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By Colonel Jean-Michel Millet, French Army, Head Transformation Delivery Division, Joint Warfare Centre

To successfully prevail in wars and conflicts, it is imperative to understand the historical context and evolution of the operational environment. Additionally, new threats observed in recent conflicts (such as hybrid and cyber), as well as the re-emergence of peer-to-peer adversaries, cause our security environment to steadily grow more complex and require focused warfare development thinking.

Although warfare development has no officially agreed definition, a NATO working definition might include: "warfare development represents the synthesis of operational-level analysis, lessons identified through observation and coaching of exercises, doctrinal and technological developments, and capability integration and experimentation in all domains to ensure the Alliance remains relevant in current and future operational environments."
 
If warfare development is increasingly necessary, it is also difficult and fraught with risk. The cumulative effects of globalization, near instantaneous information flow, the acceleration of technological development, and the merging relationship between man and machine combine to create a new and permanently changing security environment. This fluid environment blurs clear, legal delineation between peace, crisis, and war. 
 
"Decision-makers and defence analysts understand the importance of warfare development in maintaining the edge of an alliance system against different threats and potential adversaries." 
 
More than 50 years ago, General André Beaufre predicted an era of "increased variability" when "shaping would take over execution". 
 
Using a metaphor to describe this era and the importance of investing in warfare development and rigorous prospective analysis, he compared the analysts of that era to a surgeon who would "operate on a patient in a state of permanent and rapid growth, with no clear understanding of the anatomical topography, on a moving operating table, and with instruments ordered at least five years in advance."
 
Decision-makers and defence analysts understand the importance of warfare development in maintaining the edge of an alliance system against different threats and potential adversaries. Yet, military history is full of examples of failure to assess trends in developing concepts, technology and defence systems. 
 
Warfare development is about managing change in organizations, doctrine, and equipment. Change is inherently difficult. Even with positive intent, a myriad of elements can create roadblocks leading to friction in the change process, such as the lack of resources, interoperability, and parochial interests. The technological, economic, and psychological aspects of collective defence can unduly influence expectations. The fallacy of a "silver bullet" tends to be ever more present as swift changes in technology increase the risk of misjudging the progression of a technological evolution, which can result in overconfident nations and alliances and/or investment in technologies that rapidly become obsolete.
 
However, sound warfare development is not so much about fielding new technology as it is about ensuring a new concept and/or capability is consistently integrated across the doctrine, organization, training, leadership development, materiel, personnel, and facilities (DOTLMPF) spectrum. 
 
Integration remains a difficult task for a national defence system, as the different factors involved rarely conform to the same constraints, budgeting cycles, and chains of command.
 
As an example, the equipment procurement cycle rarely matches the defence human resources cycle. The highly political nature of national defence decisions adds to the difficulty of maintaining consistency in the implementation of change. Administrations change hands and new political powers with different agendas or areas of interest can alter or derail warfare development execution. This leads to the obvious conclusion that what is true for individual nations represents an even more daunting task for an Alliance such as NATO, the strength of which depends on interoperability, but where capability and decision cycles can vary greatly from nation to nation.
 
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The implementation of warfare development changes across different domains can prove risky in three fundamental ways: (1) the risk of overlooking necessary change; (2) the risk of overestimating change; (3) the risk of misunderstanding the ever-evolving nature of warfare.
 
As we contemplate the future, maintaining freedom of action in the Space and Cyber domains, retaining the lead in the development of man/machine interface, the exploitation of Artificial Intelligence advances, and new methods to achieve superiority in the information environment represent areas with an extreme risk to overlook critical change. 
 
Conversely, the risk of exaggerating benefits from change, failure to understand the context and applicability of change, and underestimation of contributing factors to war poses an equally dangerous threat to the consistency of defence concepts. Therefore, the goal of decisively "lifting the fog of war" through technological superiority of Western militaries largely ignored the fundamental nature of the conflicts that have been prosecuted over the last two decades.
 
