IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE for me to welcome you to the JWC’s tenth anniversary special edition of The Three Swords magazine. I think you will find this edition to be packed with useful and informative articles about our past, present and future. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome our large population of newcomers. As I am closing in on my second year at the JWC, I can truly tell you that you are in for a great assignment, both personally and professionally. At JWC opportunities abound, but it is easy to sometimes get lost in the fray. Don’t let this happen! If this is your first NATO assignment it can be somewhat bewildering at times, but that is far outweighed by the enriching experience you get from working with people from 15 different NATO countries, not to forget our Partnership for Peace (PfP) staff officer from Austria. I also encourage you to benefit from your time here by enjoying all that Norway, in general, and the Stavanger area, in particular, have to offer. If you prick up your ears you will quickly notice a diverse community of different nationalities outside of the JWC too. It is truly a beautiful country and if you are an outdoor enthusiast, you are in for a real treat! Again, for the newcomers, I would encourage you to stop by the PAO and pick up some previous editions of our magazine, which are full of useful information to help you “get up to speed” on who we are, what we do and how we do it. To the veterans, as always, your input to this magazine is always welcome and it is the cornerstone of its success. I look forward to working with all of you!

THE THREE SWORDS is the Joint Warfare Centre’s authorized magazine published three times a year by the Public Affairs Office. It presents a compilation of articles, editorials, opinions, news and general information related to the Centre as well as a variety of key defence and security issues. Opinions expressed in this magazine are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the policies and points of view of NATO. The Editor reserves the right to edit or shorten submissions.

Thanks
Nils Skarland,
Deputy Director
Department of Management and Financial Governance,
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence

Tomasz Krolikowski

Sgt Andreas Henriksen,
NOR AF

CDR DANIEL GAGE, U.S. NAVY
JWC CHIEF PAO
At your tenth anniversary, we all know that those years have been quite special. The Joint Warfare Centre’s ten years in Stavanger have coincided with ten years of Allied efforts that were never planned. Whether with NATO or otherwise, crisis management is, of course, never planned, just as no crisis is planned. In this context the JWC responsively adapted to our challenges. Although the JWC was neither intended nor built for NATO’s most important task of the decade, ISAF, you made a substantial contribution, mostly in interim facilities. You prepared your training audiences for many challenges they were to meet on station with good effect, much appreciated by the personnel, and obviously increasing our operational effectiveness. Beyond that you helped plan and implement the new facilities and moved your activities there.

NATO is unique in making it possible for Allies to solve real problems together. There is the consensus principle which facilitates robust decisions, compromise, contributions and common effort. When decision-making is difficult, working out the decisions may cause some to dream of a simpler state, seeing the consensus principle as a problem, where some shortcut should be taken to overcome objections. Is our consensus principle a problem? Well, only if someone is in for another purpose than to be an Ally. But that is not what NATO is about. The purpose of being Allies is a simple matter to understand; one for all and all for one. In NATO every Ally has a say, and everyone understands that behaving responsibly towards each other is the key to being credible Allies. NATO has been tested and has risen to the new challenges of the last two decades. All small or large nations have been going in together, in particular in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya.

The robustness of NATO is reflected at home. There is massive cross-party support for NATO membership in Norway, and there is appreciation of NATO’s presence in Norway where the JWC is a major flag-carrier today. NATO has been and will remain the cornerstone of Norwegian defence and security policy. Likewise, broad, cross-party support in a NATO Nation gives strength to NATO.

Your new facilities were common funded by consensus in NATO. Our common NATO programmes have become small compared to what they were before, but it remains an essential point of Allied robustness that we have common capabilities and output. Our common command structure is one of our key and unique capabilities. Such real capabilities require real funding. NATO is no longer building military airfields in Norway, but our national commitment to strong common capabilities will remain firm. Like every other Ally, what we pay in is a fraction, and what we receive is a full capability and force multiplier. Similarly, we are fully committed, for example, to provide NATO with Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), a capability which is intended to serve common requirements rather than individual nations.

Making good use of the JWC for ISAF was a clear demonstration of how NATO can adapt. It showed the value of this modern, forward-looking type of facility. The JWC has a NATO-wide, modern task ahead, to facilitate and build know-how. I trust you will keep contributing to our entire Alliance, making sure that lessons are learned, developed and disseminated. I also trust that you will take initiative beyond your received mission and show possibilities to take NATO forward. With this, I congratulate the Joint Warfare Centre with a successful ten years, and wish you all the best for the future.
From top: SACT entering the Auditorium to preside over the JWC Change of Command Ceremony and presenting the JWC flag to Major General Erhard Buchler, 25 June 2013. Pictures Alf Ove Hansen
ON THE OCCASION OF JWC’s tenth anniversary, I would like to do like I did for ACT and examine JWC’s successful past to pull out the evidence of what a bright future lies ahead for all JWC staff.

Twenty years ago, our forces were predominantly Cold War oriented. NATO was preparing for a total war in continental Europe. Then, a fundamental shift occurred with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Alliance started to put a stronger emphasis on its ability to project forces — on an expeditionary capability.

Since 2003, or during the last ten years, ACT has played a key role in this Transformation, with the indispensable contribution of the JWC. Amongst many achievements, I would underline JWC’s invaluable contribution in preparing deploying units for their missions in Afghanistan as well as in training NATO’s Joint Force Commands to assume their high-readiness capability. In this regard, the JWC has played its full part in making the NATO Response Force (NRF) an essential driver of a new NATO.

We know how instrumental ACT has been in helping the Allies’ militaries adapt to the changing circumstances. Just after its creation on 19 June 2003 and, as a result of the decisions made at the Prague Summit, ACT (including the JALLC, JWC and JFTC) swiftly began its key function of transforming NATO.

The role and importance of the JWC are now well recognised across the Alliance. This Centre has become an essential driving force for training and exercises throughout NATO. Today, the JWC remains at the very heart of our efforts to improve NATO Forces’ operational level combat effectiveness. It facilitates joint and combined training and exercises, uses modelling and simulation technology to give military leaders realistic training environments, and conducts military experimentation and doctrine development.

Since 2003, almost 40,000 service members and civilians were trained for the full spectrum of joint operational level warfare at the JWC. We understand how crucial the JWC’s work is in our collective effort to maintain the Alliance’s military effectiveness. This is due in no small part to the talented men and women of the JWC who adapt daily to new developments and work effectively in close collaboration with the wider NATO Community.

I know that the future is already a reality for the JWC. The high visibility exercises in 2014 and 2015 are now on almost everyone’s radar screen: they will be built around NRF 16 with additional forces and headquarters coming from our Nations. The Military Training and Exercise Programme (MTEP), which is evolving towards a multi-year, multi-level, joint programme of exercises, involving more of the NATO Response Force, has always been a key framework for JWC’s day-to-day work. Overall, the combined JWC and JFTC capacity should be able to support many major exercises in the next years. Thanks to the contributions of our training centres, we are now in a situation where coherent planning and coordinated execution can be conducted by ACT with great prospects for the overall efficiency of our work.

One aim of NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) and Smart Defence is to promote high quality, full-spectrum and credible exercises that include the integration of new information technologies whenever possible. JWC’s involvement in training activities like CWIX (Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation and eXamination eXercise) and SEESIM (South-Eastern Europe Simulation Network Exercise) are extremely important and powerful tools for Transformation. All of these activities provide new and extensive opportunities and perspectives for training, and we must continue to push forward these innovative practices with an emphasis on constantly adapting to the real needs of our Nations’ forces.

NATO’s complex challenges will continue to call for a wide spectrum of training, since threats are becoming more complex, networked and hybrid. I have full confidence in Joint Warfare Centre’s proven ability to provide this Alliance with effective and efficient training solutions to face these emerging challenges in the years to come.

I would like to finish by wishing the Joint Warfare Centre a very happy birthday.
From top: Major General Buehler with Vice Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hanssen, who will be appointed Norwegian Chief of Defence with the rank of Admiral on 19 November 2013, and giving an interview to JWC’s TSN Channel, 25 June 2013. Pictures Alf Ove Hansen
A S YOUR NEW COM-MANDER, it is a pleasure for me to introduce this special edition of The Three Swords magazine celebrating the tenth anniversary of the JWC. Not only does this edition take a look back at where we have been over the last ten years, it also takes a look at where we stand today and where we are headed as we move into our second decade of training NATO’s operational forces.

Looking back at the history of the JWC, from its humble beginnings to where we are today, it is clear to me that this organization will continue to play a pivotal role in leading NATO’s transformational efforts. Since the days of conducting its first exercise in February 2004, providing training for Allied Forces Southern Europe’s Deployable Joint Task Force, the JWC has evolved immensely and has established a strong track record of providing the best training possible.

During the opening ceremony of the JWC on 23 October 2003, former Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, U.S. Navy Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., described the Centre as “the Jewel in the Crown of Allied Command Transformation”. Despite having worked as Commander of the JWC for a short period of time, I can still see that the real jewel lies in the team of dedicated, capable personnel who is ready to lead us into JWC’s next decade. Despite being an organization with only 250 military and civilian staff members, I am convinced that the JWC is one of the best values in NATO.

As the current Commander I will continue to build upon the groundbreaking work, which this organization has carried out during the past 10 years. Its first Commander, Norwegian Army Lieutenant General Thorstein Skiaker was the driving force behind the creation of the JWC. Over the years, his successors (British Army Major General James Short, Royal Air Force Air Marshal Peter Walker, German Army Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte and French Army Major General Jean-Fred Berger) have continued to transform Lieutenant General Skiaker’s vision into what is now the premier operational warfare and training centre of NATO. Together we will continue to build upon the visions of my predecessors and their staffs as we lead NATO’s transformation efforts on the road to STEADFAST JAZZ 13, which is our largest NRF exercise in a decade and which will, for the first time since 2006, include a live exercise component and focus on collective defence using the JWC-developed SKOLKAN scenario.

This will also be my first real opportunity to see the JWC execute its primary mission of providing the tools and training necessary for the NATO Command Structure (NCS) to certify as a NATO Response Force (NRF). And with a successful ISAF 13/02 now behind us, our remaining Programme of Work (POW) for 2013 is ambitious and will keep us very busy here at the JWC. As we march forward towards 2014 and completion of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, the biggest uncertainty we face is what the training requirement will be in support of current operations. To what degree we support ISAF will no doubt have an impact on our 2014 POW. But until NATO’s commitment to the ISAF mission has ended, our top priority will remain to provide support to current operations, in the form of training.

In reviewing SACEUR’s Annual Guidance on NATO Education, Training, Exercise and Evaluation 2014 (SAGE 2014) for 2015-2020, you will see that we are poised to play a central role in the future of the Alliance. To quote from the SAGE: “training will be the engine of Transformation” as we look at 2015 and beyond. If you have not done so, I encourage you to read the SAGE 2014 — our mission is intertwined throughout the entire document and is key to the success of the Alliance. In particular, we will have our work cut out for us in executing the planned high visibility exercise for 2015, which will be a multi-level, joint, multi-national, Computer Assisted/Command Post and joint LIVEX, on a Divisional scale. This exercise is intended to send a clear political and military message that NATO is moving forward from a post ISAF campaign mindset to a contingency posture, ready to respond to the full range of the Alliance’s requirements.

Finally, and despite being a recent arrival myself, I would like to welcome each and every one of you to the JWC team and I look forward to getting to know both newcomers and the people behind the success of this Centre. I am proud to be the sixth Commander of the JWC and I am honoured to have been entrusted with the responsibility of leading the JWC into its second decade.
Ten Years of JWC

Training NATO
Transforming Warfare

NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), which is celebrating its tenth anniversary this year, stands by four core principles on which its success has been built since its inception: agility, alertness, adaptability and alignment. It has been flexible to respond to new challenges and is always prepared to reorganize to suit future needs. A variety of emotions come into play as we take stock. We may feel pride; especially those of us who have been on board since the beginning. Sometimes it is hard not to get a little wistful remembering those excellent individuals who said goodbye. Or, introspective, if you are built that way. However, in an age when the only thing constant is change, it is a great opportunity to take a step back and think how the JWC adapted to constant change in the midst of all operations, exercises and training events going at full pace; pushing the Alliance further on many fronts with concept, doctrine and capability development. Today, the JWC brand is recognized across NATO as the pre-eminent provider of joint, operational level training; a unique position resulting from its outstanding leadership, its trainers’ vast operational subject matter expertise, and, most of all, its customers’ trust. The JWC has the highest credibility across NATO.

In relating our extraordinary story, we are reminded of a comment by former SACT, General Stéphane Abrial, who said in the JWC’s Commemorative Book (2010) that the Centre was “just a bit young to be writing its memoirs”. He was quick to add, though, that such misgivings should be dispelled as the JWC displayed a history of accomplishments that bore little relation to its age. Indeed, looking back through ten years of history, we feel at once young and old, proud of our rich history and excited for the future. While compiling this special anniversary edition, one thing became clear to us very quickly: despite the gathering pace of change, our ten year anniversary is a meeting point of past and future. So, here’s to the next ten years!

Transformation of NATO

The Joint Warfare Centre was established on 23 October 2003 at Jåttå, Stavanger, Norway, as subordinate to NATO’s strategic commander for transformation (SACT), who is headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, United States. A training facility with multiple missions, the JWC primarily provides operational level collective training for NATO and Nations before they deploy on an ISAF mission or assume responsibility as a NATO Response Force (NRF) headquarters. However, what sets the JWC apart is the fact that training is not its only mandate.

The JWC’s establishment was the result of decisions made at the 2002 Prague NATO Summit, which laid a strong emphasis on transforming the Alliance. Given impetus by the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Summit kicked off a new era for NATO with a number of monumental and progressive changes focused on strengthening the Alliance’s ability to face the new threats of the 21st century. It introduced new military capabilities, such as the cutting-edge NRF, new members, and a new, leaner and more agile military command structure, spearheaded by two Strategic Commands, one sharply focused on Operations, the other working on Transformation. It was a defining moment for NATO’s future and also symbolic of its commitment to the transatlantic link; the two continents united for the challenges ahead and in commitment to the fundamental security tasks, such as collective defence, and shared democratic values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. During the Prague Summit, NATO defined the nexus of terrorism as the greatest security challenge of the new century, tackling it as its primary mission.
The prerequisite for transformation included the creation of new footprints under NATO’s new strategic transformational command, Allied Command Transformation (ACT), with unprecedented tasks and missions in the history of NATO, all shaped by the moment in which they came into existence. ACT would be devoted to intellectual, cultural and technological innovation facilitated by war-gaming, experimentation, education and training, and it would optimize this process with collective support of a handful of newly established organizations: the Joint Warfare Centre, the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC, Poland), the SACT Staff Element Europe (Belgium), the NATO Undersea Research Centre (NURC, Italy) and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC, Portugal).

The beginning steps of an adventure

The agreement to establish the JWC was signed on 17 July 2003 at Jåttå in the presence of Kristin Krohn Devold, the Centre’s founding Norwegian Minister of Defence; General Sigurd Frisvold, then Norwegian Chief of Defence; U.S. Navy Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., NATO’s first Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT); German Army General Harald Kujat, then Head of NATO’s Military Committee; and German Navy Admiral Rainer Feist, then Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

During her speech, Kristin Krohn Devold said: “The JWC is part of an essential process within NATO, a process that modernizes the Alliance, enabling it to tackle tomorrow's challenges. The JWC is also essential for Norway, which, with this, has secured NATO and Allied military presence on Norwegian soil for a long while ahead.”

The Activation Ceremony of the JWC took place in the afternoon of 23 October 2003 at Jåttå. Presiding over the ceremony was Admiral Giambastiani, Jr., SACT, who famously described the Centre as “the Jewel in the Crown of Allied Command Transformation.” Lieutenant General Thorstein Skiaeker became the Centre’s first Director. At the same time, he was dual-hatted as Commander of the Norwegian National Joint Headquarters.

By early 2005, the NATO Command Structure (NCS) included three pillars of fundamental training: the JWC, the JFTC and the JALLC, popularly known as the Triple Js. In April 2005, their Directors met to highlight priorities and challenges for achieving Full Operational Capability (FOC). At the time, the biggest challenge for the JWC was the manpower deficit since it was manned at only about 55 per cent of its authorized Peace-time Establishment (PE).

A second strand for the JWC concerned its organizational structure. As its initial organizational structure was configured before its terms of reference, mission and tasks were approved, the JWC had to create an “amended organizational structure” to be able to perform its mission and deliver its primary outputs. On 1 September 2005, an Amended Organizational Test Structure was implemented, providing the Centre with a new approach to conducting its missions and tasks. In addition, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) were developed to promote consistent implementation of recurring work processes within the JWC.

In these early times, the JWC already demonstrated its capability as an efficient interface between the requirements of NATO’s operational commands and the brave new world of change. At mid-2005, its Vision Statement was unveiled, charting a course for the future: A world-class training centre that drives NATO transformation forward through an innovative concept development, experimentation and doctrine development process.

The first exercise run by the JWC took place from 1-6 February 2004 for 130 staff of 11 Nations assigned to AFSOUTH, which was designated as NATO’s first Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF) headquarters. During this event, the Ulsnes Interim Training Facility was used for the first time. Initial setup and modernization of Ulsnes continued during the exercise and for several months after, culminating in the capability uplift of 2007, during which almost 1,000 additional fibre and telephone outlets were
The Three Swords Magazine   25/2013   11

installed, as well as 700 power outlets, 770 metres of cable trunking and almost 30 kilometres of cable. Contemporary office furniture were also provided. The first ISAF Mission Rehearsal Training held at Ulens was conducted for the sixth rotation of ISAF, led by Headquarters Eurocorps. It took place 18-22 June 2004 in presence of a training audience of 400 from 14 NATO and Partner Nations. The JWC also played a major role in identifying present and future training needs of Iraq’s Security Forces. When NATO decided to step up its out-of-country training, the JWC was selected to host it. NATO’s first out-of-country training for Iraqi Security Forces (IKLT) started on 1 November 2004. Major General James Short, then Director JWC, noted: “We are providing Iraqi key leaders with training that is extremely relevant to the challenges and opportunities they are facing in rebuilding their country’s security institutions. Our efforts here directly contribute to Iraq’s ability to strengthen internal security and prepare them for the future.”

The IKLT was a highly professional example of JWC training and education at its best until the programme ended in October 2011. In total, 256 Iraqi security officials were given training over the period 2004-2011.

A key tool of new NATO

On 6 December 2004, NATO approved the Capability Package for the construction of a state-of-the-art training facility to replace Ulens, thus recognizing that the JWC was worth the investment in people and infrastructure. “The JWC is about delivery. Delivery of quality training that is impartial, transparent, standardized and professional,” Air Marshal Peter Walker said, adding: “We should be the premier training establishment of the NATO Alliance, setting standards of performance and driving forward continuous development in military capabilities in a way that will cause Nations to wonder how they ever managed without us.” Air Marshal Walker took over command of the JWC in February 2005.

“Fighting” at operational level

At the core of NATO’s transformation were enhanced training programmes designed for every dimension of military conflict and mission, a state-of-the-art simulation technology and flexible CIS backbone, path-breaking concept development, and the effective capturing and implementation of lessons learned. NATO’s transformational effort inextricably encouraged thinking at a higher level and a new way of looking at the threats to basic security, which has shifted from conventional to non-linear. The operational level training aims to make NATO perform more effectively on operations and, therefore, plays a major part in creating the conditions for mission success. Upon this success is the effort behind the scenes to make training transformational,” Brigadier General Stephen Mueller, former Chief of Staff JWC, said. “Most long-time participants in the NATO training and exercise programme will recognize the traditional elements of collective training, MEL/MIL, scenario, Observer/Trainers and an EXCON made up of various Response Cells. What makes JWC training transformational is not these traditional elements, but rather how these elements are connected and driven from a concept, doctrine, and experimental (capability development) basis.”

Remarkably, this complicated relationship did not have a model or a template anywhere in NATO. It had to be developed by the staff of the JWC.

Coming of Age: Internal Shaping, External Sharing

In 2005, the JWC demonstrated its Initial Operating Capability by conducting major exercises, developing the lessons learned process of the Bi-Strategic Commands (Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation), developing new concepts and doctrine, and implementing a robust experimentation programme. During this phase, the JWC’s key outputs were exercises like Allied Action 05 (NRF 5), Allied Warrior 05 (NRF 6), ISAF VIII Mission Rehearsal Training as well as IKLT courses and the first ever NATO les-
sons learned conference, and significant upgrades to its own communication and information systems. Indeed, the IT technicians were constantly crafting a roadmap for major technical enhancements and envisioning our future as the showpiece for NATO CIS. Indeed, by 2011, these visions evolved into reality. The JWC’s new Automated Information Systems (AIS) infrastructure and the virtualization technology, fit for the special requirements of a cutting-edge training centre, were put in place, to support both exercises and permanent staff.

