilateral coalitions which "by contrast, have no common doctrine for conducting military operations, no common capabilities or command structure for quickly integrating national forces into a cohesive campaign, and no standing mechanisms for debating then deciding on an agreed course of action. Such ad hoc coalitions therefore almost always rely disproportionately on a single nation to bear the brunt of security burdens that ideally should be more equally shared."



One overlooked aspect of NATO ROE exercises is fixing the role of the ROE Staff Officer – a post on the PE or Crisis Establishment manning document that locates this officer in the Operations Directorate or CJ3 of a NATO operational staff. In some cases that officer may be a trained LEGAD, but may not be operating under the direct supervision of the command's Chief LEGAD. From a Chief LEGAD perspective, this is the time to ensure that only officers assigned to the command's LEGAD deliver legal advice. Ultimately ROE are a commander's tool, therefore the ROE Staff Officer should be an operations officer so that the operations community can build capacity in developing ROE.

Targeting

While knowing the ROE and sliding scale of national defence rules, it all comes together in Targeting. NATO has a refined Targeting process. This process results in what is known as the Joint Prioritized Target List (JPTL – pronounced “Jay-Pit-ul”). Under the standard process, practiced during NRF exercises, the JPTL includes both kinetic and non-kinetic (e.g., influence) targets. NATO Targeting is part of an Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO). NATO's emerging operations doctrine formulated in the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) reinforces use of effects in NATO planning as part of what it terms the “Comprehensive Approach.” The effects approach is also used at the joint operational level by the United States, although it may not be practiced by its service components at the tactical level.

For JWC LEGAD training of personnel designated to fill either a JFC operational staff PE post (such as ROE Staff Officer, or JFC Operational Law LEGAD), or an officer filling an ISAF Joint Command (IJC) CE post, the LEGAD may have to educate the training audience on NATO's EBAO. Alternatively the LEGAD must be sensitive to the training audiences' attitude and cultural proclivities concerning effects as part of the NATO targeting process. For a U.S. LEGAD, however, NATO Targeting is similar to the process defined by United States' joint operational doctrine, which uses the JIPTL. For ISAF operations, LEGADs at all levels (tactical or operational) must understand effects to achieve their commander's intent and ensure success with critical staff processes which occur at the IJC.

HQ ISAF has pushed the targeting process to the ISAF Joint Command (IJC), which manages the Targeting Operations Cell (TOC) and a variety of working groups and boards to nominate, approve, then service the target. The IJC has split the normal NATO practice into two processes: kinetic targeting is handled by the Joint Targeting Working Group (JTWG – pronounced “Jit-Wig”) resulting in the Joint Prioritized Effects List (JPTEL—pronounced “Jay-Pel”); and non-kinetic targeting which results in the Joint Prioritized Influence List (JPSIL—pronounced “Jip-Sill”). Training all deploying LEGADs in this core process ensures that NATO forces comply not only with international law but also command intent to minimize civilian casualties. NATO doctrine provides LEGADs with additional tools to facilitate delivery of cogent legal advice. ACE Directive (AD) 80-70, Annex K provides an extensive list of desired effects and Targeting options for a commander. When combined with NAC-approved targets and commander's intent, this doctrine provides LEGADs a meaningful way to articulate their advice and achieve a rational operational end state.

NATO Concepts, Doctrine and Integration

JWC, as SACT's agent, will be responsible for managing collective experimentation in exercises. JWC will assign an Experimentation Integrator and lead the Operational Experimentation and Capability Integration Process. Furthermore, JWC provides concept integration of innovative or mature concepts (methods, procedures and/or techniques) as directed by HQ SACT and ACO on exercises focusing on the operational level. (Bi-SC Dir. 75-3)

The Comprehensive Approach

The NATO approach to the operational art emphasizes leveraging of all tools to achieve the desired NATO End State. While COIN has taken on a life of its own in both NATO and national doctrine, the Comprehensive Approach is NATO's answer to volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) operations environments. In essence, the “[C]omprehensive Approach can be described as a means to ensure a coordinated and coherent response to crisis by all relevant actors,” (COPD, Annex A). Several initiatives follow from adoption of the Comprehensive Approach. First, JWC uses experimentation and integration of concepts into exercises

testing their validity. Second, JWC convenes working groups to analyze and develop NATO concepts such as the Comprehensive Approach. As a LEGAD, the Comprehensive Approach lends itself to examination of the legal relationships between NATO forces and civil-military actors. The legal aspects created by the relationship between non-NATO actors and NATO-oriented actors in CIMIC, Stability Operations, and Rule of Law lend themselves to doctrine development. For example, the newly established NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission (NROLFSM) as a subordinate command of COMISAF will present an excellent opportunity for NATO to fine tune the definition of Rule of Law and how it is executed.