Furthermore, the basic evolutionary nature of warfare represents the primary obstacle to warfare development as modeled by Edward Luttwak: "In war, one deals with an opponent who reacts. War is most emphatically not like building a bridge over a treacherous river. Dangerous as that latter enterprise might be, a river does not consciously devise novel means to wash away abutments, drown construction workers, and generally thwart the engineer."
 
Given the difficulties and risks previously mentioned, warfare development might appear an exercise in futility or wishful thinking at the Alliance level. However, ensuring that warfare development optimizes deliberate and pragmatic approaches has proven its value.
 
"Success in warfare development requires a pragmatic approach to achieve measurable results. The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) represents a unique asset to create, analyze, and implement warfare development products."
 
A symbiotic relationship exists between exercises and warfare development. Large-scale strategic/operational-level exercises enable the Alliance and participating Nations to evaluate new concepts. Additionally, these same exercises provide a mechanism to test the integration and interoperability of technology and organizational changes in the face of the most likely and most dangerous threats.
 
Exercises also represent a unique way to infuse new mindsets, organizations and concepts into headquarters and forces, without the need for real-world combat operations.
 
Fostering the symbiotic relationship between training exercises and warfare development requires a deliberate effort to resource an organization with the unique capability of creating a suitable training environment, such as the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway.
 
Successful warfare development integration rests upon balancing doctrinal analysis, concept experimentation, and close support from NATO Command and Force Structures. That integration relies upon three requirements. 
 
First, it supposes a firm grasp of current doctrine and best practices, which serves as the baseline for assessing any future development. From one headquarters to next, efforts to ensure standardization and interoperability through the mastery of doctrine and best practices are eroded by personnel turn-over, frequent reorganization, and shifting primary duties. However, the frequency and consistency of exercises mitigate this erosion.
 
Second, warfare development requires a suitable mindset across the entire chain of command, similar to that of an explorer, accepting, and at times, even welcoming failure as a means of discovery. This can often create tension because of the heavy emphasis placed on validating the readiness of headquarters and subordinate units. 
 
Finally, there is a need to tailor warfare development expectations to the needs and characteristics of a given Training Audience. Experimentation has its own biases and proves difficult at times to separate objective results of 
experimentation and subjective factors related to the operational environment and the audience participation in the experiment.
 
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Exercises provide the ideal venue to translate warfare development items into reality. They provide a series of realistic challenges and the opportunity to experiment without the risks associated with real-world combat, as exemplified in the Command Post Exercise (CPX) portion of TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2018.
 
The significant level of ambition associated with this exercise and the commitment of diverse Training Audiences enabled an in-depth study of the challenges posed by Joint Campaign Synchronization across the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
 
In the same vein, Space support challenges were successfully studied through experimentation that enabled the Space domain to reach a sufficient level of maturity to become a discipline in its own right, while sensitizing the Training Audience to the importance of maintaining freedom of action in that operational domain.
 
As the Alliance is planning increasingly higher levels of ambition over the next series of Command Post Exercises with the TRIDENT JUPITER Series, the relevance of warfare development products depends heavily on the ability to create a "controlled" environment for warfare development efforts.
 
This requires the early and deliberate integration of prospective experiments with a clear view of intended purpose, which is necessary to ensure all stakeholders are sensitized to the "learning organization" process involved in a major exercise.
 
In turn, if one considers that warfare development is an essential element of major training exercises, this requires the clarification and strengthening of the role of JWC Training Team, focused on creating the required conditions for testing and integrating new capabilities in the NATO Command and Force Structures, in close coordination with the Training Audiences.
 
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Conclusion
 
In an era of increased variability, warfare development is a major goal for the Alliance and directly affects the ability of NATO to optimize change and successfully face current and future threats.
 
Understanding the challenges, risks, and opportunities offered by warfare development across different domains will continue to represent a necessary condition as the Alliance adapts. Specifically, this adaptation relies on the use of sufficient resources, coherent structures, and adequate processes during major exercises.
 
