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TRANSFORMING WARFARE
March/June 2013

Listed in order of appearance: JWC Warfare Conference • COIN in Strategy, Operations and Tactics • ISAF Force Reintegration Cell and Peace for Afghanistan • The Competency Factor: Targeting • STEADFAST JOIST 12, SKOLKAN and the Nature of NATO’s Rapid Military Response • Transformation Through Training and Exercises • Yet Another Step Forward for NRF 2014 • ISAF TE 13-01 • A World of Illusions • Interview: Reorganization • TIDE Sprint 2013 • Visit of NATO’s Military Committee • Exclusive: Religious Leader Engagement

We all have our favourite summer activity: barbecuing, hiking, enjoying the sun, cruising in a fjord, searching for crabs on a rocky shore, fishing along a lake, or just soaking up the sunset on a leafy terrace! I am sure you all are looking forward to summer after a busy half year.

At work, due to the new Peacetime Establishment, more personnel than usual will be rotating in and out of JWC this summer. By the time you read this, French Commander Major General Berger will have turned over command to German Major General Bühler. I would like to thank Major General Berger for his dedication, for shifting focus back to the conceptual and doctrinal part of our effort and for his support to PAO.

This is my last issue as Chief PAO, a task that can be demanding and challenging with both laughter and tears flowing. I leave with great memories, though. Representing JWC has been a privilege. An extra special thanks to my team: Inci, Markus and Bente, you have been fantastic!

This issue reflects JWC spring activities as well as thoughts of the future. Read, reflect and relax while recharging your batteries over summer.

Fair Winds and Following Seas!

CDR (SG) Helene M. W. Langeland
Royal Norwegian Navy
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The Three Swords

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Celebrating 17 May!

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FOREWORD

Major General Jean Fred Berger
French Army – Commander, Joint Warfare Centre
(17 June 2011 – 25 June 2013)

This new issue of The Three Swords Magazine is the last one to be released under my command. As such, it provides an occasion for me to review what has been achieved over the past two years and recognize the great achievements that the JWC has made. Two years ago, inspired by SACT’s vision, I assigned myself and the JWC the objective of ensuring that the JWC transforms to become a full spectrum, world-class warfare centre. Through the exercises we conducted in support of NATO’s readiness posture or ongoing operations in Afghanistan, we congruously and collectively fulfilled our mission at the highest standard. I am proud to say, as I am about to leave, that the JWC is credible and relevant and can truly be seen as the best of its kind.

The JWC, of course, is not working for itself alone, but is at the service of others. It will have to bear an important part in helping ensure the success of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) for NATO. I strongly believe, taking into account the NATO level of ambition, the new NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure (NFS), ACO requirements and expectations, but also the capabilities of ACT (JWC, JFTC, JALLC) and Nations, that the new training concept encompassed in ACT’s plan is the appropriate tool to achieve successful implementation of the CFI.

The JWC is the premier organization within NATO able to plan, develop and deliver operationally focused, multi-level exercises, both complex and realistic ones. It was a huge challenge and a great achievement to draw up this new concept in permanent coordination with the JFTC under the direction of ACT’s Joint Force Trainer. Some of what has come out of that process was witnessed by the NATO Military Committee during its visit on 12 June. Under the new concept, NATO and Nations will have to engage in order to train yearly, involve more HQs and cover larger Training Audiences from the strategic to the tactical level, connecting the NCS, NFS and national assets and exercises, either to prepare readiness, transform HQs or train for ongoing operations.

The JWC faces a most diverse and challenging mission, balancing between ACT and ACO and serving all Nations. The Centre’s highly committed, skilled and experienced officers and enlisted personnel, along with its NATO civilian staff, are the true source of the value, credibility and success it has built during the challenging times it has gone through and still is facing. I am proud to have been the Commander of such a powerful organization of men and women. As a French general officer, I have experienced the full integration of my Nation, at every level of the Alliance and in all of its organizations, particularly at the JWC.

The JWC celebrates its tenth anniversary this year. So it is with strong confidence that I, at the end of June, will hand over to my successor and friend Major General Erhard Bühler. I know that he can trust the JWC team, which is exceptional in its professionalism and dedication. A unique tool for NATO, the JWC will continue to support NATO Transformation for the greatest benefit of the Alliance, Nations and Collective Security.
“It is our intent to ensure that the good work done by the people who participated in this conference will translate into tangible, concrete changes that will continue to not only help the war fighter but the Alliance as it continues to transform.”

JWC WARFARE CONFERENCE

First step in transforming into a warfare centre
THIS APRIL, the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) conducted its first warfare conference to coincide with the Centre's tenth year anniversary. With the Centre now reaching a decade, Major General Jean-Fred Berger, Commander JWC, directed that the JWC should begin to transform into its role as NATO's centre for warfare. After some deliberation and careful consultation with various engaged parties, NATO doctrine was chosen as the main topic. Normally seen as a dry topic and uninteresting, this was exactly the reason why it had to be the theme for the JWC’s first warfare conference.

The theme

The theme for the conference, (developed by German Navy Commander Harald Rinckenhauer) was “Warfare based on a common doctrine, the baseline for Transformation”. To understand the impact of the theme, it is important to spend some time unpacking it as it encompasses the important role NATO doctrine plays in the Alliance.

“Warfare based on a common doctrine”, refers to the operational arm of NATO: Allied Command Operations (ACO). With its multinational military units deploying to the various theatres across the globe, it is vital that they are united by a common doctrine. In fact, this common doctrine is one of NATO’s success stories; it is the reason why our Nations have been able to fight and work together since the beginning of the Alliance. The existence of a common doctrine therefore allows them to more seamlessly work together, enhancing their common efficiency and interoperability.

“A common doctrine, the baseline for Transformation”, is equally important and focuses on the necessity for the Alliance to do so. However, true transformation can only occur if it has a solid base from which to transform. Secondly, it is this foundation in common doctrine that should be constantly updated and transformed if we are to meet the future threats against NATO.

Regardless of the value of doctrine in NATO, most see doctrine as unappealing. It is surprising to think how little most of us know about doctrine despite its central importance. For example, how do we update doctrine? How does it help the war fighter? Why is it important? Why is doctrine seen as so cumbersome and difficult to change? If indeed NATO doctrine is truly important and serves as the glue which binds our Nations together, why is it so poorly received? These were some of the questions we were attempting to answer in this conference. The theme, therefore, served as an important anchor point. It became clear that one of the major aims of the conference was to reinvigorate NATO doctrine such that non-doctrine specialists (that is, the majority of NATO) could see the value of creating, developing and promoting doctrine. Further for the conference to be valuable it would have to produce outputs, which were concrete and practical. With the theme and the aims firmly in mind, it then became clear what the conference had to achieve.

The Conference

The Warfare Conference had three main components: presentations; syndicate work; and plenary. These elements are common in most conferences; however, a lot of thought was put into how to get the most out of each of them.

Presentations

The main intent through the presentations was to set the scene for the work that would be done in the syndicate groups. Therefore, the speakers were carefully chosen, with each offering a different but important perspective on NATO doctrine. Each speaker was informed about the aims of the conference, but also asked to be provocative, to bring up the real issues the NATO doctrine world suffered from. After all, their purpose was not only to educate, but to provoke the participants during the syndicate work.
The keynote speech was given by Norwegian Army Brigadier General Roy Hunstok, who has had a strong connection to the JWC. Over the years in all of his roles he is well known for not being afraid of asking the difficult questions that NATO needs to answer. His presentation was focused on the future of NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) and the NATO Response Force (NRF), which both sparked a great deal of discussion and debate over the two days.

The other presenters gave their own unique perspectives and challenges. German Army Colonel Dieter Schmaglowski, from the NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), gave the important overview of both the doctrine development process and the NSA’s role within it, but also stressed some of the issues the process faced, which served as excellent material for the syndicates.

Royal Marines Colonel Matt Porter from the Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre in the United Kingdom spoke about how their national doctrine is taking the ambitious leap to integrate NATO doctrine in their country. He also discussed some of the interesting initiatives they are exploring to make doctrine more accessible.

The final briefing for the day was from Mr Andrew Eden from the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) who provided an excellent overview of the JALLC’s products and analysis reports and how they represented a rich source of up-to-date knowledge on what NATO needs to do to develop. He also clarified some of the misconceptions of Lessons Learned, which are predominant in NATO.

On the second day, the first presentation was given by German Army Lieutenant Colonel “Harry” Rahmel from Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation’s (HQ SACT’s) Doctrine Coherence cell. HQ SACT plays an important role in NATO doctrine and he not only presented some of the new developments within his cell but also provided a sober snapshot of the effect of manning (or lack of) in key areas: a recurring problem across the Alliance.

The final presentation, given by Mr Jonny Didriksen, was very unique in that it offered a fascinating presentation on the “High North” and the emerging challenges. This is a region that was largely unknown by most Europeans, but is quite specific to Norway and some of the other Scandinavian countries.

The syndicate work

Syndicate work is often used in conferences to break up the monotony of death-by-PowerPoint. Unfortunately, in most instances, the confident English speakers dominate while many take a back seat and some poor Major is left with the task of spending the whole time crafting a slide full of animations for the final plenary session. Well aware of these typical pitfalls, much thought was given to designing syndicate sessions, which would ensure that the time was well spent rather than wasted. Therefore, great efforts were made in the design of the syndicate work to ensure that these common traps were not experienced. As a result, we developed a process to guarantee that the following conditions were met:

- Every syndicate member must be given an opportunity to participate;
• There must be various means of contributing in order to overcome the “vocal minority” problem; and,
• In the end, the syndicates were to produce concrete, actionable recommendations for future implementation.

**Syndicate composition**

The participants were split into three groups with a mix of JWC and external participants. Additionally, within each syndicate group was one of the three participating Brigadier Generals. The JWC was fortunate to have three active Brigadier Generals present at the conference (Brigadier General John W. Doucette, JWC Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff; Brigadier Gunnar E. Gustavsen, Special Adviser to the JWC Commander; and the keynote speaker from HQ SACT, Brigadier General Roy Hunstok). Their role was not to lead the syndicates but to offer their vital perspective from the leadership level to the issues at play. Normally, the presence of a general officer in a room full of officers can be counterproductive as the officers often feel obliged to say what is expected. Thankfully though, each of the Generals were fully focused on getting to the core of the issues and the rest of the syndicate members soon followed suit.

Each group also had JWC facilitators and notetakers. These staff were invaluable and ensured that everything kept to time, they kept the group moving through the process, but most importantly did what they do best by extracting all the valuable, rich perspectives from the participants.

There were two main topics, one for each day. The first day focused on how to better improve inputs into the doctrine development process while the second looked more broadly at NATO doctrine integration across the spectrum of training, exercises and operations. Timing for the syndicate work was relatively short considering what we were trying to achieve: each day had approximately two to three hours of syndicate time. Therefore, the groups needed a process to step through to ensure that the final output would be a collection of concrete actions for implementation.

**The syndicate format**

The process had five key steps to achieve the aim and will be explained with a little more detail now below.

1. **REVIEWING THE PROBLEM:** This is an obvious first step, however, it was important to combat the tendency to immediately jump in and solve the problem. By pausing and breaking the problem down into three to four key factors allowed the groups to do best by extracting all the valuable, rich perspectives from the participants.

2. **BRAINSTORMING IDEAS:** In this step, the goal was to generate as many new ideas and solutions for the factors identified and
to overcome the issue of the "vocal minority". Normally, as ideas arise, they are often easily dismissed by the experts. Also, due to the time constraints, there was not enough time to let each person speak. To solve these two issues, the syndicate facilitators directed a different approach. All participants were given post-it notes and were instructed to write their solutions on them and then stick them on the wall relating to the particular factor. This meant that the individuals were not immediately steered by other’s comments and had time to formulate their own, genuine ideas. When they were all stuck up on the wall (and people were directed to submit as many as they wished) the entire group was then able to huddle around the results and discuss it collectively. Importantly at this stage, they were instructed to suspend their judgment as the ideas were being put up. This would come later but for now the focus was on the generation of new ideas from all the different perspectives in the room.

3. RATIONALIZE: Now a multitude of ideas was generated, the task was to rationalize the results and ask the question, “what could work?”, that is, which of these ideas are actually possible? This evoked a great deal of discussion from the group. To help in this task, the facilitators first tried to help the group find the key themes in the solutions. Then, the Subject Matter Experts and other participants began to work with the proposed solutions giving their opinions on what was and was not feasible. This gave everyone a broader view of the many perspectives of the solutions. Once again, to ensure the results were not swayed by the vocal few, the participants were then each given five votes, which they could use on the possible solutions. They would then vote by setting checkmarks on those ideas they thought were the most impacting and feasible to implement. This, of course, also encouraged a lot of contribution from the whole group, but helped find the most useful ideas.
4. RECOMMEND: With the voting complete, the syndicate group was then to prioritize the five most popular solutions. Remembering that time was in short supply, the task in this stage was to turn these proposed solutions into concrete and actionable recommendations. This was achieved using the simple 5WH. 5WH stands for Who, What, Where, Why, When and How, a basic acronym, which covers all of the essential elements of the task.

Who: Who should be involved in this task?  
What: What is the task and what needs to be done?  
Where: Where in NATO should this be executed?  
Why: Why is this important? (This is an extremely important question to answer if it is to be supported and endorsed by the Chain of Command and our colleagues.)  
How: How could it be achieved?

The simplicity of these elements was by design to produce the final products within the time constraints.

5. PRESENT: The final step was to then present the findings at the plenary session. Once again, to save time, a set of template slides was created so that time and energy was spent more on the content than the slides. Here, the three groups were able to see the collective outputs of the syndicate work and discovered that each of the syndicates came to some similar conclusions as well as some different ideas.

The results

From the very beginning of the conference planning, the decision was made to ensure that the work done in the conference would not finish on the second day. That is, the results would not be hurried to fit into a handful of slides. Instead, the plan was to use the two days to generate as many tangible and concrete recommendations as possible, which would then be further analyzed and coordinated across the various enablers of doctrine across the Alliance.

This work is currently in progress and the major results will be out in the coming months. The main aim is to have targeted, concrete recommendations, which can be implemented at numerous levels and areas for the greater improvement of NATO doctrine. This was the JWC’s first warfare conference and it focused on a fundamental element, which bonds our Nations together as NATO. It is our intent to ensure that the good work done by the people who participated in this conference will translate into tangible, concrete changes that will continue to not only help the war fighter but the Alliance as it continues to transform.

RECOMMENDED READING

The Three Swords Magazine  
www.jwc.nato.int

• Doctrine: The Baseline for Operations  
(Issue No: 21, Pages 43-44)

“(…) When it comes to operations, history tells us that people [military organizations], when facing a conflict or crisis, quite often have prepared themselves by acting, and getting ready to act, according to lessons drawn from the last situation they successfully emerged from, on the understandable grounds that what has brought success must be assimilated and taught.  

History, however, also demonstrates that operations conducted on the basis of past successes alone may easily end up being unsuccessful. The contradiction is apparent. How do we address it, then? That really is what matters, what to give attention to.”

• The Doctrinal Factor of Fighting Power  
(Issue No: 17, Pages 41-43)
Counterinsurgency in Strategy, Operations and Tactics:

Theoretical foundations, practical execution
ONE OF THE FIRST STEPS in developing an appropriate doctrine to combat insurgencies is to understand the nature of counterinsurgency in its relationship to traditional conventional conflict and to understand how the conventional military concepts of the levels of war — that is the strategic, operational and tactical — are relevant to counterinsurgency.

This article examines the relationship between counterinsurgency and our standard constructs of conventional war. In several substantial ways counterinsurgency theory and practice diverges from conventional war theory, doctrine and practice. However, there are several important areas where the two theories converge, in practice, if not in theory. In focusing on counterinsurgency, this paper will highlight some of the unique elements of counterinsurgency that the strategic and operational level planners, both military and civilian, need to take into account in order to conduct an effective counterinsurgency campaign. The paper will conclude with some practical recommendations on changes in doctrine and training that ought to be developed to deal with future counterinsurgency or stability operations.

The difference between conventional conflict and counterinsurgency

At the heart of the question is the difference between conventional war, that is, war between two states and armed forces, and conflicts with non-state entities, of which insurgency is the most common type of conflict. For many years after the Vietnam War, the U.S. military largely ignored non-state conflicts and focused almost single-mindedly on the conventional war. This was partly an emotional reaction within the military to the U.S. failure in Vietnam and partly a sensible reaction to the requirements of the Cold War in which the overriding priority of the U.S. military was to deter, and if necessary, fight a large Soviet conventional force.

However, since the end of the Cold War the United States has been involved in several conflicts and interventions and peacekeeping operations in which the enemy has not been traditional states or conventional forces but rather a host of irregular non-state forces to include insurgents, terrorists, and various violent factions. The reality of the current world has raised our understanding of the role of non-state conflicts in our national strategy and has forced a major change in the orientation of U.S. military thinking, doctrine and training.

For the period 1975 to 2001 the mainstream U.S. military largely lost the understanding that wars against non-state forces are fundamentally different from conventional wars. The strategic requirements, the nature of the enemy and the centres of gravity are basically different when we compare conventional wars, which I define as a conflict against a state, and conflicts against non-state entities.

Still, in practice, the dividing line is not always so clear. Non-state forces and insurgents can often have many of the attributes of a state with a government infrastructure and semi-regular organized forces. Thus, fighting non-state enemies will sometimes require considerable conventional military forces and the types of conventional operations that are the focus of the operational level of war. Israel's campaign against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon in 1982, Israel's long fight against Hizbullah in south Lebanon from 1982-2000 and the Israeli campaign against Hizbullah in the summer of 2006 are recent examples of employing conventional forces against a largely unconventional, non-state enemy.
Counterinsurgency theory in U.S. Army Doctrine

As part of the process of rethinking the role of the military in conflict with irregular forces, in 2006, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps produced the first comprehensive doctrine dealing with counterinsurgency since the 1960s. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine, Field Manual FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (December 2006), is an extensive discussion (282 pages) of the requirements of counterinsurgency starting with an overview of basic counterinsurgency theory. What is striking about the doctrine is that it is considered a “capstone” document, that is, one of the six manuals that serve as foundation documents from which branch specific and other operational and tactical doctrine manuals are to take their doctrinal guidance. By elevating the manual on counterinsurgency to the status of a capstone document, the Army sent a clear message that counterinsurgency was no longer to be considered just a subset of conventional war operations, but is a major form of conflict in itself and requires its own distinctive approach, operational concepts and tactics.

The new doctrine in FM 3-24 begins with recognizing that insurgency and conflict with non-state enemies are fundamentally different kinds of wars and require different rules. It is also important to note that the doctrine was written for battalion commanders and staffs and above, and lays its greatest emphasis on providing guidance for the strategic level commanders and staff planners confronted with the mission of aiding a nation confronting an insurgency.

In regards to the strategic/operational/tactical levels of war it is notable that in discussing many of the most important elements of combating insurgents — and these include conduct of civil affairs, information operations, intelligence operations and training host nation forces — there is no hard distinction made between the strategic and operational levels of war. Indeed, FM 3-24 recognizes that in this kind of conflict tactical operations can have strategic level impacts. However, distinctions need to be made between the national level planning, the process of developing a theater strategy and developing local and regional plans.