Showing Muscles

Just three months before the NRF was declared fully operational at the Riga Summit, the JWC achieved its Full Operational Capability in June 2006. By September that year, the Centre had boosted its manning to nearly 80 per cent from the initial 55 per cent. The number of NATO Nations represented at the Centre increased from nine to twenty-four, plus two Partner Nations. Anchoring these sweeping changes was the construction of the new training facility in Jåttå. During this time, controlled dynamite explosions announced that the long-awaited construction process had finally begun. In August 2006, the JWC stood up its ultra-modern media simulation capability, still the only one within NATO, in order to prepare NATO commanders and their staffs for real-world media encounters.

In 2005, the Centre started to plan and coordinate the STEADFAST Series of Exercises for 2006. These exercises trained NATO’s Joint (Force) Commands, Naples, Brunssum and Lisbon, and their associated components (land, air, maritime) for NRF rotations in order to maintain connected and interoperable forces at a high-level of readiness. The NRF is trained so that it can defend any Ally, deploy anywhere at minimum notice, deal with any threat, and redeploy. The exercises also certified the headquarters’ internal processes and ability to efficiently and effectively Command and Control, as well as gather, distil and manage information. Typical planning timeline for each exercise was twelve months, which began with the exercise concept. Next came the planning and product development phase, where the Initial, Main and Final Planning Conferences occurred. The STEADFAST Series of Exercises are NATO’s most professional exercises to date.

As part of its transformation mission, the JWC conducted the first ENABLER experimentation in March 2007 with 213 staff joining from various organizations across NATO. ENABLERs were among the most valuable events undertaken by the JWC, until their conclusion in October 2009. The ENABLER had training and execution phases, experimentation and training objectives. It was supported by a sophisticated simulation system and managed by a control structure through use of suitable scenarios and MEL/MIL, all of which were tailored to stimulate desired responses. The construct looked like any STEADFAST exercise. However, during the ENABLERs the main effort was to meet the experimentation objectives. Reflecting on the first ENABLER, Mr. Adrian Williamson, JWC Analyst, said: “Our objective was to expose new capabilities
and to enable the training audience to be sufficiently skilled at these new capabilities. The event also delivered a more immediate tangible benefit for ACO staff through exposure to new capabilities.

In 2007, the JWC was also assigned the chair of the Research and Technology Organization Technical Activity, titled “Modelling and Simulation Group 68” on the NATO Education and Training Network (NETN), participated by 13 Nations and five NATO organizations. "The aim was to develop a set of technical recommendations and international standards for a persistent training environment that consists of Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL), collaboration, resource sharing and distributed simulation tools. The NETN itself promised a more efficient, less costly and more flexible training technology for NATO and Nations,” said Prof. Erdal Çayırcı, JWC CAX Support Branch Chief, adding: "The MSG-068 recommendations were successfully tested at the stand-alone experimentation event in November 2010 and no further improvements were required it was completed, with a final report drawn up, in April 2011”.

The JWC was also contributing to the exchange of information and best practices between the staffs of NATO and national simulation centres. Hosted by the JWC, the first NATO CAX Forum was held in 2006, which focused on technical issues and operating procedures relating to simulation-based exercises.

Growth

From 2008 to 2010, the JWC planned and conducted three major NRF exercises per year, one for each Joint (Force) Command. Together with the two major ISAF MRTs, which continued to adapt and evolve, the JWC’s annual exercise tempo now summed up in five major exercises per year, above and beyond other training operations. This was the busiest year so far, as these exercises were built on months of detailed preparation and required outstanding team building, communication skills and attention to detail. In 2008, the role of Commander JWC was also expanded. Indeed, in addition to his current responsibilities as Exercise Director, he was appointed Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE), so as to allow the JWC to more efficiently direct operational exercise training objectives for the NRF.

During this time, the JWC grew continuously with half a dozen major training events under development at any given time: it developed and delivered an ADL capability (online training and education), a generic Academics package to prepare headquarters for the NRF, a deliberate MEL/MIL development process that used Training Objectives as its point of reference, an expanded scenario development capability that provided an incredibly rich exercise experience, a deliberate training improvement process as well as a programme to deploy JWC teams to Afghanistan for familiarization with the ISAF mission and ensure that exercise script met current and projected training requirements. It also started to build a learning culture. “Knowledge is a commodity we are constantly collecting, integrating, exploiting and sharing. Regardless of whether you are an operator, staff officer, Subject Matter Expert or a Commander, we are all knowledge managers in the business of transforming information to best serve our needs,” said Mr. Paul Sewell, a JWC Analyst, referring to the JWC’s collection of operational Best Practices, which started in late 2007.

Another capability which is unique to the JWC is its embedded Scenario Section. It is significant to note that the primary capability to create NATO operational level and fictitious scenarios and settings is uniquely provided by the JWC. This capability includes geo information and databases, geo-strategic narratives, theatre of operations information, strategic initiation documents, crisis response planning information, force activations and deployment information, MEL/MIL and simulation databases, such as the Joint Theatre Level Simulation and Virtual Battle Space. Since 2004, the JWC has applied critical thinking to come up with realistic and rich synthetic exercise scenarios such as MADA VERDE, CERASIA and SKOLKAN.

In 2010, the JWC took over the hosting of another unique training event, which continues to this day: the Initial Augmentee
Pre-Deployment Training or the IAPDT.
From 8 to 13 September 2010 JWC conducted a pilot IAPDT, which aimed to train those who were unable to attend the JWC’s twice-annual ISAF Mission Rehearsal Training. The structure of the pilot training has also been kept to this date: Following the series of training blocks, with a close interaction between trainees and the Subject Matter Experts, a Cross Functional Training is conducted where trainees can apply their knowledge from each of the other blocks to specific tasks similar to those they are likely to encounter in-theatre.

Changes at the Jåttå base

The foundation stone for the JWC’s new training facility was laid during a ceremony held on 23 October 2008, exactly five years to the day that the Centre was officially inaugurated in 2003. “We are delighted to mark our fifth anniversary with such a special event,” said Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, then Commander JWC, adding: “The construction of our new training facility underlines one of our greatest achievements: it is the future JWC. Its construction is a testament of NATO and Norway to our future.”

Conversely, another major change occurred when the Norwegian Parliament, as part of a restructuring to re-focus on northern areas of Norway, in 2008 decided to move the Norwegian National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) to Bodø/Reitan. Until then, NJHQ facilities had been co-located with the JWC at Jåttå. By the end of May 2010, the NJHQ had completed its transition to Reitan. The new defence headquarters became operational on 1 August 2009, a date that also marks the beginning of a new era of military capability in Norway.

Training NATO, Transforming Warfare

During an ISAF pre-deployment training event, a trainee noted:

“It is critical for us to receive tough, demanding training — the idea being that it is better for us to make mistakes and learn from them here in Ulsnes, than in a combat zone, where mistakes can cost you your life.”

There is no doubt that this is where the JWC has built its current identity and vision. Every day, JWC trainers and exercise planners put their blood, sweat and tears into the creation of a unique environment designed to deliver challenging training scenarios for NATO forces. This is also an opportunity for the JWC to further develop its vision and incorporate more leading-edge technology; doing what the JWC does best, that is to continue to innovate in order to keep on providing training for those who go in harm’s way.

The JWC witnessed the immediate relevance of its training efforts in real-world operations when the training it provided during STEADFAST JUNO (December 2010) for JFC Naples significantly contributed to the success of NATO’s Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) in Libya, which started in February 2011. Indeed, following the Qaddafi regime’s targeting of civilians, NATO called upon JFC Naples to lead OUP, its operation over and around Libya. Under the OUP mandate, NATO and partners began enforcing an arms embargo, maintaining a no-fly zone and protecting civilians from an attack or threats of an attack. The operation, in which more than 8,000 service members took part, successfully ended on 31 October 2011. In the words of NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the OUP was “effective, flexible and precise.”

Very important, too, was the fact that this offered a unique opportunity to make a comparison between simulated training environments and actual operational experience. Major General Jean-Fred Berger, then Commander JWC, noted: “It is vital for NATO, as demonstrated by OUP, to be constantly ready to conduct operations and to be ambitious in its objectives. Lieutenant General Charles Bouchard, who commanded the mission, acknowledged that he and his staff would have lacked the energy, time and quality required in planning had they not received the indispensable training at the JWC in Stavanger.”

In 2011, the JWC trained 32 headquarters and over 4,300 personnel in the full
spectrum of joint operational warfare. The JWC’s operational level collective training has evolved and progressed constantly due to new threats, redefined missions and lessons learned. Ever adaptive, the Centre integrated new capacities into its exercises, delivered NATO’s new SKOLKAN scenario complete with cyber, space and missile defence challenges and launched NATO’s first large-scale virtual network. It partnered with U.S. Joint and Coalition Warfighting to conduct highly complex, four-tier, multinational ISAF/IJC pre-deployment training events. It furthermore supported NATO’s Smart Defence and Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), led the way for many other concepts, such as Comprehensive Approach and produced a wide variety of other reference documentation on modern warfare.

Exercise STEADFAST JOIST, which took place in May 2012 was the first major exercise to be hosted and run from the new training facility at Jåttå, following the closure of the interim training facility at Ulsnes. During this exercise, with over 800 personnel of 12 NATO organizations spread across the Training Audience and EXCON, the JWC’s new training facility was put to test, and delivered. The facility provided an effective and efficient training venue, while hosting NATO’s most advanced Information Technology platform. The exercise cemented the JWC’s position as one of the world’s most state-of-the-art military training venues. On 14 May 2012 King Harald V of Norway honoured the JWC with a visit, which coincided with the exercise.

In April 2013, the JWC conducted its first warfare conference, with the NATO doctrine chosen as the main topic. “Common doctrine is the reason why our Nations have been able to fight and work together since the beginning of the Alliance. It allows them to more seamlessly work together, enhancing their common efficiency and interoperability,” Mr. Paul Sewell said.

Welcoming incoming staff members to the JWC in August, Brigadier General John W. Doucette, the JWC’s Chief of Staff, summarized why an assignment at the JWC would be one of the best of their career: “The JWC is at the forefront of any activity in NATO that is ‘joint’ and ‘operational’. As NATO’s only warfare centre, we are the hub between its two Strategic Commands, focusing on what the Alliance needs as a fighting force while simultaneously developing new concepts, supporting doctrine development and collecting and implementing lessons learned.

We have developed some of the most advanced modelling, simulation and innovative computer systems in NATO to conduct the kind of exercises we are involved in. Training will determine NATO’s future cohesion and effectiveness and much of all this places the JWC in a very critical position.”

A proud heritage

As NATO embarked on the new millennium, it placed great importance on joint/combined training of Alliance and Partner forces, high deployment readiness and interoperability. Since its creation, the JWC has been able to successfully establish an outstanding reputation across NATO for delivering premium exercises for current operations and NRF missions as NATO’s first ever operational level training centre, and the only warfare centre.

Today with a PE of 250, the JWC designs and delivers four complex, operational level exercises per year, and it is NATO’s only organization that has the ability and capability to synchronize the seven key enterprises of exercise design which are: CIS, MEL/MIL Script, OPFOR (Opposing Forces), Scenario, Training Teams, CAX and EXCON (Exercise Control) organization.
During this ten-year period the JWC has trained over 37,000 personnel (excluding the EXCON organization) in the full spectrum of joint operational level warfare.

The JWC’s tenth anniversary is set against a complex background:

— Permanent transformation and recent restructuring of NATO;
— NATO after ISAF;
— NATO’s ambition to keep its operational edge;
— Defence spending cuts and how to get more for less in times of austerity.

These are only a few of the issues to consider, but they will nevertheless impact the JWC, which in turn will have to demonstrate its ability to:

— Adjust and adapt to shifting winds of politics and budgets;
— Take account of new realities and meet new needs in terms of training, and most importantly,
— be provocative and stay relevant at all times.

To be able to take on new and future challenges we need to train and qualify our joint forces. This is especially true since after 2014 NATO is expected to shift its emphasis from operational engagement to operational preparedness.

Major General Erhard Buehler, the Commander JWC, said: “As the present Commander, I am impressed with what has been achieved during the past ten years. The development during this period of time, with the continuous adaptation to current and future requirements, has certainly led to a NATO institution with an admirable reputation. Thanks to the excellent and professional personnel from contributing NATO and Partner Nations, the Joint Warfare Centre has succeeded in providing the Allied Community with the demanded products. In order to fulfil our responsibilities in the future, we will keep up the tradition of identifying future challenges and requirements at an early stage and adapt our processes and procedures accordingly in order to deliver absolute customer satisfaction.”

People claim that in Norway, and in the Stavanger area in particular, there is no such thing as bad weather, only inappropriate clothing. We would rather put it this way: “There is no such thing as bad weather, only different kinds of good weather!” We also say that, conversely to general think-
ing, it is not expensive to come to Norway for training, as Norway, our Host Nation, is providing transportation, low-cost military accommodation and security. Indeed, the more than 60-year old partnership between NATO and Host Nation Norway dates back to 1952 when Allied Forces Northern Europe, AFNORTH, stood up at Kolsås, Oslo. As NATO’s flag carrier in Norway, our reputation would not have been that good if Norway had not been such a great host country to be located and operate in.

As mentioned earlier, our tenth anniversary is a meeting of past and future. In some lines of work, you may relax when you get to the top. At the JWC we have never had the privilege to relax. Each Commander JWC brought with him a reputation for excellence, changing the JWC to the better. Through value-based leadership and distinguished service each Commander has ploughed the field and scattered the good seed on the land. Today, we are honoured to work at the JWC, all the more since the Centre has been able to establish such an outstanding reputation, across NATO and beyond, for training realistically for any type of warfare, operationalizing Transformation and shaping the future of NATO’s combined and joint operations.

These outcomes have not sprung into being through the efforts of one man alone, but rather as a growth to which all JWC members have been and are still, contributing each and every day. This organization has succeeded in building a teamwork culture with a diversity that speaks for itself, a solid base from which to solve the most difficult problems. This is an organization that recognizes the belief that “none of us is as good as all of us.”

Our history parallels one of the most radically transformative eras that NATO ever saw. And, we have been there through it all. What will the next ten years bring? No one can say for sure, but we are prepared. We are proud of our heritage and headed onward to fill our extraordinary role within NATO. Our anniversary is our way of saying Thank You to all those who have been with us! Congratulations JWC on your ten years of excellent transformation in action!

END NOTES:
(1) Air Marshal Peter Walker, Director’s Foreword, The Three Swords Magazine, Issue No. 4.
(2) NURC became Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) in 2012.
(3) On 18 December 2012, Joint Force Command Lisbon (JFC Lisbon) was officially deactivated.
JWC provides NATO’s training focal point for full spectrum joint operational level warfare.

LOOKING BACK AT TEN YEARS BY THE NUMBERS
(as of 23 October 2013)

- Number of pre-deployment training events since 2004: 21
- Number of NRF training events since 2004: 17
- Number of JWC’s Training Audiences since 2004: 37,000+*
- Number of Iraqi security officials who were given training at the JWC over the period 2004-2011: 256

*Excluding EXCON

JWC provides NATO’s training focal point for full spectrum joint operational level warfare.
The house that Norge built

By Cdr Keith Sweeney, GBR N
Head Site Management, JWC

MOUNT JÅTTÅ in Stavanger has been a strategically vital position within Norway for many years. Standing over a relatively flat landscape with views all the way to the sea, the wooded hillside provided a great vantage point to survey the extensive farmland and rugged coastline. The Vikings established defensive fortifications there to deter potential invaders as far back as 300-500 AD. Indeed, in 872 Harald Haarfagre overcame forces nearby to unite the Kingdom of Norway. During World War II, German forces were quick to identify the strategic nature of the site and establish an operational headquarters and an almost impregnable bunker complex at the foot and inside the imposing hill. Since then, the Norwegian military has had a constant presence on the site, with the National Joint Headquarters (NJHQ) and NATO’s Headquarters both establishing offices there before NATO further developed the site to become the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) it is today.

Nestled at the base of the hill, one might be forgiven for not noticing the site at all. From a distance, the red brick buildings that overlook the white wooden former German jail seem to be like any other office complex and housing site typical for the area. However, as you round the corner to climb towards Gausel Magasine you begin to see the complex site for what it is. The numerous national flags that represent the NATO Member Nations and its associated Partners for Peace fly proudly at the entrance, overlooking the site as you observe an eclectic mix of infrastructure, including the "F Block". This modern building is the latest addition to NATO’s training inventory on the site and a key asset for the provision of joint training, experimentation, interoperability development and analysis for the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) in his role in providing operational training support to the rest of NATO.

*Sogne means "Norway" in English. The title is a tribute to the Norwegian Defence Estates Agency (NDEA) working in collaboration with NATO to build JWC’s "home" in Stavanger.
The JOINT WARFARE CENTRE (JWC) is a multi-national (combined) and multi-service (joint) NATO organization. The Commander is a two-star General, based in Stavanger, Norway, falling under the pillar of the three-star DCOS Joint Force Trainer based at Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Virginia, Norfolk, United States.

Effective from 11 March 2013, the new JWC Peacetime Establishment (PE) has 250 personnel. Currently, the personnel is made up of civilians representing 11 NATO Nations as well as military staff from 15 contributing Nations: Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Also represented is one Partnership for Peace (PfP) country: Austria.

DID YOU KNOW?

Maximum number of Nations represented at the JWC

26
The successful building and refurbishment programme on the Jåttå site was given the go-ahead by the Military Committee in May 2003 as part of an extensive Capability Package, both here in Stavanger, Norway and at the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) at Bydgoszcz, Poland. The JWC was quickly established, making temporary use of legacy infrastructure within the former National Joint Headquarters, the decommissioned naval base at Ulsnes and additional warehousing facilities near Sola and Sola regions of the city, not far from Sola Airport. Meanwhile, the Norwegian Defence Estates Agency (NDEA), working for the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, was tasked with the design and construction of the main training and office facility called the F Block. This was to be an audacious project, with a tight time schedule to meet, coordinating a variety of contractors, against a dynamic NATO training requirement and an ever-present need to work within a budget. Once complete, the JWC would accommodate over 350 permanent staff and have the potential to train over 1,000 visitors in a single event. In just six years, and an estimated cost of 100 Million Euros, NDEA completed the building works and installation of a state-of-the-art Automated Information System (AIS) and Data Centre facility in time for the successful STEADFAST JOIST training event in May 2012.

In designing the JWC, there was a real desire to connect NATO to its local environment. The red cladding on F Block was designed to match the older E Block red brick complex, whilst the new auditorium facility (The Harald Haarfagre Auditorium) has a dark outer shell to match the rocky exterior of the hills behind. Internally, the colour...
The "Northern Lights"

E Block’s old entrance, which is currently under construction.

CDR Sweeney (left) with Mr. Svein Skaar (right), from the Norwegian Defence Estates Agency (NDEA).

Unveiling of Prof. Ole Listerud’s Peace and the Art of War, in main entrance, new building.

JWC Transportation

Mr. Dag Malde

JWC Security
Concepts such as Smart Defence and the CFI may be old news to some in theory, but it is within JWC that you start to get a sense of what may be possible in terms of its AIS capability.

The office and training areas, including an adaptable Joint Operations Centre (JOC) on the first floor within F Block, are truly state-of-the-art with intelligent building operation and environmental systems to keep the building efficiently lit and temperature/climate-controlled. But the real gem is the extensive Data Centre facility on the second floor, for it is this asset that gives you a sense that everyone at JWC is looking to the future. As one of the first NATO organisations to embrace cloud computing architectures and client-based user access devices (no old PCs here!) you can’t help but notice the potential to connect with multi-level command and force structures within NATO, and on a national level also. JWC appears to be well placed to be a key enabler now and in the near future for NATO operational multi-tier training and fits the bill very well for the CFI. As we prepare for the next level of STEADFAST and TRIDENT exercise series, while expanding the current Data Centre is feasible (and indeed factored into the building design) the only real constraint is the existing infrastructure against an ever expanding training audience numbers.

D BLOCK (Bunker)

The need for a second JOC was made clear during STEADFAST JOIST, and close cooperation with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) Norway opened up the possibility for the temporary use of the adjacent bunker complex for additional office space, which has been previously used by the Norwegian National Joint Headquarters. With the Ulsses site now handed back to the NDEA, D Block, within the bunker complex, has successfully provided JWC a further training space for approximately 300 training audience participants on top of its existing practical limit of 620. JWC is currently anticipating training audience and EXCON numbers to be in excess of 1,200 at some time throughout the TRIDENT series of training events. The use of the D Block facility goes someway to close the infrastructure gap with an impressive second JOC facility that is fully integrated into the JWC’s main AIS. This comes at a time where NATO is also reviewing its support arrangements, not only with NCIA, but also with MoD Norway. In terms of building maintenance and infrastructure, NDEA has provided key personnel to keep the site running smoothly.