The Joint Warfare Centre is a single organization that engages every NATO Command and Force Structure headquarters and unit throughout NATO. No greater tool e xists to ensure consistency and interoperability across the Alliance. It provides the venue to administer and implement NATO Warfare Development as well as experiment with future concepts.
 
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This is an abridged version of the original article published in Joint Warfare Centre's The Three Swords Magazine, Issue 34. The full article can be read here
 
 

By Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Sébastien Dorne, French Air Force, Subject Matter Expert CIS Cyberspace, Joint Warfare Centre

We live in a digital world in perpetual evolution where communication and information systems (CIS) are everywhere: at home, at work, on us, even in us. “Cyberspace” can be defined as the global domain created by CIS and other electronic systems, their interaction and the information that is stored, processed or transmitted in these systems. State administrations, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, companies and people are quickly accelerating their use and dependence on an increasing number of technologies and data. They are all operating in/making use of cyberspace.

In modern warfare, computers, networks, satellites, and other forms of CIS are playing a key role for NATO headquarters to command and control, monitor, target and communicate. In its operations and missions, NATO CIS are more than ever critical, enabling all processes and actions in the maritime, air, land, space and cyber domains. They constitute a critical asset to accomplish the mission. But this applies as well to all weapon systems and platforms, such as aircraft, ships and tanks. This applies by extension to all objects contained in cyberspace and used by NATO. NATO has for long established strong protections for its assets and networks. They are now considered globally and constitute the common ground of cyber warfare.

Cyber warfare, with the expansion of new technologies and the threats posed to NATO by multiple state or non-state actors, organizations and even individuals, is one area in which the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) places great focus. The integration of cyber defence as a new NATO capability in joint level exercises began in STEADFAST JUNCTURE 2011, but its development as a transformational warfare area has continued to dynamically evolve through as the cyber landscape changes and the threats, risks, and vulnerabilities morph. Cyber defence is now moving to cyberspace operations. In addition, the development of related concepts, and the maturing of the cyber DOTMLPFI (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability) strands will require continued experimentation, doctrinal development and adaptation.

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"The need for more interoperability and more realistic storylines reflecting real-world threats offer many opportunities for JWC to improve the training experience for all joint headquarters."

At the Warsaw Summit 2016, cyberspace was recognized by NATO and Allies as a domain of operations. The consequences have been significant for cyber warfare. It potentially affects, to various degrees, all activities conducted by JWC today: the planning of joint-level exercises, the development of scenarios and content (the stories made up in support of the training), simulation, media, transformational activities, doctrine development; there are very few areas that may not be impacted by this change. JWC, through a comprehensive approach, is ideally placed to integrate those changes.

Over time, cyberspace operations have become pivotal to support other activities, functions and processes. The confidentiality, the integrity and the availability (CIA) of data are more than ever to be assured in Alliance operations and missions. As for any actor in cyberspace, NATO needs to carry on its missions and trust its information in a complex, continuously evolving threat environment, in a highly contested cyberspace.

JWC incorporates these challenges in its activities with a view to offering the best training experience possible to the training audiences, and in order to contribute effectively to transformational activities and doctrine development. To that end, cyber warfare is a coordinated and synchronized effort among all JWC divisions to offer a credible and challenging contested environment mirroring real-life realities and offering to the joint commanders’ situations where they face operational dilemmas.

With the rapid evolution of cyber warfare in the last couple of years, NATO strives to adapt and transform at the same pace. The creation of the Cyber Operations Centre in SHAPE (CyOC), the development of new capabilities, the need to train with realistic cyber ranges and the necessary cooperation between Allies and NATO, or NATO and EU, have created new challenges. The need for more interoperability and more realistic storylines reflecting real-world threats offer many opportunities for JWC to improve the training experience for all joint headquarters. It will keep NATO’s joint training events up to speed with regard to cyber warfare. With a long-lasting experience in joint operational training, doctrine development and transformational activities, JWC is the ideal tool to support NATO in the evolution and adaptation to the rapidly changing cyber warfare.