In contrast to the traditional principles of war, which apply to conventional war and have been central to our understanding of operations and tactics since the 19th Century, the first chapter of FM 3-24 sets forth and discusses the “imperatives of counterinsurgency.” These imperatives differ substantially from the traditional principles of conventional war and are drawn from several fairly traditional theories of counterinsurgency. More current insights into combating insurgency are drawn from a group of contemporary military scholars. As a whole, the imperatives are grounded in a century of counterinsurgency experience as well as contemporary operations.

**Imperatives of counterinsurgency**

- Legitimacy Is the Main Objective;
- Unity of Effort Is Essential;
- Political Factors Are Primary;
Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment;
Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support;
Security under the Rule of Law is Essential;
Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment;
Manage Information and Expectations;
Use the Appropriate Level of Force;
Learn and Adapt;
Empower the Lowest Levels;
Support the Host Nation.

In addition to outlining a different set of principles for the conduct of counterinsurgency, the writers of the doctrine also brought some depth to the discussion by discussing the “paradoxes of counterinsurgency operations”.

These are given as follows:

**Paradoxes of counterinsurgency operations**

- Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be.
- Sometimes, the More Force Is Used, the Less Effective It Is.
- The More Successful the Counterinsurgency Is, the Less Force Can Be Used and the More Risk Must Be Accepted.
- Sometimes Doing Nothing Is the Best Reaction.
- Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot.
- The Host Nation Doing Something Tolerably Is Normally Better than Us Doing It Well.
- If a Tactic Works this Week, It Might Not Work Next Week; If It Works in this Province, It Might Not Work in the Next.
- Tactical Success Guarantees Nothing.
- Many Important Decisions Are Not Made by Generals.

Contrast the above with the traditional principles of war as outlined in U.S. Army doctrine: mass, offensive, objective, surprise, security, unity of command, maneuver, economy of force, offensive, simplicity. These conventional war principles are not specifically American, but are also used, with slight variations, by other major Western armies. The implications for doctrine, strategy and tactics are obvious — that the traditional, conventional approach to war and the traditional constructs concerning the planning and conduct of operations are often inappropriate for a nation fighting insurgents or non-state forces such as terrorist groups.

Chapter Two of FM 3-24 further discusses some of the operational and strategic requirements of counterinsurgency. The central theme of the Chapter, and of the counterinsurgency manual as a whole, is the integration of civilian and military efforts to defeat the insurgents. This integration of the civilian and military efforts in conventional war is usually characteristic of the strategic level planning but is not commonly found in the operational or tactical levels of war. In the Army/Marine counterinsurgency doctrine the integration of civilian government agencies’ efforts and the military efforts starts at the strategic level and is applied to every level of organization down to the tactical in considering a national plan to combat an insurgent force.

There are further fundamental differences in the way one approaches conventional war and counterinsurgency. In reviewing the history of modern insurgencies, that is the dozens of major insurgencies that have occurred around the world since World War II, we can identify two necessary requirements for the conduct of effective counterinsurgency without which success is unlikely if not impossible.

The two most fundamental requirements for successful counterinsurgency are:

1. **Good strategy.** This means a strategy that is comprehensive, which effectively applies all the elements of national power (economic, military, diplomatic, information), allows for effective coordination of those elements (provides for a good organization), sets a realistic end-state and intermediate goals and, finally, is flexible enough to meet changing conditions.

2. **Good Intelligence.** This especially means good human intelligence. Good intelligence for counterinsurgency requires not only a detailed analysis of the insurgent combatants but also an accurate and comprehensive picture of economic conditions, local politics, and social and group networks.

Here lies some of the fundamental differences in fighting conventional wars and in-
surgencies. A nation can win a conventional war by pure operational art and without a coherent strategy.

When Field Marshal Count Moltke led the German armies against the French in 1870, he was guided by no clear strategy other than put his armies up to the French border, attack swiftly and see what happened — trusting that superior German doctrine and organization would manage to defeat the French armies. And it worked.(5)

In May 1940, the Germans developed an operational plan with only an intermediate operational objective — to break through the Allied defence lines in the Ardennes. After that the German panzer forces could move to take advantage of whatever opportunities arose — either move south on Paris or to the channel to cut off the Allied northern army group. The German general staff simply trusted to their superior doctrine, training and operational art to defeat their opponents. In this case, it worked again. Yet, although one can win a war without a clear strategy and by pure operational art it is certainly not recommended. After all, one of the primary reasons that Germany lost World War II was a lack of a coherent strategy at the top.

Indeed, it is highly dangerous for a nation or a military to develop the operational art to such a high degree that it becomes a substitute for strategic thinking and planning. In the First Gulf War of 1991 U.S. and Coalition forces demonstrated their mastery of the operational art, broke the Iraqi army in short order and quickly fulfilled their operational goal of freeing Kuwait — all with minimal losses. But there was no strategic plan to exploit the operational victory and deal with the major problems of security and stability in the Middle East; Saddam Hussein remained in power to harass the Coalition at will, and he remained a threat to the region and to his own people. Lacking a coherent strategy to replace Saddam Hussein or to change the dynamics of conflict in the region, we ended up with what Jeffrey Record so aptly calls a “hollow victory” — operational success and strategic failure.(6)

We had to go back in 2003 and complete the job in Iraq under much less favorable conditions. In the aftermath of a long counterinsurgency campaign we are still confronted with serious regional security problems.

The role of intelligence in conventional war and in counterinsurgency is, as with strategy and operations, fundamentally different. Thanks to modern technology with its signals intelligence, and ability to monitor the battlefield by space and aerial surveillance, the primary mission of intelligence in conventional war — locating the enemy’s main conventional forces — is relatively easy. Conventional military intelligence is about looking for things you can see and count. Yet, even without extensive intelligence on enemy forces, a conventional force that is well led, trained and equipped can work through the fog of the battlefield and find and defeat enemy forces. History is replete with examples of armies and navies, supported by only a vague intelligence picture, managed to defeat their opponents with superior forces and superior operational art.

In contrast, one can find few, if any, modern examples of effective counterinsurgency in which the government forces did not base their operations on comprehensive and accurate human intelligence. In the Cyprus insurgency (1955-1959), the British deployed overwhelming force and resources to defeat the insurgency, which never fielded more than 300 active fighters but enjoyed strong support among the Greek Cypriot population. At the height of operations the British had 40,000 military, police and security forces on the island to control a total population of 400,000 Greek Cypriots — the most lopsided troop to population ration in the history of counterinsurgency operations. Yet the British had very little intelligence about the rebels and never managed to develop a clear intelligence picture of the insurgent forces or leaders. As a result, the insurgent leaders were never caught nor did the huge British force manage to deter insurgent attacks. In the end, the British had to grant amnesty to the insurgents and independence to the Cypriots.(5)

Role of strategy and its relationship to operations

Strategy is defined as the allocation of military, political, economic, and other resources to attain a political goal. The strategic level of war refers to applying these national or coalition resources in a coordinated manner to meet national or theatre objectives.(6) In a conventional conflict the military role in strategy is normally paramount, as the primary objective is usually the destruction of the enemy’s military capability. In contrast, when fighting an insurgency, the political, informational and economic aspects of the strategy are often as important in achieving victory, if not more important, than the military contribution.

In conventional war, states might realistically aim for full military victory. However, in countering an insurgency one can rarely expect the insurgents to surrender unconditionally. In many cases, insurgents either peter out or are settled through a process of negotiation and political compromise. Indeed, a negotiated solution is often the most realistic path to success for a government. Yet, ending a conflict by such means is not a defeat for the government if the primary goals of the government are met. As Clausewitz noted, a “favorable state of peace” is the true goal of any state involved in a conflict.

Another fundamental difference between conventional war and counterinsurgency is the centre of gravity. In a conflict with a conventional state, the enemy military forces are usually the centre of gravity. In conducting major or tactical operations the primary objective is to destroy or cripple the enemy conventional forces. In counterinsurgency, and this is pointed out several times in FM 3-24, the centre of gravity for both the insurgent and the government is the population.

Military operations designed to destroy the insurgent combat forces can be successful, but often irrelevant to the final outcome of the conflict. If the manner of military operations alienates the civilian population, a tactical or operational military success can even spell strategic defeat.

The importance in having a proper understanding of the centre of gravity in counterinsurgency is illustrated by the American strategy in Vietnam. From 1964 to 1968, the overwhelming focus of the U.S. strategy, operations and tactics in Vietnam was on the North Vietnamese fielded forces — which the U.S. government and military considered to be the centre of gravity for the conflict. It was a strategy that resulted in high enemy casualties but did not fundamentally address the primary issue — that of providing security to the South Vietnamese popu-
The role of intelligence in conventional war and in counterinsurgency is, as with strategy and operations, fundamentally different.


The operational level of war and the role of operational art

Per the official U.S. military definition, and in history and practice, the operational level of war pertains to large scale military operations normally aimed to defeat enemy forces or to fulfill primarily military objectives. The U.S. doctrinal concept of tactics is also primarily a military one and speaks to smaller units gaining lower level objectives in the service of a broader operational campaign. In some cases, when the insurgent fields or attempts to field sizeable combatant forces, applying the operational and tactical levels of war is a sound approach.

During the Algerian War from 1954-1962 the French military conducted a series of large scale operations and employed considerable operational art to successfully seal off the borders from major intrusions of Algerian rebel fighters based in Morocco and Tunisia. From 1958 to 1960, under the plan developed by the French Commander-in-Chief, General Challe, large French forces systematically cleared large regions of rebels and ensured the security of the local population. After the sweep operations, civic action was carried out by an elite corps of Arabic-speaking French soldiers and civilians and home guard detachments of loyal Algerians were formed that were highly effective in keeping the rebels away from the populations. By 1960, the National Liberation Front (FLN) was a broken organization in terms of its military forces and its ability to conduct attacks against the French or the population. France was handed an opportunity to settle the issue of Algeria from a position of great strength. Yet, France had never developed a long-term strategy with a realistic end-state — that is, set the basis for a pro-French independent Algeria that would protect French interests and citizens. Instead, the French maintained an unrealistic end-state and strategy — that is keep the status quo that was heartily disliked by the majority of Algerians. In the end, the French were unable to exploit the impressive military victory won on the ground, and eventually pulled out of Algeria on the terms of the militarily defeated FLN.

The lesson is clear, conventional military operations and the operational art can
be very useful in conducting a counterinsurgency campaign — but are only effective if coupled with a coherent strategy and plans to engage the civilian population during and after the major military operations.

In other insurgencies rebel forces have fielded considerable combatant forces and have even fought conventional campaigns for the control of regions or populations. In such cases the government has had to employ its military forces in a largely conventional manner — that is employing them in accordance with the operational art.

FROM THE mid-1990s to 2003, the rebel groups in Colombia were able to field relatively large, well-equipped and well-trained rebel forces against the government. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the largest of the rebel groups, could put as many as 20,000 well-equipped fighters into the field and managed to destroy some Colombian companies and battalions in battle. This was a case in which the Colombians had to improve its military forces and operations, which it did in 2000 with a national strategic plan called “Plan Colombia.” Plan Colombia, supported by a $1.3 billion U.S. aid package, improved the equipment and training of the Colombians and in early 2002, after years of unsuccessful negotiations, the Colombian military successfully conducted large joint military operations against the regions of the country controlled by FARC.

In March 2002, the Colombian people elected a government under President Uribe that pledged to prosecute the war against the insurgents more forcefully. In 2004, the Colombian government unveiled “Plan Patriota,” which provided increased resources to the civil side of the campaign against the insurgents. Part of the military buildup was dedicated to permanently stationing small units of soldiers in the rural villages to provide security. Part of the plan provided funds and support for disarming the paramilitary factions and returning them to civilian life. Other aspects of the plan provide subsidies to farmers to grow crops other than coca, which is processed into cocaine and used by the insurgents to finance their campaign.

In short, the Colombian case is one of a two-pronged approach — large military joint operations against the major rebel concentrations and a broad civilian-focused programme to improve the lives of the rural poor and to provide greater security for people who were plagued for decades by insurgents and paramilitaries.

While the insurgency is still ongoing in Colombia, the Colombian government has had considerable success in turning a bad situation around. Indeed, FARC has seen an enormous decline in numbers and effectiveness since 2002. The areas of the country under firm government control have increased and the violence, murder and kidnapping rates have all dropped dramatically since 2003. The most important step taken by the Colombians was to establish a clear and coherent strategy that employed both civilian and military resources and concentrated on providing security for the population. In Colombia, an approach using much of the thinking and planning of the operational level of war and a major civilian effort have been complimentary, not mutually exclusive efforts.

However, many insurgencies in the past and most insurgencies today do not feature large insurgent forces or an attempt by the insurgents to mount conventional style campaigns. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. has faced mainly small groups that fight as guerrillas — with bombings and sniping being the most common features of the insurgent campaign. In these countries, and in other cases, the insurgents live among and blend in with the civilian population and only carry out small unit operations. In cases where there are rarely large insurgent forces to combat, the operational level of war is largely irrelevant as a model for conducting counterinsurgency.

In cases where the insurgent activity consists of assassinations, sabotage, small raids, bombings and ambushes by small forces, one of the most important tasks of the government is to organize itself to fight the insurgents. In the Malayan insurgency (1948-1960), large unit sweep operations by British battalions and brigades were the focus of operations in the first three years of the war, 1948-1951. Although the British expanded the police force from 10,000 men to 50,000 men and sent in 40,000 troops, the heavily military approach to fighting the insurgents was failing. Insurgent strength grew rapidly during the time of large British military operations and insurgents and killings continued to climb. In late 1951, the
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British strategy in Malaya was foundering and the British Defence Coordination Committee in London reported: “The communist hold on Malaya is as strong, if not stronger, today than it ever has been. This fact must be faced.” The British government’s answer was to send a new leadership team to Malaya, General Gerald Templer, as Governor General, and Sir Arthur Young, as Commander of the Malaya Police. Together with a new Colonial Minister, Oliver Lyttelton, and several new leaders on the civilian side, the new leadership team took up a dramatically different approach to fighting the insurgents.

First of all, Templer realized that the large military operations were mostly a wasted effort. Emphasis was placed on smaller operations based on better intelligence that carefully targeted insurgent bands. Sir Arthur Young initiated a major programme to reform and retrain the police force, whose poor training, indiscipline and abuse of the population was working mostly in the insurgents’ favor by alienating a great part of the population against the government. On the civilian side, a new director of the government information campaign was appointed and turned a laughably bad government media campaign into a very effective operation. Funds were found to carry on a host of civilian activities to improve the lot of the population to include providing better government services to the new villages built to house the Chinese rural population that provided most of the recruits for the insurgents.

In order to manage the counterinsurgency campaign, Templer promoted the committee system, which was essentially a strategic planning and decision-making approach to dealing with the insurgency. At the national level, the counterinsurgency strategy was set by a committee consisting of the senior military officers, commander of the police, senior intelligence officers, the government’s chief information officer and the top government officials for agriculture and economic development and senior officials representing the civilian government. Templer understood that combating the insurgency would require the effective coordination of the security forces and intelligence and would also emphasize major civic and economic programmes for bettering the lives of the Malayans and a media programme designed to effectively get the government’s message to the average citizen.

“What Malaya introduced on a large scale is what is today called the ‘interagency’ approach to a campaign: coordinating the efforts of military and civilian agencies with a common plan and towards a common objective.”

Of course, the committee system that includes chief civilian officials as well as the military and intelligence officials is normal for directing a national strategy. However, in Malaya, this approach was replicated at every level of the conflict. Each of the nine Malay States had its own security committee consisting of the senior Malayan leader, the top soldier and policeman in the state, an intelligence officer and the senior civilian agency chiefs. Each state was responsible for crafting a strategy and allocating resources in accordance with its threat and its own requirements. The committee system was again replicated down at the district level in which military and civilian officials made plans and directed operations in their area.

General Templer’s insistence on directing the counterinsurgency effort through civilian/military committees ensured that the civil side of the effort was not overlooked as it had largely been in the first years of the insurgency. From 1952 to 1954, major progress was made in reducing insurgent numbers and in increasing the level of security for the population.

With better security, the government made major improvements in providing medical care and social services to the population — furthermore reducing the public dissatisfaction with the government and opening the way for an improved political climate in which most of the ethnic Chinese, who were the core of the insurgency, were able to develop the means to establish a peaceful political relationship with the ethnic Malays.

In Malaya, the committee system worked, in the words of FM 3-24, to “empower the lowest levels” of the leadership. It generally worked very successfully, although Templer noted that one of his toughest parts in making the system work is that it required finding and appointing good leaders at every level. What Malaya introduced on a large scale is what is today called the “interagency” approach to a campaign, coordinating the efforts of military and civilian agencies with a common plan and towards a common objective.

The Malayan model, which replicates the strategic process at every level and in which the operational level of war is of limited use, is very relevant today if one is dealing with an insurgency that consists of small insurgent forces conducting low level operations. The Malayan model recognizes the fact that insurgents live locally and most insurgencies are driven by local, not national concerns. Therefore, a government is likely to require a very different strategy for each region. Chairman Mao may have thought in terms of a highly organized and centrally-directed insurgency. But most insurgencies, even many that supposedly followed Mao’s model, have been organized around local alliances and factions and often follow only a minimum of central direction. Insurgents today are likely to be organized into local factions and have a variety of local grievances. Groups might split and develop new leaders; allegiances might shift as local factions switch from being friendly to the government to neutral or even hostile.

On the other hand, local factions may switch to your side depending on political conditions and alliances. In more than a few cases insurgent factions have fought civil wars among themselves to attain power or leadership within a broader movement. Some groups, such as the Al Qaeda forces in Iraq, might be implacable enemies and can only be dealt with by force. Others, however, are likely to be amenable to compromise and a political settlement with the government.

ONE CAN TAKE the case of Bangladesh as a current example of a nation combating local insurgencies. Today, there are three small insurgencies in three different regions of Bangladesh. In organizing to combat the insurgencies the Bangladesh government employs essentially the Malaya committee model in which the provincial governor chairs the committee, which includes the senior military, intelligence and police officers as well as the civilian directors of the social services, economic development and government information service. With the civilian governor in charge and the military serving in the role as support to the civilian authorities, each province crafts its own
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local strategy to combat the insurgents and provide security to the local population. The strategy in each province and district is likely to be very different. One Bangladeshi officer put it too me, “In one province the strategy is to take a hard line against the insurgents, in another province they have taken a soft line and the third province is somewhere in the middle.”

This approach also makes considerable sense in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan where the nature of the insurgency in each province is dictated more by local ethnic and tribal loyalties or allegiance to local leaders than it is by any comprehensive national movement.

In Al Anbar Province in the West of Iraq, where the population consists of Sunni tribes, the insurgents were broken in 2006-2008 when the U.S. leaders crafted a local strategy designed to win over the traditional tribal sheiks and offer economic development incentives to tribes and factions that agree to work together with the government forces. In other parts of Iraq, the insurgency took on a different local complexion, for example, in the south of Iraq the fighting was largely driven by rivalries between different Shiite leaders and factions. Again, a “sound practice” in counterinsurgency would require a local strategy be crafted to deal with local concerns. In insurrections that do not feature a higher intensity of combat or operations, the construct of the operational level of war, which focuses on large military units and operations, has some utility, but not necessarily for organizing the combat side of operations.

IN AFGHANISTAN, for example, an effective counterinsurgency campaign requires that the government has access to the population. However, the country is so lacking in all-weather roads that a large percentage of the population lives in virtual isolation and has little access to other regions or government centres. In order to establish a government presence, the U.S. Army engineers initiated a major programme of construction projects in Afghanistan, with a top priority to create a road system as well as establishing water supplies and electric power.