Whatever the revised support arrangements look like, it is clear that the Jåttå site will be in demand. The business of facilities and infrastructure management can be rather complex and needs care to ensure affordability. The relationship between MoD Norway and NATO continues to be founded on an agreed vision of success for the JWC, one which will enable novel and long-lasting solutions to provide the real estate NATO needs for its training requirements. Just as in Viking times, the JWC site has changed significantly in its first 10 years — and the next 10 look equally as promising.
JOINT WARFARE CENTRE
the Transformation link between
ACO and ACT

By Lieutenant Colonel Geoffroy Petit, FRA A
Head Doctrine and Lessons Learned Branch, JWC

Published first in ACT’s Transformer Magazine

Clockwise: A SFJZ 13 MEL/MIL coordination meeting; Mr. Adrian Williamson, a JWC analyst, at “Countering Hybrid Threat Experiment” in Estonia; Lieutenant Colonel Harribert Rahmel from ACT’s CAPDEV, briefing on NATO doctrine during JWC’s first Warfare Conference (2013); Colonel Carl Giles briefing to the participants of SFJZ 13 Scripting Conference. Pictures JWC PAO
FOR THE PAST TEN YEARS, the Joint War-
fare Centre (JWC) has been widely recog-
nized for its expertise in the field of major
NATO operational exercises, and has offered
high quality venues for implementing and
operationalizing transformational efforts on
behalf of ACT, for the benefit of ACO, NATO
and Allied Nations.

The JWC: the very heart
of transformation

Training and Education, and Joint and
Combined Concept Development, Experi-
mentation, Assessment and Doctrine are
two of the five features that define the pro-
cess of Transformation. The JWC is at the
heart of the transformation and training of
operational level NATO forces. Positioned at
the crossroads of Allied Command Opera-
tions (ACO) and Allied Command Trans-
formation (ACT) areas of responsibility, the
JWC has been advancing the principle of
conducting operations based on a common
document. The JWC is also referenced in the
regulation document AAP47 on NATO
document and development, which defines
responsibilities and tasks relating to doc-
trine between the different entities of the
Alliance and the Nations, and refers repeat-
edly to the JWC as a key element in the Alli-
ance's doctrinal process.

Amongst the five Divisions com-
prising the JWC's structure, the Joint
Capability Integration Division (JCID) is
more specifically in charge of concepts and
document. Following an iterative process,
initiated at the highest level of the Alli-
ance (North Atlantic Council, International
Military Staff, ACO, or ACT), this Division
drives the incorporation of new concepts
formulated by ACO, ACT, a NATO Centre
of Excellence or, even a Nation, into opera-
tional level NATO exercises. JCID integrates
and monitors this process from inception to
final validation. Amongst the four JCID sec-
tions, the Concept Section initiates the pro-
cess by identifying, in conjunction with ACT
CAP/DEV, which new concepts could
have an impact on the Alliance's operational
forces. The Experimentation Section is then
responsible for testing the new concepts
during an exercise or dedicated event. The
Lessons Learned Section takes into account
what has been learned from the previous
steps in order to make any necessary adjust-
ments. Last, but not least, the Doctrine Sec-
tion contributes to the writing of the final
document in association with ACT, ACO
and the Military Committee.

NATO exercises: a laboratory
for military thought

In 2012, the roles between ACT and ACO
relating to collective training were redistri-
buted leading to the implementation of the
Military Training and Exercise Programme
(MTEP). The programme annu-
ally outlines the priorities and intents of the
two strategic components of the Alliance
regarding instruction. Beyond training ob-
jectives, each NATO exercise aims to im-
prove the readiness of the headquarters and
forces. In addition, the programme tests
and confirms all aspects inherent to NATO
operations: procedures, concepts, interoper-
ability, and tactics. The priority for NATO,
Nations and the JWC in operational prepara-
tion is focused on ISAF. However, the NATO
Response Force (NRF) training exercises,
which also fall into the scope of the JWC,
offer the best comprehensive and credible
environment where operational staff can be
trained in a wide range of missions assigned
to the Alliance.

With Host Nation Norway's and NATO
Nations' support, JWC provides modern
training and transformation tools. Using
cutting-edge, modern facilities the JWC pro-
vides the ideal environment for new concepts
to be tested, adjusted (if necessary), and vali-
dated. A recently renewed scenario setting
provides possibilities for injecting incidents
in order to simulate conditions that chal-
lenge the training HQs and their subordinate
staffs. The JWC not only provides a venue
for reaching training objectives, but also for
adapting to new concepts and doctrine from
a structural and procedural point of view,
then putting them into practice. The NRF is
trained at least once a year and the doctrine
is regularly updated and tested. Moreover,
the level and the number of units involved
(from the tactical to the strategic via the op-
erational) means that the complete military
structure of the Alliance is covered and fa-
miliarised with best practices, emerging con-
cepts, and doctrinal development.

Being a doctrinal enabler for
NATO and Nations

Over the past two years the JWC has rein-
 vigorated its “think tank” duty. Along with
its sister headquarters, the Joint Force Train-
ing Centre (JFTC) and the Joint Analysis
and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC), the
JWC hosted seminars and conferences that
contributed to creating a synergy among
NATO structures, Centres of Excellence
(COE) and the national doctrinal commu-
nities. The JWC is a major actor in the pro-
cess of transformation. In the framework
of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI)
through the concept of NATO Forces 2020,
the JWC contributes to maintaining an
operational state of high readiness and the
efficiency of Allied forces and NATO struc-
tures. JWC's transformational motto could
be: “victory smiles at those who anticipate
changes in the nature of war and not at those
who wait for changes to take place before ad-
justing to them.” (– Giulio Douhet, an Italian
air strategy theoretician)

END NOTES:

(1) The NATO Military Command
Structure, 16 May 2003.
(2) Joint Exercise Division, Joint Training Division,
Simulation, Modelling and C4 Division, Exercise
and Base Support Division and Joint Capability In-
tegration Division.
(3) The Capability Development Division is one of
the four Divisions in ACT in Norfolk (USA), more
specifically responsible for developing new con-
cepts and doctrine.
(4) The SKOLKAN scenario takes place in north-
ern Europe. It allows NATO forces to prepare for all
possible missions: from humanitarian missions,
through “cyber defence” and anti-missile defence
missions to collective defence. SKOLKAN was
"played" for the first time in November 2012 during
STEADFAST JUNCTURE 12 in Estonia.
(5) The Connected Forces Initiative allows NATO
to maintain efficiency following its withdrawal from
Afghanistan, in a period of financial tension during
which the opportunities for joint operations will
probably be less frequent.
Firstly, I would like to thank you Sir for taking time to talk to us. For the last fifteen years you have actively engaged in the NATO resources and logistics community and, for the last ten years, in the provision of facilities and host nation support from your busy position at the Ministry of Defence. What is the priority?

NATO is really unique in many ways. There is broad consensus that NATO is good for peace and security. But how do you achieve it? NATO is unique in being about both policy and real capabilities. To achieve that, nations must invest in and operate a suitable set of capabilities together. The real test of any policy is when participants are asked to fund it. NATO is the only organisation to succeed and have a common command structure and common facilities. The Ministry of Defence is about defence and security policy, and consequently NATO resources and capabilities — the real issues — have been important. It remains important for the Ministry of Defence to make that work a priority.

Would you like to point out some of the highlights of your engagement with NATO resources?

I must highlight seeing the strength of NATO personally, the strength of the consensus principle. NATO’s processes and facilities have proved very adaptive and very useful — key criteria for success in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya. As for our engagement in Libya, NATO common-funded air bases — which some consider an obsolete type of investment — were of decisive significance. And Libya action was a surprise. When individuals are in the thick of it, there is no end to calls for quick fixes. From years of investment management experience, I know that NATO is doing well although processes may seem laborious. But the benchmark is that there is no benchmark. No other organisation achieves what NATO does. On an individual project scale, your new headquarters is definitely a highlight. It is a prime candidate for best and quickest project implementation. We are proud of providing you with it, and, as the Minister has pointed out, we are delighted with what you have achieved even before the new facilities were available.

Some people claim that NATO is particularly cumbersome with its consensus principle, and that it is better replaced by voting and, what they refer to as, “more modern approaches”. What do you think?

The way the consensus principle works is as unique as NATO itself. It gives robustness to decisions. Everyone can go home and say: “Everyone is in.” It’s the real musketeers, 28 of them.

Should not the public sector budgets’ crises make nations prioritise defence requirements at home?

No. If in crisis, you should do more together, not less. The founders of NATO understood that. The investment programme was not only about having facilities, but about helping force a decision in the Cold War. Every European nation was poor in the aftermath of the war. Yet the nations made NATO a priority and built it with real capabilities. We can be grateful that most of it never got used as planned.

How do you see the future for the common funded programmes and budgets and our common command structure?

Today, they are a fraction of their former size. That is the peace dividend, but the small amounts we spend still make up a lot of the difference between having real capabilities or not. To keep NATO relevant and viable, all stakeholders must be active in making the case for our common requirements. It is also a vital link between North America and Europe. There has been quite a bit of downwards pressure on our level of ambition lately, but I remain optimistic.

What is your message to the JWC staff on the occasion of the Centre’s tenth anniversary on 23 October?

Training at JWC will remain key to success. It is a modern, cost-effective approach. I believe the key to your success from now on is making your case within ACT, and for SACT to make the case for his prime asset. The Minister’s message is clear. We are impressed.

Thank you Mr. Christensen.

Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to the anniversary special edition.
OPERATIONALIZING

Connected Forces Initiative at the Joint Warfare Centre

By Lieutenant Colonel Barrett Burns, USA A
SO Concept Development, JWC
THE CONNECTED FORCES INITIATIVE (CFI) began after the Chicago Summit as a program designed to work within the constellation of NATO programs to achieve the goals of NATO Forces 2020. Complementary initiatives include Smart Defence, the Lisbon package of NATO capability requirements, NATO reform initiatives, and improvements to the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). Named as an explicit priority in Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) Direction and Guidance 2015, CFI supports the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) mandate to lead transformation of NATO military structures, forces, capabilities, and doctrine. Through carefully planned priorities and an implementation plan designed to take concrete steps toward achieving those priorities, CFI provides intermediate training and transformation objectives that serve to focus collective efforts to improve Alliance, National, and Partner forces.

THE JOINT WARFARE CENTRE (JWC) executes operational level collective training to train joint and combined staffs as part of the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and the NATO Force Structure (NFS) and to support on-going operations (ISAF and on-demand training for other NATO missions). JWC drives NATO transformation through continuous support to NATO concept and doctrine development, lessons learned, and the synchronization of ACT experimentation and capability integration in operational level training. JWC executes its CFI role daily, as part of the larger NATO CFI effort, through interdependent functions as a collective trainer and a catalyst for Transformation.

How does JWC support CFI?

While the wider scope and implications of CFI range across NATO and beyond, many of the operational level implementation activities are familiar to JWC. CFI is useful to JWC because it encourages the wider community to participate in its normal business of delivering transformative training and exercises. JWC exercises continue to prepare NCS and NFS commands, along with national headquarters and partners, for future operations in a continually evolving security environment. Coupled with JWC’s institutional transformation efforts in concepts, experiments, and doctrine, this training enables NATO to remain ready and relevant with forces and HQs prepared to meet near-, mid— and long-term mission requirements of NATO Forces 2020.

The key topics of CFI supported by JWC

• NATO Training Concept 2015-2020

This new concept should meet NATO’s future requirements for full-spectrum operations, ranging from low intensity Smaller Joint Operations (SJOs) to high intensity Major Joint Operations-plus (MJO(+)) contingency missions. It directs a multi-level, multi-national approach to exercises that links Computer Assisted Exercises/Command Post Exercises (CAX/CPX) and live exercise (LIVEX) events. This approach integrates all resources to facilitate NCS, NFS, national, and partner preparation. JWC uses this unified approach to deliver more effective training through the support of personnel drawn from national training centres and NATO Centres of Excellence.

The cross-organizational relationships built in this training are the foundation of future interoperability. As the command that delivers innovative exercises at the operational level, JWC is a vital link in a NATO-wide comprehensive program of education and training, building interoperability and readiness for NATO Forces 2020.

• Building Block Exercises

These exercises (including STEADFAST JAZZ 13, as well as the TRIDENT and NOBLE series) are designed to prepare NATO for the High Visibility Exercise in 2015 and major exercises from 2016 onward. JWC delivers many of these events, using innovative scenarios and expert Observer/Trainers. JWC’s technological capacity and capability enable turn-key operations at JWC’s facilities in Stavanger as well as distributed execution at locations worldwide. The world-class Data Centre and virtualisation technologies designed and implemented at JWC offer rapid reconfiguration of exercise CIS environments and simultaneous data preparation for multiple events. This technological agility provides a comprehensive and responsive exercise environment that enables exercise designers, Observer/Trainers, experimenters, and capability integrators to deliver the best training and transformation events possible.

• High Visibility Exercise 2015 (TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15) and Major Exercises from 2016 Onwards

TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 will be a high profile NCS/NFS synthetic and live exercise in 2015 built around the NATO Response Force (NRF) 16. From 2016, ACT plans to periodically conduct high visibility exercises. The nature of these exercises will balance Article 5 collective defence, Non-Article 5 crisis response, high-intensity, and peace support operations.

• Technological Aspects

Integrated with training and exercises, JWC strongly supports the development of the technological aspects of CFI. In addition to the modelling and simulation capability development, JWC faces the challenge of ensuring the interoperability of various Command and Control systems and the exercise requirement to stimulate many of those systems in a coherent fashion. The JWC uses its unique responsibility for exercise interoperability to develop insights that shape requirements for NATO networks, training and education software, and implementation of the Future Mission Network.

OTHER CFI FOCUS AREAS: JWC also supports other focus areas of the CFI during the conduct of its main training and transformation tasks.

• Enhancing the NRF: Currently, NRF enhancements focus on “force multiplier” initiatives addressing Transformation requirements across the DOTMLPFI (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Interoperability) spectrum. JWC support focuses on Doctrine, Training, and Interoperability observations during exercises.
• Enhancing Special Operations Forces (SOF): CFI consolidates and builds on gains made through the 2006 NATO SOF Transformation Initiative (NSTI). SOF-specific focus areas include education, medicine, and aviation. JWC supports SOF initiatives through exercise integration and support of SOF CIS functional services like BICES (Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems).

• Evaluation: The evaluation focus area of CFI is still in development. JWC supports evaluations indirectly, by participating in the doctrinal process that develops standards used by evaluators.

• Resource Considerations: The increases in readiness and interoperability envisioned by CFI require resource commitment. The JWC’s Budget and Finance Office (BUD-FIN) supports budget processes to develop and refine resources requirements to meet CFI objectives.

How can I use CFI to improve the results of our work?

CFI is a benefit for the JWC, because it brings attention (and resources) to many of the tasks that we accomplish on a day-to-day basis. Each of us can take this opportunity to reframe how critical thinking and exercise delivery are executed in JWC. Expand JWC’s operational reach and effectiveness by bringing the NATO-wide CFI audience into your community-of-interest. The end result of the reflective consideration and steady improvements triggered through the CFI will be a more effective Joint Warfare Centre, and consequently, a more effective NATO force.

Above: (Clockwise) NRF is NATO’s rapid-reaction force that is ready to defend any Ally, deploy anywhere and deal with any threat (picture NATO); Exercise SFJT 12; Colonel Stéphane Bellamy at SFJZ 13 MEL/MIL Conference; JWC’s EXCON; JWC BUDFIN personnel with Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (DSACT), Italian Air Force General Mirco Zuliani. Pictures JWC PAO.

"Coupled with JWC’s institutional transformation efforts in concepts, experiments, and doctrine, this training enables NATO to remain ready and relevant with forces and HQs prepared to meet near-, mid- and long-term mission requirements of NATO Forces 2020."
THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001. Two years later, NATO took over command and coordination of ISAF. Instead of the six-month national rotations, the Alliance would take the leadership responsibility and command those multinational forces assigned to its headquarters in-theatre. This was NATO’s first-ever operational commitment outside Europe. It was dubbed ISAF IV and commanded by German Lieutenant General Goetz Gliemeroth.

JWC’s role: Training the operational warfighter

Since its formation on 23 October 2003, the JWC has been in the position to help shape and deliver pre-deployment training for national and NATO personnel deploying to ISAF Headquarters in Kabul. Since then, JWC’s training has grown in both size and complexity. However, one fact remained constant: the Centre’s highest training priority has always been to prepare designated NATO headquarters and individuals from coalition countries for service in Afghanistan.

“Our highest priority is the Mission Rehearsal Training (MRT) for real-world operations,” U.S. Marine Corps Colonel Adele Hodges, JWC’s Chief Joint Exercise Division in 2005, said. "We
are certain that JWC is dramatically improving the ISAF Headquarters’ ability to conduct its mission through our specific training here in Stavanger.”

The first ISAF MRT at JWC’s interim training facility in Ulsnes was conducted for ISAF VI led by Headquarters Eurocorps from 18 to 22 June 2004 and consisted of a training audience of 400 participants coming from 14 NATO and Partner Nations. The MRTs, in general, included instructions on crisis management, Command and Control of forces, the Operational Planning Process, integration of all aspects of civil-military cooperation and a robust media training that aimed to catapult staff into a global media campaign. Since its inception, the model of the MRT covered all needed phases of training. Its methodology was to deliver the training in a progressive manner, an approach often referred to as “Crawl, Walk and Run”, which increased individual members’ personal confidence in their own readiness to deploy, as well as that of their team. It comprised the following training blocks: Individual Training, Key Leader Training, Mission Specific Training, Functional Area Training, Battle Staff Training and Mission Rehearsal Exercise. The MRT was supported by near-real time operational information and data collected from ISAF Headquarters a few weeks prior to the training event. The fresh data allowed the training audience to conduct research and practice their staff procedures prior to actually deploying into theatre by using current operational information. All phases of the MRT were heavily supported by Observer/Trainers, analysts and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from both ISAF HQ and the JWC.

The JWC conducted its fourth ISAF Training Event at Ulsnes from 3 to 15 March 2006, on the way to NATO’s expansion of mission to Stage III, which covered the south of Afghanistan. The MRT included over 450 personnel of NATO’s British-led Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC),
which was assigned to Headquarters ISAF IX. The training introduced a refined training model that aimed at developing the operational awareness and staff processes of Headquarters IX. French Army Colonel Paul Morillon, JWC’s Chief Training Improvement Branch in 2006, said: “We are never fully satisfied with the settings of any exercise. This is the unique trend of the JWC: to develop transformation of NATO through the training vehicle. Even though everybody will tell you this exercise has been a success, there are lessons learned as always, and they will be integrated to make our training even better for future missions.”

October 2006 witnessed a further change to NATO’s ISAF operation with the implementation of Stage IV and the inclusion of Regional Command East within the ISAF Area of Operations. ISAF’s expansion to Stage IV brought more international military forces into Afghanistan in order to build on the efforts of the former U.S.-led coalition to provide security as well as reconstruction projects and humanitarian assistance in the south of the country. NATO, at this time, decided that future ISAF Headquarters would not be deployed under the “core headquarters” model such as the ARRC deployment, but will be “composite headquarters”, which would consist of three main entities: a Command Group, a nominated NATO headquarters as a Standing Headquarters, and Individual Augmentees. Thus, the JWC changed its training model once again and the training objectives were now specifically focused on a training audience that had not met, trained or worked together before. JWC’s first “composite headquarters” training for ISAF took place from 9 to 19 October 2006 for ISAF X. According to this new model, one of the main goals was to give the training audience the opportunity to become a competent, cohesive, capable and self-confident ISAF HQ team.

The JWC delivered three ISAF Training Events in 2007. The last one of these was called ISAF TE 07/03 during which, for the first time, the JWC and the JFTC conducted collocated and interlinked exercises at Ulsnes. This sequential overlap resulted in one of the largest ISAF exercises ever conducted in the same location with over 800 personnel of both Training Audience and Exercise Control (EXCON) staff. Further, the training familiarized the training audience with some of the principal corporate activities and processes of ISAF Headquarters such as joint planning, joint coordination, campaign assessment as well as functional area specific challenges and cultural awareness. “I believe passionately that our duty is to provide for the men and women of our Nations that go in harm’s way the best prepared and trained Command and Control organization that we possibly can,” Air Marshal Walker, then Director JWC, said.