By Peter M. Hutson, Capability Integration and Experimentation Analyst, Concepts, Capability Integration and Experimentation Branch, Joint Warfare Centre

NATO operates in an environment of continuous change, requiring the Alliance to rethink, reprioritise and reform in response to new risks and the evolving security landscape. As NATO has adapted its strategy, concepts, and Military Command and Force Structures over the last 15 years, Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation (HQ SACT) has been leading the Military Transformation process, within which the JWC and its Concepts, Capability Integration and Experimentation (CCI&E) Branch have been instrumental.
Over this time of rapid, and sometimes, unpredictable change, CCI&E’s core function has been to plan and carry out Transformational Activities through the integration of new concepts, maturing capabilities, and other experimentation events into the JWC-hosted exercises. Coordinating and teaming closely with key stakeholders — such as capability developers and programme management at HQ SACT, requirement owners and operators at HQ SHAPE and the Joint Force Commands as well as from nations, industry and academia — the JWC and its CCI&E Branch have ensured that training and exercises deliver Transformation in its Programme of Work.

Transformational Challenges

It is useful to consider the challenges of Transformation at the operational level in the context of the strategies and mandates laid out in the Alliance’s Strategic Concepts, Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) and the Framework for Future Alliance Operations (FFAO). As put forth in the 1999 Strategic Concept and the military implementation strategies, the Alliance is facing new risks since those of the Cold War. These risks consist of, amongst others, terrorism, complex ethnic conflicts, and proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. In addition, the fundamental tasks of crisis response operations, building partnerships, and peace support missions were added to those of security, consultation, deterrence and defence. Furthermore, the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States brought terrorism to the fore and drove major internal reforms to adapt military structures and capabilities to conform with the new tasks, which led to the setting up of the UN-mandated International Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.
Such new strategies and missions then required HQ SACT and, consequently, the JWC, to rapidly analyse and translate the new guidance into tasks that the defence planners, capability developers, and the education and training communities could act upon. For JWC, this meant adapting the Centre’s training environment, exercise scenarios and exercise and training objectives, as well as integrating new or maturing concepts and capabilities, such as the Comprehensive Approach, the Effects-Based Approach to Operations, Knowledge Development, System of Systems Analysis, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations, and the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD). Thus, for both JWC and its Training Audiences, the introduction of new concepts, experiments and capabilities also meant "changing" and adopting a different mindset — one that involved accepting risks and opportunities and recognising that Transformation requires action as a "present activity", and not as a future event.

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Military Implications

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO revised its overarching Strategic Concept (as well as the SFA and the FFAO), and thereby endorsed an updated understanding of its core purpose in line with the evolving geopolitical and strategic landscape. Collective defence remained a core task for NATO, but crisis management and cooperative security were also elevated to core tasks to stress the fact that NATO must not only protect and defend Alliance territory but also against global, transnational, or non-traditional threats that transcend fixed, conventional boundaries.
Guided by this revised strategy, as well as the military perspectives of the SFA and the FFAO, HQ SACT and the JWC promptly shifted gears to address new major themes and initiatives to adapt and transform. One example was experimentation and scrutiny of NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defence capability, and its integration into multiple exercises to inform doctrine development and operational frameworks. Another example was cyberspace, which also received much attention with the recognition of Cyber as a new domain. With the requirement for resilient, robust and secure cyber systems, NATO developed its Cyber Defence Concept and the JWC launched a multi-year Cyber Capability Integration Campaign within its collective exercise programme. The aim was to challenge the operational level of command with simulated real-world threats, as well as to facilitate the development of the DOTMLPFI (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability) for Cyber.
NATO’s Strategic Communications, or StratCom, also quickly evolved as a core function in NATO policies and operations. Derived from lessons identified from the ISAF mission and the Ukraine crisis, particular challenges consisted of how to integrate the concept of "strategic narratives" at the operational level and how to adapt to new technologies and the global increase in the use of social media within the information environment.

"Transformation and warfare development will remain central to maintaining Alliance readiness, relevance and credibility."