In 2006, Lieutenant General Carl Strock, Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers, noted that “right now you simply can’t get in some of the places that need the most help.” The response was a large scale engineering and reconstruction programme to better trade and commerce and economic life, as well as to enable the Afghani government to establish presence and services in remote areas. The nationwide engineering efforts that followed are certainly a campaign that fits the description of the operational level of war. In this case, any reconstruction plan required the operational art skills that officers learn in the staff colleges. Of course, the programme to construct an effective transportation net in Afghanistan also required extensive security and logistics support as well as civil affairs action in the local communities. An information campaign also plays a role in convincing suspicious inhabitants of isolated regions that the changes brought by better transportation will be to their benefit. Essentially, constructing infrastructure in Afghanistan requires a military operational type of campaign plan— even if the operation is not directly geared towards combat with enemy forces.

There are other instances in which this kind of requirement for an infrastructure construction campaign is relevant. In Colombia, the insurgent movements took root largely in the southern region of the country that is the most undeveloped and most isolated region. As in Afghanistan, the first and necessary step for the government is to establish enough basic infrastructure to enable the government to establish and maintain a presence among the population. Again, this requires a planning and methodology akin to an operational level military
campaign, although the effort will include civilian agencies as well as military engineers and security forces.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have outlined a few guidelines, or “best practices in counterinsurgency.” As thinking on counterinsurgency has developed over the last fifty years, one can see that the traditional construct of the levels of war has some utility in counterinsurgency — certainly for the military planner. However, these are not universal and apply under many specific conditions, namely, when the insurgent fields substantial forces or occupies a large region or when a major infrastructure or logistics campaign is necessary to carry out the government strategy.

Yet in most insurgencies today, in which the insurgent does not field large units and fights a low level war of bombing and sniping, the strategic/operational/tactical construct is less useful and the approach first used in Malaya that of replicating the strategic organization and process at national to local level seems to work best.

Yet, even the best strategies and tactics in counterinsurgency ultimately rely upon good leadership — both on the military and civilian side. For a complex mission such as counterinsurgency the leaders need considerable special training. Furthermore, an effective counterinsurgency campaign requires a number of highly specialized personnel from human intelligence experts to media specialists. Thus one of the first tasks in planning a national or even a local counterinsurgency campaign is to assess the personnel requirements for the operation with very specific regard to ensuring that adequate leaders and civilian and military specialists can be deployed.

Essentially, the doctrinal construct of three levels of war — strategic, operational and tactical — has a limited utility in a counterinsurgency campaign. On the other hand, the three levels of war are still the best construct in understanding a conventional state-on-state war. The key question is how we ought to think of our higher military education to prepare officers to fight both kinds of wars.

Our current staff college education, oriented towards the traditional three levels of war should not be dramatically changed to reflect the better practices of counterinsurgency operations. We should not trade competence in conventional war to succeed at unconventional war. Instead, the U.S. and NATO Allies ought to consider a special half-year specialist general staff level course that will focus on counterinsurgency and irregular warfare and prepare a mix of mid-ranking and senior officers and civilians to plan and develop strategy for conflicts that do not fit into the conventional war framework such as counterinsurgency and stability operations.

TO PLAN AND MANAGE a counterinsurgency or stability campaign effectively it is not necessary to retrain the whole leadership of the armed forces for such operations. Instead, we ought to train a key group of operators and specialists (military police, civil affairs, human intelligence personnel) so that in future operations there are leaders and planners and specialists at every level — tactical, strategic, operational — who can ensure that the right mix of conventional and unconventional warfare approaches are used to solve the complex problems of counterinsurgency.

END NOTES:

(1) Some of the traditional counterinsurgency theorists cited in FM 3-24 include: Charles E. Calwell. Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996) Reprint of Small Wars: A Tacticoal Textbook for Imperial Soldiers (London: 1890); David Galula. Counterinsurgency...


(6) Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, August 2006. Definition: The strategic level of war: The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.

(7) Joint Publication 1-02 definition for Operational level of war: The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. Objective: 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan, or an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features).

(8) Joint Publication 1-02 definition for Tactical level of war: The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.


(13) "Engineers plan to double the number of construction projects in Afghanistan reparable if vision is continued."

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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From 1991 to 2004, Dr Corum was a professor at the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. In 2005, he was a visiting fellow at All Souls College, Oxford, where he held a Leverhulme Fellowship, and then an associate professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Dr Corum is the author of several books on military history, including The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (1992); The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940 (1997); The Luftwaffe’s Way of War: German Air Doctrine, 1911–1945, with Richard Muller (1998); Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists, with Wray Johnson (2003); and Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy (2007).

Dr Corum’s eighth book on Cold War History is Rearming Germany (Leiden, Brill Press, 2011).

He is the editor in chief of the translation (from German) of the Encyclopedia of the First World War (2 volumes) (Leiden, Brill, 2012). He has also authored more than sixty major book chapters and journal articles on a variety of subjects related to air power and military history, and was one of the primary authors of Field Manual 3-24, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps doctrine on counterinsurgency.

Dr Corum served in Iraq in 2004 as a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve. He holds a master’s degree from Brown University, a Master of Letters from Oxford University, and a PhD from Queen’s University, Canada.
For thirty years, the Afghan people have suffered and sacrificed to achieve peace. We Afghans desire not only short-term security, but a consolidated and sustainable peace. We must explore the sources of our differences. We must find ways to bring those who are disenfranchised back into the fabric of our society, economy and polity. We recognize many have suffered, and like all Afghans, seek justice, prosperity, and security."

President Hamid Karzai
National Consultative Peace Jirga, Kabul, June 2010

ISAF Force Reintegration Cell and peace for Afghanistan

By Lieutenant Colonel Herman Maes, Belgium Army
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INTRODUCTION: Lieutenant Colonel Herman Maes, MSc Eng, from the beginning until mid-2012, was part of the Force Reintegration Cell (FRIC) at ISAF HQ, Kabul, serving as Development Advisor in the Programs Branch. One year later, he makes an assessment of the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP), which was designed to bring peace and stability to a country ravaged by 30 years of violence and oppression. As history has proven time and time again, all civilizations and conflicts tend to swing back and forth in a pendulum motion. The Afghan turmoil, too, will sooner or later end with a peace agreement or similar arrangement between the warring parties, so the future will probably teach us that Afghanistan is no exception to this pattern. A number of tools are in place for this to happen; it is only a matter of time.

With the announced withdrawal of foreign troops from 2014, time is running fast, though, a credible peace process that can ensure stability is urgently needed and more than welcome. The international community has kept a close eye on the developments of the latest peace initiative after several previous peace initiatives failed. To help make the ongoing conflict end quickly, a twofold approach[1] is applied. On the one hand, moderate warriors who agree to stop fighting and accept the Islamic constitution, can re integrate the Afghan society in an honourable way and also obtain political amnesty. On the other hand, political leaders are negotiating global political reconciliation with Taliban leaders in all discretion. Although reintegration and reconciliation are two different levels of play, each with its...
own dynamics and purpose, they form two sides of the same coin. Reconciliation is impossible without reintegration; reintegration has no finality whatsoever without reconciliation. Those are the factors that raised the grounds of the current peace programme.

The “birth” of the APRP

The APRP was developed in response to the National Consultative Peace Jirga (NCPJ) resolution and designed utilizing previously successful peace programmes as a guide. The APRP became the name of the most recent policy initiative that was approved by Afghan President Hamid Karzai and presented to the international community in the summer of 2010. This programme claims to have learned from the past, for instance in the summer of 2010. This programme claims to have learned from the past, for instance in Afghanistan (GIRoA) itself is in charge. The APRP has its place in the ISAF counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. The diagram of the Anaconda Strategy (left), adopted by the U.S. General David Petraeus, shows bottom left the dual factors of “reconciliation” and “reintegration”. Both activities aim to support the objectives of the peace programme and military campaign. Since then, the FRIC has been led by a British two-star General and is composed of military and civilians, including Afghans. To ensure coordination and deconfliction of all APRP activities, a mirror structure between the governmental and military structures (HQ ISAF, ISAF Joint Command, Regional Commands and Provincial Reconstruction Teams) on the other side have been set up.

As already touched upon above, the main point in respect of which the APRP differs from previous attempts is the fact that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) itself is in charge. Furthermore, an integrated approach is used, involving the national political level, through provincial and district authorities, all the way down to the local community where the individual warrior has his roots. Unlike before, however, their local community will be rewarded in a sustainable manner when one or several insurgents break with the Taliban and return to their families. Former programmes barely addressed counselling and support after demobilization, causing many ex-insurgents to relapse into their old habits and return to arms. Those programmes, which according to rough estimates reintegrated about 8,000 Taliban, lacked adequate control structures, though. On top of that, there was no demonstrable link between efforts and improvements to the security situation.

While an Afghan programme, the APRP has its place in the ISAF counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. The diagram of the Anaconda Strategy (left), adopted by the U.S. General David Petraeus, shows bottom left the dual factors of “reconciliation” and “reintegration”. Both activities aim to support the international community in the planning to the implementation phase. Without proper coordination and synchronization with other lines of operation, the overall effectiveness of the APRP will be at risk. During its first year(s), the APRP mainly invested in efforts to create Afghan services and capabilities, train Afghan frameworks, promote opportunities and benefits, identify useful developments and mobilize the financial resources needed from international donor conferences. This required the FRIC to simultaneously focus on providing support to ensure the construction of the programme was completed, while also helping it mature through the development of its capacity, capability and resiliency. The APRP also needed to improve the whole of the Government’s approach to its application and continue to build GIRoA support at the provincial and Kabul level.

Will rehabilitation work for all Afghans?

Many fighters or so-called insurgents do not fight for ideological reasons but have joined warring groups out of necessity or under compulsion. Often, socio-economic reasons, local conflicts of interest or deep-rooted frustrations are the underlying core of the problem. It is estimated that this group constitutes more than 75 per cent the total number of fighters in Afghanistan. The top of the hierarchy is composed of fanatical and ideologically-motivated leaders acting in compliance with the guidelines of the Quetta Shura while, at the other end, the bulk consists of “Ten-dollar Taliban” mainly trying to survive.
The APRP is mainly targeting the last ones with a message of peace addressing the root causes; offering the fighters a viable alternative creates a reasonable chance of them reconciling back to their community and the GIRoA. Most elderly people are war-tired after the long conflict that began with the Russian invasion and has been going on for more than thirty years. The younger generation, however, has grown up under the Taliban regime and was confronted with the U.S. invasion and the large-scale NATO deployment in their “entire” country. Especially these young ones are vulnerable and extremely susceptible to the populist messages of the insurgents, who exploit and abuse them when it serves their political agenda. It is more than obvious that Information Operations and Strategic Communications are of ultimate importance in directing the peace establishment and, therefore, have to be synchronized within the military campaign.

How does the APRP work?

The APRP consists of three phases:

1. Social Outreach, Confidence Building and Negotiation

As a first step, obviously, individuals or groups of fighters who are interested in, and receptive to, the programme have to be engaged. This is done in close consultation with the local authorities as well as through the traditional authorities of the Afghan community (through so-called shuras or jirgas). In this phase, winning trust is crucial, so it is very important that the dialogue is among Afghans. In keeping with the philosophy of the APRP, only Afghans determine who is eligible for reintegration. Foreign jihadists do not meet the requirements for the obvious reason that they are not Afghan nationals.

2. Demobilization

Once communication channels are open and conditions are right for a fruitful dialogue, ex-combatants enter the actual demobilization phase (using the term “surrender” would be fundamentally wrong since it is important for potential reintegrees not to lose face) and undergo a number of screenings and vettings under the direction of the Afghan security forces. Here, their grievances and expectations are identified in order to be addressed in the next phase.

In contrast with previous peace initiatives, small arms are only registered and can be kept for self-defence. In order to counter recidivism and at least make reintegrees trackable, all of them undergo a biometric registration (photographs, fingerprints, iris scan). Since this was never done during previous initiatives, there was no way to track demobilized combatants and schemes were misused by candidates reporting several times under a different identity in order to obtain the reward.

When not guilty of crimes against the Afghan constitution, candidates are granted political amnesty and are eligible for further integration. Otherwise they must undergo legal proceedings first.

3. Consolidation of Peace and Community Recovery

The consolidation of the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants must be guaranteed. During the first months, families and aid packages provide a guaranteed income. Throughout this period, where the risk of relapse is the highest, ex-combatants are employed in structural and sustainable projects for the benefit of the community to which they belong. Furthermore, they are required to attend religious lessons and other deradicalization activities. Finally, vocational training gives them the chance to learn a job. Obviously, the composition of the packages and the approach applied may vary from case to case since specific demands and grievances must be met in each case. Although a simple concept, there is no ready-made solution.

The role of ISAF FRIC and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams at this stage is mainly to advise, mentor, assist and support through planning, resources and funds. Cooperation and coordination with all civilian and military authorities at all levels are crucial to generate the desired effects and ensure that the programme is not derailed or abused, serving other lucrative targets.

Right: Royal Marines British Major General David A. Hook CBE, former ISAF Reintegration Cell Director and Dr Abdullah Haiwad, Ghor’s Provincial Governor greet tribal leaders at Reintegration Cell for former Taliban fighters (also below). DoD photos by Lieutenant Joe Painter.
There are numerous factors and issues that complicate the programme. First, there is an important difference in the way the international community and ISAF on the one hand, and the Afghans on the other hand, see the development of the programme and its course in time. The planned troop reductions and financial efforts of the donor countries increase pressure on the international conferences to 'unpack' with tangible progress. Time is running out to prove that the current strategy is paying off.

Most Afghans realize that this might be the last chance to get out of the deadlock. They, therefore, take plenty of time and want to talk things through and go step by step. For this reason, the tight military planning of ISAF, coupled with concrete measurable objectives, regularly clashes with the Afghan process, which has a different dynamic and, in our view, there are not always visible results. This lesson was learned over and over again in the past.

“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.”

— T.E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917

SAFETY IS AND REMAINS the number one stumbling block for successful completion. The fact that this programme poses a threat to the Taliban shadow regime is demonstrated by the determination extremist elements show in fighting the APRP. In September 2011, Kabul was rocked by a suicide attack on two symbolic APRP targets, High Peace Council (HPC) Chair Burhanuddin Rabbani and Minister for Reintegration Massoum Stanekzai. Mr Rabbani, who in the 90s was President of Afghanistan, died in the attack. Minister Stanekzai was seriously injured, but has since resumed his activities. Despite all efforts to ensure the safety of converted fighters and their families, reprisals are bound to happen. Especially in the south of the country, where the Taliban and related groups have the most control and the deeply-rooted insurgency continues, potential reintegrees are reluctant out of fear for their lives and that of their family. In some cases, ex-Taliban fighters themselves wish to guarantee the safety of their village or region. If accepted, they can, like other citizens, join the police or the armed forces. Difficulties occur when militias want to integrate into a police unit as an entire block. Such practices often derail very quickly and would certainly not inspire confidence among the population.

Despite the screening by the security forces, it is inevitable that some opportunists abuse the programme. Needy citizens show up as Taliban fighters, aiming to get a reward or work. It is, nevertheless, necessary to ensure they are treated equally as they are sometimes sent as a vanguard to test the programme while the real insurgents patiently monitor the result and assess its value.

Every winter, some formerly demobilized combatants return to the mountains only to reinitiate fighting in spring. Such recidivism will no longer go unpunished thanks to biometric data. The use and sharing of the biometric databases go smoothly, while there is an increasing need to improve them.

The question is how ISAF deals with ex-Taliban fighters, including evidence that they are responsible for the deaths of military and civilian members of the coalition, whether or not via roadside bombs. This is a very sensitive issue, especially for those countries that have seen many victims. The answer is that Afghans are sovereign in deciding whom to allow into the programme, but it is not excluded that in some cases mutual agreements are made.

Can the APRP redeem the high expectations it has created?

The programme everyday deals with the legacy of previous attempts that failed. Rather than to integrate large numbers of fighters in a short timeframe, it is important that each individual case is handled right so that the integrity of the programme is not affected.

In the summer of 2012, the counter stood at 4,700 candidates who had joined the APRP. At that time, there were several negotiations ongoing with several thousand candidates, at various stages of maturity.

Today, the programme has reached more than 6,000 despite the tragic assassination of the late Chairman of the High Peace Council, Mr Rabbani. His death, to a degree, left the Council rudderless for sev-
eral months and thus seriously inhibited its ability to conduct outreach, grievance resolution and advocate for peace. The positive impact of the APRP on the security situation is hard to prove, but there are undoubtedly positive effects, locally and globally. The process of Transition has always dealt with two main factors: the security situation and governance and development progress.

Despite all the efforts in the field and limited reintegration success in the North and the West, there are indications that the Taliban are seriously considering starting negotiations. With regard to President Karzai’s offer to participate in the mainstream political life, they have always publicly stated that there is no reconciliation as long as foreign troops reside in Afghanistan. The presence of NATO and U.S. troops on Afghan soil is indeed a major horn in the side of the Taliban regime.

The current High Peace Council Chair, Mr Rabbani’s son, recently initiated the development of an organic Joint Secretariat/High Peace Council strategic communication capability, which will be critical in the effective execution of the APRP. This is indeed an important effort in support of the increasing momentum of the programme, critically needed to win the battle for the hearts and minds of the population and to counter the insurgent messaging that only proclaims fear and violence.

During the third International Conference for Islamic Cooperation for a Peaceful Future in Afghanistan, held in March 2013 in Istanbul, the UN and the Organization of the Islamic Conference agreed to establish a joint task force to promote national reconciliation and complement the peacemaking efforts of the Afghan Ulema and civil society. This would improve effectiveness, build better trust among the disputing parties, and improve cooperation with neighbouring countries. At the same time, in recognition of the strategic value of information synchronization and in an effort to deal with the requirements for flexibility and agility, HQ ISAF will probably reorganize and put all the divisions and services committing to the FRIC — Key Leader Engagement (KLE), stability building (former DCOS STAB), Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) with and from GIRoA and Traditional Communications (TRADCOMM) — under a new umbrella, DCOS Outreach.

The APRP disposes over all the ingredients required to demobilize many rebels in a sustainable manner and create favourable conditions for negotiations. However, Afghanistan and the international community still have a long and difficult way to go until all the pieces of the puzzle fall into place. The question is whether the international community’s strategic patience will continue to offer the Afghans the chance to achieve an acceptable compromise.

"The question is how ISAF deals with ex-Taliban fighters, including evidence that they are responsible for the deaths of military and civilian members of the coalition, whether or not via roadside bombs. This is a very sensitive issue, especially for those countries that have seen many victims."

END NOTES:

(1) On the January 2010 Afghanistan Conference, President Karzai claimed that it was time to "reach out to all of our countrymen, especially our disenchanted brothers who are not part of Al Qaida"; however, the core of the new strategy would also involve reaching out to Taliban fighters.

(2) 2003-2006: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process (DDR), which is part of the UNs Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP); 2005-2010: Reconciliation programme Tahkim-e-Solh (PTS), or the Peace through Strength programme.

(3) The Quetta Shura is a militant organization composed of the main leaders of the Afghan Taliban. Since 2001, they are probably hiding in the city of Quetta in the Pakistani province of Balochistan.

(4) A shura or jirga is an Afghan gathering or meeting, originally Pashtun tribes, but later also with other ethnic groups in attendance. The attendees are chiefs, regional leaders, political, military or religious figures, or sometimes even government officials. The meetings are held irregularly and usually initiated by the ruler.