Multiple Futures

ACT sponsored a review of drivers of change in an attempt to identify emerging threats and the security implications they pose for NATO. As part of ACT's and JWC's transformational review of NATO concepts and doctrine, JWC can integrate various futures into its exercise scenarios to explore operational ways and means to neutralize future threats. The Comprehensive Approach is a start down this path. Additionally, NATO experiments in scenarios operating under Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations can address the legal issues that arise from increased cooperation with non-NATO entities. As NATO transforms its structures, new staff processes have to develop to rapidly counter asymmetric future threats.

Conclusion

Service at NATO's JWC provides a unique optic into the way the Alliance prepares for operations and its conduct of daily business on Alliance territory. With a drawdown of sending states forces on Alliance territory, more Allied staff will be exposed to integrated Alliance operations. From time-to-time this may place staff beyond their comfort zone. Requirements for NATO personnel trained in the operational art will be immediate and allow little time for preparation once a crisis response operation is being executed. JWC's training and exercise platforms allow this new breed of staff officer to learn key NATO processes and identify the many legal issues associated with future scenarios. I trust that relating my perspective as a JWC LEGAD has contributed to the reader's better understanding of the NATO operating environment. †

■ COVER STORY



INFORMATION OPERATIONS VS. TARGETING: TWO SHIPS ON A COLLISION COURSE

By Major Martijn van der Meijs, NLD A
SME Information Operations/STRATCOM
Joint Warfare Centre, Joint Training Division

Doctrinal overlap

The purpose of this article is to outline some recent developments within the military functional areas of Information Operations (Info Ops) and Targeting, but also to point out the doctrinal overlap, which has developed between the two functional areas in recent years.

One of the main documents outlining the doctrine on Info Ops is Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.10 from November 2009. In it, Info Ops is defined as “a military function to provide advice and coordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives.”

In short, it is a coordinating function without its own capabilities or troops-to-task. The definition is also rather abstract,

and when looking at it a bit closer one will quickly realize that information activities (“actions designed to affect information and/or information systems”) encompass almost every military activity: anything a military force does, whether it is a lethal or a non-lethal activity, will inevitably send a message. As a consequence, Info Ops staff officers will want to coordinate almost everything, and AJP-3.10 specifically mentions amongst others Psychological Operations, Presence/Posture/Profile, Key Leader Engagement and Physical Destruction.

TARGETING, ON THE OTHER HAND, is a well-established military function that goes back centuries. It has traditionally focussed on physical destruction and is defined in both AJP 3.9 (2008) and ACO Directive 80-70 (2010, under revision). In both these documents, and as a relatively new de-

velopment, a target is defined these days as “a selected geographic area, object, capability, person, or organization (including their will, understanding, and behaviour), which can be influenced as part of the military contribution to a political end-state”.

Comparing these two definitions touches on an issue which, in my mind, NATO as a whole is struggling to resolve. Info Ops has historically involved coordinating kinetic and non-kinetic activities. Simultaneously, Targeting has, over the last few years, started to focus more on “influencing” and not only on physical destruction. As a result, both functions are now overlapping more and more.

Coordination of activities and effects

There is no doubt about the importance of coordinating and synchronizing military activities so that they complement each other.



«WHEN THERE IS A DOCTRINAL OVERLAP SUCH AS THIS, WITHOUT A CLEAR DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES, IT CAN RESULT IN CONFUSION, DUPLICATION OF EFFORT, A LACK OF COORDINATION BUT MORE SIGNIFICANTLY COULD RESULT IN PROLONGED OPERATIONS, WASTE OF RESOURCES AND LOSS OF LIFE.»



er to achieve synergy in accomplishing the effects necessary to reach Operational Objectives. Even though the NATO-term “Effects-Based Approach to Operations” is no longer in use, the principles it outlined are still valid and practised within a Comprehensive Approach. And there are ample examples from operations like ISAF and UNIFIED PROTECTOR and numerous NATO exercises where there is a clear understanding across NATO of the importance of using clearly defined effects as a foundation for conducting military activities.

However, the doctrinal overlap between Info Ops and Targeting, as mentioned earlier, increasingly raises issues about how this coordination is conducted within a headquarters, who is responsible for it and how it supports a Decision Cycle.

Take for example Key Leader Engagement (KLE); the capability to engage with key leaders in an Area of Operations to achieve specific desired effects. KLE is clearly mentioned in AJP 3.10 as a capability for Info Ops to coordinate. At the same time, Targeting also considers KLE in an effort to influence key persons. In fact, AD 80-70 (in Annex K) lays out Joint Targeting System (JTS) codes for Influencing Leadership or

Influencing Population. Doctrinally, KLE quickly becomes both functional areas’ responsibility. In practise, should a Key Leader Engagement Plan (including background information/target folder, scheduling and meeting preparation) be developed by Info Ops or by Targeting?