Addressing Future Challenges

NATO and HQ SACT continue to monitor a dynamic geopolitical landscape through the SFA and the FFAO, which have identified complex and uncertain future challenges with both risks and opportunities. Besides the continued development of the Cyber capability, HQ SACT is also focusing on the NATO operational dependencies in the Space domain and developed a highly successful and transformational three-year Space Campaign within major JWC-directed exercises. In coordination with NATO’s Space-faring nations, this high-visibility project has yielded rapid doctrinal, organisational, training and interoperability developments for NATO.
Hybrid threats are another area that the JWC integrates into its warfare development and training processes. After the Ukraine crisis and increased tensions with Russia, NATO had to rapidly confront and counter the challenges of hybrid threats and asymmetric warfare including propaganda, disinformation, cyber-attacks, economic and energy threats, and blurring of distinctions between civilians and combatants. In the JWC exercises, Training Audiences are actively challenged with such threats, while offered the opportunity to adapt doctrine, develop capabilities, and apply operational countermeasures.
Other high-visibility projects that HQ SACT and the JWC have supported over the years relate to Disablement of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) experimentation with the tasking and employment of the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance Force (NAGSF), Operations Logistics Chain Management (OLCM) capability development, information environment studies, and numerous technology projects to assist with the development of medical, logistical, and operational information systems.
Transformation is difficult, yet the potential consequences of stagnating far exceed the disruption associated with change. For the last 15 years, HQ SACT, the JWC and its CCI&E Branch have been committed to supporting and delivering change. As NATO continues to evolve in response to both complex threats and a dynamic geopolitical landscape, Transformation and warfare development will remain central to maintaining Alliance readiness, relevance and credibility.

 

Originally published in Joint Warfare Centre's 15th Anniversary Book, "Celebrating 15 Years: 2003-2018" produced by the Public Affairs Office 

 

 

By Lieutenant Colonel Michael Derksen, German Army, Head of the Scenario Branch, Joint Warfare Centre

The JWC Scenario Branch provides comprehensive and realistic scenario background and supporting documentation to the JWC-directed exercises, tailored to meet both NATO and National requirements, covering the Alliance 360° geographically. The mission of the branch is to support Allied Command Transformation (ACT), one of the two Strategic Commands at the head of NATO's Military Command Structure, in delivering training and exercise programmes to the Alliance. This is accomplished through designing and developing realistic, high-level exercise scenarios, such as SKOLKAN and OCCASUS, based on NATO’s current and future approaches to the changing, complex strategic environment.

The scenarios designed and developed by the JWC provide a credible, fictitious political, military, socio-economic, infrastructure, information and geospatial environment as well as the encompassing narrative on the political, strategic and operational levels of warfare to strengthen readiness and responsiveness and practice crisis management — one of NATO's fundamental security tasks. The narratives are relevant to the particular operational-level exercise programme, as each exercise is based upon a specific scenario. Scenario support is one of the cornerstones of the JWC’s mission portfolio, funded through a multi-million NOK annual budget within the Centre’s overall financial plan, involving contracting solutions, as most of the required non-military resources have to be acquired commercially on a regular basis.

The scope of these scenarios allows for exercises in both Article 5 collective defence and non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations mode on various levels of effort, from divisional up to multi-corps, and in all domains of the joint spectrum — Land, Sea, Air — as well as the recently added Space and Cyber dimensions. Within this broad spectrum, and in addition to the conventional spectrum of warfare, the JWC scenarios can also accommodate a wide range of modern warfare threads, such as anti-access/area denial (A2/AD); chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN); civil-military interaction, cyber defence, hybrid warfare, state- and non-state actor sponsored terrorism, etc.

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Before each exercise, military and civilian subject matter experts, in a wide variety of areas, develop the information and documentation needed to support the Training Audience with the advice and content to replicate key actors and entities during the execution phase. Focus teams for military-political, strategic and operational planning, intelligence, targeting, and geospatial development assist in channeling the information flow in order to create a realistic information environment as the source for the Training Audience’s knowledge development. As a whole, scenario support is coordinated by a small team of scenario managers who provide the interface to other critical elements and branches of the JWC’s overall exercise programme.