(5) A Provincial Reconstruction Team is a task or special force unit working to support safety and reconstruction efforts.
JWC’S RESOLUTE SUPPORT

AS OF MAY this year, the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) deployed two teams to Afghanistan to prepare for the June ISAF pre-deployment Training Event (read more on page 40). The first team included twelve, and the second sixteen exercise planners. Just like its predecessors, the deployments aimed to liaise with key staff in HQs International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and ISAF Joint Command (IJC) on critical issues and gather the most recent data available in theatre. French Army Colonel Olivier Barnay, who is in charge of the JWC Joint Training Division’s Subject Matter Expert (SME) Branch, noted: "Visits in theatre are pivotal in exercise planning. Face-to-face discussions with key leaders and flag officers are crucial to ensure that the most relevant and up-to-date training is provided. Moreover, personal relationships are built between war fighters and trainers, which can help establish mutual knowledge and confidence. As a result, the quality of the training delivered is at the highest level.”

Chief Main Events and Incidents List (MEL/MIL) for the training event, Dutch Army Lieutenant Colonel Eric Klaassen said that the script will help deploying forces to understand the complexities of the mission. "Working in liaison with HQs ISAF and IJC is crucial for the delivery of the most accurate training to incoming personnel. The training not only focuses on making them familiar with the processes and procedures of the HQ into which they are preparing to deploy, but also at the same time enhances their in-depth knowledge of the Afghan mission.”

Ms Laura Loflin DuBois, producer and news anchor at World News Today (WNT), JWC’s simulation media newscast, said the deployment was her first. "My team is responsible for creating the media environment for the training event. We want it to be as realistic as possible and reflective of the situation in theatre. Meeting with the SMEs at HQs ISAF and IJC gave us invaluable insight into their processes, particularly the role of social media as a driver.”

Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, on a visit to Afghanistan, on Monday 4 March, after talks with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, said: "Let there be no doubt: our commitment is certain to the end of Transition and beyond it. NATO will stand by you.”

The Secretary General further noted that NATO’s new mission to train, advice and assist the Afghan security forces after 2014 will be called Resolute Support, “because our support for Afghanistan remains steadfast.”

The JWC since 2004 has provided high-intensity and comprehensive ISAF pre-deployment training to staff en route for Afghanistan. Each pre-deployment training event presents realistic training scenarios, regularly updated with the latest lessons learned from the war-ridden country. The overall aim of these events is to give incoming staff a better understanding of the operational environment, which is a critical element in their ability to tackle the challenges of the ISAF mission once in theatre.

(By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO).
AS I OFFER FOR CONSIDERATION my thoughts on the competency component of NATO Targeting, I trust the reader will bear in mind an important fact; any discussion of Targeting in an open forum such as this is fraught with complications. This article is, in areas, intentionally vague, especially where specific NATO and national Targeting systems and capabilities are concerned. As a result, details that some readers may seek are left out for reasons of operational security and information classification.

The shortfalls involving NATO’s current Targeting education are well known to those of us inside the relatively small Targeting community, and great work is already being done to address the specifics of many ongoing issues, particularly in the areas of target development standards and unit-specific training. The intent of this article is to introduce those outside the NATO Targeting community to what is being done — and what still needs to be accomplished — to address a serious training shortfall within NATO’s Targeting function and engender an Alliance-wide, cross-functional agreement that these issues need to be fixed before NATO is faced with another crisis like Libya.

There are three components to the efficient and effective execution of any military function: capability, capacity and competency. On their own, none are sufficient enough to generate the kind of effects needed to achieve the objectives of a campaign’s decisive conditions and none, on their own, can make up for a lack of sufficiency in ei-
Targeting

U.S. Air Force Major John Smith teaches the details of the Joint Targeting Cycle to multinational students at NATO School Oberammergau's Targeting Course. Photo by Specialist Brian Zeisler, NATO School Oberammergau, Public Affairs Office.

The Three Swords Magazine 24/2013

ther of the others. Each of these components — when fully developed, integrated and resourced — is inter-related, complimentary and mutually supportive.

Within NATO’s Targeting function, competency is the only one of the three functional components which NATO itself is able to define the standards of performance and set the criteria for individual and collective certification. NATO can already successfully apply the basic capabilities of target development, as they are universally practiced and require little in the way of sophisticated technology. However, a majority of the advanced target development capabilities (which do require varying degrees of advanced technology) remain with the Member Nations and use of them by NATO is a sharing decision made in each capital. So too with capacity; it is the Nations who will decide what to contribute and when.

Why is there a need for a separate and distinct NATO Targeting education construct built to ensure that both the individual and organizations involved in the Targeting process are trained and certified to NATO standards? Why not just continue letting the nations filling the Targeting billets be solely responsible for taking care of training? There’s a one-word answer: RISK.

WHEN NATO UNDERTAKES military operations, it does so as an Alliance. The weapons used to generate the effects necessary to achieve Alliance objectives may be done with, by and through the capabilities contributed by the Nations, but they are done so under the authority of the Alliance itself. The decision to attack — or not to attack — a specific target is made by NATO commanders. Thus, NATO commanders must be assured that their decisions are solidly underpinned by trained and certified individuals who develop and nominate targets with the utmost care using rigorously applied standards and processes. With that assurance of competency, the commander can feel confident that the targets nominated are the ones necessary to get the job done in the most effective and efficient manner possible and mitigate, to the greatest extent possible, strategic risks to the Alliance.

So what is wrong with NATO’s current Targeting education and training? I believe it is primarily a lack of a holistic approach to the competency training construct for those assigned to NATO Targeting positions. The sum total of today’s NATO Targeting education is primarily housed at the NATO School Oberammergau (NSO) and consists of a permanent course that does very well in presenting the theories of Targeting. Those completing the course come away with a solid awareness of the Targeting process and how it can and should be applied at the operational and tactical levels. There is also an aperiodic course that teaches the U.S. methodology of collateral damage estimation. Both are excellent at what they do, but neither is sufficient to achieve the desired holistic approach to Targeting education.

Further, none of the current courses provide anything in the way of advanced skills training that nations can benefit from when their people return to national service from a NATO posting. If NATO — and the individual contributing nation — is to improve its Targeting competency for the
If not used. Only through a systemic process benefit of the Alliance as a whole, we must recognize that there is a very real need to create a standardized training programme with an integrated curriculum to develop competent NATO targeteers in every peacetime establishment Targeting position from the very first day of assignment.

To achieve this integrated curriculum, NATO’s Targeting education construct should consist of four areas of training:

- Process Awareness;
- Basic Individual;
- Advanced Individual; and
- Collective Training.

NSO’S CURRENT TARGETING course is precisely what is needed for the ground-level process awareness area of Targeting training. The course provides students with an overall familiarization of the joint Targeting cycle and introduces them to the workings of the Targeting cycle at the operational level. Moreover, it gives needed background on the international legal principles and rules that contribute to NATO Targeting decisions and provides an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the organizations, staff functions and levels of command that apply the joint Targeting cycle within NATO. Inclusion of this course in a new Targeting training construct provides all students from each Member Nation with the fundamentals of Targeting and prepares them for learning the more advance concepts to come. And its effectiveness in contributing to the awareness of the Targeting process is not limited to those assigned or about to be assigned to Targeting positions. The majority of students introduced to the processes and lexicon of Targeting through the NSO’s course are from non-Targeting staff functions such as intelligence analysts, planners, legal advisors (LEGAD) and political advisors (POLAD) and those on operations staff. While creating an understanding of the Targeting process throughout the staff makes for a more efficient execution of the Joint Targeting Cycle at the Joint Force and Component level, it is far from sufficient on its own for creating qualified NATO targeteers.

THE NEXT TWO AREAS in this article’s example of an overarching NATO Targeting training construct do not yet exist; however, it would be unfair not to mention that there are significant unit-based efforts underway and to give credit to those initiatives. Using the lessons learned from NATO’s Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, a few organizations — most notably the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre at RAF Molesworth, UK and the NATO Air Component Command at Ramstein Air Base, Germany — are building or completely revamping their in-house training programmes to address the shortfalls that currently exist in NATO’s training for targeteers. These initiatives should be encouraged — and funded — to continue, but under the umbrella of a unified and standardized NATO construct. Standardization is also critical in these two levels to ensure targets nominated for strike approval to higher headquarters are developed across the Joint Force using the same rigorous procedures. As mentioned before, this gives the Commander the assurance he requires when weighing operational gains against the strategic risks.

The first of the two new levels of Targeting competency training would be at the basic individual level. At this level, those specifically assigned to NATO Joint Force and Component Targeting positions would build upon their newly acquired knowledge of Targeting fundamentals with the basic individual competency skills necessary to begin effectively contributing to both their unit of assignment and the NATO Targeting process as a whole.

Individuals would receive training in skills such as basic and intermediate target development, collateral damage estimation, automated Targeting systems, databasing and the procedures specific to their organization’s mission in the overall execution of the joint Targeting cycle. And while these basic individual courses could be taught at the unit level, it can be argued that a mature education and training construct would centralize them (with companion on-line support documentation for reference and skills refreshing). By centralizing to the greatest extent possible, the NATO Targeting community can ensure consistency of instruction and maximization of resources by avoiding duplicate or competing courses. It is also important to note that it is at this level where certifications to performance standards should be introduced. Although labeled “basic,” each of these skills atrophy if not used. Only through a systemic process

Joint Targeting briefing during exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 12 in Estonia.
of certification can supervisors, directors and commanders be assured that individuals are capable of performing to standard when called upon. Additionally, from a practical perspective, certification ensures a measurable return on investment and that the training course’s programs of instruction remain relevant to operational requirements.

The second of the two new levels comes under the heading of Advanced Individual Training. At this level, selected targeteers would have had some degree of practical experience and demonstrated proficiency in the Targeting process and would be ready to move on to areas requiring far greater technical expertise. Examples of courses/topics included at this level would be: battle damage assessment; target nomination management; Targeting strategy; target production management; weaponeering; and coordinate measurement. As with those skills learned at the basic individual level, each of these skills would require additional certifications to approved standards of performance. However, unlike the basic courses each of the courses at this level should be taught at a centralized location (also with companion on-line support documentation for reference and skills refreshing), as most would require specific systems and software.

The final level of a new construct for NATO Targeting competency training is collective training. Using NATO’s existing NATO Response Force (NRF) certification exercises, evaluators would ensure — as they do now — that the organization as a whole is able to effectively and efficiently execute the Joint Targeting Cycle.

The key factor at this level is that the training is collective in nature. This means that it is not just the targeteers being held responsible for their ability to properly accomplish the functions of the Targeting processes. Senior leadership should also be assessed on their ability to integrate Targeting into the overall functions of the Joint Force and, conversely, that each of the Staff’s functional areas (e.g. Plans, Intel, Ops, LEGAD and POLAD) can effectively contribute, where appropriate, to the target development, nomination and approval processes. For this level of Targeting training to be both representational of the ability of Joint Force’s Targeting function and meaningful for NRF certification, there must be a direct link between training curriculum and their programs of instruction and the criteria for evaluation. Both should be developed hand-in-glove with each other.

IN CONCLUSION, the Targeting function is as critical a function as any in supporting NATO’s ability to effectively and efficiently accomplish its assigned missions with the least amount of strategic risk. To do this we must ensure that those being asked to perform this function are properly trained and certified in rigorous processes through a holistic training construct that provides the kind of meaningful education to allow them to put their many talents and professionalism to good use in service of our Alliance.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MR. RICK CARLSEN serves as the Regional Desk Officer for Targeting in the United States European Command’s Intelligence Engagements Division. His portfolio serves USEUCOM’s international security cooperation efforts by synchronizing the shared intelligence capabilities, capacities and competencies between the United States and its Allied and Partner nations throughout USEUCOM’s area of responsibility. During his 30-year military and civilian career, Mr. Carlsten has provided highly specialized targeting and combat intelligence services in a variety of technical and leadership positions in U.S. and NATO forces at the tactical unit, operational task force and strategic headquarters levels.
The NATO RESPONSE FORCE (NRF) provides NATO’s quick-strike capability for an emerging crisis. As the nature of crises evolves, the NRF must be able to perform tasks across a wide range of potential operations, whether conducted as collective defence, crisis response or assistance missions. The NRF establishes a mechanism to generate a high readiness and technologically advanced joint force package, which is constructed on a rotational cycle and is composed of elements of the NATO Command Structure and Force Structure. In order to integrate the operational and tactical levels of command and control and demonstrate competencies, the NRF undergoes an exacting training programme to achieve certification, after which it is deemed ready for its one-year stand-by period. Operational command and control of the NRF is delegated to one of the

“In light of the interest demonstrated by the Estonian leadership, SKOLKAN contributes to reassuring the Baltic countries of NATO’s core commitment.”

By Mr Jérôme Guéhenneux
POLAD Senior Advisor, JFC Naples
two standing Allied Joint Force Commands (JFCs), making certification of the JFC a major event for the nominated Headquarters. The certification programme includes two particularly demanding phases: the Crisis Response Planning Phase and the Execution Phase. Since a new exercise scenario, known as SKOLKAN, had been developed by NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), testing it added additional spice to the certification process. This paper reflects on the JFC Naples experience with this new scenario during Exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 2012 (SFJE 12).

SKOLKAN introduces a new environment for NRF training. Indeed, for the first time in its history, the NRF was to be trained to defend a (Baltic) member of the Alliance. This singular change almost pre-figured recent events on the Alliance’s southern flank, making SKOLKAN even more poignant today. During the 27-month long process of scenario development, the JWC created a large repository of documentation related to the settings as the training scenario is to become NRF’s common operational environment for the years to come. The fictitious world of SKOLKAN is set in Scandinavia. The diversity and richness of the environment allow training across the full spectrum of operations. With a wide maritime domain, SKOLKAN includes six countries, three of which could be potential aggressors. SKOLKAN also provides for training in emergent technological fields such as social networks, cyber and ballistic missile threats.

TESTING A NEW TRAINING SCENARIO brings its own challenges. At first glance, the SFJE 12 scenario seemed fairly simple: the Alliance is threatened by an aggressive state, Bothnia, which is undermined by internal pro-democratic turmoil and sees dissidents in Estonia as a reason for contention, leading to a crisis between the two states. Progress to achieve a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) was blocked, and so the Alliance deployed the NRF under the banner of the Baltic and Estonia Force (BEFOR) in order to deter a potential aggression and increase the Alliance’s self-defence means, should deterrence fail. Despite its apparent simplicity, the scenario contains complex political constituents, starting with the nature of the operations in the SKOLKAN context. Discussing some of the thinking behind BEFOR’s efforts will not expose the intricacies of the scenario, but rather it will contribute to sharing practitioner’s observations, or at least some of them, from a political perspective at the operational level. This paper will look at the nature of BEFOR’s NATO operations, with reference to the North Atlantic Treaty(1), in the context of SKOLKAN. Possible NATO responses in the event of aggression are then reviewed.

SKOLKAN and the North Atlantic Treaty

During SKOLKAN/SFJE 12, BEFOR operations were understood in many different and contradictory ways: as an Article V, non-Article V, Article IV and, even at some point, non-Article IV operation!

Whether relevant or not, the question of what kind of operation BEFOR was and what it was not kept coming back and had to be addressed. The NRF is sufficiently flexible to be used in various contexts:

“[the] purpose of the NRF is to provide an immediate response to an emerging crisis as part of the Alliance’s comprehensive..."
management system for both Article V and non-Article V Crisis Response Operations, as the Council directs in the circumstances prevailing at the time.\(^{(2)}\)

To help understand where BEFOR falls in terms of NATO doctrine, the following paragraphs look at the type of operations in the context of the SKOLKAN framework.

**ARTICLE V.** Article V stipulates that an armed attack against at least one member of the Alliance shall be considered as an attack against all.\(^{(3)}\) SKOLKAN presents the characteristics of collective defence but remains outside of the bounds of Article V as long as the aggression is not characterized and Article V invoked. For Article V to apply there must be an armed attack. Practice furthermore shows that the invocation of Article V is necessary for its application. Since the political commitment of Article V is the core element of the Treaty, the carrying out of this most fundamental commitment is also central to deterrence. As a symbol of NATO’s success story, Article V has been called upon only once, on 12 September 2001, which led to two operations: Operation EAGLE ASSIST and Operation AC-TIVE ENDEAVOUR. In the case of SFJE 12, Bothnia, however, remains unaffected by NATO’s deterrence and continues to have an aggressive stance through its threatening statements and its posture. As long as Bothnia fails to put its words into action, the potential invocation of Article V at least is a Sword of Damocles hanging over it.

**NON-ARTICLE V.** Often presented as a non-Article V operation, BEFOR by nature does not fall under the description of a Crisis Response Operation. The NATO Crisis Response System and the AJP3.4 define a NA5CRO\(^{(4)}\) as, “focused [on] contributing to effective crisis management where there appears to be no direct threat to NATO Nations or territories that otherwise would clearly fall under Article V ‘collective defence’\(^{(5)}\).” Formalised in the 1999 Strategic Concept, after NATO gradually evolved towards a crisis management organization, the past 27 non-Article V operations were established to deal with a crisis outside NATO territory and under the provisions of UNSC resolutions. Because there appears to be a direct threat to NATO Nations and territories, the scope and nature of SKOLKAN/ SFJE 12 disqualified BEFOR from being described as a non-Article V operation. This could have been different, though, had the mission consisted of supporting dissidents inside Bothnia against their own government, as suggested at some stage during the scenario development.

**ARTICLE IV.** Article IV relates to consultation\(^{(6)}\) and was not conceived as a means to initiate an operation. Instead, it places NATO as a transatlantic forum for consultation on any security issue that may affect an Ally. The new Strategic Concept signalled that Article IV could help “share information, promote convergence of views, and when appropriate forge common approach”\(^{7}\). In practice, Article IV has helped provide a background for the intervention in Kosovo — in absentia of a UNSC resolution — and was used in 2002 to pave the way for an assistance mission to Turkey. Its implementation, however, remains contentious and debated. In respect of SFJE 12, the scenario never mentioned consultation, making the relation between Article IV and the NRF highly tenuous. However, the development of such a relation at some point in the fu-
ture is not completely impossible. As highlighted by the report NATO 2020, presented by a group of high-level experts, a school of thought pledges for bolder use of Article IV.

**INITIALLY DESIGNED FOR an Article V operation,** SKOLKAN became an unidentified object after it was decided not to make it an Article V operation in order to allow Partner Nations’ participation. In an Article V designed context, the deployment of the NRF in SKOLKAN/SFJE 12 would not fit into a common NATO characterisation of operations. To cut this Gordian knot, assuming that a reference to collective (self-)defence could create confusion in respect of Article V, BEFOR could simply be considered as a “collective reassurance” measure until deterrence fails and Article V is invoked. NATO does not need a UNSC resolution or to define a NATO treaty operation to deploy — or redeploy — forces within its Members. In such a context, BEFOR would fall into the scope of Article V, with the approval of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), once an armed attack occurred. Paradoxically, by providing reassurance to the Baltic States, BEFOR could be regarded as a threat to Bothnia. This is why the BEFOR plan foresees a gradual posture of the NRF, which is initially deployed in a so-called non-aggressive posture in Latvia. As the situation deteriorates, BEFOR is permitted to transition to increased deterrent postures in Estonia. This said, the nature of NATO's responses in SKOLKAN also demands to be looked at in the light of an aggression against Estonia.