One could even argue (although I haven’t actually seen it done before) that selecting all Influencing Leadership-identifiers in JTS, combined with the relevant Target Folders, effectively becomes a Key Leader Engagement Plan. Similar examples of this doctrinal overlap exist with regards to leaflet-drops or radio-broadcasts.

Of course, NATO headquarters usually find pragmatic solutions to these issues. ISAF for example, instead of using a Joint (Prioritized) Target List, started using a Joint (Prioritized) Effects List, differentiating between a list for kinetic engagement and non-kinetic engagement. This overcomes some of the political sensitivities of having some Key Leaders on a Target List, but complicates the coordination process by having to use two separate lists.

Meanwhile, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) decided to resolve the issue in a more organizational approach by creat-

ing a Joint Fires and Influence Branch, effectively combining Targeting and Info Ops in one Branch. Similar approaches have been adopted by recent reorganizations in other NATO headquarters. This approach also effectively returns ownership of the coordination process to where it belongs: with a J3, DCOS OPS, COS and ultimately the COM, as opposed to a separate functional area.


I AM QUITE SURE THAT some readers’ first response would be something like: “it’s not an issue; we do it in this way and that is how it should be done”. But I am also quite sure that they (or their predecessors) must have gone through quite some discussion to get to where they are now. And although it is great when a headquarters has found a way to make it work, it does become an issue when headquarters with different solutions need to work together (like a Joint Force Com-

Above (left): A soldier takes notes during a Key Leader Engagement in Afghanistan. Photo by U.S. Air Force Sgt Rebecca F. Corey. Right: while moving to a new target, the joint force received hostile fire and returned fire in Wardak Province, Afghanistan. Photo by 55th Combat Camera Team.



▼ Cognitive and Physical Effects

Activities in the Physical Domain (red arrows) can create Physical and often also Cognitive Effects. Activities in the Information Domain (yellow arrows) can create Cognitive and occasionally also Physical Effects, but the Cognitive Domain can never be influenced directly.



mand with its Component Commands). It might well turn out that specific tasks in one headquarters are executed in a Targeting Section, whereas another headquarters executes the same tasks in an Info Ops Branch or an Engagement Section. When there is a doctrinal overlap such as this, without a clear delineation of responsibilities, it can result in confusion, duplication of effort, a lack of coordination but more significantly could result in prolonged operations, waste of resources and loss of life.

Physical and Cognitive effects

In a recent STEADFAST exercise, Joint Force Command Lisbon (JFCLB) faced the same kind of issues. Their approach to solving this (and I am a strong supporter of this approach) was to differentiate between Physical and Cognitive Effects where Physical Effects are physical changes to a system or system element while Cognitive Effects are related to will, understanding, perception and behaviour of people.

As part of their Decision Cycle, JFCLB tasked their Info Ops Working Group (IOWG) to focus on Cognitive Effects, while the Joint Targeting Working Group (JTWG) focussed on Physical Effects. The separation of tasks was then joined and coordinated in an Integrated Effects Board where the KLE-plan, Joint Prioritized Target

List, Synchronization Matrix and inputs for a Joint Coordination Order or Fragmentation Order were finalized. This pragmatic approach worked quite well, but it goes against the present doctrines on Info Ops and Targeting. This could be overcome by naming the two working groups Cognitive Effects Working Group and Physical Effects Working Groups.

One of the additional advantages is that differentiating between Cognitive and Physical Effects is a universal concept that is applicable in any type of military operation, although the composition of the respective working groups (just like the composition of the headquarters) would have to be tailored to the operation. In a Natural Disaster Relief operation, for example, a Physical Effects Working Group would largely depend on contributions by medical officers and engineers.

So what?

This article highlighted some of the issues related to the doctrinal overlap between Info Ops and Targeting and outlined some pragmatic solutions to these issues as observed in different NATO headquarters. But perhaps my most important aim is to increase the awareness of the doctrinal overlap across the different functional areas. I am referring back to the analogy in the title

of this article: if Info Ops and Targeting are two ships on a collision course, this article intends to act as a warning signal in a radar system. Even if the radar does not offer a solution, it does alert the two ships of an impending collision urging the captains to take action to steer clear of each other. I can't predict where this will lead, but I do sense that Info Ops as a functional area is fading somewhat. The requirement to synergize military activities remains crucial, but, as an observation, it is increasingly becoming an integral part of decision-making processes and functional responsibilities and less the responsibility of a separate functional area in a section somewhere deep down in an organization. Also, Info Ops was initially intended to act as an umbrella function to coordinate information activities. Some of its responsibilities have been taken over by the umbrella function of Strategic Communications (STRATCOM), but with the advantage that STRATCOM, besides Info Ops and Psychological Operations, also covers Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy outside the military realm. In that sense, Info Ops has become an umbrella under an umbrella, and you really only need one to stay dry... ✦



Anyone wishing further information and guidance is invited to contact the author (right) by e-mail on: martijn.vandermeijs@jwc.nato.int



«THE ROLE OF THE JWC'S MEDIA SIMULATION SECTION IS TO CREATE A REALISTIC MEDIA ENVIRONMENT THAT ALLOWS COMMANDERS AND THEIR STAFFS TO TRAIN ON MEDIA AS A WEAPON SYSTEM.»