The activation of Headquarters ISAF Joint Command

On 3 August 2009, NATO adjusted the ISAF military command structure. A new headquarters, ISAF Joint Command, or IJC, led by a three-star General, was established. While ISAF continued to be the higher operational headquarters led by a four-star General with focus on the more strategic-political aspects of the mission, the IJC would be responsible for executing the full spectrum of tactical operations throughout the country. The stand-up of the IJC changed the focus of the ISAF training
events. To balance the training for higher number of IJC Headquarters personnel with lower number of ISAF Headquarters personnel, in September 2010, JWC ran the first Individual Augmentee Pre-Deployment Training (IAPDT) Event (also a pilot training) to give priority to ISAF personnel.

During this time, for the first time in its history, the JWC conducted an in-theatre Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE) for the IJC from 6 to 9 October 2009 in Kabul. The aim was to ensure that the newly formed IJC was trained and ready to assume its tasks and responsibilities. The JWC deployed an advance team of seven personnel on 23 September, and a main party of twenty-three personnel on 30 September.

The next step was JWC’s first MRT for ISAF/IJC Headquarters, ISAF TE 09/02, which took place from 29 November to 11 December and based on the split headquarters structure for the early 2010 rotations. “Our success is a direct result of four main factors,” said Lieutenant General Wolfgang Korte, JWC’s Commander from 2007 to 2011, referring specifically to ISAF 10/01, which was conducted from 10 to 25 June 2010, involving more than 800 service members from Rapid Reaction Corps France, now-defunct Force Command HQ Heidelberg and United States Army V Corps. “Those are: detailed planning between Joint Force Command Brunssum, JWC, HQ ISAF and HQ IJC staff; stringent preparation by our training audiences; high participation rate of Individual Augmentees and invaluable mentoring by flag and field grade officers who currently serve, or recently served, in Afghanistan.”

U.S. and NATO coalition partners

A further milestone was achieved in 2011. United States Army V Corps was scheduled to undergo its preparatory training at the U.S. Army Europe training facility at Grafenwoehr in Germany. JWC was invited to join forces with the U.S. Joint and Coalition Warfighting (JCW) to deliver a multi-tiered exercise that would integrate the training of both the future HQ ISAF and HQ IJC. In addition to added realism and the early formation of staff relationships, combining forces in this way reduced the burden on ISAF by making more efficient use of current SMEs from Afghanistan and recently returned SMEs from HQ ARRC.

From 18 March to 5 April 2012 commanders and staff from U.S. V Corps, EUROCORPS, HQ Force Command Madrid, NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Spain and Individual Augmentees from as far as Australia trained together at Grafenwoehr. It was NATO’s first four-tiered Computer Assisted/Command Post distributed ISAF pre-deployment exercise, co-directed by the U.S. Joint and Coalition Warfighting and NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre. Dubbed as Unified Endeavor 12-2 / ISAF Training Event 12/01 (UE 12-2 / TE 12/01), the exercise involved a total of 1,576 personnel from four training commands (JWC, JFTC, JCW and MCTP) along with elements from the 505th Command and Control Wing. Together they formed the Combined Exercise Control Group (CECG), which planned, delivered and managed the execution of the four tiers of ISAF pre-deployment training from the United States, Germany, Poland and Norway. “The exercise boosted cooperation and mutual understanding with our U.S. counterparts and partners of the Joint and Coalition Warfighting. This can be seen as a major achievement that sets the conditions for
REALIZING ITS SUCCESS, the U.S. and NATO coalition partners again gathered in Grafenwoehr from 28 November to 14 December 2012 for UE 13-1; ISAF TE 12/02. Near 6,000 service members and civilians participated in this exercise, which took place in eight different locations, spread over the continental United States and Europe for 14 different training audiences. It was the largest U.S./NATO joint pre-deployment exercise.

From 31 May to 13 June 2013, the JWC conducted ISAF TE 13-01, which was the first training event to be conducted exclusively at Jåttå complex for approximately 200 personnel. And most recently, the JWC conducted yet another exercise in Grafenwoehr, UE 14-1; ISAF TE 13/02. "Approximately 400 personnel will deploy to Afghanistan following this training," said the JWC’s lead exercise planner for the event, Norwegian Army Lieutenant Colonel Thor Randulff. Exercise Co-Director, German Army Major General Erhard Buehler, Commander JWC said that: “the success depends heavily on the participation of the leadership in theatre. We were lucky both to have COM IJC with his most important Generals present in the exercise, and also the future leadership of IJC was almost completely present, together with the incoming Chief of Staff (COS) of HQ ISAF.”

The JWC, through its realistic and progressive ISAF/IJC training, directly contributes to the conduct of operations in Afghanistan and is a key player in NATO’s success. The ISAF/IJC pre-deployment training, unlike the NRF training, is neither a certification nor other form of test for the training audience. It is truly a mission rehearsal for the two NATO headquarters in theatre.

Although the Joint Exercise Division (JED) has a dedicated ISAF Exercise Planning Team, delivery and subsequent analysis of the ISAF training events involves personnel from every Division at the JWC, and SMEs, reflecting the JWC Commander’s statement that training personnel for ISAF is the most important thing we do.

Looking Back… Looking Forward

And finally a few comments from across the Joint Warfare Centre:

“I worked in Kabul three years ago. I could see that the training given at JWC created a well-functioning HQ out of diverse individuals by enabling them to build personal relationships under exercise conditions.”

“Planning a multi-tiered exercise for four echelons that is spread across three training areas, located on two continents has been immensely rewarding.”

“Clearly, students who learn from the experts, work hard on realistic tasks within the scenario, and develop a strong relationship with their future comrades will consequently become friends.”

“Aside from serving in Afghanistan, this is the most I can do to support NATO’s mission there.”

“Regular visits to Kabul ensure that our scenarios are realistic and up-to-date. On the MRE, the training audience grapples with the real issues facing ISAF now and in the future.”

“Visits in-theatre are pivotal in exercise planning. Personal relationships are built between warriors and trainers, which can help establish mutual knowledge and confidence. As a result, the quality of the training delivered is at the highest level.”

The ISAF/IJC pre-deployment training, unlike the NRF training, is neither a certification nor other form of test for the training audience.”

"The ISAF/IJC pre-deployment training, unlike the NRF training, is neither a certification nor other form of test for the training audience."

"Watching Exercise Movies on JWC’s Youtube Site!"

youtube.com/jointwarfarecentre

"The ISAF/IJC pre-deployment training, unlike the NRF training, is neither a certification nor other form of test for the training audience."
Thank you for giving us the time for this interview. In general terms can you explain what the responsibility of an OPR is? What are your objectives and how do you achieve them?

— For ISAF Training Events (TEs), the role of the OPR, or Officer of Primary Responsibility, is to coordinate and plan the overall framework for the exercise, in other words, to set the conditions that enable the training audience (TA) to build the skill sets and solid knowledge required to reach the training objectives of the exercise specifications. Colonel Olivier Barnay, who is in charge of our Subject Matter Expert (SME) Branch describes it quite well when he compares the ISAF TE to a computer: the OPR is responsible for the “hardware” that supports the Training Team’s “software”.

During the ISAF TE 13-01, my objectives were to ensure all the resources were in place and utilized to the best effect possible to enable the successful completion of the exercise. This included ensuring the proof-of-concept trial use of D Block (the Bunker) went well, and achieving the maximum use of the SMEs. I also ensured that all contracting was in place prior to STARTEX and that the ISAF TE would be a showcase of JWC’s capabilities during the NATO Military Committee visit to the Centre.

Can you explain what it means to run a major exercise prior to deployment?

— It was a challenging and rewarding experience to fill the OPR role for ISAF TE 13-01. Although I had been involved in the three previous ISAF TEs, TE 13-01 really hit home how important these training events are to meeting the COM ISAF and COM IJC requirements for switched-on, ready-to-get-down-to-business staffs to maintain the momentum of the ISAF mission. Also, I had greater opportunity to interact with the TA, and to hear first-hand how much value added this training is to personnel deploying. This was even true for those who had previously deployed to Afghanistan. We, the JWC staff, heard some of those deploying to ISAF for a second or third tour, voice the opinion that the TE was a waste of time because they already knew the ISAF mission. By the end of the TE, those same people were the first to acknowledge that much had changed; that the situation on the ground was still evolving and that the TE had been of significant value to them. This, to me, speaks to the importance of ISAF TEs, despite the fact that the ISAF mission has seen more than ten years.

What does a realistic operational-level exercise entail?

— Realistic operational-level training for the ISAF mission involves recreating or mirroring, as much as possible, the operational environment of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. This includes the electronic environment that is specific to ISAF (which can differ considerably from national level systems), Mission Specific Training (usually at the classified level), which the TA cannot receive through Distributed Learning, the key processes specific to the headquarters, and the Functional Area Training. The ISAF TE culminates in Mission Rehearsal Training. As the name implies, we use real world data, real events, challenges and tasks that occurred in the recent past to allow the TA to rehearse for similar tasks, working groups, meetings and briefings, which will be an every day occurrence while deployed in Afghanistan. We recreate that realistic environment so that the leadership, staff of-
Officers and staff admin assistants going into theatre have a clear and full understanding of the dynamics internal to and between the various headquarters in ISAF, which are occurring in a very fluid and rapidly evolving situation. This allows the individual military member to more quickly integrate into their position and contribute to the ISAF mission. This is especially important when you consider that tours of duty in ISAF are shorter (usually six months at the time) than the national tours, where an individual has time to grow into their mission. A second- ary benefit of attending one of JWC’s ISAF TEs, which cannot be overstated, is the opportunity for the TA to build relationships with their future colleagues and counterparts at other HQs. Getting to know your future co-workers during an ISAF TE pays huge dividends when you need to get the right answers to questions you may have while in-theatre.

How has our training evolved?

— ISAF training has evolved continually over the years of JWC conducting this training. It has had to evolve to meet the priorities and adjustments to COM ISAF Campaign Plan, the evolving relationship between HQ ISAF and HQ IJC, and most recently, with the transition to Afghans being in the lead. On a practical level, we have found better ways to consistently deliver training, such as the NCI Agency growing an organic capability to support JWC in the delivery of EWP (Electronic Working Practices); the evolution of the Grey Cell from an IO/NGO-only cell to now include personnel from the Afghan Ministries of Defence and Interior, Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. And of course, there have been changes most recently due to JWC’s partnership with key U.S. training partners to deliver combined, four-tier Unified Endeavor (UE)/ISAF Training Events. This last evolution has dramatically shifted the way we have planned and conducted ISAF training, as we have had to adapt to their different training philosophy.

What are those differences?

— While JWC and NATO train their staffs in processes and procedures, the U.S. trains and evaluates the Commander. Where JWC uses recent real world incidents as the basis for our ISAF exercise scripts, our U.S. partners are future-focused and they create and project their exercise script based on assumptions of what will happen in Afghanistan three months down the road. While JWC has adapted to the U.S. training philosophy, there has been significant give-and-take on the part of our American partners as well. Another benefit to these combined, multi-tier ISAF exercises is that JWC has enhanced its relationship with its sister organization, the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC). Whereas before JWC trained the strategic and operational HQs and JFTC trained the tactical level ISAF Regional Command HQs in relative isolation, these four-tier UE/ISAF TE exercises have had JWC and JFTC training their deploying TAs concurrently under the umbrella of one larger exercise.

ISAF TE 13-01 was the first ISAF training conducted at JWC’s new training facility. What have been the highlights?

— Firstly, it had the largest contingent of Afghan personnel to date within the EX-CON and we were able to integrate them into exercise play to a greater extent than for previous exercises. Secondly, conducting ISAF TE 13-01 at Jättå also allowed JWC to trial run our use of the Bunker for future exercises. Using the Bunker allowed JWC to establish HQs ISAF and IJC as separate HQs, just as they are in-theatre, while facilitating cross HQ working groups without...
the restrictions experienced in Afghanistan. The most significant benefit of using both F Block and the Bunker was our ability to establish two separate CJOCs, which allowed each TA to learn the procedures specific to their functions in Afghanistan, practice the flow of info between the two CJOCs in-theatre and learn how to prepare the deliverable to their respective Commanders. Thirdly, the content/exercise script was as up-to-date as we could make it, and it reflected the current iteration of the COM ISAF Campaign Plan as well as COM IJC’s current priorities. Colonel Barnay ensured this by leading a team into theatre to meet ISAF, IJC, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and Afghan Ministry of Defence/Afghan National Army senior leadership and develop the detailed exercise script with responsible Desk Officers. We focused more heavily than any previous ISAF TE on transition of the mission from an ISAF to Afghan-lead and set that emphasis early by having members of COM ISAF’s Advisory and Action Team deploy to Stavanger to provide special briefs on Transition and counterinsurgency. JWC also built on the success of employing a retired General Officer as COM ISAF during the last two Training Events in Grafenwoehr by bringing that officer back for a third time and by contracting for a (now retired) former Deputy Commander of HQ IJC to role play COM IJC. The experience these two General Officers brought to training greatly benefited both halves of the training audience and also it provided feedback to the Training Team on the strengths and challenges of each sub-component of the TA, which allowed us to adjust the pace of training to the optimal level.

According to you where will JWC stand post-2014 as NATO is preparing for a new NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan?

— Having conducted ISAF pre-deployment training events for a real world mission and NATO Response Force (NRF) certification exercises for a number of years, the JWC is very well positioned for whatever challenges NATO asks it to assume. For the yet to be defined post-ISAF mission, the JWC has the scalability to plan and execute, alone or with our established training partners, whatever size and type of pre-deployment training that is required.

(By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO).
ONE OUT OF EVERY five people assigned to the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) is a Subject Matter Expert (SME). In this era of reductions in manpower and shrinking military budgets, one may ask why such a large portion of Peacetime Establishment at the JWC is devoted to functional experts. The answer lies in the mission of the JWC: as NATO’s sole trainer of joint operational headquarters, JWC delivers operational level collective training, contributes to NATO’s lessons learned process, supports concept and doctrine development and synchronizes ACT’s experimentation into operational level training. If that mission defines the “ends” for JWC, then the SMEs in the Joint Training Division (JTD) provide the “means” to accomplish these “ends”.

The primary role of an SME is to train operational and component command level staffs. Within the JTD, SMEs are organized in four sections: Joint Planning and Execution, Joint Intelligence and Information, Joint Effects, and Joint Enablers and Logistics. Secondly, in addition to being an expert in their respective functions, all SMEs must be knowledgeable on NATO’s Operational Planning Process, as outlined in the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). To be effective, an SME must be able to coach, teach, mentor, and train headquarters, staff teams, and individual staff officers. Thirdly, the SMEs assist with exercise planning, scenario development, and scripting exercise content. Finally, SMEs also identify lessons learned and best practices and support concept integration and doctrine development.

FOR THE NRF EXERCISES, the SMEs are involved in nearly every phase of the exercise, beginning with the Academic Seminar (Phase IB) and concluding with the assessment (Phase IV), which is designed to prepare commanders and their staffs for the challenges of NATO operational missions, how to function as a joint headquarters, and how to ensure that joint processes and integration are fully understood. Before Academics, the SMEs coordinate with the training audience and develop the topics for the week-long Academic Seminar. The content of each lecture is based on NATO doctrine and lessons learned from operations and observations of previous exercises. Each SME delivering a lecture will spend approximately two weeks developing and practicing their presentations. During Academics, the SMEs work with the training audience staff in syndicates with the goal of preparing them for Phase II — namely the Crisis Response Planning.

If SHAPE is participating in the Crisis Response Planning phase of the exercise, a small team of SMEs will travel to SHAPE to observe the strategic planning effort and gain insight into the strategic planners’ thought process. Soon after the strategic planning commences the operational headquarters begins its planning effort along with their subordinate Component Commands. SMEs, organized into Training Teams, are dispatched to each headquarters to observe and assist the headquarters with the planning process. Each Training Team is composed of SMEs, an analyst, and a Senior Mentor, who is a retired flag officer. The training team at the joint headquarters may consist of as many as two dozen SMEs, while a component Training Team normally contains six to eight SMEs.

Once Phase II is complete, the SMEs review the Operations Plans, The Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), and the Supporting Plans from the components. These are used during the development of the exercise content, which occurs...
during the Main Events List/Main Incidents List (MEL/MIL) Scripting Conference. The MEL/MIL is a tool that the Exercise Control Cell uses to control the exercise. It is structured around main events that are designed to ensure the training audience achieves the exercise objectives. Once the MEL/MIL has been developed, it is time to get ready for the execution phase of the exercise (Phase III).

Just before the execution phase, the training audience staff conducts Battle Staff Training (BST). BST is technically Phase ID of the exercise training model. However, experience has shown it is most beneficial to conduct BST closer to the start of Phase III. For an NRF exercise, six to eight months may elapse between Phase IB Academics and Phase III Execution. BST provides the training audience with an opportunity to conduct internal training on staff skills and to orient the staff on processes that will be used during the execution phase of the exercise. Normally, a small team of SMEs are on site to help the training audience practice their battle rhythm using scenario driven vignettes, or refine their plan if required.

During Phase III, the focus of the SME is on helping the training audience staff achieve their training objectives. The SME will provide advice on staff processes and functional expertise as required, but will not in any way evaluate the performance of the staff. However, for the SME the interaction with the training audience is just the tip of the iceberg during Phase III with respect to their dual role as part of the training team architecture and the Exercise Control apparatus. The SMEs are busy behind the scenes exchanging information and reports with the training teams at other components and the joint headquarters. This helps to identify possible problems with information flow and reporting that the training audience may not be aware of. Additionally, the SMEs communicate directly with the MEL/MIL Event Managers, Grey Cell, the media cell, and other elements of the Exercise Control cell to ensure that the exercise runs smoothly.

When Phase III of the exercise has concluded, the SME provides observations for the After Action Review and the final exercise report. They also contribute to the lessons learned database to help identify problem areas and also to spread best practices. SMEs also coordinate closely with the Joint Concept and Integration Division at the JWC to propose amendments, changes, or additions to NATO documents. Finally, the Joint Training Division conducts its own internal After Action Review with a goal of improving delivery of the next exercise. As former JWC Chief of Staff Brigadier General Steven DePalmer said, an SME “is helpful, humble, and continually learning.” The SME’s ultimate goal is to help the training audience staff and headquarters improve throughout the exercise and ensure they reach their training objectives.

"The SME will provide advice on staff processes and functional expertise as required, but will not in any way evaluate the performance of the staff."
For most of the “life” of both the NATO Response Force concept and the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), there has been an intrinsic link between the two entities as a result of decisions and announcements that were made during the Prague Summit of November 2002. Headline events at the Summit included a major restructuring of NATO’s military Command Structure and a declaration that called for the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF); a flexible, technologically advanced and joint or combined, interoperable force. At the heart of NATO’s organizational metamorphosis was the creation of two new commands at the strategic level, one operational and the other conceptual, which together would provide the momentum for change. Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) were formally inaugurated on 19 June and 1 September 2003 respectively. The NRF should provide NATO with a robust and credible high readiness joint force, able to deploy quickly to participate in the full spectrum of Alliance missions, either within or beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. After supporting a number of major events with niche capabilities and providing assistance to disaster relief operations, the NRF was declared to be at full operational capability during the Riga Summit in 2006.

The JWC was also formally established in 2003, as an integral part of the new NATO Military Command Structure and subordinate to Headquarters Allied Command Transformation (HQ SACT), with an emphasis on meeting new levels of am-

Above: STEADFAST JAGUAR 06 LIVEX; JWC NRF training events, 2012 and 2011 clockwise. JWC PAO Copyright.
bition with regard to the provision of joint/combined training for Alliance and Partner forces. The delivery of this training would be done in concert with then subordinate Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) and Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), which together make up the three pillars of training known colloquially as the "Triple J" Centres. Secondary, but equally important roles included joint and combined concept development, experimentation and doctrine. Given the creation of three new Joint Force Command HQs and the embryonic nature of the NRF concept, it was clear that the JWC would be heavily involved from an early stage, in providing the necessary training at the operational level as directed by HQ SACT.

The JWC's first NRF exercise took place just three months after the Centre's activation. In February 2004, over 100 core staff from AFSOUTH, which was designated as NATO's first Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF) headquarters deployed to the Ulsnes Interim Training Facility, a former Norwegian naval base adjacent to the JWC in Stavanger. Simultaneously, the JWC was also in demand to develop and deliver training for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan and NATO's Training Implementation Mission in Iraq and these two commitments took up much of the new Centre's capacity for the remainder of the year.