**SKOLKAN and BEFOR responses to aggression**

Should deterrence fail, BEFOR’s main intention, as described in the Operation Plan (OPLAN), is “to respond decisively to Bothnian aggression.” This intent demands on the one hand “aggression” to be defined and weighted; on the other hand, it raises the issue of self-defence as a decisive response.

Based on a United Nations General Assembly resolution, aggression is the “use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State.” This definition is helpful but limited, mainly because General

**Limited aggression** is any armed attack that does “not imperil neither the survival of a nation nor the integrity of military forces.” It implies voluntary restraint on objective, space and the level of force used. Limited aggression includes incursions and hostile local actions but not covert actions or infiltrations. In the event of a limited aggression, BEFOR should be ready to provide “direct defence” in order to swiftly restore Estonia’s integrity. Direct defence “seeks to defeat the aggression at the level at which the enemy chooses to fight.” It implies a degree of proportionality, which fits self-defence as well. Less measured, a “deliberate escalation” could also respond to a limited aggression by “seek[ing] to defend aggression by deliberately raising but, where possible, controlling the scope and intensity of combat, maki[ng] the cost and the risk disproportionate to the aggressor’s objectives.”

*Deliberate escalation* is well-designed to address any major aggression. Major aggression is any attack in respect of which it “has been clearly determined that the aim and scope imperil directly at least one NATO country to the extent of survival or freedom, or the integrity of the military forces to the extent that capabilities are unacceptably deteriorated.”

If escalation fails to reduce enemy willingness to fight, NATO could finally “contemplate massive nuclear strikes”, as foreseen in the “general nuclear response”. While the latter option was excluded in BEFOR’s operational design, direct defence and deliberate escalation were considered in the design of BEFOR’s plans, leading to the creation of adapted postures and sets of Rules of Engagement.

In SFJE 12, Bothnia acts as a rogue state whose military doctrine is based on surprise and use of asymmetric warfare. To avoid surprise, BEFOR anticipated possible changes of posture along with extended sets of Rules of Engagement. In case of failing deterrence, NATO’s legitimacy — and possibly its cohesion — would then derive from collective self-defence and the extent of the force applied in counter-aggression. To remain justifiable, BEFOR collective self-defence must comply with its inherent limitations — i.e. necessity, proportionality, and imminence — which must be communicated efficiently.

“The necessity becomes manifest as soon as the aggression is characterised. It requires the aggression to be attributable and unequivocal. Less tangible proportionality would primarily depend on the aim of the response: “tit-for-tat” or “means-end” objective. To the first option — “tit-for-tat” —, “direct defence” would fit well. The “means-end” option could relate to a deliberate escalation. Within NATO, the aim of the response is to be determined at the highest political level with the support of the best military advice. This decisional choice is made, with more or less clarity, by NAC and then processed by SHAPE. Detrimentally, during SFJE 12, this issue had never been raised outside of the operational level.

Finally, the imminence of the threat could be described as “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” These criteria are
often used as justification for pre-emptive self-defence\(^\text{(6)}\), that is, an attempt to repel or defeat a perceived offensive or invasion, or to gain a strategic advantage in an impending (allegedly unavoidable) war before that threat materialises. During SFJE 12 execution, a significant part of the game was precisely to try to decipher bothnia’s intent and read the imminence of the threat. Here again, one would have expected that anticipating the Bothnian threat would have been discussed within the Alliance, and that the Commander would have received some guidance. Participating in the deliberation over potential responses during the execution phase was an incredible experience. The linearity of the OPLAN and the complexity of the Rules of Engagement certainly lived up to the Prussian military strategist von Moltke’s famous dictum that “no plan survives first contact with the enemy”, but the NRF did nevertheless achieve its objectives.

AN EXERCISE IS SAID to be successful when the Training Audience is pushed to leave its zone of comfort. SKOLKAN achieved its aims, taking political staff to the edge and beyond their comfort zones. Reinforced by professional staff coming from wide NATO origins, the POLAD Office was driven by the high-tempo battle rhythm, the diversity of the injects, interactions with the subordinate and superior commands, and relations with the Host Nation.

Improving SKOLKAN, from a political perspective, would probably entail framing the operational environment in a more coherent and comprehensive scenario. The simple fact that a clearly attributable attack on a NATO country does not lead to an Article V operation may be a concern to some. On a NATO country does not lead to an arrest. SKOLKAN could have done more to seize the opportunity of training within the Comprehensive Approach. Besides NATO and the Host Nations, no other actors were given any significant role in crisis management. Personally a firm proponent of this approach, I hope that future SKOLKAN scenarios will enable NATO to train in a complex environment where multiple organisations contribute to resolve the crisis.

The SFJE 12 exercise by far exceeded the JFC’s training objectives. In the light of the interest in SFJE 12 demonstrated by the Estonian leadership, SKOLKAN contributes to reassuring the Baltic countries of NATO’s core commitment. Whilst the Alliance is understandably focused on crisis management, cooperative security, new threats and Smart Defence, SKOLKAN has demonstrated that NATO’s commitment to collective defence continues to be at its core: firm, binding and indivisible. 

END NOTES:

(1) Also known as the Washington Treaty.
(2) AD 80-96
(3) “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”
(4) NASCRO stands for non-Article V Crisis Response Operation.
(6) “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”
(7) “Given the changing character and growing variety of dangers to the security of member states, the Allies should make more creative and regular use of the consultations authorized by Article IV. These consultations, which highlight the Alliance’s function as a political community, can be important both for preventing and managing crises and need not await an imminent Article V threat. Indeed consultations are singularly well-suited to the review of unconventional dangers and to situations that might require an emergency international response.”
(8) One could imagine the NRF becoming in a distant day the vehicle for an increased operationalisation of Article IV in a context of reassurance.
(9) At the time when the scenario was still under development, the participation of NATO Partners in SFJE 12 ruled out the Article V context.
(10) In addition, one could argue that since NATO’s Treaty refers to an “armed attack”, there is less need for a definition of aggression to set thresholds for the use of force by NATO troops.
(12) For SFJE12, the lack of details in the scenario, as mentioned in the introduction, was harmful to the execution. SHAPE involvement in the exercise probably suffered from this shortfall as well.
(13) Preventive war is launched to destroy the potential threat of an enemy where an attack by that party is not imminent or known to be planned.

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As NATO approaches a change of mission in Afghanistan, a change also begins towards the implementation of the new NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure (NFS) organisations shifting focus back to collective defence. There is a resurgence of interest among Allies and coalition partners in the NATO exercise programme as a vehicle to achieve common readiness. In turn, NATO has introduced a new exercise scenario, SKOLKAN, which is proving to be a catalyst in driving Transformation.

Exercising a new scenario

The SKOLKAN scenario, commissioned by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SA-CEUR) and designed by the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), presents a complex Article V collective defence of a NATO Member Nation that enables interaction between the Nations and the NCS, at all echelons. Its presentation of a robust and realistic full-spectrum adversary will challenge the command and control structure and uncover gaps in processes and capabilities that can then be redressed through training enhancement, and, on a broader scale, through processes like Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). Moreover, with its focus on NATO’s core task of collective defence, SKOLKAN provides an opportunity for engagement from NATO Headquarters all the way down to NFS units and Troop Contributing Nations, who are all focused on the single purpose of how best to defend NATO Members’ sovereign territory.

A change for the better

The change in how NATO trains is one of the more significant organisational modification for the Alliance in the last 25 years. In addition to revisiting the challenges associated with conducting operations in and
from the sovereign territory of NATO Nations and how imperative it is to partner with host-nation governments and military forces, SKOLKAN also allows for the integration of emerging challenges such as cyber defence, ballistic missile defence and energy security into a complex training environment.

Additionally, with its potential for high-intensity conflict, SKOLKAN forces greater scrutiny of traditional NATO challenges such as interoperability, force integration and the Comprehensive Approach in its traditional form. Overall, using SKOLKAN, NATO’s exercise programme is rich with potential and will enable an agile and strong NATO Response Force (NRF) that can turn its hand to conflict at anytime, anywhere in the world.

SKOLKAN provides an opportunity to transform NATO’s exercise programme through an application of the principles of CFI. This scenario is robust enough to accommodate strategic, operational and tactical problem-sets while simultaneously presenting the opportunity for a host nation to fully exercise its entire national defence programme in a single exercise. NATO now has a vehicle to conduct multi-tiered exercises that drive realistic interaction throughout the Command and Control architecture. This opportunity, learned through NATO’s partnering with the United States to deliver combined, multi-echeloned International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Mission Rehearsal Exercises, leverages the synergy achieved by cross-echelon coordination while simultaneously achieving economies of scale in collective training.

Additionally, as more exercises assume a common focus, there is potential to combine exercises and further expand Command and Control interaction, achieving even greater synergy and efficiencies.

“There is a resurgence of interest among Allies and coalition partners in the NATO exercise programme as a vehicle to achieve common readiness.”

Driving transformation across the Alliance and SFJZ 13

All of these transformative initiatives are emerging in NATO’s Exercise STEADFAST JAZZ 2013 (SFJZ 13), an Article V collective defence of Baltic Member States against a fictitious adversary and the certification vehicle for the 2014 NRF.

SFJZ 13 is multi-tiered: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) will certify its Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC) at the strategic level; Joint Force Command Brunssum will certify as the operational-level NRF headquarters; the French Rapid Reaction Corps aligned Exercise BRILLIANT LEDGER with SFJZ 13 and will certify as the NFS tactical land component headquarters; the full complement of other NFS component commands will be part of the tactical-level Training Audience.

In addition, Exercise BALTIC HOST 2013, traditionally a NATO forces reception, staging, onward movement and integration exercise with host organisations from the Baltic Nations, has combined with SFJZ 13 to exercise military throughput and follow-on force flow for the NRF. SFJZ 13 has also generated tremendous enthusiasm for direct interaction between the Baltic Nations and Poland and the NCS at all echelons. The lessons learned from the depth of this collaboration will help transform NATO’s strategy for collective defence.

A palpable result

The end result will be an NRF for 2014 that exhibits a decisive operational edge over previous NRF rotations due exclusively to the transformative training provided through NATO’s operational-level training and exercise programme.

As NATO prepares for the future in an era of strategic uncertainty, economic austerity and limited resources, the JWC, with its high-calibre staff, its leading operational-level trainers and its modernised facilities and CIS platforms, is ideally positioned to leverage SKOLKAN and NATO’s training and exercise programme to help drive Transformation across the Alliance and beyond.
A 25-PERSON OPERATIONAL Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) led by NATO’s Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC Brunssum), together with some of its subordinate Component Commands for NATO Response Force (NRF) 2014, supported a Crisis Response Planning from 11 to 15 May at the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in preparation for STEADFAST JAZZ 13 (SFJZ 13), which is scheduled for this November.

Under the command of Belgium Brigadier General Eddy Staes, Assistant Chief of Staff J3 at JFC Brunssum, the simulated mission of the OLRT was to provide its in-theatre findings and up-to-date information to the Joint Force Commander’s Joint Operational Planning Group (JOPG) in order to support their Crisis Response Planning for SFJZ 13. Based on SKOLKAN — the fictitious exercise scenario specifically developed by the JWC to train the NRF — the Centre was transformed into the Estonian Ministry of Defence to provide the appropriate setting for the OLRT. Estonia was indeed the “theatre of operations” for the Team because the fictitious world of SKOLKAN is set in the Nordic Region with the aim to defend this Baltic Ally against an outside aggressor, Bothnia. Once in Estonia, which had also liaison teams from Latvia, Lithuania and Poland present as well, the Team quickly settled into the exercise scenario and started to liaise with different stakeholders (real role players from the Baltic States and Poland).

The OLRT is a team of specialists who deploy to a possible theatre of operations through NATO, under a usually complex mandate, in order to gain a comprehensive understanding and build the operational picture of that environment, establish relationships with host-nation authorities and accurately assess what their needs are. The OLRT’s work is critical to the success of a future operation, which can also be a humanitarian relief effort and therefore an urgent issue. Simply put, it operates as the “eyes and ears” of the Joint Force Commander prior to his deployment.

Brigadier General Staes said: “We had a very good training experience at the JWC thanks to the Training Teams and high-tech facilities made available to us for the OLRT training. We trained as we would fight.”

The OLRT significantly contributes to the development of an effective Operational Plan (OPLAN) for the standing Joint Force Headquarters and conducts a detailed study of the mission and tasks that NRF forces might have to undertake during SFJZ 13. A command post exercise connected to a partial LIVEX, the SFJZ 13 is the vehicle for the NRF 2014 certification. It is, however, also pursuing NATO’s Visible Assurance as an additional aim while training JFC Brunssum and its Component Commands.
for the NRF 2014.

The SFJZ 13 will be hosted by four NATO Nations — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland — and will involve Strategic, Joint Operational and Tactical headquarters as well as Land, Air and Maritime forces from many other nations.

Brigadier General Staes went on to say: “The OLRT is, in fact, a supporting entity for the JOPG at JFC Brunssum. We contribute to their operational planning through our fact-finding mission. The NATO Operational Planning process may cover a wide range of missions, including routine training events and exercises as well as an immediate response to an attack conducted on NATO territory. Planning is everything. In this event, the JOPG is working on an operational plan based on direction and guidance from SACEUR to our Joint Force Commander. The initial plan should aim at de-escalating the crisis situation in the Baltic region, which is based on the fictitious SKOLKAN scenario. To make a prudent military planning for potential future operations, you need a lot of extremely current information, and that is exactly what we are simulating with the OLRT deployment.”

THE OLRT IS CAPABLE of deploying on a notice to move of 48 hours. There is a pressure and urgency to obtain currency (up-to-date data) in theatre for the success of the planning process in developing a concept of operations. “Because it is all very quick, we need to have the best people in that team, people who hold a wide range of expertise and share a common understanding of what needs to be done,” Brigadier General Eddy Staes added.

“Every functional area is represented here, from Legal to Public Affairs to Real Life Support, from engineers to medical and force protection experts. We organized into three clusters: operations and planning; support; and finally the Component Command cluster. The Component Commands were indeed integrated in the joint level OLRT in order to answer early those questions from the tactical level, which influences the joint level. Component Commands will then develop their own plan at the tactical level. In this OLRT we had representatives from the components provided by the French Rapid Reaction Corps, the Italian Maritime Component and the NATO Air Command Ramstein. Based on our daily reports and detailed post-meeting minutes, the JOPG can further build possible courses of action, which will be presented to the Joint Force Commander soon. Following his decision on the preferred course of action, the Commander will then provide guidance to develop the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) at the operational-level. Once SACEUR has approved the CONOPS, a detailed OPLAN, in complete format with all necessary annexes will be produced and presented to the North Atlantic Council.”

FROM THE RECEIPT of in-theatre analyses by the OLRT until approval of the CONOPS, this is very much a high-intensity planning process. “Unlike the CERASIA scenario, which focused on Crisis Response Operations outside of NATO’s borders, SKOLKAN takes place in the Nordic Region and is focused on both Article IV, which relates to consultation, and Article V Collective Defence Operations,” Brigadier General Staes further said.

“For a long time, NATO has not focused on Article IV leading to complex Article V Collective Defence Operations, so I believe it is high time to do so but with a Comprehensive Approach, where the military is an important contributor, but certainly not the only contributor. In this scenario we seek to contribute with military means to de-escalation of the crisis in a peaceful way.”

During the OLRT deployment, JWC also collaborated with a wide range of role players within its White Cell exercise structure, including Subject Matter Experts from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in order to provide the most realistic experience for the OLRT. Focusing on upcoming challenges, Brigadier General Staes concluded: “We met with the delegations, civil and military actors, from four Nations here in Stavanger. Our deliberations will provide outstanding preparation for Exercise SFJZ 13 in November. We all need to study SKOLKAN in depth to improve contemplation of high-security risks before they emerge as crises. Training is an ideal vehicle for NATO’s transformation, future capabilities and readiness.”

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Above: The White Cell for SFJZ 13 OLRT. Photo by JWC PAO.

Below: Morning meeting amongst different clusters. Photo by JWC PAO.
On 13 June 2013, the JWC successfully completed the first ISAF Mission Rehearsal Training ever conducted in the superior training environment of its new training facility at Jåttå, Stavanger. Popularly referred to as ISAF TE 13-01, the event provided operational level training in support of ongoing ISAF operations. The purpose was to train, rehearse and contribute to the overall preparation of staff before their deployment to HQs ISAF and ISAF Joint Command respectively. The training was also offered to personnel set to join the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan. The Training Audience (TA) included staff of NATO Allied Headquarters and NATO Standing Headquarters, as well as Individual Augmentees from Troop Contributing Nations. The JWC aims at providing its TA with not only the best training possible, but an opportunity for teambuilding with those they will be working with once deployed. ISAF TE 13-01 started on 31 May and nearly 600 people were involved in its execution. The training was delivered by Subject Matter Experts from all of the key functions within the two ISAF headquarters, as well as officials of the Afghan Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior and the Afghan Ground Force Command. Altogether, 70 people were brought directly from Afghanistan to help ensure our TA received the most realistic and accurate training possible.

(Text by Cdr SG Helene Langeland, Chief PAO; photos by MST Louis Breijer, Inci Kucukaksoy)
“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”

Sun Tzu

WE HAVE ALL, ARGUABLY AT SOME POINT IN OUR LIVES, IMAGINED CREATING OUR OWN COUNTRY or kingdom in accordance with our view of the ideal; there are even games that allow you to realise such ambitions. The building of a country is just the first step; inevitably, such an activity requires situating that country in a larger setting. If this is done considering regional and global realities, such an activity begets conflict; because whilst the building has an element of satisfaction, it is the threat of destruction, which catches the imagination. The idea of conflict is as old as mankind itself. So imagine what opportunities are offered if building countries and creating conflict is your daily job. Here, in Scenario Section at the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), our task is to create challenges for NATO’s senior military headquarters to exercise twice a year.

By Simon Dewing
Joint Exercise Division,
Scenario Section
Joint Warfare Centre
Whether providing a Crisis Response or a good old fashion head-to-head war fighting scenario, the Scenario Section within Joint Exercise Division (JED) is provided with an idea and certain limitations and is left to explore a myriad of options — are NATO training requirements best served using an island off the coast of West Africa (MADA); or a failing state surrounded by adversaries (CERASIA); or the current setting based upon six fictional countries bordering Europe to the North (SKOLKAN)? SACEUR will provide the training priorities that are required to be addressed in a new setting and the JWC will develop the content to meet the challenge.

THE CURRENT SETTING OF SKOLKAN is the most ambitious and complex setting to date. It is no longer enough to deliver the armed forces to battle it out; we have to also provide the context for the strategic and operational planners to analyse; the setting and the scenario need to provide the hooks for the “WHY”. The “Why” must be created based upon a balance of information on the environment across all of the PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information) domains, and enable NATO Training Audiences to consider NATO’s Instruments of Power as tools to navigate this environment (Setting).

Perhaps the most complex aspect of creating the “Why” in the Setting is in the Political domain, as creating a credible reason for any country to upset the balance of power in a region or to be in a failing position requires a credible foundation for the country both individually, and as a part of its regional and global environment. Analysis of the PMESII domains to ascertain the dynamics of a crisis demands a level of credible depth; the Setting and Scenario must include sufficient detail to provide continuity and trends. It must enable NATO Training Audiences the opportunity to train as it fights; the Setting material must mirror real world data in its content and presentation to the extent required to ensure that the environment created drives training and does not detract from it. The success or failure of the JWC in authoring the Setting is measured much like that of a novel; it manifests itself only when the audience has the opportunity to use it.