1: WNT technicians executing a live broadcast. 2: WNT Producer Pete DuBois briefing Lieutenant General Stoltz before his interview. 3: Lieutenant General Stoltz at WNT studio getting feedback on his media training interview. **Opposite:** WNT Producer Laura L. DuBois interviewing Rear Admiral da Cunha live.

JWC launches new live broadcast studio

By Laura Loflin DuBois

WNT Producer and News Anchor, Media Simulation Section, Joint Warfare Centre

THE JOINT WARFARE CENTRE (JWC) launched its new live media simulation capability during the execution of Exercise STEADFAST JOIST 2012 (SFJT 12). This bold and unprecedented capability sets the new standard in exercise media simulation, which has become an essential component in military training exercises and mission rehearsals. A 20 million Norwegian Krone investment, this live production capability reflects NATO's commitment to comprehensive operational-level training, inclusive of the media battle space.

ACCORDING TO FRENCH ARMY LIEUTENANT GENERAL Philippe Stoltz, Commander, Joint Force Command Lisbon and SFJT 12 NATO Response Force Commander, "As media perception is almost always critical to the success of the operation, because it ensures the support from the involved nations and helps the acceptance of the force in the country it is deployed, the preparation of these media events remains one step that cannot be missed if you want to train properly."

The role of the JWC's Media Simulation Section is to create a realistic media environment that allows commanders and their staffs to train on media as a weapon system. The team replicates television news, print news and social media platforms all distributed through an online intranet website. Interviews, press conferences, and newscasts are normally edited in post-production to give the impression of being broadcast live. It has been an accepted artificial element of exercise design. That has now changed. With the launch of its new state-of-the-art broadcast studio, the JWC Media Simulation Team can now produce and broadcast true live news programs directly to the training audience. It's a *first* for the media simulation community and the impact on the training audience has proven immediate and effective.



PORTUGUESE NAVY REAR ADMIRAL Fernando da Cunha, Joint Force Command Lisbon Chief of Staff experienced this first-hand during SFJT 12. "The Media Cell in JWC is a very important asset in the training and certification process," commented Rear Admiral de Cunha. "First, due to the professionalism of the media team available at JWC, they cleverly provide the 'camera and interviewer' pressure that is expected to be experienced in real world live operations. Second, they provide the challenge and the pressure to the 'interviewed' to know that their interview's content may and will be watched by the target audience and that the statements made may and will be used by the role players and exercise control in the future either 'against or in favor' of NATO's position."

An essential component of the live production capability is the distribution system. This was also launched during SFJT 12. The media team controls the video distribution channels, and can now actively push media products to the training audience, rather than relying on the training audience to pull them from the internet.

At any time the media team can redirect the 116 monitors throughout the headquarters to focus on the media products. From an Exercise Control perspective, this has made a significant contribution towards the delivery of so-called dynamic scripting. According to SFJT 12 lead planner Wing Commander Mark Attrill, "the live studio now enables us to deliver any changes to the

situation on the ground in a far more realistic and timely manner, based on the reactions and responses that we receive from the training audience as they wrestle with the variety of challenges within the comprehensive environment in which they operate."

WINNING MODERN WARS has become more dependent on carrying domestic and international public opinion than making tactical advances on the ground. Commanders have to be able to function within the new information battlespace. They must be able to manage the flow of information in a way that supports their military objectives while remaining within their political boundaries. It is a complicated and challenging environment, but with the JWC's additional media training capabilities, NATO commanders will now be more prepared than ever before.



Three Swords News

- The JWC Media Team launched "Three Swords News", a television news programme aimed at providing periodic updates on JWC events and activities.
- The premiere programme focused on the visit of His Majesty King Harald V of Norway, as well as the visit of the Nordic Defence Ministers and a meeting of the leaders of the Joint Warfare Centre, Joint Force Training Centre and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre, known collectively as the "Triple J".
- The next edition of Three Swords News is expected to be produced in the fall. Three Swords News can be found on the JWC website, www.jwc.nato.int.



JOINT WARFARE CENTRE
PO BOX 8080, EIKESSETVEIEN
4068 STAVANGER, NORWAY

PHOTO VALERIE GUYOTON



Scan the QR code with your mobile device
to visit www.jwc.nato.int to learn more.

**Joint Warfare Centre provides NATO's
training focal point for full spectrum
joint operational level warfare.**