ALL THAT CHANGED in 2005, with almost all of ACO's major activities concentrated on the certification process of the NATO Response Force with an eye on declaring its Full Operational Capability during the Riga Summit the following year. During 2005, the JWC demonstrated its Initial Operating Capability by conducting major NRF certification exercises and helping to support the lessons learned process, developing new concepts and doctrine and a robust experimentation programme. The JWC staff found themselves delivering two major NRF certification exercises at the Ulsnes training facility and deploying a team to support the major live exercise, NOBLE JAVELIN 05 (NRF 4), which tested NATO's expeditionary capability at high combat readiness.

SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT is one of the major contributions to the NRF exercise design and delivery process and for this early period, the exercise scenario was based on the MADA VERDE setting, which tested NATO's ability to engage and interact with two aggressively poised nations risking a serious regional conflict. As a reflection of NATO's demands and recent experiences, including disaster relief operations, the NRF concept continued to evolve both conceptually and in practice and this regularly tested JWC's ability to design, deliver and direct each NRF exercise in turn.

In 2005, the JWC also started to plan and coordinate the new STEADFAST Series of Exercises which were designed to ensure that NATO's Joint (Force) Commands and their associated components were ready...
"JWC and NRF were born together and have grown together..."

In 2009 the new Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE) concept was tested for the first time, which necessitated an additional JWC commitment to supporting deployed exercise locations and further developments to the CERASIA setting to cater for subtle concept changes. Further adjustments to the design and delivery of NRF exercises took place with the decision to produce a new NATO Command Structure (NCS), announced during the Lisbon Summit of 2010, which saw yet another review of the higher echelons of Command within NATO.

Indeed, 2010 proved to be a momentous year in the JWC/NRF timeline as it also provided the vehicle, in the form of STEADFAST JUNO 10, that ultimately shaped JFC){1} and the new NATO Command Structure (NCS), announced during the Lisbon Summit of 2010, which saw yet another review of the higher echelons of Command within NATO.

Indeed, 2010 proved to be a momentous year in the JWC/NRF timeline as it also provided the vehicle, in the form of STEADFAST JUNO 10, that ultimately shaped JFC

The new NRF exercise schedule for 2008 encompassed three major NRF certification exercises per year, one for each of the Joint (Force) Commands and this was also the year in which a CERASIA scenario was used for the first time. CERASIA, based on a Horn of Africa geographic setting, was a Crisis Response Operation to address regional tensions and a potential humanitarian crisis and was developed as a direct result of the NRF’s real world exposure to disaster relief operations, notably in Pakistan in 2005. The setting also served to explore the Comprehensive Approach to Operations, one of the emerging initiatives that had been derived from NATO’s most recent involvement in worldwide operations from Afghanistan to the Balkans. The JWC continued to host the majority of NRF exercises from the Ulsnes training facility although there were several notable exceptions, designed to exercise the ability of the Joint HQ to deploy “into the field”, as the JWC continued to adapt its training architecture to meet new developments and demands.

Exercise STEADFAST JOIST 12 provided the vehicle to test and evaluate the new NCS concept rather than certify a particular HQ and provided valuable lessons with which to further develop NRF exercises as we entered our second decade of exercise planning and support. It was also the first major exercise, of any kind, to be fully hosted in the JWC’s new state-of-the-art training facility at Jättå. Almost concurrently, NATO’s focus began to shift away from Crisis Response Operations with a desire to provide more exposure to potential Article 4 and 5 operations, or off NATO territory and to lend credence to the Visible Assurance initiative. The decision was therefore taken in 2010 to develop yet another setting, SKOLKAN, based on the geography of Scandinavia and the Baltic Region in order to explore the challenges associated with potential conflict in NATO’s backyard. NATO’s first exposure to the SKOLKAN setting also took place in 2012 and proved to be a resounding success, offering unprecedented levels of breadth and depth to the exercise design and execution. It was further enhanced with the support of a new ACO Command and Control structure, in the shape of the Comprehensive Crisis Operations and Management Centre (COCM), in which the JWC invested considerable resources in order to provide the most realistic setting and scenario possible.

THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT that this first decade in the relationship between the Joint Warfare Centre and the NATO Response Force has been one of change, challenge and discovery. It was perhaps a fortuitous coincidence that the two concepts were born together and have grown together although this has undoubtedly helped to shape the way in which the two mutually assist each other in tackling the often complex issues associated with change. The JWC’s ability to regularly adjust its design, delivery and support to NRF exercises, underpinned with increasingly complex and challenging settings, is an ample demonstration of just how successful this partnership has been over a first decade of change and response.

END NOTES:

(1) A component of the NRF, the DJTF was a smaller, expeditionary, agile and responsive HQ.

(2) MADA VERDE — Based on the Island of Madagascar (moved to the West Coast of Africa) and combined with the Cape Verde Islands.

(3) Maritime, Land and Air.

(4) The focus of the DJSE is to provide an agile, expeditionary Forward Command Element in order to quickly establish the Commander’s presence in theatre, while minimizing the overall “footprint” until the operation further evolves.
JWC Directors/Commanders and Chiefs of Staff, 2003-2013

Director JWC
October 2003-September 2004
Lt Gen. Thorstein Skiaker
Norwegian Army

Director JWC
September 2004-February 2005
Maj Gen. James Short OBE
British Army

Director JWC
February 2005-July 2007
Air Marshal Peter Walker CB
CBE FRAeS
Royal Air Force

Commander JWC
July 2007-June 2011
Lt Gen. Wolfgang Korte
German Army

Commander JWC
June 2011-June 2013
Maj Gen. Jean-Fred Berger
French Army

Commander JWC
June 2013-Present
Maj Gen. Erhard Buehler
German Army

Chief of Staff JWC
August 2004-August 2006
Lt Gen. Stephen Mueller
U.S. Air Force

Chief of Staff JWC
August 2006-August 2008
BG Philip Ruhiman
U.S. Air Force

Chief of Staff JWC
August 2008-August 2010
Maj Gen. Scott West
U.S. Air Force

Chief of Staff JWC
August 2010-July 2012
BG Steven J. DePalmer
U.S. Air Force

Chief of Staff JWC
July 2012-Present
BG John W. Doucette
U.S. Air Force

* Major General Theodore W. “Bill” Lay II and Major General James Short also served as Deputy Director and Chief of Staff respectively in 2003.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss STEADFAST JAZZ 2013 (SFJZ 13). You are the JWC’s OPR for this exercise. Can you explain what the role of an OPR is?

— The role of an OPR (Officer of Primary Responsibility) is predominantly one of facilitating the success of others. It takes a large team with a diverse set of skills and knowledge to design and direct an exercise. I consider myself a generalist, who is good at connecting the dots. With no specific experience in exercise planning before being appointed OPR, I remained humble and engaged as many people as possible to uncover best practices within the exercise design process. Success comes from bringing exercise design specialist, higher headquarters’ staff and training audience planners together, listening to everyone and then, together, deriving a WIN-WIN or best-value solution. For example, the Officer Scheduling the Exercise, or OSE, for SFJZ 13 directed that the exercise BALTIC HOST 2013 (BH 13), which is an annual Reception, Staging, and Onward Movement exercise conducted by the three Baltic Nations, be linked to SFJZ 13. After discussions with all parties, including Joint Force Command Brunssum, it was determined that a fully integrated, and concurrent exercise with SFJZ 13 would produce a unique golden opportunity for all participants. Previously, both exercises used limited and/or contracted Response Cells to play NATO (in the case of BH 13) or Host Nations (in the case of STEADFAST exercises). Now, in the combined SFJZ 13/BH 13 exercise, everyone will play themselves, which adds tremendously to the training value, as full and robust interaction of the staffs is possible. This all leads to my main objective, which is to ensure that the environment is created within the exercise to permit the training audience every opportunity to leverage the SFJZ 13/BH 13 experience to enhance NATO’s collective success.

In your view, what are the attributes of a successful exercise?

— A successful exercise occurs when the various Commanders’ intents are well understood and reflected in the exercise design and execution. Any foundation for success is built upon relationships and communication. In our world of regular postings and job rotations, it becomes a continuous challenge to build and maintain relationships among the exercise planning teams. It is always a matter of moving forward, while...
remaining vigilant of gaps in understanding among the exercise stakeholders. The sharing of ideas and truly listening to one another to develop a common understanding and new insight are some of the most effective ways to implement our given direction and guidance. This point brings me back to one of my earlier comments about connecting the dots. So, one of the most important skills as an OPR is to recognize these gaps, and then bring people together to facilitate solutions. Although the road to STARTEX is bumpy, there is much more goodness than badness.

SFJZ 13 is distributed to 11 different locations and involves four host nations. It also includes a live-exercise component with a collective defence scenario. How does all this affect the areas of planning, coordination and finally execution?

— One of the unique challenges of SFJZ 13 is that it is bringing together Commands and Components who are simultaneously conducting certification exercises. Previously, the focus on the Joint Force Command-level simplified decisions, but with Components and SHAPE now seeking certification, it is incumbent upon all stakeholders to find a good balance among the various Training Objectives. In practical terms, a key enabler of success is to create an exercise script, which has the ability to satisfy these Training Objectives concurrently within a derived scenario. SFJZ 13/BH 13 has been fortunate to have superb scripting and scenario teams to bring harmony to the exercise. Another dimension to SFJZ 13/BH 13’s multi-tiered, multi-exercise structure is the requirement to execute all phases in a sustainable fashion. With a myriad of new NATO Force Structure organisations requiring exercising at a joint level, there is renewed pressure on the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) and the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) to provide an effective exercise experience in an efficient manner. To promote solutions, the JFTC staff have been embedded within the SFJZ 13/BH 13 JWC teams.

In your view, what is transformational about the SKOLKAN setting?

— The aforementioned realism provided within SFJZ 13/BH 13 is further leveraged by its association with the SKOLKAN setting, which took the JWC two years to develop. SKOLKAN is NATO’s new common exercise setting, created in response to a requirement to evolve NATO training in light of new threats and very complex problems, such as the cyber environment as well as redefined missions, lessons learned and expanded capabilities. Based on the SKOLKAN setting, the collective defence nature of these exercises has promoted the use of actual NATO Member Nations instead of generic NATO Nations, which was previously typical for STEADFAST exercises. SKOLKAN is transformational because it presents a robust and realistic full-spectrum adversary that will challenge both NATO’s Command and Control structure as well as the Baltic Nations, through its linkage to BALTIC HOST 13, to uncover gaps in processes and capabilities that can then be addressed through training enhancements, and on a broader scale, through processes like Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative. Also important to note here that SFJZ 13/BH 13 is the most complex NRF exercise the JWC has delivered to date and also undertaken by NATO in seven years. It is designed to facilitate the exercising of a rapid military response to an emerging crisis, whether for the purposes of collective defence or for crisis response operations. The aim is to be prepared, for NRF headquarters and forces, to be ready to deal with any threat in a world full of uncertainties. Therefore, SKOLKAN is a move in the right direction.

(By Inci Kucukaksoy, JWC PAO)
For the Simulation, Modelling and C4(1) (SMC4) Division of the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), the past decade was exciting, challenging and packed with major changes to the NATO Training and Exercise concept. The Division has been engaged in a wide spectrum of new developments, which have generated a high demand for CIS/IM quality in order to provide the best service in support of JWC’s vision.

(1) Command, Control, Communications and Computers.

By Lieutenant Colonel Dieter Heumueller, DEU AF
Head C4 Event Support Section, SMC4

To be a world-class training centre for NATO Nations

SMC4’s Computer and Information Systems and Information Management (CIS/IM) expertise has been largely home grown, arising from various events and concepts throughout the years. The way of providing best practices of CIS/IM support, establishing and rebuilding operational electronic and data-centric environments to fulfill JWC’s level of ambition has always been the driving factor for SMC4. Flexible planning and dynamic operation of complex training and exercise constructs, with fast changing frameworks like NRF certifications as well as ISAF Training Events, have served as the baseline for developing new and innovative ideas to achieve the highest possible training output.

JWC’s capability of having seven state-of-the-art training networks, with associated CIS/IM infrastructure con-
JWC's capability of having seven state-of-the-art training networks, with associated CIS/IM infrastructure constantly available, is unique within NATO.

constantly available, is unique within NATO and enhances the JWC's training and exercise support provision. Integration of Functional Services in EXCON structures, implementation from Simulation and Modelling in NATO (ETEE) Network designs as well as the permanent improvement of information sharing procedures in virtualized technologies are the skeleton in SMC4 CIS/IM planning tool sets and frameworks.

THE HIGH TEMPO of running four Major Joint Operation type trainings and exercises (two ISAF and two NRF) a year requires permanent cross coordination and detailed planning with all the stakeholders at all levels. It also means that parallel planning for events has become the routine way of doing business. The focus of SMC4's CIS/IM planning has always been and will always be to get the proper user requirements, understanding the training concepts and overcoming existing resource limitations. The translation of operational exercise plans and simulation models into realistic and sustainable technical solutions is a unique skill, which SMC4's Event Support Branch has spent years building.

SMC4's CIS/IM planning capability provides JWC's EXCON Training Teams (wherever they may be deployed) with the best possible CIS/IM service support, many times in a demanding distributed exercise environment. These exercise environments often span different network classifications and information domains, presenting further challenges that SMC4's CIS/IM planning teams routinely must overcome. Multiple cross domain functionalities combined with exercise layouts in various classification levels as well as the proper integration of NATO's entire system portfolio is basic knowledge for the Event Support Branch.

CIS/IM in exercises

"The less people know about how laws and sausages are being made, the better they will sleep at night" — Otto von Bismarck, First Chancellor of Germany (1871 – 1890)

"The less people know about how CIS actually works, the better they will sleep at night" — An SMC4 proverb

CIS/IM in exercises is a little bit like plumbing. Most people enjoy the benefits of plumbing, but very few see or understand how it is being built or the effort involved in installing it. Just as most people expect water to come out of a tap when they turn one on or expect to be able to switch between hot and cold water, the same people also expect to be able to log into their computers and find everything in good order. To get to this state though is a huge undertaking by a large number of people across many different organizations.

The difference between CIS and IM may be lost to most people. It is perhaps best explained through the example of e-mails. CIS makes sure that your e-mails are able to end up where you want them to go while, IM makes sure that you have an e-mail account under your name and that you can access it when you log in.

One of the main challenges faced by CIS/IM, as well as by the plumber, is that of user ignorance and fuzzy requirements. Users generally do not care if the plumbing is done using plastic, copper or gold-plated tubes — they just want the water to flow at the right temperature or that the faucets are in the right color. Similarly, users have little appreciation of the design challenges and compromises being made to ensure that the water drains smoothly even when all the faucets are turned on at the same time.

Designing CIS and IM for an exercise is a bit like planning to install plumbing in a skyscraper. The difference is that for exercises the architect tends to change the building layout after you have started building or would like to cram a shower, WC and bathtub into an area which is the size of a broom cupboard! Also, when people move into the building, they will sometimes move appliances around and connect them to random water pipes they find.

Another main challenge for CIS and IM when preparing an exercise is always to understand what the user actually wants. The difficulty usually arises from either the users not really knowing themselves or not being able to express what they want in a way that can be understood and converted to a plan and design. The primary conduit between users and the CIS community is the IM. One of the main tasks of the IM is to translate user requirements into technical requirements for the CIS community. Conversely, the IM also needs to be able to ex-
plain to the users what the possibilities are with regards to CIS. Once the IM and the CIS community know what the users want, they can set about designing and planning the implementation that will provide the users what they want. Within this design and planning there will be multiple challenges that must be overcome and compromises likely be needed.

As a result of the above, the Exercise Support Branch in the SMC4 Division at the JWC, has always made it a priority to engage and stay engaged with the people we plan services for. A good dialogue is imperative for proper information collection and without good information we cannot develop a good plan for service delivery. Also, the more information we have the better we are able to come up with good estimates in areas where the user requirements are a bit fuzzy. The combination of Computer and Information Systems and Exercise Information Management has been a proven success story for the JWC.

CIS/IM future challenges and an estimation of what will be the main focus of SMC4 Event Planning Teams in the upcoming years: NATO's way ahead includes an approach for Federated Mission Networking (FMN) as the pillar for federated mission operations, paving the way for a new training and exercise paradigm at the JWC, and especially at the SMC4. Information-centric concepts as well as standardized and interoperable NATO and national technologies and platforms are deemed to drive this federated vision forward. The interaction of people, processes and technology to exchange information and/or services among federated mission participants includes, but not limited to, the use of a set of interconnected computer networks for the conduct of coalition operations, trainings and exercises. This given NATO guideline has to be incorporated and integrated in SMC4 Event Support Planning routines and, therefore, JWC will have a continued significant role to fulfil for NATO's level of ambition for the next 10 years.

Capability Development and Integration Branch (CD&I)

**TASKED WITH** ensuring that the JWC Communication and Information System (CIS) infrastructure is prepared to support training events as well as our own core staff, the SMC4’s CD&I Branch plays a critical enabling role at JWC. In addition to handling the here and now demands, the Branch is also preoccupied with the continuous development of futuristic solutions to ensure that the JWC remains at the leading edge of effective CIS provision. These activities are handled by one of our three sections:

**Service Level Management**, which:
— leads the SLA discussions and plans and executes the CIS budget ensuring we are always delivering licenses, procurements and services within the legal framework.

**Plans and Integration**, which:
— handles changes that are out of routine or that require more cross-divisional staffing.

— provides the link into the JWC senior user community, which determines the validation and priority of improvement of the CIS platform.
— is responsible for the programming of external updates, installations and surveys.

**Policy and Future Capabilities**, which:
— ensures that our CIS policies and SOPs are up to date, relevant and abided by. The group has to keep up with technology trends to ensure that they are able to deliver flexible, scalable and, ultimately, functional services to ourselves and, more importantly, to our customers.

JWC POSSESSES THE MOST ADVANCED DATA CENTRE IN NATO and lies years ahead of the ongoing plans for more general proliferation. This is due in no small part to the activities undertaken by the CD&I Branch.
JWC's mission to provide highly complex and challenging training events demands state-of-the-art simulation systems. The richly detailed operational planning environments devised by JWC staff contain thousands of discrete entities, installations and systems located in a fictitious, yet convincing geopolitical region. One of the roles of the Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX) Support Branch at JWC is to breathe life and dynamism into this arena during the execution phase of our major training events. Taking the orders and plans developed by the training audience as they work their way through their real world battle rhythm, CAX specialists from the Branch work closely with their military counterparts to interpret these orders and convert them into appropriate inputs for the simulation systems that are used to support the training objectives of the event. The simulations continually calculate the position and status of all of the thousands of entities that represent (virtually) the aircraft, ships and land forces under the control of the NATO headquarters involved in the exercise event as well as the Opposing Forces that are employed to test and challenge their plans. The computer-based models, configured and operated by the CAX Branch also calculate the outcomes of all military interactions and engagements that may arise, determining sensor detections, weapon performance, and where appropriate, losses incurred. JWC exercises are usually controlled and directed by a series of scripted events designed to target specific training objectives. The simulation is synchronized to ensure that the exercise script is supported by the situation portrayed to the training audience in terms of unit locations and status. All of this activity is relayed back to the training audience via their own native Command and Control (C2) systems, thus maintaining, as closely as possible the representation of reality that is crucial in providing a credible and robust synthetic battlespace. We like to say in CAX Support that if we do our job properly no one will know we were there. One of the key challenges we face is ensuring that our simulation systems, and the databases that support them, align correctly with the C2 systems present in the event and stimulate them completely seamlessly.

One of the most exciting aspects about working within CAX Support is the continually evolving nature of the architecture needed to support emerging requirements from the training audiences and the NATO Command Structure. One example of this area is the emergence of Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence planning as a key requirement for exercises. CAX Support Branch and Joint Training Division (JTD) took note of this requirement early in its emergence and identified a need to modify our simulation systems to represent ballistic missile intercepts as well as a need to modify our systems and processes to allow the correct representation of all of the involved weapon systems and sensors within the training audience’s C2 environment. Working closely with Subject Matter Experts from a range of NATO bodies as well as with the simulation providers we were able to plan, develop and deliver a new simulation capability within a short time frame.

It is rewarding to work in a lean agile organisation, which is constantly challenged to provide the best support possible in terms of NATO readiness and transformation. CAX Support Branch is well positioned to support JWC as it steps into the next decade of training delivery and innovation. +

By Phil Draper
CAX Team Leader, JWC

CAX Support Branch

From Left (clockwise): A CAX team (2008); Mr. Ivan Vianello during SFJZ 13 MEL/MIL Scripting; Mr. Phil Draper, the author; and Prof. Erdal Çayırcı, Head of CAX Support Branch. Pictures JWC PAO.
NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency) is the service provider to JWC for all NATO Communications and Information systems. Formerly known as the NATO CIS Services Agency (NCSA), it has delivered fielded communications, as well as static, at Jättå, Ulsnes, Soma and to several remote locations around the world. From the early start back in 2003, we have had one aim in our delivery: make this event a success!