Keeping in mind the need to challenge the Training Audience in an environment that reflects real world realities, the Setting is expanded upon in accordance with the exercise and training objectives and a Scenario is developed and delivered to focus the crisis accordingly. This is no small matter; transforming the Setting into a Scenario, fit for the purpose of any NATO exercise, requires a “Road to Crisis” to be created that adequately feeds the Knowledge Development processes at the Strategic and Operational level HQs. This requires a synchronisation of Intel and non-Intel products and information that is subsequently released to the Training Audience in a manner that reflects reality and supports the picture that is intended to be painted.

This “Knowledge” includes inputs in a plethora of domains to include media in all its forms, diplomatic engagements, public opinion publications, NATO and National Intel sources et al. Building such a comprehensive Scenario is only possible if it is underpinned by a Setting that is both realistic and in-depth. Building such a comprehensiv-
hensive environment sets the conditions for NATO Training Audiences to understand the context within which the military is operating, and that it is but one tool in NATO’s toolbox to resolve a crisis.

SKOLKAN has proven to be transformational in this regard. It has provided the Strategic and Operational levels of NATO with an unprecedented opportunity to challenge itself. The SKOLKAN Scenario, when fully embraced by the Training Audience, provides a “real-world” environment for NATO to train as it fights, across the spectrum of conflict. The JWC Scenario Section will continue to add depth to the Setting based upon the experience gained through SKOLKAN’s “contact” with the Training Audience in an effort to continue to improve the integrity of the product and provide a planning and operations environment that prepares NATO for the current and future security environment. This can only be done by maintaining a Scenario capability that is comprehensive in its coverage and current in its understanding of NATO Strategic and Operational priorities.

The last 20 years of warfare have demonstrated that Sun Tzu’s quote at the beginning of this article has never been more relevant. The true art leading in the future lies in the ability of leaders to understand the complex environment within which they are operating, the full spectrum of the dynamics of the crisis that is presented, and the ability to apply a strategy that leverages all of the instruments of power in a manner that efficiently, but most certainly effectively, resolves the crisis to their benefit.

SKOLKAN has introduced NATO to such an environment and such an opportunity; one that causes NATO leaders to conduct a detailed analysis, challenges them to enter into an intellectual debate on the most appropriate strategies to resolve the crisis, and to work comprehensively to achieve success. The introduction of SKOLKAN to NATO has raised the bar for Scenario in support of exercises. There is no going back to one or two dimensional exercise environments. Future scenario development will need to provide a complex, multi-faceted setting and scenario to prepare NATO for the challenging future security environment. +

“SKOLKAN

“The true art lies in the ability of leaders to understand the complex environment within which they are operating, the full spectrum of the dynamics of the crisis that is presented, and the ability to apply a strategy that leverages all of the instruments of power...”
IN AN ERA OF austerity-driven reforms with budgets down and risks up, particularly in a post-Afghanistan scenario, keeping defence strong requires projects and processes such as Smart Defence (pooling and sharing capabilities) and Connected Forces Initiative (building interoperability). In order to adapt to this complex environment, NATO’s Agency and Command Structure Reform, which was implemented on 1 December 2012, changed the organization of the NATO Military Command and reduced the number of major headquarters from eleven to six, with an overall 33 per cent reduction in posts (bringing staff numbers down from 13,000 to about 8,800). The aim was to create a streamlined, more responsive and more deployable command configuration that is obligated to fit today’s and tomorrow’s security environment, while making NATO more affordable.

The reform principally impacted the subordinate commands of Allied Command Operations. The resulting NATO standing Command Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure (NFS), made up of two Strategic Commands (Operations and Transformation) and two Joint Force Headquarters, reflect the expanded roles and tasks faced by NATO. To undertake and accomplish the full spectrum of Alliance missions, the NCS is supported by the NFS; the first with a strategic scope intended to command and control joint operations; the latter tactical, providing additional command and control capabilities at the tactical level within a single environment.
The reform, Admiral James G. Stavridis, the former SACEUR, said that the restructuring would retool NATO in its endeavours to increase responsiveness and transformation: “This new, leaner structure is ideas-driven. It places emphasis on special operations, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, strategic communications, missile defence and a robust set of exercises and training events to keep the edge on the Alliance’s deep military capability.”

IN ORDER TO BEST SUPPORT NATO’s new level of ambition, the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) planned and implemented an internal reorganization effective 11 March 2013, and reassigned some of the key components of its workforce while maintaining its main pillars. The new JWC Peacetime Establishment consists of altogether 250 posts, of those 190 military filled by 15 NATO Nations and one Partnership for Peace Nation, as well as 60 posts for civilians coming from 11 NATO Nations.

The JWC’s command will this June shift from a French to a German two-star officer. The new structure includes a Staff Advisory Group with special focus on the JWC’s mission, vision and future strategy. JWC’s Training and Transformational output continues to be spread across three Divisions — Joint Training Division, Joint Exercise Division and Joint Capability Integration Division — which are the nerve centres for delivering the JWC’s primary task of supporting the NATO Training and Exercise Programme.

The restructuring primarily affects administrative and support areas, which are made up of two Divisions: the newly named Exercise and Base Services Division and the Simulation, Modelling and C4 Division. Replacing the now-defunct Director of Staff, the Director of Management is responsible for the functional areas of Management Planning and Protocol. Also included on site is the NATO Communications and Information Agency Squadron Stavanger.

“The process to change a Peacetime Establishment (PE) of an organization is quite cumbersome, especially when we are dealing with efficiency measures to meet the lower manpower targets rather than the alignment of manpower to changed outputs,” said the Chief Exercise and Base Services Division, at the time of this interview, British Army Colonel Colin Nobbs, who retired in April.

Fusion of training and doctrine: Ultimate operational readiness

“Since the JWC’s inception, our strategy has always been to move transformation forward using Training as an engine to drive the process. Training is our core mission. In terms of managing the PE review within the JWC, we asked: What do we do to protect our core mission and in order to keep that mission relevant, how do we effectively augment our developmental work? Our task has been to manage the pressure of the efficiency measures without subtracting from our main pillars, which we have done by taking risk in some other areas. One of the key changes in this process, I think, was to align our structure to deliver new capabilities, such as Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD), space, cyber and Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices, into our training. Within the constraints of the PE review, what we tried to do was to increase our Subject Matter Expertise-base slightly in these areas in order to better deliver an exercise and doctrinal thinking capability around the latest initiatives, but also to meet the JWC’s overall realignment of mission requirements to deliver key tasks directed by SACEUR,” Colonel Nobbs added.

The JWC today delivers both the pre-deployment training of ISAF, which is a transitory requirement, and the training of the continually evolving NATO Response Force (NRF) concept, which is an enduring requirement. The training of the NCS and NFS to work together is fundamental to the success of NATO. As such, the aim has been to actively promote the relationship between NCS and NFS through training and exercises. Colonel Nobbs agreed: “Now, there is a greater reliance on the NFS due to the demand for a high state of readiness and quick reaction, which means that the need for readily available, highly trained forces has grown.”

More than ever, NATO’s focus is on collective training and exercises among Allies and coalition partners. This is the area where NATO will connect all channels into one to face an unpredictable future and outline a new vision. It is through training and exercises that NATO will transform forces, demonstrate cohesion, show resolve, gener-
The JWC senior leadership on 19-20 February 2013 conducted an organisational culture workshop which aimed to capture and baseline our organisation’s personality and understand the process of culture-shaping. Photo by Markus Beck. Read more at www.jwc.nato.int

Colonel Nobbs continued: “Training offers the best medium to challenge, educate, test, assess and evaluate ourselves. It allows for continuous review and feedback, the development of new doctrine and concepts, the implementation of new capabilities and the opportunity to touch all commands and staffs with our transformational objectives.”

He then pointed out. “At the JWC we provide more than training, we are also NATO’s warfare centre. This is all tied to the idea that if we just do training, the training will eventually become irrelevant as it ceases to be current. The JWC is much more than a training venue. Here we take the big ideas that are happening within NATO, and our Subject Matter Experts will transfer those big ideas into something, which firstly we at the JWC can understand and, secondly, we can add into exercises in a way that develops the HQs capabilities in these areas. Thirdly, we can help the HQs across the whole of the force structure and command structure come to a common understanding of, for example, what TBMD means in practice.”

Colonel Nobbs, On Sailing: “Both Gill and I thoroughly enjoyed our time in Norway. Neither of us ski, but we are both avid sailors. We have arranged with the UK the replacement of the offshore yacht, which is a NATO asset available to NATO members making the JWC Sailing Club the most expensive we own. Outdoors is in the fabric of Norway. We are fortunate to own our own boat and even more fortunate to have been able to berth it at Ulsnes. We have sailed two or three times every month that I have been in Norway, even through the winter. We leave shortly to embark on some longer term sailing. The plan is to head down to the Canary Islands by mid-October and then to the Caribbean.”

After 39 years of Service, Man and Boy! Colonel Nobbs retires from JWC with full Naval Honours, with a dedicated Steam Past, accompanied by his wife and colleagues. Fair Winds and Following Seas.
THE JWC MILITARY CABINS are an excellent resource for JWC staff and their families. Situated a little over 100km from Jåttå in Sirdal Kommune (in the neighbouring Fylke of Vest Agder), they are close to the Ådneram ski area (about two km) and are within easy reach of all Sirdal alpine and cross-country ski areas. In the summer they afford ready access to a beautiful area for walking, hiking and exploring, with Kjerag a reasonably short car journey away. The cabins lead directly onto a lake and there is a boat available to exploit this amenity.

The site currently comprises five cabins: three medium-sized cabins (Valkyrien, Frøya and Trym) to sleep six people and two small cabins (Tor and Odin) that sleep four-six people. A sixth larger cabin, Valhall, which includes three four-person and three six-person bedrooms plus common areas is currently closed for maintenance, but is expected to be available for hire from August/September 2013. To book the cabins you can either e-mail or call Host Nation Support Office (olejohan.haheim@jwc.nato.int / lindasvendsen@jwc.nato.int; 51342292/3) to enquire the current availability and make the booking. Host Nation Support Office can also advise on the mechanisms for taking/returning keys and the rules that apply to the booking. To book the cabins, JWC staff must join the JWC Military Cabins Club (JMCC). An annual fee (currently 250 NOK) must be paid, but this can be done at the time the first booking is made.

For many years, the cabins were run by the Norwegian Military but, with a reduction in Norwegian military personnel in the local area, consideration was given to closing them down. The JMCC was formed to prevent the loss of this facility. The club, a self-sufficient entity operating its own funds, is able to recycle the funds gained through rental and membership to maintain and improve the facility. The JMCC Committee therefore encourages you to hire the Military Cabins and get out and enjoy the wonderful environment of Sirdal!

By Adrian Williamson

<table>
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<tr>
<th>JMCC cabin rental price list</th>
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<tr>
<td>Valkyrien, Frøya and Trym</td>
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<td>Tor and Odin</td>
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<td>Valhall</td>
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<td>Valhall (two types: sleep up to 4 or 6)</td>
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TECHNOLOGY IS ONLY AN ENABLER.
IT IS PEOPLE WHO WIN OR LOSE WARS.

TIDE SPRINT

Stavanger, 15-19 April 2013

By Inci Kucukaksoy
Public Affairs Office, Joint Warfare Centre

NATO’S ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION (ACT) held its 21st Technology for Information, Decision and Execution Superiority (TIDE) Sprint from 15 to 19 April 2013 at the Joint Warfare Centre’s (JWC’s) state-of-the-art training facility in Stavanger, Norway. The TIDE Sprints began in 2005 and are biannual, alternating between one event in Europe and one in the United States. Besides being ideal networking and knowledge-sharing venues for the C4ISR community, the TIDE Sprints are also known as ACT’s think-tank for leading-edge Information Technology (IT).

Organized by ACT’s Technology and Human Factors Branch and hosted by the JWC’s SMC4 Division, the TIDE Sprint 2013 brought together academicians, decision-makers and industry leaders from 25 different establishments, not to mention a total of 161 staff members of 52 organizations, national commands and agencies from both sides of the Atlantic: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

“These are the type of events the JWC should host in the future,” U.S. Air Force Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff Brigadier General John W. Doucette said in his opening speech. During the event, approximately 140 briefing sessions and workshops were organized along eight tracks: Command and Control, Cyber Defence, Cloud and Mobile Computing, Enterprise Architecture, Training, Technology, Deployable Communications and Information Systems (CIS) and CIS Virtualization.

The TIDE Sprint 2013 audience was furthermore treated to the high-calibre contributions of three prominent key note speakers, Colonel Joachim Neumueller, Mr Tarkan Maner and Mr Pierre Paperon, who covered topics such as high technology, new trends, and information security.

Mr Johan Goossens, who has been in the role of Head of ACT’s Technology and Human Factors Branch since 2003 (then under a different name, but with the same mission), noted: “TIDE Sprints have been instrumental in aligning IT initiatives in the Alliance and coordinating interoperability efforts between the Nations and other stakeholders. However, technology is only an enabler. It is people who win or lose wars.”

Also during the event, Mr Garry Har greaves from the JWC’s SMC4 Division interviewed Mr Tarkan Maner, Vice President and General Manager of DELL/WYSE Cloud Computing, on the relationship between NATO and cloud services in the future. The JWC, of note, virtualized its IT platform down to the desktop in 2011, and in 2012, delivered private cloud services to support a NATO exercise.

During the interview, Mr Maner talked about new trends in technology, which constantly responds to new demands, as well as the shift of focus from the device (security) to the user (security). “The future of IT is all about social, mobile, virtual, convergence and contextual (intelligence) — and all this will happen around cloud-based computing,” Mr Maner said.

The next TIDE Sprint will be held at the Virginia Beach Resort Hotel in Virginia Beach, Virginia, 21-25 October 2013.

(1) Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR).
(2) Simulation, Modelling, Command, Control, Communications and Computers.
“Through the TIDE Sprints we actually came up with better tools that aimed to increase NATO’s maritime capacity.”

THE IT SECTOR’S DEVELOPMENT continues at a blazing speed, bringing new features to the market almost every day, every hour, every minute. This primarily revolves around simplicity, efficiency, high availability and reduced costs; in short, the user interface. The endless stream of buzzwords referring to products and services that have revolutionized the sector include desktop virtualization, cloud computing, convergence and connectivity, virtual communities and social media, apps, androids, data centres, storage and, always, information security. These are all real; they are not just hype concepts. This is our digital future, which is already transforming our daily lives in profound ways and is inescapable. So it is not only for the industrial and consumer markets. For the military, too, it is critical to employ high technology and avoid being outdated as lives would depend on it.

TIDE Sprint 2013 convened technical experts from the industry, academia and government agencies to engage in discussions covering eight specifically-focused but related tracks:

1. Command and Control: Enhanced Situational Awareness and effective Command and Control as related to NATO’s future unified collaboration as well as the Information and Knowledge Management (IKM) Services.

2. Cyber Defence: Analysis of hacker profiles and understanding technical insights of cyber-attack techniques.

3. Cloud and Mobile Computing: Understanding of, and transition to, cloud and mobile computing for NATO’s future CIS capabilities by sharing best practices and national initiatives.

4. Enterprise Architecture: Using the NATO Consultation, Command and Control (C3) Classification Taxonomy as a reference for a discussion of business processes, logical and physical design of CIS capabilities, linkage with the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), architecture development, and evolution of methods and tools.

5. Training: Current developments in the training areas with emphasis on Immersive Training Environments using simulation and avatar-based training and discussion on data exchange and Visualization in training and operational Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) systems.

6. Technology: Discuss and validate Service-Oriented Architecture concepts, the NATO Vector Graphics specification, and Battle Space Objects.

7. Deployable CIS: To gather at the same location NATO, Nations and Industries in order to create a forum where ideas, corporate knowledge, good practices and new technologies will be shared and help to implement interoperability, understanding and concepts in the scope of Deployable CIS.

8. CIS Virtualization: Information on this Track can be found on page 52.

MR JOHAN GOOSSENS, one of the TIDE Sprints lead event planners, said he believed in cross-pollination between the tracks. “Sprints, by definition, are collaborative events, so our goal is to encourage constant synergy between the participants. There are very smart discussions and very smart ideas. These are not only technically savvy people, but they are also good thinkers. In some cases, we have joint sessions to explore solutions to common challenges and share experiences. The whole setting is very different from an ordinary NATO board meeting… it is informal and more open and we see a
A dynamic tool that uses many of the BRITE services to access, assess and present available information on a specific track. This is far more important to us than the gadgets we use, and it is also the focus of my Branch at ACT. Mr Goossens continues, adding, “Let me give you an example. In order to improve NATO’s Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA) capability in view of NATO’s growing involvement in the conduct of maritime security operations, a few years ago, we designed a suite of Baseline for Rapid Iterative Transformational Experimentation (BRITE) applications, which include updated versions of a number of the existing Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS) Web Information Services Environment (WISE) based objects, plus some newly developed ones, the latter including Places, Routes, Areas, Lloyds, Mership, Automatic Identification System (AIS), Smart Agents and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) database. We did this because we had a challenge there: our tools were not sufficient to deal with the illicit activities at sea, from human trafficking and piracy to terrorism and espionage. Left unchecked, the maritime security would have degraded, and the sea would have become a refuge for lawless and non-state groups. Through the TIDE Sprints we actually came up with better tools that aimed to increase NATO’s maritime capacity. These tools are helping NATO’s senior maritime commanders to make better decisions in counter-terrorism operations such as Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR in the Mediterranean Sea and, as a consequence, save lives.”

TIDE Sprint 2013 also contributed to NATO’s Future Mission Network (FMN) Implementation Plan, which is currently under development. The FMN seeks to “leverage the interoperability gains achieved with the Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN) for future operations.”

Mr Goossens says: “We are developing this in coordination with ACO and the NATO Communications and Information (NCI) Agency, and also benefit from the active involvement of NATO Member and Partner Nations. We want to make lessons identified from operations in Afghanistan and Libya available for any future mission. We are seeking interoperability at all levels. The FMN is a key enabler of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). We no longer look at systems and gadgets connecting with each other, but also we are looking at connecting people. Add to this the fact that we have less money, so we have to do a lot more with a lot less.”

“When NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in 2012 presented the CFI, he said ‘Smart Defence is about building capabilities together. But we also need to be able to operate them together. That is why I have launched the Connected Forces Initiative. It puts a premium on training and education, exercises, and better use of technology.’ I think this was great because you can explain it in two ways: you can say that you need better technology, and you can also say that you have to use technology better. I think that is what the focus of TIDE Sprints has to be: we need to get better technology, and we need to use it better. Everybody’s on notice that technology is helping us to change.”

(1) A dynamic tool that uses many of the BRITE services to access, assess and present available information on a specific track.
MR TOMMY HANSEN REIESTAD, the NCI Agency’s Chief Event and Configuration Manager in Stavanger, led the Virtualization Track in TIDE Sprint 2013. Commenting on Virtualization, he says it is a far away shot from rigid IT architectures that cannot be managed efficiently; instead it offers increased flexibility, higher performance and lower costs.

THE THREE SWORDS: What have you achieved in the Virtualization Track?
Mr REIESTAD: The Virtualization Track was a newcomer at this TIDE event. It explored Virtualization technologies and their development outlook, one of the most innovative and fastest growing areas of the IT sector. Following the opening briefings by several speakers who provided a close look at the driving demand for Virtualization, we ran discussions on a variety of topics, which gave the audience excellent insight into the next-generation market opportunities and challenges. Some of the key sessions were devoted to the experiences the commercial company Gaz de France Suez had with their IT development, with focus on security, mobility and Virtualization. Another session was led by VMware, a global market leader who actually coined the term “virtual desktop infrastructure”, and discussed how software will replace many hardware components of security and switching technology. Virtualization is well positioned within NATO, and the Joint Warfare Centre’s advanced IT capabilities are at the forefront of this development.