Scenario Branch’s first generation of settings and scenarios include two settings, which form the basis for four related scenarios. A setting, in this context, is defined as the geostrategic situation of the respective crisis region and includes a broad spectrum of relevant information on all potential exercise actors. Each setting is capable of "hosting" several scenarios, each of which describes events and circumstances that lead to the respective exercise crisis or conflict. The SKOLKAN setting, for example, is named after a fictitious but peer-level adversary located in Scandinavia, whose activities range from hybrid through low-intensity, up to full-scale, high-intensity combat campaigns. Since 2010, the JWC has developed different versions of the SKOLKAN scenario which was first used in 2012. They challenge NATO’s operational level commands in both collective defence operations of Norway and the Baltic region as well as in responding to a non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation occurring in a fictitious state in southern Scandinavia. As an example, during TRIDENT JAVELIN 2017, SKOLKAN 3 provided the scenario for NATO’s so far largest and most ambitious computer-aided Command Post Exercise during which over 4,000 participants and directing staff exercised command and control in a large-scale conflict spreading from Iceland through the North-Atlantic and Norway to the Baltic States.

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The SOROTAN setting, meanwhile, addresses NATO’s capability to conduct operations not only within or adjacent to its territory, but also in austere, conflict and peace-building regions of the world. To enable the required training and exercises in reflection of this ambition, a wide array of fictitious states has been created within the geographic contours of North-Western Africa and the Mediterranean. SOROTAN portrays a combination of state and non-state actors that openly oppose NATO, or states that have failed, or are in the process of dissolving, and states seeking NATO’s assistance. Tailored to the specific requirements of the Training Audience, these elements were combined into SOROTAN 1.0, the first scenario based on this setting, which came to life during the high-visibility, non-Article 5 exercise, TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2015.

Scenario Branch’s next generation of settings and scenarios are designed in response to NATO’s so-called 360° approach to current and future challenges. Until 2024, JWC’s Scenario Branch will develop three major settings in and around Northern and Eastern Europe, Northern Africa, the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic.

The OCCASUS setting, for example, assumes a synthetic geostrategic situation in which a fictitious peer-level opponent challenges NATO on a broad front of political, military, information and economic storylines. Geographically, this setting will host multiple scenarios in an arc from the North Atlantic to the Black Sea, allowing the exercising of single, regionally limited scenarios, or a combination of scenarios, adding up to a conflict across and around all of Europe. The scenarios will focus primarily on the operational aspects and level of collective defence operations during all stages of a potential campaign, but they will also support training on the strategic and political levels of the Alliance. OCCASUS scenarios are currently planned to be used in exercises TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2018, as well as TRIDENT JUPITER 2019, 2021 and 2022.

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In addition, the FIKSO setting will specifically reflect NATO’s approach to strategic challenges from the south, geographically ranging from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. In an approach similar to OCCASUS, the FIKSO setting will include a range of various "hot-spots" that can be combined into scenarios, as required, by the Training Audience. The FIKSO setting will concentrate on non-Article 5 operations and will include specific types of operations, such as counter-terrorism, disaster relief and peace support. FIKSO scenarios are currently planned to be used in exercises TRIDENT JUPITER 2020 and 2023.

Lastly, the North-Atlantic setting will complete the 360° circle of NATO’s approach to current and future challenges. The geographic extent of the North-Atlantic setting encompasses the Atlantic Ocean between the United States of America, North-West Africa and Europe. So far, specific parameters and requirements for the design of the setting, which will be exercised for the first time in 2024, are still being developed.

In summary, by 2024, the JWC’s Scenario Branch will have developed and delivered complex, well-structured and synthetic environments, consisting of both existing NATO and non-NATO actors and of fictitious state and non-state actors that cover most of NATO’s area of responsibility. Within this environment, the variety and design of challenging "problem sets" and the ability to combine them to create a multitude of different scenarios is critical to the flexible tailoring of Major Level Exercises in accordance with existing and emerging requirements. As a key facilitator in this, the JWC’s Scenario Branch continues to follow closely geostrategic developments and prognoses in order to allow NATO to exercise not recent, but future conflicts.