When JWC was established in 2003, NCSA had the static infrastructure at Jättå in place from the Joint Headquarters North era. The challenges faced immediately were to quickly establish a CIS capability at the interim training facility located at Ulsnes, approximately 10 km from the Jättå Bunker. This was achieved over a few months with provision of some funding approved by central NATO budgets. In addition, with only a few CIS engineers and technicians available (some of which were only operators, who crosswalked from the former NATO CROSSFOX radio communications system) creativity, cross-training and improvisation became the key enablers for the first successful event at Ulsnes. With the experience from the KFOR-5 deployment to Kosovo in 2001, where the majority of these personnel were deployed, we all managed to deliver a CIS platform both in Ulsnes and to the first remote exercise, ALLIED ACTION 2005, in Spain. NCSA itself was also a relatively new organisation, and the new Squadron Stavanger stood up in 2006-2007 with a more robust Peacetime Establishment of 78 posts, where approximately 50-60 per cent of the available positions were filled over the forthcoming years, but sadly never achieved its full manning. The Squadron slowly gained momentum in processes and planning routines, elements of which had been quite ad hoc for the first five years mostly due to personnel shortages.

The pioneering period changed to a consolidation period, where plans for the all-new, state-of-the-art JWC Data Centre project gained momentum. Parallel planning and engineering of this project together with day-to-day static/exercise support was challenging for the Squadron, where priority had to lay with the current exercise deliverables. In 2010, the main building infrastructure was completed, the plan became reality and the new CIS facility was installed primarily with contracting of local ICT companies. These newly installed services were tested and commissioned, with both JWC and NClA permanent staff populating the purpose-built F Block in early 2011. With a very tight schedule, the Training/Exercise floors were “soak-tested” prior to hosting the first event in mid-2012.

The new infrastructure has been a huge success. There have been some minor challenges as always with the introduction of new technology, but the overall result has been positive and encouraging. With new technology comes new training, and many NClA personnel have been challenged with achieving new competencies and skillsets. But, that is not the end of the story. NCI Agency continues to modify and improve the IT architecture in Jättå. Squadron Stavanger and the JWC continue to provide the leading-edge ICT services across NATO, continually looking for service improvement. Together we look forward to the next 10 years of service provision.
Training to prevent civilian casualties

AT 14:07 ON 8 JUNE, THE ISAF JOINT COMMAND COMBINED JOINT OPERATIONS CENTRE RECEIVED NOTIFICATION VIA JOC WATCH THAT THERE HAD BEEN A CIVILIAN CASUALTY ALLEGATION IN REGIONAL COMMAND SOUTH. THERE WAS A SLIGHT DELAY IN REPORTING, WHICH HAD THE POTENTIAL TO SLOW THE PROCESS OF INVESTIGATING AND MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF THE ALLEGATION.

Fortunately, this Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) incident was not real, but a part of the Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) portion of ISAF Training Event 13/01. Since the first ISAF MRE conducted by the JWC in 2004, the Centre has developed content to train staff members deploying to HQ ISAF (and, since 2009, to HQ IJC) how to handle CIVCAS incidents. As Michael Oren, Israeli Ambassador to the United States, stated, “even the most moral army can make mistakes”. Operations such as ISAF and Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) highlighted the need to train headquarters in how to handle and mitigate the effects of CIVCAS incidents, whether actual or false allegations. This article is intended to describe the need to train in CIVCAS prevention and mitigation and how the JWC is implementing CIVCAS incidents into operational level exercises.

The Joint Civilian Casualty Study by Sewall and Lewis developed the following model of CIVCAS prevention and mitigation:

1. Prepare: Doctrine, professional military education, pre-deployment training and equipping, Mission Rehearsal Exercises, in-theatre training and adaptation.

2. Plan: Mission planning, rehearsals, intelligence and information, and shaping the environment.

3. Employ: Actions on contact, escalation and de-escalation of force, tactical patience, application of Rules of Engagement and tactical directives.

4. Assess: Holding the ground, battle handover, Battle Damage Assessments, data collection.

5. Respond: Medical response, Key Leader Engagement, media engagement, solatia payments, other information activities.

6. Learn: Reporting, data management, data analysis, After Action Reviews, investigations, capturing and disseminating lessons learned (these being both operational and institutional).

Steps to implement the first three steps in the model gradually had a positive effect on reducing casualties in ISAF by mid-2009. However, the processes of assessing, responding, and learning from CIVCAS incidents took long to mature. According to the United States Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA):

“Forces developed ways to mitigate the effects of CIVCAS over time, but these...
approaches took many years to develop and have not been institutionalized. For example, in Afghanistan, ISAF forces became more effective in reducing negative second-order effects of CIVCAS over time, developing best practices that included CIVCAS Battle Damage Assessments, Key Leader Engagements to explain and apologize for incidents, the provision of condolence payments, and a streamlined communications approach. Unfortunately, this effectiveness took many years to develop, after CIVCAS had exerted a significant negative impact on the overall campaign. (JCOA, 8)

Sharing procedures, lessons, and best practices has also been problematic as “existing lessons from Iraq regarding escalation of force (EOF) did not appear to migrate to Afghanistan, and lessons from Afghanistan regarding air-to-ground operations did not reach NATO participants in Libya during Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR.” (JCOA, 3).

Therefore, JWC has increased efforts to introduce CIVCAS incidents to non-ISAF exercises, including the upcoming STEADFAST JAZZ 13. Responding to tragic, but relatively simple incidents, such as road traffic accidents, which were a feature of JWC’s previous CERASIA scenario exercises, does not realistically prepare a headquarters for potential operations. Training audiences must be able to respond to a variety of CIVCAS situations, including true and false allegations, incidents resulting from offensive and defensive actions (including escalation of force), and incidents caused by friendly and opposing forces.

IN THE SKOLKAN scenario, CIVCAS incidents could take place in NATO host nations or other countries, with dramatically different political considerations in each case. The training audience must be able to assess the situation, including Battle Damage Assessment (which can be provided by JWC simulation systems), and determine how to respond to the incident, including how to mitigate the effects on victims, families, and in the information domain (in other words, the training audience must be first with the truth in confirming or denying CIVCAS incidents). Finally, the training audience must be able to learn from the incidents and, if necessary, adjust manning (for example, ISAF and IJC added cells to track and mitigate CIVCAS incidents), procedures, and reporting. The JWC has studied how to integrate CIVCAS incidents more realistically into exercises for operational level headquarters. JWC Scenario Section developed a point paper in 2012, which will be published in the near future. Until then, interested parties may contact the paper’s author directly at: iain.dell@jwc.nato.int

AMONG THE FINDINGS of the paper, instances of civilian to military casualties in a SKOLKAN-like scenario could realistically be estimated at 3:1. Many of the recommendations from the point paper are undergoing implementation in the development of exercise STEADFAST JAZZ 2013 and other upcoming exercises. While the topic of CIVCAS incidents is unpleasant, every responsible commander will want his headquarters to be prepared for such eventualities. Training in a variety of CIVCAS situations is essential, as identified by JCOA after analyzing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq: “(...) training and education that addressed overarching principles and specific risk factors for CIVCAS enabled the force to adapt its approach to better reduce and mitigate CIVCAS (JCOA, 8).”

Training audiences involved in upcoming JWC exercises should prepare and plan for a wide variety of challenging CIVCAS incidents. +

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Media Simulation for Today’s Operational Environment

By Laura Loflin DuBois
Media Producer and Trainer, Media Simulation Section, JWC

Leveraging the media

WINNING in today’s operational battle space requires a paradigm shift in the military mindset. Media planning is not a stand-alone issue, but one that affects every other principle of war upon which a commander must rely. In warfare, particularly counterinsurgency operations, it is essential to evaluate the media implications of operational decision-making. Disciplined planning for possible contingencies must include media engagement, or the planning process is not complete.

In today’s environment, NATO has to leverage the media early to ensure the story it wants told is already in the public’s consciousness — before the enemy releases his version of the story. If NATO is consistently perceived to be reacting to news reports, it will appear to be losing the media battle, and along with it, its credibility, legitimacy and relevance. This is also a key element of NATO’s counterinsurgency strategy, which requires proactively acknowledging mistakes and making them public before the adversary has the opportunity to spin the story to his advantage.

Media simulation and training

With this in mind, the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) committed considerable resources to developing its own organic media simulation and training capability. Envisioned in 2003, the capability was realized in 2006 when the JWC stood up its Media Simulation Section within the Joint Exercise Division.

The primary mission of the Section is to create and simulate the media environment for JWC exercises and mission rehearsals. Since 2006, the team has supported all JWC NATO Response Force (NRF) exercises and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) training events and has recently taken the lead for media simulation support for NATO’s Crisis Management Exercises (CMX) at NATO HQ. Working closely with the content and scenario teams, the media team’s goal is to simulate realistic environments that allow commanders and their staffs to train on media as a weapon system, one that is both strategic and asymmetric.

Social media evolution

Just as the media environment has evolved in the last decade, so have the capabilities of the Media Simulation Section. Originally focused on traditional media, including television news and print media products, the team adapted its capabilities to match the evolving environment and embraced the game-changing prominence of new media. By creating tools including its media aggregation website, “NewsWeb” and its social media simulations “FacePage” (FaceBook simulation), and “Chatter” (Twitter simulation), the JWC media team has been able to effectively simulate holistic media and information environments. “From our perspective, it is not possible to create a realistic media environment without also simulating social media. Chatter and FacePage are great tools that allow the training audiences to hone their social media skills, and they also give us a realistic medium to push strategic information to the training audiences for consumption and dissemination as necessary,” said Pete DuBois, JWC Media Producer.

Social media implications

Social media can empower individuals to achieve strategic military and political effects, without bureaucratic oversight, to a nearly unlimited audience. This means the information power monopoly formerly enjoyed by the military no longer exists, as evidenced during the ISAF operation in Afghanistan when Richard Holbrooke asked “How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s leading communications society?”
Insurgents have figured out how to leverage strategic outcomes with minimal technological infrastructure. By employing a videographer along with an improvised explosive device, they have transformed a military tactical weapon into a strategic information weapon. They understand it is not necessarily the action, but the effect that is so debilitating, and they are maximizing that effect with the use of media.

**Advance warning system**

Social media also serves as a strategic source of information for NATO. "Social media serves as an early warning indicator of major events that may surface in traditional outlets later in the day," says Dr. Juergen Focke, ISAF Public Affairs Officer. "A recent example of this would be the Taliban’s release of their most recent Eid message. The Taliban often pushes information out to both media and the general public by using Twitter and ‘justpaste.it’ in addition to their website. By monitoring the social media space we were able to read Mullah Omar’s message at the same time that journalists were and we were then prepared for the tone of the media response and also better positioned to answer questions about the statement from media."

Understanding the social media dynamic in theatre was essential for developing a realistic media environment for the recent UNIFIED ENDEAVOR 14-1/ISAF Training Event 13-2 conducted in Grafenwoehr, Germany. Based on theatre input, Chatter was launched as an open application, with users providing the noise inherent in social media, but with strategic accounts used to push scenario injects to the training audience as necessary. Ultimately, Chatter proved an effective and realistic tool that created the desired effects while at the same time replicating Twitter's advance warning capabilities.

**Future of media simulation**

The JWC Media Simulation Section was recently hailed as "NATO’s Centre of Excellence for Media Training" by SACT, General Jean-Paul Paloméros. Providing NATO’s only full-time professional media training capability across the Alliance, the Media Simulation Section is always looking for innovative ways to keep the section current and relevant.

As the environment evolves, and information becomes more powerful than bombs and bullets, it will be even more critical to simulate realistic media environments for NATO’s operational and strategic level training. Whether through World News Today reports, web-based print media articles, social media simulations or on-camera media training, the JWBM Media Simulation Section will continue to ensure NATO's warfighters are better prepared to take the fight onto the information battlefield.
THE PURPOSE OF SHAPING THE RIGHT CULTURE

By David Nauta
JWC Legal Advisor

“CULTURE eats STRATEGY for breakfast”
Peter Drucker, Management Consultant

A

N ORGANISATION’s culture is displayed through the people’s behaviour. In an organisation where a healthy cultural environment exists, people are able to take initiatives, cooperate with each other, create opportunities as well as being aligned with the mission. The signs of an unhealthy cultural environment are a tendency to blame each other, making up excuses if people fail to achieve results or the lack of initiative, thinking it is safer to wait and just do what they are told. The mission and objectives of such an organisation may be reached, but with a lot more effort and resources than what is normally spent. So, if the assumptions made by Brigadier General John W. Doucette, the JWC Chief of Staff, during last year’s introductory speech: “I believe you all come to work every day because you want to achieve something, not because you want to try to fail,” are true, what are the potential threats that could create an unhealthy culture at JWC, and are we running the risk of developing such a culture? The answer to this question is “that depends…”

Culture arises and evolves from the beliefs and values of the members of an organisation, particularly from its leadership. Over time it becomes the organisation’s DNA, which cannot be changed simply by giving an order or drawing up a Standard Operating Procedure. If the culture corresponds to the organisation and its strategy, there is no need for change however few would argue that NATO is the same organisation with the same strategy that it had 60 years ago. From being an organisation with a static collective self-defence and a focus on defending Europe against a potential massive invasion by the Soviet Union, it evolved into a global security institution deploying on Non-Article 5 crisis response missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Horn of Africa. It is hard to imagine the consequences of retaining the same organisational culture that the Alliance had in the Cold War era. If this was the case, nobody would take the initiative to cooperate with former adversaries, nor would anyone share ideas on how to form high readiness forces that are able to deploy out-of-area. If the culture does not change in line with the organisation and its strategy, it will resemble a dragging anchor through the water. When a culture is aligned with the organisation and its strategy, you will witness amazing results. These results are achieved if people, in addition to doing what they are assigned to do, also believe in their job and are able to draw the parallels between what they are doing and the organisation’s strategy as a whole. Motivation and commitment will automatically follow. This is why some organisations are more successful than others.

An example which illustrates exactly this is the famous Apple brand. Why is this company more successful and innovative than any other company in the same line of industry? All technology companies have access to the same talents, consultants, media and resources. Still people line up days in advance to purchase the new iPhone. Simon Sinek (author of the book “Start With Why”) questions how the Wright brothers managed to come up with the first controlled, powered and sustained heavier-than-air human flight, where a better-equipped, better-funded and better-educated team could not. The answer is that the Apple employees and the Wright brothers believed in what they invented. While anyone can make products, few actually stop and wonder why they make them. For Apple it is not enough to just make a computer that looks nice, that is easy to understand and that is in line with the fashion trends; they continue to develop them because they enjoy to challenge the status quo and to think in a different direction. Their product just happened to be computers. The Apple company has an organisational culture, which fits into this strategy, the result of which is success.
It is the "why" which is the driving force behind behaviours and, ultimately, decisions. JWC is NATO's training focal point for full spectrum joint operational warfare. In order to apply this to yourself, or make it your aim, you need to translate this aim into something that is meaningful to you and that resonates with your core values and beliefs.

The training that JWC provides will enable the Joint Headquarters to cooperate and function at their best in, for example, Afghanistan. The training provided is necessary in order to avoid casualties. Your work contributes to more secure living conditions for the Afghan population. Or maybe there are other reasons why you work for NATO? Understanding the reason drives behaviour which in turn forms the culture.

The changes in the politico-strategic environment that JWC has witnessed makes this the perfect time to "diagnose" the organisation and rethink its culture. JWC’s new Commander has recently arrived and there is approximately 30 per cent new staff. The cultural change process started in the beginning of this year, with the survey that Senn Delaney sent out, and which you gave an excellent feedback. The survey presented us with the opportunity to look at our current culture with a critical eye. The results have been subject to discussion among the leadership, who are currently committed to redefine our organisational culture for the future. Moreover, the JWC personnel will be given the opportunity to attend organisational culture workshops, which will give people an understanding of their behaviour pattern and their motivating factors. The workshops are intended as a step in the process of creating a better and more efficient environment at the JWC, which reflects the changes in the organisational culture in NATO as a whole.

Left: The JWC appointed a network of volunteers, called as the "Change Agents", representing each Division, to firmly establish the organizational building blocks that will carry the Centre to the future.

What’s next? In the near future we hope that everybody will have participated in a workshop, so that we are all equally informed of what characterises our new culture. The leadership is committed to not make this an all-out effort, since a change of culture is not something that happens overnight. Many of the workshops will go more into detail about some of the aspects which were brought up in the feedback and workshops. This initiative will present everyone with an opportunity of self introspection and awareness of how they use this in their daily work. I hope you will enjoy the unique endeavour we are currently on and I am certain that both you, as a staff member, and JWC will benefit from this experience.
Activities AND EVENTS

Please join us on Facebook (Facebook/JWC) and visit our website (www.jwc.nato.int) to read previous issues of The Three Swords magazine (left). And for our fantastic video content, please visit our YouTube page (YouTube/JWC).
HE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, signed in 1949, unite NATO Member States in their efforts to safeguard their freedom, common heritage and civilization, through collective defence and the preservation of peace and security in accordance with the UN Charter. The cornerstone of the Treaty is Article 5, which codifies the motto of the Three Musketeers: one for all and all for one. The Article pledges that an armed attack against a Member State is considered an attack against them all and consequently in the exercise of collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter, the other Members will provide assistance to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

The details of the role and mission of NATO in the security environment are laid down in Strategic Concepts. NATO formulated seven Strategic Concepts in response to perceived changes in either the external security environment or within the Alliance itself. The Strategic Concepts issued during the period of the Cold War concerned primarily the re-strengthening of European military capacity and collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the UN Charter, the other Members will provide assistance to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

The fall of the Berlin Wall necessitated a complete revision of the tasks of the Alliance. Although the Warsaw Pact was still in place by 1991, NATO needed to focus on the politically and economically unstable ex-Soviet regions. The 1991 Strategic Concept foresaw four tasks; that of Security, Consultation, Deterrence and Defence, and "Europe's Strategic Balance". By 1999, NATO dropped the task to preserve Europe's strategic balance in favour of "crisis management" and "partnership." By that time, NATO was heavily involved in Peace Support Operations mandated by the UN and the Strategic Concept needed to reflect that — less explicitly formulated in the North Atlantic Treaty — task. The term "Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation (NA5CRO)" indicated the great flexibility of the Alliance in adapting to a new political environment.

EMERGING THREATS, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber warfare and, especially, the terrorist attacks against the U.S. in 2001, against Spain in 2004 and London in 2005, re-emphasized the importance of NATO's cornerstone of collective defence enshrined in Article 5. In fact, the latest Strategic Concept of 2010 puts collective defence on the top of its list of three tasks, above crisis management and cooperative security. In its more than 60 years of existence, however, the Alliance had led over two-dozen Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations and invoked Article 5 only once, which gives NATO not much experience to rely on to lead collective defence operations. The expertise gained during the Cold War era serve little purpose in the current security environment. Thus, a need was identified to exercise collective defence operations.

Last year Exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 12 took place using a brand-new scenario, created by the JWC; SKOLKAN, portraying an impending attack by a hostile state against a NATO Member, which allows the training audience to exercise a collective self-defence operation. This article will analyse two of these challenges, which have been subject of much debate by the training audience, as well as by the training team of the JWC. The challenges considered the legal basis of the right of self-defence and the application of force during Article 5 operations.

By David Nauta
JWC Legal Advisor

"NATO is gaining more experience in collective defence operations through training."
Legal basis of the right of self-defence

The UN Charter says that all members shall refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations. However, there are exceptions: one is the use of force in the context of the UN collective security system, another is the use of force within the exercise of the right of self-defence and a third often quoted exception is the use of force by consent of the warring parties. Use of force in the context of the UN security system requires a decision of the UN Security Council to authorize the use of force to restore international peace and security. The UN Security Council can request nations or international organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, the African Union (AU) or the European Union (EU), to take necessary action in that respect.