THE THREE SWORDS: What is technology’s role in NATO’s transformation?
Mr REIESTAD: It encourages simplicity and efficiency, as well as higher performance and velocity at lower costs. The TIDE Sprints are one of the most important events in NATO where technology is discussed in order to understand today so as to predict the future in “scientific” terms. The last couple of years have seen an increase in the number of participants and, more importantly, our diversity expanded. This adds to the reliability and currency of the content, the quality of the discussions and the seamless knowledge-sharing. However, some key players within NATO are yet to attend. I believe, however, that they progressively will become more attentive to the state-of-the-art technology trends and power of networking, so that we will have more and more key stakeholders with us. Under the Secretary General’s Connected Forces Initiative, TIDE Sprints are also a key enabler for discussions and coordination of different initiatives, with both NATO and Nations developing new capabilities in the face of reduced funding. Sharing information on innovative ideas and projects is essential. I believe that TIDE Sprints provide one of the most straightforward and powerful IT platforms for face-to-face collaboration.
ON FRIDAY 26 APRIL 2013, the SMC4 Division hosted a retirement buffet for the Head of C4 Service Design Section, Mr Paul Taylor, who has worked for NATO since 1994. The buffet at the 426th Air Base Squadron, Stavanger, started with the arrival of Mr Taylor and his wife of 37 years, Barbara, who appeared before a cheering crowd of well-wishers: family, friends and colleagues, under a bright, unexpectedly warm April sun. Mr Taylor thanked all his colleagues, past and present, for friendship and work, and paid tribute to his wife.

Mr Taylor believes that strong engagements, diversity and new challenges drive NATO forward, and that our aim as a NATO organization must be to create the right work environment so that people look forward to being there. "The difference this brings is exponential," he said, adding that it also helps if the facilities and the Host Nation support are excellent: the JWC clearly comes through!

Due to his job, Mr Taylor has been to the JWC what Q has been to Agent 007, Mr James Bond. Although not necessarily inventing any gadgets, he was one of the factors that enabled the JWC to deliver a high-calibre training experience to its Training Audiences. "I would rather consider myself as someone who has helped to make a success on a daily basis, most often with the small and minor changes that have helped the average person meet his or her own goals," Mr Taylor commented. "And, as it turns out," he said, "you can always blame the weather in Stavanger if things go wrong."

By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO

Thank you very much for giving us the time for this interview. Can you tell us about your job at the JWC?

—I will start by saying that some people ask why am I never involved in the exercises and I respond that when an exercise starts then my and the Section's tasks should be complete, only if something has been forgotten or a new requirement emerges during the exercise that cannot be met with current resources do we become involved. The Section I head tries to ensure that all the Communication and Information Systems (CIS) requirements are met not only for exercises but for the day-to-day working of the JWC staff. I must add immediately that this involves working together with other sections of SMC4 and the CIS support provided by the local NCIA Squadron.

Within my own area of responsibility lie two very important areas: the CIS budget — which is managed day-to-day by Major Steve McLain and the Service Management Framework (SMF) — managed by Major Michael Alcantara. Simply put the SMF has focused the delivery of CIS Services to the JWC to ensure that these are delivered in an effective and efficient manner. Another major part of the Section's work is dealing with new CIS requirements that cannot be met with current resources. In these cases the requirements are forwarded for analysis and in most cases Mr Maciej Koczur, the Branch System Engineer, is the one who undertakes this work and has to design a solution how the requirement should be met. I must also not forget that the Section also organizes the CIS training for SMC4 staff and other CIS specialists within the JWC (CIS analysts in JCID for example). Master Sergeant Sebastian Petersen has the day-to-day responsibility for this amongst his other tasks. When the number of participants on a course make it cost effective, on-site training courses are organised, and for individual needs, training courses mainly in London, are arranged. I hope this gives a flavour of the role I had within the SMC4 Division in JWC.

Is it fair to say one of the most distinctive traits of NATO's organization is the close and constant working relationship between its civilian and military workforce?

—I believe this is a fair comment; NATO has always been a mixture of civilian and military. I have always maintained that I worked for a political organisation with a military wing: after all the North Atlantic Council, the senior body in NATO, consists of civilian members, not military members. For the military wing of NATO, to continue to be effective, there is probably now even more need for the close and constant working relationship between the civilian and military staff.

In your view what are the most marked characteristics of the JWC and how has the Centre grown?

—The most marked characteristic of the JWC is the international aspect. There are many NATO commands, excepting HQ SACT and SHAPE, that have just a few of the NATO Nations represented usually from the surrounding geographical area, however, in 2003, the JWC had 24 different Nations represented. Although that has since decreased there is still a high proportion of the NATO Nations represented at the JWC. There are some who may not consider this one of JWC's strengths, however, I be-
lieve it is important for our success. Another marked characteristic, and this answers the second question, is JWC’s ability to adapt to meet NATO requirements. Of course, one could argue that JWC should be able to do this as part of the “transforming arm” of NATO, however, not all organisations are as successful in this way as the JWC. An example of this is how JWC has adapted to the changing requirements for the ISAF training; because over several years there have been significant changes. As to growth, I would argue that for the first few years there was an emphasis on the training aspect of the JWC’s mission and this was to the detriment of the other roles the JWC might enact. As discussions unfold on the future role of JWC in ISAF then maybe there are opportunities to expand and grow in other areas as well.

How do you feel about retirement?
— As a card I received said I am just changing bosses from the one who hired me to the one who married me! Have no fear, I am really looking forward to retirement. I have never had enough time to do the things I wanted to do so hopefully I will be able to do more of them now, though I still doubt whether I will have time for everything.

What are your parting thoughts?
— A question I ask myself: as I leave now, if in 2001, when I came, I knew everything that would happen in my life over the next twelve years, would I still come? The answer is yes, and this sums up my response.

How was life in Stavanger? Will you stay here after your retirement?
— I enjoyed life in Stavanger — apart from the weather. Do not believe what the locals tell you; there is such a thing as bad weather in Stavanger and very often an awful lot of it. One aspect I will mention is that I was a member of a local Church in Stavanger, St. Svithun’s. This had an even more international aspect than the JWC. Every Sunday there was a celebration of Mass in English for the English speaking community — and within this community there were about thirty different nationalities, if not more, not only from North America, but South America, Africa, Asia — including India and the Far East, Australasia and, of course, Europeans from many different countries. This was a great community to be part of and indeed it was a significant part of my life in Stavanger. One of the major considerations for returning to the UK was the family, so I am looking forward to visiting my children more often and spending more time with the grandchild — will be grandchildren after September. Apart from that I will spend my time, swimming, cycling (only on the good weather days) and planning the next trip. The next cruise is already scheduled.

What will you miss most?
— This is an easy question to answer: the international aspect of the work and the life in Stavanger is what I will miss most. We return to a village in the Cotswold district of England, rural and quiet so this will be a significant change and I will miss the daily banter crossing the different cultures. I would like to think that I was a person that anyone could, and would, talk to — not only about CIS, but about any subject that was of interest, this was one of the most attractive elements in the international environment of the JWC and is irreplaceable in my retirement.

“I am leaving just on time,” Paul Taylor smiles holding one of his presents: Windows 8 for Seniors.
The NATO Military Committee visits the Joint Warfare Centre

THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE visited Norway for a three-day trip to NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger, and the Norwegian Joint Headquarters in Bodø. The visit provided NATO’s Military Representatives with a first-hand experience of the progress being made with the Alliance’s Connected Forces Initiative (CFI).

As NATO moves from a combat operation to a training mission in Afghanistan, beginning in 2015, the CFI will help maintain NATO’s readiness and combat effectiveness through expanded education and training, increased exercises and better use of technology.

NATO’s JWC is responsible for planning, developing and delivering operationally focused multi-level training and exercises, in order to enhance the interoperability of NATO’s forces and ensure CFI’s success. During the visit, the Military Committee had the opportunity to see how JWC connects all forces — land, air, maritime and special operations forces — from different NATO Nations through high-quality, integrated training events, from the strategic to the tactical level. Building on the Alliance’s military experience in Afghanistan and NATO’s enduring ability to adapt, JWC supports ongoing operations, training activities and exercises to ensure that Allies can effectively communicate and operate together. The Centre also validates and certifies this important training. Military Representatives from NATO Headquarters were briefed on ongoing and future NATO exercises, including the upcoming STEADFAST JAZZ 2013, which will train and test thousands of personnel of the NATO Response Force (NRF). Praising the Centre for its ongoing training efforts, Lieutenant General Jürgen Bornemann, Director General of NATO’s International Military Staff, emphasised JWC’s added value to NATO, providing the Alliance with highly realistic, joint and combined operational training.

Moving to the Norwegian Joint Headquarters in Bodø, the Military Committee gained valuable insights on the capabilities of this command and future Norwegian training activities. They also visited Bodo air station, the largest air station in Norway, and experienced a quick reaction alert exercise. Wrapping up the visit, Major General Alan Geder, Dean of NATO’s Military Committee, thanked Norway for its outstanding hospitality and for providing a unique opportunity to better understand the High North and its challenges.

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the JWC, during which it has trained more than 30,000 personnel for full spectrum joint operational warfare, both for ISAF and NRF operations. During the visit, the Committee members had the opportunity to observe the then ongoing ISAF TE 13-01, an Afghanistan pre-deployment training event designed to prepare NATO and Troop Contributing Nations for their deployment in July.

(Extracted from NATO Website News)
EITP’s origins

In January 2010, U.S. General Stanley McChrystal (the then Commander of ISAF) sent an Urgent Operational Needs Statement (UONS) to United States Central Command (CENTCOM), describing the serious deficiencies in ISAF’s intelligence apparatus, ranging from tactical maneuver units to the ISAF Headquarters level. The UONS specifically identified the requirement for NATO intelligence personnel to undergo pre-deployment training so that they would arrive in Afghanistan prepared to support ISAF operations, and not have to spend precious deployment time getting “spun up.” In short — no cold starts!

That same month, the Center for New American Security published a working paper titled “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan”, written by then Major General, now, Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, the former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, ISAF. The paper critically examined the efforts of the U.S. intelligence community in Afghanistan, and found numerous shortcomings in the approach the U.S. and ISAF were taking in intelligence operations. Lieutenant General Flynn specifically identified the need for a different intellectual perspective to intelligence; one focused on socio-economic factors more so than on enemy combatants.

A key obstacle in adopting a socio-economic focus was the disparity in education and training among the NATO Allies. The differences in education and training programs among Alliance and Partner Nations ran the gamut from well-established and robust to nascent and fragile programs heavily dependent on latent talent, and on-the-job training. In order for ISAF to function effec-
The need for a different intellectual perspective to intelligence, one focused on socio-economic factors more so than on enemy combatants was specifically identified.

EITP’s focus

The ISAF COIN Intelligence Course (ICIC) is EITP’s foundation course, and has undergone considerable modifications since the original ICC pilot was developed and taught in 2010. The ICC Program of Instruction (POI) emphasized Afghan culture, and introduced the technical aspects of intelligence, including the Intelligence Operations Cycle and Intelligence Support to Operations as well as Targeting cycles, and analytical tools.

The ICC POI, while extremely useful, had two significant flaws. First, in contrast to the observation made in the Flynn article, the ICC POI focused on the operational (regional command and above) vice tactical (battalion and company) level. Second, the ICC POI lacked the specifics regarding methodologies and processes supporting Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Requirements Development, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) at the maneuver level, intelligence support to Target Development, and “a way” of preparing for intelligence operations.

The arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Rick Ellis as EITP’s Director in the summer of 2010 marked a significant milestone in the focus and evolution of the ICC. Prior to his assignment with EITP, Lieutenant Colonel Ellis served as Senior Intelligence Officer at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center for U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR). Lieutenant Colonel Ellis brought a wealth of experience and knowledge to EITP and after observing his first iteration of the ICC, immediately directed a revision of the entire course.

By the time the EITC delivered its next iteration of the ICC, the POI had been completely overhauled and became what is today, the ICIC. Significant changes to the POI included the expansion of the Afghan culture block of instruction and capitalization on EITP Deputy Director Rob Beckwith’s experience and connections. Native Afghans from Defense Intelligence Agency’s Afghanistan-Pakistan (APPAK) Task Force were also brought in to teach Afghan culture. Intelligence operations classes were broadened to include application at the battalion and company level, and included staff intelligence officers and analyst tactics, techniques, and procedures. Additional topics were also introduced in ICIC, including: District Stability Framework, money as a “Weapons System”, Village Stability Operations and Afghan Police, as well as Company Intelligence Support Teams (CoIST) concepts.

By July 2010, new blocks of instruction introducing Intelligence Information Technology Management and exploitation systems used in ISAF had been incorporated including: BICES (Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System), CIDNE (Combined Information Data Network Exchange), and TIGR (Tactical Ground Reporting System).
Intelligence

AS THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND in Afghanistan evolved, so too did EITP. Since 2010, EITP has added blocks of instruction to the EITP curriculum focused on Biometric Collection and Exploitation, Network Attack and Network Engagement, Evidence Based Operations, COIN Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR) Development, and Intelligence Support to the "Insider Threat".

Outreach has proven to be a key component of the program and vital to its success. Drawing on organizations including the United States’ Defense Intelligence Agency, National Ground Intelligence Center, the Counter-IED Operations and Intelligence Integration Center, the Asymmetric Warfare Group, the Chicago Police’s Law Enforcement Program, as well as many international entities including Denmark’s Royal Danish Defence College, Great Britain’s Defence Intelligence and Security Centre, and last but not least, Australia’s Defence Intelligence Training Centre, the EITP has built a broad network of Subject Matter Experts possessing requisite intelligence support to COIN operations’ experience, knowledge, and expertise. As a result, students attending the ICIC are exposed to a broad array of knowledge and experience supplementing the basic skills that form the technical core of the ICIC.

By the spring of 2011, a disturbing trend in Afghanistan had morphed into a critical blue-force protection issue: an increase in the number of attacks by Afghan soldiers and policemen against the ISAF personnel. Consequently, an additional course was developed by the EITP staff, which focused on countering the Insider Threat. The Counter-Inselligence Threat Course (CITC) has become one of the EITPs most relevant and requested courses. As in the case of the ICIC, the ISAF CITC POI has evolved over the last two years and enjoys a whole-of-ISAF audience, including any organization or entity with a stake in combating the Insider Threat.

SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 2013, with the ISAF drawdown looming on the horizon, the EITP has continued to broaden its curriculum to include: the ISAF Commander’s Operational Intelligence Course, the Ground-Based Tactical Intelligence in Counter Piracy Operations Course, and the COIN Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Course. Additionally, EITC has begun preparing for the future to include designing an Intelligence Support to Full Spectrum Operations Course, as well as modular culture and language courses that can be adapted to any region where NATO may conduct contingency operations. The single thread that ties all EITP courses together is the understanding that there are many solutions to the multiple problems faced in today’s operational environment. It is this understanding that is at the heart of EITP’s philosophy: emphasizing the teaching of "a way", nested in NATO doctrine, and not professing to teach "the way".

Who We Are

The EITP team consists of U.S. military personnel (Army and Marine Corps), NATO Military National Voluntary Contribution Officers (France and Italy), Defense Intelligence Agency civilians, and contracted Subject Matter and Information Technology Experts (SMEs and ITEs). The EITP has built a very strong working relationship with a number of organizations and individuals who contribute guest and supporting speakers to augment our courses.

As up to 60 per cent of all course materials are customized to suit the audiences’ composition and deployment locations, these individuals are key to keeping courses current and relevant. Expanding our instructor pool and knowledge base beyond U.S. personnel is an EITP primary goal and a factor in course design strategy. The EITP team is nested in the NATO School Oberammergau’s Intelligence Surveillance and Target Acquisition (ISTAR) Department where it benefits from close cooperation and shared instruction with multiple NATO Member Nation directors.

The Impact of EITP

In the three years since its inception, EITP has had an enormous impact on NATO, ISAF, and the NSO. During that time, EITP has conducted 23 courses at the NSO, and an additional 40 Mobile Training Team Courses in 16 nations. EITP has taught over 6,500 personnel from 31 nations in both formal (classroom) and informal (seminars, conferences, and working groups) venues. These numbers do not reflect the number of students EITP has reached by sending instructors to the U.S. – German International Special Training Center in Pfallendorf, Germany, and the Central Institute of the Bundeswehr Medical Service in Munich, Germany, or in support of NSO’s ISTAR NCO Professional Development programs. Although the numbers are impressive, they fail to capture the unique relationships the EITP has developed with organizations like the Slovakian Armed Forces Academy, and
the Polish Grupa Reagowania Operacyjno-Manewrowego (GROM). The training provided by EITP instructors has stimulated professional growth in these and other organizations, and fueled a desire for further engagement. The impact EITP has had on ISAF has fostered discussion regarding the development of a common training regime for all of NATO's intelligence personnel.

The Way Ahead

Looking beyond the operational intelligence gaps and shortfalls identified in Afghanistan and Libya, the most significant intelligence education and training issue facing NATO today is the intelligence training gap at the national level. The cause of the gap is that not all NATO Nations have the capability, resources or ability to implement national intelligence training programs. As a consequence, Nations often assign under-qualified personnel to NATO command and force structure intelligence positions despite NATO policy and requirements. The effect of the gap is that not all NATO Nations have the capability to maintain their operational readiness. Acknowledging intelligence training as a significant capability shortfall, some NATO identified education and training as a core mission. As EITP enters its fourth year of intelligence training operations, it is becoming increasingly evident that the program's value to NATO and the Nations can extend beyond intelligence training support to COIN operations in Afghanistan. By applying a balanced mix of national, multinational, and NATO resources to “retool” EITP from an ISAF to a nation-level basic intelligence (JISR/AGS focus) orientation, EITP can become a critical NATO intelligence training stop-gap measure. A retooled EITP would provide those nations without basic intelligence training programs a venue to ensure their personnel meet minimum requirements before being assigned to NATO intelligence positions. Additionally, a retooled EITP would ease the training burden on NATO operational commands by allowing them to focus singularly on mission training in order to maintain their operational readiness.

EITP can easily build on its ISAF successes by leveraging its substantial training expertise, uniquely qualified staff, and its extensive SME network. EUCOM continues to look forward and identify ways to help meet tomorrow’s intelligence training needs of NATO. Partnership for Peace countries and NATO’s permanent crisis manning structures.

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EITP can easily build on its ISAF successes by leveraging its substantial training expertise, uniquely qualified staff, and its extensive SME network. EUCOM continues to look forward and identify ways to help meet tomorrow’s intelligence training needs of NATO, Partnership for Peace countries and the coalition partners.

NATO’s Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) is a military-led, U.S.-sponsored Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) organisation chartered by NATO’s Military Committee. Located in the United Kingdom, the NATO IFC became fully operational in December 2007. The NIFC comprises over 200 multinational military and civilian intelligence and support professionals from 26 of 28 NATO Nations and one North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved non-NATO Nation. The NIFC is directed by the Military Committee to significantly contribute to, but not replace, NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) key intelligence activities. The NIFC remains outside national chains of command and NATO’s permanent crisis manning structures.