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Originally published in Joint Warfare Centre's 15th Anniversary Book, "Celebrating 15 Years: 2003-2018" produced by the Public Affairs Office

By Commander Shannon Wells, United States Navy, Staff Officer, Doctrine Support Branch, Joint Warfare Centre

Throughout history, doctrine has provided an operational foundation for governments and organisations. NATO is no different in this regard. Without well-conceived doctrine, no organisation can effectively achieve its objectives.
NATO defines doctrine as, "Fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application."
Well-respected military leaders throughout history understood the value of having guiding principles during times of conflict. Carl von Clausewitz famously said, "Principles and rules are intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference."
Doctrine provides the modern military commander with guidance on the "how", but not the "what" or "why" for virtually every aspect of military operations. In this manner, doctrine provides an ever-evolving structural framework that allows for flexibility of action in a dynamic combat environment.
NATO doctrine, as a common language for operations, is essential to interoperability. Doctrine establishes the fundamentals and guidance for employing NATO assets to achieve strategic aims.
The JWC's Doctrine Support Branch is tasked to evaluate doctrine and raise doctrine lessons identified captured during the planning and execution phases of operational-level exercises hosted and directed by the Centre.
Doctrine lessons identified take the form of doctrinal gaps and shortfalls, outdated doctrine, and contradictions between various pieces of doctrine. This work in the doctrine domain supports the mission of the JWC to ensure warfare development outputs are incorporated into collective training events and exercises. This is achieved by integrating new concepts and doctrine through the support of experimentation in joint operational-level training programmes that enhance interoperability and operational effectiveness.
Additionally, the Doctrine Support Branch routinely provides subject matter experts in support of other JWC branches during periods of high-intensity exercises. The branch also works with outside entities that use JWC facilities to conduct third-party events and workshops.

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The principles of doctrine are defined by traditional, enduring capabilities proven by best practices while incorporating contemporary insights on how these principles are applied. Although doctrine has enduring principles, it is constantly reviewed for relevance and is, therefore, evolutionary in nature.
The Doctrine Support Branch has existed in one form or another over the entire lifetime of the JWC, and during this time, the branch has sought to develop, improve, and validate doctrine as a cost-effective means of maximising interoperability between Alliance Members.
As warfare continues to evolve, so must the doctrine that guides it.
The Doctrine Support Branch will remain heavily involved in the development of future doctrine, covering areas such as Hybrid Warfare, Space Warfare, Cyber and Electronic Warfare, and Strategic Communications. These are but a few of the areas developing at a rapid pace that will shape the battlefield of the future.
Establishing and maintaining relationships with Allied doctrine custodians will ensure the JWC Doctrine Support Branch has access to the “keepers” of NATO doctrine through our ongoing effort to enhance custodian involvement in every phase of the exercise lifecycle.
This relationship building includes our involvement in doctrine writing workshops in addition to custodian involvement in exercise planning.
Additionally, the Doctrine Support Branch participates in Allied Command Transformation events that develop products such as the Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) and the Framework for Future Alliance Operations (FFAO).
These documents inform the Transformation of NATO’s military forces and provide the Alliance, national leaders and defence planners with an informed perspective of the challenges and opportunities facing the Alliance forces in the decades to come. The FFAO is a key document that supports the long-term military Transformation efforts of the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and places this long-term future into an Alliance-specific context to present NATO Bilateral Strategic Command (Bi-SC) proposals on how the Alliance might transform over the next 15 years.
Clearly, for the foreseeable future, doctrine will continue to represent the binding element that allows individual, multinational military units to come together and operate as a single force to guarantee the collective security of the Alliance.

 

Originally published in Joint Warfare Centre's 15th Anniversary Book, "Celebrating 15 Years: 2003-2018" produced by the Public Affairs Office