USE OF FORCE in the context of the right of self-defence does not require a decision from the UN Security Council. Instead, the UN Charter determines that the right of self-defence is "inherent" in nature. The text of the relevant Article 51 of the UN Charter reads: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations [...]". The UN Charter permits the defensive action to be taken collectively, either on an ad hoc basis or through pre-existing commitments. An example of a pre-existing commitment is Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

ARTICLE 51 SPECIFICALLY requires that an armed attack has taken place, prior to the exercise of the right of self-defence. Many states maintain that there is also a right of self-defence when an armed attack is underway. This view is primarily based on the Caroline case in which a form of anticipatory self-defence is derived from. The case stems from 1837, when the British colonial government had attacked a steamboat, named Caroline, which shipped men and supplies to rebellious settlers in Upper Canada. The British government argued that the necessity of self-defence was instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation. The general consensus is that States may anticipate an attack and act in self-defence if there is a potential danger that an attack is actually mounted. Where confusion starts to arise is whether a right of "pre-emptive" self-defence, i.e., the right to quell any possibility of future attack by another state, even where there is no reason to believe that an attack is planned and where no prior attack has occurred. Article 51 neither defines what constitutes an "armed" attack. There has been much debate on whether the use of a hijacked civil aircraft as a lethal weapon is an armed attack as it is not a military asset. Divergent views existed on whether an armed attack by non-state actors — i.e., terrorists — would fall under the remit of Article 51. These debates have been more or less settled now, but there are still on-going discussions on other contentious topics on self-defence, such as the right of self-defence in case of a cyber-attack.

THE DIFFERENT VIEWS on when a right of self-defence actually exists may put the cohesion of the Alliance to the test when it is requested to take collective action under the mechanism of Article 5. In order to initiate a collective self-defence operation, the Members of the North Atlantic Council have to reach consensus on the interpretation of the right of self-defence. In response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 against the United States, the NAC acted with solidarity and unity when it declared the following day that these attacks were considered an armed attack and regarded as an action covered by Article 5.

STEADFAST JUNCTURE 12 highlighted this aspect as well. The training audience from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Joint Force Command Naples (JFC Naples) cooperated with — among other liaison officers — members of the Estonian Ministry of Defence. Deliberations were held on what would be considered an “armed attack” and when, in Estonia’s opinion, the right of self-defence would exist. Moreover, and if Estonia were to request the assistance of NATO to act in collective self-defence, the members of the NAC would reach consensus and determine whether there is a right of collective self-defence within the meaning of Article 51, as claimed by the requesting state.

These deliberations also raised interesting questions regarding the process on how Article 5 is invoked. Article 5 does not appear to refer to an automated response by the Member States, once an armed attack occurs. In order for a NATO-led collective defence operation to be initiated, the state so attacked needs to request assistance from NATO. Subsequently, the NAC needs to reach consensus on the decision to initiate a NATO-led collective defence operation.

In the case of the terrorist attacks against the U.S. in 2001, the U.S. stated that it would exercise its rights under Article 51 of the UN Charter, but did not request assistance from the NAC to lead operations in Afghanistan. Instead, the U.S. requested a far more limited role for NATO to play, mainly in the field of intelligence sharing, overflight clearances, the use of facilities and certain capabilities and access to ports and airfields. NATO did launch two operations, namely Operation UNIFIED ENDEAVOUR and EAGLE ASSIST, but neither of them in direct support of self-defence action undertaken by the U.S. against the Taliban.

In another instance, Turkey did not exercise its right of self-defence, nor requested (other than consultations under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty) collective NATO supported action against Syria when the latter state shot down one of its fighter planes and, subsequently, illuminated a Search and Rescue unit, which tried to localize the downed pilot.

WHILE THE NAC may decide which collective defence measure to take, there is no obligation for the Members to contribute assets or participate at all in the NATO-led mission. Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty imposes no such obligation for the members. The text of Article 5 refers to assistance to the Party so attacked, but does not specify in which shape or form this assistance needs to be rendered.

**Application of force in self-defence operations**

The exercise of self-defence is subject to necessity, proportionality and immediacy. **Necessity** reflects the existence of an ongoing attack or the clear and manifest threat of an imminent threat of an armed attack or further attack. It also relates to the absence of feasible alternative courses of action. **Proportionality** refers to the measured response to the attack, not exceeding what is required for this purpose. **Immediacy** relates to the timeframe in which the attack occurs. Measures taken in self-defence must be taken within a reasonable period and aimed at terminating the attack rather than being essentially punitive in nature.\(^{(1)}\)

These conditions are reflected in the rules of engagement for NATO-led forces. In Peace Support Operations (or Non-Article 5 Operations) a UN Security Council Resolution authorizes the use of force in a state. For instance, in Kosovo, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) operation was authorized to deter renewed hostilities, maintaining and enforcing a ceasefire and ensuring the withdrawal of forces as well as establishing a secure environment.\(^{(2)}\) This means that KFOR could use lethal force, arrest and detain persons in Kosovo, but also jam certain frequencies, gather intelligence or — more mundane — ignore traffic regulations. Simply put, the UN Security Council mandate set aside the application of the Kosovar domestic legal system.

Clearly, states acting (collectively) in self-defence are considered not to be bound to the domestic regulations of the aggressor state. After all, a state cannot be held responsible for violating domestic legislation of the state against whom war is waged. However, if self-defence action is taken within the state that is attacked — i.e. in case of an invasion — the question arises if the domestic legislation of the host state is still applicable and binding to NATO-led forces.

This is particularly relevant in case where no situation of collective self-defence is yet declared, but merely in which armed forces are pre-positioned to deter a potential threat. Certain actions, such as the gathering of intelligence on the host nation’s population, detention of individuals or the use of deadly force may be prohibited by Estonian laws and requires the consent of Estonia. Moreover, actions that are primarily in the domain of the host nation’s law enforcement, such as crowd and riot control measures, cannot be assumed to be taken over by NATO-led forces without the requesting state’s consent.

Although seemingly mundane, given the nature of operations and necessity to counter an armed attack, these issues may need to be resolved prior to the deployment of NATO-led forces in collective self-defence operations. The attacked state is a sovereign nation, and even though it may have requested NATO’s assistance, its legislation applies to NATO forces in its territory. The Operational Plan for the collective self-defence mission, the Rules of Engagement as well as the Status of Deployed Forces\(^{(3)}\) requires the host nation’s consent. That consent may be implied from the NAC’s decision — of which the attacked State is a member — to initiate a collective defence operation, it is nevertheless necessary to formalize this consent through e.g. an exchange of letters between the NATO mission and the host nation.

**Final observations**

NATO is gaining more experience in collective defence operations through training. The Alliance has gained a lot of experience in so-called Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. The doctrine on Peace Support Operations, describing in detail how the operation will function and which methods have proven most successful, may not be fully applicable to operations conducted under Article 5.\(^{(4)}\) Pride may come before the fall if NATO would fare too much on the confidence gained from leading Peace Support Operations.

NATO collective defence operations differ vastly from Peace Support Operations. The absence of a UN mandate authorizing NATO and setting restrictions for the mission means that the Alliance has to determine itself whether it considers taking collective self-defence actions legitimately and what — in close concert with the requesting State — sets the limitations on the use of force. Operating within a state where there is a complete breakdown of governmental functions — a frequent situation where NATO-led Peace Support Operations have been conducted — differs a lot from deploying forces in a fully functioning NATO Member State. In the latter situation, the government is likely to remain in control over many security aspects in its territory and will require close coordination with respect to any actions undertaken by the Alliance. +
A DECADE OF CONFLICT

By Chuck Ridgway
JALLC Editor

A JALLC Perspective

NATO — Equal to every emergency

“But some women only require an emergency to make them fit for one.”
— Thomas Hardy, Far from the Madding Crowd, 1874

SO DESCRIBED THE MASTER 19th century novelist his pastoral heroine, Bathsheba Everdene, after the quiet, reserved farm girl displays unexpected resilience and resourcefulness in extinguishing a fire in her barn. Much the same can be said of NATO, an organization designed to counter a specific threat to its Member Nations’ security, and which spent its first 40 odd years quietly developing the policies, doctrine, structures and standardization mechanisms needed to defend its Members from that one threat. When the Cold War ended, many questioned if NATO could adapt and have any useful purpose in this changing world, and many still do. And yet, NATO has since then, and most especially in this past decade of conflict, displayed a great deal of resilience and resourcefulness in addressing the wide variety of new, unanticipated challenges that have threatened its Members’ security. It has created new policies, doctrine, structures, and standardization mechanisms, developed formal processes and redesigned its standing structures to address each new crisis, all under a series of Strategic Concepts agreed by consensus of the Allies.

Above: ISAF was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001, after the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Twin Towers Memorial © JWC PAO, Riga Summit, 2006. An ISAF patrol, 2009. Pictures by NATO.
Still though, NATO is often perceived as the static, conventional organization it was in 1990. With each new crisis, as NATO scrambles to react, critics both from within and without point out how NATO was not ready, did not have the right tools in place, and certainly will not be able to handle the next crisis too. Their criticisms miss the point. While NATO is indeed far more comfortable in its day-to-day steady state, as surely most large organizations are, when NATO has faced an emergency it has proven to be equal to it, even if the response has not been as elegant or efficient as some seem to expect. This is the lesson to be drawn from this past decade of conflict. NATO may have struggled to address many of today’s challenges — five of the six themes we present in this report relate directly to areas where the Alliance has not yet gotten its head around an issue — but when faced with major evolutionary changes and unexpected impulses, NATO labours, and delivers when it counts.

Learning from our decade of change

NATO has probably faced greater change in the last decade than in the first five decades of its existence. Not only have the pace and breadth of NATO operations increased sharply in the aftermath of 9/11 — including the necessity for NATO to become expeditionary on assuming command of ISAF in August 2003 — but also the number of Allies in the Alliance has increased by nearly 50 per cent.

The NATO Response Force (NRF) has been created; military command structures made leaner; military capabilities developed and improved; and new capabilities acquired for defence against terrorism, cyber attack, and weapons of mass destruction. Not to be forgotten, of course, was the creation, in part to allow NATO to better address change, of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) from the old Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT). All of this change has happened in an environment of falling defence budgets in real terms — defence spending by the European Allies has decreased by 7 per cent in the period 2003-2011. NATO really has been asked to do more with less.

JALLC opened its doors in September 2002. Some might view the timing of the JALLC’s inauguration as particularly poor since the outcome of the Prague Summit in November 2002 was the trigger for much of the change in NATO outlined above. Originally, JALLC operated under the policy and guidance of, and was tasked by, the two major NATO Commanders, SACEUR and SACLANT. With the creation of ACT in 2003, JALLC, being seen as an entity to support NATO transformation, was positioned within ACT, originally as a subordinate command to the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), but the Peacetime Establishment review of 2006 resulted in JALLC reporting directly to HQ SACT.

In 2012, JALLC CELEBRATED its own 10th anniversary. Over the last 10+ years, the JALLC has published over 130 analysis reports and has received over 1,500 submissions to the NATO Lessons Learned Database. Indeed, the many challenges that have arisen in the past decade have provided extremely fertile ground for analysis studies and resulting lessons, although it is difficult to distinguish between cause and effect in assessing how many of those lessons have actually been learned.

Commander JALLC decided that a review of the knowledge contained in JALLC analysis reports and the NATO lessons learned database was called for, in particular after the U.S. Joint Staff J7 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) initiated its own study of the enduring lessons from the past decade of operations. Consequently, we embarked on an internal JALLC project to provide a review and summary of a “Decade of Conflict” from a JALLC perspective that would present a record of the more enduring findings, recommendations, and lessons from our decade of analysis. The final publication and release of the JALLC Decade of Conflict report coincides with ACT’s tenth anniversary in 2013.

At the outset, this project appeared to be a relatively easy task, but, in reality, it proved to be challenging; finding a “volunteer” to read over 130 reports was certainly an issue. But Greek Army Lieutenant Colonel Vasileios Tsamis, a JALLC military analyst, stepped up to the plate and proved to be more than equal to the challenge. Two months of concerted work produced an outstanding summary of important findings and recommendations from JALLC reports. In addition, where it was relatively easy to do so, the Lieutenant Colonel investigated and documented what action had been taken on the recommendations made in the reports since they had been published. Once this detailed review of published JALLC reports had been completed, the team faced the thought: “interesting historical information, but so what?” Consequently, we began looking for common causes and trends that would allow us to group individual lessons together into broader themes.

IT IS IN DEALING with challenges that the opportunity for organizational learning arises. Our review of JALLC analyses revealed indeed that most of the lessons identified over the past decade could be seen to fall under six general themes that represent the most pressing and overarching issues facing the NATO Alliance. For only one of these themes, the Ongoing Development of NATO’s Crisis Management System, did we find that NATO had gotten its head around the challenge to the point where it can be said that NATO has adapted. For the other five, the challenges have proven so tricky and difficult to deal with that NATO’s efforts so far represent just a small step down the path of true adaption.

THE SIX THEMES

1. The Ongoing Development of NATO’s Approach to Crisis Management

Over the last decade, and as a result of the drastic changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, NATO has become involved in managing and responding to a number of crises, each one placing unique demands on the Alliance in terms of complexity, rapidity of response, and resources required. In this area, NATO can be said to have successfully adapted. It has created formal mechanisms — the NATO Crisis Response System and the supporting process for operations planning — which allow for rapid political decision-making among the Allies and rapid translation of those decisions into sensible military plans that Allies can then support with assets and resources. With the advent of the Comprehensive Approach, these formal mechanisms
now recognize that any NATO response to a crisis must take place in cooperation with other entities. Crisis Management will remain a significant challenge to NATO until it puts in place robust, practical ways of ensuring a coherent and concurrent political, military and civil response to crises, including ways to guide its dealings with the international community. All the same, NATO has made significant and worthy strides that have clearly made it more fit to deal with emergencies.

2. The Requirement for Flexible and Adaptable Command and Control

In parallel to maturing its crisis response processes, NATO has expended considerable effort creating Command and Control (C2) structures and concepts able to be used to respond to crises. However, each successive standing structure and concept for employing it has seemed increasingly rigid and pre-defined, whereas NATO’s operational experience suggests that the opposite is required. For every real world operation it has conducted, NATO has had to create an equally varied number of unique C2 structures, requiring a great deal of flexibility. This ad hoc approach for real operations has largely been successful, if not smooth or efficient. But NATO has not incorporated this lesson — that the C2 structure for Crisis Response Operations will be bespoke, fluid, and large — into the concepts for NATO’s standing peacetime C2 structures.

Many factors have driven NATO’s standing C2 structures to be more rigid and pre-defined, including political considerations and the way NATO trains and certifies HQs. Nonetheless, a stark dichotomy has arisen between the way NATO intends to command a new operation with a one-size-fits-all approach, and how it actually does so, where it cobbles a C2 structure together from bits and bobs and prays it works. It would appear that NATO has not yet figured how to create standing C2 concepts and structures — in the form of the NATO Command Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure (NFS) — that can easily and seamlessly be transitioned from a peacetime footing to running a modern crisis response operation. NATO seems to require an emergency to design C2 fit for one.

3. The Need for Interoperability

The goal for NATO forces is that they be interoperable and sustainable over the full range of Alliance missions. But actually achieving this has proven increasingly challenging, as forces now need to be interoperable with a larger number of Allies and operational partners and, especially for land forces, at ever lower echelons. The implementation of technical and procedural standards using the NATO standardization process is lagging behind the political, operational, and technological realities. Opportunities for improving interoperability between forces, such as participation in the NATO standing naval forces or frequent live exercises, are no longer being used as they were in the past, resulting in fewer units that have experience working to NATO, vice national, standards. Finally, NATO-developed technical solutions designed to foster interoperability have often resulted in software tools that are, ironically, simply unusable. A major goal of NATO Forces 2020 and the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) is to ensure NATO has interoperable forces but, until the underlying challenges are resolved, NATO will continue to struggle to keep up.

4. The Complexity of NATO

NATO has always been, and remains, a complex organization, made more so by its enlargement, the demands of modern Crisis Response Operations, frequent restructuring and reorganization, and the need to cooperate and share information with a broad array of partners within a Comprehensive Approach. Internally, NATO is made up of an almost impenetrable maze of structures, polices, and doctrine, with numerous committees deciding everything from defence planning to standardization, dozens of bodies, and literally thousands of documents describing how NATO does business. There are over 70 documents describing NATO security policy alone! The result is that NATO is not just hard for outsiders to understand, but also that the vast majority of NATO staff, especially military officers serving a typical three year tour in a NATO body or as little as six months in operations, sometimes have difficulties understanding some of the mechanisms and processes for how the Alliance works. A contributory cause of the many observations and lessons of the last decade is a lack of familiarity, understanding, or indeed, maybe a disregard for NATO policies, procedures, and structures. Because of the nature of the Alliance, there appears to be little NATO can do to reduce its complexity, so any improvement in this area must come through improving understanding and awareness on the part of staff and those who do business with NATO.

5. The Increasing Importance of the Information Sphere

In the last ten years ubiquitous Internet access and powerful mobile computing devices have radically changed the way people use and share information. Over these same ten years JALLC has documented lessons that suggest that this information explosion has proven a significant challenge for NATO. NATO has struggled to align its strategic communication to simultaneously meet operational and organizational needs, blurring the lines between audiences it wishes to influence and those it wishes to inform. It has struggled to fill key information-related posts and to keep up with technological developments in the information management and sharing domains, and has perennial problems sharing information within NATO and beyond.

If NATO is to learn to live with the explosion in importance of information, then it needs to find ways to be more agile in how it introduces new technologies and adapts policy to incorporate new information paradigms. Most importantly, it needs to ensure its staff are well trained and technically savvy enough to keep up with, or exceed, the information capabilities of our adversaries.

6. The Commitment to Contribute to Alliance Ambitions

NATO, in its activities and ambitions, is no more than the manifestation of the will of its Member Nations, expressed through the consultation and decision-making process, which for the first time in history has allowed 28 sovereign Nations with common values to work together for their common security. But making these ambitions a reality depends on Nations’ will to commit their resources to the Alliance. JALLC has seen many instances over the last decade where Nations have not followed through in practical terms on pro-
grammes to which they had agreed at political level. There are many examples, some as simple as failing to send fully qualified staff to NATO Peacetime Establishment posts or meeting agreed commitments to provide forces to operations. The results have often been wasted time and money, especially in instances where NATO has failed to recognize that Nations are no longer interested in a programme or a concept is not viable. There are many reasons as well: NATO sometimes fails to adequately explain the importance of certain programmes; Nations experience difficulty translating political decisions made in Brussels into practical action by national service commands; and, of course Nations' quite rightly place their own interest first when making decisions about expenditure of their resources. There appears to be little NATO can do about this beyond moderating its expectations on the degree to which political promises will be delivered and better explaining its needs to Nations. Finally, leaders within NATO need to be better at recognizing when Nations are not interested in supporting a particular programme or concept, and when this is the case, refocus resources on issues that do have Nations' attention.

Concluding remarks

Ultimately, NATO's "decade of conflict" has simultaneously been a decade of change and JALLC has been in the privileged position of having a front-row seat observing NATO's responses to that change. In many ways, NATO's agility to respond has been nothing short of remarkable for such a large organization. It is seductive to think that all the ills of the Alliance could be cured if only the six themes were dealt with. But unfortunately it is not that simple. The six themes, in their turn, are a result of the nature of the Alliance and the manner in which it, like all organizations, has adapted to changes in its operating environment. Consequently, they can never be completely addressed without fundamental changes to the nature of the Alliance and the cultural norms and societal and fiscal restraints of the Allies.

The unresolved issues that make up each of the six themes may be characterized as wicked problems. By definition, wicked problems have no straight forward solutions. Consequently, NATO must continue to live with the issues discussed in the six themes and minimize the impact of their effects by adapting and seeking compromise when necessary. The Alliance must design for success by keeping in mind the six themes in its major endeavours and by addressing the inherent issues by involving stakeholders, applying intellectual rigour to understand their effect on the situation, and creating the conditions to allow discourse and engender creativity. And all of this needs to be supported by high quality staff work and effective leadership engagement. Perhaps the best example presented in this report of how such a process can result in a successful solution to a complex problem is the NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS).

Something that we can be certain of in an uncertain future is that change will persist, and the rate of change may increase. After 2014, the change for NATO is that we expect to shift our emphasis from operational engagement to operational preparedness. The concept behind the Connected Forces Initiative is that it will help to maintain NATO's readiness and combat effectiveness through expanded education and training, increased exercises and the better use of technology, with the aim of ensuring the ability of forces to be able to communicate and work with each other.

NATO's experience from the previous decade of change — as articulated in JALLC analysis reports and lessons identified — must not be lost and, going forward, must be used to inform all NATO's endeavours for the future of the Alliance and its Member Nations.
Strategic Communication, or StratCom, was established within NATO to help support and foster the Alliance’s information strategy. In accordance with NATO StratCom Policy (29 September 2009), Strategic Communication is defined as being “the coordinate and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities — Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (InfoOps) and Psychological Operations (PsyOps) as appropriate — in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims.” StratCom is, perhaps more than anything, about having a “mindset” about horizontal and vertical coordination between the different NATO communication disciplines and their respective activities. Integrating a StratCom component to a strategic plan early on in the decision-making process helps manage the information effects of the actions that are taken to support the strategy and the supporting military campaign. As well, integrating the StratCom mindset into NATO’s training and exercises both within and outside of NATO helps contribute to achieving StratCom’s overall mission: Ensure that the potential information effects of every action, including the exercise itself, are considered and that they inform the strategic, political and military decision-making in the pursuance of the desired objectives.