The NATO IFC falls under the operational command of SACEUR through his Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence at SHAPE. For more information visit http://web.ifc.bices.org/index.htm

COMMANDER’S VISION

«A professional, adaptable, technologically competent and operationally focused intelligence organisation, delivering timely, relevant products to enhance NATO’s situational awareness and operational effectiveness. All source intelligence fusion is underpinned by our commitment to training and professional development to maintain the highest standards of analytic tradecraft. Collaboration and innovation is the hallmark of this diverse, experienced multinational workforce for which teamwork is second nature.»
RELIGIOUS LEADER ENGAGEMENT

An emerging aspect of the COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

By S.K. Moore, PhD
Director of Development
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and

Shah Mansoor, MBA
Social and Educational Services Organization, Afghanistan

Introduction

THERE IS AN EMERGING recognition within the international community that a more Comprehensive Approach is needed to effectively intervene in violent conflict situations that confront us globally. In addition, there is an increasing acknowledgement that in many parts of the world the religious dimension of life — in both its peaceful and conflictual manifestations — must be taken into account if efforts to resolve conflict are to be effective and lasting.

This article explores the role of Religious Leader Engagement (RLE), a capability under development in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and operational focus of the CAF Chaplain Branch. It stands as a recent contribution to the Comprehensive Approach. The Operational Ministry of CAF Chaplain Imam Suleyman Demiray (Sunni), in collaboration with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT; French: Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international or MAECI), among the Sunni and Shia religious leadership of Kandahar, Afghanistan will be cited.

Also of note is the unprecedented work of Shah Mansoor, a Sunni Muslim working with the non-governmental organization, Social and Educational Services Organization (SESO), headquartered in Kabul, Afghanistan. As an indigenous initiative, in collaboration with the U.S. Department of State and the Ministry of Education of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, it serves as a porthole through which to view the significant peacebuilding role religion may occupy in the wider space of the Comprehensive Approach.

Religious extremism as a driver of conflict

Exacerbating contemporary conflict are extreme expressions of religion. While purely religious conflict is rare, there is a rise in hostilities with explicit reference to religion. For those implicated, the clash frequently becomes a struggle between good and evil, rendering violence a sacred duty.¹ Today’s unprecedented co-optation of religion as a means of deepening existing cultural and political fault lines aids in fueling the justification of militancy and terrorism.²

Noting the role of religious leadership, anthropologist Paulettta Otis illumines, “The complexities of conflict may be compounded further when religious leaders who, with their incendiary language, contribute to the congealing of adversarial identity markers, exacerbating the polarization of communities even more.”³

As a vehicle of influence, religion is known for its efficacy, frequently exploited by political leaders prone to supplement their anemic rhetoric with religious ideology as a means to motivate local populations to extreme patriotism and violent behaviour.⁴
Religious contributions to peacebuilding

A broad spectrum of individuals and organizations — external and indigenous actors, increasingly inter-religious — now collaborate in various venues on a number of levels to bring the peaceful attributes of religion to bear on conflict and violence. The impetus of this surge to include religious approaches in resolving conflict — despite the incongruous portrayal religion frequently presents — is the recognition that it possesses social and moral characteristics that often serve as constructive forces for peace and conflict transformation. In today’s new wars, "there is clearly now a greater imperative to dialogue not just to get to know the religious other, but to form bonds of inter-religious solidarity against the hijacking of religions to legitimate violence." The role and training of religious leaders often positions them to better interpret the nuances of religious belief that often escape detection — something that could be very costly to a mission. In grasping something of the meaning and reality of the faith perspective, chaplains are more apt to appreciate how the belief system of the grassroots person/community may colour their response to given mission initiatives, plans of action, troop movements, etc. The nature of command often necessitates sending troops into harms way. As such, the availability of all information pertinent to the decision-making process is vital. Advising commanders of the possible pitfalls or backlashes of given courses of action with respect to religious communities is a crucial aspect of their role.

The operational role of chaplains

Today, military leaders increasingly acknowledge the strategic merit of building rapport and establishing cooperation with the religious segment of society as critical to the accomplishment of mission mandates. Networking, partnering and, in some instances, peacebuilding endeavours among local clerics have proven to be effective means to garnering the much-needed trust of these revered community leaders — a significant development for a more Comprehensive Approach to operations.

The term Operational Ministry describes the overall role of chaplains in operations: in support of the troops and among local indigenous populations. The primary purpose for a chaplain’s presence with a deploying contingent is to administer the sacraments and to provide pastoral support for the troops — the base of the pyramid designated as Internal Operational Ministry in the above diagram. Also benefiting mission mandates is the depicted External Operational Ministry that sees the future role of chaplains extended to the strategic realm of: (1) advising Commanders in terms of the Religious Area Analysis (RAA) of an Area of Operations (AO); and (2) engendering trust and establishing cooperation within communities by engaging local and regional religious leaders — the domain of RLE.

Religious Leader Engagement (RLE)

Perhaps an imposing diagram at the outset, Figure 2, next page, unpacks in stages in actual presentation. Due to the brevity of this article the core elements of the RLE construct will be the main focus: Building Relation, JIMP, the Tolerant Voice of Religion, Encounter and Collaborative Activities. Additional aspects will be drawn upon for clarity and continuity as needed.
Religious Leader Engagement © S. K. Moore, PhD

**JIMP: Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public**
The RLE construct finds its origins in the JIMP principle, “...an [Army] descriptor [of the Comprehensive Approach] that identifies the various categories of players (e.g. organizations, interest groups, institutions) that inhabit the broad environment in which military operations take place.” The P, or the Public space, hosts a number of organizations and activities in operations, of which the indigenous population therein is undoubtedly the most consequential. Local religious leaders are centers of gravity within indigenous populations — middle range actors who, in non-western societies, where the lines of separation between faith and the public space are markedly less defined, enjoy elevated profiles at community and regional levels. This owes its origins to the seemingly seamless nature existing between religious communities and local culture and, at times, politics. Due to the common ground of the faith perspective, chaplains are able to contribute much as a result of their ability to move with relative ease within religious circles.

**Building Relation**
Engaging the other is all about building relation. Often a prominent local religious leader is a voice of reason within their community and frequently among other faith groups, as they move across ethno-religious lines easily. John Paul Lederach writes, “The centrality of relationship provides the context and potential for breaking violence, for it brings people into the pregnant moments of the moral imagination: the space of recognition that ultimately the quality of our life is dependent on the quality of life of others.” Civic engagement of this nature is not an end in and of itself but should be viewed as one in a series of engagements over an extended period of time as relation develops. Building sufficient levels of trust will require time. The objective of such engagement is not to look for “quick fixes” or “bandage solutions” that will unravel if constant “life support” is not there. The long view must be considered as the most effective approach to achieving lasting results.

**The Tolerant Voice**
Identifying the tolerant voice among religious leaders is key to initiating dialogue. These are faith group leaders — community leaders — often desirous of moving beyond conflict, thus transcending the present hostilities and intransigence that pit their respective identity groups against one another. Known as *middle-range actors*, they enjoy the confidence of the grass roots while moving freely at the higher levels of leadership within their own communities. Their ease of movement affords them relationships that are professional, institutional, some formal, while other ties are more a matter of friendship and acquaintance, hence a high degree of social capital within communities. More notable still, “middle-range actors tend to have pre-existing relationships with counterparts that cut across the lines of conflict within the setting... a network or relationships that cut across the identity divisions within the society.”

**Encounter: The Fragile We of Working Trust and Coexistence**
Facilitating the bringing together of local leadership, most often religious, is the essence of encounter. Creating that safe space for dialogue where none has existed provides occasion for altered perspectives to emerge. It is in encounter that the rigidity of long held stereotypes and the constant barrage of propaganda begin to lose their strength. Here one does not simply see the other from one’s own perspective but such exchanges facilitate viewing oneself through the eyes of the other — a double vision of sorts. Where the willingness to engage the other begins, a re-humanizing of the other has a chance to emerge — where the “us” versus “them” softens to the “fragile we.”

**Collaborative Activities: Towards Personal Trust and Integration**
In circumstances where security and opportunity have been favorable, commanders have authorized chaplains to undertake more intentional peacebuilding activities among religious communities. Dialogue and, in some instances, collaborative activities have resulted. Social psychologists currently focusing on the dynamics of intergroup reconciliation note the saliency of supra-ordinate goals to such processes. These are jointly agreed-upon objectives...
that benefit both communities, yet neither group can accomplish alone, achievable only through inter-communal cooperation. With thorough needs analysis — an evaluation process facilitated by the chaplain involving the local religious leadership and military/civilian programme developers (Comprehensive Approach) — a shared project with the right fit may be introduced. As such, nascent integration takes root. Through cooperation of this nature, an identity more inclusive of the other begins to develop. It is in such an atmosphere that conflict is transcended, new narratives are written and the healing of memory begins.\(^{(13)}\)

Extended seasons of collaboration create opportunities for building trust. Whereas some contend that trust is a prerequisite for cooperation, field research suggests that it may also be a product of collaborative activity — representing a cross-section of people joining together in common cause.\(^{(14)}\) Establishing trust may also be a way of beginning emotional healing, a level of reconciliation necessitating a higher level of trust: it moves beyond the stage of monitoring commitments but is being honoured (co-existence), to “resembl[ing] the trust of friends or family,” commonly referred to as inter-personal or simply personal trust (integration). Through continued interaction old attitudes are eclipsed by new perceptions of the other, an internalization that “over time” leaves its mark on identity. Although old frictions may rear its head — eventualities over which one has no control — the ties forged through such inter-communal collaboration leaves those involved less vulnerable to such situational changes.\(^{(15)}\)

The Comprehensive Approach: RLE and the Kandahar PRT — bridging Sunni and Shia isolation

A cogent operational example of RLE as an aspect of the Comprehensive Approach is the External Operational Ministry of a Sunni Canadian Forces Chaplain, Imam Suleyman Demiray at the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Afghanistan (2006-2007).\(^{(16)}\) Upon arriving, Imam Demiray immediately began to collaborate with Political Advisor Gavin Buchan of Foreign Affairs Canada in engaging the local religious leadership, something that had been impossible up to that point. Initially, Demiray chaired a shura in the PRT compound for the Ulema Council of Kandahar Province — a government-appointed body of Islamic scholars mandated to advise the Provincial Director of Religious Affairs on matters pertaining to Koranic interpretation and public practice.

Following this first meeting with the leading Mullahs, the Imam began attending local shuras with both Sunni and Shia faith groups. During these encounters he learned that 15 per cent of the population of greater Kandahar City were Shia Muslim. A picture began to form as to the relations between the Kandahar Sunni and Shia religious leadership.

More than two years prior to Imam Demiray’s arrival, the Taliban assassinated the senior Mullah of the Ulema Council. The demographics dictated that the majority of Mullahs be Sunni with a Shia Mullah serving as their representative on the Council. Shia participation had not occurred since the loss of the former Senior Mullah. Communication at the highest religious levels between these two faith communities had ceased. Gavin Buchan readily recognized that the continued isolation of Shia leadership was ill advised. He and Demiray began strategizing how the senior Shia Mullah (the Ayatollah) might be reunited with the Ulema Council, thus ending the alienation of his community from the majority Sunni population. The Sunni-Shia sectarian violence of Iraq held many lessons for ISAF leadership, sectarian violence to be avoided at all costs.

With continued consultation with the Political Advisor and regular meetings with the local religious leadership of both the Sunni and Shia faith communities, a strategy began to emerge. Demiray learned that both faith groups shared similar concerns: (1) numerous young males continued to stream to the territories in south-western Pakistan where they came under the influence of the radical teachings of the Taliban; and, (2) both groups were desirous of help in building more madrassas in Kandahar Province where their youth could be taught the more moderate teachings of Islam. Over a period of months, and with much dialogue, Sunni and Shia leadership agreed that their interests were indeed similar, concurred that to present their concerns, as a united body (superordinate goal) would be the wisest move forward. In early 2007, at the Governor’s Palace in Kandahar City, Shia representatives re-joined the Ulema Council to discuss how they may best present their shared concerns.

This documented case study underscores how Chaplain Imam Demiray and Political Adviser Gavin Buchan succeeded in creating the necessary intellectual space whereby a different vision of relation between the Sunni and Shia religious leadership of Kandahar Province was brought forward. It demonstrates how religious leaders — a chaplain in this instance — are able to work integratively with their interagency colleagues to aid the collective effort in creating a different reality for civil society where the influence of the religious sector cuts across all facets of society — the Comprehensive Approach.

RELIGIOUS LEADERS (MULLAHS) are the most influential group of people in Afghanistan. Via a network of mosques, madrasas and religious institutions throughout the country, their traditional/historical role and close connection with ordinary citizens make them key allies in curbing extremist efforts to co-opting religion as a means of instigating hatred and violence against their own people and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Due to their prominent role in Afghan society, their support is deemed integral in encouraging citizens to promoting a moderate and tolerant Islam in cooperation with the government of Afghanistan.

“Religious leaders and scholars are effectively present in areas and parts of the country that are virtually inaccessible to security forces and the international community. They speak from the mosque podium and condemn corruption and narcotics,” said Mawlawi Hayatullah, Director of Haj and Endowments in Balkh province. “Without the support of religious scholars the government cannot succeed, as they serve as a bridge between the government and the people. Empowering religious leaders will contribute to the elimination of narcotics, the decline of poverty, and a reduction of violence against women.”

This has not always been the case. Fol-
"Following the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the strategic value of partnering with the religious sector was underestimated as an effective means of countering the extreme rhetoric of insurgents and educating the people..."
tiative in its execution. Where western intervention occurs in the global south, more intentional effort is warranted among strategic planners to view such societies through their lens, lessening an overdependence on our own. In so doing, peacebuilding mechanisms from within indigenous cultures will come to the fore, religious or otherwise, that will be theirs, effective and long lasting — an essential element of the Comprehensive Approach that sees a nation restored to an enduring peace. +


END NOTES:


(6) Mary Kaldor states that today’s new wars are generated more around identity issues. The claim to power on the basis of a particular identity is among the principal drivers of today’s conflicts: national, clan, religious or linguistic. Such claims often hearken to the past, which leans towards identity politics becoming more exclusive and fragmented—sure footing for conflict. See Mary Kaldor, “Introduction” in New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2nd Edition (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 7-8.


(9) For a more exhaustive presentation of Religious Area Analysis, see Chapter Four of S.K. Moore. Military Chaplains as Agents of Peace: Religious Leader Engagement in Conflict and Post-conflict Environments (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2013). 18


(13), 1997, 42.

(14) For more on Volf’s “double vision” see Chapter Three, Part 3 “Reconciliation as Embrace,” dissertation of Major S.K. Moore entitled, Military Chaplains as Agents of Peace: The Theology and Praxis of Reconciliation in Stability Operations (Ontario, Canada: Saint Paul University, 2008), 117-143.


(18) To see this case study in its entirety, see S.K. Moore, Military Chaplains as Agents of Peace: Religious Leader Engagement in Conflict and Post-conflict Environments (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2013), 144-163.

(19) A house of knowledge generally referred to as an Islamic seminary or educational institution.

(20) Lieutenant Colonel (ret’d) Mike Rostek, except from an unpublished article.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

S.K. MOORE, PHD served as a chaplain in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) for 22 years. It was while with the United Nations in Bosnia (1992-93) during the war that the experience of engaging the religious leaders of greater Sarajevo left an indelible mark on his life. Subsequently, Dr. Moore conducted research at the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, Afghanistan (2006), contributing to his doctoral studies in the development of a practical theology emphasizing the role of chaplains engaging local religious leaders in an environment of deep-rooted conflict.

In 2011, the CAF Army endorsed Religious Leader Engagement (RLE) as a capability under development, presently used at the United Nations Training School, Ireland in Dublin. He is currently developing a 10-month, five-module, online program at Saint Paul University in Integrative Peacebuilding. His most recent publication is Military Chaplains as Agents of Peace: Religious Leader Engagement in Conflict and Post-conflict Environments (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2013) (Above).

SHAH MANSOOR, MBA is the head of Social and Educational Services Organization (SESO), an Afghan non profit organization. Prior to this, Mansoor was Director of the Information Resource Center at the U.S. Embassy, Kabul, Afghanistan, overseeing operations of provincial community centers and libraries throughout Afghanistan. Mansoor received a Bachelor of Information Technology from Preston University in Islamabad and a Master of Business Administration degree, with specialization in management from Schiller International University in Florida, U.S.
THE 2013 SAILING SEASON is set to be an excellent year. Under the new Chairman, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Lapslie, Bosun (dinghy) Mr Bartek Jedra, Bosun (Aurelius II) Mr Jason Bone, a new senior dinghy instructor CPO Dave Normington, Safety Boats under Wg Cdr Mark Lunan and all the old and new club members alike, 2013 looks good. We made an excellent start when so many members turned out to move the JWC Sailing Club from its previous location at Sola Sea to its new home at Madla, just past the Three Swords on the northern shore of the fjord. We will share the boathouse with the Norwegian Sea Rescue Society, Redningselskapet, which also specializes in developing water safety skills for the public. The Sailing Club has a variety of dinghies aimed at all levels of sailing: Royal Navy Bosuns (x8), a two-man dinghy for training and racing; Lasers (x3), an advanced one-man racing dinghy; Picos (x6), a mid-range two-man dinghy for training and racing; Toppers (x10), a simple one-man dinghy; one 470 Olympic-class two-man racing dinghy; one Yngling Olympic-class fixed-keel sailing boat (a cross between a planning dinghy and a keelboat); Optimist (x2) a simple one or two-man training dinghy; and Dart 16s (x2), a two-man mid-range catamaran. This is all accompanied by abundant buoyancy aids, wetsuits and splash covers. The Club also has an easy-to-sail Hallberg Rassy 310 — Aurelius II — which was purchased brand new last year to replace Aurelius and is moored at Ulnes, Hundvåg. This is an excellent yacht, well-built and very well appointed and can take up to seven crew. In addition, two club-owned safety boats are used to lay race courses and to provide rescue cover when we run dinghy courses. So, all-in-all, not only a better location with the same, safe inland sailing but also a better facility with the benefit of having a shower for those (colder) Norwegian days! (By Royal Air Force Wg Cdr R.M Watson)
GERMAN ARMY SERGEANT MAJOR HERBERT BERGER developed an interest in photography from a very young age and first took up photography as a hobby. As time progressed, taking pictures became a lifestyle with him being hooked and his hobby becoming more and more serious. Largely self-taught with no formal photo background, he began teaching himself photo skills almost 30 years ago. When photography comes up in conversation, his passion shines through: “More than anything else, the light of nature inspires me. When the light is right, the camera will do a great job everywhere. I take my time and wait long enough for the right light to come because it is so very much worth it in the end,” he says. When it comes to nature, Stavanger is one of the most visually impressive cities in the world, and Sergeant Major Berger’s favourite spots are the mountains, the fjords, the Hafrsfjord area and, in town, Gamle Stavanger, including the new concert hall. “I use a NIKON D800e with 14mm–200mm lenses, which is perfect for my kind of shooting, mostly on a tripod,” he goes on to say. His dream photography job would be a photo reportage or essay for National Geographic. “I believe in the power of a picture. For me, it is something that is linked to a deep affection for life, which I find quite amazing. I would like to travel to Japan again, since it is so beautiful, as well as to Tibet, the Sahara Desert and Antarctica. I would go back time and again to all those places because they are so stunning.” (By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO)

You can view specimens of Sergeant Major Berger's photography on (Facebook): Herbyberger photography

(Above clockwise: Boathouse at the frozen Hafrsfjord; Stavanger Konserthus and Gamle Stavanger)