Numerous obstacles may limit this integration process. For instance, the relatively new-to-NATO StratCom function, its position and the difficulty of dedicating an adequate number of personnel and resources to the issue are among the main challenges to be addressed. “In order for NATO StratCom to succeed, policies will need to be more clearly defined in terms of responsibility throughout the various levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) and across the information disciplines,” said U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Frank T. Inchargiola Allied Command Transformation (ACT) StratCom Capability Development Staff Officer.

In order to increase the internal understanding of the StratCom mindset and process, a series of training and exercise workshops have been held over the last few months. The guiding StratCom vision is “to put information strategy at the heart of all levels of policy, planning and implementation, and then, as a fully integrated part of the overall effort, ensure development of practical, effective strategies that make real contributions to success” — as is written in Allied Command Operations (ACO) Strategic Directive 95-2. A StratCom Strategic Training Plan (STP) is currently being developed to ensure that training activities for disciplines that contribute to a StratCom effort are coordinated and that they meet NATO’s overall StratCom requirements. In other words, the plan aims to promote a Comprehensive Approach to training for information activities within NATO in order to foster better cooperation and increased effectiveness.

Part of the solutions envisaged to meet the demand for StratCom training and, as such, a facet of the StratCom STP, is the development of a Strategic Communication Training and Assessments Team (STAT), drawing Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from organisations throughout NATO. The role of the team will be to support training events and exercises organised by the Alliance by providing StratCom expertise and assessment capability.

To develop a bi-SC common understanding of both the StratCom STP and the STAT concept was one of the core objectives of a StratCom Workshop that was held at the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway from 13 to 15 August 2013. Throughout presentations, discussions and
work sessions, the event also served to assess the current involvement of StratCom in collective training and exercise support. The workshop was attended by staff officer level representatives from HQ SACT StratCom and Capability Development, SHAPE, JWC and the International Staff (IS) as well as International Military Staff (IMS) from NATO Headquarters. Here, the expected roles and responsibilities between the organisations involved in developing the STP were clarified and a first draft of the STAT concept was agreed upon. Some refinements remain to be made to the concept, but the original idea was approved in principle.

Another tangible outcome of the workshop was the creation of an initial STAT matrix of qualifications’ criteria for the selection of the StratCom STAT members; this to ensure that proper StratCom experts with the “right skillset” and knowledge contribute to the teaching and assessment of the StratCom mindset at relevant training events. Numerous recommendations emerged from the workshop. One of the most important ideas raised was to focus efforts on developing a doctrine that clarifies StratCom’s roles and responsibilities across and between the different levels of the organisation — strategic, operational and tactical — as well as to better define the relationships between the various information disciplines. “Based on my experience, through exercises conducted here at the JWC, I would suggest that NATO is still struggling with how to implement the StratCom process, so the STAT initiative represents a huge step forward. The exercise environment is the perfect opportunity to help the Joint Force Commanders and single service components to better understand StratCom and how to more effectively implement it at the operational level,” said U.S. Navy Commander Daniel Gage, Chief Public Affairs Officer at the JWC.

THE WORKSHOP WAS SUCCESSFUL in increasing understanding amongst staff as to how StratCom can be better integrated in NATO training events and exercises. It also contributed in preparing the ground for future work required in the StratCom field. After all, it is in best overall interests for NATO military commanders to select courses of action that are in full consideration of the potential effects that can emerge within the information domain. Integrating StratCom aspects into NATO exercises is a complex process. Numerous difficulties have already been addressed, yet, several challenges still lie ahead.

Events such as the recent StratCom Workshop help foster cooperation amongst the various communications’ practitioners disseminated across the two Strategic Commands because they contribute in changing how the organisation views and approaches StratCom. Once they have fully developed, both the StratCom STAT and STP will play a significant role in solidifying StratCom’s integration into the Alliance’s exercises and ultimately in NATO’s decision-making process. This will enhance NATO’s capacity to deliver its information strategy and ultimately its ability to achieve its mission and goals. +

Exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 12: Translating Strategic Communication

By Gp Capt Patrick K O’Donnell, OBE MDA MSc Chart MCIPD RAF
JFC Naples StratCom Advisor

DO YOU KNOW THAT FEELING when you have been asked to define the meaning of a word that you know extremely well, yet have to resort to a dictionary in order to provide a precise definition? Working in a multinational organisation it happens routinely; working as the StratCom Advisor in NATO’s Joint Force Command Headquarters in Naples (JFC Naples), it happens to me frequently. You may be surprised to learn, though, that the term I am most regularly pressed to describe is “StratCom” itself — and I struggle. It seems that although most people — and certainly senior commanders — have an intuitive understanding of what StratCom is, or ought to be, the absence of a unifying definition within NATO and throughout its Member Nations has served to obfuscate the role and to stifle the implementation of operating principles and processes that are shared by all headquarters.

Perhaps at the Political and Strategic levels the distinction between StratCom and Public Affairs is less apparent, a factor that may have led George Little, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, to banish the term StratCom from the Pentagon. However, at the operational and tactical levels, where ideas have to be transformed into practical military activity, there is a greater array of methods and channels for communicating (including the use of force), which require coordination, synchronisation, coralling, harnessing and energising to achieve maximum effect. From a practical perspective, StratCom is not so much a thing that is done; rather it is the outcome to be achieved. It also speaks to the identification of longer term or overall aims and interests and the means of achieving them. Naturally, all tac-
tical and operational-level activities are ultimately pursuant of Political/Strategic objectives; however, with modern media able to reach global audiences instantaneously, the strategic consequences of getting it wrong tend to resonate longest and loudest.

The NATO Response Force (NRF) certification exercise STEADFAST JUNCTURE 12, conducted in Estonia during the first weeks of November 2012, provided not only for the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) to rehearse JFC Naples in its role as a deployable, operational level planning and mission execution headquarters, it also offered a valuable opportunity for participants and staff functions to examine their contribution and seek to improve personal performance and organisational effectiveness. To that end, this paper offers a personal reflection on this exercise to contribute to the discussion about how higher-level StratCom guidance can be distilled into practical activity at the operational level, which both informs the Commander’s decision-making and is of practical use to subordinate headquarters.

The STEADFAST JUNCTURE scenario presents COM BEFOR with a strategic dichotomy. He is directed to coerce Bothnia through the use of military force and at the same time act in a manner that de-escalates the crisis. Coercion through deterrence necessitates a robust interaction with the adversary’s perceptions to deliver an unequivocal expression of capability, credibility and will; de-escalation requires projecting “conciliation” to find a solution to the dispute through arbitration and negotiation. The phrase “interaction with the adversary’s perception” is informative. It gives rise to two fundamental premises: 1) Coercive operations (like most others) are an exercise in communication; 2) It is not what we do or say that is important but how adversaries interpret what we are doing and saying.

Acceptance of the first premise begins to allow for a practical definition of what StratCom means. Evidently, StratCom cannot be simply a synonym for “communications”; communications through Public Affairs, Information Operations (InfoOps), Engagement, etc., though necessary components of a definition, are clearly not sufficient. To be complete, one must incorporate all actions undertaken (or not undertaken) by the forces under command. It is probably for this reason, those aspects of the BEFOR Operational Design that allowed too much clean air between physical and cognitive effects, proved the most difficult to resolve when measuring achievement of Decisive Conditions. Indeed, singling out specific messaging activities — which are after all a means or at best a way — on an Operational Design is overly constraining.

Force posture and operational imperatives will likely dictate how particular effects will be achieved; sometimes it will be through the use of physical force, on other occasions PsyOps (for example) might provide the most expedient solution, and on yet other occasions, a combination of physical and cognitive activity will be most effective. It therefore seems counterproductive to treat communications activities as being somehow disembodied from other elements of the Operational Design. Furthermore, citing StratCom as an independent listing on an operational synchronisation matrix appears nonsensical, given that such a matrix is intrinsically an articulation of strategic communication.

The second premise speaks to an adversary’s perceptions. Central therefore is the requirement for a thorough understanding of language, culture, history, religion and other socioeconomic factors in order that we are able to reasonably predict how our activity will likely influence the behaviour of selected audiences. In addition, in order to avoid inadvertently escalating the crisis, such analysis should also be used to accurately interpret what the adversary is saying and doing. As an example, during the exercise, having completed training manoeuvres, Bothnia left a Ballistic Missile Battalion deployed along its southern border. This action could be interpreted as an increase in aggression and so trigger a change in posture by NATO; equally, it could be interpreted as a response to NATO’s deployment (in effect the most profound StratCom activity conducted by NATO at that time) in order to reassure its own people. Certainly, we should always guard against the influence of bias and preconception when interpreting adversarial actions (seeing what we expect to see rather than what is actually there). Perhaps, InfoOps would be better viewed as “perception operations”; although, as will be clearly understood by now, our opponent’s perceptions will be influenced whenever he is exposed to our actions and words. This last point is essential, for we should not lose sight of our central purpose, which is to positively influence behaviour. It is critical, therefore, for us to seek to understand the perception-behaviour nexus. By so doing, we will be able to determine what stimuli (physical and psychological) should be applied in order to elicit a desired behavioural response.

STEADFAST JUNCTURE 12 revealed how achingly difficult this can be, especially in a scenario in which our forces are not operating within the enemy’s borders and so measurement of effect is not easily achieved. The difficulty associated with measuring effect during the exercise was compounded when the behavioural modification sought was too broad or too ambitious; for example, seeking that an entire population “believe”, “understand” or “value” something.

STEADFAST JUNCTURE 12: The SKOLKAN scenario, developed by the JWC, provides myriad, overlapping challenges for Commanders and staff alike. For this exercise, it was used to present a situation in which a NATO Member (Estonia) had become increasingly vulnerable to the aggressive overtures of a neighbour (Bothnia), which threatened Estonia’s sovereignty. Picture JFC Naples PAO
Not only is it highly unlikely that such deep-routed attitudes could be changed without BEFOR committing to an operation that would last several generations, but such attitudes cannot be measured, only inferred through observable behaviour.

Given that it is generally behaviour that we are interested in, we must be disciplined when defining exactly what behaviour we are seeking to elicit, in which specified individuals/groups and, where possible, over what timeframe. COM BEFOR found that, despite behaviour modification often requiring the sustained application of stimuli, there was no a satisfactory method of monitoring influence activities or their success, to assist him in prioritising effort and allocating resources.

But what of the Commander’s challenge to balance coercion with de-escalation? Part of the difficulty is that as the tactical level is approached, the ability to posture force elements to send a coercive message increases as the ability to engage in diplomatic activity to find a peaceful resolution decreases; the inverse is true as one nears the strategic/political level. Finding the right balance therefore necessitates not only the considered orchestration of activity under COM BEFOR’s command but a careful synchronisation of effort between the tiers of command, such that sufficient diplomatic effort could be brought to bear to counterbalance changes in force posture on the ground.

This, of course, sounds far simpler than it is. If COM BEFOR were overly strong-armed, he risked being perceived as the aggressor and inviting pre-emptive strikes from the enemy; if he were overly timid, the enemy’s behaviour would be unlikely to change and the mission could ossify whilst public support gradually eroded. Both routes lead to a failure to achieve the operational objectives and strategic end-state. Equally, the Commander needed to keep his antennae tuned to what was happening on the various diplomatic channels to ensure that tactical operations did not inadvertently undermine political initiatives.

During the exercise, COM BEFOR achieved this through establishing a high-level engagement matrix, which was managed on his behalf by a bespoke engagement cell. This enabled him to maintain his appreciation of salient national, regional and international political events and to synchronise engagement at his level. Steadyng his footing on the strategic tightrope, whilst commanding the myriad other military operational activities under his control, is a complex, delicate business, requiring a full understanding of the communication geschalt. The role of the StratCom Advisor is to work principally with the Political Advisor and the Legal Advisor to provide specialist advice to the Commander and the wider staff. When arranging a high-level meeting for the Commander or planning a tactical engagement by our manoeuvre forces, the approach must be to de-conflict with, and lend support to, political endeavour. In this way, we will harness all energy and focus it to deliver maximum impact at the right time.

THE STRATCOM ADVISOR’s principal role is providing specialist counsel to the Commander; much of his time and that of his very small team is taken up with maintaining situational awareness, research and analysis. Notwithstanding, perhaps the most enduring and intransigent misconception is that the StratCom Advisor has a Command and Control relationship over the Public Affairs Office, InfoOps, the Engagement Cell or any of the other soft communications instruments. This is a fallacy. One might just as well suggest a Command and Control relationship with infantry battalions or artillery, which are also channels of communication. However, the StratCom Advisor can influence the establishment of information parameters by analysing the higher-level communications guidance provided in the NATO HQ StratCom Framework and the Operational Design to produce practical communications guidance appropriate to the operational level.

During the exercise, this was articulated via a BEFOR Narrative, which was produced in concert with the Component Commands and SHAPE to ensure that it was properly “nested.” Once drawn up, it was reviewed and agreed by the Commander at the Strategic Information Board and made available to the whole headquarters. The process was repeated with each change in posture, and would have also occurred should there had been a significant change in the operation execution or mission. The components, in turn, were encouraged to develop similar narratives appropriate to their operational level and needs. However, as not all headquarters adopt the same approach to StratCom — in function nor organisation — interaction and expectation between tiers was not always matched. Given that the passage of information and decisions must sometimes occur at lightening speed, especially in the Public Affairs domain, there is potential for frustration and error unless greater clarity is brought to this.

Despite NATO StratCom Policy (PO 2009-0141) and a supplementary ACO Directive 95-2, the absence of a universal understanding and shared approach to the conduct of StratCom is its greatest weakness, both for commanders and practitioners. This is evident within individual headquarters and certainly between them. Properly researching, analysing and interpreting adversarial perceptions is a key activity that requires appropriate investment and resourcing; this is linked to emplacing the means to monitor and evaluate adversarial media. We must work harder to develop Operational Designs that incorporate integral cognitive effects rather than treating them as additional activity. Where particular behaviours are sought, they should be specific, achievable, measurable and, where possible, time bound; affecting behavioural change should be associated with the application of specified external stimuli.

In order to provide the Commander visibility of influence activity attainment such that he can prioritise effort and allocate resources, a means should be developed to expose the energy being exerted by the various information tools against the nominated audiences and their success. It may seem self-evident, soft communications, or “messaging” cannot compensate for flawed acts of commission or omission without undermining NATO’s credibility.

To the largest extent, STEADFAST JUNCTURE 12 was an enormous success; a fact recognised by the JWC post-exercise report, by JFC Naples being conferred with NRF Certification and by the candid approach by all participants to expose those areas where improvement can be made. When asked how British Cycling came to dominate the sport, Sir Dave Brailsford, the performance director, speaks of the “aggregation of marginal gains” or the sum of minor improvements across every facet of technical and individual performance. Whether our individual role be humble or lofty, if we adopt the same attitude and find improvements in even the smallest or seemingly insignificant areas of our work, each of us can improve the overall operational effectiveness of our headquarters.
Royal Norwegian Air Force Sergeant Christer Tjessem, JWC’s Security Assistant, was named the Centre’s Outstanding Military Member of the Year (MMOY) 2012. During this year’s ceremony on 21 June, French Army Major General Jean-Fred Berger, then the Commander of JWC, recognized Sergeant Tjessem’s vital role in the setting up and daily implementation of security on the military premises as well as his support in the preparation and execution of training events and exercises. Major General Berger then praised Sergeant Tjessem’s wealth of knowledge on NATO and Norwegian security regulations and directives, the experience and superior qualities of leadership he has consistently displayed in the performance of his duties and in his conduct, as well as his commitment to excellence and ability to think outside the box when facing challenges. He then presented Sergeant Christer Tjessem with a coin and a plaque of appreciation.

JWC Outstanding Military Member of the Year Representatives:

2004: Petty Officer Ole Johan Haheim
2005: Sergeant Tomasz Krolikowski
2006: Petty Officer Amanda Tremble
2007: Staff Sergeant Mark Ledesma
2008: Sergeant Lars Lervik
2009: Master Sergeant Viljar Hallik
2010: Chief Petty Officer Gary Braddock
2011: Technical Sergeant Eric P. Krubsack

END NOTES:


10th ANNIVERSARY

JWC MMOY (2004-2012)

On 5 October, a team of two from the JWC, Mr. Andy Brown (SMC4) and Lieutenant Lasse Lokken Matberg (JWC Sports Officer) participated in the most recent TOUGH MUDDER event in the North West of England, which is a hard-core, 21 kilometers (12 mile) obstacle course designed by the Special Forces to test the participant’s strength, stamina, mental grit, and camaraderie. Along with mud, fire, electrocution (YES! electrified obstacles) and sheer exhaustion, the JWC team raised over NOK 5,300 for the U.K. charity “WALKING WITH THE WOUNDED”, which is dedicated to the retraining and re-skilling of wounded servicemen and women to assist them in finding new careers outside the military. (Picture Robert Brown).
2003-2013
in·stan·ta·ne·ous

PAOs who shot the JWC
SMSgt Juergen Eise, DEU AF
MSgt Raphael Baekler, DEU AF
Inci Kucukaksoy
Lt Col Markus Beck, DEU A
Maj Arne K. Olsen, NOR A
CELEBRATING our 10th anniversary also allows us a bit of time to reflect upon the welcoming nature of our Norwegian hosts as well as the myriad of activities, events and opportunities that abound in the region of ourselves and our families. As recently as 2008, the city and municipality of Stavanger was chosen as the European Capital of Culture. There are numerous annual events, such as Gladmat, Blink, and even more local festivals, including Sirdalsdagane, Jaerdagen, Julebyen Egersund and the Finnoy tomato festival coupled with numerous live music concerts and events for all tastes. The recently opened Stavanger Concert Hall has a wide spectrum of music concerts, and the Rogaland Theatre offers an extensive range of theatre productions. Museums abound, from the Norwegian Petroleum Museum to the Jaermuseet, which is made up of altogether 13 units and the 10 different museums of the Stavanger Museums Association (MUST). A visit to the Museum of Archaeology, the Iron Age Farm, or the prehistoric re-constructed village of Landa, will be of interest to all family members.

For those who enjoy sports and outdoors recreation and activities, again, the possibilities are almost endless. Sailing, fishing, kayaking and canoeing can be done almost anywhere within a short drive, the sand beaches of Orre are fantastic on a warm summer day and hiking can be done on almost all types of terrain and challenge levels. For Nordic and downhill ski enthusiasts, Sirdal is a short drive away, or you could decide to take the ski-boat to Sauda. One may even try dog-sledding! Professional sports teams in handball, ice hockey and football provide other choices, especially to enjoy the atmosphere at such live events.

Our children can broaden their horizons by meeting and making friends in the local community, at schools, or on local sports clubs. If they are interested in swimming, horse riding, football, gymnastics, dance or scouts, it may be found in each municipality and area. The multinational environment of both the JWC and the city of Stavanger is truly enriching. With hundreds of expatriate families living in the area, it truly is a cultural melting pot where one can enjoy Turkish cuisine, salsa dancing or Lebanese music. While living and working in a foreign country is both exciting and challenging, information and networks provide advice, tips and assistance. The Stavanger Chamber of Commerce’s International Network of Norway (INN) and the volunteer-run expatriate organization People Who Connect (PWC) are two such networks, which welcome us and our families, providing useable and pertinent information and allowing us to meet others who share our interests and are very willing to pass along their experiences, knowledge and suggestions. So, while the Stavanger municipality has activities, attractions and opportunities for almost all tastes and interests, one must become engaged. With the friendliness and openness of our hosts, this is relatively easy. It is not difficult to enroll your children in sports or recreation activities or yourself in a service club such as the Red Cross or Lions Club. All of these organizations are well used to questions and inquiries from expatriates and are generally very eager to welcome us. Taking the time to learn some Norwegian and to practice it with our hosts always goes a long way and, most importantly, there is nothing to be either nervous or anxious about.

Norway is an extremely family and activity-oriented society. Get to know what is happening, explore differing areas, try new foods and become acquainted with good clothing! By immersing ourselves in local activities and attempting new things, our short stay in this fantastic area will be rewarding and enrich our and our families’ lives with memories that will last a lifetime.
Joint Warfare Centre provides NATO's training focal point for full spectrum joint operational level warfare.